                IPv6 Hop-by-Hop Options Processing Procedures
                    draft-ietf-6man-hbh-processing-00

Abstract

   This document specifies procedures for how IPv6 Hop-by-Hop options
   are processed. It modifies the procedures specified in the IPv6
   Protocol Specification (RFC8200) to make processing of IPv6 Hop-by-
   Hop options practical with the goal of making IPv6 Hop-by-Hop options
   useful to deploy and use in the Internet. When published, this
   document updates RFC8200.

Status of This Memo

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[1](#). Introduction

   This document specifies procedures for how IPv6 Hop-by-Hop options
   are processed. It modifies the procedures specified in the IPv6
   Protocol Specification ([RFC8200](#)) to make processing of IPv6 Hop-by-
   Hop options practical with the goal of making IPv6 Hop-by-Hop options
   useful to deploy and use in the Internet.

   When published this document updates [[RFC8200](#)].

   The current list of defined Hop-by-Hop options can be found at
   [[IANA-HBH](#)].

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.

3. Terminology

This document uses the following loosely defined terms:

*   Forwarding Plane: IPv6 hosts exchange user data through the
    forwarding plane. User data is processed by its recipient (i.e.,
    an IPv6 host). User data can traverse intermediate nodes (i.e.,
    routers) between its source and its destination. These
    intermediate nodes process metadata contained in packet headers.
    However, they do not process information contained in packet
    payloads.

*   Control Plane: IPv6 routers exchange management and routing
    information with controllers. They also exchange routing
    information with one another. Management and routing information
    is processed by its recipient (i.e., an IPv6 router or
    controller). Management and control information can traverse
    intermediate nodes (i.e., routers) between its source and its
    destination. These intermediate nodes process metadata contained
    in packet headers. However, they do not process information
    contained in packet payloads. So, from their perspective, this
    information is user data.

*   Fast Path: A path through a router that is optimized for
    forwarding packets without processing their payloads. The Fast
    Path may be supported by Application Specific Integrated Circuits
    (ASICS), Network Processor (NP), or other special purpose
    hardware. This is the usual processing path within a router taken

by the forwarding plane.

   *   Slow Path: A path through a router that is capable of general
       purpose processing and is not optimized for any particular
       function. This is processing path is used for packets that
       require special processing or differ from assumptions made in Fast
       Path heuristics, or to process router control protocols used by
       the control plane.

   NOTE: This distinct separation between hardware and software
   processing from [RFC6398] does not apply to all router architectures.
   However, a router that performs all or most processing in software
   might still incur more processing cost when providing special
   processing (aka Slow Path).

   [RFC6192] is an example of how designs can separate control plane
   (Slow Path) and forwarding plane (Fast Path) functions.

4. Background

   In the first version of the IPv6 specification, Hop-by-Hop options
   were required to be processed by all nodes: routers and hosts. This
   proved to not be practical in high speed routers due to several
   factors, including:

   *   Inability to process the hop-by-hop options at full the forwarding
       rate (e.g., routers with no support on the Fast Path).

   *   Hop-by-Hop options would be sent to the Slow Path. This could
       could degrade the a router's performance and it's ability to
       process important control traffic.

   *   A mechanism that forces packets from any source to the routers
       "Slow Path" could be exploited as a Denial of Service attack
       against the router.

   *   Packets could contain multiple Hop-by-Hop options making the
       previous issues worse by increasing the complexity required to

process them.

When the IPv6 Specification was updated and published in July 2017 as
[RFC8200], the procedures relating to hop-by-hop options were as
follows:

> Extension headers (except for the Hop-by-Hop Options header) are
> not processed, inserted, or deleted by any node along a packet's
> delivery path, until the packet reaches the node (or each of the
> set of nodes, in the case of multicast) identified in the
> Destination Address field of the IPv6 header.

> The Hop-by-Hop Options header is not inserted or deleted, but may
> be examined or processed by any node along a packet's delivery
> path, until the packet reaches the node (or each of the set of
> nodes, in the case of multicast) identified in the Destination
> Address field of the IPv6 header. The Hop-by-Hop Options header,
> when present, must immediately follow the IPv6 header. Its
> presence is indicated by the value zero in the Next Header field
> of the IPv6 header.

> NOTE: While [RFC2460] required that all nodes must examine and
> process the Hop-by-Hop Options header, it is now expected that
> nodes along a packet's delivery path only examine and process the
> Hop-by-Hop Options header if explicitly configured to do so.

The changes meant that an implementation complied with the IPv6
specification even if it did not process hop-by-hop options, and that
it was expected that routers would add configuration information to
control which hop-by-hop options they would process.

Unfortunately, this did not improve the processing of Hop-by-Hop
options and did not significantly improve deployment and use in the
Internet. Essentially, it only documented how they were being used

in the Internet at the time RFC8200 was published.

The main issues remain:

*   Routers are commonly configured to drop transit packets containing
    hop-by-hop options that would have be processed in the Slow Path.
    This behavior is seen as protecting against a denial of service
    attack on the router. This is discussed in [RFC9098].

*   Allowing multiple hop-by-hop options in a single packet makes it
    even more expensive in router resources to process these packets.
    It adds complexity to the number of permutations that might need
    to be processed.

*   Any mechanism that can be used to force packets into the router's
    Slow Path can be exploited as a denial of service attack on a
    transit router by saturating the resources needed for router
    management protocols (e.g., routing protocols, network management
    protocols, etc.) that may cause the router to fail. This issue
    for the Router Alert option, which intentionally places packets on
    the Slow Path, is discussed in [RFC6398]. Section 3 of that RFC
    includes a good summary:

    "In a nutshell, the IP Router Alert Option does not provide a
    convenient universal mechanism to accurately and reliably
    distinguish between IP Router Alert packets of interest and

    unwanted IP Router Alert packets. This, in turn, creates a
    security concern when the IP Router Alert Option is used, because,
    short of appropriate router-implementation-specific mechanisms,
    the router Slow Path is at risk of being flooded by unwanted
    traffic."

There has been research that discussed the general problem with
dropping packets containing IPv6 extension headers, including the
Hop-by-Hop Options header. For example [Hendriks] states that
"dropping all packets with Extension Headers, is a bad practice", and
that "The share of traffic containing more than one EH however, is
very small. For the design of hardware able to handle the dynamic
nature of EHs, we therefore recommend to support at least one EH".

This document defines a set of procedures for the hop-by-hop option

header that make the processing of hop-by-hop options practical in
modern transit routers.

5. Hop-by-Hop Header Processing Procedures

This section describes several changes to [RFC8200].

5.1. Hop-by-Hop Options Per Packet

The Hop-by-Hop Option Header as defined in Section 4.3 of [RFC8200]
is identified by a Next Header value of 0 in the IPv6 header.
Section 4.1 of [RFC8200] requires a Hop-by-Hop Options header to
appear immediately after the IPv6 header. [RFC8200] also requires
that a Hop-by-Hop Options header can only appear once in a packet.

The Hop-by-Hop Options Header as defined in [RFC8200] can contain one
or more Hop-by-Hop options. This document updates [RFC8200] that a
node MUST process the first Option in the Hop-by-Hop Header at full
forwarding rate the (e.g. on the router's Fast Path) and MAY process
additional Hop-by-Hop Options if configured to do so. The motivation
for this change is to simplify the processing of Hop-by-Hop options
as a part of normal forwarding.

Nodes creating packets with a Hop-by-Hop option headers SHOULD
include a single Hop-by-Hop Option in the packet and MAY include more
based on local configuration.

If there are more than one Hop-by-Hop options in the Hop-by-Hop
Options header, the node MAY skip the rest of the options without
having to examine these options using the "Hdr Ext Len" field in the
Hop-by-Hop Options header. This field specifies the length of the
Option Header in 8-octet units. The additional options do not need
to be processed or verified.

5.2. Hop-by-Hop Headers Processing

Nodes that implement a differentiation between a Fast Path and a Slow
Path MUST process all (with one exception noted below) Hop-by-Hop
options in the Fast Path. The one exception to this is the Router
Alert Option [RFC2711]. See Section 5.3 for discussion of the Router
Alert.

If the node can not process an option at the full forwarding rate, it
MUST behave as if it does not recognize the Option Type (as described
in the next paragraph).

Section 4.2 of [RFC8200] defines the Option Type identifiers as
internally encoded such that their highest-order 2 bits specify the
action that must be taken if the processing IPv6 node does not
recognize the Option Type. The text is:

    00 - skip over this option and continue processing the header.

    01 - discard the packet.

    10 - discard the packet and, regardless of whether or not the
         packet's Destination Address was a multicast address, send an
         ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 2, message to the packet's
         Source Address, pointing to the unrecognized Option Type.

    11 - discard the packet and, only if the packet's Destination
         Address was not a multicast address, send an ICMP Parameter
         Problem, Code 2, message to the packet's Source Address,
         pointing to the unrecognized Option Type.

This document modifies this behaviour for the "10" and "11" values
that the node MAY send an ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 2, message to
the packet's Source Address, pointing to the unrecognized Option
Type. The modified text for "10" and 11" values is:

    10 - discard the packet and, regardless of whether or not the
         packet's Destination Address was a multicast address, MAY
         send an ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 2, message to the
         packet's Source Address, pointing to the unrecognized Option
         Type.

    11 - discard the packet and, only if the packet's Destination
         Address was not a multicast address, MAY send an ICMP
         Parameter Problem, Code 2, message to the packet's Source
         Address, pointing to the unrecognized Option Type.

The motivation for this change is to loosen the requirement to send

ICMPv6 Parameter Problem messages by simplifying what the router
needs to do when it performs forwarding of an Option Type it does not
recognize.

When an ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 2, message is delivered to the
source, the source can become aware that at least one node on the
patch has failed to recognize the option.

5.3. Router Alert Option

The Router Alert option [RFC2711] purpose is to tell the node that
the packet needs additional processing on the Slow Path.

The Router Alert option includes a two octet Value field that
describes the protocol that is carried in the packet. The current
values can be found in the IANA Router Alert Value registry
[IANA-RA].

DISCUSSION

>   The Router Alert Option is a problem since it's function is to do
>   what this specification is proposing to eliminate, that is,
>   process the packet in the Slow Path. One approach would be to
>   deprecate it as it's usage appears to be limited and packets
>   containing Hop-by-Hop options are frequently dropped. Deprecation
>   would allow current implementations to continue and it's use could
>   be phased out over time.

>   The authors current thinking is that the Router Alert function may
>   have reasonable potential use for new functions that have to be
>   processed in the Slow Path. We think that keeping it as the
>   single exception for Slow Path processing with the following
>   restrictions is a reasonable compromise to allow future
>   flexibility. These are compatible with Section 5 of [RFC6398].

A Fast Path implementation SHOULD verify that a Router Alert contains
a protocol, as indicated by the Value field in the Router Alert
option, that is configured as a protocol of interest to that router.
A verified packet SHOULD be sent on the Slow Path for processing
[RFC6398]. Otherwise, the router implementation SHOULD forward
within the Fast Path (subject to all normal policies and forwarding
rules). As specified in [RFC2711] the top two bits of Option Type
for the Router Alert option are always set to "00" indicating the
node should skip over this option and continue processing the header
in this case.

Implementations of the IP Router Alert Option SHOULD offer the
configuration option to simply ignore the presence of "IP Router
Alert" in IPv4 and IPv6 packets" [RFC6398].

A node that is configured to process a Router Alert option using the
Slow Path MUST protect itself from infrastructure attack that could
result from processing on the Slow Path. This might include some
combination of access control list to only permit from trusted nodes,
rate limiting of processing, or other methods [RFC6398].

5.4. Configuration

Section 4 of [RFC8200] allows for a router to control it's processing
of IPv6 Hop-by-Hop options by local configuration. The text is:

   NOTE: While [RFC2460] required that all nodes must examine and
   process the Hop-by-Hop Options header, it is now expected that
   nodes along a packet's delivery path only examine and process the
   Hop-by-Hop Options header if explicitly configured to do so.

A possible approach to implementing this is to maintain a lookup
table based on Option Type of the IPv6 options that are supported in
the Fast Path. This would allow for a node to quickly determine if
an option is supported and can be processed. If the option is not
supported, then the node processes it as described in Section 5.2 of
this document.

A node configured not to process HBH options, MUST drop the packet if
the top two bits of the Option Type field of the first HBH option is
non-zero.

The actions of the lookup table SHOULD be configurable by the
operator of the router.

6. New Hop-by-Hop Options

Any new IPv6 Hop-by-Hop option designed in the future should be
designed to be processed at full forwarding rate (e.g., on a router's
Fast Path). New options MUST NOT be defined that are not reasonably
expected to be executed at full forwarding rates. New Hop-by-Hop
options SHOULD have the following characteristics:

* Straight forward to process. That is, they should be designed to
   keep the time to process low.

* New Hop-by-Hop options should be designed to be the first option

in a Hop-by-Hop options header.

   * The size of an option should not extend beyond what can be
      reasonably expected to be executed at full forwarding rate (e.g.,
      forwarded on a router's fast path).

   Any new Hop-by-Hop option that is standardized that does not meet
   these criteria needs to explain in detail in its specification why
   this can not be accomplished and that there is a reasonable
   expectation that it can be proceed in most Fast Path implementations.

7. IANA Considerations

   There are no actions required for IANA defined in this document.

8. Security Considerations

   Security issues with IPv6 Hop-by-Hop options are well known and have
   been documented in several places, including [RFC6398], [RFC6192],
   and [RFC9098]. The main issue, as noted in Section 4, is that any
   mechanism that can be used to force packets into the router's Slow
   Path can be exploited as a denial of service attack on a transit
   router by saturating the resources need for router management
   protocols (e.g., routing protocols, network management protocols,
   etc.) that may cause the router to fail. Due to this it's common for
   transit routers to drop packets with Hop-by-Hop options headers.

   While Hop-by-Hop options are not required to be processed in the Slow
   Path, the Router Alert options is designed to do just that.

   This document changes the way Hop-by-Hop options are processed in
   several ways that significantly reduces the attack surface. These
   changes include:

   * All Hop-by-Hop options (with one exception) must be processed in
      the Fast Path. Only one HBH Option MUST be processed and
      additional HBH Options MAY be processed based on local
      configuration.

   * Only the Router Alert option can be processed in the Slow Path,
      and the router must be configured to do so.

* Added criteria to allow control over how Router Alert options are
      processed and that a node configured to support these options must
      protect itself from attacks using the Router Alert.

   * Limited the default number of Hop-by-Hop options that that can be
      in a packet to a single Hop-by-Hop option.

   * Additional Hop-by-Hop options MAY be included, based on local
      configuration. Although nodes only process these additional Hop-
      by-Hop Options if configured to do so.

   * Added restrictions to any future new Hop-by-Hop options that limit
      their size and computational requirements.

   The authors believe that these changes significantly reduces the
   security issues relating to IPv6 Hop-by-Hop options and will enable
   them to be used safely in the Internet.

9. Acknowledgments

   Helpful comments were received from Brian Carpenter, Ron Bonica, Ole
   Troan, Mark Heard, Tom Herbert, [your name here], and other members
   of the 6MAN working group.

10. Change log [RFC Editor: Please remove]

   draft-ietf-6man-hbh-processing-00, 2022-January-29:

   * 6MAN Working Group Draft
   * Reworked text to talk about processing HBH options at full
      forwarding rates, instead of "fast path"
   * Revised Section 6 "New Hop-by-Hop Options" to allow variable sized
      HBH options, remove specific length requirements, and other
      clarifications.
   * Editorial changes.

   draft-hinden-6man-hbh-processing-01, 2021-June-2:

   * Expanded terminology section to include Forwarding Plane and

Control Plane.
       * Changed draft that only one HBH Option MUST be processed and
          additional HBH Options MAY be processed based on local
          configuration.
       * Clarified that all HBH options (with one exception) must be
          processed on the Fast Path.
       * Kept the Router Alert options as the single exception for Slow
          Path processing.
       * Rewrote and expanded section on New Hop-by-Hop Options.
       * Removed requirement for HBH Option size and alignment.
       * Removed sections evaluating currently defined HBH Options.
       * Added content to the Security Considerations section.
       * Added people to the acknowledgements section.
       * Numerous editorial changes

       draft-hinden-6man-hbh-processing-00, 2020-Nov-29:

       * Initial draft.

11. Normative References

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