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ACME Integrations
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Abstract

This document outlines multiple advanced use cases and integrations that ACME facilitates without any modifications or enhancements required to the base ACME specification. The use cases include ACME integration with EST, BRSKI and TEAP.

Status of This Memo

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[1.](#) Introduction

ACME [[RFC8555](#)] defines a protocol that a certificate authority (CA) and an applicant can use to automate the process of domain name ownership validation and X.509 (PKIX) certificate issuance. The protocol is rich and flexible and enables multiple use cases that are not immediately obvious from reading the specification. This document explicitly outlines multiple advanced ACME use cases including:

- o ACME integration with EST [[RFC7030](#)]
- o ACME integration with BRSKI [[RFC8995](#)]
- o ACME integration with BRSKI Default Cloud Registrar [[I-D.ietf-anima-brski-cloud](#)]
- o ACME integration with TEAP [[RFC7170](#)] and TEAP Update and Extensions for Bootstrapping [[I-D.lear-eap-teap-brski](#)]

The integrations with EST, BRSKI (which is based upon EST), and TEAP enable automated certificate enrollment for devices.

ACME for subdomains [[I-D.friel-acme-subdomains](#)] outlines how ACME can be used by a client to obtain a certificate for a subdomain identifier from a certificate authority where the client has fulfilled a challenge against a parent domain, but does not need to fulfil a challenge against the explicit subdomain. This is a useful optimization when ACME is used to issue certificates for large numbers of devices as it reduces the domain ownership proof traffic (DNS or HTTP) and ACME traffic overhead, but is not a necessary requirement.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [BCP 14](#) [[RFC2119](#)] [[RFC8174](#)] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The following terms are defined in the CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements [[CAB](#)] and are reproduced here:

- o Authorization Domain Name (ADN): The Domain Name used to obtain authorization for certificate issuance for a given FQDN. The CA may use the FQDN returned from a DNS CNAME lookup as the FQDN for the purposes of domain validation. If the FQDN contains a wildcard character, then the CA MUST remove all wildcard labels from the left most portion of requested FQDN. The CA may prune zero or more labels from left to right until encountering a Base Domain Name and may use any one of the intermediate values for the purpose of domain validation
- o Base Domain Name: The portion of an applied-for FQDN that is the first domain name node left of a registry-controlled or public suffix plus the registry-controlled or public suffix (e.g. "example.co.uk" or "example.com"). For FQDNs where the right-most domain name node is a gTLD having ICANN Specification 13 in its registry agreement, the gTLD itself may be used as the Base Domain Name.
- o Certification Authority (CA): An organization that is responsible for the creation, issuance, revocation, and management of Certificates. The term applies equally to both Roots CAs and Subordinate CAs
- o Domain Name: The label assigned to a node in the Domain Name System

- o Domain Namespace: The set of all possible Domain Names that are subordinate to a single node in the Domain Name System
- o Fully-Qualified Domain Name (FQDN): A Domain Name that includes the labels of all superior nodes in the Internet Domain Name System.

The following terms are used in this document:

- o BRSKI: Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures [[RFC8995](#)]
- o CMC: Certificate Management over CMS
- o CSR: Certificate Signing Request
- o EST: Enrollment over Secure Transport [[RFC7030](#)]
- o RA: PKI Registration Authority
- o TEAP: Tunnelled Extensible Authentication Protocol [[RFC7170](#)]

3. ACME Integration with EST

EST [[RFC7030](#)] defines a mechanism for clients to enroll with a PKI Registration Authority by sending CMC messages over HTTP. EST [section 1](#) states:

"Architecturally, the EST service is located between a Certification Authority (CA) and a client. It performs several functions traditionally allocated to the Registration Authority (RA) role in a PKI."

EST [section 1.1](#) states that:

"For certificate issuing services, the EST CA is reached through the EST server; the CA could be logically "behind" the EST server or embedded within it."

When the CA is logically "behind" the EST RA, EST does not specify how the RA communicates with the CA. EST [section 1](#) states:


"The nature of communication between an EST server and a CA is not described in this document."

This section outlines how ACME could be used for communication between the EST RA and the CA. The example call flow leverages [[I-D.friel-acme-subdomains](#)] and shows the RA proving ownership of a parent domain, with individual client certificates being subdomains

under that parent domain. This is an optimization that reduces DNS and ACME traffic overhead. The RA could of course prove ownership of every explicit client certificate identifier.

The call flow illustrates the client calling the EST /csrattrs API before calling the EST /simpleenroll API.

The call flow illustrates the EST RA returning a 202 Retry-After response to the client's simpleenroll request. This is an optional step and may be necessary if the interactions between the RA and the ACME server take some time to complete. The exact details of when the RA returns a 202 Retry-After are implementation specific.



```

| SAN OID: | | |
| "pledge.example.com" | | |
|<-----> | | |
|
| POST /simpleenroll | | |
| PCSK#10 CSR | | |
| "pledge.example.com" | | |
|-----> | | |
|
| 202 Retry-After | | |
|<-----> | | |
|
| STEP 3: RA places ACME order | | |
|
| POST /newOrder | | |
| "pledge.example.com" | | |
|-----> | | |
|
| 201 status=ready | | |
|<-----> | | |
|
| POST /finalize | | |
| PKCS#10 CSR | | |
| "pledge.example.com" | | |
|-----> | | |
|
| 200 OK status=valid | | |
|<-----> | | |
|
| POST /certificate | | |
|-----> | | |
|
| 200 OK | | |
| PKCS#7 | | |
| "pledge.example.com" | | |
|<-----> | | |
|
| STEP 4: Pledge retries enroll | | |
|
| POST /simpleenroll | | |
| PCSK#10 CSR | | |
| "pledge.example.com" | | |
|-----> | | |
|
| 200 OK | | |
| PKCS#7 | | |
| "pledge.example.com" | | |
|<-----> | | |

```


4. ACME Integration with BRSKI

BRSKI [RFC8995] is based upon EST [RFC7030] and defines how to autonomically bootstrap PKI trust anchors into devices via means of signed vouchers. EST certificate enrollment may then optionally take place after trust has been established. BRSKI voucher exchange and trust establishment are based on EST extensions and the certificate enrollment part of BRSKI is fully based on EST. Similar to EST, BRSKI does not define how the EST RA communicates with the CA. Therefore, the mechanisms outlined in the previous section for using ACME as the communications protocol between the EST RA and the CA are equally applicable to BRSKI.

The following call flow shows how ACME may be integrated into a full BRSKI voucher plus EST enrollment workflow. For brevity, it assumes that the EST RA has previously proven ownership of a parent domain and that pledge certificate identifiers are a subdomain of that parent domain. The domain ownership exchanges between the RA, ACME and DNS are not shown. Similarly, not all BRSKI interactions are shown and only the key protocol flows involving voucher exchange and EST enrollment are shown.

Similar to the EST section above, the client calls EST /csrattrs API before calling the EST /simpleenroll API. This enables the server to indicate what fields the pledge should include in the CSR that the client sends in the /simpleenroll API.

The call flow illustrates the RA returning a 202 Retry-After response to the initial EST /simpleenroll API. This may be appropriate if processing of the /simpleenroll request and ACME interactions takes some time to complete.






```

| POST /simpleenroll | | |
| PCSK#10 CSR      | | |
| "pledge.example.com" | | |
|----->         | | |
|
| 200 OK           | | |
| PKCS#7          | | |
| "pledge.example.com" | | |
|<-----        | | |

```

5. ACME Integration with BRSKI Default Cloud Registrar

BRSKI Cloud Registrar [[I-D.ietf-anima-brski-cloud](#)] specifies the behaviour of a BRSKI Cloud Registrar, and how a pledge can interact with a BRSKI Cloud Registrar when bootstrapping. Similar to the local domain registrar BRSKI flow, ACME can be easily integrated with a cloud registrar bootstrap flow.

BRSKI cloud registrar is flexible and allows for multiple different local domain discovery and redirect scenarios. In the example illustrated here, the extension to [[RFC8366](#)] Vouchers which is defined in [[I-D.ietf-anima-brski-cloud](#)], and allows the specification of a bootstrap EST domain, is leveraged. This extension allows the cloud registrar to specify the local domain RA that the pledge should connect to for the purposes of EST enrollment.

Similar to the sections above, the client calls EST /csrattrs API before calling the EST /simpleenroll API.

```

+-----+           +-----+           +-----+           +-----+
| Pledge |           | EST RA |           | ACME |           | Cloud RA |
+-----+           +-----+           +-----+           | / MASA |
|
| NOTE: Pre-Authorization of "example.com" is complete |
| STEP 1: Pledge requests Voucher from Cloud Registrar |
| POST /requestvoucher |
|----->         |
| 200 OK Voucher (includes 'est-domain') |
|<-----        |
| STEP 2: Pledge enrolls against local domain RA |
| GET /csrattrs |
|----->         |

```

```

| 200 OK
| SEQUENCE {AttrOrOID}
| SAN OID:
| "pledge.example.com"
| <----->
|
| POST /simpleenroll
| PCSK#10 CSR
| "pledge.example.com"
| ----->
|
| 202 Retry-After
| <----->
|
| STEP 3: RA places ACME order
|
| POST /newOrder
| "pledge.example.com"
| ----->
|
| 201 status=ready
| <----->
|
| POST /finalize
| PKCS#10 CSR
| "pledge.example.com"
| ----->
|
| 200 OK status=valid
| <----->
|
| POST /certificate
| ----->
|
| 200 OK
| PKCS#7
| "pledge.example.com"
| <----->
|
| STEP 4: Pledge retries enroll
|
| POST /simpleenroll
| PCSK#10 CSR
| "pledge.example.com"
| ----->
|
| 200 OK

```

```

| PKCS#7 | | |
| "pledge.example.com" | | |
|<-----| | |

```


6. ACME Integration with TEAP


TEAP [RFC7170] defines a tunnel-based EAP method that enables secure communication between a peer and a server by using TLS to establish a mutually authenticated tunnel. TEAP enables certificate provisioning within the tunnel. TEAP Update and Extensions for Bootstrapping [I-D.lear-eap-teap-brski] defines extensions to TEAP that includes additional TLVs for certificate enrollment and BRSKI handling inside the TEAP tunnel. Neither TEAP [RFC7170] or TEAP Update and Extensions for Bootstrapping [I-D.lear-eap-teap-brski] define how the TEAP server communicates with the CA.


This section outlines how ACME could be used for communication between the TEAP server and the CA. The example call flow leverages [I-D.friel-acme-subdomains] and shows the TEAP server proving ownership of a parent domain, with individual client certificates being subdomains under that parent domain.

The example illustrates the TEAP server sending a Request-Action TLV including a CSR-Attributes TLV instructing the peer to send a CSR-Attributes TLV to the server. This enables the server to indicate what fields the peer should include in the CSR that the peer sends in the PKCS#10 TLV. For example, the TEAP server could instruct the peer what Subject or SAN entries to include in its CSR.

Although not explicitly illustrated in this call flow, the Peer and TEAP Server could exchange BRSKI TLVs, and a BRSKI integration and voucher exchange with a MASA server could take place over TEAP. Whether a BRSKI TLV exchange takes place or not does not impact the ACME specific message exchanges.







```

|                                     | "pledge.example.com" |
|                                     | ----->
|                                     | 201 status=ready
|                                     | <-----
|                                     |
|                                     | POST /finalize
|                                     | PKCS#10 CSR
|                                     | "pledge.example.com"
|                                     | ----->
|                                     |
|                                     | 200 OK status=valid
|                                     | <-----
|                                     |
|                                     | POST /certificate
|                                     | ----->
|                                     |
|                                     | 200 OK
|                                     | PKCS#7
|                                     | "pledge.example.com"
|                                     | <-----
|
| EAP-Request/
|   Type=TEAP,
|   {PKCS#7 TLV,
|     Result TLV=Success}
| <-----
|
| EAP-Response/
|   Type=TEAP,
|   {Result TLV=Success}
| ----->
|
| EAP-Success
| <-----

```

7. ACME Integration Considerations

7.1. Service Operators

The goal of these integrations is enabling issuance of certificates with identifiers in a given domain by an ACME server to a client. It is expected that the EST RA or TEAP servers that the client sends certificate enrollment requests to are operated by the organization that controls the domains. The ACME server is not necessarily operated by the organization that controls the domain.

7.2. CSR Attributes

In all integrations, the client MUST send a CSR Attributes request to the EST or TEAP server prior to sending a certificate enrollment request. This enables the server to indicate to the client what attributes it expects the client to include in the subsequent CSR request.

Servers MUST use this mechanism to tell the client what identifiers to include in CSR request. ACME [RFC8555] allows the identifier to be included in either CSR Subject or Subject Alternative Name fields, however [I-D.ietf-uta-use-san] states that Subject Alternative Name field MUST be used. This document aligns with [I-D.ietf-uta-use-san] and Subject Alternate Name field MUST be used. The identifier must be a Domain Name in a Domain Namespace that the server has control over and can fulfill ACME challenges against. The leftmost part of the identifier MAY be a field that the client presented to the server in an IEEE 802.1AR [IDevID].

Servers MAY use this field to instruct the client to include other attributes such as specific policy OIDs. Refer to EST [RFC7030] [section 2.6](#) for further details.

7.3. Certificate Chains and Trust Anchors

ACME [RFC8555] [section 9.1](#) states that ACME servers may return a certificate chain to an ACME client where an end entity certificate is followed by certificates that certify it. The trust anchor certificate MAY be omitted from the chain as it is assumed that the trust anchor is already known by the ACME client i.e. the EST or TEAP server.

7.3.1. EST /cacerts

EST [RFC7030] [section 4.2.3](#) states that the /simpleenroll response contains "only the certificate that was issued". EST [RFC7030] [section 4.1.3](#) states that the /cacerts response "MUST include any additional certificates the client would need to build a chain from an EST CA-issued certificate to the current EST CA TA".

Therefore, the EST server MUST return only the ACME end entity certificate in the /simpleenroll response. The EST server MUST return the remainder of the chain returned by the ACME server to the EST server in the /cacerts response to the client, appending the trust anchor root CA if necessary.

7.3.2. TEAP PKCS#7 TLV

TEAP [\[RFC7170\] section 4.2.16](#) allows for download of a PKCS#7 certificate chain in response to a TEAP PKCS#10 TLV request. TEAP also allows for download of multiple PKCS#7 certificates in response to a TEAP Trusted-Server-Root TLV request.

The TEAP server MUST return the full ACME client certificate chain in the PKCS#7 response to the PKCS#10 TLV request. The TEAP server MUST return the ACME server trust anchor in a PKCS#7 response to a Trusted-Server-Root TLV request. As outlined in [Section 7.4](#), the TEAP server SHOULD also return the trust anchor that was used for issuing its own identity certificate, if different from the ACME server trust anchor.

7.4. id-kp-cmcRA

BRSKI [\[RFC8995\]](#) mandates that the id-kp-cmcRA extended key usage bit is set in the Registrar (or EST RA) end entity certificate that the Registrar uses when signing voucher request messages sent to the MASA. Public ACME servers may not be willing to issue end entity certificates that have the id-kp-cmcRA extended key usage bit set. In these scenarios, the EST RA may be used by the pledge to get issued certificates by a public ACME server, but the EST RA itself will need an end entity certificate that has been issued by a different CA (e.g. an operator deployed private CA) and that has the id-kp-cmcRA bit set.

7.5. Error Handling

ACME [\[RFC8555\] section 6.7](#) defines multiple errors that may be returned by an ACME server to an ACME client. TEAP [\[RFC7170\] section 4.2.6](#) defines multiple errors that may be returned by a TEAP server to a client in an Error TLV. EST [\[RFC7030\] section 4.2.3](#) defines how an EST server may return an error encoded in a CMC response, or may return a human readable error in the response body.

The following mapping from ACME errors to CMC [\[RFC5272\] section 6.1.4](#) CMCFailInfo and TEAP [\[RFC7170\] section 4.2.6](#) error codes is RECOMMENDED.

ACME	CMCFailInfo	TEAP Error Code
badCSR	badRequest	1025 Bad CSR
caa	badRequest	1025 Bad CSR
rejectedIdentifier	badIdentity	1024 Bad Identity In CSR
all other errors	internalCAError	1026 Internal CA Error

8. IANA Considerations

This document does not make any requests to IANA.

9. Security Considerations

This draft is informational and makes no changes to the referenced specifications. All security considerations from these referenced documents are applicable here:

- o EST [[RFC7030](#)]
- o BRSKI [[RFC8995](#)]
- o BRSKI Default Cloud Registrar [[I-D.ietf-anima-brski-cloud](#)]
- o TEAP [[RFC7170](#)] and TEAP Update and Extensions for Bootstrapping [[I-D.lear-eap-teap-brski](#)]

Additionally, all Security Considerations in ACME in the following areas are equally applicable to ACME Integrations.

The integration mechanisms proposed here will primarily use the DNS-01 challenge documented in [[RFC8555](#)] [section 8.4](#). The security considerations in [RFC8555](#) says:

The DNS is a common point of vulnerability for all of these challenges. An entity that can provision false DNS records for a domain can attack the DNS challenge directly and can provision false A/AAAA records to direct the ACME server to send its HTTP validation query to a remote server of the attacker's choosing.

It is expected that the TEAP-EAP server/EST Registrar will perform DNS dynamic updates to a DNS primary server using [[RFC3007](#)] Dynamic updates, secured with with either SIG(0), or TSIG keys.

A major source of vulnerability is the disclosure of these DNS key records. An attacker that has access to them, can provision their own certificates into the the name space of the entity.

For many uses, this may allow the attacker to get access to some enterprise resource. When used to provision, for instance, a (SIP) phone system this would permit an attacker to impersonate a legitimate phone. Not only does this allow for redirection of phone calls, but possibly also toll fraud.

Operators should consider restricting the integration server such that it can only update the DNS records for a specific zone or zones where ACME is required for client certificate enrollment automation. For example, if all IoT devices in an organisation enroll using EST against an EST RA, and all IoT devices will be issued certificates in a subdomain under `iot.example.com`, then the integration server could be issued a credential that only allows updating of DNS records in a zone that includes domains in the `iot.example.com` namespace, but does not allow updating of DNS records under any other `example.com` DNS namespace.

When performing challenge fulfilment via writing files to HTTP web servers, write access should only be granted to a specific set of servers, and only to a specific set of directories for storage of challenge files.

9.1. Denial of Service against ACME infrastructure

The intermediate node (the TEAP-EAP server, or the EST Registrar) should cache the resulting certificates such that if the communication with the pledge is lost, subsequent attempts to enroll will result in the cache certificate being returned.

As many ACME servers have per-day, per-IP and per-subjectAltName limits, it is prudent not to request identical certificates too often. This could be due to operator or installer error, with multiple configuration resets occurring within a short period of time.

The cache should be indexed by the complete contents of the Certificate Signing Request, and should not persist beyond the `notAfter` date in the certificate.

This means that if the private/public keypair changes on the pledge, then a new certificate will be issued. If the the requested SubjectAltName changes, then a new certificate will be requested.

In a case where a device is simply factory reset, and enrolls again, then the same certificate can be returned.

10. Informative References

- [CAB] CA/Browser Forum, "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates", n.d., <<https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/CA-Browser-Forum-BR-1.7.1.pdf>>.
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- [RFC7170] Zhou, H., Cam-Winget, N., Salowey, J., and S. Hanna, "Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) Version 1", [RFC 7170](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC7170, May 2014, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7170>>.
- [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in [RFC 2119](#) Key Words", [BCP 14](#), [RFC 8174](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>>.
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- [RFC8995] Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M., and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI)", [RFC 8995](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC8995, May 2021, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8995>>.

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