Abstract

This specification defines the ACE framework for authentication and authorization in Internet of Things (IoT) deployments. The ACE framework is based on a set of building blocks including OAuth 2.0 and CoAP, thus making a well-known and widely used authorization solution suitable for IoT devices. Existing specifications are used where possible, but where the limitations of IoT devices require it, profiles and extensions are provided.
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Table of Contents

1. Introduction .................................................. 3
2. Terminology .................................................. 4
3. Overview ...................................................... 5
   3.1. OAuth 2.0 ................................................... 6
   3.2. CoAP ....................................................... 8
4. Protocol Interactions ......................................... 9
5. Framework .................................................... 13
6. The 'Token' Resource .......................................... 14
   6.1. Client-to-AS Request ..................................... 14
   6.2. AS-to-Client Response ................................... 17
   6.3. Error Response ........................................... 18
   6.4. New Request and Response Parameters .................. 18
      6.4.1. Grant Type ........................................... 19
      6.4.2. Token Type and Algorithms ........................ 19
      6.4.3. Profile ............................................... 20
      6.4.4. Confirmation ........................................ 20
   6.5. Mapping parameters to CBOR ........................... 22
7. The 'Introspect' Resource .................................... 22
   7.1. RS-to-AS Request ........................................ 23
   7.2. AS-to-RS Response ....................................... 23
   7.3. Error Response ........................................... 24
   7.4. Client Token ............................................. 25
   7.5. Mapping Introspection parameters to CBOR ............ 26
8. The Access Token .............................................. 27
   8.1. The 'Authorization Information' Resource .............. 27
   8.2. Token Expiration ....................................... 28
9. Security Considerations ....................................... 28
10. IANA Considerations ......................................... 29
   10.1. OAuth Introspection Response Parameter Registration . 29
   10.2. OAuth Parameter Registration .......................... 30
   10.3. OAuth Access Token Types .............................. 30
Authorization is the process for granting approval to an entity to access a resource [RFC4949]. The authorization task itself can best be described as granting access to a requesting client, for a resource hosted on a device, the resource server (RS). This exchange is mediated by one or multiple authorization servers (AS). Managing authorization for a large number of devices and users is a complex task.

We envision that end consumers and enterprises will manage access to resources on, or produced by, Internet of Things (IoT) devices in the same style as they do today with data, services and applications on the Web or with their mobile devices. This desire will increase with
the number of exposed services and capabilities provided by applications hosted on the IoT devices.

While prior work on authorization solutions for the Web and for the mobile environment also applies to the IoT environment many IoT devices are constrained, for example in terms of processing capabilities, available memory, etc. For web applications on constrained nodes this specification makes use of CoAP [RFC7252].

A detailed treatment of constraints can be found in [RFC7228], and the different IoT deployments present a continuous range of device and network capabilities. Taking energy consumption as an example:

At one end there are energy-harvesting or battery powered devices which have a tight power budget, on the other end there are mains-powered devices, and all levels in between.

Hence, IoT devices may be very different in terms of available processing and message exchange capabilities and there is a need to support many different authorization use cases [RFC7744].

This specification describes a framework for authentication and authorization in constrained environments (ACE) built on re-use of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749], thereby extending authorization to Internet of Things devices. This specification contains the necessary building blocks for adjusting OAuth 2.0 to IoT environments.

More detailed, interoperable specifications can be found in profiles. Implementations may claim conformance with a specific profile, whereby implementations utilizing the same profile interoperate while implementations of different profiles are not expected to be interoperable. Some devices, such as mobile phones and tablets, may implement multiple profiles and will therefore be able to interact with a wider range of low end devices.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

Certain security-related terms such as "authentication",...
"authorization", "confidentiality", "(data) integrity", "message authentication code", and "verify" are taken from [RFC4949].

Since we describe exchanges as RESTful protocol interactions HTTP [RFC7231] offers useful terminology.

Terminology for entities in the architecture is defined in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] and [I-D.ietf-ace-actors], such as client (C), resource server (RS), and authorization server (AS).

Note that the term "endpoint" is used here following its OAuth definition, which is to denote resources such as /token and /introspect at the AS and /authz-info at the RS. The CoAP [RFC7252] definition, which is "An entity participating in the CoAP protocol" is not used in this memo.

Since this specification focuses on the problem of access control to resources, we simplify the actors by assuming that the client authorization server (CAS) functionality is not stand-alone but subsumed by either the authorization server or the client (see section 2.2 in [I-D.ietf-ace-actors]).

3. Overview

This specification describes the ACE framework for authorization in the Internet of Things consisting of a set of building blocks.

The basic block is the OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] framework, which enjoys widespread deployment. Many IoT devices can support OAuth 2.0 without any additional extensions, but for certain constrained settings additional profiling is needed.

Another building block is the lightweight web transfer protocol CoAP [RFC7252] for those communication environments where HTTP is not appropriate. CoAP typically runs on top of UDP which further reduces overhead and message exchanges. While this specification defines extensions for the use of OAuth over CoAP, we do envision further underlying protocols to be supported in the future, such as MQTT or QUIC.

A third building block is CBOR [RFC7049] for encodings where JSON
RFC7159] is not sufficiently compact. CBOR is a binary encoding designed for small code and message size, which may be used for encoding of self contained tokens, and also for encoding CoAP POST parameters and CoAP responses.

A fourth building block is the compact CBOR-based secure message format COSE [I-D.ietf-cose-msg], which enables application layer security as an alternative or complement to transport layer security (DTLS [RFC6347] or TLS [RFC5246]). COSE is used to secure self contained tokens such as proof-of-possession (PoP) tokens [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture], which is an extension to the OAuth access tokens, and "client tokens" which are defined in this framework (see Section 7.4). The default access token format is defined in CBOR web token (CWT) [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token]. Application layer security for CoAP using COSE can be provided with OSCOAP [I-D.selander-ace-object-security].

With the building blocks listed above, solutions satisfying various IoT device and network constraints are possible. A list of constraints is described in detail in RFC 7228 [RFC7228] and a description of how the building blocks mentioned above relate to the various constraints can be found in Appendix A.

Luckily, not every IoT device suffers from all constraints. The ACE framework nevertheless takes all these aspects into account and allows several different deployment variants to co-exist rather than mandating a one-size-fits-all solution. We believe this is important to cover the wide range of possible interworking use cases and the different requirements from a security point of view. Once IoT deployments mature, popular deployment variants will be documented in form of ACE profiles.

In the subsections below we provide further details about the different building blocks.

3.1. OAuth 2.0

The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a client to obtain limited access to a resource with the permission of a resource owner. Authorization information, or references to it, is passed between the nodes using access tokens. These access tokens are issued to clients
by an authorization server with the approval of the resource owner. The client uses the access token to access the protected resources hosted by the resource server.

A number of OAuth 2.0 terms are used within this specification:

The token and introspect Endpoints:

The AS hosts the /token endpoint that allows a client to request access tokens. The client makes a POST request to the /token endpoint on the AS and receives the access token in the response (if the request was successful).

The token introspection endpoint, /introspect, is used by the RS when requesting additional information regarding a received access token. The RS makes a POST request to /introspect on the AS and receives information about the access token contain in the response. (See "Introspection" below.)

Access Tokens:

Access tokens are credentials needed to access protected resources. An access token is a data structure representing authorization permissions issued by the AS to the client. Access tokens are generated by the authorization server and consumed by the resource server. The access token content is opaque to the client.

Access tokens can have different formats, and various methods of utilization (e.g., cryptographic properties) based on the security requirements of the given deployment.

Proof of Possession Tokens:

An access token may be bound to a cryptographic key, which is then used by an RS to authenticate requests from a client. Such tokens are called proof-of-possession tokens (or PoP tokens) [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture].

The proof-of-possession (PoP) security concept assumes that the AS
acts as a trusted third party that binds keys to access tokens. These so called PoP keys are then used by the client to demonstrate the possession of the secret to the RS when accessing the resource. The RS, when receiving an access token, needs to verify that the key used by the client matches the one included in the access token. When this specification uses the term "access token" it is assumed to be a PoP token unless specifically stated otherwise.

The key bound to the access token (aka PoP key) may be based on symmetric as well as on asymmetric cryptography. The appropriate choice of security depends on the constraints of the IoT devices as well as on the security requirements of the use case.

Symmetric PoP key: The AS generates a random symmetric PoP key, encrypts it for the RS and includes it inside an access token. The PoP key is also encrypted for the client and sent together with the access token to the client.

Asymmetric PoP key: An asymmetric key pair is generated on the client and the public key is sent to the AS (if it does not already have knowledge of the client's public key). Information about the public key, which is the PoP key in this case, is then included inside the access token and sent back to the requesting client. The RS can identify the client's public key from the information in the token, which allows the client to use the corresponding private key for the proof of possession.

The access token is protected against modifications using a MAC or a digital signature, which is added by the AS. The choice of PoP key does not necessarily imply a specific credential type for the integrity protection of the token. More information about PoP tokens can be found in [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture].

Scopes and Permissions:

In OAuth 2.0, the client specifies the type of permissions it is seeking to obtain (via the scope parameter) in the access request. In turn, the AS may use the scope response parameter to inform the

client of the scope of the access token issued. As the client
could be a constrained device as well, this specification uses CBOR encoded messages for CoAP, defined in Section 5, to request scopes and to be informed what scopes the access token was actually authorized for by the AS.

The values of the scope parameter are expressed as a list of space- delimited, case-sensitive strings, with a semantic that is well-known to the AS and the RS. More details about the concept of scopes is found under Section 3.3 in [RFC6749].

Claims:

Information carried in the access token, called claims, is in the form of type-value pairs. An access token may, for example, include a claim identifying the AS that issued the token (via the "iss" claim) and what audience the access token is intended for (via the "aud" claim). The audience of an access token can be a specific resource or one or many resource servers. The resource owner policies influence what claims are put into the access token by the authorization server.

While the structure and encoding of the access token varies throughout deployments, a standardized format has been defined with the JSON Web Token (JWT) [RFC7519] where claims are encoded as a JSON object. In [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token] an equivalent format using CBOR encoding (CWT) has been defined.

Introspection:

Introspection is a method for a resource server to query the authorization server for the active state and content of a received access token. This is particularly useful in those cases where the authorization decisions are very dynamic and/or where the received access token itself is a reference rather than a self-contained token. More information about introspection in OAuth 2.0 can be found in [RFC7662].

3.2. CoAP

CoAP is an application layer protocol similar to HTTP, but specifically designed for constrained environments. CoAP typically uses datagram-oriented transport, such as UDP, where reordering and loss of packets can occur. A security solution need to take the latter aspects into account.
While HTTP uses headers and query-strings to convey additional information about a request, CoAP encodes such information in so-called 'options'.

CoAP supports application-layer fragmentation of the CoAP payloads through blockwise transfers [I-D.ietf-core-block]. However, blockwise transfer does not increase the size limits of CoAP options, therefore data encoded in options has to be kept small.

Transport layer security for CoAP can be provided by DTLS 1.2 [RFC6347] or TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]. CoAP defines a number of proxy operations which requires transport layer security to be terminated at the proxy. One approach for protecting CoAP communication end-to-end through proxies, and also to support security for CoAP over different transport in a uniform way, is to provide security on application layer using an object-based security mechanism such as CBOR Encoded Message Syntax [I-D.ietf-cose-msg].

One application of COSE is OSCOAP [I-D.selander-ace-object-security], which provides end-to-end confidentiality, integrity and replay protection, and a secure binding between CoAP request and response messages. In OSCOAP, the CoAP messages are wrapped in COSE objects and sent using CoAP.

4. Protocol Interactions

The ACE framework is based on the OAuth 2.0 protocol interactions using the /token and /introspect endpoints. A client obtains an access token from an AS using the /token endpoint and subsequently presents the access token to a RS to gain access to a protected resource. The RS, after receiving an access token, may present it to the AS via the /introspect endpoint to get information about the access token. In other deployments the RS may process the access token locally without the need to contact an AS. These interactions are shown in Figure 1. An overview of various OAuth concepts is provided in Section 3.1.

The consent of the resource owner, for giving a client access to a protected resource, can be pre-configured authorization policies or dynamically at the time when the request is sent. The resource owner and the requesting party (i.e. client owner) are not shown in Figure 1.

This framework supports a wide variety of communication security mechanisms between the ACE entities, such as client, AS, and RS. We assume that the client has been registered (also called enrolled or
onboarded) to an AS using a mechanism defined outside the scope of this document. In practice, various techniques for onboarding have been used, such as factory-based provisioning or the use of commissioning tools. Regardless of the onboarding technique, this registration procedure implies that the client and the AS share credentials, and configuration parameters. These credentials are used to mutually authenticate each other and to protect messages exchanged between the client and the AS.

It is also assumed that the RS has been registered with the AS, potentially in a similar way as the client has been registered with the AS. Established keying material between the AS and the RS allows the AS to apply cryptographic protection to the access token to ensure that its content cannot be modified, and if needed, that the content is confidentiality protected.

The keying material necessary for establishing communication security between C and RS is dynamically established as part of the protocol described in this document.

At the start of the protocol there is an optional discovery step where the client discovers the resource server and the resources this server hosts. In this step the client might also determine what permissions are needed to access the protected resource. The detailed procedures for this discovery process may be defined in an ACE profile and depend on the protocols being used and the specific deployment environment.

In Bluetooth Low Energy, for example, advertisements are broadcasted by a peripheral, including information about the primary services. In CoAP, as a second example, a client can makes a request to "/.well-known/core" to obtain information about available resources, which are returned in a standardized format as described in [RFC6690].
Requesting an Access Token (A):

The client makes an access token request to the /token endpoint at the AS. This framework assumes the use of PoP tokens (see Section 3.1 for a short description) wherein the AS binds a key to an access token. The client may include permissions it seeks to obtain, and information about the credentials it wants to use (e.g., symmetric/asymmetric cryptography or a reference to a specific credential).

Access Token Response (B):
If the AS successfully processes the request from the client, it returns an access token. It also returns various parameters, referred as "Client Information". In addition to the response parameters defined by OAuth 2.0 and the PoP token extension, further response parameters, such as information on which profile the client should use with the resource server(s). More information about these parameters can be found in in Section 6.4.

Resource Request (C):

The client interacts with the RS to request access to the protected resource and provides the access token. The protocol to use between the client and the RS is not restricted to CoAP. HTTP, HTTP/2, QUIC, MQTT, Bluetooth Low Energy, etc., are also viable candidates.

Depending on the device limitations and the selected protocol this exchange may be split up into two parts:

(1) the client sends the access token containing, or referencing, the authorization information to the RS, that may be used for subsequent resource requests by the client, and
(2) the client makes the resource access request, using the communication security protocol and other client information obtained from the AS.

The Client and the RS mutually authenticate using the security protocol specified in the profile (see step B) and the keys obtained in the access token or the client information or the client token. The RS verifies that the token is integrity protected by the AS and compares the claims contained in the access token with the resource request. If the RS is online, validation can be handed over to the AS using token introspection (see messages D and E) over HTTP or CoAP, in which case the different parts of step C may be interleaved with introspection.

Token Introspection Request (D):

A resource server may be configured to introspect the access token by including it in a request to the /introspect endpoint at that AS. Token introspection over CoAP is defined in Section 7 and for
HTTP in [RFC7662].

Note that token introspection is an optional step and can be omitted if the token is self-contained and the resource server is prepared to perform the token validation on its own.

Token Introspection Response (E):

The AS validates the token and returns the most recent parameters, such as scope, audience, validity etc. associated with it back to the RS. The RS then uses the received parameters to process the request to either accept or to deny it. The AS can additionally return information that the RS needs to pass on to the client in the form of a client token. The latter is used to establish keys for mutual authentication between client and RS, when the client has no direct connectivity to the AS.

Protected Resource (F):

If the request from the client is authorized, the RS fulfills the request and returns a response with the appropriate response code. The RS uses the dynamically established keys to protect the response, according to used communication security protocol.

5. Framework

The following sections detail the profiling and extensions of OAuth 2.0 for constrained environments which constitutes the ACE framework.

Credential Provisioning

For IoT we cannot generally assume that the client and RS are part of a common key infrastructure, so the AS provisions credentials or associated information to allow mutual authentication. These credentials need to be provided to the parties before or during the authentication protocol is executed, and may be re-used for subsequent token requests.

Proof-of-Possession

The ACE framework by default implements proof-of-possession for access tokens, i.e. that the authenticated token holder is bound
to the token. The binding is provided by the "cnf" claim indicating what key is used for mutual authentication. If clients need to update a token, e.g. to get additional rights, they can request that the AS binds the new access token to the same credential as the previous token.

ACE Profile Negotiation

The client or RS may be limited in the encodings or protocols it supports. To support a variety of different deployment settings, specific interactions between client and RS are defined in an ACE profile. The ACE framework supports the negotiation of different ACE profiles between client and AS using the "profile" parameter in the token request and token response.

OAuth 2.0 requires the use of TLS both to protect the communication between AS and client when requesting an access token and between AS and RS for introspection. In constrained settings TLS is not always feasible, or desirable. Nevertheless it is REQUIRED that the data exchanged with the AS is encrypted and integrity protected. It is furthermore REQUIRED that the AS and the endpoint communicating with it (client or RS) perform mutual authentication.

Profiles are expected to specify the details of how this is done, depending e.g. on the communication protocol and the credentials used by the client or the RS.

In OAuth 2.0 the communication with the Token and the Introspection resources at the AS is assumed to be via HTTP and may use Uri-query parameters. This framework RECOMMENDS to use CoAP instead and RECOMMENDS the use of the following alternative instead of Uri-query parameters: The sender (client or RS) encodes the parameters of its request as a CBOR map and submits that map as the payload of the POST request. The Content-format MUST be "application/cbor" in that case.

The OAuth 2.0 AS uses a JSON structure in the payload of its responses both to client and RS. This framework RECOMMENDS the use of CBOR [RFC7049] instead. The requesting device can explicitly request this encoding by setting the CoAP Accept option in the request to "application/cbor".
6. The 'Token' Resource

In plain OAuth 2.0 the AS provides the /token resource for submitting access token requests. This framework extends the functionality of the /token resource, giving the AS the possibility to help client and RS to establish shared keys or to exchange their public keys.

Communication between the client and the token resource at the AS MUST be integrity protected and encrypted. Furthermore AS and client MUST perform mutual authentication. Profiles of this framework are expected to specify how authentication and communication security is implemented.

The figures of this section uses CBOR diagnostic notation without the integer abbreviations for the parameters or their values for better readability.

6.1. Client-to-AS Request

When requesting an access token from the AS, the client MAY include the following parameters in the request in addition to the ones required or optional according to the OAuth 2.0 specification [RFC6749]:

token_type
  OPTIONAL. See Section 6.4 for more details.

alg
  OPTIONAL. See Section 6.4 for more details.

profile
  OPTIONAL. This indicates the profile that the client would like to use with the RS. See Section 6.4 for more details on the formatting of this parameter. If the RS cannot support the requested profile, the AS MUST reply with an error message.
provide a public key, the AS MUST respond with an error message. See Section 6.4 for more details on the formatting of the 'cnf' parameter.

These new parameters are optional in the case where the AS has prior knowledge of the capabilities of the client, otherwise these parameters are required. This prior knowledge may, for example, be set by the use of a dynamic client registration protocol exchange [RFC7591].

The following examples illustrate different types of requests for proof-of-possession tokens.

Figure 2 shows a request for a token with a symmetric proof-of-possession key.

Header: POST (Code=0.02)
Uri-Host: "server.example.com"
Uri-Path: "token"
Content-Type: "application/cbor"
Payload:
{
  "grant_type": "client_credentials",
  "aud": "tempSensor4711",
  "client_id": "myclient",
  "client_secret": b64'FWRUVGZUZmZFRkWSRlVGhA',
  "token_type": "pop",
  "alg": "HS256",
  "profile": "coap_dtls"
}

Figure 2: Example request for an access token bound to a symmetric key.

Figure 3 shows a request for a token with an asymmetric proof-of-possession key.
Header: POST (Code=0.02)
Uri-Host: "server.example.com"
Uri-Path: "token"
Content-Type: "application/cbor"
Payload:
{
    "grant_type": "token",
    "aud": "lockOfDoor0815",
    "client_id": "myclient",
    "token_type": "pop",
    "alg": "ES256",
    "profile": "coap_oscoap"
    "cnf": {
        "COSE_Key": {
            "kty": "EC",
            "kid": h'11',
            "crv": "P-256",
            "x": b64'usWxHK2PmfHHkXPS54m0kTcGJ90UiglWiGahtagnv8',
            "y": b64'IBOL+C3BttVivg+lSreASjpkttc8+1rb7btKLv8EX4'
        }
    }
}

Figure 3: Example request for an access token bound to an asymmetric key.

Figure 4 shows a request for a token where a previously communicated proof-of-possession key is only referenced.
Figure 4: Example request for an access token bound to a key reference.

6.2. AS-to-Client Response

If the access token request has been successfully verified by the AS and the client is authorized to obtain a PoP token for the indicated audience and scopes (if any), the AS issues an access token. If client authentication failed or is invalid, the authorization server returns an error response as described in Section 6.3.

The following parameters may also be part of a successful response in addition to those defined in section 5.1 of [RFC6749]:

**profile**

REQUIRED. This indicates the profile that the client MUST use towards the RS. See Section 6.4 for the formatting of this parameter.

**cnf**

REQUIRED. This field contains information about the proof-of-possession key for this access token. See Section 6.4 for the
Note that the access token can also contains a 'cnf' claim, however, these two values are consumed by different parties. The access token is created by the AS and processed by the RS (and opaque to the client) whereas the Client Information is created by the AS and processed by the client; it is never forwarded to the resource server.

The following examples illustrate different types of responses for proof-of-possession tokens.

Figure 5 shows a response containing a token and a 'cnf' parameter with a symmetric proof-of-possession key.

Header: Created (Code=2.01)
Content-Type: "application/cbor"
Payload:
{
  "access_token" : b64'SlAV32hkKG ... (remainder of CWT omitted for brevity;
    CWT contains COSE_Key in the 'cnf' claim),
  "token_type" : "pop",
  "alg" : "HS256",
  "expires_in" : "3600",
  "profile" : "coap_dtls"
  "cnf" : {
    "COSE_Key" : {
      "kty" : "Symmetric",
      "kid" : b64'39Gqlw',
      "k" : b64'hJtXhkV8FJG+Onbc6mxCQh'
    }
  }
}

Figure 5: Example AS response with an access token bound to a symmetric key.

6.3. Error Response

The error responses for CoAP-based interactions with the AS are equivalent to the ones for HTTP-based interactions as defined in
section 5.2 of [RFC6749], with the following differences: The Content-Type MUST be set to "application/cbor", the payload MUST be encoded in a CBOR map and the CoAP response code 4.00 Bad Request MUST be used unless specified otherwise.

6.4. New Request and Response Parameters

This section defines parameters that can be used in access token requests and responses, as well as abbreviations for more compact encoding of existing parameters and common values.

6.4.1. Grant Type

The abbreviations in Figure 6 MAY be used in CBOR encodings instead of the string values defined in [RFC6749].

```
+------------------+-----------+-------------+
| grant_type       | CBOR Key  | Major Type  |
+------------------+-----------+-------------+
| password         | 0         | 0 (uint)    |
| authorization_code| 1         | 0           |
| client_credentials| 2         | 0           |
| refresh_token    | 3         | 0           |
+------------------+-----------+-------------+
```

Figure 6: CBOR abbreviations for common grant types

6.4.2. Token Type and Algorithms

To allow clients to indicate support for specific token types and respective algorithms they need to interact with the AS. They can either provide this information out-of-band or via the 'token_type' and 'alg' parameter in the client request.

The value in the 'alg' parameter together with value from the 'token_type' parameter allow the client to indicate the supported algorithms for a given token type. The token type refers to the
specification used by the client to interact with the resource server to demonstrate possession of the key. The 'alg' parameter provides further information about the algorithm, such as whether a symmetric or an asymmetric crypto-system is used. Hence, a client supporting a specific token type also knows how to populate the values to the 'alg' parameter.

This document registers the new value "pop" for the OAuth Access Token Types registry, specifying a Proof-of-Possession token. How the proof-of-possession is performed is specified by the 'alg' parameter. Profiles of this framework are responsible for defining values for the 'alg' parameter together with the corresponding proof-of-possession mechanisms.

The values in the 'alg' parameter are case-sensitive. If the client supports more than one algorithm then each individual value MUST be separated by a space.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profile identifier</th>
<th>CBOR Key</th>
<th>Major Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>http_tls</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 (uint)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coap_dtls</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coap_oscoap</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7: Profile identifiers and their CBOR mappings
Profiles MAY define additional parameters for both the token request and the client information in the access token response in order to support negotiation or signalling of profile specific parameters.

6.4.4. Confirmation

The "cnf" parameter identifies or provides the key used for proof-of-possession. This framework extends the definition of 'cnf' from [RFC7800] by defining CBOR/COSE encodings and the use of 'cnf' for transporting keys in the client information.

A CBOR encoded payload MAY contain the 'cnf' parameter with the following contents:

**COSE_Key** In this case the 'cnf' parameter contains the proof-of-possession key to be used by the client. An example is shown in Figure 8.

```
"cnf" : {
    "COSE_Key" : {
        "kty" : "EC",
        "kid" : "h'11",
        "crv" : "P-256",
        "x" : b64'usWxHK2PmfHKwXPS54m0kTcGJ90UiglWiGahtagnv8',
        "y" : b64'IBOL+C3BttVivg+SreASjpkttcsz+1rb7bKLv8EX4'
    }
}
```

Figure 8: Confirmation parameter containing a public key

**COSE_Encrypted** In this case the 'cnf' parameter contains an encrypted symmetric key destined for the client. The client is assumed to be able to decrypt the ciphertext of this parameter. The parameter is encoded as COSE_Encrypted object wrapping a COSE_Key object. Figure 9 shows an example of this type of encoding.

```
"cnf" : {
    "COSE_Encrypted" : {
        993{
            [ h'a1010a' # protected header : {"alg" : "AES-CCM-16-64-128"}
            "iv" : b64'ifUvZaHFgJM7UmGnjA', # unprotected header
        }
    }
}
```

Figure 9: Confirmation parameter containing an encrypted symmetric key
Figure 9: Confirmation parameter containing an encrypted symmetric key

The ciphertext here could e.g. contain a symmetric key as in Figure 10.

```json
{
    "kty": "Symmetric",
    "kid": "b64'39Gqlw'",
    "k": "b64'hJtXhkV8FJG+0nbc6mxCcQh'
}
```

Figure 10: Example plaintext of an encrypted cnf parameter

Key Identifier  In this case the 'cnf' parameter references a key that is assumed to be previously known by the recipient. This allows clients that perform repeated requests for an access token for the same audience but e.g. with different scopes to omit key transport in the access token, token request and token response. Figure 11 shows such an example.

```json
"cnf": {
    "kid": "b64'39Gqlw'
}
```

Figure 11: A Confirmation parameter with just a key identifier

6.5. Mapping parameters to CBOR

All OAuth parameters in access token requests and responses are mapped to CBOR types as follows and are given an integer key value to save space.
Table 12: CBOR mappings used in token requests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter name</th>
<th>CBOR Key</th>
<th>Major Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>client_id</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 (text string)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>client_secret</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 (byte string)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>response_type</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>redirect_uri</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scope</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>code</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>error_description</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>error_uri</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grant_type</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0 (unit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>access_token</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>token_type</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expires_in</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>username</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>password</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>refresh_token</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alg</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cnf</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5 (map)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aud</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>profile</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12: CBOR mappings used in token requests

7. The 'Introspect' Resource

Token introspection [RFC7662] is used by the RS and potentially the client to query the AS for metadata about a given token e.g. validity or scope. Analogous to the protocol defined in RFC 7662 [RFC7662] for HTTP and JSON, this section defines adaptations to more constrained environments using CoAP and CBOR.

Communication between the RS and the introspection resource at the AS MUST be integrity protected and encrypted. Furthermore AS and RS MUST perform mutual authentication. Finally the AS SHOULD to verify that the RS has the right to access introspection information about the provided token. Profiles of this framework are expected to specify how authentication and communication security is implemented.
The figures of this section use CBOR diagnostic notation without the integer abbreviations for the parameters or their values for better readability.

### 7.1. RS-to-AS Request

The RS sends a CoAP POST request to the introspection resource at the AS, with payload sent as "application/cbor" data. The payload is a CBOR map with a 'token' parameter containing the access token along with optional parameters representing additional context that is known by the RS to aid the AS in its response.

The same parameters are required and optional as in section 2.1 of RFC 7662 [RFC7662].

For example, Figure 13 shows a RS calling the token introspection resource at the AS to query about an OAuth 2.0 proof-of-possession token.

Header: POST (Code=0.02)
Uri-Host: "server.example.com"
Uri-Path: "introspect"
Content-Type: "application/cbor"
Payload:
{
    "token" : b64'7gj0dXJQ43U',
    "token_type_hint" : "pop"
}

Figure 13: Example introspection request.

### 7.2. AS-to-RS Response

The AS responds with a CBOR object in "application/cbor" format with the same required and optional parameters as in section 2.2. of RFC 7662 [RFC7662] with the following additions:

**alg**

OPTIONAL. See Section 6.4 for more details.

**cnf**

OPTIONAL. This field contains information about the proof-of-possession key that binds the client to the access token. See Section 6.4 for more details on the formatting of the 'cnf' parameter.

**profile**
OPTIONAL. This indicates the profile that the RS MUST use with the client. See Section 6.4 for more details on the formatting of this parameter.

client_token

OPTIONAL. This parameter contains information that the RS MUST pass on to the client. See Section 7.4 for more details.

For example, Figure 14 shows an AS response to the introspection request in Figure 13.

Header: Created Code=2.01)
Content-Type: "application/cbor"
Payload:
{
    "active": true,
    "scope": "read",
    "token_type": "pop",
    "alg": "HS256",
    "profile": "coap_dtls",
    "client_token": b64'2QPhg0OhAQo ...
    (remainder of client token omitted for brevity)',
    "cnf": {
        "COSE_Key": {
            "kty": "Symmetric",
            "kid": b64'39Gqlw',
            "k": b64'hJtXhkV8FJG+0nbc6mxCcQh'
        }
    }
}

Figure 14: Example introspection response.

7.3. Error Response

The error responses for CoAP-based interactions with the AS are equivalent to the ones for HTTP-based interactions as defined in section 2.3 of [RFC7662], with the following differences:

- If content is sent, the Content-Type MUST be set to "application/cbor", and the payload MUST be encoded in a CBOR map.
- If the credentials used by the RS are invalid the AS MUST respond
with the CoAP response code code 4.01 (Unauthorized) and use the required and optional parameters from section 5.2 in RFC 6749 [RFC6749].

- If the RS does not have the right to perform this introspection request, the AS MUST respond with the CoAP response code 4.03 (Forbidden). In this case no payload is returned.

Note that a properly formed and authorized query for an inactive or otherwise invalid token does not warrant an error response by this specification. In these cases, the authorization server MUST instead respond with an introspection response with the "active" field set to "false".

### 7.4. Client Token

EDITORIAL NOTE: We have tentatively introduced this concept and would specifically like feedback if this is viewed as a useful addition to the framework.

In cases where the client has limited connectivity and is requesting access to a previously unknown resource servers, using a long term token, there are situations where it would be beneficial to relay the proof-of-possession key and other relevant information from the AS to the client through the RS. The client_token parameter is designed to carry such information, and is intended to be used as described in Figure 15.
Figure 15: Use of the client_token parameter.

The client token is a COSE_Encrypted object, containing as payload a CBOR map with the following claims:

- **cnf**
  - REQUIRED. Contains information about the proof-of-possession key the client is to use with its access token. See Section 6.4.4.

- **token_type**
  - OPTIONAL. See Section 6.4.2.

- **alg**
  - OPTIONAL. See Section 6.4.2.

- **profile**
  - REQUIRED. See Section 6.4.3.

- **rs_cnf**
  - OPTIONAL. Contains information about the key that the RS uses to authenticate towards the client. If the key is symmetric then this claim MUST NOT be part of the Client Token, since this is the same key as the one specified through the 'cnf' claim. This claim uses the same encoding as the 'cnf' parameter. See Section 6.4.3.

The AS encrypts this token using a key shared between the AS and the client, so that only the client can decrypt it and access its payload. How this key is established is out of scope of this framework.

### 7.5. Mapping Introspection parameters to CBOR

The introspection request and response parameters are mapped to CBOR types as follows and are given an integer key value to save space.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter name</th>
<th>CBOR Key</th>
<th>Major Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>active</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0 (uint)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>username</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3 (text string)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>client_id</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scope</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>token_type</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exp</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6 tag value 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iat</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6 tag value 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nbf</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6 tag value 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sub</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aud</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>iss</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jti</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alg</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cnf</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5 (map)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aud</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>client_token</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rs_cnf</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. The Access Token

This framework RECOMMENDS the use of CBOR web token (CWT) as specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-cbor-web-token].

In order to facilitate offline processing of access tokens, this draft specifies the "scope" claim for access tokens that explicitly encodes the scope of a given access token. This claim follows the same encoding rules as defined in section 3.3 of [RFC6749]. The meaning of a specific scope value is application specific and expected to be known to the RS running that application.

8.1. The 'Authorization Information' Resource

The access token, containing authorization information and information of the key used by the client, is transported to the RS so that the RS can authenticate and authorize the client request. This section defines a method for transporting the access token to the RS using CoAP that MAY be used. An ACE profile MAY define other methods for token transport.

This method REQUIRES the RS to implement an /authz-info resource. A client using this method MUST make a POST request to /authz-info on the RS with the access token in the payload. The RS receiving the token MUST verify the validity of the token. If the token is valid, the RS MUST respond to the POST request with 2.04 (Changed).

If the token is not valid, the RS MUST respond with error code 4.01 (Unauthorized). If the token is valid but the audience of the token does not match the RS, the RS MUST respond with error code 4.03 (Forbidden).

The RS MAY make an introspection request to validate the token before responding to the POST /authz-info request. If the introspection response contains a client token (Section 7.4) then this token SHALL be included in the payload of the 2.04 (Changed) response.

8.2. Token Expiration
Depending on the capabilities of the RS, there are various ways in which it can verify the validity of a received access token. We list the possibilities here including what functionality they require of the RS.

- The token is a CWT/JWT and includes a 'exp' claim and possibly the 'nbf' claim. The RS verifies these by comparing them to values from its internal clock as defined in [RFC7519]. In this case the RS must have a real time chip (RTC) or some other way of reliably measuring time.
- The RS verifies the validity of the token by performing an introspection request as specified in Section 7. This requires the RS to have a reliable network connection to the AS and to be able to handle two secure sessions in parallel (C to RS and AS to RS).
- The RS and the AS both store a sequence number linked to their common security association. The AS increments this number for each access token it issues and includes it in the access token, which is a CWT/JWT. The RS keeps track of the most recently received sequence number, and only accepts tokens as valid, that are in a certain range around this number. This method does only require the RS to keep track of the sequence number. The method does not provide timely expiration, but it makes sure that older tokens cease to be valid after a certain number of newer ones got issued. For a constrained RS with no network connectivity and no means of reliably measuring time, this is the best that can be achieved.

9. Security Considerations

The entire document is about security. Security considerations applicable to authentication and authorization in RESTful environments provided in OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] apply to this work, as well as the security considerations from [I-D.ietf-ace-actors]. Furthermore [RFC6819] provides additional security considerations for OAuth which apply to IoT deployments as well. Finally [I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-architecture] discusses security and privacy threats as well as mitigation measures for Proof-of-Possession tokens.
10. IANA Considerations

This specification registers new parameters for OAuth and establishes registries for mappings to CBOR.

10.1. OAuth Introspection Response Parameter Registration

This specification registers the following parameters in the OAuth introspection response parameters:

- **Name**: "alg"
  - Description: Algorithm to use with PoP key, as defined in PoP token specification.
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- **Name**: "cnf"
  - Description: Key to use to prove the right to use an access token, as defined in [RFC7800].
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- **Name**: "aud"
  - Description: Reference to intended receiving RS, as defined in PoP token specification.
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- **Name**: "profile"
  - Description: The communication and communication security profile used between client and RS, as defined in ACE profiles.
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- **Name**: "client_token"
  - Description: Information that the RS MUST pass to the client e.g. about the proof-of-possession keys.
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document
10.2. OAuth Parameter Registration

This specification registers the following parameters in the OAuth Parameters Registry

- **Name**: "alg"
- **Description**: Algorithm to use with PoP key, as defined in PoP token specification,
- **Change Controller**: IESG
- **Specification Document(s)**: this document

- **Parameter name**: "profile"
- **Parameter usage location**: token request, and token response
- **Change Controller**: IESG
- **Specification Document(s)**: this document

- **Name**: "cnf"
- **Description**: Key to use to prove the right to use an access token, as defined in [RFC7800].
- **Change Controller**: IESG
- **Specification Document(s)**: this document

10.3. OAuth Access Token Types

This specification registers the following new token type in the OAuth Access Token Types Registry

- **Name**: "PoP"
- **Description**: A proof-of-possession token.
- **Change Controller**: IESG
- **Specification Document(s)**: this document

10.4. Token Type Mappings

A new registry will be requested from IANA, entitled "Token Type Mappings". The registry is to be created as Expert Review Required.

10.4.1. Registration Template

**Token Type:**

Name of token type as registered in the OAuth token type registry e.g. "Bearer".

**Mapped value:**

Integer representation for the token type value. The key value MUST be an integer in the range of 1 to 65536.

**Change Controller:**
10.4.2. Initial Registry Contents

- Parameter name: "Bearer"
  - Mapped value: 1
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Parameter name: "pop"
  - Mapped value: 2
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

10.5. JSON Web Token Claims

This specification registers the following new claim in the JSON Web Token (JWT) registry.

- Claim Name: "scope"
  - Claim Description: The scope of an access token as defined in [RFC6749].
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

10.6. ACE Profile Registry

A new registry will be requested from IANA, entitled "ACE Profile Registry". The registry is to be created as Expert Review Required.

10.6.1. Registration Template

Profile name:
  Name of the profile to be included in the profile attribute.

Profile description:
  Text giving an over view of the profile and the context it is
Profile ID:
Integer value to identify the profile. The value MUST be an integer in the range of 1 to 65536.

Change Controller:

10.7. OAuth Parameter Mappings Registry

A new registry will be requested from IANA, entitled "Token Resource CBOR Mappings Registry". The registry is to be created as Expert Review Required.

10.7.1. Registration Template

Parameter name:
OAuth Parameter name, refers to the name in the OAuth parameter registry e.g. "client_id".

CBOR key value:
Key value for the claim. The key value MUST be an integer in the range of 1 to 65536.

Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.

Specification Document(s):
Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter, preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required.

10.7.2. Initial Registry Contents

- Parameter name: "client_id"
- CBOR key value: 1
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Parameter name: "client_secret"
  - CBOR key value: 2
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Parameter name: "response_type"
  - CBOR key value: 3
  - Change Controller: IESG

- Parameter name: "redirect_uri"
  - CBOR key value: 4
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Parameter name: "scope"
  - CBOR key value: 5
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Parameter name: "state"
  - CBOR key value: 6
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Parameter name: "code"
  - CBOR key value: 7
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Parameter name: "error_description"
  - CBOR key value: 8
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Parameter name: "error_uri"
  - CBOR key value: 9
Parameter name: "grant_type"
CBOR key value: 10
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): this document

Parameter name: "access_token"
CBOR key value: 11
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): this document

Parameter name: "token_type"
CBOR key value: 12
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): this document

Parameter name: "expires_in"

Parameter name: "username"
CBOR key value: 13
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): this document

Parameter name: "password"
CBOR key value: 14
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): this document

Parameter name: "refresh_token"
CBOR key value: 15
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): this document

Parameter name: "alg"
CBOR key value: 16
Change Controller: IESG
Specification Document(s): this document
10.8. Introspection Resource CBOR Mappings Registry

A new registry will be requested from IANA, entitled "Introspection Resource CBOR Mappings Registry". The registry is to be created as Expert Review Required.

10.8.1. Registration Template

Response parameter name:
   Name of the response parameter as defined in the "OAuth Token Introspection Response" registry e.g. "active".

CBOR key value:
   Key value for the claim. The key value MUST be an integer in the range of 1 to 65536.

Change Controller:
   For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, email address, home page URI) may also be included.

Specification Document(s):
   Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter, preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve
copies of the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be included but is not required.

10.8.2. Initial Registry Contents

- Response parameter name: "active"
  - CBOR key value: 1
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Response parameter name: "username"
  - CBOR key value: 2
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Response parameter name: "client_id"
  - CBOR key value: 3
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Response parameter name: "scope"
  - CBOR key value: 4
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Response parameter name: "token_type"
  - CBOR key value: 5
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Response parameter name: "exp"
  - CBOR key value: 6
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Response parameter name: "iat"
  - CBOR key value: 7
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Response parameter name: "nbf"
10.9. CoAP Option Number Registration

- CBOR key value: 8
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Response parameter name: "sub"
  - CBOR key value: 9
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Response parameter name: "aud"
  - CBOR key value: 10
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Response parameter name: "iss"
  - CBOR key value: 11
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Response parameter name: "jti"
  - CBOR key value: 12
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Parameter name: "alg"
  - CBOR key value: 13
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Parameter name: "cnf"
  - CBOR key value: 14
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document

- Parameter name: "aud"
  - CBOR key value: 15
  - Change Controller: IESG
  - Specification Document(s): this document
This section registers the "Access-Token" CoAP Option Number in the "CoRE Parameters" sub-registry "CoAP Option Numbers" in the manner described in [RFC7252].

Name

Access-Token

Number

TBD

Reference

[This document].

Meaning in Request

Contains an Access Token according to [This document] containing access permissions of the client.

Meaning in Response

Not used in response

Safe-to-Forward

TBD

Format

Based on the observer the format is perceived differently. Opaque data to the client and CWT or reference token to the RS.

Length

Less then 255 bytes

11. Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Eve Maler for her contributions to the use of OAuth 2.0 and UMA in IoT scenarios, Robert Taylor for his discussion input, and Malisa Vucinic for his input on the ACRE proposal [I-D.seitz-ace-core-authz] which was one source of inspiration for this work. Finally, we would like to thank the ACE working group in general for their feedback.

Ludwig Seitz and Goeran Selander worked on this document as part of the CelticPlus project CyberWI, with funding from Vinnova.
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Internet-Draft ACE June 2016

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[RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049,
Appendix A. Design Justification

This section provides further insight into the design decisions of the solution documented in this document. Section 3 lists several building blocks and briefly summarizes their importance. The justification for offering some of those building blocks, as opposed to using OAuth 2.0 as is, is given below.
Common IoT constraints are:

Low Power Radio:

Many IoT devices are equipped with a small battery which needs to last for a long time. For many constrained wireless devices the highest energy cost is associated to transmitting or receiving messages. It is therefore important to keep the total communication overhead low, including minimizing the number and size of messages sent and received, which has an impact of choice on the message format and protocol. By using CoAP over UDP, and CBOR encoded messages some of these aspects are addressed. Security protocols contribute to the communication overhead and can in some cases be optimized. For example authentication and key establishment may in certain cases where security requirements so allows be replaced by provisioning of security context by a trusted third party, using transport or application layer security.

Low CPU Speed:

Some IoT devices are equipped with processors that are significantly slower than those found in most current devices on the Internet. This typically has implications on what timely cryptographic operations a device is capable to perform, which in turn impacts e.g. protocol latency. Symmetric key cryptography may be used instead of the computationally more expensive public key cryptography where the security requirements so allows, but this may also require support for trusted third party assisted secret key establishment using transport or application layer security.

Small Amount of Memory:

Microcontrollers embedded in IoT devices are often equipped with small amount of RAM and flash memory, which places limitations what kind of processing can be performed and how much code can be put on those devices. To reduce code size fewer and smaller protocol implementations can be put on the firmware of such a device. In this case, CoAP may be used instead of HTTP, symmetric
key cryptography instead of public key cryptography, and CBOR instead of JSON. Authentication and key establishment protocol, e.g. the DTLS handshake, in comparison with assisted key establishment also has an impact on memory and code.

User Interface Limitations:

Protecting access to resources is both an important security as well as privacy feature. End users and enterprise customers do not want to give access to the data collected by their IoT device or to functions it may offer to third parties. Since the classical approach of requesting permissions from end users via a rich user interface does not work in many IoT deployment scenarios these functions need to be delegated to user controlled devices that are better suitable for such tasks, such as smart phones and tablets.

Communication Constraints:

In certain constrained settings an IoT device may not be able to communicate with a given device at all times. Devices may be sleeping, or just disconnected from the Internet because of general lack of connectivity in the area, for cost reasons, or for security reasons, e.g. to avoid an entry point for Denial-of-Service attacks.

The communication interactions this framework builds upon (as shown graphically in Figure 1) may be accomplished using a variety of different protocols, and not all parts of the message flow are used in all applications due to the communication constraints. While we envision deployments to make use of CoAP we explicitly want to support HTTP, HTTP/2 or specific protocols, such as Bluetooth Smart communication, which does not necessarily use IP. The latter raises the need for application layer security over the various interfaces.

Appendix B. Roles and Responsibilities

Resource Owner

* Make sure that the RS is registered at the AS.
* Make sure that clients can discover the AS which is in charge of the RS.
* Make sure that the AS has the necessary, up-to-date, access control policies for the RS.

Requesting Party

* Make sure that the client is provisioned the necessary credentials to authenticate to the AS.
* Make sure that the client is configured to follow the security requirements of the Requesting Party, when issuing requests (e.g. minimum communication security requirements, trust anchors).
* Register the client at the AS.

Authorization Server

* Register RS and manage corresponding security contexts.
* Register clients and including authentication credentials.
* Allow Resource Owners to configure and update access control policies related to their registered RS'.
* Expose a service that allows clients to request tokens.
* Authenticate clients that wishes to request a token.
* Process a token requests against the authorization policies configured for the RS.
* Expose a service that allows RS's to submit token introspection requests.
* Authenticate RS's that wishes to get an introspection response.
* Process token introspection requests.
* Optionally: Handle token revocation.

Client

* Discover the AS in charge of the RS that is to be targeted with a request.
* Submit the token request (A).
  + Authenticate towards the AS.
  + Specify which RS, which resource(s), and which action(s) the request(s) will target.
  + Specify preferences for communication security
  + If raw public key (rpk) or certificate is used, make sure
the AS has the right rpk or certificate for this client.
* Process the access token and client information (B)
  + Check that the token has the right format (e.g. CWT).
  + Check that the client information provides the necessary
    security parameters (e.g. PoP key, information on
    communication security protocols supported by the RS).
* Send the token and request to the RS (C)
  + Authenticate towards the RS (this could coincide with the
    proof of possession process).
  + Transmit the token as specified by the AS (default is to an
    authorization information resource, alternative options are
    as a CoAP option or in the DTLS handshake).
  + Perform the proof-of-possession procedure as specified for
    the type of used token (this may already have been taken
    care of through the authentication procedure).
* Process the RS response (F) requirements of the Requesting
  Party, when issuing requests (e.g. minimum communication
  security requirements, trust anchors).
* Register the client at the AS.

Resource Server

* Expose a way to submit access tokens.
* Process an access token.
  + Verify the token is from the right AS.
  + Verify that the token applies to this RS.
  + Check that the token has not expired (if the token provides
    expiration information).
  + Check the token's integrity.
  + Store the token so that it can be retrieved in the context
    of a matching request.
* Process a request.
  + Set up communication security with the client.

  + Authenticate the client.
  + Match the client against existing tokens.
  + Check that tokens belonging to the client actually authorize
    the requested action.
Appendix C. Deployment Examples

There is a large variety of IoT deployments, as is indicated in Appendix A, and this section highlights a few common variants. This section is not normative but illustrates how the framework can be applied.

For each of the deployment variants there are a number of possible security setups between clients, resource servers and authorization servers. The main focus in the following subsections is on how authorization of a client request for a resource hosted by a RS is performed. This requires the the security of the requests and responses between the clients and the RS to consider.

Note: CBOR diagnostic notation is used for examples of requests and responses.

C.1. Local Token Validation

In this scenario we consider the case where the resource server is offline, i.e. it is not connected to the AS at the time of the access request. This access procedure involves steps A, B, C, and F of Figure 1.

Since the resource server must be able to verify the access token locally, self-contained access tokens must be used.

This example shows the interactions between a client, the authorization server and a temperature sensor acting as a resource server. Message exchanges A and B are shown in Figure 17.

A: The client first generates a public-private key pair used for communication security with the RS. The client sends the POST request to /token at the AS. The request contains the public key of the client and the Audience parameter set to "tempSensorInLivingRoom", a value that the temperature sensor identifies itself with. The AS evaluates the request and authorizes the client to access the resource.
B: The AS responds with a PoP token and client information. The PoP token contains the public key of the client, and the client information contains the public key of the RS. For communication security this example uses DTLS RawPublicKey between the client and the RS. The issued token will have a short validity time, i.e. 'exp' close to 'iat', to protect the RS from replay attacks since it, that cannot do introspection to check the tokens current validity. The token includes the claim "aif" with the authorized access that an owner of the temperature device can enjoy. The 'aif' claim, issued by the AS, informs the RS that the owner of the token, that can prove the possession of a key is authorized to make a GET request against the /temperature resource and a POST request on the /firmware resource.

Note: In this example we assume that the client knows what resource it wants to access, and is therefore able to request specific audience and scope claims for the access token.

Authorization

Client    Server
|         |
|         |
|         |
A:  +--------> | Header: POST (Code=0.02)
  | POST       | Uri-Path:"token"
  |            | Content-Type: application/cbor
  |            | Payload: <Request-Payload>
|         |
B:  |<--------+ Header: 2.05 Content
  | 2.05      | Content-Type: application/cbor
  |            | Payload: <Response-Payload>
|         |

Figure 17: Token Request and Response Using Client Credentials.

The information contained in the Request-Payload and the Response-Payload is shown in Figure 18.
Request-Payload:
{
  "grant_type" : "client_credentials",
  "aud" : "tempSensorInLivingRoom",
  "client_id" : "myclient",
  "client_secret" : "qwerty"
}

Response-Payload:
{
  "access_token" : b64'SlAV32hkKG ...',
  "token_type" : "pop",
  "csp" : "DTLS",
  "cnf" : {
    "COSE_Key" : {
      "kid" : b64'c29tZSBwdWJsaWMga2V5IGlk",
      "kty" : "EC",
      "crv" : "P-256",
      "x" : b64'MKBCTNIcKUSDIi11ySs3526iDZ8AiTo7Tu6KPAqv7D4",
      "y" : b64'4EtI6SR2WYiLURN5vfVHuhp7x8PxtmWWlbM4IFyM'
    }
  }
}

Figure 18: Request and Response Payload Details.

The content of the access token is shown in Figure 19.

{  
  "aud" : "tempSensorInLivingRoom",
  "iat" : "1360189224",
  "exp" : "1360289224",
  "aif" : [[["/temperature", 0], ["/firmware", 2]],
  "cnf" : {
    "jwk" : {
      "kid" : b64'1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e8",
      "kty" : "EC",
      "crv" : "P-256",
      "x" : b64'f830J3D2xF1B8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e8Tus9uPHvRVEU",
      "y" : b64'x_FEzRu9m36HLN_tue659LNpXW6pCyStikYjKIWI5a0'
C: The client then sends the PoP token to the /authz-info resource at the RS. This is a plain CoAP request, i.e. no transport or application layer security between client and RS, since the token is integrity protected between AS and RS. The RS verifies that the PoP token was created by a known and trusted AS, is valid, and responds to the client. The RS caches the security context together with authorization information about this client contained in the PoP token.

```
Resource
Client  Server
|        |
C: +-------->| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
|  POST    | Uri-Path:"authz-info"
|         | Payload: SlAV32hkKG ...
|<--------+ Header: 2.01 Created
|  2.01   |  |
|         |
```

Figure 20: Access Token provisioning to RS
The client and the RS runs the DTLS handshake using the raw public keys established in step B and C. The client sends the CoAP request GET to /temperature on RS over DTLS. The RS verifies that the request is authorized, based on previously established security context.

F: The RS responds with a resource representation over DTLS.

```
Resource
Client  Server
|        |
|<=======>| DTLS Connection Establishment
```
C.2. Introspection Aided Token Validation

In this deployment scenario we assume that a client is not be able to access the AS at the time of the access request. Since the RS is, however, connected to the back-end infrastructure it can make use of token introspection. This access procedure involves steps A-F of Figure 1, but assumes steps A and B have been carried out during a phase when the client had connectivity to AS.

Since the client is assumed to be offline, at least for a certain period of time, a pre-provisioned access token has to be long-lived. The resource server may use its online connectivity to validate the access token with the authorization server, which is shown in the example below.

In the example we show the interactions between an offline client (key fob), a resource server (online lock), and an authorization server. We assume that there is a provisioning step where the client has access to the AS. This corresponds to message exchanges A and B which are shown in Figure 22.

Authorization consent from the resource owner can be pre-configured, but it can also be provided via an interactive flow with the resource owner. An example of this for the key fob case could be that the resource owner has a connected car, he buys a generic key that he wants to use with the car. To authorize the key fob he connects it
to his computer that then provides the UI for the device. After that OAuth 2.0 implicit flow can be used to authorize the key for his car at the car manufacturer's AS.

Note: In this example the client does not know the exact door it will be used to access since the token request is not send at the time of access. So the scope and audience parameters is set quite wide to start with and new values different from the original ones can be returned from introspection later on.

A: The client sends the request using POST to /token at AS. The request contains the Audience parameter set to "PACS1337" (PACS, Physical Access System), a value that the online door in question identifies itself with. The AS generates an access token as an opaque string, which it can match to the specific client, a targeted audience and a symmetric key.

B: The AS responds with the access token and client information, the latter containing a symmetric key. Communication security between C and RS will be DTLS and PreSharedKey. The PoP key being used as the PreSharedKey.

Figure 22: Token Request and Response using Client Credentials.

The information contained in the Request-Payload and the Response-Payload is shown in Figure 23.
Request-Payload:
{
    "grant_type" : "client_credentials",
    "aud" : "lockOfDoor4711",
    "client_id" : "keyfob",
    "client_secret" : "qwerty"
}

Response-Payload:
{
    "access_token" : b64'SlAV32hkKG ...',
    "token_type" : "pop",
    "csp" : "DTLS",
    "cnf" : {
        "COSE_Key" : {
            "kid" : b64'c29tZSBwdWJsaWMga2V5IGlk',
            "kty" : "oct",
            "alg" : "HS256",
            "k" : b64'ZoRSOrFzN_FzUA5XKMYoVHyzff5oRJxl-IXRtzJ6uE'  
        }
    }
}

Figure 23: Request and Response Payload for C offline

The access token in this case is just an opaque string referencing the authorization information at the AS.

C: Next, the client POSTs the access token to the /authz-info resource in the RS. This is a plain CoAP request, i.e. no DTLS between client and RS. Since the token is an opaque string, the RS cannot verify it on its own, and thus defers to respond the client with a status code until after step E.

D: The RS forwards the token to the /introspect resource on the AS. Introspection assumes a secure connection between the AS and the RS, e.g. using transport of application layer security, which is not detailed in this example.

E: The AS provides the introspection response containing parameters about the token. This includes the confirmation key (cnf) parameter that allows the RS to verify the client's proof of
After receiving message E, the RS responds to the client's POST in step C with Code 2.01 Created.

```
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Client</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C:</td>
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<tr>
<td>E:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| C:     | 2.01    | **                
```

Figure 24: Token Introspection for C offline
The information contained in the Request-Payload and the Response-Payload is shown in Figure 25.

```
Request-Payload:
{
  "token" : b64'SlAV32hkKG...',
  "client_id" : "FrontDoor",
  "client_secret" : "ytrewq"
```
Response-Payload:
{
    "active" : true,
    "aud" : "lockOfDoor4711",
    "scope" : "open, close",
    "iat" : 1311280970,
    "cnf" : {
        "kid" : b64'JDLUhTMjU2IiwiY3R5Ijoi ...'
    }
}

Figure 25: Request and Response Payload for Introspection

The client uses the symmetric PoP key to establish a DTLS PreSharedKey secure connection to the RS. The CoAP request PUT is sent to the uri-path /state on RS changing state of the door to locked.

F: The RS responds with an appropriate over the secure DTLS channel.

Resource

Client    Server
|         | DTLS Connection Establishment
|         | using Pre Shared Key
|         |
|<========| Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
| PUT     | Uri-Path: "state"
|         | Payload: <new state for the lock>
|         |
F: |<--------+ Header: 2.04 Changed
| 2.04    | Payload: <new state for the lock>
|         |

Figure 26: Resource request and response protected by OSCOAP

Appendix D. Document Updates
D.1. Version -01 to -02

- Restructured to remove communication security parts. These shall now be defined in profiles.
- Restructured section 5 to create new sections on the OAuth endpoints /token, /introspect and /authz-info.
- Pulled in material from draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution in order to define proof-of-possession key distribution.
- Introduced the 'cnf' parameter as defined in RFC7800 to reference or transport keys used for proof of possession.
- Introduced the 'client-token' to transport client information from the AS to the client via the RS in conjunction with introspection.
- Expanded the IANA section to define parameters for token request, introspection and CWT claims.
- Moved deployment scenarios to the appendix as examples.

D.2. Version -00 to -01

- Changed 5.1. from "Communication Security Protocol" to "Client Information".
- Major rewrite of 5.1 to clarify the information exchanged between C and AS in the PoP token request profile for IoT.
  * Allow the client to indicate preferences for the communication security protocol.
  * Defined the term "Client Information" for the additional information returned to the client in addition to the access token.
  * Require that the messages between AS and client are secured, either with (D)TLS or with COSE_Encrypted wrappers.
  * Removed dependency on OSCoAP and added generic text about object security instead.
  * Defined the "rpk" parameter in the client information to transmit the raw public key of the RS from AS to client.
  * (D)TLS MUST use the PoP key in the handshake (either as PSK or as client RPK with client authentication).
  * Defined the use of x5c, x5t and x5tS256 parameters when a client certificate is used for proof of possession.
  * Defined "tktn" parameter for signaling for how to transfer the access token.
- Added 5.2. the CoAP Access-Token option for transferring access tokens in messages that do not have payload.
- 5.3.2. Defined success and error responses from the RS when receiving an access token.
- 5.6.: Added section giving guidance on how to handle token expiration in the absence of reliable time.
- Appendix B Added list of roles and responsibilities for C, AS and RS.
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