F. Gont IPv6 maintenance Working Group (6man) SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH Internet-Draft Updates: <u>2464</u>, <u>2467</u>, <u>2470</u>, 2491, 2492, A. Cooper <u>2497</u>, <u>2590</u>, <u>3146</u>, <u>3315</u>, <u>3572</u>, Cisco 4291, 4338, 4391, 5072, 5121 D. Thaler (if approved) Microsoft Intended status: Standards Track W. Liu Expires: August 20, 2016 Huawei Technologies

Recommendation on Stable IPv6 Interface Identifiers draft-ietf-6man-default-iids-10

Abstract

This document changes the default Interface Identifier generation scheme for SLAAC to that specified in RFC7217, and recommends against embedding link-layer addresses in IPv6 Interface Identifiers. It formally updates RFC2464, RFC2470, RFC2491, RFC2492, RFC2497, RFC3146, RFC4291, RFC4391, RFC5072, and RFC5121, by removing the text in these RFCs that required the IPv6 Interface Identifiers to be derived from the underlying link-layer address, and replacing the aforementioned text with a pointer to this document. Additionally, this document updates RFC3315 by specifying additional requirements on the generation of Interface Identifiers used in Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol version 6 (DHCPv6). It also provides advice to system administrators who employ manual configuration.

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1. Introduction

[RFC4862] specifies Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) for IPv6 [RFC2460], which typically results in hosts configuring one or more "stable" addresses composed of a network prefix advertised by a local router, and an Interface Identifier (IID) [RFC4291] that typically embeds a link-layer address (e.g., an IEEE LAN MAC address).

In some network technologies and adaptation layers, the use of an IID based on a link-layer address may offer some advantages. For example, the IP-over-IEEE802.15.4 standard in [RFC6775] allows for compression of IPv6 addresses when the IID is based on the underlying link-layer address.

The security and privacy implications of embedding a link-layer address in an IPv6 IID have been known for some time now, and are

discussed in great detail in
[I-D.ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy]; they include:

- o Network activity correlation
- o Location tracking
- o Address scanning
- o Device-specific vulnerability exploitation

Some popular IPv6 implementations have already deviated from the traditional stable IID generation scheme to mitigate the aforementioned security and privacy implications [Microsoft].

As a result of the aforementioned issues, this document changes the default Interface Identifier generation scheme for SLAAC to that specified in [RFC7217], and recommends against embedding link-layer addresses in IPv6 Interface Identifiers, such that the aforementioned issues are mitigated.

NOTE: [RFC4291] defines the "Modified EUI-64 format" for IIDs.

Appendix A of [RFC4291] then describes how to transform an IEEE
EUI-64 identifier, or an IEEE 802 48-bit MAC address from which an
EUI-64 identifier is derived, into an IID in the Modified EUI-64
format.

Finally this document updates [RFC3315] by specifying additional requirements on the generation of Interface Identifiers used in Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol version 6 (DHCPv6), and also provides advice to system administrators who employ manual configuration.

2. Terminology

Stable address:

An address that does not vary over time within the same network (as defined in [I-D.ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy]).

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

3. Generation of IPv6 Interface Identifiers with SLAAC

Link layers MUST define a mechanism that provides mitigation of the security and privacy implications discussed in <u>Section 1</u>. Such mechanism MUST meet the following requirements:

- 1. The resulting Interface Identifiers remain stable for each prefix used with SLAAC within each subnet for the same network interface. That is, the algorithm generates the same Interface Identifier when configuring an address (for the same interface) belonging to the same prefix within the same subnet
- 2. The resulting Interface Identifiers must change when addresses are configured for different prefixes. That is, if different autoconfiguration prefixes are used to configure addresses for the same network interface card, the resulting Interface Identifiers must be (statistically) different. This means that, given two addresses, it must be difficult for an outside entity to tell whether the addresses have been generated by the same host.
- It must be difficult for an outside entity to predict the Interface Identifiers that will be generated by the algorithm, even with knowledge of the Interface Identifiers generated for configuring other addresses.
- 4. The resulting Interface Identifiers must be semantically opaque.

Nodes SHOULD implement and employ [RFC7217] as the default scheme for generating stable IPv6 addresses with SLAAC. A link layer MAY also define a mechanism that is more efficient and does not comply with the aforementioned requirements. The choice of whether to enable the security- and privacy-preserving mechanism or not SHOULD be configurable in such a case.

By default, nodes SHOULD NOT employ IPv6 address generation schemes that embed the underlying link-layer address in the IID. In particular, this document RECOMMENDS that nodes do not generate IIDs with the schemes specified in [RFC2464], [RFC2467], [RFC2470], [RFC2491], [RFC2492], [RFC2497], [RFC2590], [RFC3146], [RFC3572], [RFC4338], [RFC4391], [RFC5121], and [RFC5072]. The recommendations in this document override any other recommendations on the generation of IIDs in the updated RFCs. The specific updates to these documents to effectuate this recommendation are included in Section 6.

4. Generation of IPv6 Interface Identifiers with DHCPv6

By default, DHCPv6 server implementations SHOULD NOT generate predictable IPv6 addresses (such as IPv6 addresses where the IIDs are consecutive small numbers). [I-D.ietf-dhc-stable-privacy-addresses] specifies one possible algorithm that could be employed to comply with this requirement. Another possible algorithm would be to select a pseudo-random value chosen from a discrete uniform distribution,

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while avoiding the reserved IPv6 Interface Identifiers [RFC5453] [IANA-RESERVED-IID].

5. Generation of IPv6 Interface Identifiers with Manual Configuration

Network administrators should be aware of the security implications of predictable Interface Identifiers

[<u>I-D.ietf-6man-ipv6-address-generation-privacy</u>], and avoid the use of predictable addresses when the aforementioned issues are of concern.

6. Update to existing RFCs

The following subsections clarify how each of the RFCs affected by this document are updated.

Note to the RFC Editor:

In the following subsections, the legend "[RFCXXXX]" should be replaced with the RFC number assigned to this document, and this note to the RFC Editor should be removed before publication of this document as an RFC.

6.1. Update to **RFC2464**

The entire text of $\underline{\text{Section 4 of [RFC2464]}}$ is replaced with the following text:
The Interface Identifier [AARCH] for an Ethernet interface MUST be generated as specified in [RFCXXXX].
The following text from <u>Section 6 of [RFC2464]</u> :
cut here cut here
Ethernet Address The 48 bit Ethernet IEEE 802 address, in canonical bit order. This is the address the interface currently responds to, and may be different from the built-in address used to derive the Interface Identifier.
is formally replaced with:

cut here cut here Ethernet Address	
The 48 bit Ethernet IEEE 802 address, in canonical bit order. This is the address the interface currently responds to.	
cut here cut here	
6.2. Update to RFC2467	
The entire text of $\underline{\text{Section 5 of [RFC2467]}}$ is replaced with the following text:	
cut here cut here The Interface Identifier [AARCH] for an FDDI interface MUST be generated as specified in [RFCXXXX] cut here	
The following text from <u>Section 7 of [RFC2467]</u> :	
FDDI Address The 48 bit FDDI IEEE 802 address, in canonical bit order This is the address the interface currently responds to, and may be different from the built-in address used to derive the Interface Identifier.	· ·
cut here cut here cut here	
The entire text of <u>Section 4 of [RFC2470]</u> is replaced with the following text:	
The Interface Identifier [AARCH] for a Token Ring interface MUST be generated as specified in [RFCXXXX].	
The following text from <u>Section 6 of [RFC2470]</u> :	

cut here cut here
Token Ring Address: The 48 bit Token Ring IEEE 802
address, in canonical bit order. This is the address the
interface currently responds to, and may be different from
the built-in address used to derive the Interface
Identifier.
cut here cut here
is formally replaced with:
cut here cut here
Token Ring Address: The 48 bit Token Ring IEEE 802
address, in canonical bit order. This is the address the
interface currently responds to.
cut here cut here
de nore
6.4. Update to <u>RFC2491</u>
The entire text of <u>Section 5.1</u> , <u>Section 5.1.1</u> , and <u>Section 5.1.2 of</u>
<pre>[RFC2491] is replaced with the following text:</pre>
cut here cut here
5.1 Interface Tokens
The Interface Token (or Interface Identifier [AARCH]) for each IPv6
interface MUST be generated as specified in [RFCXXXX].
interface most be generated as specified in [NFCNNN].
All implementations MUCT support manual configuration of interface
All implementations MUST support manual configuration of interface
tokens to allow operators to manually change a interface token on
a per-LL basis. Operators may choose to manually set interface
tokens for reasons other than eliminating duplicate addresses.
All interface tokens MUST be 64 bits in length.
cut here cut here
ode not o
6.5. Update to RFC2492

The entire text of $\underline{\text{Section 5}}$ (and all the corresponding subsections) of of [RFC2492] is replaced with the following text:

	5.1 Interface Tokens
	The Interface Token (or Interface Identifier [AARCH]) for each IPv6 interface MUST be generated as specified in [RFCXXXX].
	All implementations MUST support manual configuration of interface tokens to allow operators to manually change a interface token on a per-LL basis. Operators may choose to manually set interface tokens for reasons other than eliminating duplicate addresses.
	All interface tokens MUST be 64 bits in length.
<u>6.</u>	6. Update to RFC2497
	The entire text of $\underline{\text{Section 4 of [RFC2497]}}$ is replaced with the following text:
	The Interface Identifier [AARCH] for an ARCnet interface MUST be generated as specified in [RFCXXXX].
	The entire text of $\underline{\text{Section 8 of [RFC2497]}}$ is replaced with the following text:
	Interface Identifiers generated as specified in [RFCXXXX] mitigate the security and privacy implications discussed in <u>Section 1</u> of such document.

6.7. Update to <u>RFC2590</u>

The entire $\underline{\text{Section 4}}$ and $\underline{\text{Section 4.1 of [RFC2590]}}$ is replaced with the following text:

----- cut here ----- cut here

		cut	here		cut	here	 	
4.	Stateless	Autoconf	⁼igura	ation				

An interface identifier [AARCH] for an IPv6 Frame Relay interface MUST be unique on a Frame Relay link [AARCH], and MUST be unique on each of the virtual links represented by the VCs terminated on the interface.

The interface identifier for the Frame Relay interface MUST be generated as specified in [RFCXXXX].

We note that each virtual circuit in a Frame Relay network is uniquely identified on a Frame Relay interface by a DLCI. Furthermore, a DLCI can be seen as an identification of the end point of a virtual circuit on a Frame Relay interface. Since each Frame Relay VC is configured or established separately, and acts like an independent virtual-link from other VCs in the network, or on the interface, link, wire or fiber, it seems beneficial to view each VC's termination point on the Frame Relay interface as a "pseudo-interface" or "logical-interface" overlaid on the Frame Relay interface. Furthermore, it seems beneficial to be able to generate and associate an IPv6 autoconfigured address (including an IPv6 link local address) to each "pseudo-interface", i.e. end-point of a VC, i.e. to each DLCI on a Frame Relay interface.

----- cut here ----- cut here -----

The entire <u>Section 9 of [RFC2590]</u> is replaced as follows:

----- cut here ----- cut here -----

9. Security Considerations

Security protection against forgery or accident at the level of the mechanisms described here is provided by the IPv6 security mechanisms [IPSEC], [IPSEC-Auth], [IPSEC-ESP] applied to Neighbor Discovery [IPv6-ND] or Inverse Neighbor Discovery [IND] messages.

To avoid an IPsec Authentication verification failure, the Frame Relay specific preprocessing of a Neighbor Discovery Solicitation message that contains a DLCI format Source link-layer address option, MUST be done by the receiver node after it completed IP Security processing.

----- cut here ----- cut here -----

6.8. Update to **RFC3146**

The entire $\underline{\text{Section 6 of [RFC3146]}}$ is replaced with the following text:

6	cut here cut here STATELESS AUTOCONFIGURATION
	he Interface Identifier [AARCH] for an IEEE1394 interface MUST be enerated as specified in [RFCXXXX].
0	n IPv6 address prefix used for stateless autoconfiguration [ACONF] f an IEEE1394 interface MUST have a length of 64 bits.
<u>6.9</u> .	Update to RFC3315
Т	he following text in <u>Section 11</u> of of [<u>RFC3315</u>]:
A i (i 2	ny address assigned by a server that is based on an EUI-64 dentifier MUST include an interface identifier with the "u" universal/local) and "g" (individual/group) bits of the interface dentifier set appropriately, as indicated in section 2.5.1 of RFC 373 [5].
i	s formally replaced with:
By p c' s w a w	y default, DHCPv6 server implementations SHOULD NOT generate redictable IPv6 addresses (such as IPv6 addresses where the IIDs are onsecutive small numbers). [I-D.ietf-dhc-stable-privacy-addresses] pecifies one possible algorithm that could be employed to comply ith this requirement. Another possible algorithm would be to select pseudo-random value chosen from a discrete uniform distribution, hile avoiding the reserved IPv6 Interface Identifiers [RFC5453] IANA-RESERVED-IID].
	dditionally, the following references should be added to <u>Section 26</u> f [RFC3315]:

Cl	ut here cut here
[IANA-RESERVED-IID]]
IANA, "F	Reserved IPv6 Interface Identifiers",
< <u>http://</u>	/www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-interface-ids>.
RFC 5453	n, S., "Reserved IPv6 Interface Identifiers", 3, DOI 10.17487/RFC5453, February 2009, /www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5453>.
Gont, F. Opaque I Configu <u>stable-</u> 2015.	le-privacy-addresses] . and S. LIU, "A Method for Generating Semantically Interface Identifiers with Dynamic Host ration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", draft-ietf-dhc- privacy-addresses-02 (work in progress), April ut here
6.10. Update to RFC3	<u>572</u>
The entire text of	Section 3 of [RFC3572] is replaced as follows:
3. Interface Ident	ut here cut heretifier
generated as specif	tifier [AARCH] for a MAPOS interface MUST be fied in [RFCXXXX]. ut here cut here
Additionally, <u>Sections</u> [RFC3572] is entire	ion 6.2 ("Uniqueness of Interface Identifiers") of ely eliminated.
6.11. Update to RFC42	<u>291</u>

The entire text of Section 2.5.1 of [RFC4291] is replaced with the following text:

cut here cut here
Interface identifiers in IPv6 unicast addresses are used to identify interfaces on a link. They are required to be unique within a subnet prefix. It is recommended that the same interface identifier not be assigned to different nodes on a link. They may also be unique over a broader scope. The same interface identifier may be used on multiple interfaces on a single node, as long as they are attached to different subnets.
For all unicast addresses, except those that start with the binary value 000, Interface IDs are required to be 64 bits long, and MUST be generated as specified in [RFCXXXX].
The details of forming interface identifiers are defined in the appropriate "IPv6 over <link/> " specification, such as "IPv6 over Ethernet" [ETHER], and "IPv6 over FDDI" [FDDI].
6.12. Update to <u>RFC4338</u>
The entire text of <u>Section 5</u> (and of all the corresponding subsections) of [<u>RFC4338</u>] is replaced with the following text:
cut here cut here5. IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration
The IPv6 Interface ID [AARCH] for an Nx_Port MUST be generated as specified in [RFCXXXX].
IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration MUST be performed as specified in [ACONF]. An IPv6 Address Prefix used for stateless address autoconfiguration of an Nx_Port MUST have a length of 64 bits.
cut here cut here
6.13. Update to <u>RFC4391</u>
The entire text of $\underbrace{\text{Section 8 of [RFC4391]}}_{\text{IS replaced with the following text:}}$
cut here cut here8. IPv6 Stateless Autoconfiguration
The IPv6 Interface ID [AARCH] MUST be generated as specified in [RFCXXXX].

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6.14. Update to <u>RFC5072</u>

The	entire	text	of	<u>Section</u>	4.1	of	[RFC5072]	is	replaced	with	the
foll	Lowing t	text:									

----- cut here ------ cut here ------- 4.1. Interface Identifier

Description

This Configuration Option provides a way to negotiate a unique, 64-bit interface identifier to be used for the address autoconfiguration [3] at the local end of the link (see Section 5). A Configure-Request MUST contain exactly one instance of the interface-identifier option [1]. The interface identifier MUST be unique within the PPP link; i.e., upon completion of the negotiation, different interface-identifier values are to be selected for the ends of the PPP link.

Before this Configuration Option is requested, an implementation chooses its tentative interface identifier. The non-zero value of the tentative interface identifier SHOULD be chosen such that the value is unique to the link and, preferably, consistently reproducible across initializations of the IPV6CP finite state machine (administrative Close and reOpen, reboots, etc.). The rationale for preferring a consistently reproducible unique interface identifier to a completely random interface identifier is to provide stability to global scope addresses (see Appendix A) that can be formed from the interface identifier. Additionally, the tentative interface identifier SHOULD be generated as specified in [RFCXXXX].

If neither a unique number nor a random number can be generated, it is recommended that a zero value be used for the interface identifier transmitted in the Configure-Request. In this case, the PPP peer may provide a valid non-zero interface identifier in its response as described below. Note that if at least one of the PPP peers is able to generate separate non-zero numbers for itself and its peer, the identifier negotiation will succeed.

When a Configure-Request is received with the Interface-Identifier Configuration Option and the receiving peer implements this option, the received interface identifier is compared with the interface identifier of the last Configure-Request sent to the peer. Depending on the result of the comparison, an implementation MUST respond in one of the following ways:

If the two interface identifiers are different but the received interface identifier is zero, a Configure-Nak is sent with a non-zero interface-identifier value suggested for use by the remote peer.

Such a suggested interface identifier MUST be different from the interface identifier of the last Configure-Request sent to the peer. It is recommended that the value suggested be consistently reproducible across initializations of the IPV6CP finite state machine (administrative Close and reOpen, reboots, etc). Additionally, the value suggested SHOULD be generated as specified in [RFCXXXX].

If the two interface identifiers are different and the received interface identifier is not zero, the interface identifier MUST be acknowledged, i.e., a Configure-Ack is sent with the requested interface identifier, meaning that the responding peer agrees with the interface identifier requested.

If the two interface identifiers are equal and are not zero, Configure-Nak MUST be sent specifying a different non-zero interface-identifier value suggested for use by the remote peer. It is recommended that the value suggested be consistently reproducible across initializations of the IPV6CP finite state machine (administrative Close and reOpen, reboots, etc). Additionally, the value suggested SHOULD be generated as specified in [RFCXXXX].

If the two interface identifiers are equal to zero, the interface identifier's negotiation MUST be terminated by transmitting the Configure-Reject with the interface-identifier value set to zero. In this case, a unique interface identifier cannot be negotiated.

If a Configure-Request is received with the Interface-Identifier Configuration Option and the receiving peer does not implement this option, Configure-Reject is sent.

A new Configure-Request SHOULD NOT be sent to the peer until normal processing would cause it to be sent (that is, until a Configure-Nak is received or the Restart timer runs out [1]).

A new Configure-Request MUST NOT contain the interface-identifier option if a valid Interface-Identifier Configure-Reject is received.

Reception of a Configure-Nak with a suggested interface identifier different from that of the last Configure-Nak sent to the peer indicates a unique interface identifier. In this case, a new Configure-Request MUST be sent with the identifier value suggested in the last Configure-Nak from the peer. But if the received interface identifier is equal to the one sent in the last Configure-Nak, a new interface identifier MUST be chosen. In this case, a new Configure-Request SHOULD be sent with the new tentative interface identifier. This sequence (transmit Configure-Request, receive Configure-Request, transmit Configure-Nak, receive Configure-Nak) might occur a few

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times, but it is extremely unlikely to occur repeatedly. More likely, the interface identifiers chosen at either end will quickly diverge, terminating the sequence.

If negotiation of the interface identifier is required, and the peer did not provide the option in its Configure-Request, the option SHOULD be appended to a Configure-Nak. The tentative value of the interface identifier given must be acceptable as the remote interface identifier; i.e., it should be different from the identifier value selected for the local end of the PPP link. The next Configure-Request from the peer may include this option. If the next Configure-Request does not include this option, the peer MUST NOT send another Configure-Nak with this option included. It should assume that the peer's implementation does not support this option.

By default, an implementation SHOULD attempt to negotiate the interface identifier for its end of the PPP connection.

A summary of the Interface-Identifier Configuration Option format is shown below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.

0									1										2										3	
0 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1
+-+	-+-	+-	+-	+-	+-	+-	+-	+-	+-	+-	+-	+-	+-	-+-	+-	+-	-+-	+-	+-	+	-+	+-	+	-+	-+-	-+-	-+-	-+	-+-	-+-+
		Ty	/pe	è					L	_er	ngt	h				Ιr	nte	er1	fac	се	- I	dei	nt:	if.	ie		(MS	S I	Ву	tes)
+-+	-+-	-+-	+-	+-	+-	+-	+-	+-	+-	+-	+-	+-	-+-	-+-	-+-	+-	-+-	+-	+-	+	-+	+-	+-	-+	-+	-+-	-+-	-+	-+-	-+-+
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Int	er1	fac	ce-	·Ic	den	ti	if:	ier	- (ĹS	S E	3yt	tes	s)																
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	Тур	ре																												
		1																												

Length

10

Interface-Identifier

The 64-bit interface identifier, which is very likely to be unique on the link, or zero if a good source of uniqueness cannot be found.

Default

If no valid interface identifier can be successfully

negotiated, no default interface-identifier value should be
assumed. The procedures for recovering from such a case will
depend on the algorithm employed to generate the interface
identifier. One approach is to manually configure the
interface identifier of the interface.
cut here cut here
Additionally, the following text of <u>Section 5 of [RFC5072]</u> :

----- cut here ----- cut here -----

5. Stateless Autoconfiguration and Link-Local Addresses

The interface identifier of IPv6 unicast addresses [5] of a PPP interface SHOULD be negotiated in the IPv6CP phase of the PPP connection setup (see Section 4.1). If no valid interface identifier has been successfully negotiated, procedures for recovering from such a case are unspecified. One approach is to manually configure the interface identifier of the interface.

The negotiated interface identifier is used by the local end of the PPP link to autoconfigure an IPv6 link-local unicast address for the PPP interface. However, it SHOULD NOT be assumed that the same interface identifier is used in configuring global unicast addresses for the PPP interface using IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration [3]. The PPP peer MAY generate one or more interface identifiers, for instance, using a method described in [8], to autoconfigure one or more global unicast addresses.

The interface identifier of IPv6 unicast addresses [5] of a PPP interface SHOULD be negotiated in the IPV6CP phase of the PPP connection setup (see Section 4.1). If no valid interface identifier has been successfully negotiated, procedures for recovering from such a case will depend on the algorithm employed to generate the interface identifier. One approach is to manually configure the interface identifier of the interface.

The negotiated interface identifier is used by the local end of the PPP link to autoconfigure an IPv6 link-local unicast address for the PPP interface. However, it SHOULD NOT be assumed that the same interface identifier is used in configuring global unicast addresses for the PPP interface using IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration [3].

	cut	here		cut	here	
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6.15. Update to **RFC5121**

The entire text of $\underline{\text{Section 9.1 of [RFC5121]}}$ is replaced with the following text:
9.1. Interface Identifier
The MS SHOULD generate interface identifiers as specified in [RFCXXXX].
Additionally, <u>Section 9.2</u> is replaced as follows:
cut here cut here 9.2. Duplicate Address Detection

DAD SHOULD be performed as per "Neighbor Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", [RFC4861] and "IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration" [RFC4862]. The IPv6 link over 802.16 is specified in this document as a point-to-point link. Based on this criteria, it may be redundant to perform DAD on a global unicast address that is configured as part of the IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration Protocol [RFC4862] as long as the following two conditions are met:

- 1. The prefixes advertised through the router advertisement messages by the access router terminating the 802.16 IPv6 link are unique to that link.
- The access router terminating the 802.16 IPv6 link does not autoconfigure any IPv6 global unicast addresses from the prefix that it advertises.

----- cut here ------ cut here

7. Future Work

At the time of this writing, the mechanisms specified in the following documents might require updates to be fully compatible with the recommendations in this document:

- o "Compression Format for IPv6 Datagrams over IEEE 802.15.4-Based Networks" [RFC6282]
- o "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4 Networks" [RFC4944]
- o "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)"[RFC6775]

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o "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over ITU-T G.9959 Networks"[RFC7428]

Future revisions or updates of these documents should take the issues of privacy and security mentioned in <u>Section 1</u> and explain any design and engineering considerations that lead to the use of IIDs based on a node's link-layer address.

8. IANA Considerations

There are no IANA registries within this document. The RFC-Editor can remove this section before publication of this document as an RFC.

9. Security Considerations

This recommends against the (default) use of predictable Interface Identifiers in IPv6 addresses. It recommends [RFC7217] as the default scheme for generating IPv6 stable addresses with SLAAC, such that the security and privacy issues of IIDs that embed link-layer addresses are mitigated. Additionally, it recommends against predictable IIDs in DHCPv6 and manual configuration

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Authors' Addresses

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Fernando Gont SI6 Networks / UTN-FRH Evaristo Carriego 2644 Haedo, Provincia de Buenos Aires 1706 Argentina

Phone: +54 11 4650 8472 Email: fgont@si6networks.com

URI: http://www.si6networks.com

Alissa Cooper Cisco 707 Tasman Drive Milpitas, CA 95035 US

Phone: +1-408-902-3950 Email: alcoop@cisco.com

URI: https://www.cisco.com/

Dave Thaler Microsoft Microsoft Corporation One Microsoft Way Redmond, WA 98052

Phone: +1 425 703 8835

Email: dthaler@microsoft.com

Will Liu Huawei Technologies Bantian, Longgang District Shenzhen 518129 P.R. China

Email: liushucheng@huawei.com