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Key Provisioning for Group Communication using ACE

Abstract

This document defines message formats and procedures for requesting
and distributing group keying material using the ACE framework, to
protect communications between group members.

Discussion Venues

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/ace-wg/ace-key-groupcomm.

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1. Introduction

This document expands the ACE framework [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] to define the message exchanges used to request, distribute and renew the keying material in a group communication scenario, e.g. based on multicast [I-D.ietf-core-groupcomm-bis] or on publishing-subscribing [I-D.ietf-core-coap-pubsub]. The ACE framework is based on CBOR [RFC7049], so CBOR is the format used in this specification. However, using JSON [RFC8259] instead of CBOR is possible, using the conversion method specified in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 of [RFC7049].

Profiles that use group communication can build on this document, by defining a number of details such as the exact group communication protocol and security protocols used. The specific list of details a profile needs to define is shown in Appendix A.

If the application requires backward and forward security, new keying material is generated and distributed to the group upon membership changes. A key management scheme performs the actual distribution of the new keying material to the group. In particular, the key management scheme rekeys the current group members when a new node joins the group, and the remaining group members when a node leaves the group. Rekeying mechanisms can be based on [RFC2093], [RFC2094] and [RFC2627].

1.1. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Readers are expected to be familiar with the terms and concepts described in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz][I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-struct][I-D.ietf-cose-rfc8152bis-algs], such as Authorization Server (AS) and Resource Server (RS).

This document uses names or identifiers for groups and nodes. Their different meanings are summarized here:

  *"Group name" is the invariant once established identifier of the group. It is used in the communication between AS, RS and Client to identify the group.

  *"GROUPNAME" is the invariant once established text string used in URIs. GROUPNAME maps to the group name of a group, although it is not necessarily the same.

  *"Group identifier" is the identifier of the group keying material. Opposite to group name and GROUPNAME, this identifier changes over time, when the keying material is updated.

  *"NODENAME" is the invariant once established text string used in URIs. NODENAME is used to identify a node in a group.

This document additionally uses the following terminology:

  *Transport profile, to indicate a profile of ACE as per Section 5.6.4.3 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. A transport profile specifies the communication protocol and communication security protocol between an ACE Client and Resource Server, as well as proof-of-possession methods, if it supports proof-of-possession access tokens, etc. Tranport profiles of ACE include, for instance, [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile], [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] and [I-D.ietf-ace-mqtt-tls-profile].

  *Application profile, that defines how applications enforce and use supporting security services they require. These services may include, for instance, provisioning, revocation and distribution of keying material. An application profile may define specific procedures and message formats.

2. Overview

The full procedure can be separated in two phases: the first follows the ACE framework, between Client, AS and KDC. The second part is the key distribution between Client and KDC. After the two phases the Client is able to participate in the group communication, via a Dispatcher entity.

```
        +------------+                 +-----------+
        |     AS     |                 |    KDC    |
        |            |      .-------->|            |
        +------------+     /           +-----------+
             ^            /
             |           /
             v          /                    +-----------+
        +------------+  /      +------------+ |+-----------+
        |   Client   |<-'      | Dispatcher | ||+-----------+
        |            |<-------->|            |  |<------->||   Group   |
        +------------+          +------------+  +|  members  |
                                                 +-----------+
```

Figure 1: Key Distribution Participants

The following participants (see Figure 1) take part in the
authorization and key distribution.

  *Client (C): node that wants to join the group communication. It
   can request write and/or read rights.

  *Authorization Server (AS): same as AS in the ACE Framework; it
   enforces access policies, and knows if a node is allowed to join
   a given group with write and/or read rights.

  *Key Distribution Center (KDC): maintains the keying material to
   protect group communications, and provides it to Clients
   authorized to join a given group. During the first part of the
   exchange (Section 3), it takes the role of the RS in the ACE
   Framework. During the second part (Section 4), which is not based
   on the ACE Framework, it distributes the keying material. In
   addition, it provides the latest keying material to group members
   when requested or, if required by the application, when
   membership changes.

  *Dispatcher: entity through which the Clients communicate with the
   group and which distributes messages to the group members.
   Examples of dispatchers are: the Broker node in a pub-sub
   setting; a relayer node for group communication that delivers
   group messages as multiple unicast messages to all group members;
   an implicit entity as in a multicast communication setting, where
   messages are transmitted to a multicast IP address and delivered
   on the transport channel.

This document specifies a mechanism for:

  *Authorizing a new node to join the group (Section 3), and
   providing it with the group keying material to communicate with
   the other group members (Section 4).

*Allowing a group member to leave the group (Section 5).

*Evicting a group member from the group (Section 5).

*Allowing a group member to retrieve keying material (Section 4.4 and Section 4.5).

*Renewing and re-distributing the group keying material (rekeying) upon a membership change in the group (Section 4.10 and Section 5).

Figure 2 provides a high level overview of the message flow for a node joining a group communication setting, which can be expanded as follows.

1. The joining node requests an Access Token from the AS, in order to access a specific group-membership resource on the KDC and hence join the associated group. This exchange between Client and AS MUST be secured, as specified by the transport profile of ACE used between Client and KDC. The joining node will start or continue using a secure communication association with the KDC, according to the response from the AS.

2. The joining node transfers authentication and authorization information to the KDC, by posting the obtained Access Token to the /authz-info endpoint at the KDC. This exchange, and all further communications between the Client and the KDC, MUST occur over the secure channel established as a result of the transport profile of ACE used between Client and KDC. After that, a joining node MUST have a secure communication association established with the KDC, before starting to join a group under that KDC. Possible ways to provide a secure communication association are described in the DTLS transport profile [I-D.ietf-ace-dtls-authorize] and OSCORE transport profile [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile] of ACE.

3. The joining node starts the joining process to become a member of the group, by accessing the related group-membership resource at the KDC. At the end of the joining process, the joining node has received from the KDC the parameters and keying material to securely communicate with the other members of the group, and the KDC has stored the association between the authorization information from the access token and the secure session with the client.

4. The joining node and the KDC maintain the secure association, to support possible future communications. These especially include key management operations, such as retrieval of updated keying material or participation to a group rekeying process.

5. The joining node can communicate securely with the other group
    members, using the keying material provided in step 3.


```
                   C                             AS   KDC               Group
                   |                             |    |                Member
               /   |                             |    |                    |
               |   |    Authorization Request    |    |                    |
      Defined  |   |---------------------------->|    |                    |
      in the   |   |                             |    |                    |
       ACE     |   |    Authorization Response   |    |                    |
    framework  |   |<----------------------------|    |                    |
               |   |                             |    |                    |
               \   |---------- Token Post --------->|                      |
                   |                                 |                      |
                   |------- Joining Request ------->|                       |
                   |                                 |                      |
                   |<------ Joining Response -------|-- Group Rekeying -->|
                   |                                 |                      |
                   |                                      Dispatcher       |
                   |                                 |        |            |
                   |<===== Secure group communication =======|==========>|
                   |                                 |        |            |
```

              Figure 2: Message Flow Upon New Node's Joining

3. Authorization to Join a Group

   This section describes in detail the format of messages exchanged by
   the participants when a node requests access to a given group. This
   exchange is based on ACE [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

   As defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], the Client requests from
   the AS an authorization to join the group through the KDC (see
   Section 3.1). If the request is approved and authorization is
   granted, the AS provides the Client with a proof-of-possession
   access token and parameters to securely communicate with the KDC
   (see Section 3.2).

   Communications between the Client and the AS MUST be secured, as
   defined by the transport profile of ACE used. The Content-Format
   used in the message depends on the used transport profile of ACE.
   For example, this can be application/ace+cbor for the first two
   messages and application/cwt for the third message, which are
   defined in the ACE framework. The transport profile of ACE also
   defines a number of details such as the communication and security
   protocols used with the KDC (see Appendix C of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-
   authz]).

   Figure 3 gives an overview of the exchange described above.

```
      Client                                              AS   KDC
         |                                                |    |
         |---- Authorization Request: POST /token ------>|    |
         |                                                |    |
         |<--- Authorization Response: 2.01 (Created) ---|    |
         |                                                |    |
         |----- POST Token: POST /authz-info --------------->|
         |                                                     |
```

                 Figure 3: Message Flow of Join Authorization

3.1. Authorization Request

The Authorization Request sent from the Client to the AS is defined
in Section 5.6.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] and MAY contain the
following parameters, which, if included, MUST have the
corresponding values:

  *'scope', containing the identifier of the specific group(s), or
   topic(s) in the case of pub-sub, that the Client wishes to
   access, and optionally the role(s) that the Client wishes to
   take.

   This value is a CBOR byte string, encoding a CBOR array of one or
   more entries.

   By default, each entry is encoded as specified by [I-D.bormann-
   core-ace-aif]. The object identifier Toid corresponds to the
   group name and MUST be encoded as a tstr. The permission set
   Tperm indicates the roles that the client wishes to take in the
   group. It is up to the application profiles to define Tperm
   (REQ2) and register Toid and Tperm to fit the use case. An
   example of scope using the AIF format is given in Figure 5.

   Otherwise, each scope entry can be defined as a CBOR array, which
   contains:

     -As first element, the identifier of the specific group or
      topic, encoded as a tstr.

     -Optionally, as second element, the role (or CBOR array of
      roles) that the Client wishes to take in the group. This
      element is optional since roles may have been pre-assigned to
      the Client, as associated to its verifiable identity
      credentials. Alternatively, the application may have defined a
      single, well-known role for the target resource(s) and
      audience(s).

In each entry, the encoding of the role identifiers is
application specific, and part of the requirements for the
application profile (REQ2). In particular, the application
profile may specify CBOR values to use for abbreviating role
identifiers (OPT7).

An example of CDDL definition [RFC8610] of scope using the format
above, with group name and role identifiers encoded as text
strings is given in Figure 4.

*'audience', with an identifier of a KDC.

*'req_cnf', as defined in Section 3.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-
params], optionally containing the public key or a reference to
the public key of the Client, if it wishes to communicate that to
the AS.

Other additional parameters as defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-
authz], can be included if necessary.

As in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], these parameters are included in
the payload, which is formatted as a CBOR map. The Content-Format
"application/ace+cbor" defined in Section 8.14 of [I-D.ietf-ace-
oauth-authz] is used.

```
gname = tstr

role = tstr

scope_entry = [ gname , ? ( role / [ 2*role ] ) ]

scope = << [ + scope_entry ] >>
```

Figure 4: CDLL definition of scope, using as example group name encoded
as tstr and role as tstr

```
            gname = tstr

            permissions = uint . bits roles

            roles = &(
               Requester: 1,
               Responder: 2,
               Monitor: 3,
               Verifier: 4
            )

            scope_entry = AIF_Generic<gname, permissions>

            scope = << [ + scope_entry ] >>
```

Figure 5: Example CDLL definition of scope, using the default
                Authorization Information Format

3.2. Authorization Response

The Authorization Response sent from the AS to the Client is defined
in Section 5.6.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] and MUST contain the
following parameters:

*'access_token', containing the proof-of-possession access token.

*'cnf' if symmetric keys are used, not present if asymmetric keys
 are used. This parameter is defined in Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-
 ace-oauth-params] and contains the symmetric proof-of-possession
 key that the Client is supposed to use with the KDC.

*'rs_cnf' if asymmetric keys are used, not present if symmetric
 keys are used. This parameter is defined in Section 3.2 of [I-
 D.ietf-ace-oauth-params] and contains information about the
 public key of the KDC.

*'expires_in', contains the lifetime in seconds of the access
 token. This parameter MAY be omitted if the application defines
 how the expiration time is communicated to the Client via other
 means, or if it establishes a default value.

Additionally, the Authorization Response MAY contain the following
parameters, which, if included, MUST have the corresponding values:

*'scope' containing the scope the AS grants access to. This
 parameter has the same format and encoding of 'scope' in the
 Authorization Request, defined in Section 3.1. If this parameter
 is not present the granted scope is equal to the one requested in
 Section 3.1}.

Other additional parameters as defined in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], if necessary.

The proof-of-possession access token (in 'access_token' above) MUST contain the following parameters:

  *a confirmation claim (see for example 'cnf' defined in Section 3.1 of [RFC8747] for CWT);

  *an expiration time claim (see for example 'exp' defined in Section 3.1.4 of [RFC8392] for CWT);

  *a scope claim (see for example 'scope' registered in Section 8.13 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz] for CWT). This claim has the same encoding as 'scope' parameter above. Additionally, this claim has the same value of the 'scope' parameter if the parameter is present in the message, or it takes the value of 'scope' in the Authorization Request otherwise.

The access token MAY additionally contain other claims that the transport profile of ACE requires, or other optional parameters.

As in [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz], these parameters are included in the payload, which is formatted as a CBOR map. The Content-Format "application/ace+cbor" is used.

When receiving an Authorization Request from a Client that was previously authorized, and for which the AS still owns a valid non-expired access token, the AS MAY reply with that token. Note that it is up to application profiles of ACE to make sure that re-posting the same token does not cause re-use of keying material between nodes (for example, that is done with the use of random nonces in [I-D.ietf-ace-oscore-profile]).

3.3. Token Post

The Client sends a CoAP POST request including the access token to the KDC, as specified in Section 5.8.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. If the specific transport profile of ACE defines it, the Client MAY use a different endpoint than /authz-info at the KDC to post the access token to.

Optionally, the Client might want to request encoding information about the public keys in the group, used for source authentication, as well as any other group parameters. The joining node MAY ask for this information from the KDC in the same message it uses to POST the token to the RS.

The payload of the message MUST be formatted as a CBOR map including the access token.

Additionally, the CoAP POST request MAY contain the following
parameter, which, if included, MUST have the corresponding values:

  *'sign_info' defined in Section 3.3.1, encoding the CBOR simple
   value Null to require information about the signature algorithm,
   signature algorithm parameters, signature key parameters and on
   the exact encoding of public keys used in the group.

Alternatively, the joining node may retrieve this information by
other means.

After successful verification, the Client is authorized to receive
the group keying material from the KDC and join the group.

The KDC replies to the Client with a 2.01 (Created) response, using
Content-Format "application/ace+cbor" defined in Section 8.14 of [I-
D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz].

The payload of the 2.01 response is a CBOR map. If the access token
contains a role that requires the Client to send its own public key
to the KDC when joining the group, the CBOR map MUST include the
parameter 'kdcchallenge' defined in Section Section 3.3.2,
specifying a dedicated challenge N_S generated by the KDC. The
Client uses this challenge to prove possession of its own private
key (see the 'client_cred_verify' parameter in Section 4). Note that
the payload format of the response deviates from the one defined in
the ACE framework (see Section 5.8.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]),
which has no payload.

The KDC MUST store the 'kdcchallenge' value associated to the Client
at least until it receives a join request from it (see Section 4.3),
to be able to verify the proof of possession. The same challenge MAY
be reused several times by the Client, to generate new proof of
possessions, e.g. in case of update of the public key, or to join a
different group with a different signing key, so it is RECOMMENDED
that the KDC keeps storing the 'kdcchallenge' after the first join
is processed as well. If the KDC has already discarded the
'kdcchallenge', that will trigger an error response with a newly
generated 'kdcchallenge' that the client can use to restart the join
process, as specified in Section 4.3.

If 'sign_info' is included in the request, the KDC MAY include the
'sign_info' parameter defined in Section 3.3.1, with the same
encoding. Note that the field 'id' takes the value of the group name
for which the 'sign_info_entry' applies to.

Note that the CBOR map specified as payload of the 2.01 (Created)
response may include further parameters, e.g. according to the
signalled transport profile of ACE.

Application profiles of this specification MAY define alternative specific negotiations of parameter values for signature algorithm and signature keys, if 'sign_info' is not used (OPT2).

3.3.1. 'sign_info' Parameter

The 'sign_info' parameter is an OPTIONAL parameter of the Token Post response message defined in Section 5.1.2. of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. This parameter contains information and parameters about the signature algorithm and the public keys to be used between the Client and the RS. Its exact content is application specific.

In this specification and in application profiles building on it, this parameter is used to ask and retrieve from the KDC information about the signature algorithm and related parameters used in the group.

When used in the request, the 'sign_info' encodes the CBOR simple value Null, to require information and parameters on the signature algorithm and on the public keys used.

The CDDL notation [RFC8610] of the 'sign_info' parameter formatted as in the request is given below.

sign_info_req = nil

The 'sign_info' parameter of the 2.01 (Created) response is a CBOR array of one or more elements. The number of elements is at most the number of groups the client has been authorized to join. Each element contains information about signing parameters and keys for one or more group or topic and is formatted as follows.

  *The first element 'id' is an identifier of the group or an array of identifiers for the groups for which this information applies.

  *The second element 'sign_alg' is an integer or a text string if the POST request included the 'sign_info' parameter with value Null, and indicates the signature algorithm used in the group identified by 'gname'. It is REQUIRED of the application profiles to define specific values that this parameter can take (REQ3), selected from the set of signing algorithms of the COSE Algorithms registry [COSE.Algorithms].

  *The third element 'sign_parameters' is a CBOR array indicating the parameters of the signature algorithm. Its content depends on the value of 'sign_alg'. It is REQUIRED of the application profiles to define the possible values and structure for the elements of this parameter (REQ4).

*The fourth element 'sign_key_parameters' is a CBOR array
   indicating the parameters of the key used with the signature
   algorithm. Its content depends on the value of 'sign_alg'. It is
   REQUIRED of the application profiles to define the possible
   values and structure for the elements of this parameter (REQ5).

  *The fifth element 'pub_key_enc' parameter is either a CBOR
   integer indicating the encoding of public keys used in the group
   identified by 'gname', or has value Null indicating that the KDC
   does not act as repository of public keys for group members. Its
   acceptable values are taken from the "CWT Confirmation Method"
   Registry defined in [RFC8747]. It is REQUIRED of the application
   profiles to define specific values to use for this parameter
   (REQ6).

The CDDL notation [RFC8610] of the 'sign_info' parameter formatted
as in the response is given below.

```
sign_info_res = [ + sign_info_entry ]

sign_info_entry =
[
  id : gname / [ + gname ],
  sign_alg : int / tstr,
  sign_parameters : [ any ],
  sign_key_parameters : [ any ],
  pub_key_enc = int / nil
]

gname = tstr
```

3.3.2. 'kdcchallenge' Parameter

The 'kdcchallenge' parameter is an OPTIONAL parameter of the Token
Post response message defined in Section 5.1.2. of [I-D.ietf-ace-
oauth-authz]. This parameter contains a challenge generated by the
KDC and provided to the Client. The Client may use this challenge to
prove possession of its own private key in the Joining Request (see
the 'client_cred_verify' parameter in Section 4).

4. Keying Material Provisioning and Group Membership Management

This section defines the interface available at the KDC. Moreover,
this section specifies how the clients can use this interface to
join a group, leave a group, retrieve the group policies or the new
keying material.

During the first exchange with the KDC ("Joining") after posting the
Token, the Client sends a request to the KDC, specifying the group
it wishes to join (see Section 4.3). Then, the KDC verifies the

access token and that the Client is authorized to join that group. If so, it provides the Client with the keying material to securely communicate with the other members of the group. Whenever used, the Content-Format in messages containing a payload is set to application/ace-groupcomm+cbor, as defined in Section 8.2.

When the Client is already a group member, the Client can use the interface at the KDC to perform the following actions:

  *The Client can get the current keying material, for cases such as expiration, loss or suspected mismatch, due to e.g. reboot or missed group rekeying. This is described in Section 4.4.

  *The Client can retrieve new keying material for itself. This is described in Section 4.5.

  *The Client can get the public keys of other group members. This is described in Section 4.6.

  *The Client can get the group policies. This is described in Section 4.8.

  *The Client can get the version number of the keying material currently used in the group. This is described in Section 4.9.

  *The Client can request to leave the group. This is further discussed in Section 4.10.

Upon receiving a request from a Client, the KDC MUST check that it is storing a valid access token from that Client for the group name associated to the endpoint. If that is not the case, i.e. the KDC does not store a valid access token or this is not valid for that Client for the group name, the KDC MUST respond to the Client with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error message.

4.1. Interface at the KDC

The KDC is configured with the following resources. Note that the root url-path "ace-group" given here are default names: implementations are not required to use these names, and can define their own instead. Each application profile of this specification MUST register a Resource Type for the root url-path (REQ7a), and that Resource Type can be used to discover the correct url to access at the KDC. This Resource Type can also be used at the GROUPNAME sub-resource, to indicate different application profiles for different groups. The Interface Description (if=) Link Target

Attribute value ace.group is registered (Section 8.10) and can be used to describe this interface.

  */ace-group: this resource is invariant once established and indicates that this specification is used. If other applications run on a KDC implementing this specification and use this same resource, these applications will collide, and a mechanism will be needed to differentiate the endpoints. This resource supports FETCH method.

  */ace-group/GROUPNAME: one sub-resource to /ace-group is implemented for each group the KDC manages. If the value of the GROUPNAME URI path and the group name in the access token scope (gname in Section 3.2) don't match, the KDC MUST implement a mechanism to map the GROUPNAME value in the URI to the group name, to retrieve the right group (REQ1). Each resource contains the symmetric group keying material for that group. These resources support GET and POST method.

  */ace-group/GROUPNAME/pub-key: this resource is invariant once established and contains the public keys of all group members. This resource supports GET and FETCH methods.

  */ace-group/GROUPNAME/policies: this resource is invariant once established and contains the group policies. This resource supports the GET method.

  */ace-group/GROUPNAME/num: this resource is invariant once established and contains the version number for the symmetric group keying material. This sub-resource supports the GET method.

  */ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME: one sub-resource to /ace-group/GROUPNAME is implemented for each node in the group the KDC manages. These resources are identified by the node name (in this example, the node name has value "NODENAME"). Each resource contains the group and individual keying material for that node. These resources support GET, PUT and DELETE methods.

  */ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME/pub-key: one sub-resource to /ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME is implemented for each node in the group the KDC manages. These resources are identified by the node name (in this example, the node name has value "NODENAME"). Each resource contains the individual public keying material for that node. These resources support the POST method.

The details for the handlers of each resource are given in the following sections. These endpoints are used to perform the operations introduced in Section 4.

4.1.1. ace-group

This resource implements a FETCH handler.

4.1.1.1. FETCH Handler

The FETCH handler receives group identifiers and returns the corresponding group names and GROUPNAME URIs.

The handler expects a request with payload formatted as a CBOR map. The payload of this request is a CBOR Map that MUST contain the following fields:

* 'gid', whose value is encoded as a CBOR array, containing one or more group identifiers. The exact encoding of group identifier MUST be specified by the application profile (REQ7b). The Client indicates that it wishes to receive the group names and GROUPNAMEs of all groups having these identifiers.

The handler identifies the groups that are secured by the keying material identified by those group identifiers.

Then, the handler returns a 2.05 (Content) message response with payload formatted as a CBOR map that MUST contain the following fields:

* 'gid', whose value is encoded as a CBOR array, containing zero or more group identifiers. The handler indicates that those are the identifiers it is sending group names and GROUPNAMEs for. This CBOR array is a subset of the 'gid' array in the FETCH request.

* 'gname', whose value is encoded as a CBOR array, containing zero or more group names. The elements of this array are encoded as text strings. Each element of index i of this CBOR array corresponds to the element of group identifier i in the 'gid' array.

* 'guri', whose value is encoded as a CBOR array, containing zero or more URIs, each indicating a GROUPNAME resource. The elements of this array are encoded as text strings. Each element of index i of this CBOR array corresponds to the element of group identifier i in the 'gid' array.

If the KDC does not find any group associated with the specified group identifiers, the handler returns a response with payload formatted as a CBOR byte string of zero length.

4.1.2. ace-group/GROUPNAME

This resource implements GET and POST handlers.

4.1.2.1. POST Handler

The POST handler adds the public key of the client to the list of the group members' public keys and returns the symmetric group keying material for the group identified by "GROUPNAME". Note that the group joining exchange is done by the client via this operation, as described in Section 4.3.

The handler expects a request with payload formatted as a CBOR map which MAY contain the following fields, which, if included, MUST have the corresponding values:

  *'scope', with value the specific resource at the KDC that the Client is authorized to access, i.e. group or topic identifier, and role(s). This value is a CBOR byte string encoding one scope entry, as defined in Section 3.1.

  *'get_pub_keys', if the Client wishes to receive the public keys of the other nodes in the group from the KDC. This parameter may be present if the KDC stores the public keys of the nodes in the group and distributes them to the Client; it is useless to have here if the set of public keys of the members of the group is known in another way, e.g. it was provided by the AS. Note that including this parameter may result in a large message size for the following response, which can be inconvenient for resource-constrained devices. The parameter's value is a non-empty CBOR array containing two CBOR arrays:

    -The first array contains zero or more roles (or combination of roles) of group members for the group identified by "GROUPNAME". The Client indicates that it wishes to receive the public keys of all nodes having these roles. If empty, it means the client wishes to receive the public keys of all nodes.

    -The second array is empty.

  The CDDL definition [RFC8610] of 'get_pub_keys' is given in Figure 6 using as example encoding: node identifier encoded as byte string, role identifier as text string, and combination of roles encoded as a CBOR array of roles. Note that the array ids is empty for this handler, but is not necessarily empty for the value of "get_pub_keys" received by the handler of FETCH to ace-group/GROUPNAME/pub-key (see Section 4.1.3.1).

```
      id = bstr

      role = tstr

      comb_role = [ 2*role ]

      get_pub_keys = [ [ *(role / comb_role) ], [ *id ] ]
```

Figure 6: CDLL definition of get_pub_keys, using as example node
identifier encoded as bstr and role as tstr

*'client_cred', with value the public key or certificate of the
 Client, encoded as a CBOR byte string. This field contains the
 public key of the Client. This field is used if the KDC is
 managing (collecting from/distributing to the Client) the public
 keys of the group members, and if the Client's role in the group
 will require for it to send messages to one or more group
 members. The default encoding for public keys is COSE Keys.
 Alternative specific encodings of this parameter MAY be defined
 in applications of this specification (OPT1 in Appendix A).

*'cnonce', encoded as a CBOR byte string, and including a
 dedicated nonce N_C generated by the Client. This parameter MUST
 be present if the 'client_cred' parameter is present.

*'client_cred_verify', encoded as a CBOR byte string. This
 parameter MUST be present if the 'client_cred' parameter is
 present and no public key associated to the client's token can be
 retrieved for that group. This parameter contains a signature
 computed by the Client over the scope concatenated with N_S
 concatenated with N_C, where:

   -scope is the byte string specified in the 'scope parameter
    above'.

   -N_S is the challenge received from the KDC in the
    'kdcchallenge' parameter of the 2.01 (Created) response to the
    token POST request (see Section 3.3).

   -N_C is the nonce generated by the Client and specified in the
    'cnonce' parameter above.

If the token was not posted (e.g. if it is used directly to
validate TLS instead), it is REQUIRED of the specific profile to
define how the challenge N_S is generated (REQ17). The Client
computes the signature by using its own private key, whose
corresponding public key is either directly specified in the
'client_cred' parameter or included in the certificate specified
in the 'client_cred' parameter.

*'pub_keys_repos', can be present if a certificate is present in
 the 'client_cred' field, with value the URI of the certificate of
 the Client. This parameter is encoded as a CBOR text string.
 Alternative specific encodings of this parameter MAY be defined
 in applications of this specification (OPT3).

*'control_path', with value a full URI, encoded as a CBOR text
 string. If 'control_path' is supported by the Client, the Client
 acts as a CoAP server and hosts a resource at this specific URI.
 The KDC MAY use this URI to send CoAP requests to the Client
 (acting as CoAP server in this exchange), for example for
 individual provisioning of new keying material when performing a
 group rekeying (see Section 4.4), or to inform the Client of its
 removal from the group Section 5. If the KDC does not implement
 mechanisms using this resource, it can just ignore this
 parameter. Other additional functionalities of this resource MAY
 be defined in application profiles of this specifications (OPT9).
 In particular, this resource is intended for communications
 concerning exclusively the group or topic specified in the
 'scope' parameter.

The handler extracts the granted scope from the access token, and
checks the requested one against the token one. If this join message
does not include a 'scope' field, the KDC is expected to understand
which group and role the Client is requesting (e.g. there is only
one the Client has been granted). If the KDC can not recognize which
scope the Client is requesting, it MUST respond with a 4.00 (Bad
Request) error message.

The handler verifies that the group name of the /ace-group/GROUPNAME
path is a subset of the 'scope' stored in the access token
associated to this client. If verification fails, the KDC MUST
respond with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error message. The KDC MAY
respond with an AS Request Creation Hints, as defined in Section
5.1.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. Note that in this case, the
content format MUST be set to application/ace+cbor.

If the request is not formatted correctly (i.e. required fields non
received or received with incorrect format), the handler MUST
respond with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error message. The response MAY
contain a CBOR map in the payload with ace+cbor format, e.g. it
could send back 'sign_info_res' with 'pub_key_enc' set to Null if
the Client sent its own public key and the KDC is not set to store
public keys of the group members. If the request contained unknown
or non-expected fields present, the handler MUST silently drop them
and continue processing. Application profiles MAY define optional or
mandatory payload formats for specific error cases (OPT6).

If the KDC stores the group members' public keys, the handler checks
if one is included in the 'client_cred' field, retrieves it and
associates it to the access token received, after verifications
succeeded. In particular, the KDC verifies:

  *that such public key has an acceptable format for the group
   identified by "GROUPNAME", i.e. it is encoded as expected and is
   compatible with the signature algorithm and possible associated
   parameters.

  *that the signature contained in "client_cred_verify" passes
   verification.

If that cannot be verified, it is RECOMMENDED that the handler stops
the process and responds with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error message.
Applications profiles MAY define alternatives (OPT5).

If one public key is already associated to the access token and to
that group, but the 'client_cred' is populated with a different
public key, the handler MUST delete the previous one and replace it
with this one, after verifying the points above.

If no public key is included in the 'client_cred' field, the handler
checks if one public key is already associated to the access token
received (see Section 4.3 for an example) and to the group
identified by "GROUPNAME". If that is not the case, the handler
responds with a 4.00 Bad Request error response.

If the token was posted but the KDC cannot retrieve the
'kdcchallenge' associated to this Client (see Section 3.3), the KDC
MUST respond with a 4.00 Bad Request error response, including a
newly generated 'kdcchallenge' in a CBOR map in the payload. This
error response MUST also have Content-Format "application/ace+cbor".

If all verifications succeed, the handler:

  *Adds the node to the list of current members of the group.

  *Assigns a name NODENAME to the node, and creates a sub-resource
   to /ace-group/GROUPNAME/ at the KDC (e.g. "/ace-group/GROUPNAME/
   nodes/NODENAME").

  *Associates the identifier "NODENAME" with the access token and
   the secure session for that node.

  *If the KDC manages public keys for group members:

     -Adds the retrieved public key of the node to the list of
      public keys stored for the group identified by "GROUPNAME"

-Associates the node's public key with its access token and the
       group identified by "GROUPNAME", if such association did not
       already exist.

   *Returns a 2.01 (Created) message containing the symmetric group
    keying material, the group policies and all the public keys of
    the current members of the group, if the KDC manages those and
    the Client requested them.

The response message also contains the URI path to the sub-resource
created for that node in a Location-Path CoAP option. The payload of
the response is formatted as a CBOR map which MUST contain the
following fields and values:

   *'gkty', identifying the key type of the 'key' parameter. The set
    of values can be found in the "Key Type" column of the "ACE
    Groupcomm Key" Registry. Implementations MUST verify that the key
    type matches the application profile being used, if present, as
    registered in the "ACE Groupcomm Key" registry.

   *'key', containing the keying material for the group
    communication, or information required to derive it.

   *'num', containing the version number of the keying material for
    the group communication, formatted as an integer. This is a
    strictly monotonic increasing field. The application profile MUST
    define the initial version number (REQ19).

The exact format of the 'key' value MUST be defined in applications
of this specification (REQ7), as well as accepted values of 'gkty'
by the application (REQ8). Additionally, documents specifying the
key format MUST register it in the "ACE Groupcomm Key" registry
defined in Section 8.6, including its name, type and application
profile to be used with.

   +----------+----------------+---------+------------------------+
   | Name | Key Type Value | Profile | Description |
   +----------+----------------+---------+------------------------+
   | Reserved | 0 | | This value is reserved |
   +----------+----------------+---------+------------------------+

                     Figure 7: Key Type Values

The response SHOULD contain the following parameter:

   *'exp', with value the expiration time of the keying material for
    the group communication, encoded as a CBOR unsigned integer. This
    field contains a numeric value representing the number of seconds
    from 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z UTC until the specified UTC date/time,

ignoring leap seconds, analogous to what specified for
NumericDate in Section 2 of [RFC7519]. Group members MUST stop
using the keying material to protect outgoing messages and
retrieve new keying material at the time indicated in this field.

Optionally, the response MAY contain the following parameters,
which, if included, MUST have the corresponding values:

  * 'ace-groupcomm-profile', with value a CBOR integer that MUST be
    used to uniquely identify the application profile for group
    communication. Applications of this specification MUST register
    an application profile identifier and the related value for this
    parameter in the "ACE Groupcomm Profile" Registry (REQ12).

  * 'pub_keys', may only be present if 'get_pub_keys' was present in
    the request. This parameter is a CBOR byte string, which encodes
    the public keys of all the group members paired with the
    respective member identifiers. The default encoding for public
    keys is COSE Keys, so the default encoding for 'pub_keys' is a
    CBOR byte string wrapping a COSE_KeySet (see [I-D.ietf-cose-
    rfc8152bis-struct]), which contains the public keys of all the
    members of the group. In particular, each COSE Key in the
    COSE_KeySet includes the identifier of the corresponding group
    member as value of its 'kid' key parameter. Alternative specific
    encodings of this parameter MAY be defined in applications of
    this specification (OPT1). The specific format of the identifiers
    of group members MUST be specified in the application profile
    (REQ9).

  * 'peer_roles', MUST be present if 'pub_keys' is present. This
    parameter is a CBOR array of n elements, with n the number of
    members in the group (and number of public keys included in the
    'pub_keys' parameter). The i-th element of the array specifies
    the role (or CBOR array of roles) that the group member
    associated to the i-th public key in 'pub_keys' has in the group.
    In particular, each array element is encoded as the role element
    of a scope entry, as defined in Section 3.1.

  * 'group_policies', with value a CBOR map, whose entries specify
    how the group handles specific management aspects. These include,
    for instance, approaches to achieve synchronization of sequence
    numbers among group members. The elements of this field are
    registered in the "ACE Groupcomm Policy" Registry. This
    specification defines the three elements "Sequence Number
    Synchronization Method", "Key Update Check Interval" and
    "Expiration Delta", which are summarized in Figure 8. Application
    profiles that build on this document MUST specify the exact
    content format and default value of included map entries (REQ14).

```
+--------------+-------+----------+--------------------|-----------+
|     Name     | CBOR  |   CBOR   |    Description      | Reference |
|              | label |   type   |                     |           |
|--------------+-------+----------|--------------------|-----------|
| Sequence     | TBD1  | tstr/int | Method for a re-    | [[this    |
| Number       |       |          | cipient node to     | document]]|
| Synchroniza- |       |          | synchronize with    |           |
| tion Method  |       |          | sequence numbers    |           |
|              |       |          | of a sender node.   |           |
|              |       |          | Its value is taken  |           |
|              |       |          | from the 'Value'    |           |
|              |       |          | column of the       |           |
|              |       |          | Sequence Number     |           |
|              |       |          | Synchronization     |           |
|              |       |          | Method registry     |           |
|              |       |          |                     |           |
| Key Update   | TBD2  |   int    | Polling interval    | [[this    |
| Check        |       |          | in seconds, to      | document]]|
| Interval     |       |          | check for new       |           |
|              |       |          | keying material at  |           |
|              |       |          | the KDC             |           |
|              |       |          |                     |           |
| Expiration   | TBD3  |   uint   | Number of seconds   | [[this    |
| Delta        |       |          | from 'exp' until    | document]]|
|              |       |          | the specified UTC   |           |
|              |       |          | date/time after     |           |
|              |       |          | which group members|           |
|              |       |          | MUST stop using the|           |
|              |       |          | keying material to  |           |
|              |       |          | verify incoming     |           |
|              |       |          | messages.           |           |
+--------------+-------+----------+--------------------|-----------+
```

Figure 8: ACE Groupcomm Policies

*'mgt_key_material', encoded as a CBOR byte string and containing
 the administrative keying material to participate in the group
 rekeying performed by the KDC. The application profile MUST
 define if this field is used, and if used then MUST specify the
 exact format and content which depend on the specific rekeying
 scheme used in the group. If the usage of 'mgt_key_material' is
 indicated and its format defined for a specific key management
 scheme, that format must explicitly indicate the key management
 scheme itself. If a new rekeying scheme is defined to be used for
 an existing 'mgt_key_material' in an existing profile, then that
 profile will have to be updated accordingly, especially with
 respect to the usage of 'mgt_key_material' related format and
 content (REQ18).

Specific application profiles that build on this document MUST
specify the communication protocol that members of the group use to
communicate with each other (REQ10) and how exactly the keying
material is used to protect the group communication (REQ11).

CBOR labels for these fields are defined in Section 6.

4.1.2.2. GET Handler

The GET handler returns the symmetric group keying material for the
group identified by "GROUPNAME".

The handler expects a GET request.

The handler verifies that the group name of the /ace-group/GROUPNAME
path is a subset of the 'scope' stored in the access token
associated to this client. If verification fails, the KDC MUST
respond with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error message. The KDC MAY
respond with an AS Request Creation Hints, as defined in Section
5.1.2 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]. Note that in this case, the
content format MUST be set to application/ace+cbor.

Additionally, the handler verifies that the node is a current member
of the group. If verification fails, the KDC MUST respond with a
4.00 (Bad Request) error message.

If verification succeeds, the handler returns a 2.05 (Content)
message containing the symmetric group keying material. The payload
of the response is formatted as a CBOR map which MUST contain the
parameters 'gkty','key' and 'num' specified in Section 4.1.2.1.

The payload MAY also include the parameters 'ace-groupcomm-profile',
'exp', and 'mgt_key_material' parameters specified in Section
4.1.2.1.

4.1.3. ace-group/GROUPNAME/pub-key

If the KDC does not maintain public keys for the group, the handler
for any request on this resource returns a 4.05 (Method Not Allowed)
error message. If it does, the rest of this section applies.

This resource implements GET and FETCH handlers.

4.1.3.1. FETCH Handler

The FETCH handler receives identifiers of group members for the
group identified by "GROUPNAME" and returns the public keys of such
group members.

The handler expects a request with payload formatted as a CBOR map. The payload of this request is a CBOR Map that MUST contain the following fields:

  *'get_pub_keys', whose value is encoded as in [Section 4.1.2.1](#) with the following modification:

    -The second array contains zero or more identifiers of group members for the group identified by "GROUPNAME". The Client indicates that it wishes to receive the public keys of all nodes having these identifiers.

The specific format of public keys as well as identifiers, roles and combination of roles of group members MUST be specified by the application profile (OPT1, REQ2, REQ9).

The handler verifies that the group name of the /ace-group/GROUPNAME path is a subset of the 'scope' stored in the access token associated to this client. If verification fails, the KDC MUST respond with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error message.

If verification succeeds, the handler identifies the public keys of the current group members for which either:

  *the role identifier matches with one of those indicated in the request; note that the request can contain a "combination of roles", where the handler select all group members who have all roles included in the combination.

  *the identifier matches with one of those indicated in the request.

Then, the handler returns a 2.05 (Content) message response with payload formatted as a CBOR map, containing only the 'pub_keys' and 'peer_roles' parameters from [Section 4.1.2.1](#). In particular, 'pub_keys' encodes the list of public keys of those group members including the respective member identifiers, while 'peer_roles' encodes their respective role (or CBOR array of roles) in the group. The specific format of public keys as well as of identifiers of group members is specified by the application profile (OPT1, REQ9).

If the KDC does not store any public key associated with the specified member identifiers, the handler returns a response with payload formatted as a CBOR byte string of zero length.

The handler MAY enforce one of the following policies, in order to handle possible identifiers that are included in the 'get_pub_keys' parameter of the request but are not associated to any current group

member. Such a policy MUST be specified by the application profile (REQ13)

   *The KDC silently ignores those identifiers.

   *The KDC retains public keys of group members for a given amount
    of time after their leaving, before discarding them. As long as
    such public keys are retained, the KDC provides them to a
    requesting Client.

Note that this resource handler only verifies that the node is authorized by the AS to access this resource. Nodes that are not members of the group but are authorized to do signature verifications on the group messages may be allowed to access this resource, if the application needs it.

4.1.3.2. GET Handler

The handler expects a GET request.

The handler verifies that the group name of the /ace-group/GROUPNAME path is a subset of the 'scope' stored in the access token associated to this client. If verification fails, the KDC MUST respond with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error message.

If verification succeeds, the handler returns a 2.05 (Content) message containing the public keys of all the current group members, for the group identified by "GROUPNAME". The payload of the response is formatted as a CBOR map, containing only the 'pub_keys' and 'peer_roles' parameters from Section 4.1.2.1. In particular, 'pub_keys' encodes the list of public keys of those group members including the respective member identifiers, while 'peer_roles' encodes their respective role (or CBOR array of roles) in the group.

If the KDC does not store any public key for the group, the handler returns a response with payload formatted as a CBOR byte string of zero length. The specific format of public keys as well as of identifiers of group members is specified by the application profile (OPT1, REQ9).

Note that this resource handler only verifies that the node is authorized by the AS to access this resource. Nodes that are not members of the group but are authorized to do signature verifications on the group messages may be allowed to access this resource, if the application needs it.

4.1.4. ace-group/GROUPNAME/policies

This resource implements a GET handler.

4.1.4.1. GET Handler

The handler expects a GET request.

The handler verifies that the group name of the /ace-group/GROUPNAME path is a subset of the 'scope' stored in the access token associated to this client. If verification fails, the KDC MUST respond with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error message.

Additionally, the handler verifies that the node is a current member of the group. If verification fails, the KDC MUST respond with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error message.

If verification succeeds, the handler returns a 2.05 (Content) message containing the list of policies for the group identified by "GROUPNAME". The payload of the response is formatted as a CBOR map including only the parameter 'group_policies' defined in Section 4.1.2.1 and specifying the current policies in the group. If the KDC does not store any policy, the payload is formatted as a zero-length CBOR byte string.

The specific format and meaning of group policies MUST be specified in the application profile (REQ14).

4.1.5. ace-group/GROUPNAME/num

This resource implements a GET handler.

4.1.5.1. GET Handler

The handler expects a GET request.

The handler verifies that the group name of the /ace-group/GROUPNAME path is a subset of the 'scope' stored in the access token associated to this client. If verification fails, the KDC MUST respond with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error message.

Additionally, the handler verifies that the node is a current member of the group. If verification fails, the KDC MUST respond with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error message.

If verification succeeds, the handler returns a 2.05 (Content) message containing an integer that represents the version number of the symmetric group keying material. This number is incremented on the KDC every time the KDC updates the symmetric group keying material, before the new keying material is distributed. This number is stored in persistent storage.

The payload of the response is formatted as a CBOR integer.

4.1.6. ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME

This resource implements GET, PUT and DELETE handlers.

4.1.6.1. PUT Handler

The PUT handler is used to get the KDC to produce and return individual keying material to protect outgoing messages for the node (identified by "NODENAME") for the group identified by "GROUPNAME". Application profiles MAY also use this handler to rekey the whole group. (OPT8) It is up to the application profiles to specify if this handler supports renewal of individual keying material, renewal of the group keying material or both.

The handler expects a request with empty payload.

The handler verifies that the group name of the /ace-group/GROUPNAME path is a subset of the 'scope' stored in the access token associated to this client, identified by "NODENAME". If verification fails, the KDC MUST respond with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error message.

Additionally, the handler verifies that the node is a current member of the group. If verification fails, the KDC MUST respond with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error message.

If verification succeeds, the handler returns a 2.05 (Content) message containing newly-generated keying material for the Client, and/or, if the application profiles requires it (OPT8), starts the comprete group rekeying. The payload of the response is formatted as a CBOR map. The specific format of newly-generated individual keying material for group members, or of the information to derive it, and corresponding CBOR label, MUST be specified in the application profile (REQ15) and registered in Section 8.5.

4.1.6.2. GET Handler

The handler expects a GET request.

The handler verifies that the group name of the /ace-group/GROUPNAME path is a subset of the 'scope' stored in the access token associated to this client, identified by "NODENAME". If verification fails, the KDC MUST respond with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error message.

The handler also verifies that the node sending the request and the node name used in the Uri-Path match. If that is not the case, the handler responds with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error response.

Additionally, the handler verifies that the node is a current member of the group. If verification fails, the KDC MUST respond with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error message.

If verification succeeds, the handler returns a 2.05 (Content) message containing both the group keying material and the individual keying material for the Client, or information enabling the Client to derive it. The payload of the response is formatted as a CBOR map. The format for the group keying material is the same as defined in the response of Section 4.1.2.2. The specific format of individual keying material for group members, or of the information to derive it, and corresponding CBOR label, MUST be specified in the application profile (REQ15) and registered in Section 8.5.

4.1.6.3. DELETE Handler

The DELETE handler removes the node identified by "NODENAME" from the group identified by "GROUPNAME".

The handler expects a request with method DELETE (and empty payload).

The handler verifies that the group name of the /ace-group/GROUPNAME path is a subset of the 'scope' stored in the access token associated to this client, identified by "NODENAME". If verification fails, the KDC MUST respond with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error message.

The handler also verifies that the node sending the request and the node name used in the Uri-Path match. If that is not the case, the handler responds with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error response.

Additionally, the handler verifies that the node is a current member of the group. If verification fails, the KDC MUST respond with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error message.

If verification succeeds, the handler removes the client from the group identified by "GROUPNAME", for specific roles if roles were specified in the 'scope' field, or for all roles. That includes removing the public key of the client if the KDC keep tracks of that. Then, the handler delete the sub-resource nodes/NODENAME and returns a 2.02 (Deleted) message with empty payload.

4.1.7. ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME/pub-key

This resource implements a POST handler, if the KDC stores the public key of group members. If the KDC does not store the public keys of group members, the handler does not implement any method, and every request returns a 4.05 Method Not Allowed error.

4.1.7.1. POST Handler

The POST handler is used to replace the stored public key of this client (identified by "NODENAME") with the one specified in the request at the KDC, for the group identified by "GROUPNAME".

The handler expects a POST request with payload as specified in Section 4.1.2.1, with the difference that it includes only the parameters 'client_cred', 'cnonce' and 'client_cred_verify'. In particular, the signature included in 'client_cred_verify' is expected to be computed as defined in Section 4.1.2.1, with a newly generated N_C nonce and the previously received N_S. The specific format of public keys is specified by the application profile (OPT1).

The handler verifies that the group name GROUPNAME is a subset of the 'scope' stored in the access token associated to this client. If verification fails, the KDC MUST respond with a 4.01 (Unauthorized) error message.

If the request is not formatted correctly (i.e. required fields non received or received with incorrect format), the handler MUST respond with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error message. If the request contained unknown or non-expected fields present, the handler MUST silently drop them and continue processing. Application profiles MAY define optional or mandatory payload formats for specific error cases (OPT6).

Otherwise, the handler checks that the public key specified in the 'client_cred' field has a valid format for the group identified by "GROUPNAME", i.e. it is encoded as expected and is compatible with the signature algorithm and possible associated parameters. If that cannot be verified, the handler MUST respond with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error message. Applications profiles MAY define alternatives (OPT5).

Otherwise, the handler verifies the signature contained in the 'client_cred_verify' field of the request, using the public key specified in the 'client_cred' field. If the signature does not pass verification, the handler MUST respond with a 4.00 (Bad Request) error message. If the KDC cannot retrieve the 'kdcchallenge' associated to this Client (see Section 3.3), the KDC MUST respond with a 4.00 Bad Request error respons, including a newly generated 'kdcchallenge' in a CBOR map in the payload the payload. This error response MUST also have Content-Format "application/ace+cbor".

If verification succeeds, the handler replaces the old public key of the node NODENAME with the one specified in the 'client_cred' field of the request, and stores it as the new current public key of the

node NODENAME, in the list of group members' public keys for the group identified by GROUPNAME. Then, the handler replies with a 2.04 (Changed) response, which does not include a payload.

4.2. Retrieval of Group Names and URIs

In case the joining node only knows the group identifier of the group it wishes to join or about which it wishes to get update information from the KDC, the node can contact the KDC to request the corresponding group name and joining resource URI. The node can request several group identifiers at once. It does so by sending a CoAP FETCH request to the /ace-group endpoint at the KDC formatted as defined in Section 4.1.1.1.

Figure 9 gives an overview of the exchanges described above.

```
   Client                                               KDC
      |                                                  |
      |-------- Group Name and URI Retrieval Request: -------->|
      |                 FETCH /ace-group                 |
      |                                                  |
      |<-Group Name and URI Retrieval Response: 2.05 (Content)-|
      |                                                  |
```

 Figure 9: Message Flow of Group Name and URI Retrieval Request-Response

4.3. Joining Exchange

Figure 10 gives an overview of the Joining exchange between Client and KDC, when the Client first joins a group.

```
   Client                                               KDC
      |                                                  |
      |----- Joining Request: POST /ace-group/GROUPNAME ------>|
      |                                                  |
      |<--------- Joining Response: 2.01 (Created) ----------- |
      | Location-Path = "/ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME"  |
```

     Figure 10: Message Flow of First Exchange for Group Joining

If not previously established, the Client and the KDC MUST first establish a pairwise secure communication channel (REQ16). This can be achieved, for instance, by using a transport profile of ACE. The Joining exchange MUST occur over that secure channel. The Client and the KDC MAY use that same secure channel to protect further pairwise communications that must be secured.

The secure communication protocol is REQUIRED to establish the secure channel between Client and KDC by using the proof-of-possession key bound to the access token. As a result, the proof-of-possession to bind the access token to the Client is performed by using the proof-of-possession key bound to the access token for establishing secure communication between the Client and the KDC.

To join the group, the Client sends a CoAP POST request to the /ace-group/GROUPNAME endpoint at the KDC, where GROUPNAME is the group name of the group to join, formatted as specified in Section 4.1.2.1. This group name is the same as in the scope entry corresponding to that group, specified in the 'scope' parameter of the Authorization Request/Response, or it can be retrieved from it. Note that, in case of successful joining, the Client will receive the URI to retrieve group keying material and to leave the group in the Location-Path option of the response.

If the node is joining a group for the first time, and the KDC maintains the public keys of the group members, the Client is REQUIRED to send its own public key and proof of possession ("client_cred" and "client_cred_verify" in Section 4.1.2.1). The request is only accepted if both public key and proof of possession are provided. If a node re-joins a group with the same access token and the same public key, it can omit to send the public key and the proof of possession, or just omit the proof of possession, and the KDC will be able to retrieve its public key associated to its token for that group (if the key has been discarded, the KDC will reply with 4.00 Bad Request, as specified in Section 4.1.2.1). If a node re-joins a group but wants to update its own public key, it needs to send both public key and proof of possession.

If the application requires backward security, the KDC MUST generate new group keying material and securely distribute it to all the current group members, upon a new node's joining the group. To this end, the KDC uses the message format of the response defined in Section 4.1.2.2. Application profiles may define alternative ways of retrieving the keying material, such as sending separate requests to different resources at the KDC (Section 4.1.2.2, Section 4.1.3.2, Section 4.1.4.1). After distributing the new group keying material, the KDC MUST increment the version number of the keying material.

4.4. Retrieval of Updated Keying Material

When any of the following happens, a node MUST stop using the owned group keying material to protect outgoing messages, and SHOULD stop using it to decrypt and verify incoming messages.

  *Upon expiration of the keying material, according to what indicated by the KDC with the 'exp' parameter in a Joining Response, or to a pre-configured value.

  *Upon receiving a notification of revoked/renewed keying material from the KDC, possibly as part of an update of the keying material (rekeying) triggered by the KDC.

  *Upon receiving messages from other group members without being able to retrieve the keying material to correctly decrypt them. This may be due to rekeying messages previously sent by the KDC, that the Client was not able to receive or decrypt.

In either case, if it wants to continue participating in the group communication, the node has to request the latest keying material from the KDC. To this end, the Client sends a CoAP GET request to the /ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME endpoint at the KDC, formatted as specified in Section 4.1.6.2.

Note that policies can be set up, so that the Client sends a Key Re-Distribution request to the KDC only after a given number of received messages could not be decrypted (because of failed decryption processing or inability to retrieve the necessary keying material).

It is application dependent and pertaining to the particular message exchange (e.g. [I-D.ietf-core-oscore-groupcomm]) to set up these policies, to instruct clients to retain incoming messages and for how long (OPT4). This allows clients to possibly decrypt such messages after getting updated keying material, rather than just consider them non valid messages to discard right away.

The same Key Distribution Request could also be sent by the Client without being triggered by a failed decryption of a message, if the Client wants to be sure that it has the latest group keying material. If that is the case, the Client will receive from the KDC the same group keying material it already has in memory.

Figure 11 gives an overview of the exchange described above.

```
Client                                                              KDC
    |                                                                |
    |----------------- Key Distribution Request: --------------->|
    |               GET ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME           |
    |                                                                |
    |<-------- Key Distribution Response: 2.05 (Content) ---------|
    |                                                                |
```

        Figure 11: Message Flow of Key Distribution Request-Response

   Alternatively, the re-distribution of keying material can be
   initiated by the KDC, which e.g.:

     *Can make the ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME resource
      Observable [RFC7641], and send notifications to Clients when the
      keying material is updated.

     *Can send the payload of the Key Distribution Response in one or
      multiple multicast POST requests to the members of the group,
      using secure rekeying schemes such as [RFC2093][RFC2094]
      [RFC2627].

     *Can send unicast POST requests to each Client over a secure
      channel, with the same payload as the Key Distribution Response.
      When sending such requests, the KDC can target the URI path
      provided by the intended recipient upon joining the group, as
      specified in the 'control_path' parameter of the Joining Request
      (see Section 4.1.2.1).

     *Can act as a publisher in a pub-sub scenario, and update the
      keying material by publishing on a specific topic on a broker,
      which all the members of the group are subscribed to.

   Note that these methods of KDC-initiated key distribution have
   different security properties and require different security
   associations.

4.5. Requesting a Change of Keying Material

   Beside possible expiration, the client may need to communicate to
   the KDC its need for the keying material to be renewed, e.g. due to
   exhaustion of AEAD nonces, if AEAD is used for protecting group
   communnication. Depending on the application profile (OPT8), this
   can result in renewal of idividual keying material, group keying
   material, or both. For example, if the Client uses an individual key
   to protect outgoing traffic and has to renew it, the node may
   request a new one, or new input material to derive it, without
   renewing the whole group keying material.

To this end, the client performs a Key Renewal Request/Response
exchange with the KDC, i.e. it sends a CoAP PUT request to the /ace-
group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME endpoint at the KDC, where GROUPNAME
is the group name and NODENAME is the node's name, and formatted as
defined in Section 4.1.6.2.

Figure 12 gives an overview of the exchange described above.

```
   Client                                                        KDC
      |                                                           |
      |----------------- Key Renewal Request: -------------->|
      |           PUT ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME       |
      |                                                           |
      |<-------- Key Renewal Response: 2.05 (Content) --------|
      |                                                           |
```

           Figure 12: Message Flow of Key Renewal Request-Response

Note the difference between the Key Distribution Request and the Key
Renewal Request: while the first one only triggers distribution (the
renewal might have happened independently, e.g. because of
expiration), the second one triggers the KDC to produce new
individual keying material for the requesting node.

4.6. Retrieval of Public Keys and Roles for Group Members

In case the KDC maintains the public keys of group members, a node
in the group can contact the KDC to request public keys and roles of
either all group members or a specified subset, by sending a CoAP
GET or FETCH request to the /ace-group/GROUPNAME/pub-key endpoint at
the KDC, where GROUPNAME is the group name, and formatted as defined
in Section 4.1.3.2 and Section 4.1.3.1.

Figure 13 and Figure 14 give an overview of the exchanges described
above.

```
   Client                                                        KDC
      |                                                           |
      |--Public Key Request: GET /ace-group/GROUPNAME/pub-key->|
      |                                                           |
      |<--------- Public Key Response: 2.05 (Content) ---------|
      |                                                           |
```

   Figure 13: Message Flow of Public Key Exchange to Request All Members
                           Public Keys

```
   Client                                                      KDC
      |                                                         |
      |-Public Key Request: FETCH /ace-group/GROUPNAME/pub-key->|
      |                                                         |
      |<--------- Public Key Response: 2.05 (Created) ----------|
      |                                                         |
```

   Figure 14: Message Flow of Public Key Exchange to Request Specific
                            Members Public Keys

4.7. Update of Public Key

   In case the KDC maintains the public keys of group members, a node
   in the group can contact the KDC to upload a new public key to use
   in the group, and replace the currently stored one.

   To this end, the Client performs a Public Key Update Request/
   Response exchange with the KDC, i.e. it sends a CoAP POST request to
   the /ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME/pub-key endpoint at the KDC,
   where GROUPNAME is the group name and NODENAME is the node's name.

   The request is formatted as specified in Section 4.1.7.1.

   Figure Figure 15 gives an overview of the exchange described above.

```
   Client                                                         KDC
   |                                                               |
   |-------------- Public Key Update Request: --------------------->|
   |       POST ace-group/GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME/pub-key         |
   |                                                               |
   |<------- Public Key Update Response: 2.04 (Changed) ------------|
   |                                                               |
```

       Figure 15: Message Flow of Public Key Update Request-Response

   If the application requires backward security, the KDC MUST generate
   new group keying material and securely distribute it to all the
   current group members, upon a group member updating its own public
   key. To this end, the KDC uses the message format of the response
   defined in Section 4.1.2.2. Application profiles may define
   alternative ways of retrieving the keying material, such as sending
   separate requests to different resources at the KDC (Section
   4.1.2.2, Section 4.1.3.2, Section 4.1.4.1). The KDC MUST increment
   the version number of the current keying material, before
   distributing the newly generated keying material to the group. After
   that, the KDC SHOULD store the distributed keying material in
   persistent storage.

Additionally, after updating its own public key, a group member MAY send a number of the later requests including an identifier of the updated public key, to signal nodes that they need to retrieve it. How that is done depends on the group communication protocol used, and therefore is application profile specific (OPT10).

4.8. Retrieval of Group Policies

A node in the group can contact the KDC to retrieve the current group policies, by sending a CoAP GET request to the /ace-group/GROUPNAME/policies endpoint at the KDC, where GROUPNAME is the group name, and formatted as defined in Section 4.1.4.1

Figure 16 gives an overview of the exchange described above.

```
   Client                                                  KDC
      |                                                     |
      |-Policies Request: GET ace-group/GROUPNAME/policies ->|
      |                                                     |
      |<--------- Policies Response: 2.05 (Content) ---------|
      |                                                     |
```

            Figure 16: Message Flow of Policies Request-Response

4.9. Retrieval of Keying Material Version

A node in the group can contact the KDC to request information about the version number of the symmetric group keying material, by sending a CoAP GET request to the /ace-group/GROUPNAME/num endpoint at the KDC, where GROUPNAME is the group name, formatted as defined in Section 4.1.5.1. In particular, the version is incremented by the KDC every time the group keying material is renewed, before it's distributed to the group members.

Figure 17 gives an overview of the exchange described above.

```
   Client                                                  KDC
      |                                                     |
      |---- Version Request: GET ace-group/GROUPNAME/num ---->|
      |                                                     |
      |<--------- Version Response: 2.05 (Content) -----------|
      |                                                     |
```

            Figure 17: Message Flow of Version Request-Response

4.10. Group Leaving Request

A node can actively request to leave the group. In this case, the
Client sends a CoAP DELETE request to the endpoint /ace-group/
GROUPNAME/nodes/NODENAME at the KDC, where GROUPNAME is the group
name and NODENAME is the node's name, formatted as defined in
Section 4.1.6.3

Alternatively, a node may be removed by the KDC, without having
explicitly asked for it. This is further discussed in Section 5.

5. Removal of a Node from the Group

This section describes the different scenarios according to which a
node ends up being removed from the group.

If the application requires forward security, the KDC MUST generate
new group keying material and securely distribute it to all the
current group members but the leaving node, using the message format
of the Key Distribution Response (see Section 4.4). Application
profiles may define alternative message formats. Before distributing
the new group keying material, the KDC MUST increment the version
number of the keying material.

Note that, after having left the group, a node may wish to join it
again. Then, as long as the node is still authorized to join the
group, i.e. it still has a valid access token, it can re-request to
join the group directly to the KDC without needing to retrieve a new
access token from the AS. This means that the KDC might decide to
keep track of nodes with valid access tokens, before deleting all
information about the leaving node.

A node may be evicted from the group in the following cases.

   1. The node explicitly asks to leave the group, as defined in
      Section 4.10.

   2. The node has been found compromised or is suspected so.

   3. The node's authorization to be a group member is not valid
      anymore, either because the access token has expired, or it has
      been revoked. If the AS provides Token introspection (see
      Section 5.7 of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]), the KDC can
      optionally use it and check whether the node is still
      authorized for that group in that role.

In either case, once aware that a node is not authorized anymore,
the KDC has to remove the unauthorized node from the list of group
members, if the KDC keeps track of that.

In case of forced eviction, the KDC MAY explicitly inform the leaving node, if the Client implements the 'control_path' resource specified in [Section 4.1.2.1](#). To this end, the KDC MAY send a DEL request, targeting the URI specified in the 'control_path' parameter of the Joining Request.

6. ACE Groupcomm Parameters

This specification defines a number of fields used during the second part of the message exchange, after the ACE Token POST exchange. The table below summarizes them, and specifies the CBOR key to use instead of the full descriptive name. Note that the media type ace-groupcomm+cbor MUST be used when these fields are transported.

Name	CBOR Key	CBOR Type	Reference
scope	TBD	byte string	Section 4.1.2.1
get_pub_keys	TBD	array	Section 4.1.2.1, Section 4.1.3.1
client_cred	TBD	byte string	Section 4.1.2.1
cnonce	TBD	byte string	Section 4.1.2.1
client_cred_verify	TBD	byte string	Section 4.1.2.1
pub_keys_repos	TBD	text string	Section 4.1.2.1
control_path	TBD	text string	Section 4.1.2.1
gkty	TBD	integer / text string	Section 4.1.2.1
key	TBD	see "ACE Groupcomm Key" Registry	Section 4.1.2.1
num	TBD	integer	Section 4.1.2.1
ace-groupcomm-profile	TBD	int	Section 4.1.2.1
exp	TBD	int	Section 4.1.2.1
pub_keys	TBD	byte string	Section 4.1.2.1
peer_roles	TBD	array	Section 4.1.2.1
group_policies	TBD	map	Section 4.1.2.1
mgt_key_material	TBD	byte string	Section 4.1.2.1
gid	TBD	array	Section 4.1.1.1
gname	TBD	array of text string	Section 4.1.1.1
guri	TBD	array of text string	Section 4.1.1.1

Table 1

7. Security Considerations

When a Client receives a message from a sender for the first time, it needs to have a mechanism in place to avoid replay, e.g. Appendix

B.2 of [RFC8613]. In case the Client rebooted and lost the security state used to protect previous communication with that sender, such a mechanism is useful for the recipient to be on the safe side. Besides, if the KDC has renewed the group keying material, and the time interval between the end of the rekeying process and the joining of the Client is sufficiently small, that Client is also on the safe side, since replayed older messages protected with the previous keying material will not be accepted.

The KDC must renew the group keying material upon its expiration.

The KDC should renew the keying material upon group membership change, and should provide it to the current group members through the rekeying scheme used in the group.

The KDC should renew the group keying material after rebooting, even in the case where all keying material is stored in persistent storage. However, if the KDC relies on Observe responses to notify the group of renewed keying material, after rebooting the KDC will have lost all the current ongoing Observations with the group members, and the previous keying material will be used to protect messages in the group anyway. The KDC will rely on each node requesting updates of the group keying material to establish the new keying material in the nodes, or, if implemented, it can push the update to the nodes in the group using the 'control_path' resource.

The KDC may enforce a rekeying policy that takes into account the overall time required to rekey the group, as well as the expected rate of changes in the group membership.

That is, the KDC may not rekey the group at every membership change, for instance if members' joining and leaving occur frequently and performing a group rekeying takes too long. The KDC may rekey the group after a minimum number of group members have joined or left within a given time interval, or after maximum amount of time since the last rekeying was completed, or yet during predictable network inactivity periods.

However, this would result in the KDC not constantly preserving backward and forward security. Newly joining group members could be able to access the keying material used before their joining, and thus could access past group communications. Also, until the KDC performs a group rekeying, the newly leaving nodes would still be able to access upcoming group communications that are protected with the keying material that has not yet been updated.

The KDC needs to have a mechanism in place to detect DoS attacks from nodes constantly initiating rekey events (for example by

updating their public key), such as removing these nodes from the group.

The KDC also needs to have a congestion control mechanism in place to avoid network congestion when the KDC renews the group keying material; CoAP and Observe give guidance on such mechanisms, see Section 4.7 of [RFC7252] and Section 4.5.1 of [RFC7641].

7.1. Update of Keying Material

A group member can receive a message shortly after the group has been rekeyed, and new keying material has been distributed by the KDC. In the following two cases, this may result in misaligned keying material between the group members.

In the first case, the sender protects a message using the old keying material. However, the recipient receives the message after having received the new keying material, hence not being able to correctly process it. A possible way to ameliorate this issue is to preserve the old, recent, keying material for a maximum amount of time defined by the application. By doing so, the recipient can still try to process the received message using the old retained keying material. Note that a former (compromised) group member can take advantage of this by sending messages protected with the old retained keying material. Therefore, a conservative application policy should not admit the storage of old keying material.

In the second case, the sender protects a message using the new keying material, but the recipient receives that request before having received the new keying material. Therefore, the recipient would not be able to correctly process the request and hence discards it. If the recipient receives the new keying material shortly after that and the application at the sender endpoint performs retransmissions, the former will still be able to receive and correctly process the message. In any case, the recipient should actively ask the KDC for an updated keying material according to an application-defined policy, for instance after a given number of unsuccessfully decrypted incoming messages.

A node that has left the group should not expect any of its outgoing messages to be successfully processed, if received after its leaving, due to a possible group rekeying occurred before the message reception.

7.2. Block-Wise Considerations

If the block-wise options [RFC7959] are used, and the keying material is updated in the middle of a block-wise transfer, the sender of the blocks just changes the keying material to the updated one and continues the transfer. As long as both sides get the new

keying material, updating the keying material in the middle of a transfer will not cause any issue. Otherwise, the sender will have to transmit the message again, when receiving an error message from the recipient.

Compared to a scenario where the transfer does not use block-wise, depending on how fast the keying material is changed, the nodes might consume a larger amount of the network bandwidth resending the blocks again and again, which might be problematic.

8. IANA Considerations

This document has the following actions for IANA.

8.1. Media Type Registrations

This specification registers the 'application/ace-groupcomm+cbor' media type for messages of the protocols defined in this document following the ACE exchange and carrying parameters encoded in CBOR. This registration follows the procedures specified in [RFC6838].

Type name: application

Subtype name: ace-groupcomm+cbor

Required parameters: none

Optional parameters: none

Encoding considerations: Must be encoded as CBOR map containing the protocol parameters defined in [this document].

Security considerations: See Section 7 of this document.

Interoperability considerations: n/a

Published specification: [this document]

Applications that use this media type: The type is used by authorization servers, clients and resource servers that support the ACE groupcomm framework as specified in [this document].

Additional information:

Magic number(s): n/a

File extension(s): .ace-groupcomm

Macintosh file type code(s): n/a

Person & email address to contact for further information:
iesg@ietf.org

Intended usage: COMMON

Restrictions on usage: None

Author: Francesca Palombini francesca.palombini@ericsson.com

Change controller: IESG

8.2. CoAP Content-Formats Registry

This specification registers the following entry to the "CoAP
Content-Formats" registry, within the "CoRE Parameters" registry:

Media Type: application/ace-groupcomm+cbor

Encoding: -

ID: TBD

Reference: [this document]

8.3. OAuth Parameters Registry

The following registrations are done for the OAuth
ParametersRegistry following the procedure specified in section 11.2
of [RFC6749]:

o Parameter name: sign_info o Parameter usage location: token
request, token response o Change Controller: IESG o Specification
Document(s): [[This specification]]

o Parameter name: kdcchallenge o Parameter usage location: token
response o Change Controller: IESG o Specification Document(s):
[[This specification]]

8.4. OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings Registry

The following registrations are done for the OAuth Parameters CBOR
Mappings Registry following the procedure specified in section 8.9
of [I-D.ietf-ace-oauth-authz]:

* Name: sign_info
* CBOR Key: TBD (range -256 to 255)
* Value Type: any
* Reference: \[\[This specification\]\]

* Name: kdcchallenge
* CBOR Key: TBD (range -256 to 255)
* Value Type: byte string
* Reference: \[\[This specification\]\]

8.5. ACE Groupcomm Parameters Registry

This specification establishes the "ACE Groupcomm Parameters" IANA Registry. The Registry has been created to use the "Expert Review Required" registration procedure [RFC8126]. Expert review guidelines are provided in Section 8.11.

The columns of this Registry are:

  *Name: This is a descriptive name that enables easier reference to the item. The name MUST be unique. It is not used in the encoding.

  *CBOR Key: This is the value used as CBOR key of the item. These values MUST be unique. The value can be a positive integer, a negative integer, or a string.

  *CBOR Type: This contains the CBOR type of the item, or a pointer to the registry that defines its type, when that depends on another item.

  *Reference: This contains a pointer to the public specification for the item.

This Registry has been initially populated by the values in Section 6. The Reference column for all of these entries refers to sections of this document.

8.6. ACE Groupcomm Key Registry

This specification establishes the "ACE Groupcomm Key" IANA Registry. The Registry has been created to use the "Expert Review Required" registration procedure [RFC8126]. Expert review guidelines are provided in Section 8.11.

The columns of this Registry are:

  *Name: This is a descriptive name that enables easier reference to the item. The name MUST be unique. It is not used in the encoding.

*Key Type Value: This is the value used to identify the keying
 material. These values MUST be unique. The value can be a
 positive integer, a negative integer, or a text string.

*Profile: This field may contain one or more descriptive strings
 of application profiles to be used with this item. The values
 should be taken from the Name column of the "ACE Groupcomm
 Profile" Registry.

*Description: This field contains a brief description of the
 keying material.

*References: This contains a pointer to the public specification
 for the format of the keying material, if one exists.

This Registry has been initially populated by the values in Figure
7. The specification column for all of these entries will be this
document.

8.7. ACE Groupcomm Profile Registry

This specification establishes the "ACE Groupcomm Profile" IANA
Registry. The Registry has been created to use the "Expert Review
Required" registration procedure [RFC8126]. Expert review guidelines
are provided in Section 8.11. It should be noted that, in addition
to the expert review, some portions of the Registry require a
specification, potentially a Standards Track RFC, be supplied as
well.

The columns of this Registry are:

 *Name: The name of the application profile, to be used as value of
  the profile attribute.

 *Description: Text giving an overview of the application profile
  and the context it is developed for.

 *CBOR Value: CBOR abbreviation for the name of this application
  profile. Different ranges of values use different registration
  policies [RFC8126]. Integer values from -256 to 255 are
  designated as Standards Action. Integer values from -65536 to
  -257 and from 256 to 65535 are designated as Specification
  Required. Integer values greater than 65535 are designated as
  Expert Review. Integer values less than -65536 are marked as
  Private Use.

 *Reference: This contains a pointer to the public specification of
  the abbreviation for this application profile, if one exists.

8.8. ACE Groupcomm Policy Registry

This specification establishes the "ACE Groupcomm Policy" IANA
Registry. The Registry has been created to use the "Expert Review
Required" registration procedure [RFC8126]. Expert review guidelines
are provided in Section 8.11. It should be noted that, in addition
to the expert review, some portions of the Registry require a
specification, potentially a Standards Track RFC, be supplied as
well.

The columns of this Registry are:

  *Name: The name of the group communication policy.

  *CBOR label: The value to be used to identify this group
   communication policy. Key map labels MUST be unique. The label
   can be a positive integer, a negative integer or a string.
   Integer values between 0 and 255 and strings of length 1 are
   designated as Standards Track Document required. Integer values
   from 256 to 65535 and strings of length 2 are designated as
   Specification Required. Integer values of greater than 65535 and
   strings of length greater than 2 are designated as expert review.
   Integer values less than -65536 are marked as private use.

  *CBOR type: the CBOR type used to encode the value of this group
   communication policy.

  *Description: This field contains a brief description for this
   group communication policy.

  *Reference: This field contains a pointer to the public
   specification providing the format of the group communication
   policy, if one exists.

This registry will be initially populated by the values in Figure 8.

8.9. Sequence Number Synchronization Method Registry

This specification establishes the "Sequence Number Synchronization
Method" IANA Registry. The Registry has been created to use the
"Expert Review Required" registration procedure [RFC8126]. Expert
review guidelines are provided in Section 8.11. It should be noted
that, in addition to the expert review, some portions of the
Registry require a specification, potentially a Standards Track RFC,
be supplied as well.

The columns of this Registry are:

  *Name: The name of the sequence number synchronization method.

*Value: The value to be used to identify this sequence number synchronization method.

*Description: This field contains a brief description for this sequence number synchronization method.

*Reference: This field contains a pointer to the public specification describing the sequence number synchronization method.

8.10. Interface Description (if=) Link Target Attribute Values Registry

This specification registers the following entry to the "Interface Description (if=) Link Target Attribute Values Registry" registry, within the "CoRE Parameters" registry:

*Attribute Value: ace.group

*Description: The 'ace group' interface is used to provision keying material and related informations and policies to members of a group using the Ace framework.

*Reference: [This Document]

8.11. Expert Review Instructions

The IANA Registries established in this document are defined as expert review. This section gives some general guidelines for what the experts should be looking for, but they are being designated as experts for a reason so they should be given substantial latitude.

Expert reviewers should take into consideration the following points:

*Point squatting should be discouraged. Reviewers are encouraged to get sufficient information for registration requests to ensure that the usage is not going to duplicate one that is already registered and that the point is likely to be used in deployments. The zones tagged as private use are intended for testing purposes and closed environments, code points in other ranges should not be assigned for testing.

*Specifications are required for the standards track range of point assignment. Specifications should exist for specification required ranges, but early assignment before a specification is available is considered to be permissible. Specifications are needed for the first-come, first-serve range if they are expected to be used outside of closed environments in an interoperable way. When specifications are not provided, the description

provided needs to have sufficient information to identify what
the point is being used for.

   *Experts should take into account the expected usage of fields
    when approving point assignment. The fact that there is a range
    for standards track documents does not mean that a standards
    track document cannot have points assigned outside of that range.
    The length of the encoded value should be weighed against how
    many code points of that length are left, the size of device it
    will be used on, and the number of code points left that encode
    to that size.

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Appendix A. Requirements on Application Profiles

This section lists the requirements on application profiles of this specification,for the convenience of application profile designers.

*REQ1: If the value of the GROUPNAME URI path and the group name in the access token scope (gname in Section 3.2) don't match, specify the mechanism to map the GROUPNAME value in the URI to the group name (REQ1) (see Section 4.1).

*REQ2: Specify the encoding and value of roles, for scope entries of 'scope' (see Section 3.1).

*REQ3: If used, specify the acceptable values for 'sign_alg' (see Section 3.3).

*REQ4: If used, specify the acceptable values for 'sign_parameters' (see Section 3.3).

*REQ5: If used, specify the acceptable values for 'sign_key_parameters' (see Section 3.3).

*REQ6: If used, specify the acceptable values for 'pub_key_enc' (see Section 3.3).

*REQ7a: Register a Resource Type for the root url-path, which is used to discover the correct url to access at the KDC (see Section 4.1).

*REQ7b: Specify the exact encoding of group identifier (see Section 4.1.1.1).

*REQ7: Specify the exact format of the 'key' value (see Section 4.1.2.1).

*REQ8: Specify the acceptable values of 'gkty' (see Section 4.1.2.1).

*REQ9: Specify the format of the identifiers of group members (see Section 4.1.2.1).

*REQ10: Specify the communication protocol the members of the group must use (e.g., multicast CoAP).

*REQ11: Specify the security protocol the group members must use to protect their communication (e.g., group OSCORE). This must provide encryption, integrity and replay protection.

*REQ12: Specify and register the application profile identifier (see Section 4.1.2.1).

*REQ13: Specify policies at the KDC to handle ids that are not
 included in get_pub_keys (see Section 4.1.3.1).

*REQ14: If used, specify the format and content of
 'group_policies' and its entries. Specify the policies default
 values (see Section 4.1.2.1).

*REQ15: Specify the format of newly-generated individual keying
 material for group members, or of the information to derive it,
 and corresponding CBOR label (see Section 4.1.6.2).

*REQ16: Specify how the communication is secured between Client
 and KDC. Optionally, specify tranport profile of ACE [I-D.ietf-
 ace-oauth-authz] to use between Client and KDC (see Section 4.3.

*REQ17: Specify how the nonce N_S is generated, if the token was
 not posted (e.g. if it is used directly to validate TLS instead).

*REQ18: Specify if 'mgt_key_material' used, and if yes specify its
 format and content (see Section 4.1.2.1). If the usage of
 'mgt_key_material' is indicated and its format defined for a
 specific key management scheme, that format must explicitly
 indicate the key management scheme itself. If a new rekeying
 scheme is defined to be used for an existing 'mgt_key_material'
 in an existing profile, then that profile will have to be updated
 accordingly, especially with respect to the usage of
 'mgt_key_material' related format and content.

*REQ19: Define the initial value of the 'num' parameter (sse
 Section 4.1.2.1).

*OPT1: Optionally, specify the encoding of public keys, of
 'client_cred', and of 'pub_keys' if COSE_Keys are not used (see
 Section 4.1.2.1).

*OPT2: Optionally, specify the negotiation of parameter values for
 signature algorithm and signature keys, if 'sign_info' is not
 used (see Section 3.3).

*OPT3: Optionally, specify the encoding of 'pub_keys_repos' if the
 default is not used (see Section 4.1.2.1).

*OPT4: Optionally, specify policies that instruct clients to
 retain messages and for how long, if they are unsuccessfully
 decrypted (see Section 4.4). This makes it possible to decrypt
 such messages after getting updated keying material.

*OPT5: Optionally, specify the behavior of the handler in case of
 failure to retrieve a public key for the specific node (see
 Section 4.1.2.1).

*OPT6: Optionally, specify possible or required payload formats
 for specific error cases.

*OPT7: Optionally, specify CBOR values to use for abbreviating
 identifiers of roles in the group or topic (see Section 3.1).

*OPT8: Optionally, specify for the KDC to perform group rekeying
 (together or instead of renewing individual keying material) when
 receiving a Key Renewal Request (see Section 4.5).

*OPT9: Optionally, specify the functionalities implemented at the
 'control_path' resource hosted at the Client, including message
 exchange encoding and other details (see Section 4.1.2.1).

*OPT10: Optionally, specify how the identifier of the sender's
 public key is included in the group request (see Section 4.7).

Appendix B. Document Updates

   RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS SECTION.

B.1. Version -04 to -05

*Updated uppercase/lowercase URI segments for KDC resources.

*Supporting single Access Token for multiple groups/topics.

*Added 'control_path' parameter in the Joining Request.

*Added 'peer_roles' parameter to support legal requesters/
 responders.

*Clarification on stopping using owned keying material.

*Clarification on different reasons for processing failures,
 related policies, and requirement OPT4.

*Added a KDC sub-resource for group members to upload a new public
 key.

*Possible group rekeying following an individual Key Renewal
 Request.

*Clarified meaning of requirement REQ3; added requirement OPT8.

*Editorial improvements.

B.2. Version -03 to -04

*Revised RESTful interface, as to methods and parameters.

*Extended processing of joining request, as to check/retrieval of
 public keys.

*Revised and extended profile requirements.

*Clarified specific usage of parameters related to signature
 algorithms/keys.

*Included general content previously in draft-ietf-ace-key-
 groupcomm-oscore

*Registration of media type and content format application/ace-
 group+cbor

*Editorial improvements.

B.3. Version -02 to -03

*Exchange of information on the countersignature algorithm and
 related parameters, during the Token POST (Section 3.3).

*Restructured KDC interface, with new possible operations (Section
 4).

*Client PoP signature for the Joining Request upon joining
 (Section 4.1.2.1).

*Revised text on group member removal (Section 5).

*Added more profile requirements (Appendix A).

B.4. Version -01 to -02

*Editorial fixes.

*Distinction between transport profile and application profile
 (Section 1.1).

*New parameters 'sign_info' and 'pub_key_enc' to negotiate
 parameter values for signature algorithm and signature keys
 (Section 3.3).

*New parameter 'type' to distinguish different Key Distribution
 Request messages (Section 4.1).

*New parameter 'client_cred_verify' in the Key Distribution
 Request to convey a Client signature (Section 4.1).

*Encoding of 'pub_keys_repos' (Section 4.1).

*Encoding of 'mgt_key_material' (Section 4.1).

*Improved description on retrieval of new or updated keying
 material (Section 6).

*Encoding of 'get_pub_keys' in Public Key Request (Section 7.1).

*Extended security considerations (Sections 10.1 and 10.2).

*New "ACE Public Key Encoding" IANA Registry (Section 11.2).

*New "ACE Groupcomm Parameters" IANA Registry (Section 11.3),
 populated with the entries in Section 8.

*New "Ace Groupcomm Request Type" IANA Registry (Section 11.4),
 populated with the values in Section 9.

*New "ACE Groupcomm Policy" IANA Registry (Section 11.7) populated
 with two entries "Sequence Number Synchronization Method" and
 "Key Update Check Interval" (Section 4.2).

*Improved list of requirements for application profiles (Appendix
 A).

B.5. Version -00 to -01

*Changed name of 'req_aud' to 'audience' in the Authorization
 Request (Section 3.1).

*Defined error handling on the KDC (Sections 4.2 and 6.2).

*Updated format of the Key Distribution Response as a whole
 (Section 4.2).

*Generalized format of 'pub_keys' in the Key Distribution Response
 (Section 4.2).

*Defined format for the message to request leaving the group
 (Section 5.2).

*Renewal of individual keying material and methods for group
 rekeying initiated by the KDC (Section 6).

*CBOR type for node identifiers in 'get_pub_keys' (Section 7.1).

*Added section on parameter identifiers and their CBOR keys
 (Section 8).

*Added request types for requests to a Join Response (Section 9).

      *Extended security considerations (Section 10).

      *New IANA registries "ACE Groupcomm Key Registry", "ACE Groupcomm
       Profile Registry", "ACE Groupcomm Policy Registry" and "Sequence
       Number Synchronization Method Registry" (Section 11).

      *Added appendix about requirements for application profiles of ACE
       on group communication (Appendix A).

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