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H. Singh W. Beebee Cisco Systems, Inc. E. Nordmark Sun Microsystems May 15, 2009

# IPv6 Subnet Model: the Relationship between Links and Subnet Prefixes draft-ietf-6man-ipv6-subnet-model-05

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## Abstract

IPv6 specifies a model of a subnet that is different than the IPv4 subnet model. The subtlety of the differences has resulted in incorrect implementations that do not interoperate. This document spells out the most important difference; that an IPv6 address isn't automatically associated with an IPv6 on-link prefix. This document also updates (partially due to security concerns caused by incorrect implementations) a part of the definition of on-link from [RFC4861].

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### **<u>1</u>**. Introduction

IPv4 implementations typically associate a netmask with an address when an IPv4 address is assigned to an interface. That netmask together with the IPv4 address designates an on-link prefix. Addresses that are covered by this prefix are viewed as on-link i.e., traffic to these addresses is not sent to a router. See <u>section</u> <u>3.3.1 in [RFC1122]</u>. Prior to the deployment of Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR), an address's netmask could be derived directly from the address. In the absence of specifying a specific netmask when assigning an address, some implementations would fall back to deriving the netmask from the class of the address.

The behavior of IPv6 as specified in Neighbor Discovery [RFC4861] is quite different. The on-link determination is separate from the address assignment. A host can have IPv6 addresses without any related on-link prefixes or have on-link prefixes that are not related to any IPv6 addresses that are assigned to the host. Any assigned address on an interface should initially be considered as having no internal structure as shown in [RFC4291].

In IPv6, by default, a host treats only the link-local prefix as onlink.

The reception of a Prefix Information Option (PIO) with the L-bit set [<u>RFC4861</u>] and a non-zero valid lifetime creates (or updates) an entry in the Prefix List. All the prefixes that are on the Prefix List, i.e., have not yet timed out, are considered to be on-link.

The on-link definition in the Terminology section of [<u>RFC4861</u>], as modified by this document, defines the complete list of cases where an address is considered on-link. Individual address entries can be expired by the Neighbor Unreachability Detection mechanism.

IPv6 packets sent using the Conceptual Sending Algorithm as described in [RFC4861] only trigger address resolution for IPv6 addresses that are on-link. Packets to any other address are sent to a default router. If there is no default router, then the node should send an ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable indication as specified in [RFC4861] more details are provided in the Host Behavior and Rules section. (Note that [RFC4861] changed the behavior when the Default Router List is empty. In the old version of Neighbor Discovery [RFC2461], if the Default router List is empty, rather than sending the ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable indication, the [RFC2461] node assumed that the destination was on-link.") Note that ND is scoped to a single link. All Neighbor Solicitation responses are assumed to be sent out the same interface on which the corresponding query was received without using the Conceptual Sending Algorithm.

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Failure of host implementations to correctly implement the IPv6 subnet model can result in lack of IPv6 connectivity. See the Observed Incorrect Implementation Behavior section for details.

This document deprecates the last two bullets from the definition of on-link from [<u>RFC4861</u>] to address security concerns arising from particular ND implementations.

Host behavior is clarified in the Host Behavior and Rules section.

### **2**. Host Behavior

1. The original Neighbor Discovery (ND) specification [RFC4861] was unclear in its usage of the term on-link in a few places. In IPv6, an address is considered to be on-link (with respect to a specific link), if the address has been assigned to an interface attached to that link. Any node attached to the link can send a datagram directly to an on-link address without forwarding the datagram through a router. In IPv6, there are two ways to indicate an address is on-link. First, a host maintains a Prefix List that identifies ranges of addresses that are to be considered on-link. Second, Redirects can identify individual destinations that are on-link; such Redirects update the Destination Cache.

The Prefix List is populated via the following means:

- \* Receipt of a Valid Router Advertisement (RA) that specifies a prefix with the L-bit set. Such a prefix is considered onlink for a period specified in the Valid Lifetime and is added to the Prefix List. (The link-local prefix is effectively considered a permanent entry on the Prefix List.)
- \* Indication of an on-link prefix (which may be a /128) via manual configuration, or some other yet-to-be specified configuration mechanism.

A Redirect can also signal whether an address is on-link. If a host originates a packet, but the first-hop router routes the received packet back out onto the same link, the router also sends the host a Redirect. If the Target and Destination Address

of the Redirect are the same, the Target Address is to be treated as on-link as specified in <u>Section 8 of [RFC4861]</u>. That is, the host updates its Destination Cache (but not its Prefix List -though the impact is similar).

- 2. Note that Redirect Messages do not contain sufficient information to signal that an address is off-link. Rather, they indicate a preferred next-hop that is a more appropriate choice to use than the originator of the Redirect. That alternate next-hop may be the destination itself (in which case packets would flow directly to a neighbor), or a router closer to the destination than the current next-hop router (which is the originator of the Redirect). Note, however, that the Redirect message itself does not contain sufficient information to distinguish these cases. But that does not matter, because the receiver of such a message does the same in either case, updating its Neighbor Cache as defined in <u>Section 8.1 of [RFC4861]</u>.
- 3. IPv6 also defines the term "neighbor" and "link" to refer to nodes attached to the same link and that can send packets directly to each other. Received ND packets that pass the required validation tests can only come from a neighbor attached to the link on which the ND packet was received. Unfortunately, [RFC4861] is imprecise in its definition of on-link and states that a node considers an address to be on-link if:

- a Neighbor Advertisement message is received for the (target) address, or

- any Neighbor Discovery message is received from the address.

Neither of these tests are acceptable definitions for an address to be considered as on-link as defined above, and this document deprecates and removes both of them from the formal definition of on-link. Neither of these tests should be used as justification for modifying the Prefix List or Destination Cache for an address.

The conceptual sending algorithm of [RFC4861] defines a Prefix List and Neighbor Cache. The combination of Prefix List and Neighbor Cache form what many implementations consider to be the IP data forwarding table for a host. Note that the Neighbor

Cache is a separate data structure referenced by the Destination Cache, but entries in the Neighbor Cache are not necessarily in the Destination Cache. It is quite possible (and intentional) that entries be added to the Neighbor Cache for addresses that would not be considered on-link as-defined above. For example, upon receipt of a valid NS, <u>Section 7.2.3 of [RFC4861]</u> states:

If an entry does not already exist, the node SHOULD create a new one and set its reachability state to STALE as specified in <u>Section 7.3.3</u>. If an entry already exists, and the cached link-layer address differs from the one in the received Source Link-Layer option, the cached address should be replaced by the received address, and the entry's reachability state MUST be set to STALE.

The intention of the above feature is to add an address to the Neighbor Cache, even though it might not be considered on-link per the Prefix List. The benefit of such a step is to have the receiver populate the Neighbor Cache with an address it will almost certainly be sending packets to shortly, thus avoiding the need for an additional round of ND to perform address resolution. But because there is no validation of the address being added to the Neighbor Cache, an intruder could spoof the address and cause a receiver to add an address for a remote site to its Neighbor Cache. This vulnerability is a specific instance of the broad set of attacks that are possible by an on-link neighbor [RFC3756]. This causes no problems in practice, so long as the entry only exists in the Neighbor Cache and the address is not considered to be on-link by the IP forwarding code (i.e., the address is not added to the Prefix List and is not marked as onlink in the Destination Cache).

4. After the update to the on-link definition in [<u>RFC4861</u>], certain text from <u>section 7.2.3 of [RFC4861]</u> may appear, upon a cursory examination, to be inconsistent with the updated definition of on-link because the text does not ensure that the source address is already deemed on-link through other methods:

> If the Source Address is not the unspecified address and, onlink layers that have addresses, the solicitation includes a Source Link-Layer Address option, then the recipient SHOULD create or update the Neighbor Cache entry for the IP Source Address of the solicitation.

Similarly, the following text from <u>section 6.2.5 of [RFC4861]</u> may also seem inconsistent:

If there is no existing Neighbor Cache entry for the solicitation's sender, the router creates one, installs the link-layer address and sets its reachability state to STALE as specified in Section 7.3.3.

However, the text in the aforementioned sections of [RFC4861], upon closer inspection, is actually consistent with the deprecation of the last two bullets of the on-link definition because there are two different ways in which on-link determination can affect the state of ND: through updating the Prefix List or the Neighbor Cache. Through deprecating the last two bullets of the on-link definition, the Prefix List is explicitly not to be changed when a node receives an NS, NA, or RS. The Neighbor Cache can still be updated through receipt of an NS, NA, or RS.

5. [RFC4861] is written from the perspective of a host with a single interface on which Neighbor Discovery is run. All ND traffic (whether sent or received) traverses the single interface. On hosts with multiple interfaces, care must be taken to ensure that the scope of ND processing from one link stays local to that link. That is, when responding to a NS, the NA would be sent out on the same link on which it was received. Likewise, a host would not respond to a received NS for an an address assigned to an interface on a different link. Although implementions may choose to implement Neighbor Discovery using a single data structure that merges the Neighbor Caches of all interfaces, an implementation's behavior must be consistent with the above model.

# 3. Host Rules

A correctly implemented IPv6 host MUST adhere to the following rules:

 The assignment of an IPv6 address, whether through IPv6 stateless address autoconfiguration [RFC4862], DHCPv6 [RFC3315], or manual configuration MUST NOT implicitly cause a prefix derived from that address to be treated as on-link and added to the Prefix List. A host considers a prefix to be on-link only through explicit means, such as those specified in the on-link definition in the Terminology section of [RFC4861], as modified by this document, or via manual configuration. Note that the requirement

for manually configured addresses is not explicitly mentioned in [<u>RFC4861</u>].

- In the absence of other sources of on-link information, including Redirects, if the RA advertises a prefix with the on-link(L) bit set and later the Valid Lifetime expires, the host MUST then consider addresses of the prefix to be off-link, as specified by the PIO paragraph of <u>section 6.3.4 of [RFC4861]</u>.
- 3. Newer implementations, which are compliant with [<u>RFC4861</u>] MUST adhere to the following rules. Older implementations, which are compliant with [<u>RFC2461</u>] but not [<u>RFC4861</u>] may remain as is. If the Default Router List is empty and there is no other source of on-link information about any address or prefix:
  - 1. The host MUST NOT assume that all destinations are on-link.
  - 2. The host MUST NOT perform address resolution for non-linklocal addresses.
  - 3. Since the host cannot assume the destination is on-link, and off-link traffic cannot be sent to a default router (since the Default Router List is empty), address resolution cannot be performed. This case is specified in the last paragraph of section 4 of [RFC4943]: when there is no route to destination, the host should send an ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable indication (for example, a locally delivered error message) as specified in the Terminology section of [RFC4861].

On-link information concerning particular addresses and prefixes can make those specific addresses and prefixes on-link, but does not change the default behavior mentioned above for addresses and prefixes not specified. [RFC4943] provides justification for these rules.

4. Hosts MUST verify that on-link information is still valid after IPv6 interface re-initialization before using cached on-link determination information. Failure to do so may lead to lack of IPv6 network connectivity. For example, a host receives an RA from a router with on-link prefix A. The host powers down. During the power off, the router sends out prefix A with on-link

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bit set and a zero lifetime to indicate a renumbering. The host misses the renumbering. The host powers on and comes online. Then, the router sends an RA with no PIO. The host uses cached on-link prefix A and issues NS's instead of sending traffic to a default router. The "Observed Incorrect Implementation Behavior" section below describes how this can result in lack of IPv6 connectivity.

# 4. Observed Incorrect Implementation Behavior

One incorrect implementation behavior illustrates the severe consequences when the IPv6 subnet model is not understood by the implementers of several popular host operating systems. In an access concentrator network ([RFC4388]), a host receives a Router Advertisement Message with no on-link prefix advertised. The host incorrectly assumes an invented prefix is on-link and performs address resolution when the host should send all non-link-local traffic to a default router. Neither the router nor any other host will respond to the address resolution, preventing this host from sending IPv6 traffic.

# 5. Conclusion

This document clarifies and summarizes the relationship between links and subnet prefixes described in [<u>RFC4861</u>]. Configuration of an IPv6 address does not imply the existence of corresponding on-link prefixes. One should also look at API considerations for prefix length as described in last paragraph of <u>section 4.2 of [RFC4903]</u>. This document also updates the definition of on-link from [<u>RFC4861</u>] by retracting the last two bullets.

# <u>6</u>. Security Considerations

This document addresses a security concern present in [<u>RFC4861</u>]. As a result, the last bullet of the on-link definition in [<u>RFC4861</u>] has been retracted. US-CERT Vulnerability Note VU#472363 lists the implementations affected.

# 7. IANA Considerations

None.

#### 8. Contributors

Thomas Narten contributed significant text and provided substantial guidance to the production of this document.

#### 9. Acknowledgements

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# **10**. References

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Authors' Addresses

Hemant Singh Cisco Systems, Inc. 1414 Massachusetts Ave. Boxborough, MA 01719 USA

Phone: +1 978 936 1622 Email: shemant@cisco.com URI: <u>http://www.cisco.com/</u>

Wes Beebee Cisco Systems, Inc. 1414 Massachusetts Ave. Boxborough, MA 01719 USA

Phone: +1 978 936 2030 Email: wbeebee@cisco.com URI: http://www.cisco.com/

Erik Nordmark Sun Microsystems 17 Network Circle Menlo Park, CA 94025 USA

Phone: +1 650 786 2921 Email: erik.nordmark@sun.com