Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Delay-Tolerant Networking (DTN) Node ID Validation Extension

Abstract

This document specifies an extension to the Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) protocol which allows an ACME server to validate the Delay-Tolerant Networking (DTN) Node ID for an ACME client. The DTN Node ID is encoded as a certificate Subject Alternative Name (SAN) of type otherName with a name form of BundleEID and as an ACME Identifier type "bundleEID".

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1. Introduction

Although the original purpose of the Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) [RFC8555] was to allow Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) certificate authorities to validate network domain names of clients, the same mechanism can be used to validate any of the subject claims supported by the PKIX profile [RFC5280].

In the case of this specification, the claim being validated is a Subject Alternative Name (SAN) of type otherName with a name form of BundleEID, which used to represent an Endpoint ID (EID) for a Delay-Tolerant Networking (DTN) bundle. Currently the URI schemes "dtn" and "ipn" as defined in [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis] are valid for an Endpoint ID. A DTN Node ID is an Endpoint ID with scheme-specific restrictions to identify it as such; currently the "dtn" scheme uses an empty demux part and the "ipn" scheme uses service number zero.

Because the BundleEID claim is new to ACME, a new ACME Identifier type "bundleEID" is needed to manage this claim within ACME messaging. A "bundleEID" claim can be part of a pre-authorization or as one of the authorizations of an order containing any number of claims.

Once an ACME server validates a Node ID, either as a pre-authorization of the "bundleEID" or as one of the authorizations of an order containing a "bundleEID", the client can finalize the order using an associated certificate signing request (CSR). Because a single order can contain multiple identifiers of multiple types, there can be operational issues for a client attempting to, and possibly failing to, validate those multiple identifiers as described in Section 5.1. Once a certificate is issued for a Node ID, how the ACME client configures the Bundle Protocol (BP) agent with the new certificate is an implementation matter.

The scope and behavior of this validation mechanism is similar to that of secured email validation of [RFC8823].

1.1. Scope

This document describes the ACME messages, BPv7 payloads, and BPSec requirements needed to validate Node ID ownership. This document does not address:

  *Mechanisms for communication between ACME client or ACME server and their associated BP agent(s). This document only describes exchanges between ACME client--server pairs and between their BP agents.

*Specific BP extension blocks or BPSec security contexts necessary
    to fulfill the security requirements of this protocol. The exact
    security context needed, and their parameters, are network-
    specific.

   *Policies or mechanisms for defining or configuring bundle
    integrity gateways, or trusting integrity gateways on an
    individual entity or across a network.

   *Mechanisms for locating or identifying other bundle entities
    (peers) within a network or across an internet. The mapping of
    Node ID to potential convergence layer (CL) protocol and network
    address is left to implementation and configuration of the BP
    Agent and its various potential routing strategies.

   *Logic for routing bundles along a path toward a bundle's
    endpoint. This protocol is involved only in creating bundles at a
    source and handling them at a destination.

   *Logic for performing rate control and congestion control of
    bundle transfers. The ACME server is responsible for rate control
    of validation requests.

   *Policies or mechanisms for provisioning, deploying, or accessing
    certificates and private keys; deploying or accessing certificate
    revocation lists (CRLs); or configuring security parameters on an
    individual entity or across a network.

   *Policies or mechanisms for an ACME server to handle mixed-use
    certificate requests. This specification is focused only on
    single-use DTN-specific PKIX profiles.

1.2. Authorization Strategy

The basic unit of data exchange in a DTN is a Bundle [I-D.ietf-dtn-
bpbis], which consists of a data payload with accompanying metadata.
An Endpoint ID is used as the destination of a Bundle and can
indicate both a unicast or a multicast destination. A Node ID is
used to identify the source of a Bundle and is used for routing
through intermediate nodes, including the final node(s) used to
deliver a Bundle to its destination endpoint. A Node ID can also be
used as an endpoint for administrative bundles. More detailed
descriptions of the rationale and capabilities of these networks can
be found in "Delay-Tolerant Network Architecture" [RFC4838].

When an ACME client requests a pre-authorization or an order with a
"bundleEID" identifier type having a value consistent with a Node ID
(see Section 4.2.5 of [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis]), the ACME server offers
a "dtn-nodeid-01" challenge type to validate that Node ID. If the
ACME client attempts the authorization challenge to validate a Node

ID, the ACME server sends an ACME Node ID Validation Challenge
Bundle with a destination of the Node ID being validated. The BP
agent on that node receives the Challenge Bundle, generates an ACME
key authorization digest, and sends an ACME Node ID Validation
Response Bundle in reply. An Integrity Gateway on the client side of
the DTN can be used to attest to the source of the Response Bundle.
Finally, the ACME server receives the Response Bundle and checks
that the digest was generated for the associated ACME challenge and
from the client account key associated with the original request.
This workflow is shown in the diagram of [Figure 1](#) and defined in
[Section 3](#).

```
    +------------+                              +------------+
    |    ACME    |<===== HTTPS exchanges =====>|    ACME    |
    |   Client   |                              |   Server   |
    +------------+                              +------------+
         |                                        |   ^
(1) Enable or (6) disable                 (2) Send |   |
  validation from server                 Challenge |   |(5) Indicate
         |                Non-DTN                   |   |    Response
~~~~~~~~~~|~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~|~~~|~~~~~~~~~~~~
         V                  DTN                    V   |
    ++------------++                          ++------------++
    || Admin Elem.||                          || Admin Elem.||-+
    |+------------+|          (3) Challenge    |+------------+| |
    |   Client's   |<------------- Bundle -----|   Server's   | |
    |   BP Agent   |                           |   BP Agent   | |
    +--------------+                           +--------------+ |
         |                                     +----^--------+
         |      +-------------+                     |
         |      |  Integrity  |  (4) Response       |
      +---->|   Gateway   |------ Bundle --------+
             +-------------+
```

    Figure 1: The relationships and flows between Node ID Validation
                                entities

Because the DTN Node ID is used both for routing bundles between BP
agents and for multiplexing administrative services within a BP
agent, there is no possibility to separate the ACME validation of a
Node ID from normal bundle handling for that same Node ID. This
leaves administrative record types as a way to leave the Node ID
unchanged while disambiguating from other service data bundles.

There is nothing in this protocol which requires network-topological
co-location of either the ACME client or ACME server with their
associated BP agent. While ACME requires a low-enough latency
network to perform HTTPS exchanges between ACME client and server,

the client's BP agent (the one being validated) could be on the far
side of a long-delay or multi-hop DTN network. The means by which
the ACME client or server communicates with its associated BP agent
is an implementation matter.

1.3. Use of CDDL

This document defines CBOR structure using the Concise Data
Definition Language (CDDL) of [RFC8610]. The entire CDDL structure
can be extracted from the XML version of this document using the
XPath expression:

```
'//sourcecode[@type="cddl"]'
```

The following initial fragment defines the top-level symbols of this
document's CDDL, which includes the example CBOR content.

```
start = acme-record / bundle / tstr
```

1.4. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.

In this document, several terms are shortened for the sake of
terseness. These terms are:

Challenge Request: This is a shortened form of the full "DTN Node
    ID Challenge Request Object". It is a JSON object created by the
    ACME server for challenge type "dtn-nodeid-01".

Challenge Response: This is a shortened form of the full "DTN Node
    ID Challenge Response Object". It is a JSON object created by the
    ACME client to authorize a challenge type "dtn-nodeid-01".

Challenge Bundle: This is a shortened form of the full "ACME Node
    ID Validation Challenge Bundle". It is a Bundle created by the BP
    agent managed by the ACME server to challenge a Node ID claim.

Response Bundle: This is a shortened form of the full "ACME Node ID
    Validation Response Bundle". It is a Bundle created by the BP
    agent managed by the ACME client to validate a Node ID claim.

2. Bundle Endpoint ID ACME Identifier

This specification is the first to make use of an Bundle Endpoint ID to identify a claim for a certificate request in ACME. In this document, the only purpose for which an Bundle Endpoint ID ACME identifier is validated is as a DTN Node ID (see Section 3), but other specifications can define challenge types for other Endpoint ID uses.

Identifiers of type "bundleEID" in certificate requests **MUST** appear in an extensionRequest attribute [RFC2985] containing a subjectAltName extension of type otherName with a name form of BundleEID, identified by id-on-bundleEID of [IANA-SMI], consistent with the requirements of Section 4.4.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-dtn-tcpclv4]. Because the BundleEID is encoded as an IA5String it **SHALL** be treated as being in the percent-encoded form of Section 2.1 of [RFC3986]. Any "bundleEID" identifier which fails to properly percent-decode **SHALL** be rejected with an ACME error type of "malformed".

The ACME server **SHALL** decode and normalize (based on scheme-specific syntax) all received identifiers of type "bundleEID". Any "bundleEID" identifier request which uses a scheme not handled by the ACME server or for which the EID does not match the scheme-specific syntax **SHALL** be rejected with an ACME error type of "rejectedIdentifier".

When an ACME server needs to request proof that a client controls a BundleEID, it **SHALL** create an authorization with the identifier type "bundleEID". The ACME server **SHALL NOT** attempt to dereference the EID value on its own. It is the responsibility of a validation method to ensure the EID ownership via scheme-specific means authorized by the ACME client.

An identifier for the Node ID of "dtn://example/" would be formatted as:

```
{
  "type": "bundleEID",
  "value": "dtn://example/"
}
```

3. DTN Node ID Validation

The DTN Node ID validation method proves control over a Node ID by requiring the ACME client to configure a BP agent to respond to specific Challenge Bundles sent from the ACME server. The ACME server validates control of the Node ID by verifying that received

Response Bundles correspond with the BP Node and client account key being validated.

Similar to the ACME use case for validating email address ownership [RFC8823], this challenge splits the token into several parts, each being transported by a different channel, and the Key Authorization result requires combining all parts of the token. The token parts are:

token-chal This token is unique to, and identifies, each ACME authorization. It is contained in the Challenge Object of Section 3.1 as well as the Challenge Bundle of Section 3.3 and Response Bundle of Section 3.4. Each authorization can consist of multiple Challenge Bundles (e.g. taking different routes), but they all share the same token-chal value. This ensures that the Key Authorization is bound to the specific ACME challenge (and parent ACME authorization) and also allows the ACME client's BP agent to filter-in only valid Challenge Bundles. This token is also accessible to DTN on-path eavesdroppers.

token-bundle This token is unique to each Challenge Bundle sent by the ACME server. It is contained in the Challenge Bundle of Section 3.3 and Response Bundle of Section 3.4. This ensures that the Key Authorization is bound to the ability to receive the Challenge Bundle and not just have access to the ACME Challenge Object. This token is also accessible to DTN on-path eavesdroppers.

For each ACME server, the pair of token-chal and token-bundle values is the unique correlator between Challenge and Response bundles. Because multiple Challenge Bundles can be sent to validate the same Node ID, the token-bundle in the response is needed to correlate with the expected Key Authorization digest.

The DTN Node ID Challenge **SHALL** only be allowed for an EID usable as a DTN Node ID, which [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis]. When an ACME server supports Node ID validation, the ACME server **SHALL** define a challenge object in accordance with Section 3.1. Once this challenge object is defined, the ACME client may begin the validation.

To initiate a Node ID validation, the ACME client performs the following steps:

  1. The ACME client POSTs a newOrder or newAuthz request including the identifier of type "bundleEID" for the desired Node ID. From either of these entry points an authorization for the "bundleEID" type is indicated by the ACME server. See Section 7.4 of [RFC8555] for more details.

2. The ACME client obtains the challenge source Node ID and token-chal from the challenge object in accordance with Section 3.1.

3. The ACME client indicates to the administrative element of its BP agent the source Node ID and challenge token-chal which is authorized for use and the associated client account key thumbprint. The ACME client **SHALL** wait, if necessary, until the agent is configured before proceeding to the next step.

4. The ACME client POSTs a challenge response to the challenge URL on the ACME server accordance with Section 7.5.1 of [RFC8555]. The payload object is constructed in accordance with Section 3.2.

5. The administrative element waits for a Challenge Bundle to be received with the authorized ACME parameters, including its token-bundle payload, in accordance with Section 3.3.

6. The administrative element concatenates token-bundle with token-chal (each as base64url-encoded text strings) and computes the Key Authorization in accordance with Section 8.1 of [RFC8555] using the full token and client account key thumbprint.

7. The administrative element computes the SHA-256 digest of the Key Authorization result and generates a Response Bundle to send back to the ACME server in accordance with Section 3.4.

8. The ACME client waits for the authorization to be finalized on the ACME server in accordance with Section 7.5.1 of [RFC8555].

9. Once the challenge is completed (successfully or not), the ACME client indicates to the BP agent that the validation source and token-chal is no longer usable. If the authorization fails, the ACME client **MAY** retry the challenge from Step 3.

The ACME server verifies the client's control over a Node ID by performing the following steps:

1. The ACME server receives a newOrder or newAuthz request including the identifier of type "bundleEID", where the URI value is a Node ID.

2. The ACME server generates an authorization for the Node ID with challenge type "dtn-nodeid-01" in accordance with Section 3.1.

3. The ACME server receives a POST to the challenge URL indicated from the authorization object. The payload is handled in accordance with Section 3.2.

4. The ACME server sends, via the administrative element of its BP agent, one or more Challenge Bundles in accordance with Section 3.3. Each challenge bundle **SHALL** contain a distinct token-bundle to be able to correlate with a response bundle. Computing an expected Key Authorization digest is not necessary until a response is received.

5. The ACME server waits for Response Bundle(s) for a limited interval of time (based on the challenge response object of Section 3.2). Responses are encoded in accordance with Section 3.4.

6. Once received and decoded, the ACME server checks the contents of each Response Bundle in accordance with Section 3.4.1. After all Challenge Bundles have either been responded to or timed-out, the ACME server policy (see Section 3.5) determines whether the validation is successful. If validation is not successful, a client may retry the challenge which starts in Step 3.

When responding to a Challenge Bundle, a BP agent **SHALL** send a single Response Bundle in accordance with Section 3.4. A BP agent **SHALL** respond to ACME challenges only within the interval of time, only for the Node ID, and only for the token-chal indicated by the ACME client. A BP agent **SHALL** respond to multiple Challenge Bundles with the same ACME parameters but different bundle identities (source Node ID and timestamp); these correspond with the ACME server validating via multiple routing paths.

3.1. DTN Node ID Challenge Request Object

The DTN Node ID Challenge request object is defined by the ACME server when it supports validating Node IDs.

The DTN Node ID Challenge request object has the following content:

type (required, string): The string "dtn-nodeid-01".

source (required, array of string): An unordered list of possible source Node ID of bundles originating at the BP agent(s) of the ACME server. See Section 3.5 for a discussion of multi-perspective validation using multiple sources. The array **SHALL** be non-empty. The array **MAY** contain Node IDs which are not actually used as a challenge bundle source.

token-chal (required, string): A random value that uniquely identifies the challenge. This value **MUST** have at least 128 bits of entropy. It **MUST** contain any characters outside the base64url alphabet as described in Section 5 of [RFC4648]. Trailing '='

padding characters **MUST** be stripped. See [RFC4086] for additional
information on randomness requirements.

```
{
  "type": "dtn-nodeid-01",
  "url": "https://example.com/acme/chall/prV_B7yEyA4",
  "source": ["dtn://acme-server/"],
  "token-chal": "tPUZNY4ONIk6LxErRFEjVw"
}
```

The token-chal value included in this object is fixed for the entire
challenge, and may correspond with multiple separate token-bundle
values when multiple Challenge Bundles are sent for a single
validation.

3.2. DTN Node ID Challenge Response Object

The DTN Node ID Challenge response object is defined by the ACME
client when it authorizes validation of a Node ID. Because a DTN has
the potential for significantly longer delays than a non-DTN
network, the ACME client is able to inform the ACME server if a
particular validation round-trip is expected to take longer than
normal network delays (on the order of seconds).

The DTN Node ID Challenge response object has the following content:

rtt (optional, number): An expected round-trip time (RTT), in
seconds, between sending a Challenge Bundle and receiving a
Response Bundle. This value is a hint to the ACME server for how
long to wait for responses but is not authoritative. The minimum
RTT value **SHALL** be zero. There is no special significance to
zero-value RTT, it simply indicates the response is expected in
less than the least significant unit used by the ACME client.

```
{
  "rtt": 300.0
}
```

A challenge response is not sent until the BP agent has been
configured to properly respond to the challenge, so the RTT value is
meant to indicate any node-specific path delays expected to
encountered from the ACME server. Because there is no requirement on
the path (or paths) which bundles may traverse between the ACME
server and the BP agent, and the ACME server can attempt some path
diversity, the RTT value **SHOULD** be pessimistic.

A default bundle response interval, used when the object does not contain an RTT, **SHOULD** be a configurable parameter of the ACME server. If the ACME client indicated an RTT value in the object, the response interval **SHOULD** be twice the RTT (with limiting logic applied as described below). The lower limit on response interval is network-specific, but **SHOULD NOT** be shorter than one second. The upper limit on response interval is network-specific, but **SHOULD NOT** be longer than one minute (60 seconds) for a terrestrial-only DTN.

3.3. ACME Node ID Validation Challenge Bundles

Each ACME Node ID Validation Challenge Bundle **SHALL** be structured and encoded in accordance with [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis].

Each Challenge Bundle has parameters as listed here:

Bundle Processing Control Flags: The primary block flags **SHALL** indicate that the payload is an administrative record. The primary block flags **SHALL** indicate that user application acknowledgement is requested; this flag distinguishes the Challenge Bundle from the Response Bundle. The primary block flags **MAY** indicate that status reports are requested; such status can be helpful to troubleshoot routing issues.

Destination EID: The Destination EID **SHALL** be the ACME-server-normalized Node ID being validated.

Source Node ID: The Source Node ID **SHALL** indicate the Node ID of the BP agent of the ACME server performing the challenge. The challenge bundle source **SHALL** be present in the "source" array of the challenge object (see Section 3.1)

Creation Timestamp and Lifetime: The Creation Timestamp **SHALL** be set to the time at which the challenge was generated. The Lifetime **SHALL** indicate the response interval (of Section 3.2) for which ACME server will accept responses to this challenge.

Administrative Record Type Code: Set to the ACME Node ID Validation type code defined in Section 8.3.

Administrative Record Content: The Challenge Bundle administrative record content **SHALL** consist of a CBOR map containing two pairs:

> *One pair **SHALL** consist of key 1 with value of ACME challenge token-chal, copied from the challenge object, represented as a CBOR byte string.

> *One pair **SHALL** consist of key 2 with value of ACME challenge token-bundle, represented as a CBOR byte string. The token-bundle is a random value that uniquely identifies

the challenge bundle. This value **MUST** have at least 128
bits of entropy. See [RFC4086] for additional information
on randomness requirements.

This structure is part of the extension CDDL in Appendix A. An
example full Challenge Bundle is included in Appendix B.1

If the BP agent generating a Challenge Bundle does not have a well-
synchronized clock or the agent responding to the challenge is
expected to not have a well-synchronized clock, the bundle **SHALL**
include a Bundle Age extension block.

Challenge Bundles **SHALL** include a Block Integrity Block (BIB) in
accordance with Section 4 or with a Security Source identical to the
bundle Source Node. Challenge Bundles **SHALL NOT** be directly
encrypted by Block Confidentiality Block (BCB) or any other method
(see Section 7.1).

3.3.1. Challenge Bundle Checks

A proper Challenge Bundle meets all of the following criteria:

*The Challenge Bundle was received within the time interval
 allowed for the challenge. The allowed interval starts at the
 Creation Timestamp and extends for the Lifetime of the Challenge
 Bundle.

*The Challenge Bundle Source Node ID is identical to the Node ID
 indicated in the ACME challenge object. The comparison of Node
 IDs **SHALL** use the comparison logic of the NODE-ID from
 Section 4.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-dtn-tcpclv4].

*The Challenge Bundle contains a BIB which covers at least the
 primary block and payload. That BIB has a security source which
 is trusted and passes security-context-specific validation (i.e.
 MAC or signature verification).

*The challenge payload contains the token-chal as indicated in the
 ACME challenge object. The challenge payload contains a token-
 bundle meeting the definition in Section 3.3.

Any of the failures above **SHALL** cause the challenge bundle to be
deleted and otherwise ignored by the BP agent. The BP agent **MAY** send
status reports about the deletion if allowed by security policy.

3.4. ACME Node ID Validation Response Bundles

Each ACME Node ID Validation Response Bundle **SHALL** be structured and
encoded in accordance with [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis].

Each Response Bundle has parameters as listed here:

Bundle Processing Control Flags: The primary block flags **SHALL**
   indicate that the payload is an administrative record. The
   primary block flags **SHALL NOT** indicate that user application
   acknowledgement is requested; this flag distinguishes the
   Response Bundle from the Challenge Bundle. The primary block
   flags **MAY** indicate that status reports are requested; such status
   can be helpful to troubleshoot routing issues.

Destination EID: The Destination EID **SHALL** be identical to the
   Source Node ID of the Challenge Bundle to which this response
   corresponds.

Source Node ID: The Source Node ID **SHALL** be identical to the
   Destination EID of the Challenge Bundle to which this response
   corresponds.

Creation Timestamp and Lifetime: The Creation Timestamp **SHALL** be
   set to the time at which the response was generated. The response
   Lifetime **SHALL** indicate the response interval remaining if the
   Challenge Bundle indicated a limited Lifetime.

Administrative Record Type Code: Set to the ACME Node ID Validation
   type code defined in [Section 8.3](#).

Administrative Record Content: The Response Bundle administrative
   record content **SHALL** consist of a CBOR map containing three
   pairs:

   *One pair **SHALL** consist of key 1 with value of ACME
    challenge token-chal, copied from the Request Bundle,
    represented as a CBOR byte string.

   *One pair **SHALL** consist of key 2 with value of ACME
    challenge token-bundle, copied from the Request Bundle,
    represented as a CBOR byte string.

   *One pair **SHALL** consist of key 3 with value of the SHA-256
    digest [FIPS180-4] of the ACME Key Authorization in
    accordance with [Section 8.1](#) of [RFC8555], represented as a
    CBOR byte string.

This structure is part of the extension CDDL in [Appendix A](#). An
example full Response Bundle is included in [Appendix B.2](#)

If the BP agent responding to a Challenge Bundle does not have a
well-synchronized clock, it **SHALL** use any information about last-hop
delays and (if present) Bundle Age extension data to infer the age
of the Challenge Bundle and lifetime of the Response Bundle.

Response Bundles **SHALL** include a BIB in accordance with Section 4.
Response Bundles **SHALL NOT** be directly encrypted by BCB or any other
method (see Section 7.1 for explanation).

3.4.1. Response Bundle Checks

A proper Response Bundle meets all of the following criteria:

  *The Response Bundle was received within the time interval allowed
   for the challenge. The allowed interval starts at the Creation
   Timestamp and extends for the Lifetime of the associated
   Challenge Bundle. The interval of the Challenge Bundle is used
   here because the interval of the Response Bundle could be made to
   disagree with the Challenge Bundle.

  *The Response Bundle Source Node ID is identical to the Node ID
   being validated. The comparison of Node IDs **SHALL** use the
   comparison logic of the NODE-ID from Section 4.4.1 of [I-D.ietf-
   dtn-tcpclv4].

  *The Response Bundle contains a BIB which covers at least the
   primary block and payload. That BIB has a security source which
   is trusted and passes security-context-specific validation.

  *The response payload contains the same token-chal and token-
   bundle as sent in the Challenge Bundle (this is also how the two
   bundles are correlated). The response payload contains the
   expected Key Authorization digest computed by the ACME server.

Any of the failures above **SHALL** cause that single-perspective
validation to fail. Any of the failures above **SHOULD** be
distinguished as subproblems to the ACME client. The lack of a
response within the expected response interval, as defined in
Section 3.2, **SHALL** also be treated as a validation failure.

3.5. Multi-Perspective Validation

To avoid possible on-path attacks in certain networks, an ACME
server can perform a single validation using multiple challenge
bundle sources or via multiple routing paths. This technique is
called multi-perspective validation as recommended in Section 10.2
of [RFC8555] and an implementation used by Let's Encrypt is
described in [LE-multi-perspective].

When required by policy, an ACME server **SHALL** send multiple
challenge bundles from different sources in the DTN network. When
multiple Challenge Bundles are sent for a single validation, it is a
matter of ACME server policy to determine whether or not the
validation as a whole is successful. The result of each single-
source validation is defined as success or failure in Section 3.4.1.

A **RECOMMENDED** validation policy is to succeed if the challenge from a primary bundle source is successful and if there are no more than one failure from a secondary source. The determination of which perspectives are considered primary or secondary is an implementation matter.

Regardless of whether a validation is single- or multi-perspective, a validation failure **SHALL** be indicated by an ACME error type of "incorrectResponse". Each specific perspective failure **SHOULD** be indicated to the ACME client as a validation subproblem.

4. Bundle Integrity Gateway

This section defines a BIB use which closely resembles the function of DKIM email signing [RFC6376]. In this mechanism a routing node in a DTN sub-network attests to the origination of a bundle by adding a BIB before forwarding it. The bundle receiver then need not trust the source of the bundle, but only trust this security source node. The receiver needs policy configuration to know which security sources are permitted to attest for which bundle sources.

An integrity gateway **SHALL** validate the Source Node ID of a bundle, using local-network-specific means, before adding a BIB to the bundle. The exact means by which an integrity gateway validates a bundle's source is network-specific, but could use physical-layer, network-layer or BP-convergence-layer authentication. The bundle source could also add its own BIB with a local-network-specific security context or local-network-specific key material (i.e. a group key shared within the local network).

When an integrity gateway adds a BIB it **SHALL** be in accordance with [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec]. The BIB targets **SHALL** cover both the payload block and the primary block (either directly as a target or as additional authenticated data for the payload block MAC/signature). The Security Source of this BIB **SHALL** be either the bundle source Node ID itself or a routing node trusted by the destination node (see Section 7.2).

5. Certificate Request Profile

The ultimate purpose of this ACME validation is to allow a CA to issue certificates following the profiles of Section 4.4.2 of [I-D.ietf-dtn-tcpclv4], [I-D.sipos-dtn-udpcl], and [I-D.bsipos-dtn-bpsec-cose]. These purposes are referred to here as bundle security certificates.

One defining aspect of bundle security certificates is the Extended Key Usage key purpose id-kp-bundleSecurity of [IANA-SMI]. When requesting a certificate which includes a Node ID SAN, the CSR **SHOULD** include an Extended Key Usage of id-kp-bundleSecurity. When a

bundle security certificate is issued based on a validated Node ID SAN, the certificate **SHALL** include an Extended Key Usage of id-kp-bundleSecurity.

5.1. Multiple Identity Claims

A single bundle security CSR **MAY** contain a mixed set of SAN claims, including combinations of "ip", "dns", and "bundleEID" claims. There is no restriction on how a certificate combines these claims, but each claim **MUST** be validated by an ACME server to issue such a certificate as part of an associated ACME order. This is no different than the existing behavior of [RFC8555] but is mentioned here to make sure that CA policy handles such situations; especially related to validation failure of an identifier in the presence of multiple identifiers. The specific use case of [I-D.ietf-dtn-tcpclv4] allows, and for some network policies requires, that a certificate authenticate both the DNS name of an entity as well as the Node ID of the entity.

5.2. Generating Encryption-only or Signing-only Bundle Security Certificates

ACME extensions specified in this document can be used to request encryption-only or signing-only bundle security certificates.

In order to request signing only bundle security certificate, the CSR **MUST** include the key usage extension with digitalSignature and/or nonRepudiation bits set and no other bits set.

In order to request encryption only bundle security certificate, the CSR **MUST** include the key usage extension with keyEncipherment or keyAgreement bits set and no other bits set.

Presence of both of the above sets of key usage bits in the CSR, as well as absence of key usage extension in the CSR, signals to ACME server to issue a bundle security certificate suitable for both signing and encryption.

6. Implementation Status

This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

[NOTE to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication, as well as the reference to [RFC7942] and [github-dtn-demo-agent] and [github-dtn-wireshark].]

This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942]. The description of implementations in this section is

intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations can exist.

An example implementation of the this draft of ACME Node ID Validation has been created as a GitHub project [github-dtn-demo-agent] and is intended to use as a proof-of-concept and as a possible source of interoperability testing.

A Wireshark dissector for of the this draft of ACME Node ID Validation has been created as a GitHub project [github-dtn-wireshark] and is intended to be used to inspect and troubleshoot implementations.

7. Security Considerations

This section separates security considerations into threat categories based on guidance of BCP 72 [RFC3552].

7.1. Threat: Passive Leak of Validation Data

Because this challenge mechanism is used to bootstrap security between DTN Nodes, the challenge and its response are likely to be transferred in plaintext. The only ACME data present on-the-wire is a random token and a cryptographic digest, so there is no sensitive data to be leaked within the Node ID Validation bundle exchange. Because each challenge uses a separate token, there is no value in an on-path attacker seeing the tokens from past challenges and/or responses.

It is possible for intermediate BP nodes to encapsulate-and-encrypt Challenge and/or Response Bundles while they traverse untrusted networks, but that is a DTN configuration matter outside of the scope of this document.

7.2. Threat: BP Node Impersonation

As described in Section 8.1 of [RFC8555], it is possible for an active attacker to alter data on both ACME client channel and the DTN validation channel.

The primary mitigation is to delegate bundle integrity sourcing to a trusted routing node near, in the sense of bundle routing topology, to the bundle source node as defined in Section 4. This is

functionally similar to DKIM signing of [RFC6376] and provides some
level of bundle origination.

Another way to mitigate single-path on-path attacks is to attempt
validation of the same Node ID from multiple sources or via multiple
bundle routing paths, as defined in Section 3.5. It is not a trivial
task to guarantee bundle routing though, so more advanced techniques
such as onion routing (using bundle-in-bundle encapsulation [I-
D.ietf-dtn-bibect]) could be employed.

7.3. Threat: Bundle Replay

It is possible for an on-path attacker to replay both Challenge
Bundles or Response Bundles. Even in a properly-configured DTN it is
possible that intermediate bundle routers to use multicast
forwarding of a unicast-destination bundle.

Ultimately, the point of the ACME bundle exchange is to derive a Key
Authorization and its cryptographic digest and communicate it back
to the ACME server for validation, so the uniqueness of the Key
Authorization directly determines the scope of replay validity. The
uniqueness of each token-bundle to each challenge bundle ensures
that the Key Authorization is unique to the challenge bundle. The
uniqueness of each token-chal to the ACME challenge ensures that the
Key Authorization is unique to that ACME challenge.

Having each bundle's primary block and payload block covered by a
BIB from a trusted security source (see Section 4) ensures that a
replayed bundle cannot be altered in the blocks used by ACME. All
together, these properties mean that there is no degraded security
caused by replay of either a Challenge Bundle or a Response Bundle
even in the case where the primary or payload block is not covered
by a BIB. The worst that can come of bundle replay is the waste of
network resources as described in Section 7.4.

7.4. Threat: Denial of Service

The behaviors described in this section all amount to a potential
denial-of-service to a BP agent.

A malicious entity can continually send Challenge Bundles to a BP
agent. The victim BP agent can ignore Challenge Bundles which do not
conform to the specific time interval and challenge token for which
the ACME client has informed the BP agent that challenges are
expected. The victim BP agent can require all Challenge Bundles to
be BIB-signed to ensure authenticity of the challenge.

A malicious entity can continually send Response Bundles to a BP
agent. The victim BP agent can ignore Response Bundles which do not

conform to the specific time interval or Source Node ID or challenge token for an active Node ID validation.

Similar to other validation methods, an ACME server validating a DTN Node ID could be used as a denial of service amplifier. For this reason any ACME server can rate-limit validation activities for individual clients and individual certificate requests.

7.5. Inherited Security Considerations

Because this protocol relies on ACME for part of its operation, the security considerations of [RFC8555] apply to all ACME client-- server exchanges during Node ID validation.

Because this protocol relies on BPv7 for part of its operation, the security considerations of [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis] and [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec] apply to all BP messaging during Node ID validation.

7.6. Out-of-Scope BP Agent Communication

Although messaging between an ACME client or ACME server an its associated BP agent are out-of-scope for this document, both of those channels are critical to Node ID validation security. Either channel can potentially leak data or provide attack vectors if not properly secured. These channels need to protect against spoofing of messaging in both directions to avoid interruption of normal validation sequencing and to prevent false validations from succeeding.

The ACME server and its BP agent exchange the outgoing token-chal, token-bundle, and Key Authorization digest but these values do not need to be confidential (they are also in plaintext over the BP channel).

Depending on implementation details, the ACME client might transmit the client account key thumbprint to its BP agent to allow computing the Key Authorization digest on the BP agent. If an ACME client does transmit its client account key thumbprint to a BP agent, it is important that this data is kept confidential because it provides the binding of the client account key to the Node ID validation (as well as for all other types of ACME validation). Avoiding this transmission would require a full round-trip between BP agent and ACME client, which can be undesirable if the two are separated by a long-delay network.

8. IANA Considerations

This specification adds to the ACME registry and BP registry for this behavior.

8.1. ACME Identifier Types

Within the "Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Protocol" registry [IANA-ACME], the following entry has been added to the "ACME Identifier Types" sub-registry.

Label	Reference
uri	This specification and [RFC3986]

Table 1

8.2. ACME Validation Methods

Within the "Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Protocol" registry [IANA-ACME], the following entry has been added to the "ACME Validation Methods" sub-registry.

Label	Identifier Type	ACME	Reference
dtn-nodeid-01	uri	Y	This specification

Table 2

8.3. Bundle Administrative Record Types

Within the "Bundle Protocol" registry [IANA-BP], the following entries have been added to the "Bundle Administrative Record Types" sub-registry.

[NOTE to the RFC Editor: For [RFC5050] compatibility the AR-TBD value needs to be no larger than 15, but such compatibility is not needed. For BPbis the AR-TBD value needs to be no larger than 65535 as defined by [I-D.sipos-bpv7-admin-iana].]

Bundle Protocol Version	Value	Description	Reference
7	AR-TBD	ACME Node ID Validation	This specification

Table 3

9. Acknowledgments

This specification is based on DTN use cases related to PKIX certificate issuance.

The workflow and terminology of this validation method was originally copied from the work of Alexey Melnikov in [RFC8823].

10. References

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Appendix A. Administrative Record Types CDDL

   [NOTE to the RFC Editor: The "0xFFFF" in this CDDL is replaced by
   the "ACME Node ID Validation" administrative record type code.]

   The CDDL extension of BP [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis] for the ACME bundles
   is:

```
; All ACME records have the same structure
$admin-record /= [0xFFFF, acme-record]
acme-record = {
  token-chal,
  token-bundle,
  ? key-auth-digest ; present for Response Bundles
}
token-chal = (1 => bstr)
token-bundle = (2 => bstr)
key-auth-digest = (3 => bstr)
```

Appendix B. Example Authorization

   [NOTE to the RFC Editor: The "0xFFFF" in these examples are replaced
   by the "ACME Node ID Validation" administrative record type code.]

   This example is a bundle exchange for the ACME server with Node ID
   "dtn://acme-server/" performing a verification for ACME client Node
   ID "dtn://acme-client/". The example bundles use no block CRC or
   BPSec integrity, which is for simplicity and is not recommended for
   normal use. The provided figures are extended diagnostic notation
   [RFC8610].

   For this example the ACME client key thumbprint has the base64url
   encoded value of:

```
"LPJNul-wow4m6DsqxbninhsWHlwfp0JecwQzYpOLmCQ"
```

   And the ACME-server generated token-chal has the base64url-encoded
   value of:

```
"tPUZNY4ONIk6LxErRFEjVw"
```

B.1. Challenge Bundle

For the single challenge bundle in this example, the token-bundle
(transported as byte string via BP) has the base64url-encoded value
of:

"p3yRYFU4KxwQaHQjJ2RdiQ"

The minimal-but-valid Challenge Bundle is shown in Figure 2. This
challenge requires that the ACME client respond within a 60 second
time window.

```
[
  [
    7, / BP version /
    0x22, / flags: user-app-ack, payload-is-an-admin-record /
    0, / CRC type: none /
    [1, "//acme-client/"], / destination /
    [1, "//acme-server/"], / source /
    [1, "//acme-server/"], / report-to /
    [1000000, 0], / timestamp: 2000-01-01T00:16:40+00:00 /
    60000 / lifetime: 60s /
  ],
  [
    1, / block type code /
    1, / block number /
    0, / flags /
    0, / CRC type: none /
    <<[ / type-specific data /
      0xFFFF, / record-type-code /
      { / record-content /
        1: b64'tPUZNY4ONIk6LxErRFEjVw' / token-chal /
        2: b64'p3yRYFU4KxwQaHQjJ2RdiQ' / token-bundle /
      }
    ]>>
  ]
]
```

Figure 2: Example Challenge Bundle

B.2. Response Bundle

When the tokens are combined with the key thumbprint, the full Key
Authorization value (a single string split across lines for
readability) is:

"p3yRYFU4KxwQaHQjJ2RdiQtPUZNY4ONIk6LxErRFEjVw."
"LPJNul-wow4m6DsqxbninhsWHlwfp0JecwQzYpOLmCQ"

The minimal-but-valid Response Bundle is shown in [Figure 3](#). This
response indicates that there is 30 seconds remaining in the
response time window.

```
[
  [
    7, / BP version /
    0x02, / flags: payload-is-an-admin-record /
    0, / CRC type: none /
    [1, "//acme-server/"], / destination /
    [1, "//acme-client/"], / source /
    [1, 0], / report-to: none /
    [1030000, 0], / timestamp: 2000-01-01T00:17:10+00:00 /
    30000 / lifetime: 30s /
  ],
  [
    1, / block type code /
    1, / block number /
    0, / flags /
    0, / CRC type: none /
    <<[ / block-type-specific data /
      0xFFFF, / record-type-code /
      { / record-content /
        1: b64'tPUZNY4ONIk6LxErRFEjVw' / token-chal /
        2: b64'p3yRYFU4KxwQaHQjJ2RdiQ' / token-bundle /
        3: b64'mVIOJEQZie8XpYM6MMVSQUiNPH64URnhM9niJ5XHrew'
        / key auth. digest /
      }
    ]>>
  ]
]
```

Figure 3: Example Response Bundle

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