

Network Working Group  
Internet-Draft  
Intended status: Informational  
Expires: August 10, 2015

R. Barnes  
B. Schneier  
C. Jennings  
T. Hardie  
B. Trammell  
C. Huitema  
D. Borkmann

February 06, 2015

**Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: A Threat Model  
and Problem Statement**  
**draft-iab-privsec-confidentiality-threat-02**

Abstract

Documents published in 2013 revealed several classes of pervasive surveillance attack on Internet communications. In this document we develop a threat model that describes these pervasive attacks. We start by assuming a completely passive attacker with an interest in undetected, indiscriminate eavesdropping, then expand the threat model with a set of verified attacks that have been published. Based on this threat model, we discuss the techniques that can be employed in Internet protocol design to increase the protocols robustness to pervasive surveillance.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of [BCP 78](#) and [BCP 79](#).

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at <http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/>.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on August 10, 2015.

## Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to [BCP 78](#) and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (<http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info>) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

## 1. Introduction

Starting in June 2013, documents released to the press by Edward Snowden have revealed several operations undertaken by intelligence agencies to exploit Internet communications for intelligence purposes. These attacks were largely based on protocol vulnerabilities that were already known to exist. The attacks were nonetheless striking in their pervasive nature, both in terms of the amount of Internet communications targeted, and in terms of the diversity of attack techniques employed.

To ensure that the Internet can be trusted by users, it is necessary for the Internet technical community to address the vulnerabilities exploited in these attacks [[RFC7258](#)]. The goal of this document is to describe more precisely the threats posed by these pervasive attacks, and based on those threats, lay out the problems that need to be solved in order to secure the Internet in the face of those threats.

The remainder of this document is structured as follows. In [Section 3](#), we describe an idealized passive attacker, one which could completely undetectably compromise communications at Internet scale. In [Section 4](#), we provide a brief summary of some attacks that have been disclosed, and use these to expand the assumed capabilities of our idealized attacker. [Section 5](#) describes a threat model based on these attacks, focusing on classes of attack that have not been a focus of Internet engineering to date.



## **2. Terminology**

This document makes extensive use of standard security and privacy terminology; see [[RFC4949](#)] and [[RFC6973](#)]. Terms used from [[RFC6973](#)] include Eavesdropper, Observer, Initiator, Intermediary, Recipient, Attack (in a privacy context), Correlation, Fingerprint, Traffic Analysis, and Identifiability (and related terms). In addition, we use a few terms that are specific to the attacks discussed here:

**Passive Attack:** In this document, the term passive attack is used with respect to the traffic stream: a passive attack does not modify the packets in the traffic stream between two endpoints, modify the treatment of packets in the traffic stream (e.g. delay, routing), or add or remove packets in the traffic stream. Passive attacks are undetectable from the endpoints.

**Active Attack:** In contrast to a passive attack, an active attack may modify a traffic stream, at the cost of possible detection at the endpoints.

**Pervasive Attack:** An attack on Internet communications that makes use of access at a large number of points in the network, or otherwise provides the attacker with access to a large amount of Internet traffic; see [[RFC7258](#)]

**Observation:** Information collected directly from communications by an eavesdropper or observer. For example, the knowledge that <alice@example.com> sent a message to <bob@example.com> via SMTP taken from the headers of an observed SMTP message would be an observation.

**Inference:** Information extracted from analysis of information collected directly from communications by an eavesdropper or observer. For example, the knowledge that a given web page was accessed by a given IP address, by comparing the size in octets of measured network flow records to fingerprints derived from known sizes of linked resources on the web servers involved, would be an inference.

**Collaborator:** An entity that is a legitimate participant in a communication, but who deliberately provides information about that interaction to an attacker.

**Unwitting Collaborator:** An entity that is a legitimate participant in a communication, and who is the source of information obtained by the attacker without the entity's consent or intention, because the attacker has exploited some technology used by the entity.



Key Exfiltration: The transmission of keying material for an encrypted communication from a collaborator, deliberately or unwittingly, to an attacker

Content Exfiltration: The transmission of the content of a communication from a collaborator, deliberately or unwittingly, to an attacker

### **3. An Idealized Pervasive Passive Attacker**

In considering the threat posed by pervasive surveillance, we begin by defining an idealized pervasive passive attacker. While this attacker is less capable than those which we now know to have compromised the Internet from press reports, as elaborated in [Section 4](#), it does set a lower bound on the capabilities of an attacker interested in indiscriminate passive surveillance while interested in remaining undetectable. We note that, prior to the Snowden revelations in 2013, the assumptions of attacker capability presented here would be considered on the border of paranoia outside the network security community.

Our idealized attacker is an indiscriminate eavesdropper on an Internet-attached computer network that:

- o can observe every packet of all communications at any hop in any network path between an initiator and a recipient;
- o can observe data at rest in any intermediate system between the endpoints controlled by the initiator and recipient; and
- o can share information with other such attackers; but
- o takes no other action with respect to these communications (i.e., blocking, modification, injection, etc.).

The techniques available to our ideal attacker are direct observation and inference. Direct observation involves taking information directly from eavesdropped communications - e.g., URLs identifying content or email addresses identifying individuals from application-layer headers. Inference, on the other hand, involves analyzing eavesdropped information to derive new information from it; e.g., searching for application or behavioral fingerprints in observed traffic to derive information about the observed individual from them, in absence of directly-observed sources of the same information. The use of encryption to protect confidentiality is generally enough to prevent direct observation of unencrypted content, assuming uncompromised encryption implementations and key material. However, it provides less complete protection against



inference, especially inference based only on unprotected portions of communications (e.g. IP and TCP headers for TLS [[RFC5246](#)]).

### **3.1. Information subject to direct observation**

Protocols which do not encrypt their payload make the entire content of the communication available to the idealized attacker along their path. Following the advice in [[RFC3365](#)], most such protocols have a secure variant which encrypts payload for confidentiality, and these secure variants are seeing ever-wider deployment. A noteworthy exception is DNS [[RFC1035](#)], as DNSSEC [[RFC4033](#)] does not have confidentiality as a requirement. This implies that, in the absence of changes to the protocol as presently under development in the DPRIVE working group, all DNS queries and answers generated by the activities of any protocol are available to the attacker.

Protocols which imply the storage of some data at rest in intermediaries (e.g. SMTP [[RFC5321](#)]) leave this data subject to observation by an attacker that has compromised these intermediaries, unless the data is encrypted end-to-end by the application layer protocol, or the implementation uses an encrypted store for this data.

### **3.2. Information useful for inference**

Inference is information extracted from later analysis of an observed or eavesdropped communication, and/or correlation of observed or eavesdropped information with information available from other sources. Indeed, most useful inference performed by the attacker falls under the rubric of correlation. The simplest example of this is the observation of DNS queries and answers from and to a source and correlating those with IP addresses with which that source communicates. This can give access to information otherwise not available from encrypted application payloads (e.g., the Host: HTTP/1.1 request header when HTTP is used with TLS).

Protocols which encrypt their payload using an application- or transport-layer encryption scheme (e.g. TLS) still expose all the information in their network and transport layer headers to the attacker, including source and destination addresses and ports. IPsec ESP[[RFC4303](#)] further encrypts the transport-layer headers, but still leaves IP address information unencrypted; in tunnel mode, these addresses correspond to the tunnel endpoints. Features of the cryptographic protocols themselves, e.g. the TLS session identifier, may leak information that can be used for correlation and inference. While this information is much less semantically rich than the application payload, it can still be useful for the inferring an individual's activities.





Inference can also leverage information obtained from sources other than direct traffic observation. Geolocation databases, for example, have been developed map IP addresses to a location, in order to provide location-aware services such as targeted advertising. This location information is often of sufficient resolution that it can be used to draw further inferences toward identifying or profiling an individual.

Social media provide another source of more or less publicly accessible information. This information can be extremely semantically rich, including information about an individual's location, associations with other individuals and groups, and activities. Further, this information is generally contributed and curated voluntarily by the individuals themselves: it represents information which the individuals are not necessarily interested in protecting for privacy reasons. However, correlation of this social networking data with information available from direct observation of network traffic allows the creation of a much richer picture of an individual's activities than either alone.

We note with some alarm that there is little that can be done at protocol design time to limit such correlation by the attacker, and that the existence of such data sources in many cases greatly complicates the problem of protecting privacy by hardening protocols alone.

### **3.3. An illustration of an ideal passive attack**

To illustrate how capable the idealized attacker is even given its limitations, we explore the non-anonymity of encrypted IP traffic in this section. Here we examine in detail some inference techniques for associating a set of addresses with an individual, in order to illustrate the difficulty of defending communications against our idealized attacker. Here, the basic problem is that information radiated even from protocols which have no obvious connection with personal data can be correlated with other information which can paint a very rich behavioral picture, that only takes one unprotected link in the chain to associate with an identity.

#### **3.3.1. Analysis of IP headers**

Internet traffic can be monitored by tapping Internet links, or by installing monitoring tools in Internet routers. Of course, a single link or a single router only provides access to a fraction of the global Internet traffic. However, monitoring a number of high capacity links or a set of routers placed at strategic locations provides access to a good sampling of Internet traffic.



Tools like IPFIX [[RFC7011](#)] allow administrators to acquire statistics about sequences of packets with some common properties that pass through a network device. The most common set of properties used in flow measurement is the "five-tuple" of source and destination addresses, protocol type, and source and destination ports. These statistics are commonly used for network engineering, but could certainly be used for other purposes.

Let's assume for a moment that IP addresses can be correlated to specific services or specific users. Analysis of the sequences of packets will quickly reveal which users use what services, and also which users engage in peer-to-peer connections with other users. Analysis of traffic variations over time can be used to detect increased activity by particular users, or in the case of peer-to-peer connections increased activity within groups of users.

### **3.3.2. Correlation of IP addresses to user identities**

The correlation of IP addresses with specific users can be done in various ways. For example, tools like reverse DNS lookup can be used to retrieve the DNS names of servers. Since the addresses of servers tend to be quite stable and since servers are relatively less numerous than users, an attacker could easily maintain its own copy of the DNS for well-known or popular servers, to accelerate such lookups.

On the other hand, the reverse lookup of IP addresses of users is generally less informative. For example, a lookup of the address currently used by one author's home network returns a name of the form "c-192-000-002-033.hsd1.wa.comcast.net". This particular type of reverse DNS lookup generally reveals only coarse-grained location or provider information, equivalent to that available from geolocation databases.

In many jurisdictions, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are required to provide identification on a case by case basis of the "owner" of a specific IP address for law enforcement purposes. This is a reasonably expedient process for targeted investigations, but pervasive surveillance requires something more efficient. This provides an incentive for the attacker to secure the cooperation of the ISP in order to automate this correlation.

### **3.3.3. Monitoring messaging clients for IP address correlation**

Even if the ISP does not cooperate, user identity can often be obtained via inference. POP3 [[RFC1939](#)] and IMAP [[RFC3501](#)] are used to retrieve mail from mail servers, while a variant of SMTP is used to submit messages through mail servers. IMAP connections originate



from the client, and typically start with an authentication exchange in which the client proves its identity by answering a password challenge. The same holds for the SIP protocol [[RFC3261](#)] and many instant messaging services operating over the Internet using proprietary protocols.

The username is directly observable if any of these protocols operate in cleartext; the username can then be directly associated with the source address.

#### **3.3.4. Retrieving IP addresses from mail headers**

SMTP [[RFC5321](#)] requires that each successive SMTP relay adds a "Received" header to the mail headers. The purpose of these headers is to enable audit of mail transmission, and perhaps to distinguish between regular mail and spam. Here is an extract from the headers of a message recently received from the "perpass" mailing list:

```
"Received: from 192-000-002-044.zone13.example.org (HELO
?192.168.1.100?) (xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx) by lvps192-000-002-219.example.net
with ESMTPSA (DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA encrypted, authenticated); 27 Oct
2013 21:47:14 +0100 Message-ID: <526D7BD2.7070908@example.org> Date:
Sun, 27 Oct 2013 20:47:14 +0000 From: Some One <some.one@example.org>
"
```

This is the first "Received" header attached to the message by the first SMTP relay; for privacy reasons, the field values have been anonymized. We learn here that the message was submitted by "Some One" on October 27, from a host behind a NAT (192.168.1.100) [[RFC1918](#)] that used the IP address 192.0.2.44. The information remained in the message, and is accessible by all recipients of the "perpass" mailing list, or indeed by any attacker that sees at least one copy of the message.

An attacker that can observe sufficient email traffic can regularly update the mapping between public IP addresses and individual email identities. Even if the SMTP traffic was encrypted on submission and relaying, the attacker can still receive a copy of public mailing lists like "perpass".

#### **3.3.5. Tracking address usage with web cookies**

Many web sites only encrypt a small fraction of their transactions. A popular pattern is to use HTTPS for the login information, and then use a "cookie" to associate following clear-text transactions with the user's identity. Cookies are also used by various advertisement services to quickly identify the users and serve them with "personalized" advertisements. Such cookies are particularly useful



if the advertisement services want to keep tracking the user across multiple sessions that may use different IP addresses.

As cookies are sent in clear text, an attacker can build a database that associates cookies to IP addresses for non-HTTPS traffic. If the IP address is already identified, the cookie can be linked to the user identify. After that, if the same cookie appears on a new IP address, the new IP address can be immediately associated with the pre-determined identity.

#### **3.3.6. Graph-based approaches to address correlation**

An attacker can track traffic from an IP address not yet associated with an individual to various public services (e.g. websites, mail servers, game servers), and exploit patterns in the observed traffic to correlate this address with other addresses that show similar patterns. For example, any two addresses that show connections to the same IMAP or webmail services, the same set of favorite websites, and game servers at similar times of day may be associated with the same individual. Correlated addresses can then be tied to an individual through one of the techniques above, walking the "network graph" to expand the set of attributable traffic.

#### **3.3.7. Tracking of MAC Addresses**

Moving back down the stack, technologies like Ethernet or Wi-Fi use MAC Addresses to identify link-level destinations. MAC Addresses assigned according to IEEE-802 standards are unique to the device. If the link is publicly accessible, an attacker can track it. For example, the attacker can track the wireless traffic at public Wi-Fi networks. Simple devices can monitor the traffic, and reveal which MAC Addresses are present. If the network does not use some form of Wi-Fi encryption, or if the attacker can access the decrypted traffic, the analysis will also provide the correlation between MAC Addresses and IP addresses. Additional monitoring using techniques exposed in the previous sections will reveal the correlation between MAC Addresses, IP Addresses, and user identity.

Given that large-scale databases of the MAC addresses of wireless access points for geolocation purposes have been known to exist for some time, the attacker could easily build a database linking MAC Addresses and device or user identities, and use it to track the movement of devices and of their owners.





#### **4. Reported Instances of Large-Scale Attacks**

The situation in reality is more bleak than that suggested by an analysis of our idealized attacker. Through revelations of sensitive documents in several media outlets, the Internet community has been made aware of several intelligence activities conducted by US and UK national intelligence agencies, particularly the US National Security Agency (NSA) and the UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). These documents have revealed methods that these agencies use to attack Internet applications and obtain sensitive user information.

First, they have confirmed that these agencies have capabilities in line with those of our idealized attacker, though the large-scale passive collection of Internet traffic [[pass1](#)][[pass2](#)][[pass3](#)][[pass4](#)]. For example: - The NSA XKEYSCORE system accesses data from multiple access points and searches for "selectors" such as email addresses, at the scale of tens of terabytes of data per day. - The GCHQ Tempora system appears to have access to around 1,500 major cables passing through the UK. - The NSA MUSCULAR program tapped cables between data centers belonging to major service providers. - Several programs appear to perform wide-scale collection of cookies in web traffic and location data from location-aware portable devices such as smartphones.

However, the capabilities described go beyond those available to our idealized attacker, including:

- o Decryption of TLS-protected Internet sessions [[dec1](#)][[dec2](#)][[dec3](#)]. For example, the NSA BULLRUN project appears to have had a budget of around \$250M per year to undermine encryption through multiple approaches.
- o Insertion of NSA devices as a man-in-the-middle of Internet transactions [[TOR1](#)][[TOR2](#)]. For example, the NSA QUANTUM system appears to use several different techniques to hijack HTTP connections, ranging from DNS response injection to HTTP 302 redirects.
- o Direct acquisition of bulk data and metadata from service providers [[dir1](#)][[dir2](#)][[dir3](#)]. For example, the NSA PRISM program provides the agency with access to many types of user data (e.g., email, chat, VoIP).
- o Use of implants (covert modifications or malware) to undermine security and anonymity features [[dec2](#)][[TOR1](#)][[TOR2](#)]. For example:



- \* NSA appears to use the QUANTUM man-in-the-middle system to direct users to a FOXACID server, which delivers an implant to compromise the browser of a user of the Tor anonymous communications network.
- \* The BULLRUN program mentioned above includes the addition of covert modifications to software as one means to undermine encryption.
- \* There is also some suspicion that NSA modifications to the DUAL\_EC\_DRBG random number generator were made to ensure that keys generated using that generator could be predicted by NSA. These suspicions have been reinforced by reports that RSA Security was paid roughly \$10M to make DUAL\_EC\_DRBG the default in their products.

We use the term "pervasive attack" [[RFC7258](#)] to collectively describe these operations. The term "pervasive" is used because the attacks are designed to indiscriminately gather as much data as possible and to apply selective analysis on targets after the fact. This means that all, or nearly all, Internet communications are targets for these attacks. To achieve this scale, the attacks are physically pervasive; they affect a large number of Internet communications. They are pervasive in content, consuming and exploiting any information revealed by the protocol. And they are pervasive in technology, exploiting many different vulnerabilities in many different protocols.

It's important to note that although the attacks mentioned above were executed by NSA and GCHQ, there are many other organizations that can mount pervasive surveillance attacks. Because of the resources required to achieve pervasive scale, these attacks are most commonly undertaken by nation-state actors. For example, the Chinese Internet filtering system known as the "Great Firewall of China" uses several techniques that are similar to the QUANTUM program, and which have a high degree of pervasiveness with regard to the Internet in China.

## 5. Threat Model

Given these disclosures, we must consider a broader threat model.

Pervasive surveillance aims to collect information across a large number of Internet communications, analyzing the collected communications to identify information of interest within individual communications, or inferring information from correlated communications. This analysis sometimes benefits from decryption of encrypted communications and deanonymization of anonymized communications. As a result, these attackers desire both access to



the bulk of Internet traffic and to the keying material required to decrypt any traffic that has been encrypted. Even if keys are not available, note that the presence of a communication and the fact that it is encrypted may both be inputs to an analysis, even if the attacker cannot decrypt the communication.

The attacks listed above highlight new avenues both for access to traffic and for access to relevant encryption keys. They further indicate that the scale of surveillance is sufficient to provide a general capability to cross-correlate communications, a threat not previously thought to be relevant at the scale of the Internet.

**5.1. Attacker Capabilities**

Attack Class	Capability
Passive observation	Directly capture data in transit
Passive inference	Infer from reduced/encrypted data
Active	Manipulate / inject data in transit
Static key exfiltration	Obtain key material once / rarely
Dynamic key exfiltration	Obtain per-session key material
Content exfiltration	Access data at rest

Security analyses of Internet protocols commonly consider two classes of attacker: Passive attackers, who can simply listen in on communications as they transit the network, and active attackers, who can modify or delete packets in addition to simply collecting them.

In the context of pervasive passive surveillance, these attacks take on an even greater significance. In the past, these attackers were often assumed to operate near the edge of the network, where attacks can be simpler. For example, in some LANs, it is simple for any node to engage in passive listening to other nodes' traffic or inject packets to accomplish active attacks. However, as we now know, both passive and active attacks are undertaken by pervasive attackers closer to the core of the network, greatly expanding the scope and capability of the attacker.

Eavesdropping and observation at a larger scale make passive inference attacks easier to carry out: a passive attacker with access to a large portion of the Internet can analyze collected traffic to



create a much more detailed view of individual behavior than an attacker that collects at a single point. Even the usual claim that encryption defeats passive attackers is weakened, since a pervasive passive attacker can infer relationships from correlations over large numbers of sessions, e.g., pairing encrypted sessions with unencrypted sessions from the same host, or performing traffic fingerprinting between known and unknown encrypted sessions. Reports on the NSA XKEYSCORE system would indicate it is an example of such an attacker.

A pervasive active attacker likewise has capabilities beyond those of a localized active attacker. Active attacks are often limited by network topology, for example by a requirement that the attacker be able to see a targeted session as well as inject packets into it. A pervasive active attacker with access at multiple points within the core of the Internet is able to overcome these topological limitations and perform attacks over a much broader scope. Being positioned in the core of the network rather than the edge can also enable a pervasive active attacker to reroute targeted traffic, amplifying the ability to perform both eavesdropping and traffic injection. Pervasive active attackers can also benefit from pervasive passive collection to identify vulnerable hosts.

While not directly related to pervasiveness, attackers that are in a position to mount a pervasive active attack are also often in a position to subvert authentication, a traditional protection against such attacks. Authentication in the Internet is often achieved via trusted third party authorities such as the Certificate Authorities (CAs) that provide web sites with authentication credentials. An attacker with sufficient resources may also be able to induce an authority to grant credentials for an identity of the attacker's choosing. If the parties to a communication will trust multiple authorities to certify a specific identity, this attack may be mounted by suborning any one of the authorities (the proverbial "weakest link"). Subversion of authorities in this way can allow an active attack to succeed in spite of an authentication check.

Beyond these three classes (observation, inference, and active), reports on the BULLRUN effort to defeat encryption and the PRISM effort to obtain data from service providers suggest three more classes of attack:

- o Static key exfiltration
- o Dynamic key exfiltration
- o Content exfiltration





These attacks all rely on a collaborator providing the attacker with some information, either keys or data. These attacks have not traditionally been considered in scope for the Security Considerations sections of IETF protocols, as they occur outside the protocol.

The term "key exfiltration" refers to the transfer of keying material for an encrypted communication from the collaborator to the attacker. By "static", we mean that the transfer of keys happens once, or rarely, typically of a long-lived key. For example, this case would cover a web site operator that provides the private key corresponding to its HTTPS certificate to an intelligence agency.

"Dynamic" key exfiltration, by contrast, refers to attacks in which the collaborator delivers keying material to the attacker frequently, e.g., on a per-session basis. This does not necessarily imply frequent communications with the attacker; the transfer of keying material may be virtual. For example, if an endpoint were modified in such a way that the attacker could predict the state of its pseudorandom number generator, then the attacker would be able to derive per-session keys even without per-session communications.

Finally, content exfiltration is the attack in which the collaborator simply provides the attacker with the desired data or metadata. Unlike the key exfiltration cases, this attack does not require the attacker to capture the desired data as it flows through the network. The risk is to data at rest as opposed to data in transit. This increases the scope of data that the attacker can obtain, since the attacker can access historical data - the attacker does not have to be listening at the time the communication happens.

Exfiltration attacks can be accomplished via attacks against one of the parties to a communication, i.e., by the attacker stealing the keys or content rather than the party providing them willingly. In these cases, the party may not be aware that they are collaborating, at least at a human level. Rather, the subverted technical assets are "collaborating" with the attacker (by providing keys/content) without their owner's knowledge or consent.

Any party that has access to encryption keys or unencrypted data can be a collaborator. While collaborators are typically the endpoints of a communication (with encryption securing the links), intermediaries in an unencrypted communication can also facilitate content exfiltration attacks as collaborators by providing the attacker access to those communications. For example, documents describing the NSA PRISM program claim that NSA is able to access user data directly from servers, where it is stored unencrypted. In these cases, the operator of the server would be a collaborator, if



an unwitting one. By contrast, in the NSA MUSCULAR program, a set of collaborators enabled attackers to access the cables connecting data centers used by service providers such as Google and Yahoo. Because communications among these data centers were not encrypted, the collaboration by an intermediate entity allowed NSA to collect unencrypted user data.

5.2. Attacker Costs

Attack Class	Cost / Risk to Attacker
Passive observation	Passive data access
Passive inference	Passive data access + processing
Active	Active data access + processing
Static key exfiltration	One-time interaction
Dynamic key exfiltration	Ongoing interaction / code change
Content exfiltration	Ongoing, bulk interaction

Each of the attack types discussed in the previous section entails certain costs and risks. These costs differ by attack, and can be helpful in guiding response to pervasive attack.

Depending on the attack, the attacker may be exposed to several types of risk, ranging from simply losing access to arrest or prosecution. In order for any of these negative consequences to occur, however, the attacker must first be discovered and identified. So the primary risk we focus on here is the risk of discovery and attribution.

A passive attack is the simplest to mount in some ways. The base requirement is that the attacker obtain physical access to a communications medium and extract communications from it. For example, the attacker might tap a fiber-optic cable, acquire a mirror port on a switch, or listen to a wireless signal. The need for these taps to have physical access or proximity to a link exposes the attacker to the risk that the taps will be discovered. For example, a fiber tap or mirror port might be discovered by network operators noticing increased attenuation in the fiber or a change in switch configuration. Of course, passive attacks may be accomplished with the cooperation of the network operator, in which case there is a risk that the attacker's interactions with the network operator will be exposed.



In many ways, the costs and risks for an active attack are similar to those for a passive attack, with a few additions. An active attacker requires more robust network access than a passive attacker, since for example they will often need to transmit data as well as receiving it. In the wireless example above, the attacker would need to act as an transmitter as well as receiver, greatly increasing the probability the attacker will be discovered (e.g., using direction-finding technology). Active attacks are also much more observable at higher layers of the network. For example, an active attacker that attempts to use a mis-issued certificate could be detected via Certificate Transparency [[RFC6962](#)].

In terms of raw implementation complexity, passive attacks require only enough processing to extract information from the network and store it. Active attacks, by contrast, often depend on winning race conditions to inject packets into active connections. So active attacks in the core of the network require processing hardware to that can operate at line speed (roughly 100Gbps to 1Tbps in the core) to identify opportunities for attack and insert attack traffic in a high-volume traffic.

Key exfiltration attacks rely on passive attack for access to encrypted data, with the collaborator providing keys to decrypt the data. So the attacker undertakes the cost and risk of a passive attack, as well as additional risk of discovery via the interactions that the attacker has with the collaborator.

In this sense, static exfiltration has a lower risk profile than dynamic. In the static case, the attacker need only interact with the collaborator a small number of times, possibly only once, say to exchange a private key. In the dynamic case, the attacker must have continuing interactions with the collaborator. As noted above these interactions may real, such as in-person meetings, or virtual, such as software modifications that render keys available to the attacker. Both of these types of interactions introduce a risk that they will be discovered, e.g., by employees of the collaborator organization noticing suspicious meetings or suspicious code changes.

Content exfiltration has a similar risk profile to dynamic key exfiltration. In a content exfiltration attack, the attacker saves the cost and risk of conducting a passive attack. The risk of discovery through interactions with the collaborator, however, is still present, and may be higher. The content of a communication is obviously larger than the key used to encrypt it, often by several orders of magnitude. So in the content exfiltration case, the interactions between the collaborator and the attacker need to be much higher-bandwidth than in the key exfiltration cases, with a corresponding increase in the risk that this high-bandwidth channel will be discovered.



It should also be noted that in these latter three exfiltration cases, the collaborator also undertakes a risk that his collaboration with the attacker will be discovered. Thus the attacker may have to incur additional cost in order to convince the collaborator to participate in the attack. Likewise, the scope of these attacks is limited to case where the attacker can convince a collaborator to participate. If the attacker is a national government, for example, it may be able to compel participation within its borders, but have a much more difficult time recruiting foreign collaborators.

As noted above, the collaborator in an exfiltration attack can be unwitting; the attacker can steal keys or data to enable the attack. In some ways, the risks of this approach are similar to the case of an active collaborator. In the static case, the attacker needs to steal information from the collaborator once; in the dynamic case, the attacker needs to continued presence inside the collaborators systems. The main difference is that the risk in this case is of automated discovery (e.g., by intrusion detection systems) rather than discovery by humans.

## **6. Security Considerations**

This document describes a threat model for pervasive surveillance attacks. Mitigations are to be given in a future document.

## **7. IANA Considerations**

This document has no actions for IANA.

## **8. Acknowledgements**

Thanks to Dave Thaler for the list of attacks and taxonomy; to Security Area Directors Stephen Farrell, Sean Turner, and Kathleen Moriarty for starting and managing the IETF's discussion on pervasive attack; and to Stephan Neuhaus, Mark Townsley, Chris Inacio, Evangelos Halepolidis, Bjoern Hoehrmann, Aziz Mohaisen, as well as the IAB Privacy and Security Program, for their input.

## **9. References**

### **9.1. Normative References**

[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols", [RFC 6973](#), July 2013.





## 9.2. Informative References

- [pass1] The Guardian, "How the NSA is still harvesting your online data", 2013,  
<<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/27/nsa-online-metadata-collection>>.
- [pass2] The Guardian, "NSA's Prism surveillance program: how it works and what it can do", 2013,  
<<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-prism-server-collection-facebook-google>>.
- [pass3] The Guardian, "XKeyscore: NSA tool collects 'nearly everything a user does on the internet'", 2013,  
<<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data>>.
- [pass4] The Guardian, "How does GCHQ's internet surveillance work?", n.d., <<http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/how-does-gchq-internet-surveillance-work>>.
- [dec1] The New York Times, "N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web", 2013,  
<<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html>>.
- [dec2] The Guardian, "Project Bullrun - classification guide to the NSA's decryption program", 2013,  
<<http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/05/nsa-project-bullrun-classification-guide>>.
- [dec3] The Guardian, "Revealed: how US and UK spy agencies defeat internet privacy and security", 2013,  
<<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security>>.
- [TOR] The Tor Project, "Tor", 2013,  
<<https://www.torproject.org/>>.
- [TOR1] Schneier, B., "How the NSA Attacks Tor/Firefox Users With QUANTUM and FOXACID", 2013,  
<[https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/how\\_the\\_nsa\\_att.html](https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/how_the_nsa_att.html)>.
- [TOR2] The Guardian, "'Tor Stinks' presentation - read the full document", 2013,  
<<http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/tor-stinks-nsa-presentation-document>>.



- [dir1] The Guardian, "NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily", 2013,  
<<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order>>.
- [dir2] The Guardian, "NSA Prism program taps in to user data of Apple, Google and others", 2013,  
<<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data>>.
- [dir3] The Guardian, "Sigint - how the NSA collaborates with technology companies", 2013,  
<<http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/05/sigint-nsa-collaborates-technology-companies>>.
- [secure] Schneier, B., "NSA surveillance: A guide to staying secure", 2013,  
<<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-how-to-remain-secure-surveillance>>.
- [snowden] Technology Review, "NSA Leak Leaves Crypto-Math Intact but Highlights Known Workarounds", 2013,  
<<http://www.technologyreview.com/news/519171/nsa-leak-leaves-crypto-math-intact-but-highlights-known-workarounds/>>.
- [key-recovery]  
Golle, P., "The Design and Implementation of Protocol-Based Hidden Key Recovery", 2003,  
<<http://crypto.stanford.edu/~pgolle/papers/escrow.pdf>>.
- [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and specification", STD 13, [RFC 1035](#), November 1987.
- [RFC1918] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot, G., and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", [BCP 5](#), [RFC 1918](#), February 1996.
- [RFC1939] Myers, J. and M. Rose, "Post Office Protocol - Version 3", STD 53, [RFC 1939](#), May 1996.
- [RFC2015] Elkins, M., "MIME Security with Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)", [RFC 2015](#), October 1996.
- [RFC2821] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", [RFC 2821](#), April 2001.



- [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", [RFC 3261](#), June 2002.
- [RFC3365] Schiller, J., "Strong Security Requirements for Internet Engineering Task Force Standard Protocols", [BCP 61](#), [RFC 3365](#), August 2002.
- [RFC3501] Crispin, M., "INTERNET MESSAGE ACCESS PROTOCOL - VERSION 4rev1", [RFC 3501](#), March 2003.
- [RFC3851] Ramsdell, B., "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.1 Message Specification", [RFC 3851](#), July 2004.
- [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", [RFC 4033](#), March 2005.
- [RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol", [RFC 4301](#), December 2005.
- [RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", [RFC 4303](#), December 2005.
- [RFC4306] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", [RFC 4306](#), December 2005.
- [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", [RFC 4949](#), August 2007.
- [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", [RFC 5246](#), August 2008.
- [RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", [RFC 5321](#), October 2008.
- [RFC5655] Trammell, B., Boschi, E., Mark, L., Zseby, T., and A. Wagner, "Specification of the IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) File Format", [RFC 5655](#), October 2009.
- [RFC5750] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Certificate Handling", [RFC 5750](#), January 2010.
- [RFC6120] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core", [RFC 6120](#), March 2011.



- [RFC6962] Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate Transparency", [RFC 6962](#), June 2013.
- [RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA", [RFC 6698](#), August 2012.
- [RFC7011] Claise, B., Trammell, B., and P. Aitken, "Specification of the IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX) Protocol for the Exchange of Flow Information", STD 77, [RFC 7011](#), September 2013.
- [RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack", [BCP 188](#), [RFC 7258](#), May 2014.

#### Authors' Addresses

Richard Barnes

Email: [rlb@ipv.sx](mailto:rlb@ipv.sx)

Bruce Schneier

Email: [schneier@schneier.com](mailto:schneier@schneier.com)

Cullen Jennings

Email: [fluffy@cisco.com](mailto:fluffy@cisco.com)

Ted Hardie

Email: [ted.ietf@gmail.com](mailto:ted.ietf@gmail.com)

Brian Trammell

Email: [ietf@trammell.ch](mailto:ietf@trammell.ch)

Christian Huitema

Email: [huitema@huitema.net](mailto:huitema@huitema.net)





Daniel Borkmann

Email: [dborkman@redhat.com](mailto:dborkman@redhat.com)