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## **IPv6 Flow Label Specification draft-ietf-6man-flow-3697bis-02**

### **Abstract**

This document specifies the IPv6 Flow Label field and the minimum requirements for IPv6 nodes labeling flows, IPv6 nodes forwarding labeled packets, and flow state establishment methods. Even when mentioned as examples of possible uses of the flow labeling, more detailed requirements for specific use cases are out of scope for this document.

The usage of the Flow Label field enables efficient IPv6 flow classification based only on IPv6 main header fields in fixed positions.

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## **1. Introduction**

A flow is a sequence of packets sent from a particular source to a particular unicast, anycast, or multicast destination that a node desires to label as a flow. A flow could consist of all packets in a specific transport connection or a media stream. However, a flow is not necessarily 1:1 mapped to a transport connection.

Traditionally, flow classifiers have been based on the 5-tuple of the source and destination addresses, ports, and the transport protocol type. However, some of these fields may be unavailable due to either fragmentation or encryption, or locating them past a chain of IPv6 extension headers may be inefficient. Additionally, if classifiers depend only on IP layer headers, later introduction of alternative transport layer protocols will be easier.

The usage of the 3-tuple of the Flow Label and the Source and Destination Address fields enables efficient IPv6 flow classification, where only IPv6 main header fields in fixed positions are used.

The flow label could be used in both stateless and stateful scenarios. A stateless scenario is one where a node that sets the flow label value for all packets of a given flow does not need to store any information about the flow, and any node that processes the flow label in any way also does not need to store any information after a packet has been processed. A stateful scenario is one where a node that sets or processes the flow label value needs to store information about the flow, including the flow label value. A stateful scenario might also require a signaling mechanism to establish flow state in the network.

The flow label can be used most simply in stateless scenarios. This specification concentrates on the stateless model and how it can be used as a default mechanism. Details of stateful models, signaling, specific flow state establishment methods and their related service models are out of scope for this specification. The basic requirement for stateful models is set forth in [Section 4](#).

The minimum level of IPv6 flow support consists of labeling the flows. A specific goal is to enable and encourage the use of the flow label for various forms of stateless load distribution, especially across Equal Cost Multi-Path (ECMP) and/or Link Aggregation Group (LAG) paths. ECMP and LAG are methods to bond together multiple physical links used to procure the required capacity necessary to carry an offered load greater than the bandwidth of an individual physical link. IPv6 source nodes SHOULD be able to label known flows (e.g., TCP connections, application



streams), even if the node itself does not require any flow-specific treatment. Node requirements for stateless flow labeling are given in [Section 3](#).

This document replaces [\[RFC3697\]](#) and [Appendix A of \[RFC2460\]](#). A rationale for the changes made is documented in [\[I-D.ietf-6man-flow-update\]](#). The present document also includes a correction to [\[RFC2205\]](#) concerning the flow label.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [\[RFC2119\]](#).

## **2. IPv6 Flow Label Specification**

The 20-bit Flow Label field in the IPv6 header [\[RFC2460\]](#) is used by a node to label packets of a flow. A Flow Label of zero is used to indicate packets not part of any flow. Packet classifiers can use the triplet of Flow Label, Source Address, and Destination Address fields to identify which flow a particular packet belongs to. Packets are processed in a flow-specific manner by nodes that are able to do so in a stateless manner, or that have been set up with flow-specific state. The nature of the specific treatment and the methods for flow state establishment are out of scope for this specification. However, any node that sets flow label values according to a stateful scheme MUST ensure that packets conform to [Section 3](#) of the present specification if they are sent outside the network domain using the stateful scheme.

As specified below in [Section 3](#), the normal expectation is that flow label values are uniformly distributed. In this specification, it is recommended below that a pseudo-random method should be used to achieve such a uniform distribution. Intentionally, there are no precise mathematical requirements placed on the distribution or the pseudo-random method.

Once set to a non-zero value, the Flow Label MUST be delivered unchanged to the destination node(s). A forwarding node MUST NOT change the flow label value in an arriving packet if it is non-zero. However, there are two qualifications to this rule:

1. Implementers are advised that forwarding nodes, especially those acting as domain border devices, might nevertheless be configured to change the flow label value in packets. This is undetectable, unless some future version of IPsec authentication [\[RFC4302\]](#) protects the flow label value.





2. To enable stateless load distribution at any point in the Internet, a network domain should never export packets originating within the domain whose flow label values do not conform to [Section 3](#). However, neither domain border egress routers nor intermediate routers/devices (using a flow-label, for example, as a part of an input-key for a load-distribution hash) can determine by inspection that a value is not part of a uniform distribution. Therefore, if nodes within a domain ignore the recommendations of [Section 3](#), and such packets are forwarded outside the domain, this might result in undesirable operational implications (e.g., congestion, reordering) for not only the inappropriately flow-labelled packets, but also well-behaved flow-labelled packets, during forwarding at various intermediate devices. Thus, a domain must protect its peers by never exporting inappropriately labelled packets originating within the domain. This is why nodes using a stateful scheme must not set the flow label to a non-zero and non-uniformly distributed value if the packet will leave their domain. If it is known to a border router that flow labels originated within the domain are not uniformly distributed, it will need to set outgoing flow labels in the same manner as described for forwarding nodes in [Section 3](#).

There is no way to verify whether a flow label has been modified en route or whether it belongs to a uniform distribution. Therefore, no Internet-wide mechanism can depend mathematically on immutable and uniformly distributed flow labels; they have a "best effort" quality. This leads to the following formal rules:

- o Implementers should be aware that the flow label is an unprotected field that could have been accidentally or intentionally changed en route. Implementations MUST take appropriate steps to protect themselves from being vulnerable to denial of service and other types of attack that could result (see [Section 6.1](#)).
- o Forwarding nodes such as routers and load balancers MUST NOT depend only on Flow Label values being uniformly distributed. In any usage such as a hash key for load distribution, the Flow Label bits MUST be combined at least with bits from other sources within the packet, so as to produce a constant hash value for each flow and a suitable distribution of hash values across flows.

Although uniformly distributed flow label values are recommended below, and will always be helpful for load balancing, it is unsafe to assume their presence in the general case, and the use case needs to work even if the flow label value is zero.

The use of the Flow Label field does not necessarily signal any requirement on packet reordering. Especially, the zero label does not imply that significant reordering is acceptable.



An IPv6 node that does not set the flow label to a non-zero value, or make use of it in any way, MUST ignore it when receiving or forwarding a packet.

### 3. Stateless Flow Labeling Requirements

This section defines the minimum requirements for stateless methods of setting the flow label value.

To enable Flow Label based classification, source nodes SHOULD assign each unrelated transport connection and application data stream to a new flow. A typical definition of a flow for this purpose is any set of packets carrying the same 5-tuple {dest addr, source addr, protocol, dest port, source port}.

It is desirable that flow label values should be uniformly distributed to assist load distribution. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that source hosts support the flow label by setting the flow label field for all packets of a given flow to the same uniformly distributed pseudo-random value. Both stateful and stateless methods of assigning a pseudo-random value could be used, but it is outside the scope of this specification to mandate an algorithm. In a stateless mechanism, the algorithm SHOULD ensure that the resulting flow label values are unique with high probability.

An OPTIONAL algorithm for generating such a pseudo-random value is described in [[I-D.gont-6man-flowlabel-security](#)].

[[ NOTE TO RFC EDITOR: The preceding sentence should be deleted, and the reference should be changed to Informative, if the cited draft is not on the standards track at the time of publication. ]]

A source node which does not otherwise set the flow label MUST set its value to zero.

A node that forwards a flow whose flow label value in arriving packets is zero MAY set the flow label value. In that case, it is RECOMMENDED that the forwarding node sets the flow label field for a flow to a uniformly distributed pseudo-random value.

- o The same considerations apply as to source hosts setting the flow label; in particular, the normal case is that a flow is defined by the 5-tuple.
- o This option, if implemented, would presumably be used by first-hop or ingress routers. It might place a considerable per-packet processing load on them, even if they adopted a stateless method of flow identification and label assignment. This is why the principal recommendation is that the source host should set the



label.

The preceding rules taken together allow a given network domain to include routers that set flow labels on behalf of hosts that do not do so. They also recommend that flow labels exported to the Internet are always either zero or uniformly distributed.

#### **4. Flow State Establishment Requirements**

A node that sets the flow label MAY also take part in a flow state establishment method that results in assigning specific treatments to specific flows, possibly including signaling. Any such method MUST NOT disturb nodes taking part in the stateless model just described. Further details are not discussed in this document.

#### **5. Essential correction to [RFC 2205](#)**

[RFC2460] reduced the size of the flow label field from 24 to 20 bits. The references to a 24 bit flow label field on pages 87 and 88 of [[RFC2205](#)] are updated accordingly.

#### **6. Security Considerations**

This section considers security issues raised by the use of the Flow Label, primarily the potential for denial-of-service attacks, and the related potential for theft of service by unauthorized traffic ([Section 6.1](#)). [Section 6.2](#) addresses the use of the Flow Label in the presence of IPsec including its interaction with IPsec tunnel mode and other tunneling protocols. We also note that inspection of unencrypted Flow Labels may allow some forms of traffic analysis by revealing some structure of the underlying communications. Even if the flow label were encrypted, its presence as a constant value in a fixed position might assist traffic analysis and cryptanalysis.

The flow label is not protected in any way and can be forged by an on-path attacker. On the other hand, a uniformly distributed pseudo-random flow label cannot be readily guessed by an off-path attacker; see [[I-D.gont-6man-flowlabel-security](#)] for further discussion.

##### **[6.1](#). Theft and Denial of Service**

Since the mapping of network traffic to flow-specific treatment is triggered by the IP addresses and Flow Label value of the IPv6 header, an adversary may be able to obtain unintended service by modifying the IPv6 header or by injecting packets with false



addresses and/or labels. Theft of service is not further discussed in this document, since it can only be analysed for specific stateful methods of using the flow label. However, a denial of service attack becomes possible in the stateless model when the modified or injected traffic depletes the resources available to forward it and other traffic streams. If a DoS attack were undertaken against a given Flow Label (or set of Flow Labels), then traffic containing an affected Flow Label might well experience worse-than-best-effort network performance.

Note that since the treatment of IP headers by nodes is typically unverified, there is no guarantee that flow labels sent by a node are set according to the recommendations in this document. A man-in-the-middle or injected-traffic denial of service attack specifically directed at flow label handling would involve setting unusual flow labels. For example, an attacker could set all flow labels reaching a given router to the same arbitrary non-zero value, or could perform rapid cycling of flow label values such that the packets of a given flow will each have a different value. Either of these attacks would cause a stateless load distribution algorithm to perform badly and would cause a stateful mechanism to behave incorrectly. For this reason, stateless mechanisms should not use the flow label alone to control load distribution, and stateful mechanisms should include explicit methods to detect and ignore suspect flow label values.

Since flows are identified by the 3-tuple of the Flow Label and the Source and Destination Address, the risk of denial of service introduced by the Flow Label is closely related to the risk of denial of service by address spoofing. An adversary who is in a position to forge an address is also likely to be able to forge a label, and vice versa.

There are two issues with different properties: Spoofing of the Flow Label only, and spoofing of the whole 3-tuple, including Source and Destination Address.

The former can be done inside a node which is using or transmitting the correct source address. The ability to spoof a Flow Label typically implies being in a position to also forge an address, but in many cases, spoofing an address may not be interesting to the spoofer, especially if the spoofer's goal is theft of service, rather than denial of service.

The latter can be done by a host which is not subject to ingress filtering [[RFC2827](#)] or by an intermediate router. Due to its properties, this is typically useful only for denial of service. In the absence of ingress filtering, almost any third party could instigate such an attack.





In the presence of ingress filtering, forging a non-zero Flow Label on packets that originated with a zero label, or modifying or clearing a label, could only occur if an intermediate system such as a router was compromised, or through some other form of man-in-the-middle attack.

## **6.2. IPsec and Tunneling Interactions**

The IPsec protocol, as defined in [[RFC4301](#)], [[RFC4302](#)], [[RFC4303](#)] does not include the IPv6 header's Flow Label in any of its cryptographic calculations (in the case of tunnel mode, it is the outer IPv6 header's Flow Label that is not included). Hence modification of the Flow Label by a network node has no effect on IPsec end-to-end security, because it cannot cause any IPsec integrity check to fail. As a consequence, IPsec does not provide any defense against an adversary's modification of the Flow Label (i.e., a man-in-the-middle attack).

IPsec tunnel mode provides security for the encapsulated IP header's Flow Label. A tunnel mode IPsec packet contains two IP headers: an outer header supplied by the tunnel ingress node and an encapsulated inner header supplied by the original source of the packet. When an IPsec tunnel is passing through nodes performing flow classification, the intermediate network nodes operate on the Flow Label in the outer header. At the tunnel egress node, IPsec processing includes removing the outer header and forwarding the packet (if required) using the inner header. The IPsec protocol requires that the inner header's Flow Label not be changed by this decapsulation processing to ensure that modifications to label cannot be used to launch theft- or denial-of-service attacks across an IPsec tunnel endpoint. This document makes no change to that requirement; indeed it forbids changes to the Flow Label.

When IPsec tunnel egress decapsulation processing includes a sufficiently strong cryptographic integrity check of the encapsulated packet (where sufficiency is determined by local security policy), the tunnel egress node can safely assume that the Flow Label in the inner header has the same value as it had at the tunnel ingress node.

This analysis and its implications apply to any tunneling protocol that performs integrity checks. Of course, any Flow Label set in an encapsulating IPv6 header is subject to the risks described in the previous section.

## **6.3. Security Filtering Interactions**

The Flow Label does nothing to eliminate the need for packet filtering based on headers past the IP header, if such filtering is



deemed necessary for security reasons on nodes such as firewalls or filtering routers.

However, security devices that clear or rewrite non-zero flow label values would be in violation of this specification.

## **7. IANA Considerations**

This document requests no action by IANA.

## **8. Acknowledgements**

Steve Deering and Alex Conta were co-authors of [RFC 3697](#), on which this document is based.

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## **9. Change log**

[draft-ietf-6man-flow-3697bis-02](#): update to remove most text about stateful methods, 2011-03-13

[draft-ietf-6man-flow-3697bis-01](#): update after resolving 11 initial issues, 2011-02-26

[draft-ietf-6man-flow-3697bis-00](#): original version, built from [RFC3697](#) and [draft-ietf-6man-flow-update-01](#), 2011-01-31

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