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Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI) draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-17

Abstract

This document specifies automated bootstrapping of a remote secure key infrastructure (BRSKI) using manufacturer installed X.509 certificate, in combination with a manufacturer's authorizing service, both online and offline. Bootstrapping a new device can occur using a routable address and a cloud service, or using only link-local connectivity, or on limited/disconnected networks. Support for lower security models, including devices with minimal identity, is described for legacy reasons but not encouraged. Bootstrapping is complete when the cryptographic identity of the new key infrastructure is successfully deployed to the device but the established secure connection can be used to deploy a locally issued certificate to the device as well.

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BRSKI

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1. Introduction

BRSKI provides a solution for secure zero-touch (automated) bootstrap of virgin (untouched) devices that are called pledges in this document. These pledges need to discover (or be discovered by) an element of the network domain to which the pledge belongs to perform the bootstrap. This element (device) is called the registrar. Before any other operation, pledge and registrar need to establish mutual trust:

- Registrar authenticating the pledge: "Who is this device? What is its identity?"
- Registrar authorizing the pledge: "Is it mine? Do I want it? What are the chances it has been compromised?"
- Pledge authenticating the registrar: "What is this registrar's identity?"
- 4. Pledge authorizing the registrar: "Should I join it?"

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This document details protocols and messages to answer the above questions. It uses a TLS connection and an PKIX (X.509v3) certificate (an IEEE 802.1AR [IDevID] LDevID) of the pledge to answer points 1 and 2. It uses a new artifact called a "voucher" that the registrar receives from a "Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority" and passes to the pledge to answer points 3 and 2.

A proxy provides very limited connectivity between the pledge and the registrar.

The syntactic details of vouchers are described in detail in [<u>RFC8366</u>]. This document details automated protocol mechanisms to obtain vouchers, including the definition of a 'voucher-request' message that is a minor extension to the voucher format (see <u>Section 3</u>) defined by [<u>RFC8366</u>].

BRSKI results in the pledge storing an X.509 root certificate sufficient for verifying the registrar identity. In the process a TLS connection is established that can be directly used for Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST). In effect BRSKI provides an automated mechanism for the "Bootstrap Distribution of CA Certificates" described in [RFC7030] Section 4.1.1 wherein the pledge "MUST [...] engage a human user to authorize the CA certificate using out-of-band" information". With BRSKI the pledge now can automate this process using the voucher. Integration with a complete EST enrollment is optional but trivial.

BRSKI is agile enough to support bootstrapping alternative key infrastructures, such as a symmetric key solutions, but no such system is described in this document.

<u>1.1</u>. Prior Bootstrapping Approaches

To literally "pull yourself up by the bootstraps" is an impossible action. Similarly the secure establishment of a key infrastructure without external help is also an impossibility. Today it is commonly accepted that the initial connections between nodes are insecure, until key distribution is complete, or that domain-specific keying material (often pre-shared keys, including mechanisms like SIM cards) is pre-provisioned on each new device in a costly and non-scalable manner. Existing automated mechanisms are known as non-secured 'Trust on First Use' (TOFU) [RFC7435], 'resurrecting duckling' [Stajano99theresurrecting] or 'pre-staging'.

Another prior approach has been to try and minimize user actions during bootstrapping, but not eliminate all user-actions. The original EST protocol [<u>RFC7030</u>] does reduce user actions during

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bootstrap but does not provide solutions for how the following protocol steps can be made autonomic (not involving user actions):

- using the Implicit Trust Anchor database to authenticate an owner specific service (not an autonomic solution because the URL must be securely distributed),
- engaging a human user to authorize the CA certificate using outof-band data (not an autonomic solution because the human user is involved),
- using a configured Explicit TA database (not an autonomic solution because the distribution of an explicit TA database is not autonomic),
- o and using a Certificate-Less TLS mutual authentication method (not an autonomic solution because the distribution of symmetric key material is not autonomic).

These "touch" methods do not meet the requirements for zero-touch.

There are "call home" technologies where the pledge first establishes a connection to a well known manufacturer service using a common client-server authentication model. After mutual authentication, appropriate credentials to authenticate the target domain are transfered to the pledge. This creates serveral problems and limitations:

- the pledge requires realtime connectivity to the manufacturer service,
- the domain identity is exposed to the manufacturer service (this is a privacy concern),
- o the manufacturer is responsible for making the authorization decisions (this is a liability concern),

BRSKI addresses these issues by defining extensions to the EST protocol for the automated distribution of vouchers.

<u>1.2</u>. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

The following terms are defined for clarity:

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- domainID: The domain IDentity is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the BIT STRING of the subjectPublicKey of the pinned-domain-cert leaf, i.e. the Registrars' certificate. This is consistent with the subject key identifier (Section 4.2.1.2 [RFC5280]).
- drop ship: The physical distribution of equipment containing the "factory default" configuration to a final destination. In zero- touch scenarios there is no staging or pre-configuration during drop-ship.
- imprint: The process where a device obtains the cryptographic key
 material to identify and trust future interactions with a network.
 This term is taken from Konrad Lorenz's work in biology with new
 ducklings: during a critical period, the duckling would assume
 that anything that looks like a mother duck is in fact their
 mother. An equivalent for a device is to obtain the fingerprint
 of the network's root certification authority certificate. A
 device that imprints on an attacker suffers a similar fate to a
 duckling that imprints on a hungry wolf. Securely imprinting is a
 primary focus of this document [imprinting]. The analogy to
 Lorenz's work was first noted in [Stajano99theresurrecting].
- enrollment: The process where a device presents key material to a network and acquires a network specific identity. For example when a certificate signing request is presented to a certification authority and a certificate is obtained in response.
- Pledge: The prospective device, which has an identity installed at the factory.
- Voucher: A signed artifact from the MASA that indicates to a pledge the cryptographic identity of the registrar it should trust. There are different types of vouchers depending on how that trust is asserted. Multiple voucher types are defined in [RFC8366]
- Domain: The set of entities that share a common local trust anchor. This includes the proxy, registrar, Domain Certificate Authority, Management components and any existing entity that is already a member of the domain.
- Domain CA: The domain Certification Authority (CA) provides certification functionalities to the domain. At a minimum it provides certification functionalities to a registrar and manages the private key that defines the domain. Optionally, it certifies all elements.
- Join Registrar (and Coordinator): A representative of the domain that is configured, perhaps autonomically, to decide whether a new

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device is allowed to join the domain. The administrator of the domain interfaces with a "join registrar (and coordinator)" to control this process. Typically a join registrar is "inside" its domain. For simplicity this document often refers to this as just "registrar". Within [I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model] this is refered to as the "join registrar autonomic service agent". Other communities use the abbreviation "JRC".

- (Public) Key Infrastructure: The collection of systems and processes that sustain the activities of a public key system. The registrar acts as an [RFC5280] and [RFC5272] (see section 7) "Registration Authority".
- Join Proxy: A domain entity that helps the pledge join the domain. A join proxy facilitates communication for devices that find themselves in an environment where they are not provided connectivity until after they are validated as members of the domain. For simplicity this document sometimes uses the term of 'proxy' to indicate the join proxy. The pledge is unaware that they are communicating with a proxy rather than directly with a registrar.
- Circuit Proxy: A stateful implementation of the join proxy. This is the assumed type of proxy.

IPIP Proxy: A stateless proxy alternative.

- MASA Service: A third-party Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA) service on the global Internet. The MASA signs vouchers. It also provides a repository for audit log information of privacy protected bootstrapping events. It does not track ownership.
- Ownership Tracker: An Ownership Tracker service on the global internet. The Ownership Tracker uses business processes to accurately track ownership of all devices shipped against domains that have purchased them. Although optional, this component allows vendors to provide additional value in cases where their sales and distribution channels allow for accurately tracking of such ownership. Ownership tracking information is indicated in vouchers as described in [<u>RFC8366</u>]
- IDevID: An Initial Device Identity X.509 certificate installed by the vendor on new equipment.
- TOFU: Trust on First Use. Used similarly to [<u>RFC7435</u>]. This is where a pledge device makes no security decisions but rather

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simply trusts the first registrar it is contacted by. This is also known as the "resurrecting duckling" model.

- nonced: a voucher (or request) that contains a nonce (the normal case).
- nonceless: a voucher (or request) that does not contain a nonce, relying upon accurate clocks for expiration, or which does not expire.
- manufacturer: the term manufacturer is used throughout this document to be the entity that created the device. This is typically the "original equipment manufacturer" or OEM, but in more complex situations it could be a "value added retailer" (VAR), or possibly even a systems integrator. In general, it a goal of BRSKI to eliminate small distinctions between different sales channels. The reason for this is that it permits a single device, with a uniform firmware load, to be shipped directly to all customers. This eliminates costs for the manufacturer. This also reduces the number of products supported in the field increasing the chance that firmware will be more up to date.
- ANI: The Autonomic Network Infrastructure as defined by [<u>I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model</u>]. This document details specific requirements for pledges, proxies and registrars when they are part of an ANI.
- offline: When an architectural component cannot perform realtime communications with a peer, either due to network connectivity or because the peer is turned off, the operation is said to be occurring offline.

<u>1.3</u>. Scope of solution

<u>1.3.1</u>. Support environment

This solution (BRSKI) can support large router platforms with multigigabit inter-connections, mounted in controlled access data centers. But this solution is not exclusive to large equipment: it is intended to scale to thousands of devices located in hostile environments, such as ISP provided CPE devices which are drop-shipped to the end user. The situation where an order is fulfilled from distributed warehouse from a common stock and shipped directly to the target location at the request of a domain owner is explicitly supported. That stock ("SKU") could be provided to a number of potential domain owners, and the eventual domain owner will not know a-priori which device will go to which location.

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The bootstrapping process can take minutes to complete depending on the network infrastructure and device processing speed. The network communication itself is not optimized for speed; for privacy reasons, the discovery process allows for the pledge to avoid announcing its presence through broadcasting.

Nomadic or mobile devices often need to aquire credentials to access the network at the new location. An example of this is mobile phone roaming among network operators, or even between cell towers. This is usually called handoff. BRSKI does not provide a low-latency handoff which is usually a requirement in such situations. For these solutions BRSKI can be used to create a relationship (an LDevID) with the "home" domain owner. The resulting credentials are then used to provide credentials more appropriate for a low-latency handoff.

<u>1.3.2</u>. Constrained environments

Questions have been posed as to whether this solution is suitable in general for Internet of Things (IoT) networks. This depends on the capabilities of the devices in question. The terminology of [RFC7228] is best used to describe the boundaries.

The solution described in this document is aimed in general at nonconstrained (i.e., class 2+) devices operating on a non-Challenged network. The entire solution as described here is not intended to be useable as-is by constrained devices operating on challenged networks (such as 802.15.4 LLNs).

Specifically, there are protocol aspects described here that might result in congestion collapse or energy-exhaustion of intermediate battery powered routers in an LLN. Those types of networks SHOULD NOT use this solution. These limitations are predominately related to the large credential and key sizes required for device authentication. Defining symmetric key techniques that meet the operational requirements is out-of-scope but the underlying protocol operations (TLS handshake and signing structures) have sufficient algorithm agility to support such techniques when defined.

The imprint protocol described here could, however, be used by nonenergy constrained devices joining a non-constrained network (for instance, smart light bulbs are usually mains powered, and speak 802.11). It could also be used by non-constrained devices across a non-energy constrained, but challenged network (such as 802.15.4). The certificate contents, and the process by which the four questions above are resolved do apply to constrained devices. It is simply the actual on-the-wire imprint protocol that could be inappropriate.

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<u>1.3.3</u>. Network Access Controls

This document presumes that network access control has either already occurred, is not required, or is integrated by the proxy and registrar in such a way that the device itself does not need to be aware of the details. Although the use of an X.509 Initial Device Identity is consistant with IEEE 802.1AR [IDevID], and allows for alignment with 802.1X network access control methods, its use here is for pledge authentication rather than network access control. Integrating this protocol with network access control, perhaps as an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) method (see [RFC3748]), is out-of-scope.

<u>1.3.4</u>. Bootstrapping is not Booting

This document describes "bootstrapping" as the protocol used to obtain a local trust anchor. It is expected that this trust anchor, along with any additional configuration information subsequently installed, is persisted on the device across system restarts ("booting"). Bootstrapping occurs only infrequently such as when a device is transfered to a new owner or has been reset to factory default settings.

<u>1.4</u>. Leveraging the new key infrastructure / next steps

As a result of the protocol described herein, the bootstrapped devices have the Domain CA trust anchor in common. An end entity certificate has optionally been issued from the Domain CA. This makes it possible to automatically deploy services across the domain in a secure manner.

Services that benefit from this:

- o Device management.
- o Routing authentication.
- o Service discovery.

The major beneficiary is that it possible to use the credentials deployed by this protocol to secure the Autonomic Control Plane (ACP) ([<u>I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane</u>]).

<u>1.5</u>. Requirements for Autonomic Network Infrastructure (ANI) devices

The BRSKI protocol can be used in a number of environments. Some of the flexibility in this document is the result of users out of the

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ANI scope. This section defines the base requirements for ANI devices.

For devices that intend to become part of an Autonomic Network Infrastructure (ANI) ([<u>I-D.ietf-anima-reference-model</u>]) that includes an Autonomic Control Plane ([<u>I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane</u>]), the following actions are required and MUST be performed by the pledge:

- o BRSKI: Request Voucher
- o EST: CA Certificates Request
- o EST: CSR Attributes
- o EST: Client Certificate Request
- o BRSKI: Enrollment status Telemetry


The ANI Join Registrar ASA MUST support all the BRSKI and above listed EST operations.

All ANI devices SHOULD support the BRSKI proxy function, using circuit proxies. Other proxy methods are optional, and MUST NOT enabled unless the Join Registrar ASA indicates support for them in it's announcement. (See <u>Section 4.3</u>)

2. Architectural Overview

The logical elements of the bootstrapping framework are described in this section. Figure 1 provides a simplified overview of the components.

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BRSKI

Figure 1

We assume a multi-vendor network. In such an environment there could be a Manufacturer Service for each manufacturer that supports devices following this document's specification, or an integrator could provide a generic service authorized by multiple manufacturers. It is unlikely that an integrator could provide Ownership Tracking services for multiple manufacturers due to the required sales channel integrations necessary to track ownership.

The domain is the managed network infrastructure with a Key Infrastructure the pledge is joining. The domain provides initial device connectivity sufficient for bootstrapping through a proxy. The domain registrar authenticates the pledge, makes authorization decisions, and distributes vouchers obtained from the Manufacturer Service. Optionally the registrar also acts as a PKI Registration Authority.

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<u>2.1</u>. Behavior of a Pledge

The pledge goes through a series of steps, which are outlined here at a high level.

+----+ | Factory | | default +---+ +---+ | (1) Discover | +----> | +----+ 1 +----+ | (2) Identity | ^----+ | rejected +----+ +----+ | (3) Request | | Join | +---+ +---+ | (4) Imprint | Т ^ - - - - - - - - - + | Bad MASA +----+ | response | send Voucher Status Telemetry +----+ | (5) Enroll | ^ - - - - - - - - - + | Enroll +----+ | Failure | +---+ | (6) Enrolled | ^ - - - - - - - - - + - 1 Factory +----+ reset

Figure 2

State descriptions for the pledge are as follows:

1. Discover a communication channel to a registrar.

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- Identify itself. This is done by presenting an X.509 IDevID credential to the discovered registrar (via the proxy) in a TLS handshake. (The registrar credentials are only provisionally accepted at this time).
- 3. Request to join the discovered registrar. A unique nonce can be included ensuring that any responses can be associated with this particular bootstrapping attempt.
- 4. Imprint on the registrar. This requires verification of the manufacturer service provided voucher. A voucher contains sufficient information for the pledge to complete authentication of a registrar. (The embedded 'pinned-domain-certificate' enables the pledge to finish authentication of the registrar TLS server certificate).
- Enroll. By accepting the domain specific information from a registrar, and by obtaining a domain certificate from a registrar using a standard enrollment protocol, e.g. Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030].
- 6. The pledge is now a member of, and can be managed by, the domain and will only repeat the discovery aspects of bootstrapping if it is returned to factory default settings.

After imprint a secure transport exists between pledge and registrar. This specification details integration with EST enrollment so that pledges can optionally obtain a locally issued certificate, although any REST interface could be integrated in future work.

<u>2.2</u>. Secure Imprinting using Vouchers

A voucher is a cryptographically protected artifact (a digital signature) to the pledge device authorizing a zero-touch imprint on the registrar domain.

The format and cryptographic mechanism of vouchers is described in detail in [<u>RFC8366</u>].

Vouchers provide a flexible mechanism to secure imprinting: the pledge device only imprints when a voucher can be validated. At the lowest security levels the MASA can indiscriminately issue vouchers and log claims of ownership by domains. At the highest security levels issuance of vouchers can be integrated with complex sales channel integrations that are beyond the scope of this document. The sales channel integration would verify actual (legal) ownership of the pledge by the domain. This provides the flexibility for a number of use cases via a single common protocol mechanism on the pledge and

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registrar devices that are to be widely deployed in the field. The MASA services have the flexibility to leverage either the currently defined claim mechanisms or to experiment with higher or lower security levels.

Vouchers provide a signed but non-encrypted communication channel among the pledge, the MASA, and the registrar. The registrar maintains control over the transport and policy decisions allowing the local security policy of the domain network to be enforced.

2.3. Initial Device Identifier

Pledge authentication and pledge voucher-request signing is via a PKIX certificate installed during the manufacturing process. This is the 802.1AR Initial Device Identifier (IDevID), and it provides a basis for authenticating the pledge during the protocol exchanges described here. There is no requirement for a common root PKI hierarchy. Each device manufacturer can generate its own root certificate. Specifically, the IDevID:

- 1. Uniquely identifying the pledge by the Distinguished Name (DN) and subjectAltName (SAN) parameters in the IDevID. The unique identification of a pledge in the voucher objects are derived from those parameters as described below.
- Securely authentating the pledges identity via TLS connection to registrar. This provides protection against cloned/fake pledged.
- 3. Secure auto-discovery of the pledges MASA by the registrar via the MASA URI in IDevID as explained below.
- 4. (Optionally) communicating the MUD URL (see <u>Appendix C</u>.
- 5. (Optional) Signing of voucher-request by the pledges IDevID to enable MASA to generate voucher only to a registrar that has a connection to the pledge.
- 6. Authorizing pledge (via registrar) to receive certificate from domain CA, by signing the Certificate Signing Request (CSR).

<u>2.3.1</u>. Identification of the Pledge

In the context of BRSKI, pledges are uniquely identified by a "serial-number". This serial-number is used both in the "serialnumber" field of voucher or voucher-requests (see <u>Section 3</u>) and in local policies on registrar or MASA (see <u>Section 5</u>).

The following fields are defined in [IDevID] and [RFC5280]:

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- o The subject field's DN encoding MUST include the "serialNumber" attribute with the device's unique serial number. (from [IDevID] section 7.2.8, and [RFC5280] section 4.1.2.4's list of standard attributes)
- The subject-alt field's encoding MAY include a non-critical version of the <u>RFC4108</u> defined HardwareModuleName. (from [<u>IDevID</u>] <u>section 7.2.9</u>) If the IDevID is stored in a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), then this field MAY contain the TPM identification rather than the device's serial number. If both fields are present, then the subject field takes precedence.

and they are used as follows by the pledge to build the "serialnumber" that is placed in the voucher-request. In order to build it, the fields need to be converted into a serial-number of "type string". The following methods are used depending on the first available IDevID certificate field (attempted in this order):

- [RFC4519] section 2.31 provides an example ("WI-3005") of the Distinguished Name "serialNumber" attribute, formatted according to <u>RFC4514</u> rules.
- 2. The HardwareModuleName hwSerialNum OCTET STRING, base64 encoded.

2.3.2. MASA URI extension

The following newly defined field SHOULD be in the PKIX IDevID certificate: A PKIX non-critical certificate extension that contains a single Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) that points to an on-line Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority. The URI is represented as described in <u>Section 7.4 of [RFC5280]</u>.

Any Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs) MUST be mapped to URIs as specified in <u>Section 3.1 of [RFC3987]</u> before they are placed in the certificate extension. The URI provides the authority information. The BRSKI "/.well-known" tree ([<u>RFC5785]</u>) is described in <u>Section 5</u>.

The new extension is identified as follows:

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<CODE BEGINS> MASAURLExtnModule-2016 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-MASAURLExtn2016(TBD) } DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN -- EXPORTS ALL --IMPORTS EXTENSION FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) } id-pe FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) } ; MASACertExtensions EXTENSION ::= { ext-MASAURL, ... } ext-MASAURL EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX MASAURLSyntax IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-masa-url } id-pe-masa-url OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe TBD } MASAURLSyntax ::= IA5String END <CODE ENDS> The choice of id-pe is based on guidance found in Section 4.2.2 of [RFC5280], "These extensions may be used to direct applications to on-line information about the issuer or the subject". The MASA URL is precisely that: online information about the particular subject.

2.4. Protocol Flow

A representative flow is shown in Figure 3:

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+---+ +----+ +---+ | Vendor | Pledge | | Circuit | | Domain | | Join | | Registrar | | Service | Proxy | | (JRC) | | (MASA) +---+ +---+ +---+ +---+ Internet | |<-RFC4862 IPv6 addr |</pre> |<-RFC3927 IPv4 addr | Appendix A</pre> | Legend |---->| C - circuit | optional: mDNS query | Appendix B join proxy | RFC6763/RFC6762 | P - provisional |<----| TLS connection | GRASP M_FLOOD | periodic broadcast |<---->C<---->| TLS via the Join Proxy |<--Registrar TLS server authentication---|</pre> [PROVISIONAL accept of server cert] P---X.509 client authentication----->| Ρ P---Voucher Request (include nonce)---->| /---> Ρ Ρ [accept device?] [contact Vendor] Ρ |--Pledge ID---->| Ρ |--Domain ID---->| P |--optional:nonce--->| Ρ [extract DomainID] Ρ [update audit log] optional: can P occur P lin advance |if |nonceless | P |<- voucher ------</pre> \---> P<-----l [verify voucher , [verify provisional cert| | |----->| [verify audit log and voucher] |<---->| | Continue with <u>RFC7030</u> enrollment | using now bidirectionally authenticated | | TLS session. |

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<u>2.5</u>. Architectural Components

<u>2.5.1</u>. Pledge

The pledge is the device that is attempting to join. Until the pledge completes the enrollment process, it has link-local network connectivity only to the proxy.

2.5.2. Join Proxy

The join proxy provides HTTPS connectivity between the pledge and the registrar. A circuit proxy mechanism is described in <u>Section 4</u>. Additional mechanisms, including a CoAP mechanism and a stateless IPIP mechanism are the subject of future work.

2.5.3. Domain Registrar

The domain's registrar operates as the BRSKI-MASA client when requesting vouchers from the MASA (see <u>Section 5.4</u>). The registrar operates as the BRSKI-EST server when pledges request vouchers (see <u>Section 5.1</u>). The registrar operates as the BRSKI-EST server "Registration Authority" if the pledge requests an end entity certificate over the BRSKI-EST connection (see <u>Section 5.9</u>).

The registrar uses an Implicit Trust Anchor database for authenticating the BRSKI-MASA TLS connection MASA certificate. The registrar uses a different Implicit Trust Anchor database for authenticating the BRSKI-EST TLS connection pledge client certificate. Configuration or distribution of these trust anchor databases is out-of-scope of this specification.

<u>2.5.4</u>. Manufacturer Service

The Manufacturer Service provides two logically seperate functions: the Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA) described in <u>Section 5.5</u> and <u>Section 5.6</u>, and an ownership tracking/auditing function described in <u>Section 5.7</u> and <u>Section 5.8</u>.

<u>2.5.5</u>. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) administers certificates for the domain of concerns, providing the trust anchor(s) for it and allowing enrollment of pledges with domain certificates.

The voucher provides a method for the distribution of a single PKI trust anchor (as the "pinned-domain-cert"). A distribution of the full set of current trust anchors is possible using the optional EST integration.

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The domain's registrar acts as an [<u>RFC5272</u>] Registration Authority, requesting certificates for pledges from the Key Infrastructure.

The expectations of the PKI are unchanged from EST [[<u>RFC7030</u>]]. This document does not place any additional architectural requirements on the Public Key Infrastructure.

<u>2.6</u>. Certificate Time Validation

<u>2.6.1</u>. Lack of realtime clock

Many devices when bootstrapping do not have knowledge of the current time. Mechanisms such as Network Time Protocols cannot be secured until bootstrapping is complete. Therefore bootstrapping is defined in a method that does not require knowledge of the current time.

Unfortunately there are moments during bootstrapping when certificates are verified, such as during the TLS handshake, where validity periods are confirmed. This paradoxical "catch-22" is resolved by the pledge maintaining a concept of the current "window" of presumed time validity that is continually refined throughout the bootstrapping process as follows:

- o Initially the pledge does not know the current time.
- Bootstrapping pledges that have a Realtime Clock (RTC), SHOULD use it to verify certificate validity. However, they MUST be prepared for the recognize that the RTC might be completely wrong when a RTC battery fails and resets to an origin time (e.g., Jan. 1, 1970)
- o If the pledge has any stable storage (such as from where firmware is loaded) then it SHOULD assume that the clock CAN NOT be before the date at which the firmware or the the storage was last time stamped. The pledge SHOULD NOT update the timestamps in any file systems until it has a secure time source. This provides an earliest date which is reasonable. Call this the current reasonable date (CRD). This value MUST NOT be used for any future Registration attempt. The current reasonable date (CRD) may only increase during a single attempt.
- The pledge is exposed to dates in the following five places (registrar certificate, notBefore and notAfter. Voucher createdon, and expires-on. Additionally, CMS signatures contain a signingTime)
- o During the initial connection with the registrar, the pledge sees the registrar's Certificate. It has an inception date (notBefore)

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and an expiry date (notAfter). It is reasonable that the notBefore date be after the pledge's current working reasonable date. It is however, suspicious for the notAfter date to be before the pledge's current reasonable date. No action is recommended, other than an internal audit entry for this.

- o If the notBefore date of the registrar's certificate is newer than the pledge's reasonable date, then it MAY update it's current reasonable date to the notBefore value.
- o After the voucher request process, the pledge will have a voucher. It can validate the signature on the voucher, as it has been (by literal construction) provided with the MASA's key as a trust anchor. The time values (created-on, expires-on) in the voucher can not in general be validated as the pledge has no certain real time clock. There are some reasonable assumptions that can be made: the voucher's expires-on time can not be prior to the pledge's current reasonable date. For nonceless vouchers, the voucher's created-on time COULD be earlier if the as well if a long-lived voucher was obtained some time in the past, and the pledge has since gone through a firmware update and factory reset.
- o If the voucher contains a nonce then the pledge MUST confirm the nonce matches the original pledge voucher-request. This ensures the voucher is fresh. See / (Section 5.2). In that case, the voucher's created-on date MUST NOT be prior to the pledge's current reasonable date. In addition, when there is a valid nonce, the current reasonable date MAY be incremented to that of the CMS signingTime.
- o Once the voucher is accepted the validity period of the pinneddomain-cert in the voucher now serves as a valid time window. As explained in <u>Section 5.5.4</u>, the MASA has checked the registrar's certificate against real clocks , the endorsement of the MASA allows the pledge to treat the notBefore and notAfter dates as being constraints on any subsequent certificate validity periods that may need to be checked: for instance, validating peer certificates during ANIMA ACP setup.
- When accepting an enrollment certificate the validity period within the new certificate is assumed to be valid by the pledge. The pledge is now willing to use this credential for client authentication.

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2.6.2. Infinite Lifetime of IDevID

[RFC5280] explains that long lived pledge certificates "SHOULD be assigned the GeneralizedTime value of 99991231235959Z". Registrars MUST support such lifetimes and SHOULD support ignoring pledge lifetimes if they did not follow the <u>RFC5280</u> recommendations.

For example, IDevID may have incorrect lifetime of N <= 3 years, rendering replacement pledges from storage useless after N years unless registrars support ignoring such a lifetime.

2.7. Cloud Registrar

There exist operationally open network wherein devices gain unauthenticated access to the internet at large. In these use cases the management domain for the device needs to be discovered within the larger internet. These are less likely within the anima scope but may be more important in the future.

There are additionally some greenfield situations involving an entirely new installation where a device may have some kind of management uplink that it can use (such as via 3G network for instance). In such a future situation, the device might use this management interface to learn that it should configure itself by tobe-determined mechanism (such as an Intent) to become the local registrar.

In order to support these scenarios, the pledge MAY contact a well known URI of a cloud registrar if a local registrar cannot be discovered or if the pledge's target use cases do not include a local registrar.

If the pledge uses a well known URI for contacting a cloud registrar an Implicit Trust Anchor database (see [RFC7030]) MUST be used to authenticate service as described in [RFC6125]. This is consistent with the human user configuration of an EST server URI in [RFC7030] which also depends on RFC6125.

2.8. Determining the MASA to contact

The registrar needs to be able to contact a MASA that is trusted by the pledge in order to obtain vouchers. There are three mechanisms described:

The device's Initial Device Identifier will normally contain the MASA URL as detailed in <u>Section 2.3</u>. This is the RECOMMENDED mechanism.

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If the registrar is integrated with [I-D.ietf-opsawg-mud] and the pledge IDevID contains the id-pe-mud-url then the registrar MAY attempt to obtain the MASA URL from the MUD file. The MUD file extension for the MASA URL is defined in <u>Appendix C</u>.

It can be operationally difficult to ensure the necessary X.509 extensions are in the pledge's IDevID due to the difficulty of aligning current pledge manufacturing with software releases and development. As a final fallback the registrar MAY be manually configured or distributed with a MASA URL for each manufacturer. Note that the registrar can only select the configured MASA URL based on the trust anchor -- so manufacturers can only leverage this approach if they ensure a single MASA URL works for all pledge's associated with each trust anchor.

3. Voucher-Request artifact

Voucher-requests are how vouchers are requested. The semantics of the vouchers are described below, in the YANG model.

A pledge forms the "pledge voucher-request" and submits it to the registrar.

The registrar in turn forms the "registrar voucher-request", and submits it to the MASA.

The "proximity-registrar-cert" leaf is used in the pledge voucherrequests. This provides a method for the pledge to assert the registrar's proximity.

The "prior-signed-voucher-request" leaf is used in registrar voucherrequests. If present, it is the encoded (signed form) of the pledge voucher-request. This provides a method for the registrar to forward the pledge's signed request to the MASA. This completes transmission of the signed "proximity-registrar-cert" leaf.

A registrar MAY also retrieve nonceless vouchers by sending nonceless voucher-requests to the MASA in order to obtain vouchers for use when the registrar does not have connectivity to the MASA. No "priorsigned-voucher-request" leaf would be included. The registrar will also need to know the serial number of the pledge. This document does not provide a mechanism for the registrar to learn that in an automated fashion. Typically this will be done via scanning of barcode or QR-code on packaging, or via some sales channel integration.

Unless otherwise signaled (outside the voucher-request artifact), the signing structure is as defined for vouchers, see [<u>RFC8366</u>].

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<u>3.1</u>. Tree Diagram

The following tree diagram illustrates a high-level view of a voucher-request document. The notation used in this diagram is described in [<u>RFC8366</u>]. Each node in the diagram is fully described by the YANG module in <u>Section 3.3</u>. Please review the YANG module for a detailed description of the voucher-request format.

module: ietf-voucher-request

grouping voucher-request-grouping

+ voucher	
+ created-on?	yang:date-and-time
+ expires-on?	yang:date-and-time
+ assertion	enumeration
+ serial-number	string
+ idevid-issuer?	binary
+ pinned-domain-cert?	binary
+ domain-cert-revocation-checks?	boolean
+ nonce?	binary
+ last-renewal-date?	yang:date-and-time
+ prior-signed-voucher-request?	binary
+ proximity-registrar-cert?	binary

3.2. Examples

This section provides voucher-request examples for illustration purposes. These examples conform to the encoding rules defined in [RFC7951].

```
Example (1) The following example illustrates a pledge voucher-
request. The assertion leaf is indicated as 'proximity'
and the registrar's TLS server certificate is included
in the 'proximity-registrar-cert' leaf. See
<u>Section 5.2</u>.
```

```
{
    "ietf-voucher-request:voucher": {
        "nonce": "62a2e7693d82fcda2624de58fb6722e5",
        "created-on": "2017-01-01T00:00:00.000Z",
        "assertion": "proximity",
        "proximity-registrar-cert": "base64encodedvalue=="
    }
}
```

Example (2) The following example illustrates a registrar voucherrequest. The 'prior-signed-voucher-request' leaf is populated with the pledge's voucher-request (such as the

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prior example). The pledge's voucher-request, if a signed artifact with a CMS format signature is a binary object. In the JSON encoding used here it must be base64 encoded. The nonce, created-on and assertion is carried forward. The serial-number is extracted from the pledge's Client Certificate from the TLS connection. See <u>Section 5.5</u>.

{

```
"ietf-voucher-request:voucher": {
    "nonce": "62a2e7693d82fcda2624de58fb6722e5",
    "created-on": "2017-01-01T00:00:02.000Z",
    "assertion": "proximity",
    "idevid-issuer": "base64encodedvalue=="
    "serial-number": "JADA123456789"
    "prior-signed-voucher": "base64encodedvalue=="
}
```

```
}
```

Example (3) The following example illustrates a registrar voucherrequest. The 'prior-signed-voucher-request' leaf is not populated with the pledge's voucher-request nor is the nonce leaf. This form might be used by a registrar requesting a voucher when the pledge can not communicate with the registrar (such as when it is powered down, or still in packaging), and therefore could not submit a nonce. This scenario is most useful when the registrar is aware that it will not be able to reach the MASA during deployment. See <u>Section 5.5</u>.

```
{
   "ietf-voucher-request:voucher": {
     "created-on": "2017-01-01T00:00:02.000Z",
     "assertion": "TBD",
     "idevid-issuer": "base64encodedvalue=="
     "serial-number": "JADA123456789"
}
```

```
}
```

Example (4) The following example illustrates a registrar voucherrequest. The 'prior-signed-voucher-request' leaf is not populated with the pledge voucher-request because the pledge did not sign its own request. This form might be used when more constrained pledges are being deployed. The nonce is populated from the pledge's request. See <u>Section 5.5</u>.

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```
{
    "ietf-voucher-request:voucher": {
        "nonce": "62a2e7693d82fcda2624de58fb6722e5",
        "created-on": "2017-01-01T00:00:02.000Z",
        "assertion": "proximity",
        "idevid-issuer": "base64encodedvalue=="
        "serial-number": "JADA123456789"
    }
}
```

3.3. YANG Module

```
Following is a YANG [RFC7950] module formally extending the [RFC8366]
   voucher into a voucher-request.
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-voucher-request@2018-02-14.yang"
module ietf-voucher-request {
  yang-version 1.1;
 namespace
    "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-voucher-request";
  prefix "vch";
  import ietf-restconf {
    prefix rc;
    description "This import statement is only present to access
       the yang-data extension defined in <u>RFC 8040</u>.";
    reference "RFC 8040: RESTCONF Protocol";
  }
  import ietf-voucher {
    prefix v;
    description "This module defines the format for a voucher,
        which is produced by a pledge's manufacturer or
        delegate (MASA) to securely assign a pledge to
        an 'owner', so that the pledge may establish a secure
        conn ection to the owner's network infrastructure";
    reference "RFC YYYY: Voucher Profile for Bootstrapping Protocols";
  }
  organization
   "IETF ANIMA Working Group";
  contact
   "WG Web:
              <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/anima/>
   WG List: <mailto:anima@ietf.org>
    Author: Kent Watsen
```

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```
<mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>
 Author:
           Max Pritikin
           <mailto:pritikin@cisco.com>
 Author:
           Michael Richardson
            <mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
 Author:
           Toerless Eckert
            <mailto:tte+ietf@cs.fau.de>";
description
 "This module defines the format for a voucher request.
  It is a superset of the voucher itself.
 This artifact may be optionally signed.
  It provides content to the MASA for consideration
  during a voucher request.
  The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT',
  'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in
  the module text are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
  Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
  authors of the code. All rights reserved.
  Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
  modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license
  terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in Section
  4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
  (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
  This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC
 itself for full legal notices.";
revision "2018-02-14" {
  description
  "Initial version";
  reference
   "RFC XXXX: Voucher Profile for Bootstrapping Protocols";
}
// Top-level statement
rc:yang-data voucher-request-artifact {
 uses voucher-request-grouping;
}
// Grouping defined for future usage
grouping voucher-request-grouping {
 description
    "Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work.";
```

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```
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```

```
uses v:voucher-artifact-grouping {
 refine "voucher/created-on" {
   mandatory false;
 }
 refine "voucher/pinned-domain-cert" {
   mandatory false;
 }
 augment "voucher" {
    description
     "Adds leaf nodes appropriate for requesting vouchers.";
    leaf prior-signed-voucher-request {
     type binary;
     description
        "If it is necessary to change a voucher, or re-sign and
        forward a voucher that was previously provided along a
        protocol path, then the previously signed voucher SHOULD be
         included in this field.
        For example, a pledge might sign a proximity voucher, which
         an intermediate registrar then re-signs to make its own
         proximity assertion. This is a simple mechanism for a
         chain of trusted parties to change a voucher, while
         maintaining the prior signature information.
        The pledge MUST ignore all prior voucher information when
         accepting a voucher for imprinting. Other parties MAY
         examine the prior signed voucher information for the
         purposes of policy decisions. For example this information
         could be useful to a MASA to determine that both pledge and
         registrar agree on proximity assertions. The MASA SHOULD
         remove all prior-signed-voucher-request information when
         signing a voucher for imprinting so as to minimize the
         final voucher size.";
   }
   leaf proximity-registrar-cert {
     type binary;
     description
        "An X.509 v3 certificate structure as specified by RFC 5280,
        Section 4 encoded using the ASN.1 distinguished encoding
         rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690.
        The first certificate in the Registrar TLS server
        certificate_list sequence (see [RFC5246]) presented by
         the Registrar to the Pledge. This MUST be populated in a
```

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```
Pledge's voucher request if the proximity assertion is
populated.";
}
}
```

<CODE ENDS>

4. Proxying details (Pledge - Proxy - Registrar)

The role of the proxy is to facilitate communications. The proxy forwards packets between the pledge and a registrar that has been provisioned to the proxy via GRASP discovery.

This section defines a stateful proxy mechanism which is refered to as a "circuit" proxy.

The proxy does not terminate the TLS handshake: it passes streams of bytes onward without examination.

A proxy MAY assume TLS framing for auditing purposes, but MUST NOT assume any TLS version.

Registrars are assumed to have logically a locally integrated circuit proxy to support directly (subnet) connected pledges - because registrars themself does not define any functions for pledges to discover them. Such a logical local proxy does not need to provide actual TCP proxying (just discovery) as long as the registrar can operate with subnet (link) local addresses on the interfaces where pledges may connect to.

As a result of the proxy Discovery process in <u>Section 4.1.1</u>, the port number exposed by the proxy does not need to be well known, or require an IANA allocation.

In the ANI, the Autonomic Control Plane (ACP) secured instance of GRASP ([<u>I-D.ietf-anima-grasp</u>]) MUST be used for discovery of ANI registrar ACP addresses and ports by ANI proxies. The TCP leg of the proxy connection between ANI proxy and ANI registrar therefore also runs across the ACP.

During the discovery of the Registrar by the Join Proxy, the Join Proxy will also learn which kinds of proxy mechanisms are available. This will allow the Join Proxy to use the lowest impact mechanism which the Join Proxy and Registrar have in common.

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In order to permit the proxy functionality to be implemented on the maximum variety of devices the chosen mechanism SHOULD use the minimum amount of state on the proxy device. While many devices in the ANIMA target space will be rather large routers, the proxy function is likely to be implemented in the control plane CPU of such a device, with available capabilities for the proxy function similar to many class 2 IoT devices.

The document [<u>I-D.richardson-anima-state-for-joinrouter</u>] provides a more extensive analysis and background of the alternative proxy methods.

<u>4.1</u>. Pledge discovery of Proxy

The result of discovery is a logical communication with a registrar, through a proxy. The proxy is transparent to the pledge but is always assumed to exist.

To discover the proxy the pledge performs the following actions:

- MUST: Obtains a local address using IPv6 methods as described in [RFC4862] IPv6 Stateless Address AutoConfiguration. Use of [RFC4941] temporary addresses is encouraged. A new temporary address SHOULD be allocated whenever the discovery process is forced to restart due to failures. Pledges will generally prefer use of IPv6 Link-Local addresses, and discovery of proxy will be by Link-Local mechanisms. IPv4 methods are described in Appendix A
- MUST: Listen for GRASP M_FLOOD ([<u>I-D.ietf-anima-grasp</u>]) announcements of the objective: "AN_Proxy". See section <u>Section 4.1.1</u> for the details of the objective. The pledge MAY listen concurrently for other sources of information, see <u>Appendix B</u>.

Once a proxy is discovered the pledge communicates with a registrar through the proxy using the bootstrapping protocol defined in <u>Section 5</u>.

While the GRASP M_FLOOD mechanism is passive for the pledge, the optional other methods (mDNS, and IPv4 methods) are active. The pledge SHOULD run those methods in parallel with listening to for the M_FLOOD. The active methods SHOULD exponentially back-off to a maximum of one hour to avoid overloading the network with discovery attempts. Detection of change of physical link status (ethernet carrier for instance) SHOULD reset the exponential back off.

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The pledge could discover more than one proxy on a given physical interface. The pledge can have a multitude of physical interfaces as well: a layer-2/3 ethernet switch may have hundreds of physical ports.

Each possible proxy offer SHOULD be attempted up to the point where a voucher is received: while there are many ways in which the attempt may fail, it does not succeed until the voucher has been validated.

The connection attempts via a single proxy SHOULD exponentially backoff to a maximum of one hour to avoid overloading the network infrastructure. The back-off timer for each MUST be independent of other connection attempts.

Connection attempts SHOULD be run in parallel to avoid head of queue problems wherein an attacker running a fake proxy or registrar could perform protocol actions intentionally slowly. The pledge SHOULD continue to listen to for additional GRASP M_FLOOD messages during the connection attempts.

Once a connection to a registrar is established (e.g. establishment of a TLS session key) there are expectations of more timely responses, see <u>Section 5.2</u>.

Once all discovered services are attempted (assuming that none succeeded) the device MUST return to listening for GRASP M_FLOOD. It SHOULD periodically retry the manufacturer specific mechanisms. The pledge MAY prioritize selection order as appropriate for the anticipated environment.

<u>4.1.1</u>. Proxy GRASP announcements

A proxy uses the DULL GRASP M_FLOOD mechanism to announce itself. This announcement can be within the same message as the ACP announcement detailed in [<u>I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane</u>]. The M_FLOOD is formatted as follows:

Figure 6b: Proxy Discovery

The formal CDDL [<u>I-D.ietf-cbor-cddl</u>] definition is:

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```
flood-message = [M_FLOOD, session-id, initiator, ttl,
                +[objective, (locator-option / [])]]
objective = ["AN_Proxy", objective-flags, loop-count,
                                      objective-value]
ttl
                          ; 180,000 ms (3 minutes)
               = 180000
initiator = ACP address to contact Registrar
objective-flags = sync-only ; as in GRASP spec
                 = 4
                            ; M_FLOOD only requires synchronization
sync-only
loop-count
               = 1
                             ; one hop only
                              ; none
objective-value = any
locator-option = [ 0_IPv6_LOCATOR, ipv6-address,
                   transport-proto, port-number ]
ipv6-address
                 = the v6 LL of the Proxy
$transport-proto /= IPPROTO_TCP ; note this can be any value from the
                                ; IANA protocol registry, as per
                                ; [GRASP] <u>section 2.9.5.1</u>, note 3.
port-number
                = selected by Proxy
```

Figure 6c: AN_Proxy CDDL

4.2. CoAP connection to Registrar

The use of CoAP to connect from pledge to registrar is out of scope for this document, and may be described in future work.

<u>4.3</u>. Proxy discovery of Registrar

The registrar SHOULD announce itself so that proxies can find it and determine what kind of connections can be terminated.

The registrar announces itself using ACP instance of GRASP using M_FLOOD messages. They MUST support ANI TLS circuit proxy and therefore BRSKI across HTTPS/TLS native across the ACP. ANI proxies MUST support GRASP discovery of registrars.

The M_FLOOD is formatted as follows:

Figure 7a: Registrar Discovery

The formal CDDL definition is:

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Figure 7: AN_join_registrar CDDL

The M_FLOOD message MUST be sent periodically. The period is subject to network administrator policy (EST server configuration). It must be sufficiently low that the aggregate amount of periodic M_FLOODs from all EST servers causes negligible traffic across the ACP.

Here are some examples of locators for illustrative purposes. Only the first one (transport-protocol = 6, TCP) is defined in this document and is mandatory to implement.

```
locator1 = [0_IPv6_LOCATOR, fd45:1345::6789, 6, 443]
locator2 = [0_IPv6_LOCATOR, fd45:1345::6789, 17, 5683]
locator3 = [0_IPv6_LOCATOR, fe80::1234, 41, nil]
```

A protocol of 6 indicates that TCP proxying on the indicated port is desired.

Registrars MUST announce the set of protocols that they support. They MUST support TCP traffic.

Registrars MUST accept HTTPS/EST traffic on the TCP ports indicated.

5. Protocol Details (Pledge - Registrar - MASA)

The pledge MUST initiate BRSKI after boot if it is unconfigured. The pledge MUST NOT automatically initiate BRSKI if it has been configured or is in the process of being configured.

BRSKI is described as extensions to EST [<u>RFC7030</u>]. The goal of these extensions is to reduce the number of TLS connections and crypto operations required on the pledge. The registrar implements the BRSKI REST interface within the same "/.well-known" URI tree as the existing EST URIs as described in EST [<u>RFC7030</u>] section 3.2.2. The

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communication channel between the pledge and the registrar is referred to as "BRSKI-EST" (see Figure 1).

The communication channel between the registrar and MASA is similarly described as extensions to EST within the same "/.well-known" tree. For clarity this channel is referred to as "BRSKI-MASA". (See Figure 1).

MASA URI is "https://" authority "/.well-known/est".

BRSKI uses existing CMS message formats for existing EST operations. BRSKI uses JSON [<u>RFC7159</u>] for all new operations defined here, and voucher formats.

While EST <u>section 3.2</u> does not insist upon use of HTTP 1.1 persistent connections, BRSKI-EST connections SHOULD use persistent connections. The intention of this guidance is to ensure the provisional TLS state occurs only once, and that the subsequent resolution of the provision state is not subject to a MITM attack during a critical phase.

Summarized automation extensions for the BRSKI-EST flow are:

- o The pledge provisionally accepts the registrar certificate during the TLS handshake as detailed in <u>Section 5.1</u>.
- The pledge either attempts concurrent connections, or it times out quickly and tries connections in series.
- o The pledge requests and validates a voucher using the new REST calls described below.
- o The pledge completes authentication of the server certificate as detailed in <u>Section 5.6.1</u>. This moves the BRSKI-EST TLS connection out of the provisional state.
- Mandatory boostrap steps conclude with voucher status telemetry (see <u>Section 5.7</u>).

The BRSKI-EST TLS connection can now be used for EST enrollment.

The extensions for a registrar (equivalent to EST server) are:

 Client authentication is automated using Initial Device Identity (IDevID) as per the EST certificate based client authentication. The subject field's DN encoding MUST include the "serialNumber" attribute with the device's unique serial number.

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- o In the language of [RFC6125] this provides for a SERIALNUM-ID category of identifier that can be included in a certificate and therefore that can also be used for matching purposes. The SERIALNUM-ID whitelist is collated according to manufacturer trust anchor since serial numbers are not globally unique.
- o The registrar requests and validates the voucher from the MASA.
- o The registrar forwards the voucher to the pledge when requested.
- The registrar performs log verifications in addition to local authorization checks before accepting optional pledge device enrollment requests.

5.1. BRSKI-EST TLS establishment details

The pledge establishes the TLS connection with the registrar through the circuit proxy (see <u>Section 4</u>) but the TLS handshake is with the registrar. The BRSKI-EST pledge is the TLS client and the BRSKI-EST registrar is the TLS server. All security associations established are between the pledge and the registrar regardless of proxy operations.

Establishment of the BRSKI-EST TLS connection is as specified in EST [RFC7030] section 4.1.1 "Bootstrap Distribution of CA Certificates" [RFC7030] wherein the client is authenticated with the IDevID certificate, and the EST server (the registrar) is provisionally authenticated with an unverified server certificate.

The pledge maintains a security paranoia concerning the provisional state, and all data received, until a voucher is received and verified as specified in <u>Section 5.6.1</u>

To avoid blocking on a single erroneous registrar the pledge MUST drop the connection after 5 seconds in which there has been no progress on the TCP connection. It should proceed to connect to any other registrar's via any other discovered proxies if there are any. If there were no other proxies discovered, the pledge MAY continue to wait, as long as it is concurrently listening for new proxy announcements.

5.2. Pledge Requests Voucher from the Registrar

When the pledge bootstraps it makes a request for a voucher from a registrar.

This is done with an HTTPS POST using the operation path value of "/.well-known/est/requestvoucher".

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The request media types are:

application/voucher-cms+json The request is a "YANG-defined JSON document that has been signed using a CMS structure" as described in <u>Section 3</u> using the JSON encoding described in [<u>RFC7951</u>]. The pledge SHOULD sign the request using the <u>Section 2.3</u> credential.

application/json The request is the "YANG-defined JSON document" as described in <u>Section 3</u> with the exception that it is not within a CMS structure. It is protected only by the TLS client authentication. This reduces the cryptographic requirements on the pledge.

For simplicity the term 'voucher-request' is used to refer to either of these media types. Registrar impementations SHOULD anticipate future media types but of course will simply fail the request if those types are not yet known.

The pledge populates the voucher-request fields as follows:

- created-on: Pledges that have a realtime clock are RECOMMENDED to populate this field. This provides additional information to the MASA.
- nonce: The pledge voucher-request MUST contain a cryptographically
 strong random or pseudo-random number nonce. Doing so ensures
 Section 2.6.1 functionality. The nonce MUST NOT be reused for
 multiple bootstrapping attempts.
- assertion: The pledge voucher-request MAY contain an assertion of "proximity".
- proximity-registrar-cert: In a pledge voucher-request this is the first certificate in the TLS server 'certificate_list' sequence (see [RFC5246]) presented by the registrar to the pledge. This MUST be populated in a pledge voucher-request if the "proximity" assertion is populated.

All other fields MAY be omitted in the pledge voucher-request.

An example JSON payload of a pledge voucher-request is in <u>Section 3.2</u> Example 1.

The registrar validates the client identity as described in EST [RFC7030] section 3.3.2. If the request is signed the registrar confirms that the 'proximity' asserion and associated 'proximity-registrar-cert' are correct.

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5.3. Registrar Authorization of Pledge

In a fully automated network all devices must be securely identified and authorized to join the domain.

A Registrar accepts or declines a request to join the domain, based on the authenticated identity presented. Automated acceptance criteria include:

- allow any device of a specific type (as determined by the X.509 IDevID),
- allow any device from a specific vendor (as determined by the X.509 IDevID),
- o allow a specific device from a vendor (as determined by the X.509 IDevID) against a domain white list. (The mechanism for checking a shared white list potentially used by multiple Registrars is out of scope).

If these validations fail the registrar SHOULD respond with an appropriate HTTP error code.

If authorization is successful the registrar obtains a voucher from the MASA service (see <u>Section 5.5</u>) and returns that MASA signed voucher to the pledge as described in <u>Section 5.6</u>.

5.4. BRSKI-MASA TLS establishment details

The BRSKI-MASA TLS connection is a 'normal' TLS connection appropriate for HTTPS REST interfaces. The registrar initiates the connection and uses the MASA URL obtained as described in <u>Section 2.8</u> for [<u>RFC6125</u>] authentication of the MASA.

The primary method of registrar "authentication" by the MASA is detailed in <u>Section 5.5</u>. As detailed in <u>Section 9</u> the MASA might find it necessary to request additional registrar authentication.

The MASA and the registrars SHOULD be prepared to support TLS client certificate authentication and/or HTTP Basic or Digest authentication as described in <u>RFC7030</u> for EST clients. This connection MAY also have no client authentication at all (<u>Section 6.4</u>)

The authentication of the BRSKI-MASA connection does not affect the voucher-request process, as voucher-requests are already signed by the registrar. Instead, this authentication provides access control to the audit log.

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Implementors are advised that contacting the MASA is to establish a secured REST connection with a web service and that there are a number of authentication models being explored within the industry. Registrars are RECOMMENDED to fail gracefully and generate useful administrative notifications or logs in the advent of unexpected HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) responses from the MASA.

5.5. Registrar Requests Voucher from MASA

When a registrar receives a pledge voucher-request it in turn submits a registrar voucher-request to the MASA service via an HTTPS RESTful interface ([<u>RFC7231</u>]).

This is done with an HTTP POST using the operation path value of "/.well-known/est/requestvoucher".

The request media type is defined in [RFC8366] and is application/ voucher-cms+json. It is a JSON document that has been signed using a CMS structure. The registrar MUST sign the registrar voucherrequest. The entire registrar certificate chain, up to and including the Domain CA, MUST be included in the CMS structure.

MASA impementations SHOULD anticipate future media types but of course will simply fail the request if those types are not yet known.

The registrar populates the voucher-request fields as follows:

- created-on: Registrars are RECOMMENDED to populate this field. This provides additional information to the MASA.
- nonce: The optional nonce value from the pledge request if desired (see below).
- serial-number: The serial number of the pledge the registrar would like a voucher for. The registrar determines this value by parsing the authenticated pledge IDevID certificate. See <u>Section 2.3</u>. The registrar SHOULD verify that the serial number field it parsed matches the serial number field the pledge provided in its voucher-request. This provides a sanity check useful for detecting error conditions and logging. The registrar MUST NOT simply copy the serial number field from a pledge voucher request as that field is claimed but not certified.
- idevid-issuer: The idevid-issuer value from the pledge certificate is included to ensure a statistically unique identity.
- prior-signed-voucher-request: If a signed pledge voucher-request was received then it SHOULD be included in the registrar voucher-

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request. (NOTE: what is included is the complete pledge voucherrequest, inclusive of the 'assertion', 'proximity-registrar-cert', etc wrapped by the pledge's original signature). If a signed voucher-request was not recieved from the pledge then this leaf is omitted from the registrar voucher request.

A nonceless registrar voucher-request MAY be submitted to the MASA. Doing so allows the registrar to request a voucher when the pledge is offline, or when the registrar anticipates not being able to connect to the MASA while the pledge is being deployed. Some use cases require the registrar to learn the appropriate IDevID SerialNumber field from the physical device labeling or from the sales channel (out-of-scope for this document).

All other fields MAY be omitted in the registrar voucher-request.

Example JSON payloads of registrar voucher-requests are in <u>Section 3.2</u> Examples 2 through 4.

The MASA verifies that the registrar voucher-request is internally consistent but does not necessarily authenticate the registrar certificate since the registrar is not known to the MASA in advance. The MASA performs the actions and validation checks described in the following sub-sections before issuing a voucher.

5.5.1. MASA renewal of expired vouchers

As described in [RFC8366] vouchers are normally short lived to avoid revocation issues. If the request is for a previous (expired) voucher using the same registrar then the request for a renewed voucher SHOULD be automatically authorized. The MASA has sufficient information to determine this by examining the request, the registrar authentication, and the existing audit log. The issuance of a renewed voucher is logged as detailed in <u>Section 5.6</u>.

To inform the MASA that existing vouchers are not to be renewed one can update or revoke the registrar credentials used to authorize the request (see <u>Section 5.5.3</u> and <u>Section 5.5.4</u>). More flexible methods will likely involve sales channel integration and authorizations (details are out-of-scope of this document).

5.5.2. MASA verification of voucher-request signature consistency

The MASA MUST verify that the registrar voucher-request is signed by a registrar. This is confirmed by verifying that the id-kp-cmcRA extended key usage extension field (as detailed in EST <u>RFC7030</u> <u>section 3.6.1</u>) exists in the certificate of the entity that signed the registrar voucher-request. This verification is only a

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consistency check that the unauthenticated domain CA intended the voucher-request signer to be a registrar. Performing this check provides value to the domain PKI by assuring the domain administrator that the MASA service will only respect claims from authorized Registration Authorities of the domain.

The MASA verifies that the domain CA certificate is included in the CMS structure as detailed in <u>Section 5.5</u>.

<u>5.5.3</u>. MASA authentication of registrar (certificate)

If a nonceless voucher-request is submitted the MASA MUST authenticate the registrar as described in either EST [RFC7030] section 3.2, section 3.3, or by validating the registrar's certificate used to sign the registrar voucher-request. Any of these methods reduce the risk of DDoS attacks and provide an authenticated identity as an input to sales channel integration and authorizations (details are out-of-scope of this document).

In the nonced case, validation of the registrar MAY be omitted if the device policy is to accept audit-only vouchers.

5.5.4. MASA revocation checking of registrar (certificate)

As noted in <u>Section 5.5.3</u> the MASA performs registrar authentication in a subset of situations (e.g. nonceless voucher requests). Normal PKIX revocation checking is assumed during either EST client authentication or voucher-request signature validation. Similarly, as noted in <u>Section 5.5.2</u>, the MASA performs normal PKIX revocation checking during signature consistency checks (a signature by a registrar certificate that has been revoked is an inconsistency).

5.5.5. MASA verification of pledge prior-signed-voucher-request

The MASA MAY verify that the registrar voucher-request includes the 'prior-signed-voucher-request' field. If so the prior-signedvoucher-request MUST include a 'proximity-registrar-cert' that is consistent with the certificate used to sign the registrar voucherrequest. Additionally the voucher-request serial-number leaf MUST match the pledge serial-number that the MASA extracts from the signing certificate of the prior-signed-voucher-request. The MASA is aware of which pledges support signing of their voucher requests and can use this information to confirm proximity of the pledge with the registrar, thus ensuring that the BRSKI-EST TLS connection has no man-in-the-middle.

If these checks succeed the MASA updates the voucher and audit log assertion leafs with the "proximity" assertion.

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5.5.6. MASA pinning of registrar

The registrar's certificate chain is extracted from the signature method. The chain includes the domain CA certificate as specified in <u>Section 5.5</u>. This certificate is used to populate the "pinned-domain-cert" of the voucher being issued. The domainID (e.g., hash of the root public key) is determined from the pinned-domain-cert and is used to update the audit log.

5.5.7. MASA nonce handling

The MASA does not verify the nonce itself. It MAY perform a simple consistency check: If the registrar voucher-request contains a nonce and the prior-signed-voucher-request exists then the nonce in both MUST be consistent. (Recall from above that the voucher-request might not contain a nonce, see <u>Section 5.5</u> and <u>Section 5.5.3</u>).

The MASA MUST use the nonce from the registrar voucher-request for the resulting voucher and audit log. The prior-signed-voucherrequest nonce is ignored during this operation.

5.6. MASA and Registrar Voucher Response

The MASA voucher response to the registrar is forwarded without changes to the pledge; therefore this section applies to both the MASA and the registrar. The HTTP signaling described applies to both the MASA and registrar responses. A registrar either caches prior MASA responses or dynamically requests a new voucher based on local policy (it does not generate or sign a voucher).

If the voucher-request is successful, the server (MASA responding to registrar or registrar responding to pledge) response MUST contain an HTTP 200 response code. The server MUST answer with a suitable 4xx or 5xx HTTP [RFC2616] error code when a problem occurs. In this case, the response data from the MASA MUST be a plaintext human-readable (ASCII, English) error message containing explanatory information describing why the request was rejected.

The registrar MAY respond with an HTTP 202 ("the request has been accepted for processing, but the processing has not been completed") as described in EST [RFC7030] section 4.2.3 wherein the client "MUST wait at least the specified 'Retry-After' time before repeating the same request". (see [RFC7231] section 6.6.4) The pledge is RECOMMENDED to provide local feedback (blinked LED etc) during this wait cycle if mechanisms for this are available. To prevent an attacker registrar from significantly delaying bootstrapping the pledge MUST limit the 'Retry-After' time to 60 seconds. Ideally the pledge would keep track of the appropriate Retry-After header values

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for any number of outstanding registrars but this would involve a state table on the pledge. Instead the pledge MAY ignore the exact Retry-After value in favor of a single hard coded value. A registrar that is unable to complete the transaction the first time due to timing reasons will have future chances.

In order to avoid infinite redirect loops, which a malicious registrar might do in order to keep the pledge from discovering the correct registrar, the pledge MUST NOT follow more than one redirection (3xx code) to another web origins. EST supports redirection but requires user input; this change allows the pledge to follow a single redirection without a user interaction.

A 403 (Forbidden) response is appropriate if the voucher-request is not signed correctly, stale, or if the pledge has another outstanding voucher that cannot be overridden.

A 404 (Not Found) response is appropriate when the request is for a device that is not known to the MASA.

A 406 (Not Acceptable) response is appropriate if a voucher of the desired type or using the desired algorithms (as indicated by the Accept: headers, and algorithms used in the signature) cannot be issued such as because the MASA knows the pledge cannot process that type. The registrar SHOULD use this response if it determines the pledge is unacceptable due to inventory control, MASA audit logs, or any other reason.

A 415 (Unsupported Media Type) response is approriate for a request that has a voucher encoding that is not understood.

The response media type is:

application/voucher-cms+json The response is a "YANG-defined JSON document that has been signed using a CMS structure" as described in [<u>RFC8366</u>] using the JSON encoded described in [<u>RFC7951</u>]. The MASA MUST sign the response.

The syntactic details of vouchers are described in detail in [<u>RFC8366</u>]. For example, the voucher consists of:

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```
{
   "ietf-voucher:voucher": {
     "nonce": "62a2e7693d82fcda2624de58fb6722e5",
     "assertion": "logging"
     "pinned-domain-cert": "base64encodedvalue=="
     "serial-number": "JADA123456789"
   }
}
```

The MASA populates the voucher fields as follows:

nonce: The nonce from the pledge if available. See <u>Section 5.5.7</u>.

assertion: The method used to verify assertion. See Section 5.5.5.

pinned-domain-cert: The domain CA cert. See <u>Section 5.5.6</u>.

- serial-number: The serial-number as provided in the voucher-request. Also see <u>Section 5.5.5</u>.
- domain-cert-revocation-checks: Set as appropriate for the pledge's capabilities and as documented in [RFC8366]. The MASA MAY set this field to 'false' since setting it to 'true' would require that revocation information be available to the pledge and this document does not make normative requirements for [RFC6961] or equivalent integrations.
- expires-on: This is set for nonceless vouchers. The MASA ensures the voucher lifetime is consistent with any revocation or pinneddomain-cert consistency checks the pledge might perform. See section <u>Section 2.6.1</u>. There are three times to consider: (a) a configured voucher lifetime in the MASA, (b) the expiry time for the registrar's certificate, (c) any certificate revocation information (CRL) lifetime. The expires-on field SHOULD be before the earliest of these three values. Typically (b) will be some significant time in the future, but (c) will typically be short (on the order of a week or less). The RECOMMENDED period for (a) is on the order of 20 minutes, so it will typically determine the lifespan of the resulting voucher.

Whenever a voucher is issued the MASA MUST update the audit log appropriately. The internal state requirements to maintain the audit log are out-of-scope. See <u>Section 5.8.1</u> for a discussion of reporting the log to a registrar.

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<u>5.6.1</u>. Pledge voucher verification

The pledge MUST verify the voucher signature using the manufacturer installed trust anchor associated with the manufacturer's MASA (this is likely included in the pledge's firmware).

The pledge MUST verify the serial-number field of the signed voucher matches the pledge's own serial-number.

The pledge MUST verify that the voucher nonce field is accurate and matches the nonce the pledge submitted to this registrar, or that the voucher is nonceless (see <u>Section 6.2</u>).

The pledge MUST be prepared to parse and fail gracefully from a voucher response that does not contain a 'pinned-domain-cert' field. The pledge MUST be prepared to ignore additional fields that it does not recognize.

<u>5.6.2</u>. Pledge authentication of provisional TLS connection

The 'pinned-domain-cert' element of the voucher contains the domain CA's public key. The pledge MUST use the 'pinned-domain-cert' trust anchor to immediately complete authentication of the provisional TLS connection.

If a registrar's credentials cannot be verified using the pinneddomain-cert trust anchor from the voucher then the TLS connection is immediately discarded and the pledge abandons attempts to bootstrap with this discovered registrar. The pledge SHOULD send voucher status telemetry (described below) before closing the TLS connection. The pledge MUST attempt to enroll using any other proxies it has found. It SHOULD return to the same proxy again after attempting with other proxies. Attempts should be attempted in the exponential backoff described earlier. Attempts SHOULD be repeated as failure may be the result of a temporary inconsistently (an inconsistently rolled registrar key, or some other mis-configuration). The inconsistently could also be the result an active MITM attack on the EST connection.

The registrar MUST use a certificate that chains to the pinneddomain-cert as its TLS server certificate.

The pledge's PKIX path validation of a registrar certificate's validity period information is as described in <u>Section 2.6.1</u>. Once the PKIX path validation is successful the TLS connection is no longer provisional.

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The pinned-domain-cert MAY be installed as an trust anchor for future operations. It can therefore can be used to authenticate any dynamically discovered EST server that contain the id-kp-cmcRA extended key usage extension as detailed in EST RFC7030 section 3.6.1; but to reduce system complexity the pledge SHOULD avoid additional discovery operations. Instead the pledge SHOULD communicate directly with the registrar as the EST server. The 'pinned-domain-cert' is not a complete distribution of the [RFC7030] section 4.1.3 CA Certificate Response, which is an additional justification for the recommendation to proceed with EST key management operations. Once a full CA Certificate Response is obtained it is more authoritative for the domain than the limited 'pinned-domain-cert' response.

5.7. Pledge BRSKI Status Telemetry

The domain is expected to provide indications to the system administrators concerning device lifecycle status. To facilitate this it needs telemetry information concerning the device's status.

To indicate pledge status regarding the voucher, the pledge MUST post a status message.

The posted data media type: application/json

The client HTTP POSTs the following to the server at the EST well known URI "/voucher_status". The Status field indicates if the voucher was acceptable. If it was not acceptable the Reason string indicates why. In the failure case this message may be sent to an unauthenticated, potentially malicious registrar and therefore the Reason string SHOULD NOT provide information beneficial to an attacker. The operational benefit of this telemetry information is balanced against the operational costs of not recording that an voucher was ignored by a client the registrar expected to continue joining the domain.

```
{
    "version":"1",
    "Status":FALSE /* TRUE=Success, FALSE=Fail"
    "Reason":"Informative human readable message"
    "reason-context": { additional JSON }
}
```

The server SHOULD respond with an HTTP 200 but MAY simply fail with an HTTP 404 error. The client ignores any response. Within the server logs the server SHOULD capture this telemetry information.

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The reason-context attribute is an arbitrary JSON object (literal value or hash of values) which provides additional information specific to this pledge. The contents of this field are not subject to standardization.

Additional standard JSON fields in this POST MAY be added, see <u>Section 7.3</u>.

5.8. Registrar audit log request

After receiving the pledge status telemetry <u>Section 5.7</u>, the registrar SHOULD request the MASA audit log from the MASA service.

This is done with an HTTP GET using the operation path value of "/.well-known/est/requestauditlog".

The registrar SHOULD HTTP POST the same registrar voucher-request as it did when requesting a voucher. It is posted to the /requestauditlog URI instead. The "idevid-issuer" and "serialnumber" informs the MASA which log is requested so the appropriate log can be prepared for the response. Using the same media type and message minimizes cryptographic and message operations although it results in additional network traffic. The relying MASA implementation MAY leverage internal state to associate this request with the original, and by now already validated, voucher-request so as to avoid an extra crypto validation.

A registrar MAY request logs at future times. If the registrar generates a new request then the MASA is forced to perform the additional cryptographic operations to verify the new request.

A MASA that receives a request for a device that does not exist, or for which the requesting owner was never an owner returns an HTTP 404 ("Not found") code.

Rather than returning the audit log as a response to the POST (with a return code 200), the MASA MAY instead return a 201 ("Created") RESTful response ([RFC7231] section 7.1) containing a URL to the prepared (and easily cachable) audit response.

In order to avoid enumeration of device audit logs, MASA that return URLs SHOULD take care to make the returned URL unguessable. For instance, rather than returning URLs containing a database number such as https://example.com/auditlog/1234 or the EUI of the device such https://example.com/auditlog/10-00-00-11-22-33, the MASA SHOULD return a randomly generated value (a "slug" in web parlance). The value is used to find the relevant database entry.

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A MASA that returns a code 200 MAY also include a Location: header for future reference by the registrar.

The request media type is:

application/voucher-cms+json The request is a "YANG-defined JSON document that has been signed using a CMS structure" as described in <u>Section 3</u> using the JSON encoded described in [<u>RFC7951</u>]. The registrar MUST sign the request. The entire registrar certificate chain, up to and including the Domain CA, MUST be included in the CMS structure.

<u>5.8.1</u>. MASA audit log response

A log data file is returned consisting of all log entries. The returned data is in JSON format ([<u>RFC7951</u>]), and the Content-Type SHOULD be "application/json". For example:

```
{
  "version":"1",
  "events":[
    {
     "date":"<date/time of the entry>",
    "domainID":"<domainID extracted from voucher-request>",
    "nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or the exact string 'NULL')>"
     "assertion":"<the value from the voucher assertion leaf>"
    "truncated":"<the number of domainID entries truncated>"
   },
    {
    "date":"<date/time of the entry>",
    "domainID":"<anotherDomainID extracted from voucher-request>",
     "nonce":"<any nonce if supplied (or the exact string 'NULL')>"
     "assertion":"<the value from the voucher assertion leaf>"
   }
  1,
  "truncation": {
     "nonced duplicates": "<total number of entries truncated>",
     "nonceless duplicates": "<total number of entries truncated>",
    "arbitrary": "<number of domainID entries removed entirely>"
    }
}
```

Distribution of a large log is less than ideal. This structure can be optimized as follows: Nonced or Nonceless entries for the same domainID MAY be truncated from the log leaving only the single most recent nonced or nonceless entry for that domainID. In the case of truncation the 'event' truncation value SHOULD contain a count of the number of events for this domainID that were truncated. The log

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SHOULD NOT be further reduced but there could exist operational situation where maintaining the full log is not possible. In such situations the log MAY be arbitrarily truncated for length, with the number of removed entries indicated as 'arbitrary'.

If the truncation count exceeds 1024 then the MASA MAY use this value without further incrementing it.

A log where duplicate entries for the same domain have been truncated ("nonced duplicates" and/or "nonceless duplicates) could still be acceptable for informed decisions. A log that has had "arbitrary" truncations is less acceptable but manufacturer transparency is better than hidden truncations.

This document specifies a simple log format as provided by the MASA service to the registrar. This format could be improved by distributed consensus technologies that integrate vouchers with technologies such as block-chain or hash trees or optimized logging approaches. Doing so is out of the scope of this document but is an anticipated improvement for future work. As such, the registrar client SHOULD anticipate new kinds of responses, and SHOULD provide operator controls to indicate how to process unknown responses.

<u>5.8.2</u>. Registrar audit log verification

Each time the Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA) issues a voucher, it places it into the audit log for that device. The details are described in <u>Section 5.8</u>. The contents of the audit log can express a variety of trust levels, and this section explains what kind of trust a registrar can derive from the entries.

While the audit log provides a list of vouchers that were issued by the MASA, the vouchers are issued in response to voucher-requests, and it is the contents of the voucher-requests which determines how meaningful the audit log entries are.

A registrar SHOULD use the log information to make an informed decision regarding the continued bootstrapping of the pledge. The exact policy is out of scope of this document as it depends on the security requirements within the registrar domain. Equipment that is purchased pre-owned can be expected to have an extensive history. The following dicussion is provided to help explain the value of each log element:

date: The date field provides the registrar an opportunity to divide the log around known events such as the purchase date. Depending on context known to the registrar or administrator evens before/ after certain dates can have different levels of importance. For

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example for equipment that is expected to be new, and thus have no history, it would be a surprise to find prior entries.

- domainID: If the log includes an unexpected domainID then the pledge could have imprinted on an unexpected domain. The registrar can be expected to use a variety of techniques to define "unexpected" ranging from white lists of prior domains to anomoly detection (e.g. "this device was previously bound to a different domain than any other device deployed"). Log entries can also be compared against local history logs in search of discrepancies (e.g. "this device was re-deployed some number of times internally but the external audit log shows additional re-deployments our internal logs are unaware of").
- nonce: Nonceless entries mean the logged domainID could theoretically trigger a reset of the pledge and then take over management by using the existing nonceless voucher.
- assertion: The assetion leaf in the voucher and audit log indicates why the MASA issued the voucher. A "verified" entry means that the MASA issued the associated voucher as a result of positive verification of ownership but this can still be problematic for registrar's that expected only new (not pre-owned) pledges. A "logged" assertion informs the registrar that the prior vouchers were issued with minimal verification. A "proximity" assertion assures the registrar that the pledge was truly communicating with the prior domain and thus provides assurance that the prior domain really has deployed the pledge.

A relatively simple policy is to white list known (internal or external) domainIDs and to require all vouchers to have a nonce and/ or require that all nonceless vouchers be from a subset (e.g. only internal) domainIDs. A simple action is to revoke any locally issued credentials for the pledge in question or to refuse to forward the voucher. A registrar MAY be configured to ignore the history of the device but it is RECOMMENDED that this only be configured if hardware assisted NEA [RFC5209] is supported.

5.9. EST Integration for PKI bootstrapping

The pledge SHOULD follow the BRSKI operations with EST enrollment operations including "CA Certificates Request", "CSR Attributes" and "Client Certificate Request" or "Server-Side Key Generation", etc. This is a relatively seamless integration since BRSKI REST calls provide an automated alternative to the manual bootstrapping method described in [RFC7030]. As noted above, use of HTTP 1.1 persistent connections simplifies the pledge state machine.

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An ANIMA ANI pledge MUST implement the EST automation extensions described below. They supplement the [RFC7030] EST to better support automated devices that do not have an end user.

Although EST allows clients to obtain multiple certificates by sending multiple CSR requests BRSKI mandates use of the CSR Attributes request and mandates that the registrar validate the CSR against the expected attributes. This implies that client requests will "look the same" and therefore result in a single logical certificate being issued even if the client were to make multiple requests. Registrars MAY contain more complex logic but doing so is out-of-scope of this specification. BRSKI does not signal any enhancement or restriction to this capability.

5.9.1. EST Distribution of CA Certificates

The pledge SHOULD request the full EST Distribution of CA Certificates message. See <u>RFC7030</u>, section 4.1.

This ensures that the pledge has the complete set of current CA certificates beyond the pinned-domain-cert (see <u>Section 5.6.1</u> for a discussion of the limitations inherent in having a single certificate instead of a full CA Certificates response.) Although these limitations are acceptable during initial bootstrapping, they are not appropriate for ongoing PKIX end entity certificate validation.

5.9.2. EST CSR Attributes

Automated bootstrapping occurs without local administrative configuration of the pledge. In some deployments it is plausible that the pledge generates a certificate request containing only identity information known to the pledge (essentially the X.509 IDevID information) and ultimately receives a certificate containing domain specific identity information. Conceptually the CA has complete control over all fields issued in the end entity certificate. Realistically this is operationally difficult with the current status of PKI certificate authority deployments, where the CSR is submitted to the CA via a number of non-standard protocols. Even with all standardized protocols used, it could operationally be problematic to expect that service specific certificate fields can be created by a CA that is likely operated by a group that has no insight into different network services/protocols used. For example, the CA could even be outsourced.

To alleviate these operational difficulties, the pledge MUST request the EST "CSR Attributes" from the EST server and the EST server needs to be able to reply with the attributes necessary for use of the certificate in its intended protocols/services. This approach allows

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for minimal CA integrations and instead the local infrastructure (EST server) informs the pledge of the proper fields to include in the generated CSR. This approach is beneficial to automated boostrapping in the widest number of environments.

If the hardwareModuleName in the X.509 IDevID is populated then it SHOULD by default be propagated to the LDevID along with the hwSerialNum. The EST server SHOULD support local policy concerning this functionality.

In networks using the BRSKI enrolled certificate to authenticate the ACP (Autonomic Control Plane), the EST attributes MUST include the "ACP information" field. See

[I-D.ietf-anima-autonomic-control-plane] for more details.

The registrar MUST also confirm that the resulting CSR is formatted as indicated before forwarding the request to a CA. If the registrar is communicating with the CA using a protocol such as full CMC, which provides mechanisms to override the CSR attributes, then these mechanisms MAY be used even if the client ignores CSR Attribute guidance.

5.9.3. EST Client Certificate Request

The pledge MUST request a new client certificate. See <u>RFC7030</u>, section 4.2.

5.9.4. Enrollment Status Telemetry

For automated bootstrapping of devices, the adminstrative elements providing bootstrapping also provide indications to the system administrators concerning device lifecycle status. This might include information concerning attempted bootstrapping messages seen by the client, MASA provides logs and status of credential enrollment. [RFC7030] assumes an end user and therefore does not include a final success indication back to the server. This is insufficient for automated use cases.

To indicate successful enrollment the client SHOULD re-negotiate the EST TLS session using the newly obtained credentials. This occurs by the client initiating a new TLS ClientHello message on the existing TLS connection. The client MAY simply close the old TLS session and start a new one. The server MUST support either model.

In the case of a FAIL, the Reason string indicates why the most recent enrollment failed. The SubjectKeyIdentifier field MUST be included if the enrollment attempt was for a keypair that is locally

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known to the client. If EST /serverkeygen was used and failed then the field is omitted from the status telemetry.

In the case of a SUCCESS the Reason string is omitted. The SubjectKeyIdentifier is included so that the server can record the successful certificate distribution.

Status media type: application/json

The client HTTP POSTs the following to the server at the new EST well known URI /enrollstatus.

```
{
    "version":"1",
    "Status":TRUE /* TRUE=Success, FALSE=Fail"
    "Reason":"Informative human readable message"
    "reason-context": "Additional information"
}
```

The server SHOULD respond with an HTTP 200 but MAY simply fail with an HTTP 404 error.

Within the server logs the server MUST capture if this message was received over an TLS session with a matching client certificate. This allows for clients that wish to minimize their crypto operations to simply POST this response without renegotiating the TLS session at the cost of the server not being able to accurately verify that enrollment was truly successful.

5.9.5. Multiple certificates

Pledges that require multiple certificates could establish direct EST connections to the registrar.

5.9.6. EST over CoAP

This document describes extensions to EST for the purposes of bootstrapping of remote key infrastructures. Bootstrapping is relevant for CoAP enrollment discussions as well. The definition of EST and BRSKI over CoAP is not discussed within this document beyond ensuring proxy support for CoAP operations. Instead it is anticipated that a definition of CoAP mappings will occur in subsequent documents such as [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] and that CoAP mappings for BRSKI will be discussed either there or in future work.

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<u>6</u>. Reduced security operational modes

A common requirement of bootstrapping is to support less secure operational modes for support specific use cases. The following sections detail specific ways that the pledge, registrar and MASA can be configured to run in a less secure mode for the indicated reasons.

This section is considered non-normative: use suggested methods MUST be detailed in specific profiles of BRSKI. This is the subject for future work.

6.1. Trust Model

++	++	++	++
Pledge	Join	Domain	Manufacturer
	Proxy	Registrar	Service
			(Internet)
++	++	++	++

Figure 10

- Pledge: The pledge could be compromised and providing an attack vector for malware. The entity is trusted to only imprint using secure methods described in this document. Additional endpoint assessment techniques are RECOMMENDED but are out-of-scope of this document.
- Join Proxy: Provides proxy functionalities but is not involved in security considerations.
- Registrar: When interacting with a MASA a registrar makes all decisions. For Ownership Audit Vouchers (see [<u>RFC8366</u>]) the registrar is provided an opportunity to accept MASA decisions.
- Vendor Service, MASA: This form of manufacturer service is trusted to accurately log all claim attempts and to provide authoritative log information to registrars. The MASA does not know which devices are associated with which domains. These claims could be strengthened by using cryptographic log techniques to provide append only, cryptographic assured, publicly auditable logs. Current text provides only for a trusted manufacturer.
- Vendor Service, Ownership Validation: This form of manufacturer service is trusted to accurately know which device is owned by which domain.

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<u>6.2</u>. Pledge security reductions

The pledge can choose to accept vouchers using less secure methods. These methods enable offline and emergency (touch based) deployment use cases:

- The pledge MUST accept nonceless vouchers. This allows for a use case where the registrar can not connect to the MASA at the deployment time. Logging and validity periods address the security considerations of supporting these use cases.
- The pledge MAY support "trust on first use" for physical interfaces such as a local console port or physical user interface but MUST NOT support "trust on first use" on network interfaces. This is because "trust on first use" permanently degrades the security for all use cases.
- 3. The pledge MAY have an operational mode where it skips voucher validation one time. For example if a physical button is depressed during the bootstrapping operation. This can be useful if the manufacturer service is unavailable. This behavior SHOULD be available via local configuration or physical presence methods (such as use of a serial/craft console) to ensure new entities can always be deployed even when autonomic methods fail. This allows for unsecured imprint.

It is RECOMMENDED that "trust on first use" or any method of skipping voucher validation (including use of craft serial console) only be available if hardware assisted Network Endpoint Assessment [RFC5209] is supported. This recommendation ensures that domain network monitoring can detect innappropriate use of offline or emergency deployment procedures when voucher-based bootstrapping is not used.

6.3. Registrar security reductions

A registrar can choose to accept devices using less secure methods. These methods are acceptable when low security models are needed, as the security decisions are being made by the local administrator, but they MUST NOT be the default behavior:

- 1. A registrar MAY choose to accept all devices, or all devices of a particular type, at the administrator's discretion. This could occur when informing all registrars of unique identifiers of new entities might be operationally difficult.
- A registrar MAY choose to accept devices that claim a unique identity without the benefit of authenticating that claimed identity. This could occur when the pledge does not include an

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X.509 IDevID factory installed credential. New Entities without an X.509 IDevID credential MAY form the <u>Section 5.2</u> request using the <u>Section 5.5</u> format to ensure the pledge's serial number information is provided to the registrar (this includes the IDevID AuthorityKeyIdentifier value, which would be statically configured on the pledge.) The pledge MAY refuse to provide a TLS client certificate (as one is not available.) The pledge SHOULD support HTTP-based or certificate-less TLS authentication as described in EST <u>RFC7030 section 3.3.2</u>. A registrar MUST NOT accept unauthenticated New Entities unless it has been configured to do so by an administrator that has verified that only expected new entities can communicate with a registrar (presumably via a physically secured perimeter.)

- 3. A registrar MAY submit a nonceless voucher-requests to the MASA service (by not including a nonce in the voucher-request.) The resulting vouchers can then be stored by the registrar until they are needed during bootstrapping operations. This is for use cases where the target network is protected by an air gap and therefore cannot contact the MASA service during pledge deployment.
- 4. A registrar MAY ignore unrecognized nonceless log entries. This could occur when used equipment is purchased with a valid history being deployed in air gap networks that required permanent vouchers.

<u>6.4</u>. MASA security reductions

Lower security modes chosen by the MASA service affect all device deployments unless bound to the specific device identities. In which case these modes can be provided as additional features for specific customers. The MASA service can choose to run in less secure modes by:

1. Not enforcing that a nonce is in the voucher. This results in distribution of a voucher that never expires and in effect makes the Domain an always trusted entity to the pledge during any subsequent bootstrapping attempts. That this occurred is captured in the log information so that the registrar can make appropriate security decisions when a pledge joins the Domain. This is useful to support use cases where registrars might not be online during actual device deployment. Because this results in a long lived voucher and does not require the proof that the device is online, this is only accepted when the registrar is authenticated by the MASA and authorized to provide this functionality. The MASA is RECOMMENDED to use this functionality only in concert with an enhanced level of ownership tracking

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(out-of-scope.) If the pledge device is known to have a realtime-clock that is set from the factory, use of a voucher validity period is RECOMMENDED.

2. Not verifying ownership before responding with a voucher. This is expected to be a common operational model because doing so relieves the manufacturer providing MASA services from having to track ownership during shipping and supply chain and allows for a very low overhead MASA service. A registrar uses the audit log information as a defense in depth strategy to ensure that this does not occur unexpectedly (for example when purchasing new equipment the registrar would throw an error if any audit log information is reported.) The MASA SHOULD verify the 'prior-signed-voucher-request' information for pledges that support that functionality. This provides a proof-of-proximity check that reduces the need for ownership verification.

7. IANA Considerations

This document requires the following IANA actions:

7.1. Well-known EST registration

This document extends the definitions of "est" (so far defined via <u>RFC7030</u>) in the "https://www.iana.org/assignments/well-known-uris/ well-known-uris.xhtml" registry as follows:

- o add /.well-known/est/requestvoucher (see Section 5.5)
- o add /.well-known/est/requestauditlog (see Section 5.7)

7.2. PKIX Registry

IANA is requested to register the following:

This document requests a number for id-mod-MASAURLExtn2016(TBD) from the pkix(7) id-mod(0) Registry. [[EDNOTE: fix names]]

This document requests a number from the id-pe registry for id-pe-masa-url. XXX

7.3. Pledge BRSKI Status Telemetry

IANA is requested to create a new Registry entitled: "BRSKI Parameters", and within that Registry to create a table called: "Pledge BRSKI Status Telemetry Attributes". New items can be added using the Specification Required. The following items are to be in

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the initial registration, with this document (<u>Section 5.7</u>) as the reference:

- o version
- o Status
- o Reason
- o reason-context

7.4. DNS Service Names

IANA is requested to register the following Service Names:

7.5. MUD File Extension for the MASA

The IANA is requested to list the name "masa" in the MUD extensions registry defined in [I-D.ietf-opsawg-mud]. Its use is documented in Appendix C.

8. Privacy Considerations

8.1. MASA audit log

The MASA audit log includes a hash of the domainID for each Registrar a voucher has been issued to. This information is closely related to the actual domain identity, especially when paired with the anti-DDoS authentication information the MASA might collect. This could provide sufficient information for the MASA service to build a detailed understanding the devices that have been provisioned within a domain.

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There are a number of design choices that mitigate this risk. The domain can maintain some privacy since it has not necessarily been authenticated and is not authoritatively bound to the supply chain.

Additionally the domainID captures only the unauthenticated subject key identifier of the domain. A privacy sensitive domain could theoretically generate a new domainID for each device being deployed. Similarly a privacy sensitive domain would likely purchase devices that support proximity assertions from a manufacturer that does not require sales channel integrations. This would result in a significant level of privacy while maintaining the security characteristics provided by Registrar based audit log inspection.

9. Security Considerations

This document details a protocol for bootstrapping that balances operational concerns against security concerns. As detailed in the introduction, and touched on again in <u>Section 6</u>, the protocol allows for reduced security modes. These attempt to deliver additional control to the local administrator and owner in cases where less security provides operational benefits. This section goes into more detail about a variety of specific considerations.

To facilitate logging and administrative oversight, in addition to triggering Registration verification of MASA logs, the pledge reports on voucher parsing status to the registrar. In the case of a failure, this information is informative to a potentially malicious registrar. This is mandated anyway because of the operational benefits of an informed administrator in cases where the failure is indicative of a problem. The registrar is RECOMMENDED to verify MASA logs if voucher status telemetry is not received.

To facilitate truely limited clients EST <u>RFC7030 section 3.3.2</u> requirements that the client MUST support a client authentication model have been reduced in <u>Section 6</u> to a statement that the registrar "MAY" choose to accept devices that fail cryptographic authentication. This reflects current (poor) practices in shipping devices without a cryptographic identity that are NOT RECOMMENDED.

During the provisional period of the connection the pledge MUST treat all HTTP header and content data as untrusted data. HTTP libraries are regularly exposed to non-secured HTTP traffic: mature libraries should not have any problems.

Pledges might chose to engage in protocol operations with multiple discovered registrars in parallel. As noted above they will only do so with distinct nonce values, but the end result could be multiple vouchers issued from the MASA if all registrars attempt to claim the

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device. This is not a failure and the pledge choses whichever voucher to accept based on internal logic. The registrars verifying log information will see multiple entries and take this into account for their analytics purposes.

9.1. DoS against MASA

There are uses cases where the MASA could be unavailable or uncooperative to the Registrar. They include active DoS attacks, planned and unplanned network partitions, changes to MASA policy, or other instances where MASA policy rejects a claim. These introduce an operational risk to the Registrar owner in that MASA behavior might limit the ability to bootstrap a pledge device. For example this might be an issue during disaster recovery. This risk can be mitigated by Registrars that request and maintain long term copies of "nonceless" vouchers. In that way they are guaranteed to be able to bootstrap their devices.

The issuance of nonceless vouchers themselves creates a security concern. If the Registrar of a previous domain can intercept protocol communications then it can use a previously issued nonceless voucher to establish management control of a pledge device even after having sold it. This risk is mitigated by recording the issuance of such vouchers in the MASA audit log that is verified by the subsequent Registrar and by Pledges only bootstrapping when in a factory default state. This reflects a balance between enabling MASA independence during future bootstrapping and the security of bootstrapping itself. Registrar control over requesting and auditing nonceless vouchers allows device owners to choose an appropriate balance.

The MASA is exposed to DoS attacks wherein attackers claim an unbounded number of devices. Ensuring a registrar is representative of a valid manufacturer customer, even without validating ownership of specific pledge devices, helps to mitigate this. Pledge signatures on the pledge voucher-request, as forwarded by the registrar in the prior-signed-voucher-request field of the registrar voucher-request, significantly reduce this risk by ensuring the MASA can confirm proximity between the pledge and the registrar making the request. This mechanism is optional to allow for constrained devices. Supply chain integration ("know your customer") is an additional step that MASA providers and device vendors can explore.

<u>9.2</u>. Freshness in Voucher-Requests

A concern has been raised that the pledge voucher-request should contain some content (a nonce) provided by the registrar and/or MASA

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in order for those actors to verify that the pledge voucher-request is fresh.

There are a number of operational problems with getting a nonce from the MASA to the pledge. It is somewhat easier to collect a random value from the registrar, but as the registrar is not yet vouched for, such a registrar nonce has little value. There are privacy and logistical challenges to addressing these operational issues, so if such a thing were to be considered, it would have to provide some clear value. This section examines the impacts of not having a fresh pledge voucher-request.

Because the registrar authenticates the pledge, a full Man-in-the-Middle attack is not possible, despite the provisional TLS authentication by the pledge (see <u>Section 5</u>.) Instead we examine the case of a fake registrar (Rm) that communicates with the pledge in parallel or in close time proximity with the intended registrar. (This scenario is intentionally supported as described in <u>Section 4.1</u>.)

The fake registrar (Rm) can obtain a voucher signed by the MASA either directly or through arbitrary intermediaries. Assuming that the MASA accepts the registrar voucher-request (either because Rm is collaborating with a legitimate registrar according to supply chain information, or because the MASA is in audit-log only mode), then a voucher linking the pledge to the registrar Rm is issued.

Such a voucher, when passed back to the pledge, would link the pledge to registrar Rm, and would permit the pledge to end the provisional state. It now trusts Rm and, if it has any security vulnerabilities leveragable by an Rm with full administrative control, can be assumed to be a threat against the intended registrar.

This flow is mitigated by the intended registrar verifying the audit logs available from the MASA as described in <u>Section 5.8</u>. Rm might chose to collect a voucher-request but wait until after the intended registrar completes the authorization process before submitting it. This pledge voucher-request would be 'stale' in that it has a nonce that no longer matches the internal state of the pledge. In order to successfully use any resulting voucher the Rm would need to remove the stale nonce or anticipate the pledge's future nonce state. Reducing the possibility of this is why the pledge is mandated to generate a strong random or pseudo-random number nonce.

Additionally, in order to successfully use the resulting voucher the Rm would have to attack the pledge and return it to a bootstrapping enabled state. This would require wiping the pledge of current configuration and triggering a re-bootstrapping of the pledge. This

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is no more likely than simply taking control of the pledge directly but if this is a consideration the target network is RECOMMENDED to take the following steps:

- Ongoing network monitoring for unexpected bootstrapping attempts by pledges.
- Retreival and examination of MASA log information upon the occurance of any such unexpected events. Rm will be listed in the logs along with nonce information for analysis.

<u>9.3</u>. Trusting manufacturers

The BRSKI extensions to EST permit a new pledge to be completely configured with domain specific trust anchors. The link from builtin manufacturer-provided trust anchors to domain-specific trust anchors is mediated by the signed voucher artifact.

If the manufacturer's IDevID signing key is not properly validated, then there is a risk that the network will accept a pledge that should not be a member of the network. As the address of the manufacturer's MASA is provided in the IDevID using the extension from <u>Section 2.3</u>, the malicious pledge will have no problem collaborating with it's MASA to produce a completely valid voucher.

BRSKI does not, however, fundamentally change the trust model from domain owner to manufacturer. Assuming that the pledge used its IDevID with <u>RFC7030</u> EST and BRSKI, the domain (registrar) still needs to trust the manufacturer.

Establishing this trust between domain and manufacturer is outside the scope of BRSKI. There are a number of mechanisms that can adopted including:

- o Manually configuring each manufacturer's trust anchor.
- o A Trust-On-First-Use (TOFU) mechanism. A human would be queried upon seeing a manufacturer's trust anchor for the first time, and then the trust anchor would be installed to the trusted store. There are risks with this; even if the key to name is validated using something like the WebPKI, there remains the possibility that the name is a look alike: e.g, c1sco.com, ..
- o scanning the trust anchor from a QR code that came with the packaging (this is really a manual TOFU mechanism)

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- some sales integration process where trust anchors are provided as part of the sales process, probably included in a digital packing "slip", or a sales invoice.
- o consortium membership, where all manufacturers of a particular device category (e.g, a light bulb, or a cable-modem) are signed by an certificate authority specifically for this. This is done by CableLabs today. It is used for authentication and authorization as part of TR-79: [docsisroot] and [TR069].

The existing WebPKI provides a reasonable anchor between manufacturer name and public key. It authenticates the key. It does not provide a reasonable authorization for the manufacturer, so it is not directly useable on it's own.

10. Acknowledgements

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Appendix A. IPv4 and non-ANI operations

The secification of BRSKI in <u>Section 4</u> intentionally only covers the mechanisms for an IPv6 pledge using Link-Local addresses. This section describes non-normative extensions that can be used in other environments.

A.1. IPv4 Link Local addresses

Instead of an IPv6 link-local address, an IPv4 address may be generated using [<u>RFC3927</u>] Dynamic Configuration of IPv4 Link-Local Addresses.

In the case that an IPv4 Link-Local address is formed, then the bootstrap process would continue as in the IPv6 case by looking for a (circuit) proxy.

A.2. Use of DHCPv4

The Plege MAY obtain an IP address via DHCP [<u>RFC2131</u>]. The DHCP provided parameters for the Domain Name System can be used to perform DNS operations if all local discovery attempts fail.

Appendix B. mDNS / DNSSD proxy discovery options

Pledge discovery of the proxy (<u>Section 4.1</u>) MAY be performed with DNS-based Service Discovery [<u>RFC6763</u>] over Multicast DNS [<u>RFC6762</u>] to discover the proxy at "_brski-proxy._tcp.local.".

Proxy discovery of the registrar (<u>Section 4.3</u>) MAY be performed with DNS-based Service Discovery over Multicast DNS to discover registrars by searching for the service "_brski-registrar._tcp.local.".

To prevent unaccceptable levels of network traffic, when using mDNS, the congestion avoidance mechanisms specified in <u>[RFC6762] section 7</u> MUST be followed. The pledge SHOULD listen for an unsolicited broadcast response as described in <u>[RFC6762]</u>. This allows devices to

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avoid announcing their presence via mDNS broadcasts and instead silently join a network by watching for periodic unsolicited broadcast responses.

Discovery of registrar MAY also be performed with DNS-based service discovery by searching for the service "_brskiregistrar._tcp.example.com". In this case the domain "example.com" is discovered as described in [RFC6763] section 11 (Appendix A.2 suggests the use of DHCP parameters).

If no local proxy or registrar service is located using the GRASP mechanisms or the above mentioned DNS-based Service Discovery methods the pledge MAY contact a well known manufacturer provided bootstrapping server by performing a DNS lookup using a well known URI such as "brski-registrar.manufacturer.example.com". The details of the URI are manufacturer specific. Manufacturers that leverage this method on the pledge are responsible for providing the registrar service. Also see Section 2.7.

The current DNS services returned during each query are maintained until bootstrapping is completed. If bootstrapping fails and the pledge returns to the Discovery state, it picks up where it left off and continues attempting bootstrapping. For example, if the first Multicast DNS _bootstrapks._tcp.local response doesn't work then the second and third responses are tried. If these fail the pledge moves on to normal DNS-based Service Discovery.

<u>Appendix C</u>. MUD Extension

The following extension augments the MUD model to include a single node, as described in $[\underline{I-D.ietf-opsawg-mud}]$ section 3.6, using the following sample module that has the following tree structure:

module: ietf-mud-brski-masa
augment /ietf-mud:mud:
+--rw masa-server? inet:uri

The model is defined as follows:

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```
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-mud-extension@2018-02-14.yang"
module ietf-mud-brski-masa {
 yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-mud-brski-masa";
  prefix ietf-mud-brski-masa;
  import ietf-mud {
    prefix ietf-mud;
  }
  import ietf-inet-types {
    prefix inet;
  }
  organization
    "IETF ANIMA (Autonomic Networking Integrated Model and
    Approach) Working Group";
    contact
    "WG Web: <a href="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/anima/">http://tools.ietf.org/wg/anima/</a>
    WG List: anima@ietf.org
    ";
  description
    "BRSKI extension to a MUD file to indicate the
    MASA URL.";
  revision 2018-02-14 {
    description
    "Initial revision.";
    reference
    "RFC XXXX: Manufacturer Usage Description
    Specification";
 }
  augment "/ietf-mud:mud" {
    description
    "BRSKI extension to a MUD file to indicate the
    MASA URL.";
    leaf masa-server {
      type inet:uri;
      description
      "This value is the URI of the MASA server";
    }
 }
}
<CODE ENDS>
```

The MUD extensions string "masa" is defined, and MUST be included in the extensions array of the mud container of a MUD file when this extension is used.

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<u>Appendix D</u>. Example Vouchers

Three entities are involved in a voucher: the MASA issues (signs) it, the registrar's public key is mentioned in the voucher, and the pledge validates it. In order to provide reproduceable examples the public and private keys for an example MASA and registrar are first listed.

D.1. Keys involved

The Manufacturer has a Certificate Authority that signs the pledge's IDevID. In addition the Manufacturer's signing authority (the MASA) signs the vouchers, and that certificate must distributed to the devices at manufacturing time so that vouchers can be validated.

D.1.1. MASA key pair for voucher signatures

This private key signs vouchers:

```
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
```

MIGkAgEBBDAgiRoYqKoEcfOfvRvmZ5P5Azn58tuI7nSnIy70gFnCeiNo+BmbgMho r6lcU60gwVagBwYFK4EEACKhZANiAATZAH3Rb2FvIJOnts+vXuWW35ofyNbCHzjA z0i2kWZFE1ByurKImNcNMFGirGnRXIXGqWCfw5ICgJ8CuM3vV5ty9bf7KUl0kejz Tvv+5PV++elkP9HQ83vqTAws2WwWTxI=

-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----

This public key validates vouchers:

----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----

MIIBzzCCAVagAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjBNMRIWEAYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYC Y2ExGTAXBgoJkiaJk/IsZAEZFglzYW5kZWxtYW4xHDAaBgNVBAMME1Vuc3RydW5n IEhpZ2h3YXkgQ0EwHhcNMTcwMzI2MTYxOTQwWhcNMTkwMzI2MTYxOTQwWjBHMRIW EAYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYCY2ExGTAXBgoJkiaJk/IsZAEZFglzYW5kZWxtYW4xFjAU BgNVBAMMDVVuc3RydW5nIE1BU0EwdjAQBgcqhkjOPQIBBgUrgQQAIgNiAATZAH3R b2FvIJOnts+vXuWW35ofyNbCHzjAzOi2kWZFE1ByurKImNcNMFGirGnRXIXGqWCf w5ICgJ8CuM3vV5ty9bf7KU10kejzTvv+5PV++elkP9HQ83vqTAws2WwWTxKjEDAO MAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDZwAwZAIwGb0oyM0doP6t3/LSPL50 DuatEwMYh7WGO+IYTHC8K7EyHBOmCYReKT2+GhV/CLWzAjBNy6UMJTt1tsxJsJqd MPUIFj+4wZg1AOIb/JoA6M7r33pwLQTrHRxEzVMGfWOkYUw= -----END CERTIFICATE-----

D.1.2. Manufacturer key pair for IDevID signatures

This private key signs IDevID certificates:

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----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----

MIGkAgEBBDAgiRoYqKoEcf0fvRvmZ5P5Azn58tuI7nSnIy70gFnCeiNo+BmbgMho r6lcU60gwVagBwYFK4EEACKhZANiAATZAH3Rb2FvIJOnts+vXuWW35ofyNbCHzjA z0i2kWZFE1ByurKImNcNMFGirGnRXIXGqWCfw5ICqJ8CuM3vV5ty9bf7KUl0kejz Tvv+5PV++elkP9HQ83vqTAws2WwWTxI=

-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----

This public key validates IDevID certificates:

----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----

MIIBzzCCAVagAwIBAgIBATAKBggqhkj0PQQDAjBNMRIwEAYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYC Y2ExGTAXBgoJkiaJk/IsZAEZFglzYW5kZWxtYW4xHDAaBgNVBAMME1Vuc3RydW5n IEhpZ2h3YXkgQ0EwHhcNMTcwMzI2MTYxOTQwWhcNMTkwMzI2MTYxOTQwWjBHMRIw EAYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYCY2ExGTAXBgoJkiaJk/IsZAEZFglzYW5kZWxtYW4xFjAU BgNVBAMMDVVuc3RydW5nIE1BU0EwdjAQBgcqhkj0PQIBBgUrgQQAIgNiAATZAH3R b2FvIJOnts+vXuWW35ofyNbCHzjAz0i2kWZFE1ByurKImNcNMFGirGnRXIXGqWCf w5ICgJ8CuM3vV5ty9bf7KUl0kejzTvv+5PV++elkP9HQ83vqTAws2WwWTxKjEDA0 MAwGA1UdEwEB/wQCMAAwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDZwAwZAIwGb0oyM0doP6t3/LSPL50 DuatEwMYh7WG0+IYTHC8K7EyHB0mCYReKT2+GhV/CLWzAjBNy6UMJTt1tsxJsJqd MPUIFj+4wZg1A0Ib/JoA6M7r33pwLQTrHRxEzVMGfWOkYUw= ----END CERTIFICATE-----

D.1.3. Registrar key pair

The registrar key (or chain) is the representative of the domain owner. This key signs registrar voucher-requests:

```
----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
```

MHcCAQEEIF+obiToYYYeMifPsZvrjWJ0yFsCJwIFhpokmT/TULmXoAoGCCqGSM49 AwEHoUODOqAENWOOzcNMUjPONrtfeBc0DJLWfeMGqCFdIv6FUz4DifM1ujMBec/q 6W/P6boTmyTGdF0h/8HwKUerL5bpneK8sg== -----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----

The public key is indicated in a pledge voucher-request to show proximity.

----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----

MIIBrjCCATOgAwIBAgIBAzAKBggqhkjOPQQDAzBOMRIwEAYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYC Y2ExGTAXBgoJkiaJk/IsZAEZFglzYW5kZWxtYW4xHTAbBgNVBAMMFFVuc3RydW5n IEZvdW50YWluIENBMB4XDTE3MDkwNTAxMTI0NVoXDTE5MDkwNTAxMTI0NVowQzES MBAGCgmSJomT8ixkARkWAmNhMRkwFwYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYJc2FuZGVsbWFuMRIw EAYDVQQDDAlsb2NhbGhvc3QwWTATBgcqhkj0PQIBBggqhkj0PQMBBwNCAAQ1ZA7N w0xSM/Q2u194FzQMktZ94waAIV0i/oVTPq0J8zW6MwF5z+Dpb8/puh0bJMZ0U6H/ wfApR6svlumd4ryyow0wCzAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMAoGCCqGSM49BAMDA2kAMGYCMQC3 /iTQJ3evYYcqbXhbmzrp64t3QC6qjIeY2jkDx062nuNifVKtyaara3F30AIkKSEC MQDi29efbTLbdtDk3tecY/rD7V77XaJ6nYCmdDCR54TrSFNLgxvt1lyFM+0fYpYR c3o=

----END CERTIFICATE-----

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The registrar public certificate as decoded by openssl's x509 utility. Note that the registrar certificate is marked with the cmcRA extension. Certificate: Data: Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number: 3 (0x3) Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA384 Issuer: DC = ca, DC = sandelman, CN = Unstrung Fount ain CA Validity Not Before: Sep 5 01:12:45 2017 GMT Not After : Sep 5 01:12:45 2019 GMT Subject: DC = ca, DC = sandelman, CN = localhost Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey Public-Key: (256 bit) pub: 04:35:64:0e:cd:c3:4c:52:33:f4:36:bb:5f:7 8:17: 34:0c:92:d6:7d:e3:06:80:21:5d:22:fe:85:5 3:3e: 03:89:f3:35:ba:33:01:79:cf:e0:e9:6f:cf:e 9:ba: 13:9b:24:c6:74:53:a1:ff:c1:f0:29:47:ab:2 f:96: e9:9d:e2:bc:b2 ASN1 OID: prime256v1 NIST CURVE: P-256 X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Basic Constraints: CA: FALSE Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA384 30:66:02:31:00:b7:fe:24:d0:27:77:af:61:87:20:6d:78: 5b: 9b:3a:e9:eb:8b:77:40:2e:aa:8c:87:98:da:39:03:c7:4e: b6: 9e:e3:62:7d:52:ad:c9:a6:ab:6b:71:77:d0:02:24:29:21: 02: 31:00:e2:db:d7:9f:6d:32:db:76:d0:e4:de:d7:9c:63:fa: c3: ed:5e:fb:5d:a2:7a:9d:80:a6:74:30:91:e7:84:eb:48:53: 4b: 83:1b:ed:d6:5c:85:33:ed:1f:62:96:11:73:7a

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D.1.4. Pledge key pair

The pledge has an IDevID key pair built in at manufacturing time:

----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----

MHcCAQEEIL+ue8PQcN+M7LFBGPsompYwobI/rsoHnTb2a+0h0+8joAoGCCqGSM49 AwEHoUQDQgAEumBVaDlX87WyME8CJToyt9NWy6sYw0DTbjjJIn79pgr7ALa//Y8p r70WpK1SIaiUeeFw7e+lCzTp1Z+wJu14Bg== -----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----

The public key is used by the registrar to find the MASA. The MASA URL is in an extension described in <u>Section 2.3</u>. RFC-EDITOR: Note that these certificates are using a Private Enterprise Number for the not-yet-assigned by IANA MASA URL, and need to be replaced before AUTH48.

----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----

MIICMjCCAbegAwIBAgIBDDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjBNMRIWEAYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYC Y2ExGTAXBgoJkiaJk/IsZAEZFglzYW5kZWxtYW4xHDAaBgNVBAMME1Vuc3RydW5n IEhpZ2h3YXkgQ0EwIBcNMTcxMDEyMTM1MjUyWhgPMjk5OTEyMzEwMDAwMDBaMEsx EjAQBgoJkiaJk/IsZAEZFgJjYTEZMBcGCgmSJomT8ixkARkWCXNhbmRlbG1hbjEa MBgGA1UEAwwRMDAtRDAtRTUtRjItMDAtMDIwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMB BwNCAARJp5i0dU1aUnR2u8wMRwgkNupNbNM7m1n0mj+0KJZjcPIqID+trPjTSobt uIdpRPfGZ8hU/nIUveqwyoYI8BPb04GHMIGEMB0GA1UdDgQWBBQdMRZhthFQmzz6 E7YVXzkL7XZDKjAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMCsGA1UdEQQkMCKgIAYJKwYBBAGC71IBoBMM ETAwLUQwLUU1LUYyLTAwLTAyMCsGCSsGAQQBgu5SAgQeDBxodHRwczovL2hpZ2h3 YXkuc2FuZGVsbWFuLmNhMA0GCCqGSM49BAMCA2kAMGYCMQDhJ1N+eanW1U/e5qoM SGvUvWHR7uic8cJbh7vXy580nBs8bpNn60k/+IzvEUetMzICMQCr1uxvdYeKq7mb RXCR4ZCJsw67fJ7jyXZbCUSir+3wBT2+1WggzPDRgYB5ABb7sAw= -----END CERTIFICATE-----

The pledge public certificate as decoded by openssl's x509 utility so that the extensions can be seen. A second custom Extension is included to provided to contain the EUI48/EUI64 that the pledge will configure.

```
Certificate:

Data:

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number: 12 (0xc)

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

Issuer: DC = ca, DC = sandelman, CN = Unstrung Highw

ay CA

Validity

Not Before: Oct 12 13:52:52 2017 GMT

Not After : Dec 31 00:00:00 2999 GMT

Subject: DC = ca, DC = sandelman, CN = 00-D0-E5-F2-0

0-02
```

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BRSKI

Subject Public Key Info: Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey Public-Key: (256 bit) pub:
04:49:a7:98:b4:75:4d:5a:52:74:76:bb:cc:0
c:47:
08:24:36:ea:4d:6c:d3:3b:9b:59:f4:9a:3f:b
4:28:
96:63:70:f2:2a:20:3f:ad:ac:f8:d3:4a:86:e
d:b8: 87:69:44:f7:c6:67:c8:54:fe:72:14:bd:ea:b
0:ca:
86:08:f0:13:db
ASN1 OID: prime256v1
NIST CURVE: P-256
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
1D:31:16:61:B6:11:50:9B:3C:FA:13:B6:15:5F:39
:0B:ED:76:43:2A
X509v3 Basic Constraints:
CA: FALSE
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
othername: <unsupported></unsupported>
1.3.6.1.4.1.46930.2:
https://highway.sandelman.ca
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
30:66:02:31:00:e1:27:53:7e:79:a9:d6:d5:4f:de:e6:aa:
0c:
48:6b:d4:bd:61:d1:ee:e8:9c:f1:c2:5b:87:bb:d7:cb:9f:
34:
9c:1b:3c:6e:93:67:eb:49:3f:f8:8c:ef:11:47:ad:33:32:
02:
31:00:ab:d6:ec:6f:75:87:8a:ab:b9:9b:45:70:91:e1:90:
89:
b3:0e:bb:7c:9e:e3:c9:76:5b:09:44:a2:af:ed:f0:05:3d:
be:
95:68:20:cc:f0:d1:81:80:79:00:16:fb:b0:0c

D.2. Example process

RFC-EDITOR: these examples will need to be replaced with CMS versions once IANA has assigned the eContentType in [<u>RFC8366</u>].

D.2.1. Pledge to Registrar

As described in <u>Section 5.2</u>, the pledge will sign a pledge voucherrequest containing the registrar's public key in the proximity-

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registrar-cert field. The base64 has been wrapped at 60 characters for presentation reasons.

MIIHHAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIHDTCCBwkCAQExDzANBglghkgBZQMEAgEFADCC Aw4GCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCCAv8EggL7eyJpZXRmLXZvdWNoZXItcmVxdWVzdDp2 b3VjaGVyIjp7ImFzc2VydGlvbiI6InByb3hpbWl0eSIsImNyZWF0ZWQtb24i 0iIyMDE3LTA5LTAXIiwic2VyaWFsLW51bWJlciI6IjAwLUQwLUU1LUYyLTAw LTAyIiwibm9uY2Ui0iJEc3M50XNCcjNwTk1PQUN1LUxZWTd3IiwicHJveGlt aXR5LXJlZ2lzdHJhci1jZXJ0IjoiTUlJQnJqQ0NBVE9nQXdJQkFnSUJBekFL QmdncWhrak9QUVFEQXpCT01SSXdFQVlLQ1pJbWlaUHlMR1FCR1JZQ1kyRXhH VEFYQmdvSmtpYUprL0lzWkFFWkZnbHpZVzVrWld4dFlXNHhIVEFiQmd0VkJB TU1GR1Z1YzNSeWRXNW5JRVp2ZFc1MF1XbHVJRU5CTUI0WERURTNNRGt3T1RB eE1USTB0Vm9YRFRFNU1Ea3d0VEF4TVRJME5Wb3dRekVTTUJBR0NnbVNKb21U OG14a0FSa1dBbU5oTVJrd0Z3WUtDWkltaVpQeUxHUUJHU11KYzJGdVpHVnNi V0Z1TVJJd0VBWURWUVFEREFsc2IyTmhiR2h2YzNRd1dUQVRCZ2NxaGtqT1BR SUJCZ2dxaGtqT1BRTUJCd05DQUFRMVpBN053MHhTTS9RMnUx0TRGe1FNa3Ra OTR3YUFJVjBpL29WVFBnT0o4elc2TXdGNXorRHBi0C9wdWhPYkpNWjBVNkqv d2ZBcFI2c3ZsdW1kNHJ5eW93MHdDekFKQmd0VkhSTUVBakFBTUFvR0NDcUdT TTQ5QkFNREEya0FNR1lDTVFDMy9pVFFKM2V2WV1jZ2JYaGJtenJwNjR0M1FD NnFqSWVZMmprRHqwNjJudU5pZlZLdHlhYXJhM0YzMEFJa0tTRUNNUURpMjll ZmJUTGJkdERrM3RlY1kvckQ3Vjc3WGFKNm5ZQ21kRENSNTRUc1NGTkxneHZ0 MWx5Rk0rMGZZcF1SYzNvPSJ9faCCAjYwggIyMIIBt6ADAgECAgEMMAoGCCqG SM49BAMCME0xEjAQBgoJkiaJk/IsZAEZFgJjYTEZMBcGCgmSJomT8ixkARkW CXNhbmRlbG1hbjEcMBoGA1UEAwwTVW5zdHJ1bmcgSGlnaHdheSBDQTAgFw0x NzEwMTIxMzUyNTJaGA8yOTk5MTIzMTAwMDAwMFowSzESMBAGCgmSJomT8ixk ARkWAmNhMRkwFwYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYJc2FuZGVsbWFuMRowGAYDVQQDDBEw MC1EMC1FNS1GMi0wMC0wMjBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABEmn mLR1TVpSdHa7zAxHCCQ26k1s0zubWfSaP7QolmNw8iogP62s+NNKhu24h2lE 98ZnyFT+chS96rDKhgjwE9ujgYcwgYQwHQYDVR00BBYEFB0xFmG2EVCbPPoT thVf0QvtdkMqMAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwKwYDVR0RBCQwIqAqBqkrBqEEAYLuUqGq EwwRMDAtRDAtRTUtRjItMDAtMDIwKwYJKwYBBAGC71ICBB4MHGh0dHBz0i8v aGlnaHdheS5zYW5kZWxtYW4uY2EwCqYIKoZIzj0EAwIDaQAwZqIxA0EnU355 qdbVT97mqgxIa9S9YdHu6JzxwluHu9fLnzScGzxuk2frST/4j08RR60zMgIx AKvW7G91h4gruZtFcJHhkImzDrt8nuPJdlsJRKKv7fAFPb6VaCDM8NGBgHkA FvuwDDGCAaUwqqGhAqEBMFIwTTESMBAGCqmSJomT8ixkARkWAmNhMRkwFwYK CZImiZPyLGQBGRYJc2FuZGVsbWFuMRwwGqYDVQQDDBNVbnN0cnVuZyBIaWdo d2F5IENBAgEMMA0GCWCGSAF1AwQCAQUAoIHkMBgGCSgGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkg hkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTE3MTAxMjE3NTQzMFowLwYJKoZI hvcNAQkEMSIEIP59cuKVAPkK00lQIaIV/W1AsWKbmVmBd9wFSuD5yLafMHkG CSqGSIb3DQEJDzFsMGowCwYJYIZIAWUDBAEqMAsGCWCGSAF1AwQBFjALBg1g hkgBZQMEAQIwCgYIKoZIhvcNAwcwDgYIKoZIhvcNAwICAgCAMA0GCCqGSIb3 DQMCAgFAMAcGBSs0AwIHMA0GCCqGSIb3DQMCAgEoMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCBEYw RAIgYUy0NTdP+xTkm/Et69eI++S/2z3dQwPKOwdL0cDCSvACIAh3jJbybMnK cf7DKKnsn2G/006HeB/8imMT+hnA7CfN

file: examples/vr_00-D0-E5-F2-00-02.pkcs

The ASN1 decoding of the artifact:

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```
0:d=0 hl=4 l=1820 cons: SEQUENCE
    4:d=1 hl=2 l=
                    9 prim: OBJECT
                                              :pkcs7-signed
Data
  15:d=1 hl=4 l=1805 cons: cont [ 0 ]
  19:d=2 hl=4 l=1801 cons: SEQUENCE
  23:d=3 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER
                                              :01
   26:d=3 hl=2 l= 15 cons: SET
  28:d=4 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
  30:d=5 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                              :sha256
  41:d=5 hl=2 l=
                    0 prim: NULL
  43:d=3 hl=4 l= 782 cons: SEQUENCE
  47:d=4 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                              :pkcs7-data
  58:d=4 hl=4 l= 767 cons: cont [ 0 ]
                                             :{"ietf-vouch
  62:d=5 hl=4 l= 763 prim: OCTET STRING
er-request:voucher":{"assertion":"proximity","created-on":"2
017-09-01", "serial-number": "00-D0-E5-F2-00-02", "nonce": "Dss9
9sBr3pNMOACe-LYY7w", "proximity-registrar-cert": "MIIBrjCCATOg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"}}
  829:d=3 hl=4 l= 566 cons: cont [ 0 ]
  833:d=4 hl=4 l= 562 cons: SEQUENCE
  837:d=5 hl=4 l= 439 cons: SEQUENCE
  841:d=6 hl=2 l= 3 cons: cont [ 0 ]
  843:d=7 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER
                                              :02
  846:d=6 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER
                                              :0C
  849:d=6 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
  851:d=7 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT
                                             :ecdsa-with-S
HA256
  861:d=6 hl=2 l= 77 cons: SEQUENCE
  863:d=7 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET
  865:d=8 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE
  867:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT
                                              :domainCompon
ent
  879:d=9 hl=2 l= 2 prim: IA5STRING
                                              :ca
  883:d=7 hl=2 l= 25 cons: SET
  885:d=8 hl=2 l= 23 cons: SEQUENCE
  887:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT
                                              :domainCompon
ent
  899:d=9 hl=2 l=
                    9 prim: IA5STRING
                                              :sandelman
  910:d=7 hl=2 l= 28 cons: SET
```

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```
912:d=8 hl=2 l= 26 cons: SEQUENCE
  914:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT
                                             :commonName
 919:d=9 hl=2 l= 19 prim: UTF8STRING
                                             :Unstrung Hig
hway CA
 940:d=6 hl=2 l= 32 cons: SEQUENCE
  942:d=7 hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTCTIME
                                             :171012135252
Ζ
  957:d=7 hl=2 l= 15 prim: GENERALIZEDTIME :299912310000
007
  974:d=6 hl=2 l= 75 cons: SEQUENCE
  976:d=7 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET
  978:d=8 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE
 980:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT
                                             :domainCompon
ent
  992:d=9 hl=2 l= 2 prim: IA5STRING
                                             :ca
 996:d=7 hl=2 l= 25 cons: SET
  998:d=8 hl=2 l= 23 cons: SEQUENCE
1000:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT
                                             :domainCompon
ent
1012:d=9 hl=2 l= 9 prim: IA5STRING
                                             :sandelman
1023:d=7 hl=2 l= 26 cons: SET
1025:d=8 hl=2 l= 24 cons: SEQUENCE
1027:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT
                                             :commonName
1032:d=9 hl=2 l= 17 prim: UTF8STRING
                                             :00-D0-E5-F2-
00-02
1051:d=6 hl=2 l= 89 cons: SEQUENCE
1053:d=7 hl=2 l= 19 cons: SEQUENCE
1055:d=8 hl=2 l= 7 prim: OBJECT
                                             :id-ecPublicK
ey
1064:d=8 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT
                                             :prime256v1
1074:d=7 hl=2 l= 66 prim: BIT STRING
1142:d=6 hl=3 l= 135 cons: cont [ 3 ]
1145:d=7 hl=3 l= 132 cons: SEQUENCE
1148:d=8 hl=2 l= 29 cons: SEQUENCE
1150:d=9 hl=2 l=
                    3 prim: OBJECT
                                             :X509v3 Subje
ct Key Identifier
 1155:d=9 hl=2 l= 22 prim: OCTET STRING
                                             [HEX DUMP]:04
141D311661B611509B3CFA13B6155F390BED76432A
1179:d=8 hl=2 l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE
1181:d=9 hl=2 l=
                    3 prim: OBJECT
                                             :X509v3 Basic
Constraints
1186:d=9 hl=2 l= 2 prim: OCTET STRING
                                             [HEX DUMP]:30
00
1190:d=8 hl=2 l= 43 cons: SEQUENCE
 1192:d=9 hl=2 l=
                    3 prim: OBJECT
                                             :X509v3 Subje
ct Alternative Name
1197:d=9 hl=2 l= 36 prim: OCTET STRING
                                             [HEX DUMP]:30
22A02006092B0601040182EE5201A0130C1130302D44302D45352D46322D
```

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```
30302D3032
 1235:d=8 hl=2 l= 43 cons: SEQUENCE
1237:d=9 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                             :1.3.6.1.4.1.
46930.2
1248:d=9 hl=2 l= 30 prim: OCTET STRING
                                             [HEX DUMP]:0C
1C68747470733A2F2F686967687761792E73616E64656C6D616E2E6361
 1280:d=5 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
1282:d=6 hl=2 l=
                    8 prim: OBJECT
                                            :ecdsa-with-S
HA256
1292:d=5 hl=2 l= 105 prim: BIT STRING
1399:d=3 hl=4 l= 421 cons: SET
1403:d=4 hl=4 l= 417 cons: SEQUENCE
1407:d=5 hl=2 l=
                  1 prim: INTEGER
                                             :01
1410:d=5 hl=2 l= 82 cons: SEQUENCE
1412:d=6 hl=2 l= 77 cons: SEQUENCE
1414:d=7 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET
1416:d=8 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE
1418:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT
                                             :domainCompon
ent
1430:d=9 hl=2 l= 2 prim: IA5STRING
                                             :ca
1434:d=7 hl=2 l= 25 cons: SET
1436:d=8 hl=2 l= 23 cons: SEQUENCE
1438:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT
                                             :domainCompon
ent
 1450:d=9 hl=2 l= 9 prim: IA5STRING
                                             :sandelman
1461:d=7 hl=2 l= 28 cons: SET
1463:d=8 hl=2 l= 26 cons: SEQUENCE
1465:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT
                                             :commonName
1470:d=9 hl=2 l= 19 prim: UTF8STRING
                                             :Unstrung Hig
hway CA
 1491:d=6 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER
                                             :0C
1494:d=5 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
1496:d=6 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                             :sha256
1507:d=6 hl=2 l=
                    0 prim: NULL
1509:d=5 hl=3 l= 228 cons: cont [ 0 ]
1512:d=6 hl=2 l= 24 cons: SEQUENCE
 1514:d=7 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                             :contentType
 1525:d=7 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SET
1527:d=8 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                             :pkcs7-data
 1538:d=6 hl=2 l= 28 cons: SEQUENCE
 1540:d=7 hl=2 l=
                  9 prim: OBJECT
                                             :signingTime
 1551:d=7 hl=2 l= 15 cons: SET
1553:d=8 hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTCTIME
                                             :171012175430
Ζ
1568:d=6 hl=2 l= 47 cons: SEQUENCE
1570:d=7 hl=2 l=
                    9 prim: OBJECT
                                             :messageDiges
t
 1581:d=7 hl=2 l= 34 cons: SET
```

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```
1583:d=8 hl=2 l= 32 prim: OCTET STRING [HEX DUMP]:FE
7D72E29500F90A38E95021A215FD6D40B1629B99598177DC054AE0F9C8B6
9F
1617:d=6 hl=2 l= 121 cons: SEQUENCE
1619:d=7 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                        :S/MIME Capab
ilities
1630:d=7 hl=2 l= 108 cons: SET
1632:d=8 hl=2 l= 106 cons: SEQUENCE
1634:d=9 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
1636:d=10 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                           :aes-256-cbc
1647:d=9 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
1649:d=10 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                            :aes-192-cbc
1660:d=9 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
1662:d=10 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                           :aes-128-cbc
1673:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
1675:d=10 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT
                                            :des-ede3-cbc
1685:d=9 hl=2 l= 14 cons: SEQUENCE
1687:d=10 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT
                                            :rc2-cbc
1697:d=10 hl=2 l= 2 prim: INTEGER
                                            :80
1701:d=9 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
1703:d=10 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT
                                            :rc2-cbc
1713:d=10 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER
                                            :40
1716:d=9 hl=2 l= 7 cons: SEQUENCE
1718:d=10 hl=2 l= 5 prim: OBJECT
                                            :des-cbc
1725:d=9 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
1727:d=10 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT
                                            :rc2-cbc
1737:d=10 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER
                                            :28
1740:d=5 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
1742:d=6 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT
                                           :ecdsa-with-S
HA256
1752:d=5 hl=2 l= 70 prim: OCTET STRING
                                           [HEX DUMP]:30
```

440220614CB435374FFB14E49BF12DEBD788FBE4BFDB3DDD4303CA3B074B D1C0C24AF0022008778C96F26CC9CA71FEC328A9EC9F61BF3B4E87781FFC 8A6308FA19C0EC27CD

The JSON contained in the voucher request:

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{"ietf-voucher-request:voucher":{"assertion":"proximity","cr eated-on":"2017-09-01","serial-number":"00-D0-E5-F2-00-02"," nonce":"Dss99sBr3pNMOACe-LYY7w","proximity-registrar-cert":" MIIBrjCCAT0gAwIBAgIBAzAKBggqhkj0PQQDAzBOMRIwEAYKCZImiZPyLGQB GRYCY2ExGTAXBgoJkiaJk/IsZAEZFglzYW5kZWxtYW4xHTAbBgNVBAMMFFVu c3RydW5nIEZvdW50YWluIENBMB4XDTE3MDkwNTAxMTI0NVoXDTE5MDkwNTAx MTI0NVowQzESMBAGCgmSJomT8ixkARkWAmNhMRkwFwYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYJ c2FuZGVsbWFuMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlsb2NhbGhvc3QwWTATBgcqhkj0PQIBBggq hkj0PQMBBwNCAAQ1ZA7Nw0xSM/Q2u194FzQMktZ94waAIV0i/oVTPg0J8zW6 MwF5z+Dpb8/puh0bJMZ0U6H/wfApR6svlumd4ryyow0wCzAJBgNVHRMEAjAA MAoGCCqGSM49BAMDA2kAMGYCMQC3/iTQJ3evYYcgbXhbmzrp64t3QC6qjIeY 2jkDx062nuNifVKtyaara3F30AIkKSECMQDi29efbTLbdtDk3tecY/rD7V77 XaJ6nYCmdDCR54TrSFNLgxvt1lyFM+0fYpYRc3o="}}

D.2.2. Registrar to MASA

As described in <u>Section 5.5</u> the registrar will sign a registrar voucher-request, and will include pledge's voucher request in the prior-signed-voucher-request.

MIIN2gYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIINyzCCDccCAQExDzANBglghkgBZQMEAgEFADCC Ck4GCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCCCj8Eqqo7eyJpZXRmLXZvdWNoZXItcmVxdWVzdDp2 b3VjaGVyIjp7ImFzc2VydGlvbiI6InByb3hpbWl0eSIsImNyZWF0ZWQtb24i OiIyMDE3LTA5LTE1VDAwOjAwOjAwLjAwMFoiLCJzZXJpYWwtbnVtYmVyIjoi SkFEQTEyMzQ1Njc40SIsIm5vbmNlIjoiYWJjZDEyMzQiLCJwcmlvci1zaWdu ZWQtdm91Y2hlci1yZXF1ZXN0IjoiTUlJSEhRWUpLb1pJaHZjTkFRY0NvSUlI RGpDQ0J3b0NBUUV4RHpBTkJnbGdoa2dCW1FNRUFnRUZBRENDQXc0R0NTcUdT SWIZRFFFSEFhQ0NBdjhFZ2dMN2V5SnBaWFJtTFhadmRXTm9aWE10Y21WeGRX VnpkRHAyYjNWamFHVnlJanA3SW1GemMyVnlkR2x2YmlJNkluQnliM2hwYlds MGVTSXNJbU55WldGMFpXUXRiMjRpT2lJeU1ERTNMVEE1TFRBeElpd2ljMlZ5 YVdGc0xXNTFiV0psY2lJNklqQXdMVVF3TFVVMUxVWXlMVEF3TFRBeUlpd2li bTl1WTJVaU9pSkVjM001T1h002NgTndUazF0UVV0bExVeFpXVG0zSWl3aWNI SnZlR2x0YVhSNUxYSmxaMmx6ZEhKaGNpMWpaWEowSWpvaVRVbEpRbkpxUTB0 Q1ZFOW5RWGRKUWtGb1NVSkJ1a0ZMUW1kbmNXaHJhaz1RVVZGRVFYcENUMDFT U1hkRlFWbExRMXBKYldsYVVIbE1SMUZDUjFKWlExa3lSWGhIVkVGWVFtZHZT bXRwWVVwckwwbHpXa0ZGV2tabmJIcFpWelZyV2xkNGRGbFhOSGhJVkVGaVFt ZE9Wa0pCVFUxR1JsWjFZek5TZVdSWE5XNUpSVnAyWkZjMU1GbFhiSFZKUlU1 Q1RVSTBXRVJVU1R0T1JHdDNUbFJCZUUxVVNUQk9WbT1ZUkZSRk5VMUVhM2RP VkVGNFRWUkpNRTVXYjNkUmVrVlRUVUpCUjBObmJWTktiMjFVT0dsNGEwRlNh MWRCY1U1b1RWSnJkMFozV1V0RFdrbHRhVnBRZVV4SFVVSkhVbGxLWXpKR2RW cEhWbk5pVjBaMVRWSkpkMFZCV1VSV1VWRkVSRUZzYzJJeVRtaGlSMmgyWXp0 UmQxZFVRVlJDWjJ0eGFHdHFUMUJSU1VKQ1oyZHhhR3RxVDFCUlRVSkNkMDVE UVVGUk1WcEJ0MDUzTUhoVFRT0VJNb1V4T1RSR2VsRk5hM1JhT1RSM11VRkpW akJwTDI5V1ZGQm5UMG80ZWxjMlRYZEdOWG9yUkhCaU9D0XdkV2hQWWtwTldq QlZOa2d2ZDJaQmNGSTJjM1pzZFcxa05ISjVlVzkzTUhkRGVrRktRbWRPVmto U1RVVkJha0ZCVFVGdl1wTkRjVWRUVFRRNVFrRk5SRUV5YTBGT11xbERUVkZE TXk5cFZGRktNMlYyV1ZsaloySllhR0p0ZW5Kd05qUjBNMUZETm5GcVNXVlpN bXByUkhnd05qSnVkVTVwWmxaTGRIbGhZWEpoTTBZek1FRkphMHRUU1V0T1VV

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UnBNamxsWm1KVVRHSmtkRVJyTTNSbFkxa3Zja1EzVmpjM1dHRkt0bTVaUTIx a1JFT1N0VFJVY2x0R1RreG5lSFowTVd4NVJrMHJNR1paY0ZsU116TnZQU0o5 ZmFDQ0FqWXdnZ015TU1JQnQ2QURBZ0VDQWdFTU1Bb0dDQ3FHU0000UJBTUNN RTB4RWpBUUJnb0praWFKay9Jc1pBRVpGZ0pqWVRFWk1CY0dDZ21TSm9tVDhp eGtBUmtXQ1hOaGJtUmxiRzFoYmpFY01Cb0dBMVVFQXd3VFZXNXpkSEoxYm1j Z1NHbG5hSGRoZVNCRFFUQWdGdzB4TnpFd01USXhNelV5TlRKYUdB0HlPVGs1 TVRJek1UQXdNREF3TUZvd1N6RVNNQkFHQ2dtU0pvbVQ4aXhrQVJrV0FtTmhN Umt3RndZS0NaSW1pW1B5TEdRQkdSWUpjMkZ1WkdWc2JXRnVNUm93R0FZRFZR UUREQkV3TUMxRU1DMUZ0UzFHTWkwd01DMHdNakJaTUJNR0J5cUdTTTQ5QWdF R0NDcUdTTTQ5QXdFSEEwSUFCRW1ubUxSMVRwcFNkSGE3ekF4SENDUTI2azFz MHp1YldmU2FQN1FvbG10dzhpb2dQNjJzK050S2h1MjRoMmxF0ThabnlGVCtj aFM5NnJES2hnandF0XVqZ1ljd2dZUXdIUVlEVlIwT0JCWUVGQjB4Rm1HMkVW Q2JQUG9UdGhWZk9RdnRka01xTUFrR0ExVWRFd1FDTUFBd0t3WURWUjBSQkNR d01xQWdCZ2tyQmdFRUFZTHVVZ0dnRXd3Uk1EQXRSREF0U1RVdFJqSXRNREF0 TURJd0t3WUpLd1lCQkFHQzdsSUNCQjRNSEdoMGRIQnpPaTh2YUdsbmFIZGhl UzV6WVc1a1pXeHRZVzR1WTJFd0NnWUlLb1pJemowRUF3SURhUUF3WmdJeEFP RW5VMzU1cWRiVlQ5N21xZ3hJYT1T0VlkSHU2Snp4d2x1SHU5ZkxuelNjR3p4 dWsyZnJTVC80ak84UlI2MHpNZ0l4QUt2VzdH0TFoNHFydVp0RmNKSGhrSW16 RHJ00G51UEpkbHNKUktLdjdmQUZQYjZWYUNETThOR0JnSGtBRnZ1d0RER0NB YV13Z2dHaUFnRUJNRk13VFRFU01CQUdDZ21TSm9tVDhpeGtBUmtXQW10aE1S a3dGd1lLQ1pJbWlaUH1MR1FCR1JZSmMyRnVaR1ZzYldGdU1Sd3dHZ11EV1FR RERCT1Zibk4wY25WdVp5Qk1hV2RvZDJGNU1FTkJBZ0VNTUEwR0NXQ0dTQUZs OXdRO0FRVUFvSUhrTUJnR0NTcUdTSWIzRFFFSkF6RUxCZ2txaGtpRzl3MEJC d0V3SEFZSktvWklodmN0QVFrRk1R0FhEVEUzTVRBeE1qRXp0VGd5TTFvd0x3 WUpLb1pJaHZjTkFRa0VNU01FSVA10WN1S1ZBUGtLT09sUU1hSVYvVzFBc1dL Ym1WbUJkOXdGU3VENX1MYWZNSGtHQ1NxR1NJYjNEUUVKRHpGc01Hb3dDd11K WU1aSUFXVURCQUVxTUFzR0NXQ0dTQUZsQXdRQkZqQUxCZ2xnaGtnQ1pRTUVB UU13Q2dZSUtvWklodmN0QXdjd0RnWU1Lb1pJaHZjTkF3SUNBZ0NBTUEwR0ND cUdTSWIzRFFNQ0FnRkFNQWNHQ1NzT0F3SUhNQTBHQ0NxR1NJYjNEUU1DQWdF b01Bb0dDQ3FHU0000UJBTUNCRWN3U1FJZ0VNZzFkSkw3RmNkdHJWRHg4cUNh em910SsyMk56NFp3UkI5Z0FUR0w3TU1DSVFEanNzVWxaekpxcDIva0NkNFdo eFVoc2FDcFRGd1Bybk5ldzV302tZVUY4UT09In19oIIBsjCCAa4wqqEzoAMC AQICAQMwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwMwTjESMBAGCgmSJomT8ixkARkWAmNhMRkwFwYK CZImiZPyLGQBGRYJc2FuZGVsbWFuMR0wGwYDVQQDDBRVbnN0cnVuZyBGb3Vu dGFpbiBDQTAeFw0xNzA5MDUwMTEyNDVaFw0x0TA5MDUwMTEyNDVaMEMxEjAQ BgoJkiaJk/IsZAEZFgJjYTEZMBcGCgmSJomT8ixkARkWCXNhbmRlbG1hbjES MBAGA1UEAwwJbG9jYWxob3N0MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE NWQOzcNMUjPONrtfeBc0DJLWfeMGgCFdIv6FUz4DifM1ujMBec/g6W/P6boT myTGdF0h/8HwKUerL5bpneK8sqMNMAswCQYDVR0TBAIwADAKBgqqhkj0PQQD AwNpADBmAjEAt/4k0Cd3r2GHIG14W5s66euLd0AugoyHmNo5A8d0tp7jYn1S rcmmq2txd9ACJCkhAjEA4tvXn20y23bQ5N7XnGP6w+1e+12iep2ApnQwkeeE 60hTS4Mb7dZchTPtH2KWEXN6MYIBpzCCAaMCAQEwUzB0MRIwEAYKCZImiZPy LGQBGRYCY2ExGTAXBgoJkiaJk/IsZAEZFglzYW5kZWxtYW4xHTAbBgNVBAMM FFVuc3RydW5nIEZvdW50YW1uIENBAgEDMA0GCWCGSAF1AwQCAQUAoIHkMBgG CSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBgkqhkiG9w0BBwEwHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTE3MTAy NjAxMzYxOFowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEIEQBM73PZzPo7tE9Mj8qQvaaYeMQ OsxlACaW/HenAqNwMHkGCSqGSIb3DQEJDzFsMGowCwYJYIZIAWUDBAEqMAsG CWCGSAF1AwQBFjALBg1ghkgBZQMEAQIwCgYIKoZIhvcNAwcwDgYIKoZIhvcN

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AwICAgCAMA0GCCqGSIb3DQMCAgFAMAcGBSs0AwIHMA0GCCqGSIb3DQMCAgEo MAoGCCqGSM49BAMCBEcwRQIgDdp5uPUlMKp7GFQAD7ypAgqFv8q+KkJt6c30 7iVpVI8CIQCD1u8BkxipvigwvIDmWfjlYdJxcvozNjffq5j3UHg7Rg==

```
file: examples/parboiled_vr_00-D0-E5-F2-00-02.pkcs
```

The ASN1 decoding of the artifact:

0:d=0	hl=4 l=354	6 cons:	SEQUENCE	
4:d=1	hl=2 l=	9 prim:	OBJECT	:pkcs7-signed
Data				
15:d=1	hl=4 l=353	1 cons:	cont [0]	
19:d=2	hl=4 l=352	7 cons:	SEQUENCE	
23:d=3	hl=2 l=	1 prim:	INTEGER	:01
26:d=3	hl=2 l= 1	5 cons:	SET	
28:d=4	hl=2 l= 1	3 cons:	SEQUENCE	
30:d=5	hl=2 l=	9 prim:	OBJECT	:sha256
41:d=5	hl=2 l=	⊙ prim:	NULL	
43:d=3	hl=4 l=263	8 cons:	SEQUENCE	
47:d=4	hl=2 l=	9 prim:	OBJECT	:pkcs7-data
58:d=4	hl=4 l=262	3 cons:	cont [0]	
62:d=5	hl=4 l=261	9 prim:	OCTET STRING	:{"ietf-vouch

er-request:voucher":{"assertion":"proximity","created-on":"2 017-09-15T00:00:00.000Z", "serial-number": "JADA123456789", "no nce":"abcd1234","prior-signed-voucher-request":"MIIHHQYJKoZI hvcNAQcCoIIHDjCCBwoCAQExDzANBglghkgBZQMEAgEFADCCAw4GCSqGSIb3 DQEHAaCCAv8EggL7eyJpZXRmLXZvdWNoZXItcmVxdWVzdDp2b3VjaGVyIjp7 ImFzc2VydGlvbiI6InByb3hpbWl0eSIsImNyZWF0ZWQtb24i0iIyMDE3LTA5 LTAXIiwic2VyaWFsLW51bWJlciI6IjAwLUQwLUU1LUYyLTAwLTAyIiwibm9u Y2Ui0iJEc3M50XNCcjNwTk1PQUN1LUxZWTd3IiwicHJveGltaXR5LXJ1Z21z dHJhci1jZXJ0IjoiTUlJQnJqQ0NBVE9nQXdJQkFnSUJBekFLQmdncWhrak9Q UVFEQXpCT01SSXdFQV1LQ1pJbW1aUH1MR1FCR1JZQ1kyRXhHVEFYQmdvSmtp YUprL0lzWkFFWkZnbHpZVzVrWld4dFlXNHhIVEFiQmd0VkJBTU1GRlZ1YzNS eWRXNW5JRVp2ZFc1MF1XbHVJRU5CTUI0WERURTNNRGt3T1RBeE1USTB0Vm9Y RFRFNU1Ea3d0VEF4TVRJME5Wb3dRekVTTUJBR0NnbVNKb21U0G14a0FSa1dB bU5oTVJrd0Z3WUtDWkltaVpQeUxHUUJHUllKYzJGdVpHVnNiV0Z1TVJJd0VB WURWUVFEREFsc2IyTmhiR2h2YzNRd1dUQVRCZ2NxaGtqT1BRSUJCZ2dxaGtq T1BRTUJCd05DQUFRMVpBN053MHhTTS9RMnUx0TRGe1FNa3Ra0TR3YUFJVjBp L29WVFBnT0o4elc2TXdGNXorRHBi0C9wdWhPYkpNWjBVNkgvd2ZBcFI2c3Zs dW1kNHJ5eW93MHdDekFKQmdOVkhSTUVBakFBTUFvR0NDcUdTTTQ5QkFNREEy a0FNR1lDTVFDMy9pVFFKM2V2WVljZ2JYaGJtenJwNjR0M1FDNnFqSWVZMmpr RHgwNjJudU5pZlZLdHlhYXJhM0YzMEFJa0tTRUNNUURpMjllZmJUTGJkdERr M3RlY1kvckQ3Vjc3WGFKNm5ZQ21kRENSNTRUc1NGTkxneHZ0MWx5Rk0rMGZZ cFlSYzNvPSJ9faCCAjYwggIyMIIBt6ADAgECAgEMMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCME0x EjAQBgoJkiaJk/IsZAEZFgJjYTEZMBcGCgmSJomT8ixkARkWCXNhbmRlbG1h bjEcMBoGA1UEAwwTVW5zdHJ1bmcgSG1naHdheSBDQTAgFw0xNzEwMTIxMzUy NTJaGA8y0Tk5MTIzMTAwMDAwMFowSzESMBAGCgmSJomT8ixkARkWAmNhMRkw FwYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYJc2FuZGVsbWFuMRowGAYDVQQDDBEwMC1EMC1FNS1G

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:190905011245

Mi0wMC0wMjBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABEmnmLR1TVpSdHa7 zAxHCCQ26k1s0zubWfSaP7QolmNw8iogP62s+NNKhu24h2lE98ZnyFT+chS9 6rDKhgjwE9ujgYcwgYQwHQYDVR00BBYEFB0xFmG2EVCbPPoTthVf0QvtdkMq MAkGA1UdEwQCMAAwKwYDVR0RBCQwIqAqBqkrBqEEAYLuUqGqEwwRMDAtRDAt RTUtRjItMDAtMDIwKwYJKwYBBAGC7lICBB4MHGh0dHBz0i8vaGlnaHdheS5z YW5kZWxtYW4uY2EwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDaQAwZgIxA0EnU355qdbVT97mqgxI a9S9YdHu6JzxwluHu9fLnzScGzxuk2frST/4j08RR60zMgIxAKvW7G91h4qr uZtFcJHhkImzDrt8nuPJdlsJRKKv7fAFPb6VaCDM8NGBgHkAFvuwDDGCAaYw ggGiAgEBMFIwTTESMBAGCgmSJomT8ixkARkWAmNhMRkwFwYKCZImiZPyLGQB GRYJc2FuZGVsbWFuMRwwGgYDVQQDDBNVbnN0cnVuZyBIaWdod2F5IENBAgEM MA0GCWCGSAF1AwQCAQUAoIHkMBqGCSqGSIb3DQEJAzELBqkqhkiG9w0BBwEw HAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTE3MTAxMjEzNTgyM1owLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIE IP59cuKVAPkK00lQIaIV/W1AsWKbmVmBd9wFSuD5yLafMHkGCSqGSIb3DQEJ DzFsMGowCwYJYIZIAWUDBAEqMAsGCWCGSAF1AwQBFjALBg1ghkgBZQMEAQIw CgYIKoZIhvcNAwcwDgYIKoZIhvcNAwICAgCAMA0GCCqGSIb3DQMCAgFAMAcG BSsOAwIHMA0GCCqGSIb3DQMCAgEoMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCBEcwRQIgEMg1dJL7 FcdtrVDx8qCazoe9+22Nz4ZwRB9gATGL7MMCIQDjssUlZzJqp2/kCd4WhxUh saCpTFwPrnNew5wCkYUF8Q=="}} 2685:d=3 hl=4 l= 434 cons: cont [0] 2689:d=4 hl=4 l= 430 cons: SEQUENCE 2693:d=5 hl=4 l= 307 cons: SEQUENCE 2697:d=6 hl=2 l= 3 cons: cont [0] 2699:d=7 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :02 2702:d=6 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :03 2705:d=6 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE :ecdsa-with-S 2707:d=7 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT HA384 2717:d=6 hl=2 l= 78 cons: SEOUENCE 2719:d=7 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET 2721:d=8 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE 2723:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT :domainCompon ent 2735:d=9 hl=2 l= 2 prim: IA5STRING :ca 2739:d=7 hl=2 l= 25 cons: SET 2741:d=8 hl=2 l= 23 cons: SEQUENCE 2743:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT :domainCompon ent 2755:d=9 hl=2 l= 9 prim: IA5STRING :sandelman 2766:d=7 hl=2 l= 29 cons: SET 2768:d=8 hl=2 l= 27 cons: SEQUENCE 2770:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT :commonName 2775:d=9 hl=2 l= 20 prim: UTF8STRING :Unstrung Fou ntain CA 2797:d=6 hl=2 l= 30 cons: SEQUENCE 2799:d=7 hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTCTIME :170905011245 Ζ

2814:d=7 hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTCTIME

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```
2829:d=6 h1=2 1= 67 cons: SEQUENCE
2831:d=7 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET
 2833:d=8 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE
2835:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT
                                             :domainCompon
ent
 2847:d=9 hl=2 l=
                    2 prim: IA5STRING
                                             :ca
2851:d=7 hl=2 l= 25 cons: SET
 2853:d=8 hl=2 l= 23 cons: SEQUENCE
 2855:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT
                                              :domainCompon
ent
 2867:d=9 hl=2 l=
                    9 prim: IA5STRING
                                             :sandelman
 2878:d=7 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET
2880:d=8 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE
 2882:d=9 hl=2 l=
                    3 prim: OBJECT
                                             :commonName
 2887:d=9 hl=2 l= 9 prim: UTF8STRING
                                             :localhost
 2898:d=6 h1=2 1= 89 cons: SEQUENCE
 2900:d=7 hl=2 l= 19 cons: SEQUENCE
2902:d=8 hl=2 l= 7 prim: OBJECT
                                             :id-ecPublicK
ey
2911:d=8 hl=2 l=
                  8 prim: OBJECT
                                             :prime256v1
2921:d=7 hl=2 l= 66 prim: BIT STRING
2989:d=6 hl=2 l= 13 cons: cont [ 3 ]
 2991:d=7 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
2993:d=8 hl=2 l= 9 cons: SEQUENCE
 2995:d=9 hl=2 l=
                    3 prim: OBJECT
                                             :X509v3 Basic
Constraints
 3000:d=9 hl=2 l= 2 prim: OCTET STRING
                                             [HEX DUMP]:30
00
 3004:d=5 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
 3006:d=6 hl=2 l=
                                             :ecdsa-with-S
                    8 prim: OBJECT
HA384
 3016:d=5 hl=2 l= 105 prim: BIT STRING
3123:d=3 hl=4 l= 423 cons: SET
 3127:d=4 hl=4 l= 419 cons: SEQUENCE
 3131:d=5 hl=2 l=
                    1 prim: INTEGER
                                              :01
3134:d=5 hl=2 l= 83 cons: SEQUENCE
 3136:d=6 hl=2 l= 78 cons: SEQUENCE
 3138:d=7 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET
 3140:d=8 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE
3142:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT
                                              :domainCompon
ent
 3154:d=9 hl=2 l=
                  2 prim: IA5STRING
                                              :ca
3158:d=7 hl=2 l= 25 cons: SET
3160:d=8 hl=2 l= 23 cons: SEQUENCE
3162:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT
                                             :domainCompon
ent
 3174:d=9 hl=2 l=
                    9 prim: IA5STRING
                                             :sandelman
 3185:d=7 hl=2 l= 29 cons: SET
```

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```
3187:d=8 hl=2 l= 27 cons: SEQUENCE
3189:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT
                                             :commonName
 3194:d=9 hl=2 l= 20 prim: UTF8STRING
                                             :Unstrung Fou
ntain CA
3216:d=6 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER
                                             :03
 3219:d=5 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
 3221:d=6 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                             :sha256
 3232:d=6 hl=2 l=
                    0 prim: NULL
3234:d=5 hl=3 l= 228 cons: cont [ 0 ]
 3237:d=6 hl=2 l= 24 cons: SEQUENCE
 3239:d=7 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                             :contentType
 3250:d=7 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SET
 3252:d=8 hl=2 l=
                  9 prim: OBJECT
                                             :pkcs7-data
3263:d=6 hl=2 l= 28 cons: SEQUENCE
3265:d=7 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                             :signingTime
 3276:d=7 hl=2 l= 15 cons: SET
3278:d=8 hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTCTIME
                                             :171026013618
Ζ
 3293:d=6 hl=2 l= 47 cons: SEQUENCE
 3295:d=7 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                             :messageDiges
t
3306:d=7 hl=2 l= 34 cons: SET
 3308:d=8 hl=2 l= 32 prim: OCTET STRING
                                             [HEX DUMP]:44
0133BDCF6733E8EED13D323F2042F69A61E3103ACC65002696FC77A702A3
70
 3342:d=6 hl=2 l= 121 cons: SEQUENCE
 3344:d=7 hl=2 l=
                    9 prim: OBJECT
                                            :S/MIME Capab
ilities
 3355:d=7 hl=2 l= 108 cons: SET
 3357:d=8 hl=2 l= 106 cons: SEQUENCE
 3359:d=9 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
3361:d=10 hl=2 l=
                  9 prim: OBJECT
                                             :aes-256-cbc
3372:d=9 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
 3374:d=10 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                             :aes-192-cbc
 3385:d=9 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
 3387:d=10 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                             :aes-128-cbc
 3398:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
 3400:d=10 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT
                                             :des-ede3-cbc
3410:d=9 hl=2 l= 14 cons: SEQUENCE
 3412:d=10 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT
                                             :rc2-cbc
 3422:d=10 hl=2 l= 2 prim: INTEGER
                                             :80
 3426:d=9 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
 3428:d=10 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT
                                             :rc2-cbc
 3438:d=10 hl=2 l=
                    1 prim: INTEGER
                                             :40
 3441:d=9 hl=2 l= 7 cons: SEQUENCE
 3443:d=10 hl=2 l= 5 prim: OBJECT
                                             :des-cbc
 3450:d=9 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
 3452:d=10 hl=2 l=
                    8 prim: OBJECT
                                             :rc2-cbc
```

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3462:d=10 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER :28 3465:d=5 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE 3467:d=6 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT :ecdsa-with-S HA256 3477:d=5 hl=2 l= 71 prim: OCTET STRING [HEX DUMP]:30 4502200DDA79B8F52530AA7B1854000FBCA9020A85BFCABE2A426DE9CDCE EE2569548F02210083D6EF019318A9BE2830BC80E659F8E561D27172FA33 3637DFAB98F750783B46

D.2.3. MASA to Registrar

The MASA will return a voucher to the registrar, to be relayed to the pledge.

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MIIG3AYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGzTCCBskCAQExDzANBglghkgBZQMEAgEFADCC AxAGCSqGSIb3DQEHAaCCAwEEggL9eyJpZXRmLXZvdWNoZXI6dm91Y2hlciI6 eyJhc3NlcnRpb24i0iJsb2dnZWQiLCJjcmVhdGVkLW9uIjoiMjAxNy0xMC0x MlQxMzo1NDozMS40MzktMDQ6MDAiLCJzZXJpYWwtbnVtYmVyIjoiMDAtRDAt RTUtRjItMDAtMDIiLCJub25jZSI6IkRzczk5c0JyM3B0TU9BQ2UtTFlZN3ci LCJwaW5uZWQtZG9tYWluLWNlcnQiOiJNSUlCcmpDQ0FUT2dBd0lCQWdJQkF6 QUtCZ2dxaGtqT1BRUURBekJPTVJJd0VBWUtDWkltaVpQeUxHUUJHUllDWTJF eEdUQVhCZ29Ka2lhSmsvSXNaQUVaRmdsellXNWtaV3h0WVc0eEhUQWJCZ05W QkFNTUZGVnVjM1J5ZFc1bklFWnZkVzUwWVdsdUlFTkJNQjRYRFRFM01Ea3d0 VEF4TVRJME5Wb1hEVEU1TURrd05UQXhNVEkwTlZvd1F6RVNNQkFHQ2dtU0pv bVQ4aXhrQVJrV0FtTmhNUmt3RndZS0NaSW1pWlB5TEdRQkdSWUpjMkZ1WkdW c2JXRnVNUk13RUFZRFZRUUREQWxzYjJ0aGJHaHZjM1F3V1RBVEJnY3Foa2pP UFFJQkJnZ3Foa2pPUFFNQkJ3TkNBQVExWkE3TncweFNNL1EydTE5NEZ6UU1r dFo5NHdhQU1WMGkvb1ZUUGdPSjh6VzZNd0Y1eitEcGI4L3B1aE9iSk1aMFU2 SC93ZkFwUjZzdmx1bWQ0cnl5b3cwd0N6QUpCZ05WSFJNRUFqQUFNQW9HQ0Nx R1NNNDlCQU1EQTJrQU1HWUNNUUMzL21UUUozZXZZWWNnYlhoYm16cnA2NHQz UUM2cWpJZVkyamtEeDA2Mm51TmlmVkt0eWFhcmEzRjMwQUlrS1NFQ01RRGky OWVmYlRMYmR0RGszdGVjWS9yRDdWNzdYYUo2bllDbWREQ1I1NFRyU0Z0TGd4 dnQxbHlGTSswZllwWVJjM289In19oIIB0zCCAc8wggFWoAMCAQICAQEwCgYI KoZIzj0EAwIwTTESMBAGCgmSJomT8ixkARkWAmNhMRkwFwYKCZImiZPyLGQB GRYJc2FuZGVsbWFuMRwwGgYDVQQDDBNVbnN0cnVuZyBIaWdod2F5IENBMB4X DTE3MDMyNjE2MTk0MFoXDTE5MDMyNjE2MTk0MFowRzESMBAGCgmSJomT8ixk ARkWAmNhMRkwFwYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYJc2FuZGVsbWFuMRYwFAYDVQQDDA1V bnN0cnVuZyBNQVNBMHYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIDYgAE2QB90W9hbyCT p7bPr17llt+aH8jWwh84wMzotpFmRRNQcrqyiJjXDTBRoqxp0VyFxqlgn80S AoCfArjN71ebcvW3+ylJTpHo8077/uT1fvnpZD/R0PN76kwMLN1sFk8SoxAw DjAMBgNVHRMBAf8EAjAAMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA2cAMGQCMBm9KMjNHaD+rd/y 0jy+Tq7mrRMDGIe1hjviGExwvCuxMhwTpqmEXik9vhoVfwi1swIwTculDCU7 dbbMSbCanTD1CBY/uMGYNQDiG/yaA0j06996cC0E6x0cRM1TBn1jpGFMMYIB xjCCAcICAQEwUjBNMRIwEAYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYCY2ExGTAXBgoJkiaJk/Is ZAEZFglzYW5kZWxtYW4xHDAaBgNVBAMME1Vuc3RydW5nIEhpZ2h3YXkgQ0EC AQEwDQYJYIZIAWUDBAIBBQCggeQwGAYJKoZIhvcNAQkDMQsGCSqGSIb3DQEH ATAcBgkqhkiG9w0BCQUxDxcNMTcxMDEyMTc1NDMxWjAvBgkqhkiG9w0BCQQx IgQgQXnG628cIW8MoYfB1ljDDlLlJQlxED2tnjcvkLEfix0weQYJKoZIhvcN AQkPMWwwajALBqlqhkqBZQMEASowCwYJYIZIAWUDBAEWMAsGCWCGSAF1AwQB AjAKBggqhkiG9w0DBzA0BggqhkiG9w0DAgICAIAwDQYIKoZIhvcNAwICAUAw BwYFKw4DAgcwDQYIKoZIhvcNAwICASgwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIEZzBlAjEAhzid /AkNjttpSP1rflNppdHsi324Z2+TXJxueewnJ8z/2NXb+Tf3DsThv7du000z AjBjyOnmkkSKHsPR2JluA5c6wovuPEnNKP32daGGeFKGEHMkTInbrqipC881 /5K9Q+k=

file: examples/voucher_00-D0-E5-F2-00-02.pkcs

The ASN1 decoding of the artifact:

0:d=0 hl=4 l=1756 cons: SEQUENCE 4:d=1 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT Data

:pkcs7-signed

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```
15:d=1 hl=4 l=1741 cons: cont [ 0 ]
19:d=2 hl=4 l=1737 cons: SEQUENCE
23:d=3 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER
                                          :01
26:d=3 hl=2 l= 15 cons: SET
28:d=4 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
30:d=5 hl=2 l=
                 9 prim: OBJECT
                                          :sha256
41:d=5 hl=2 l=
                 0 prim: NULL
43:d=3 hl=4 l= 784 cons: SEQUENCE
47:d=4 hl=2 l=
                 9 prim: OBJECT
                                          :pkcs7-data
58:d=4 hl=4 l= 769 cons: cont [ 0 ]
```

62:d=5 hl=4 l= 765 prim: OCTET STRING :{"ietf-vouch er:voucher":{"assertion":"logged", "created-on":"2017-10-12T1 3:54:31.439-04:00", "serial-number":"00-D0-E5-F2-00-02", "nonc e":"Dss99sBr3pNMOACe-LYY7w", "pinned-domain-cert":"MIIBrjCCAT OgAwIBAgIBAzAKBggqhkjOPQQDAzBOMRIwEAYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYCY2ExGT AXBgoJkiaJk/IsZAEZFglzYW5kZWxtYW4xHTAbBgNVBAMMFFVuc3RydW5nIE ZvdW50YWluIENBMB4XDTE3MDkwNTAxMTI0NVoXDTE5MDkwNTAxMTI0NVowQz ESMBAGCgmSJomT8ixkARkWAmNhMRkwFwYKCZImiZPyLGQBGRYJc2FuZGVsbW FuMRIwEAYDVQQDDAlsb2NhbGhvc3QwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBw NCAAQ1ZA7Nw0xSM/Q2u194FzQMktZ94waAIV0i/oVTPg0J8zW6MwF5z+Dpb8 /puhObJMZ0U6H/wfApR6svlumd4ryyow0wCzAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMAoGCCqGSM 49BAMDA2kAMGYCMQC3/iTQJ3evYYcgbXhbmzrp64t3QC6qjIeY2jkDx062nu NifVKtyaara3F30AIkKSECMQDi29efbTLbdtDk3tecY/rD7V77XaJ6nYCmdD CR54TrSFNLgxvt1lyFM+0fYpYRc3o="}}

```
831:d=3 hl=4 l= 467 cons: cont [ 0 ]
  835:d=4 hl=4 l= 463 cons: SEQUENCE
  839:d=5 hl=4 l= 342 cons: SEQUENCE
  843:d=6 hl=2 l=
                    3 cons: cont [ 0 ]
  845:d=7 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER
                                             :02
  848:d=6 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER
                                             :01
  851:d=6 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
  853:d=7 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT
                                             :ecdsa-with-S
HA256
  863:d=6 hl=2 l= 77 cons: SEQUENCE
  865:d=7 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET
  867:d=8 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE
  869:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT
                                             :domainCompon
ent
  881:d=9 hl=2 l= 2 prim: IA5STRING
                                             :ca
  885:d=7 hl=2 l= 25 cons: SET
  887:d=8 hl=2 l= 23 cons: SEQUENCE
  889:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT
                                             :domainCompon
ent
  901:d=9 hl=2 l=
                  9 prim: IA5STRING
                                             :sandelman
  912:d=7 hl=2 l= 28 cons: SET
 914:d=8 hl=2 l= 26 cons: SEQUENCE
  916:d=9 hl=2 l=
                    3 prim: OBJECT
                                             :commonName
  921:d=9 hl=2 l= 19 prim: UTF8STRING
                                             :Unstrung Hig
```

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```
hway CA
  942:d=6 hl=2 l= 30 cons: SEQUENCE
 944:d=7 hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTCTIME
                                            :170326161940
Ζ
 959:d=7 hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTCTIME
                                             :190326161940
Ζ
 974:d=6 hl=2 l= 71 cons: SEQUENCE
  976:d=7 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET
 978:d=8 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE
 980:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT
                                             :domainCompon
ent
  992:d=9 hl=2 l= 2 prim: IA5STRING
                                             :ca
  996:d=7 hl=2 l= 25 cons: SET
 998:d=8 hl=2 l= 23 cons: SEQUENCE
 1000:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT
                                             :domainCompon
ent
1012:d=9 hl=2 l= 9 prim: IA5STRING
                                             :sandelman
1023:d=7 hl=2 l= 22 cons: SET
1025:d=8 hl=2 l= 20 cons: SEQUENCE
 1027:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT
                                             :commonName
1032:d=9 hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTF8STRING
                                             :Unstrung MAS
А
1047:d=6 hl=2 l= 118 cons: SEQUENCE
 1049:d=7 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE
1051:d=8 hl=2 l= 7 prim: OBJECT
                                             :id-ecPublicK
ev
1060:d=8 hl=2 l= 5 prim: OBJECT
                                             :secp384r1
1067:d=7 hl=2 l= 98 prim: BIT STRING
1167:d=6 hl=2 l= 16 cons: cont [ 3 ]
 1169:d=7 hl=2 l= 14 cons: SEQUENCE
 1171:d=8 hl=2 l= 12 cons: SEQUENCE
                                             :X509v3 Basic
1173:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT
Constraints
1178:d=9 hl=2 l= 1 prim: BOOLEAN
                                             :255
1181:d=9 hl=2 l=
                    2 prim: OCTET STRING
                                             [HEX DUMP]:30
00
 1185:d=5 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
1187:d=6 hl=2 l=
                    8 prim: OBJECT
                                             :ecdsa-with-S
HA256
 1197:d=5 hl=2 l= 103 prim: BIT STRING
 1302:d=3 hl=4 l= 454 cons: SET
1306:d=4 hl=4 l= 450 cons: SEQUENCE
1310:d=5 hl=2 l=
                   1 prim: INTEGER
                                             :01
1313:d=5 hl=2 l= 82 cons: SEQUENCE
1315:d=6 hl=2 l= 77 cons: SEQUENCE
1317:d=7 hl=2 l= 18 cons: SET
 1319:d=8 hl=2 l= 16 cons: SEQUENCE
 1321:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT
                                             :domainCompon
```

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```
ent
1333:d=9 hl=2 l= 2 prim: IA5STRING
                                             :ca
1337:d=7 hl=2 l= 25 cons: SET
1339:d=8 hl=2 l= 23 cons: SEQUENCE
1341:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 prim: OBJECT
                                             :domainCompon
ent
1353:d=9 hl=2 l= 9 prim: IA5STRING
                                             :sandelman
1364:d=7 hl=2 l= 28 cons: SET
1366:d=8 hl=2 l= 26 cons: SEQUENCE
1368:d=9 hl=2 l= 3 prim: OBJECT
                                             :commonName
1373:d=9 hl=2 l= 19 prim: UTF8STRING
                                             :Unstrung Hig
hway CA
1394:d=6 hl=2 l= 1 prim: INTEGER
                                             :01
1397:d=5 hl=2 l= 13 cons: SEQUENCE
1399:d=6 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                             :sha256
1410:d=6 hl=2 l= 0 prim: NULL
1412:d=5 hl=3 l= 228 cons: cont [ 0 ]
1415:d=6 hl=2 l= 24 cons: SEQUENCE
1417:d=7 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                             :contentType
1428:d=7 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SET
1430:d=8 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                             :pkcs7-data
1441:d=6 hl=2 l= 28 cons: SEQUENCE
1443:d=7 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                             :signingTime
1454:d=7 hl=2 l= 15 cons: SET
1456:d=8 hl=2 l= 13 prim: UTCTIME
                                             :171012175431
Ζ
1471:d=6 hl=2 l= 47 cons: SEQUENCE
                                             :messageDiges
1473:d=7 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
t
1484:d=7 hl=2 l= 34 cons: SET
1486:d=8 hl=2 l= 32 prim: OCTET STRING
                                             [HEX DUMP]:41
79C6EB6F1C216F0CA187C1D658C30E52E5250971103DAD9E372F90B11F8B
1D
1520:d=6 hl=2 l= 121 cons: SEQUENCE
1522:d=7 hl=2 l=
                    9 prim: OBJECT
                                            :S/MIME Capab
ilities
1533:d=7 hl=2 l= 108 cons: SET
1535:d=8 hl=2 l= 106 cons: SEQUENCE
1537:d=9 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
1539:d=10 hl=2 l=
                    9 prim: OBJECT
                                             :aes-256-cbc
1550:d=9 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
1552:d=10 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                             :aes-192-cbc
1563:d=9 hl=2 l= 11 cons: SEQUENCE
1565:d=10 hl=2 l= 9 prim: OBJECT
                                             :aes-128-cbc
1576:d=9 hl=2 l= 10 cons: SEQUENCE
1578:d=10 hl=2 l= 8 prim: OBJECT
                                             :des-ede3-cbc
1588:d=9 hl=2 l= 14 cons: SEQUENCE
1590:d=10 hl=2 l=
                    8 prim: OBJECT
                                             :rc2-cbc
```

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1600:d=10 hl=2 l=	2 prim:	INTEGER	:80		
1604:d=9 hl=2 l=	13 cons:	SEQUENCE			
1606:d=10 hl=2 l=	8 prim:	OBJECT	:rc2-cbc		
1616:d=10 hl=2 l=	1 prim:	INTEGER	:40		
1619:d=9 hl=2 l=	7 cons:	SEQUENCE			
1621:d=10 hl=2 l=	5 prim:	OBJECT	:des-cbc		
1628:d=9 hl=2 l=	13 cons:	SEQUENCE			
1630:d=10 hl=2 l=	8 prim:	OBJECT	:rc2-cbc		
1640:d=10 hl=2 l=	1 prim:	INTEGER	:28		
1643:d=5 hl=2 l=	10 cons:	SEQUENCE			
1645:d=6 hl=2 l=	8 prim:	OBJECT	:ecdsa-with-S		
HA256					
1655:d=5 hl=2 l= 1	103 prim:	OCTET STRING	[HEX DUMP]:30		
6502310087389DFC090D8EDB6948FD6B7E5369A5D1EC8B7DB8676F935C9C					
6E79EC2727CCFFD8D5DBF937F70EC4E1BFB76ED343B3023063C8E9E69244					

6E79EC2727CCFFD8D5DBF937F70EC4E1BFB76ED343B3023063C8E9E69244 8A1EC3D1D8996E03973AC28BEE3C49CD28FDF675A1867852861073244C89 DBAEA8A90BCF35FF92BD43E9

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