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## **Constrained Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (cBRSKI)**

### **Abstract**

This document defines the Constrained Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (cBRSKI) protocol, which provides a solution for secure zero-touch onboarding of resource-constrained (IoT) devices into the network of a domain owner. This protocol is designed for constrained networks, which may have limited data throughput or may experience frequent packet loss. cBRSKI is a variant of the BRSKI protocol, which uses an artifact signed by the device manufacturer called the "voucher" which enables a new device and the owner's network to mutually authenticate. While the BRSKI voucher data is encoded in JSON, cBRSKI uses a compact CBOR-encoded voucher. The BRSKI voucher data definition is extended with new data types that allow for smaller voucher sizes. The Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) protocol, used in BRSKI, is replaced with EST-over-CoAPS; and HTTPS used in BRSKI is replaced with DTLS-secured CoAP (CoAPS). This document Updates RFC 8995 and RFC 9148.

### **About This Document**

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Status information for this document may be found at <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher/>.

Discussion of this document takes place on the anima Working Group mailing list (<mailto:anima@ietf.org>), which is archived at <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/anima/>. Subscribe at <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/anima/>.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at <https://github.com/anima-wg/constrained-voucher>.

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## 1. Introduction

Secure enrollment of new nodes into constrained networks with constrained nodes presents unique challenges. As explained in [\[RFC7228\]](#), such networks may have limited data throughput or may experience frequent packet loss. In addition, its nodes may be constrained by energy availability, memory space, and code size.

The Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI) protocol described in [\[RFC8995\]](#) provides a solution for secure zero-touch (automated) onboarding of new (unconfigured) devices. In it, these new devices are called "pledges", equipped with a factory-installed Initial Device Identifier (IDeVID) (see [\[ieee802-1AR\]](#)). Using the IDeVID the pledges are securely enrolled into a network.

The BRSKI solution described in [\[RFC8995\]](#) was designed to be modular, and this document describes a version scaled to the constraints of IoT deployments.

Therefore, this document uses the constrained voucher artifact and voucher request artifact defined in [\[RFC8366bis\]](#) and specifies a constrained version of the BRSKI protocol: cBRSKI. The cBRSKI protocol uses the CoAP-based version of EST (EST-coaps from [\[RFC9148\]](#)) rather than the EST over HTTPS [\[RFC7030\]](#). cBRSKI is itself scalable to multiple resource levels through the definition of optional functions. [Appendix E](#) illustrates this.

In BRSKI, the [\[RFC8366\]](#) voucher data is by default serialized to JSON with a signature in CMS [\[RFC5652\]](#). This document uses the new CBOR [\[RFC8949\]](#) voucher data serialization, as defined by [\[RFC8366bis\]](#), and applies a new COSE [\[RFC9052\]](#) signature format as defined in [Section 9](#).

This COSE-signed CBOR-encoded voucher is transported using both secured CoAP and HTTPS. The CoAP connection (between Pledge and Registrar) is to be protected by DTLS (CoAPS). The HTTP connection (between Registrar and MASA) is to be protected using TLS (HTTPS).

[Section 4](#) to [Section 10](#) define the default cBRSKI protocol, by means of additions to and modifications of regular BRSKI. [Section 11](#) considers some variations of the protocol, specific to particular deployments or IoT networking technologies. Next in [Section 12](#), some considerations for the design and implementation of cBRSKI components are provided.

[Section 13](#) introduces a variant of cBRSKI for the most-constrained Pledges: the use of Raw Public Keys (RPK). This variant achieves smaller sizes of data objects and avoids doing certain costly PKIX verification operations on the Pledge.

[Section 14](#) provides more details on how a Pledge may discover the various onboarding/enrollment options that a Registrar provides. Implementing these methods is optional for a Pledge.

## 2. Terminology

The following terms are defined in [[RFC8366bis](#)], and are used identically as in that document: artifact, domain, Join Registrar/Coordinator (JRC), malicious Registrar, Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA), Pledge, Registrar, Onboarding, Owner, Voucher Data and Voucher.

The following terms from [[RFC8995](#)] are used identically as in that document: Domain CA, enrollment, IDevID, Join Proxy, LDevID, manufacturer, nonced, nonceless, PKIX.

The following terms from [[RFC7030](#)] are used identically as in that document: Explicit Trust Anchor (TA), Explicit TA database, Third-party TA.

The term Pledge Voucher Request, or acronym PVR, is introduced to refer to the voucher request between the Pledge and the Registrar.

The term Registrar Voucher Request, or acronym RVR, is introduced to refer to the voucher request between the Registrar and the MASA.

This document uses the term "PKIX Certificate" to refer to the X.509v3 profile described in [[RFC5280](#)].

In code examples, the string "<CODE BEGINS>" denotes the start of a code example and "<CODE ENDS>" the end of the code example. The ellipsis ("...") in a CBOR diagnostic notation byte string denotes a further sequence of bytes that is not shown for brevity. This notation is defined in [[I-D.ietf-cbor-edn-literals](#)].

## 3. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [[RFC2119](#)] [[RFC8174](#)] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

## 4. Overview of Protocol

[[RFC8366bis](#)] defines a voucher that can assert proximity, authenticates the Registrar, and can offer varying levels of anti-replay protection. The proximity proof provided by a voucher is an assertion that the Pledge and the Registrar are believed to be close together, from a network topology point of view. Similar to BRSKI

[[RFC8995](#)], proximity is proven by making a DTLS connection between a Pledge and a Registrar. The Pledge initiates this connection using a link-local source address.

The secure DTLS connection is then used by the Pledge to make a Pledge Voucher Request (PVR). The Registrar then includes the PVR into its own Registrar Voucher Request (RVR), sent to an agent (MASA) of the Pledge's manufacturer. The MASA verifies the PVR and RVR and issues a signed voucher. The voucher provides an authorization statement from the manufacturer indicating that the Registrar is the intended owner of the Pledge. The voucher refers to the Registrar through pinning of the Registrar's identity.

After verification of the voucher, the Pledge enrolls into the Registrar's domain by obtaining a certificate using the EST-coaps [[RFC9148](#)] protocol, suitable for constrained devices. Once the Pledge has obtained its domain identity (LDevID) in this manner, it can use this identity to obtain network access credentials, to join the local IP network. The method to obtain such credentials depends on the particular network technology used and is outside the scope of this document.

This document does not make any extensions to the semantic meaning of vouchers, though a new signature method based on COSE [[RFC9052](#)] is defined to optimize for constrained devices and networks.

The two main parts of the BRSKI protocol are named separately in this document: BRSKI-EST ([Section 6](#)) for the protocol between Pledge and Registrar, and BRSKI-MASA ([Section 7](#)) for the protocol between the Registrar and the MASA.

Time-based vouchers are supported, but given that constrained devices are unlikely to have accurate time, their use will be uncommon. Most Pledges using constrained vouchers will be online during enrollment and will use live nonces to provide anti-replay protection rather than expiry times.

[[RFC8366bis](#)] defines the CBOR voucher data encoding for the constrained voucher and the constrained voucher request, which are used by cBRSKI.

The constrained voucher request MUST be signed by the Pledge. COSE [[RFC9052](#)] is used for signing as defined in [Section 9.2](#). It signs using the private key associated with its IDevID certificate.

The constrained voucher MUST be signed by the MASA. Also in this case, COSE is used for signing.

For the constrained voucher request (PVR) the default method for the Pledge to identify the Registrar is using the Registrar's full PKIX

certificate. But when operating PKIX-less as described in [Section 13](#), the Registrar's Raw Public Key (RPK) is used for this.

For the constrained voucher the default method to indicate ("pin") a trusted domain identity is the domain's PKIX CA certificate, but when operating PKIX-less instead the RPK of the Registrar is pinned.

For certificates, cBRSKI currently uses the X.509 format, like BRSKI. The protocol and data formats are defined such that future extension to other certificate formats is enabled. For example, CBOR-encoded and COSE-signed C509 certificates ([\[I-D.ietf-cose-cbor-encoded-cert\]](#)) may provide data size savings as well as code sharing benefits with CBOR/COSE libraries, when applied to cBRSKI.

The BRSKI architecture mandates that the MASA be aware of the capabilities of the Pledge. This is not a drawback as a Pledge is constructed by a manufacturer which also arranges for the MASA to be aware of the inventory of devices. The MASA therefore knows if the Pledge supports PKIX operations, or if it is limited to RPK operations only. Based upon this, the MASA can select which attributes to use in the voucher data for certain operations, like the pinning of the Registrar or domain identity.

## 5. Updates to RFC 8995 and RFC 9148

This section details the ways in which this document updates other RFCs. The terminology for Updates, Amends and Extends is taken from [\[I-D.kuehlewind-update-tag\]](#).

This document Updates [\[RFC8995\]](#). It Amends [\[RFC8995\]](#) because it:

- \*clarifies how pinning in vouchers is done ([Section 8](#)),
- \*adopts clearer explanation of the TLS Server Name Indicator (SNI) in [Section 6.1.4](#) and [Section 7.3](#),
- \*clarifies when new trust anchors should be retrieved by a Pledge ([Section 6.5.1](#)),
- \*clarifies what kinds of Extended Key Usage attributes are appropriate for each certificate ([Section 6.1.5](#), [Section 7.4](#)).

It Extends [\[RFC8995\]](#) as follows:

- \*defines the use of CoAP for the BRSKI protocol,
- \*makes some messages optional if the results can be inferred from other validations ([Section 6.5](#)),



\*extends the BRSKI-EST protocol ([Section 6](#), [Section 9.2](#)) to carry the new "application/voucher+cose" format.

\*extends the BRSKI-MASA protocol ([Section 7](#), [Section 9.2](#)) to carry the new "application/voucher+cose" format.

This document Updates [[RFC9148](#)]. It Amends [[RFC9148](#)] because it:

\*defines stricter DTLS requirements ([Section 6.1](#)),

\*details how an EST-coaps client handles certificate renewal and re-enrollment ([Section 6.5](#)),

\*details how an EST-coaps server processes a "CA certificates" request for content format 287 ("application/pkix-cert") ([Section 6.6](#)).

It Extends [[RFC9148](#)] as follows:

\*adds enrollment status telemetry to the certificate renewal procedure ([Section 6.5.4](#)),

\*adds a new media type for the CA certificates (/crts) resource ([Section 6.5.5](#)).

## 6. BRSKI-EST Protocol

This section describes the extensions to both BRSKI [[RFC8995](#)] and EST-coaps [[RFC9148](#)] protocol operations between Pledge and Registrar. The extensions are targeting low-resource networks with small packets, based on CoAP and DTLS.

### 6.1. DTLS Connection

A DTLS connection is established between the Pledge and the Registrar, similar to the TLS connection described in [Section 5.1](#) of [[RFC8995](#)]. This may occur via a Join Proxy as described in [Section 6.2](#). Regardless of the Join Proxy presence or particular mechanism used, the DTLS connection should operate identically. The cBRSKI and EST-coaps requests and responses for onboarding are carried over this DTLS connection.

#### 6.1.1. DTLS Version

DTLS version 1.3 [[RFC9147](#)] SHOULD be used in any implementation of this specification. An exception case where DTLS 1.2 [[RFC6347](#)] MAY be used is in a Pledge that uses a software platform where a DTLS 1.3 client is not available (yet). This may occur for example if a legacy device gets software-upgraded to support cBRSKI. For this reason, a Registrar MUST by default support both DTLS 1.3 and DTLS

1.2 client connections. However, for security reasons the Registrar MAY be administratively configured to support only a particular DTLS version or higher.

An EST-coaps server [[RFC9148](#)] (as a separate entity from above Registrar) that implements this specification also MUST support both DTLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.2 client connections by default. However, for security reasons the EST-coaps server MAY be administratively configured to support only a particular DTLS version or higher.

#### **6.1.2. TLS Client Certificates: IDevID authentication**

As described in [Section 5.1](#) of [[RFC8995](#)], the Pledge makes a connection to the Registrar using a TLS Client Certificate for authentication. This is the Pledge's IDevID certificate.

Subsequently the Pledge will send a Pledge Voucher Request (PVR). Further elements of Pledge authentication may be present in the PVR, as detailed in [Section 9.2](#).

#### **6.1.3. DTLS Handshake Fragmentation Considerations**

DTLS includes a mechanism to fragment handshake messages. This is described in [Section 4.4](#) of [[RFC9147](#)]. cBRSKI will often be used with a Join Proxy, described in [Section 6.2](#), which relays each DTLS message to the Registrar. A stateless Join Proxy will need some additional space to wrap each DTLS message inside a CoAP request, while the wrapped result needs to fit in the maximum IPv6 MTU guaranteed on 6LoWPAN networks, which is 1280 bytes.

For this reason it is RECOMMENDED that a PMTU of 1024 bytes be assumed for the DTLS handshake and appropriate DTLS fragmentation is used. It is unlikely that any Packet Too Big indications ([[RFC4443](#)]) will be relayed by the Join Proxy back to the Pledge.

During the operation of the EST-coaps protocol, the CoAP Block-wise transfer mechanism [[RFC7959](#)] will be automatically used when message sizes exceed the PMTU. A Pledge/EST-client on a constrained network MUST use the (D)TLS maximum fragment length extension ("max\_fragment\_length") defined in [Section 4](#) of [[RFC6066](#)] with the maximum fragment length set to a value of either  $2^9$  or  $2^{10}$ , when operating as a DTLS 1.2 client.

A Pledge/EST-client operating as DTLS 1.3 client, MUST use the (D)TLS record size limit extensions ("record\_size\_limit") defined in [Section 4](#) of [[RFC8449](#)], with RecordSizeLimit set to a value between 512 and 1024.

#### 6.1.4. Registrar and the Server Name Indicator (SNI)

The SNI issue described below affects [\[RFC8995\]](#) as well, and is reported in errata: <https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid6648>

As the Registrar is discovered by IP address, and typically connected via a Join Proxy, the name of the Registrar is not known to the Pledge. The Pledge will not know what the hostname for the Registrar is, so it cannot do DNS-ID validation ([\[RFC9525\]](#)) on the Registrar's certificate. Instead, it must do validation using the voucher.

As the Pledge does not know the name of the Registrar, the Pledge cannot put any reasonable value into the [\[RFC6066\]](#) Server Name Indicator (SNI). Therefore the Pledge SHOULD omit the SNI extension as per [Section 9.2](#) of [\[RFC8446\]](#).

In some cases, particularly while testing BRSKI, a Pledge may be given the hostname of a particular Registrar to connect to directly. Such a bypass of the discovery process may result in the Pledge taking a different code branch to establish a DTLS connection, and may result in the SNI being inserted by a library. The Registrar MUST ignore any SNI it receives from a Pledge.

A primary motivation for making the SNI ubiquitous in the public web is because it allows for multi-tenant hosting of HTTPS sites on a single (scarce) IPv4 address. This consideration does not apply to the server function in the Registrar because:

- \*it uses DTLS and CoAP, not HTTPS

- \*it typically uses IPv6, often [\[RFC4193\]](#) Unique Local Address, which are plentiful

- \*the server port number is typically discovered, so multiple tenants can be accommodated via unique port numbers.

#### 6.1.5. Registrar Server Certificate Requirements

As per [Section 3.6.1](#) of [\[RFC7030\]](#), the Registrar certificate MUST have the Extended Key Usage (EKU) id-kp-cmcRA. This certificate is also used as a TLS Server Certificate, so it MUST also have the EKU id-kp-serverAuth.

See [Appendix C.2.2](#) for an example of a Registrar certificate with these EKUs set. See [Section 6.1.5](#) for Registrar client certificate requirements.

## 6.2. cBRSKI Join Proxy

[[I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy](#)] specifies the details for a stateful and stateless constrained Join Proxy which is equivalent to the Proxy defined in [[RFC8995](#)], [Section 4](#). See also [Section 10](#) for more details on discovery of a Join Proxy by a Pledge, and discovery of a Registrar by a Join Proxy.

## 6.3. Request URIs, Resource Discovery and Content Formats

cBRSKI operates using CoAP over DTLS, with request URIs using the coaps scheme. The Pledge operates in CoAP client role. To keep the protocol messages small the EST-coaps and cBRSKI request URIs are shorter than the respective EST and BRSKI URIs.

During the BRSKI onboarding on an IPv6 network these request URIs have the following form:

```
coaps://[<link-local-ipv6>]:<port>/.well-known/brski/<short-name>
coaps://[<link-local-ipv6>]:<port>/.well-known/est/<short-name>
```

where <link-local-ipv6> is the discovered link-local IPv6 address of a Join Proxy, and <port> is the discovered port of the Join Proxy that is used to offer the BRSKI proxy functionality.

<short-name> is the short resource name for the cBRSKI and EST-coaps resources. For EST-coaps, [Section 5.1](#) of [[RFC9148](#)] defines the CoAP <short-name> resource names. For cBRSKI, this document defines the short resource names based on the [[RFC8995](#)] long HTTP resource names. See [Table 1](#) for a summary of these resource names.

[Section 11](#) details how the Pledge discovers a Join Proxy link-local address and port in different deployment scenarios.

The request URI formats defined above enable the Pledge to perform onboarding/enrollment without requiring to perform any discovery of the available onboarding options, voucher formats, BRSKI/EST resources, enrollment protocols, and so on. This is helpful for a majority of constrained Pledges that would support only a single set of options. However, for Pledges that do support multiple options, sending CoAP discovery queries to the Registrar is supported as defined in [Section 14](#).

Because a Pledge only has indirect access to the Registrar via a single port on the Join Proxy, the Registrar MUST host all BRSKI/EST-coaps resources on the same (UDP) server IP address and port. This is the address and port where a Join Proxy would relay DTLS records from the Pledge to.

Although the request URI templates include IP address, scheme and port, in practice the CoAP request sent over the secure DTLS connection only encodes the request URI. For example, a Pledge that skips resource discovery operations just sends the initial CoAP voucher request as follows:

```
REQ: POST /.well-known/brski/rv
      Content-Format: 836
      Payload       : (COSE-signed Pledge Voucher Request, PVR)
```

Note that only Content-Format 836 ("application/voucher+cose") is defined in this document for the payload sent to the voucher request resource (/rv). Content-Format 836 MUST be supported by the Registrar for the /rv resource and it MAY support additional formats. The Pledge MAY also indicate in the request the desired format of the (voucher) response, using the Accept Option. An example of using this option in the request is as follows:

```
REQ: POST /.well-known/brski/rv
      Content-Format: 836
      Accept       : 836
      Payload     : (COSE-signed Pledge Voucher Request, PVR)
```

If the Accept Option is omitted in the request, the response format follows from the request payload format (which is 836).

Note that this specification allows for voucher+cose format requests and vouchers to be transmitted over HTTPS, as well as for voucher-cms+json and other formats yet to be defined over CoAP. The burden for this flexibility is placed upon the Registrar. A Pledge on constrained hardware is expected to support a single format only.

The Pledge and MASA need to support one or more formats (at least format 836) for the voucher and for the voucher request. The MASA needs to support all formats that the Pledge supports.

### 6.3.1. RFC8995 Telemetry Returns

[[RFC8995](#)] defines two telemetry returns from the Pledge which are sent to the Registrar. These are the BRSKI Status Telemetry [[RFC8995](#)], [Section 5.7](#) and the Enrollment Status Telemetry [[RFC8995](#)], [Section 5.9.4](#). These are two CoAP POST request made the by Pledge at two key steps in the process.

[[RFC8995](#)] defines the content of these POST operations in CDDL, which are serialized as JSON. This document extends this with an additional CBOR format, derived using the CDDL rules from [[RFC8610](#)].

The new CBOR format has CoAP Content-Format 60 ("application/cbor") and MUST be supported by the Registrar for both the /vs and /es

resources. The existing JSON format has CoAP Content-Format 50 ("application/json") and also MUST be supported by the Registrar. A Pledge MUST support at least the new CBOR format and it MAY support the JSON format.

### 6.3.2. CoAP Resources Table

This document inherits EST-coaps [RFC9148] functions: specifically, the mandatory Simple (Re-)Enrollment (/sen and /sren) and Certification Authority certificates request (/crts). Support for CSR Attributes Request (/att) and server-side key generation (/skg, /skc) remains optional for the EST-coaps server.

[Table 1](#) summarizes the resources used in cBRSKI. It includes both the short-name BRSKI resources and the EST-coaps resources.

BRSKI + EST	cBRSKI + EST-coaps <short-name>	Well-known URI namespace	Required for Registrar?
/enrollstatus	/es	brski	MUST
/requestvoucher	/rv	brski	MUST
/voucher_status	/vs	brski	MUST
/cacerts	/crts	est	MUST
/csrattrs	/att	est	MAY
/simpleenroll	/sen	est	MUST
/simplereenroll	/sren	est	MUST
/serverkeygen	/skg	est	MAY
/serverkeygen	/skc	est	MAY

Table 1: BRSKI/EST resource name mapping to cBRSKI/EST-coaps short resource name

### 6.4. CoAP Responses

[RFC8995], [Section 5](#) defines a number of HTTP response codes that the Registrar is to return when certain conditions occur.

The 401, 403, 404, 406 and 415 response codes map directly to CoAP codes 4.01, 4.03, 4.04, 4.06 and 4.15.

The 202 Retry process which occurs in the voucher request, is to be handled in the same way as the [Section 5.7](#) of [RFC9148] process for Delayed Responses.

## 6.5. Extensions to EST-coaps

This section defines extensions to EST-coaps for Pledges (during initial onboarding), EST-coaps clients (after initial onboarding) and Registrars (that implement an EST-coaps server). Note that a device that is already onboarded is not called "Pledge" in this section: it now acts in the role of an EST-coaps client.

### 6.5.1. Pledge enrollment procedure

This section defines optimizations for the EST-coaps protocol as used by a Pledge. These aim to reduce payload sizes and the number of messages (round-trips) required for the initial EST enrollment.

A Pledge SHOULD NOT perform the optional EST-coaps "CSR attributes request" (/att). Instead, the Pledge selects the attributes to include in the CSR as specified below.

One or more Subject Distinguished Name fields MUST be included in the CSR. If the Pledge has no specific information on what attributes/fields are desired in the CSR, which is the common case, it MUST use the Subject Distinguished Name fields from its IDevID unmodified. Note that a Pledge MAY receive such specific information via the voucher data (encoded in a vendor-specific way) or via some other, out-of-band means.

A Pledge uses the following optimized EST-coaps procedure:

1. If the voucher, that validates the current Registrar, contains a single pinned domain CA certificate, the Pledge provisionally considers this certificate as the EST trust anchor, as if it were the result of a "CA certificates request" (/crts) to the Registrar.
2. Using this CA certificate as trust anchor it proceeds with EST simple enrollment (/sen) to obtain a provisionally trusted LDevID certificate.
3. If the Pledge determines that the pinned domain CA is (1) a root CA certificate and (2) signer of the LDevID certificate, the Pledge accepts the pinned domain CA certificate as the legitimate trust anchor root CA for the Registrar's domain. It also accepts the LDevID certificate as its new LDevID identity. And steps 4 and 5 are skipped.
4. Otherwise, if the step 3 condition was not met, the Pledge MUST perform a "CA certificates request" (/crts) to the EST server to obtain the full set of EST CA trust anchors. It then MUST attempt to chain the LDevID certificate to one of the CAs in the set.

5. If the Pledge cannot obtain the set of CA certificates, or it is unable to create the chain as defined in step 4, the Pledge MUST abort the enrollment process and report the error using the enrollment status telemetry (/es).

### 6.5.2. Renewal of CA certificates

An EST-coaps client that has an idea of the current time (internally, or via Network Time Protocol) SHOULD consider the validity time of the trust anchor CA(s), and MAY begin requesting new trust anchor certificates(s) using the /crtts request when the CA has 50% of its validity time (notAfter - notBefore) left. A client without access to the current time cannot decide if trust anchor CA(s) have expired, and SHOULD poll periodically for a new trust anchor certificate(s) using the /crtts request at an interval of approximately 1 month. An EST-coaps server SHOULD include the CoAP ETag Option in every response to a /crtts request, to enable clients to perform low-overhead validation whether their trust anchor CA is still valid. The EST-coaps client SHOULD store the ETag resulting from a /crtts response in memory and SHOULD use this value in an ETag Option in its next GET /crtts request.

### 6.5.3. Change of domain trust anchor(s)

The domain trust anchor(s) may change over time. Such a change may happen due to relocation of the client device to a new domain, a new subdomain, or due to a key update of a trust anchor as described in [\[RFC4210\]](#), [Section 4.4](#).

From the client's viewpoint, a trust anchor change happens during EST-coaps re-enrollment: since a change of domain CA requires all devices operating under the old domain CA to acquire a new LDevID certificate issued by the new domain CA. A client's re-enrollment may be triggered by various events, such as an instruction to re-enroll sent by a domain entity, or an imminent expiry of its LDevID certificate, or other. How the re-enrollment is explicitly triggered on the client by a domain entity, such as a commissioner or a Registrar, is out of scope of this specification.

The mechanism described in [\[RFC7030\]](#), [Section 4.1.3](#) and [\[RFC4210\]](#), [Section 4.4](#) for Root CA key update requires four certificates: OldWithOld, OldWithNew, NewWithOld, and NewWithNew. Of these four, the OldWithOld certificate is already stored in the client's Explicit TA database. The other certificates will be provided to the client in a /crtts response, during the EST-coaps re-enrollment procedure.



#### 6.5.4. Re-enrollment procedure

For re-enrollment, the EST-coaps client MUST support the following EST-coaps procedure. During this procedure the EST-coaps server MAY re-enroll the client into a new domain or into a new sub-CA within a domain.

1. The client connects with DTLS to the EST-coaps server, and authenticates with its present domain certificate (LDevID) as usual. The EST-coaps server authenticates itself with its domain RA certificate that is currently trusted by the client, i.e. it chains to a trust anchor CA that the client has stored in its Explicit TA database. This is the OldWithOld trust anchor. The client checks that the server is a Registration Authority (RA) of the domain as required by [Section 3.6.1](#) of [\[RFC7030\]](#) before proceeding.
2. The client performs the simple re-enrollment request (/sren) and upon success it obtains a new LDevID certificate.
3. The client verifies the new LDevID certificate against its Explicit TA database. If the new LDevID chains successfully to a TA, this means trust anchors did not significantly change and the client MAY skip retrieving the current CA certificates using the "CA certificates request" (/crts). If it does not chain successfully, it means trust anchor(s) were changed significantly and the client MUST retrieve the new domain trust anchors using the "CA certificates request" (/crts).
4. If the client retrieved new trust anchor(s) in step 3, then it MUST verify that the new LDevID certificate it obtained in step 2 chains with the new trust anchor(s). If it chains successfully, the client stores the new trust anchor(s) in its Explicit TA database, accepts the new LDevID certificate and stops using its prior LDevID certificate. If it does not chain successfully, the client MUST NOT update its LDevID certificate, and it MUST NOT update its Explicit TA database, and the client MUST abort the enrollment process and MUST attempt to report the error to the EST-coaps server using enrollment status telemetry (/es).

Note that even though the EST-coaps client may skip the /crts request in step 3 at this time, it SHOULD still support retrieval of the trust anchors periodically as detailed in [Section 6.5.2](#).

Note that an EST-coaps server that is also a Registrar will already support the enrollment status telemetry resource (/es) in step 4, while an EST-coaps server that purely implements [\[RFC9148\]](#), and not the present specification, will not support this resource.

### 6.5.5. Multipart Content Format for CA certificates (/crts) Resource

In EST-coaps [[RFC9148](#)] the PKCS#7 container format is used for CA certificates distribution. Because the PKCS#7 format is only used as a certificate container and no additional security is applied on the container, it becomes attractive to replace this format by something simpler, on a constrained Pledge: so that additional PKCS#7 code is avoided. Therefore, this document defines a container format using the [[RFC8710](#)] "application/multipart-core" media type (CoAP Content-Format 62). This is beneficial since a Pledge necessarily already supports CBOR parsing, so there is little code overhead to support this CBOR-based container format.

A Registrar or EST-coaps server MUST support Content-Format 62 for the /crts resource. The multipart collection MUST contain the individual CA certificates, each encoded as an "application/pkix-cert" (287) representation. Future documents may define other certificate formats: the multipart collection can handle any future types. The order of CA certificates MUST be in the CA hierarchy order starting from the issuer of the client's LDevID first, up to the highest-level domain CA, then optionally followed by any further CA certificates that are not part of this hierarchy. These further CA certificates may be Third-party TAs as defined in [[RFC7030](#)]. The highest-level domain CA may or may not be a root CA certificate.

As an example, for the two-level CA domain PKI of [Figure 1](#) the multipart container will contain two representations:

```
[ <domain sub-CA cert (2)> , <domain CA cert (1)> ]
```

Encoded as an "application/multipart-core" CBOR array this is (shown in CBOR diagnostic notation):

```
[ 287, h'3082' ... 'd713', 287, h'3082' ... 'a034' ]
```

The total number of CA certificates SHOULD be 1, 2 or 3 and not higher to prevent constrained Pledges from running out of memory for the trust anchor storage (Explicit TA database). However if a domain operator can guarantee that any Pledges enrolled in its network can support larger sets of CA certificates, the total number MAY be configured as higher than 3. To facilitate a reliable transfer of large payloads over constrained networks, the server MUST support CoAP Block-wise transfer for the /crts response. The server MUST also support the Size2 Option [[RFC7959](#)] to provide the total resource length in bytes, when requested by a client.

Implementation notes: a client that receives the first block of payload data from the server, can already inspect the total number of CA certificates by decoding the first byte of the payload. In CBOR encoding, the respective first bytes 0x81-0x97 represent an

array with length 1-23, respectively. Furthermore, the length in bytes of the first CA certificate can be already determined by decoding the first bytes of the second element, because the CBOR encoding for binary string includes the length of this string. A client that requires an estimate of the total resource size (to be returned as part of the first Block2 response from the server) can use a Size2 Option with value 0 in its request. Knowing the overall progress of the data transfer may be helpful in certain cases, e.g. when a Pledge provides visual progress information on the onboarding progress.

## 6.6. Registrar Extensions

The Content-Format 60 ("application/cbor") MUST be supported by the Registrar for the /vs and /es resources.

Content-Format 836 ("application/voucher+cose") MUST be supported by the Registrar for the /rv resource for CoAP POST requests, both as request payload and as response payload.

Content-Format 287 ("application/pkix-cert") MUST be supported by the Registrar as a response payload for the /sen and /sren resources.

When a Registrar receives a "CA certificates request" (/crts) request with a CoAP Accept Option with value 287 ("application/pkix-cert") it MUST return only the single CA certificate that is the envisioned or actual CA authority for the current, authenticated Pledge making the request. An exception to this rule is when the domain has been configured to operate with multiple CA trust anchors only: then the Registrar returns a 4.06 Not Acceptable error to signal to the client that it needs to request another Content Format that supports retrieval of multiple CA certificates.

## 7. BRSKI-MASA Protocol

This section describes extensions to and clarifications of the BRSKI-MASA protocol between Registrar and MASA.

### 7.1. Protocol and Formats

[Section 5.4](#) of [\[RFC8995\]](#) describes a connection between the Registrar and the MASA as being a normal TLS connection using HTTPS. This document does not change that. The Registrar MUST use the format "application/voucher+cose" in its voucher request to MASA, when the Pledge uses this format in its request to the Registrar.

The MASA only needs to support formats for which it has constructed Pledges that use that format.

The Registrar MUST use the same format for the RVR as the Pledge used for its PVR. The Registrar indicates the voucher format it wants to receive from MASA using the HTTP Accept header. This format MUST be the same as the format of the PVR, so that the Pledge can parse it.

At the moment of writing the creation of coaps based MASAs is deemed unrealistic. The use of CoAP for the BRSKI-MASA connection can be the subject of another document. Some consideration was made to specify CoAP support for consistency, but:

- \*the Registrar is not expected to be so constrained that it cannot support HTTPS client connections.

- \*the technology and experience to build Internet-scale HTTPS responders (which the MASA is) is common, while the experience doing the same for CoAP is much less common.

- \*a Registrar is likely to provide onboarding services to both constrained and non-constrained devices. Such a Registrar would need to speak HTTPS anyway.

- \*a manufacturer is likely to offer both constrained and non-constrained devices, so there may in practice be no situation in which the MASA could be CoAP-only. Additionally, as the MASA is intended to be a function that can easily be outsourced to a third-party service provider, reducing the complexity would also seem to reduce the cost of that function.

- \*security-related considerations: see [Section 15.6](#).

## 7.2. Registrar Voucher Request

If the PVR contains a proximity assertion, the Registrar MUST propagate this assertion into the RVR by including the "assertion" field with the value "proximity". This conforms to the example in [Section 3.3](#) of [[RFC8995](#)] of carrying the assertion forward.

## 7.3. MASA and the Server Name Indicator (SNI)

A TLS/HTTPS connection is established between the Registrar and MASA.

[Section 5.4](#) of [[RFC8995](#)] explains this process, and there are no externally visible changes. A MASA that supports the unconstrained voucher formats should be able to support constrained voucher formats equally well.

There is no requirement that a single MASA be used for both constrained and unconstrained voucher requests: the choice of MASA

is determined by the id-mod-MASAUExtn2016 extension contained in the IDevID.

The Registrar MUST do DNS-ID checks ([RFC9525]) on the contents of the certificate provided by the MASA.

In contrast to the Pledge/Registrar situation, the Registrar always knows the name of the MASA, and MUST always include an [RFC6066] Server Name Indicator. The SNI is optional in TLS1.2, but common. The SNI is considered mandatory with TLS1.3.

The presence of the SNI is needed by the MASA, in order for the MASA's server to host multiple tenants (for different customers).

#### **7.4. Registrar Client Certificate Requirement**

The Registrar SHOULD use a TLS Client Certificate to authenticate to the MASA per [Section 5.4.1](#) of [RFC8995]. If the certificate that the Registrar uses is marked as a id-kp-cmcRA certificate, via Extended Key Usage, then it MUST also have the id-kp-clientAuth EKU attribute set.

In summary for typical Registrar use, where a single Registrar certificate is used, then the certificate MUST have EKU of: id-kp-cmcRA, id-kp-serverAuth, id-kp-clientAuth.

### **8. Pinning in Voucher Artifacts**

The voucher is a statement by the MASA for use by the Pledge that provides the identity of the Pledge's owner. This section describes how the owner's identity is determined and how it is specified within the voucher.

#### **8.1. Registrar Identity Selection and Encoding**

[Section 5.5](#) of [RFC8995] describes BRSKI policies for selection of the owner identity. It indicates some of the flexibility that is possible for the Registrar, and recommends the Registrar to include only certificates in the voucher request (CMS) signing structure that participate in the certificate chain that is to be pinned.

The MASA is expected to evaluate the certificates included by the Registrar in its voucher request, forming them into a chain with the Registrar's (signing) identity on one end. Then, it pins a certificate selected from the chain. For instance, for a domain with a two-level certification authority (see [Figure 1](#)), where the voucher request has been signed by "Registrar", its signing structure includes two additional CA certificates. The arrows in the figure indicate the issuing of a certificate, i.e. author of (1) issued (2) and author of (2) issued (3).




Figure 1: Two-Level CA PKI

When the Registrar is using a COSE-signed constrained voucher request towards MASA, instead of a regular CMS-signed voucher request, the COSE\_Sign1 object contains a protected and an unprotected header. The Registrar MUST place all the certificates needed to validate the signature chain from the Registrar on the RVR in an "x5bag" attribute in the unprotected header as defined in [\[RFC9360\]](#).

The "x5bag" attribute is very important as it provides the required signals from the Registrar to control what identity is pinned in the resulting voucher. This is explained in the next section.

## 8.2. MASA Pinning Policy

The MASA, having assembled and verified the chain in the signing structure of the voucher request needs to select a certificate to pin. (For the case that only the Registrar's End-Entity certificate is included, only this certificate can be selected and this section does not apply.) The BRSKI policy for pinning by the MASA as described in [Section 5.5.2](#) of [\[RFC8995\]](#) leaves much flexibility to the manufacturer.

The present document adds the following rules to the MASA pinning policy to reduce the network load on the constrained network side:

1. for a voucher containing a nonce, it SHOULD select the most specific (lowest-level) CA certificate in the chain.

2. for a nonceless voucher, it SHOULD select the least-specific (highest-level) CA certificate in the chain that is allowed under the MASA's policy for this specific domain.

The rationale for 1. is that in case of a voucher with nonce, the voucher is valid only in scope of the present DTLS connection between Pledge and Registrar anyway, so there is no benefit to pin a higher-level CA. By pinning the most specific CA the constrained Pledge can validate its DTLS connection using less crypto operations. The rationale for pinning a CA instead of the Registrar's End-Entity certificate directly is based on the following benefit on constrained networks: the pinned certificate in the voucher can in common cases be re-used as a Domain CA trust anchor during the EST enrollment and during the operational phase that follows after EST enrollment, as explained in [Section 6.5.1](#).

The rationale for 2. follows from the flexible BRSKI trust model for, and purpose of, nonceless vouchers (Sections 5.5.\* and 7.4.1 of [\[RFC8995\]](#)).

Referring to [Figure 1](#) of a domain with a two-level certification authority, the most specific CA ("Sub-CA") is the identity that is pinned by MASA in a nonced voucher. A Registrar that wished to have only the Registrar's End-Entity certificate pinned would omit the "domain CA" and "Sub-CA" certificates from the voucher request.

In case of a nonceless voucher, depending on the trust level, the MASA pins the "Registrar" certificate (low trust in customer), or the "Sub-CA" certificate (in case of medium trust, implying that any Registrar of that sub-domain is acceptable), or even the "domain CA" certificate (in case of high trust in the customer, and possibly a pre-agreed need of the customer to obtain flexible long-lived vouchers).

### **8.3. Pinning of Raw Public Keys**

Specifically for the most-constrained use cases, the pinning of the raw public key (RPK) of the Registrar is also supported in the constrained voucher, instead of a PKIX certificate. This is used by the RPK variant of cBRSKI described in [Section 13](#), but it can also be used in the default cBRSKI flow as a means to reduce voucher size.

For both cases, if an RPK is pinned, it MUST be the RPK of the Registrar.

When the Pledge is known by MASA to support the RPK variant only, the voucher produced by the MASA pins the RPK of the Registrar in either the "pinned-domain-pubk" or "pinned-domain-pubk-sha256" field

of the voucher data. This is described in more detail in [\[RFC8366bis\]](#) and [Section 13](#).

When the Pledge is known by MASA to support PKIX certificates, the "pinned-domain-cert" field present in a voucher normally pins a domain certificate. That can be either the End-Entity certificate of the Registrar, or the certificate of a domain CA of the Registrar's domain as specified in [Section 8.2](#). However, if the Pledge is known by MASA to also support RPK pinning and the MASA intends to pin the Registrar in the voucher (and not the CA), then MASA SHOULD pin the RPK (RPK3 in [Figure 2](#)) of the Registrar instead of the Registrar's End-Entity certificate to save space in the voucher.




Figure 2: Raw Public Key (RPK) pinning examples

#### 8.4. Considerations for use of IDevID-Issuer

[\[RFC8366bis\]](#) and [\[RFC8995\]](#) define the idevid-issuer attribute for voucher and voucher-request (respectively), but they summarily explain when to use it.

The use of idevid-issuer is provided so that the serial-number to which the issued voucher pertains can be relative to the entity that issued the devices' IDevID. In most cases there is a one to one relationship between the trust anchor that signs vouchers (and is trusted by the pledge), and the Certification Authority that signs the IDevID. In that case, the serial-number in the voucher data must refer to the same device as the serial-number that is in the IDevID certificate.

However, there situations where the one to one relationship may be broken. This occurs whenever a manufacturer has a common MASA, but



different products (on different assembly lines) are produced with identical serial numbers. A system of serial numbers which is just a simple counter is a good example of this. A system of serial numbers where there is some prefix relating the product type does not fit into this, even if the lower digits are a counter.

It is not possible for the Pledge or the Registrar to know which situation applies. The question to be answered is whether or not to include the idevid-issuer in the PVR and the RVR. A second question arises as to what the format of the idevid-issuer contents are.

Analysis of the situation shows that the pledge never needs to include the idevid-issuer in its PVR, because the pledge's IDevID certificate is available to the Registrar, and the Authority Key Identifier is contained within that IDevID certificate. The pledge therefore has no need to repeat this.

For the RVR, the Registrar has to examine the pledge's IDevID certificate to discover the serial number for the Registrar's Voucher Request (RVR). This is clear in [Section 5.5](#) of [\[RFC8995\]](#). That section also clarifies that the idevid-issuer is to be included in the RVR.

Concerning the Authority Key Identifier, [\[RFC8366bis\]](#) specifies that the entire object i.e. the extnValue OCTET STRING is to be included: comprising the AuthorityKeyIdentifier, SEQUENCE, Choice as well as the OCTET STRING that is the keyIdentifier.

## 9. Artifacts

The YANG ([\[RFC7950\]](#)) module and CBOR serialization for the constrained voucher as used by cBRSKI are described in [\[RFC8366bis\]](#). That document also assigns SID values to YANG elements in accordance with [\[I-D.ietf-core-sid\]](#). The present section provides some examples of these artifacts and defines a new signature format for these, using COSE.

Compared to the first voucher request definition done in [\[RFC8995\]](#), the constrained voucher request adds the fields proximity-registrar-pubk and proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256. One of these is optionally used to replace the proximity-registrar-cert field, for a smaller voucher data size - useful for the most constrained cases.

The constrained voucher adds the fields pinned-domain-pubk and pinned-domain-pubk-sha256. One of these is optionally used instead of the pinned-domain-cert field, for a smaller voucher data size.

## 9.1. Example Artifacts

### 9.1.1. Example Pledge voucher request (PVR) artifact

Below, example voucher data from a constrained voucher request (PVR) from a Pledge to a Registrar is shown in CBOR diagnostic notation. Long CBOR byte strings have been shortened for readability, using the ellipsis ("...") to indicate elided bytes. This notation is defined in [[I-D.ietf-cbor-edn-literals](#)]. The enum value of the assertion field is 2 for the "proximity" assertion as defined in [Section 6.3](#) of [[RFC8366bis](#)].

```
{
  2501: {
    1: 2, / SID=2501, ietf-voucher-request:voucher|voucher /
    7: h'831D5198A6CA2C7F', / SID=2502, assertion 2 = "proximity"/
    12: h'30593013' ... '9A54', / SID=2508, nonce /
    13: "JADA123456789" / SID=2513, proximity-registrar-pubk /
  } / SID=2514, serial-number /
}
```

The Pledge has included the item proximity-registrar-pubk which carries the public key of the Registrar, instead of including the full Registrar certificate in a proximity-registrar-cert item. This is done to reduce the size of the PVR. Also note that the Pledge did not include the created-on field since it lacks an internal real-time clock and has no knowledge of the current time at the moment of performing the onboarding.

### 9.1.2. Example Registrar voucher request (RVR) artifact

Next, example voucher data from a constrained voucher request (RVR) from a Registrar to a MASA is shown in CBOR diagnostic notation. The Registrar has created this request triggered by the reception of the Pledge voucher request (PVR) of the previous example. Again, long CBOR byte strings have been shortened for readability.

```
{
  "ietf-request-voucher:voucher": {
    "assertion": 2,
    "created-on": "2022-12-05T19:19:19.536Z",
    "nonce": h'831D5198A6CA2C7F',
    "idevid-issuer": h'04183016' ... '1736C3E0',
    "serial-number": "JADA123456789",
    "prior-signed-voucher-request": h'A11909' ... '373839'
  }
}
```

Note that the Registrar uses here the string data type for all key names, instead of the more compact SID integer keys. This is fine for any use cases where the network between Registrar and MASA is an unconstrained network where data size is not critical. The constrained voucher request format supports both the string and SID key types.

### 9.1.3. Example voucher artifacts

Below, an example of constrained voucher data is shown in CBOR diagnostic notation. It was created by a MASA in response to receiving the Registrar Voucher Request (RVR) shown in [Section 9.1.2](#). The enum value of the assertion field is set to 2, to acknowledge to both the Pledge and the Registrar that the proximity of the Pledge to the Registrar is considered proven.

```
{
2451: {
  1: 2,
  2: "2022-12-05T19:19:23Z",
  3: false,
  7: h'831D5198A6CA2C7F',
  8: h'308201' ... '8CFF',
  11: "JADA123456789"
}
}
```

While the above example voucher data includes the nonce from the PVR, the next example is for a nonce-less voucher. Instead of a nonce, it includes an expires-on field with the date and time on which the voucher expires. Because the MASA did not verify the proximity of the Pledge and Registrar in this case, the assertion field contains a weaker assertion of "verified" (0). This indicates that the MASA verified the domain's ownership of the Pledge via some other means. The enum value of the assertion field for "verified" is calculated to be 0 by following the algorithm described in section 9.6.4.2 of [\[RFC7950\]](#).

```

{
  2451: {
    / SID = 2451, ietf-voucher:voucher|voucher /
    1: 0, / SID = 2452, assertion "verified" /
    2: "2022-12-06T10:15:32Z", / SID = 2453, created-on /
    3: false, / SID = 2454, domain-cert-revocation-checks /
    4: "2022-12-13T10:15:32Z", / SID = 2455, expires-on /
    8: h'308201F8' ... 'FF', / SID = 2459, pinned-domain-cert /
    11: "JADA123456789" / SID = 2462, serial-number /
  }
}

```

The voucher is valid for one week. To verify the voucher's validity, the Pledge would either need an internal real-time clock or some external means of obtaining the current time, such as Network Time Protocol (NTP) or a radio time signal receiver.

## 9.2. Signing voucher and voucher request artifacts with COSE

The COSE\_Sign1 structure is discussed in [Section 4.2](#) of [\[RFC9052\]](#). The CBOR object that carries the body, the signature, and the information about the body and signature is called the COSE\_Sign1 structure. It is used when only one signature is used on the body.

Support for ECDSA with SHA2-256 using curve secp256r1 (aka prime256k1) is RECOMMENDED. Most current low power hardware has support for acceleration of this algorithm. Future hardware designs could omit this in favour of a newer algorithms. This is the ES256 keytype from Table 1 of [\[RFC9053\]](#). Support for curve secp256k1 is OPTIONAL.

Support for EdDSA using Curve 25519 is RECOMMENDED in new designs if hardware support is available. This is keytype EDDSA (-8) from Table 2 of [\[RFC9053\]](#). A "crv" parameter is necessary to specify the Curve, which from Table 18. The 'kty' field MUST be present, and it MUST be 'OKP'. (Table 17)

A transition towards EdDSA is occurring in the industry. Some hardware can accelerate only some algorithms with specific curves, other hardware can accelerate any curve, and still other kinds of hardware provide a tool kit for acceleration of any elliptic curve algorithm.

In general, the Pledge is expected to support only a single algorithm, while the Registrar, usually not constrained, is expected to support a wide variety of algorithms: both legacy ones and up-and-coming ones via regular software updates.

An example of the supported COSE\_Sign1 object structure containing a Pledge Voucher Request (PVR) is shown in [Figure 3](#).

```

18(          / tag for COSE_Sign1          /
 [
   h'A10126',          / protected COSE header encoding: {1: -7} /
                       /           which means { "alg": ES256 } /
   {},                / unprotected COSE header parameters /
   h'A119' ... '3839', / voucher-request binary content (in CBOR)/
   h'4567' ... '1234' / voucher-request binary Sign1 signature /
 ]
)

```

Figure 3: COSE\_Sign1 PVR example in CBOR diagnostic notation

The [COSE-registry] specifies the integers/encoding for the "alg" field in Figure 3. The "alg" field restricts the key usage for verification of this COSE object to a particular cryptographic algorithm.

### 9.2.1. Signing of Registrar Voucher Request (RVR)

A Registrar MUST include a COSE "x5bag" structure in the RVR as explained in Section 8.1. Figure 4 shows an example Registrar Voucher Request (RVR) that includes the x5bag as an unprotected header parameter (32). The bag contains two certificates in this case.

```

18(          / tag for COSE_Sign1          /
 [
   h'A10126',          / protected COSE header encoding: {1: -7} /
                       /           which means { "alg": ES256 } /
   {
     32: [h'308202' ... '20AE', h'308201' ... '8CFF'] / x5bag /
   },
   h'A178' ... '7FED', / voucher-request binary content (in CBOR)/
   h'E1B7' ... '2925' / voucher-request binary Sign1 signature /
 ]
)

```

Figure 4: COSE\_Sign1 RVR example in CBOR diagnostic notation

A "kid" (key ID) field is optionally present in the unprotected COSE header parameters map of a COSE object. If present, it identifies the public key of the key pair that was used to sign the COSE message. The value of the key identifier "kid" parameter may be in any format agreed between signer and verifier. Usually a hash of the public key is used to identify the public key; but the choice of key identifier method is vendor-specific. If "kid" is not present, then a verifying party needs to use other context information to retrieve the right public key to verify the COSE\_Sign1 object against.

By default, a Registrar does not include a "kid" parameter in the RVR since the signing key is already identified by the signing certificates included in the COSE "x5bag" structure. A Registrar nevertheless MAY use a "kid" parameter in its RVR to identify its signing key/identity.

The method of generating such "kid" value is vendor-specific and SHOULD be configurable in the Registrar to support commonly used methods. In order to support future business cases and supply chain integrations, a Registrar using the "kid" field MUST be configurable, on a per-manufacturer basis, to select a particular method for generating the "kid" value such that it is compatible with the method that the manufacturer expects. Note that the "kid" field always has a CBOR byte string (bstr) format.

### **9.2.2. Signing of Pledge Voucher Request (PVR)**

Like in the RVR, a "kid" (key ID) field is also optionally present in the PVR. It can be used to identify the signing key/identity to the MASA.

A Pledge by default SHOULD NOT use a "kid" parameter in its PVR, because its signing key is already identified by the Pledge's unique serial number that is included in the PVR and (by the Registrar) in the RVR. This achieves the smallest possible PVR data size while still enabling the MASA to verify the PVR. Still, when required the Pledge MAY use a "kid" parameter in its PVR to help the MASA identify the right public key to verify against. This can occur for example if a Pledge has multiple IDevID identities. The "kid" parameter in this case may be an integer byte identifying one out of N identities present, or it may be a hash of the public key, or anything else the Pledge vendor decides. A Registrar normally SHOULD ignore a "kid" parameter used in a received PVR, as this information is intended for the MASA. In other words, there is no need for the Registrar to verify the contents of this field, but it may include it in an audit log.

The example in [Figure 5](#) shows a PVR with the "kid" parameter present.

```

18(                                     / tag for COSE_Sign1                               /
  [
    h'A10126',                           / protected COSE header encoding: {1: -7} /
                                          /           which means { "alg": ES256 } /
    {
      4: h'59AB3E'                         / COSE "kid" header parameter           /
    },
    h'A119' ... '3839', / voucher-request binary content (in CBOR)/
    h'5678' ... '7890' / voucher-request binary Sign1 signature /
  ]
)

```

Figure 5: COSE\_Sign1 PVR example with "kid" field present

The Pledge SHOULD NOT use the "x5bag" structure in the PVR. A Registrar that processes a PVR with an "x5bag" structure MUST ignore it, and MUST use only the TLS Client Certificate extension for authentication of the Pledge.

A situation where the Pledge MAY use the x5bag structure is for communication of certificate chains to the MASA. This would arise in some vendor- specific situations involving outsourcing of MASA functionality, or rekeying of the IDevID certification authority.

In [Appendix C](#) further examples of signed PVRs are shown.

### 9.2.3. Signing of voucher by MASA

The MASA SHOULD NOT use a "kid" parameter in the voucher response, because the MASA's signing key is already known to the Pledge. Still, where needed the MASA MAY use a "kid" parameter in the voucher response to help the Pledge identify the right MASA public key to verify against. This can occur for example if a Pledge has multiple IDevID identities.

The MASA SHOULD NOT include an x5bag attribute in the voucher response - the exception is if the MASA knows that the Pledge doesn't pre-store the signing public key and certificate, and thus the MASA needs to provide a cert or cert chain that will enable linking the signing identity to the pre-stored Trust Anchor (CA) in the Pledge. This approach is not recommended, because including certificates in the x5bag attribute will significantly increase the size of the voucher which impacts operations on constrained networks.

If the MASA signing key is based upon a PKI (see [\[I-D.richardson-anima-masa-considerations\]](#) Section 2.3), and the Pledge only pre-stores a manufacturer (root) CA identity in its Trust Store which is not the identity that signs the voucher, then a certificate chain needs to be included with the voucher in order for

the Pledge to validate the MASA signing CA's signature by validating the chain up to the CA in its Trust Store.

In BRSKI CMS signed vouchers [RFC8995], the CMS structure has a place for such certificates. In the COSE-signed constrained vouchers described in this document, the x5bag attribute [RFC9360] is used to contain the needed certificates to form the chain. A Registrar MUST NOT remove the x5bag attribute from the unprotected COSE header parameters when sending the voucher back to the Pledge.

In [Figure 6](#) an example is shown of a COSE-signed voucher. This example shows the common case where the "x5bag" attribute is not used.

```
18(           / tag for COSE_Sign1           /
 [
   h'A10126',           / protected COSE header encoding: {1: -7}/
                       /           which means { "alg": ES256 }/
   {},                 / unprotected COSE header parameters   /
   h'A119' ... '3839', / voucher data (binary CBOR)           /
   h'2A2C' ... '7FBF' / voucher binary Sign1 signature by MASA /
 ]
)
```

Figure 6: COSE\_Sign1 signed voucher in CBOR diagnostic notation

## 10. Extensions to Discovery

It is assumed that a Join Proxy ([Section 6.2](#)) seamlessly provides a relayed DTLS connection between the Pledge and the Registrar. To use a Join Proxy, a Pledge needs to discover it. For Pledge discovery of a Join Proxy, this section extends Section 4.1 of [RFC8995] for the cBRSKI case.

In general, the Pledge may be one or more hops away from the Registrar, where one hop means the Registrar is a direct link-local neighbor of the Pledge. The case of one hop away can be considered as a degenerate case, because a Join Proxy is not really needed then.

The degenerate case would be unusual in constrained wireless network deployments, because a Registrar would typically not have a wireless network interface of the type used for constrained devices. Rather, it would have a high-speed network interface. Nevertheless, the situation where the Registrar is one hop away from the Pledge could occur in various cases like wired IoT networks or in wireless constrained networks where the Pledge is in radio range of a 6LowPAN Border Router (6LBR) and the 6LBR happens to host a Registrar.



In order to support the degenerate case, the Registrar SHOULD announce itself as if it were a Join Proxy -- though it would actually announce its real (stateful) Registrar CoAPS endpoint. No actual Join Proxy functionality is then required on the Registrar.

That way, a Pledge only needs to discover a Join Proxy, regardless of whether it is one or more than one hop away from a relevant Registrar. It first discovers the link-local address and the join-port of a Join Proxy. The Pledge then follows the cBRSKI procedure of initiating a DTLS connection using the link-local address and join-port of the Join Proxy.

Once enrolled, a Pledge itself may function as a Join Proxy. The decision whether or not to provide this functionality depends upon many factors and is out of scope for this document. Such a decision might depend upon the amount of energy available to the device, the network bandwidth available, as well as CPU and memory availability.

The process by which a Pledge discovers the Join Proxy, and how a Join Proxy discovers the location of the Registrar, are the subject of the remainder of this section. Further details on both these topics are provided in [[I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy](#)].

### **10.1. Discovery Operations by a Pledge**

The Pledge must discover the address/port and optionally the protocol with which to communicate. The present document only defines coaps (CoAP over DTLS) as the default protocol for cBRSKI, therefore protocol discovery is out of scope.

For the discovery method, this section only defines unsecured CoAP discovery per [Section 7](#) of [[RFC7252](#)] as the default method. This uses CoRE Link Format [[RFC6690](#)] payloads.

[Section 11](#) briefly mentions other methods that apply to specific deployment types or technologies. Details about these deployment-specific methods, or yet other methods, new payload formats, or more elaborate CoAP-based methods, may be defined in future documents such as [[I-D.eckert-anima-brski-discovery](#)]. The more elaborate methods for example may include discovering only Join Proxies that support a particular desired onboarding protocol, voucher format, or cBRSKI variant.

Note that identifying the format of the voucher request and the voucher is currently not a required part of the Pledge's discovery operation. It is assumed that all Registrars support all relevant voucher(-request) formats, while the Pledge only supports a single format. A Pledge that makes a voucher request to a Registrar that does not support that format will receive a CoAP 4.06 Not Acceptable status code and the onboarding attempt will fail.

Using CoAP discovery, a Pledge can discover a Join Proxy by sending a link-local multicast discovery message to the All CoAP Nodes address FF02::FD. Zero, one, or multiple Constrained Join Proxies may respond. The handling of multiple responses and absence of responses cases follow the guidelines of Section 4 of [[RFC8995](#)]. The discovery message is a CoAP GET request on the URI path `"/.well-known/core"` using a URI query `"rt=brski.jp"`. This resource type (rt) is defined in [Section 8.3](#) of [[I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy](#)].

#### 10.1.1. Examples

Below, a typical example is provided showing the Pledge's CoAP request and the Join Proxy's CoAP response. The Join Proxy responds with a link-local source address, which is the same address as indicated in the URI-reference element ([RFC6690](#)) in the discovery response payload. The Join Proxy has a dedicated port 8485 open for DTLS connections of Pledges.

```
REQ: GET coap://[ff02::fd]/.well-known/core?rt=brski.jp
```

```
RES: 2.05 Content  
<coaps://[fe80::c78:e3c4:58a0:a4ad]:8485>;rt=brski.jp
```

The next example shows a Join Proxy that uses the default CoAPS port 5684 for DTLS connections of Pledges. In this case, the Join Proxy host is not using port 5684 for any other purposes, so it has the port available for this purpose.

```
REQ: GET coap://[ff02::fd]/.well-known/core?rt=brski.jp
```

```
RES: 2.05 Content  
<coaps://[fe80::c78:e3c4:58a0:a4ad]>;rt=brski.jp
```

In the following example, two Join Proxies respond to the multicast query. The Join Proxies each use a slightly different CoRE Link Format 'rt' value encoding. While the first encoding is more compact, both encodings are allowed per [[RFC6690](#)]. The Pledge may now select one of the two Join Proxies for initiating its DTLS connection.

```
REQ: GET coap://[ff02::fd]/.well-known/core?rt=brski*
```

```
RES: 2.05 Content  
<coaps://[fe80::c78:e3c4:58a0:a4ad]:8485>;rt=brski.jp
```

```
RES: 2.05 Content  
<coaps://[fe80::d359:3813:f382:3b23]:63245>;rt="brski.jp"
```

## 10.2. Discovery Operations by a Join Proxy

A Join Proxy needs to discover a Registrar, either at the moment it needs to relay data (of a Pledge) towards the Registrar, or prior to that moment. For example, it may start Registrar discovery as soon as it is requested to be enabled in a Join Proxy role. It may periodically redo this discovery, or periodically or on-demand check that the Registrar is still available in the network at the discovered IP address.

Further details on CoAP discovery of the Registrar by a Join Proxy are provided in [Section 5.1.1](#) of [\[I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy\]](#).

## 11. Deployment-specific Discovery Considerations

This section details how discovery of a Join Proxy is done by the Pledge in specific deployment scenarios. Future work such as [\[I-D.eckert-anima-brski-discovery\]](#) may define more details on discovery operations in the specific deployments listed here.

### 11.1. 6TiSCH Deployments

In 6TiSCH networks, the Constrained Join Proxy (CoJP) mechanism is used as described in [\[RFC9031\]](#). Such networks are expected to use [\[I-D.ietf-lake-edhoc\]](#) for key management. This is the subject of future work. The Enhanced Beacon has been extended in [\[RFC9032\]](#) to allow for discovery of a 6TiSCH-compliant Join Proxy.

### 11.2. IP networks using GRASP

In IP networks that support GRASP [\[RFC8990\]](#), a Pledge can discover a Join Proxy by listening for GRASP messages. GRASP supports mesh networks, and can also be used over unencrypted Wi-Fi.

Details of GRASP discovery of Constrained Join Proxies are out of scope of this document and may be defined in future work.

### 11.3. IP networks using mDNS

[\[RFC8995\]](#) defines a mechanism for the Pledge to discover a Join Proxy by sending mDNS [\[RFC6762\]](#) queries. This mechanism can be used on any IP network which does not have another recommended mechanism. It can be used over unencrypted Wi-Fi. This mechanism does support link-local Join Proxy discovery in mesh networks. However, it does not support Registrar discovery by Join Proxies in mesh networks, because the Registrar is typically not reachable by link-local communication in that case. For this, another mechanism is needed, which is out of scope of this document and may be defined in future work.

A Pledge uses an mDNS PTR query for the name "\_brski-proxy.\_udp.local." to discover link-local Constrained Join Proxies. The label "\_udp" here indicates a query for cBRSKI Constrained Join Proxies, as opposed to "\_tcp" defined in [RFC8995] which is for discovering BRSKI Join Proxies.

#### 11.4. Thread networks using Mesh Link Establishment (MLE)

Thread [Thread] is a wireless mesh network protocol based on 6LoWPAN [RFC6282] and other IETF protocols. In Thread, a new device discovers potential Thread networks and Thread routers to join by using the Mesh Link Establishment (MLE) [I-D.ietf-6lo-mesh-link-establishment] protocol. MLE uses the UDP port number 19788. The new device sends discovery requests on different IEEE 802.15.4 radio channels, to which routers (if any present) respond with a discovery response containing information about their respective network. Once a suitable router is selected the new device initiates a DTLS transport-layer secured connection to the network's commissioning application, over a link-local single radio hop to the selected Thread router. This link is not yet secured at the radio/MAC link layer: link-layer security will be set up once the new device is approved by the commissioning application to join the Thread network, and it gets provisioned with network access credentials.

The Thread router acts here as a Join Proxy. The MLE discovery response message contains UDP port information to signal the new device which port to use for its DTLS connection to the Join Proxy function. The link-local IPv6 source address of the MLE response message indicates the address of the Join Proxy.

## 12. Design and Implementation Considerations

### 12.1. Voucher Format and Encoding

The design considerations for vouchers from Section 8 of [RFC8366bis] apply. Specifically for CBOR encoding of voucher data, one key difference with JSON encoding is that the names of the leaves in the YANG definition do not affect the size of the resulting CBOR, as the SID ([I-D.ietf-core-sid]) translation process assigns integers to the names.

To obtain the lowest code size and RAM use on the Pledge, it is recommended that a Pledge is designed to only process/generate these SID integers and not the lengthy strings. The MASA in that case is required to generate the voucher data for that Pledge using only SID integers. Yet, this MASA implementation MUST still support both SID integers and strings, to be able to process the field names in the RVR.

Any POST request to the Registrar with resource /vs or /es returns a 2.04 Changed response with empty payload. The client should be aware that the server may use a piggybacked CoAP response (ACK, 2.04) but may also respond with a separate CoAP response, i.e. first an (ACK, 0.0) that is an acknowledgement of the request reception followed by a (CON, 2.04) response in a separate CoAP message. See [[RFC7252](#)] for details.

## 12.2. Use of cBRSKI with HTTPS

This specification contains two extensions to [[RFC8995](#)]: a constrained voucher format (COSE), and a constrained transfer protocol (CoAP).

On constrained networks with constrained devices, it make senses to use both together. However, this document does not mandate that this be the only way.

A given constrained device design and software may be re-used for multiple device models, such as a model having only an IEEE 802.15.4 radio, or a model having only an IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) radio, or a model having both these radios. A manufacturer of such device models may wish to have code only for the use of the constrained voucher format (COSE), and use it on all supported radios including the IEEE 802.11 radio. For this radio, the software stack to support HTTP/TLS may be already integrated into the radio module hence it is attractive for the manufacturer to reuse this. This type of approach is supported by this document. In the case that HTTPS is used, the regular long [[RFC8995](#)] resource names are used, together with the new "application/voucher+cose" media type described in this document. For status telemetry requests, the Pledge may use either one or both of the formats defined in [Section 6.3.1](#). A Registrar MUST support both formats.

Other combinations are possible, but they are not enumerated here. New work such as [[I-D.ietf-anima-jws-voucher](#)] provides new formats that may be useable over a number of different transports. In general, sending larger payloads over constrained networks makes less sense, while sending smaller payloads over unconstrained networks is perfectly acceptable.

The Pledge will in most cases support a single voucher format, which it uses without negotiation i.e. without discovery of formats supported. The Registrar, being unconstrained, is expected to support all voucher formats. There will be cases where a Registrar does not support a new format that a new Pledge uses, and this is an unfortunate situation that will result in lack of interoperation.

The responsibility for supporting new formats is on the Registrar.

## 13. Raw Public Key Variant

### 13.1. Introduction and Scope

This section introduces a cBRSKI variant to further reduce the data volume and complexity of the cBRSKI onboarding. The use of a raw public key (RPK) in the pinning process can significantly reduce the number of bytes sent over the wire and the number of round trips, and reduce the code footprint in a Pledge. But it comes with a few significant operational limitations.

One simplification that comes with RPK use is that a Pledge can avoid doing PKIX certificate operations, such as certificate chain validation.

### 13.2. The Registrar Trust Anchor

When the Pledge first connects to the Registrar, the connection to the Registrar is provisional, as explained in [Section 5.6.2 of \[RFC8995\]](#). The Registrar normally provides its public key in a `TLSServerCertificate`, and the Pledge uses that to validate that integrity of the (D)TLS connection, but it does not validate the identity of the provided certificate.

As the `TLSServerCertificate` object is never verified directly by the Pledge, sending it can be considered superfluous. So instead of using a `(TLSServer)Certificate` of type X509 (see section 4.4.2 of [\[RFC8446\]](#)), a `RawPublicKey` object (as defined by [\[RFC7250\]](#)) is used.

A Registrar operating in a mixed environment can determine whether to send a `Certificate` or a `Raw Public Key` to the Pledge: this is signaled by the Pledge. In the case it needs an RPK, it includes the `server_certificate_type` of `RawPublicKey`. This is shown in section 5 of [\[RFC7250\]](#).

The Pledge MUST send a `client_certificate_type` of X509 (not an RPK), so that the Registrar can properly identify the Pledge and distill the MASA URI information from its `IDevID` certificate.

### 13.3. The Pledge Voucher Request

The Pledge puts the Registrar's public key into the `proximity-registrar-pubk` field of the Pledge Voucher Request (PVR). (The `proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256` can alternatively be used for efficiency, if the 32-bytes of a SHA256 hash turns out to be smaller than a typical ECDSA key.)

As the format of this `pubk` field is identical to the TLS `RawPublicKey` data object, no manipulation at all is needed to insert

this field into the PVR. This approach reduces the size of the PVR significantly.

#### **13.4. The Voucher Response**

A returned voucher will have a pinned-domain-pubk field with the identical key as was found in the proximity-registrar-pubk field above, as well as being identical to the Registrar's RPK in the currently active DTLS connection. (Or alternatively the MASA may include the "pinned-domain-pubk-sha256" field if it knows the Pledge supports this field.)

Validation of this key by the Pledge is what takes the DTLS connection out of the provisional state; see [Section 5.6.2](#) of [\[RFC8995\]](#) for more details.

The received voucher needs to be validated first by the Pledge. The Pledge needs to have a public key to validate the signature from the MASA on the voucher.

The MASA's public key counterpart of the (private) MASA signing key MUST be already installed in the Pledge at manufacturing time. Otherwise, the Pledge cannot validate the voucher's signature.

#### **13.5. The Enrollment Phase**

A Pledge that does not support PKIX operations cannot use EST to enroll; it has to use another method for enrollment without certificates and the Registrar has to support this method also. For example, an enrollment process that records an RPK owned by the Pledge as a legitimate entity that is part of the domain.

It is possible that the Pledge will not enroll after obtaining a valid voucher, but instead will do only a network join operation (see for example [\[RFC9031\]](#)). How the Pledge discovers this method and details of such enrollment methods are out of scope of this document.

### **14. Pledge Discovery of Onboarding and Enrollment Options**

The functionality in this section is optional for a Pledge to implement. In typical cases, for a constrained Pledge that only supports a single onboarding and enrollment method, this functionality is not needed.

#### **14.1. Pledge Discovery Query for All BRSKI Resources**

A Pledge that wishes to discover the available BRSKI onboarding options/formats can do a discovery operation using CoAP discovery per [Section 7](#) of [\[RFC7252\]](#) and [Section 4](#) of [\[RFC6690\]](#). It first

sends a CoAP discovery query to the Registrar over the secured DTLS connection. The Registrar then responds with a CoRE Link Format payload containing the requested resources, if any.

For example, if the Registrar supports a short BRSKI URL (/b) instead of just the longer "/.well-known" resources, and supports only the voucher format "application/voucher+ cose" (836), and status reporting in both CBOR and JSON formats, a CoAP resource discovery request and response may look as follows:

```
REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=brski*
```

```
RES: 2.05 Content
```

```
Content-Format: 40
```

```
Payload:
```

```
</b>;rt=brski,  
</b/rv>;rt=brski.rv;ct=836,  
</b/vs>;rt=brski.vs;ct="50 60",  
</b/es>;rt=brski.es;ct="50 60"
```

The Registrar is under no obligation to provide shorter URLs, and MAY respond to this query with only the "/.well-known/brski/<short-name>" resources for the short names as defined in [Table 1](#). This case is shown in the below interaction:

```
REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=brski*
```

```
RES: 2.05 Content
```

```
Content-Format: 40
```

```
Payload:
```

```
</.well-known/brski>;rt=brski,  
</.well-known/brski/rv>;rt=brski.rv;ct=836,  
</.well-known/brski/vs>;rt=brski.vs;ct="50 60",  
</.well-known/brski/es>;rt=brski.es;ct="50 60"
```

However, for efficiency reasons it would be better if the Registrar would return shorter URLs instead.

When responding to a discovery request for BRSKI resources, the Registrar MAY return the full resource paths for all <short-name> resources and the content types which are supported by these resources (using ct attributes) as shown in the above examples. This is useful when multiple content types are specified for a particular resource on the Registrar and the discovering Pledge also supports multiple.

Registrars that have implemented shorter URLs MUST process a request on the corresponding "/.well-known/brski/<short-name>" URL identically. In particular, a Pledge MAY use the longer (well-known) and shorter URLs in any combination.



## 14.2. Pledge Discovery Query for the Root BRSKI Resource

In case the client queries for only `rt=brski` type resources, the Registrar responds with only the root path for the BRSKI resources (`rt=brski`, resource `/b` in earlier examples) and no others. (So, a query for `rt=brski`, without the wildcard character.) This is shown in the below example. The Pledge in this case requests only the BRSKI root resource of type `rt=brski` to check if BRSKI is supported by the Registrar and if short names are supported or not. In this case, the Pledge is not interested to check what voucher request formats, or status telemetry formats -- other than the mandatory default formats -- are supported. The compact response then shows that the Registrar indeed supports a short-name BRSKI resource at `/b`:

```
REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=brski
```

```
RES: 2.05 Content
```

```
Content-Format: 40
```

```
Payload:
```

```
</b>;rt=brski
```

The Pledge can now start using any of the BRSKI resources `/b/<short-name>`. In above example, the well-known resource present under `/.well-known/brski` is not returned because this is assumed to be well-known to the Pledge and would not require discovery anyway.

As a follow-up example, the Pledge can now start the onboarding by sending its PVR:

```
REQ: POST /b/rv
```

```
Content-Format: 836
```

```
Accept: 836
```

```
Payload: (binary COSE-signed PVR)
```

## 14.3. Usage of `ct` Attribute

The return of multiple content-types in the `"ct"` attribute by the Registrar allows the Pledge to choose the most appropriate one for a particular operation, and allows extension with new voucher formats. Note that only Content-Format 836 (`"application/voucher+ cose"`) is defined in this document for the voucher request resource (`/rv`), both as request payload and as response payload.

Content-Format 836 MUST be supported by the Registrar for the `/rv` resource. If the `"ct"` attribute is not indicated for the `/rv` resource in the CoRE link format description, this implies that at least format 836 is supported and maybe more.

Note that this specification allows for voucher+cose format requests and vouchers to be transmitted over HTTPS, as well as for voucher-cms+json and other formats yet to be defined over CoAP. The burden for this flexibility is placed upon the Registrar. A Pledge on constrained hardware is expected to support a single format only.

The Pledge and MASA need to support one or more formats (at least format 836) for the voucher and for the voucher request. The MASA needs to support all formats that the Pledge supports.

In the below example, a Pledge queries specifically for the brski.rv resource type to learn what voucher formats are supported:

```
REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=brski.rv
```

```
RES: 2.05 Content
```

```
Content-Format: 40
```

```
Payload:
```

```
</b/rv>;rt=brski.rv;ct="836 65123 65124"
```

The Registrar returns 3 supported voucher formats: 836, 65123, and 65124. The first is the mandatory "application/voucher+cose". The other two are numbers from the Experimental Use number range of the CoAP Content-Formats sub-registry, which are used as mere examples. The Pledge can now make a selection between the supported formats.

Note that if the Registrar only supports the default Content-Formats for each BRSKI resource as specified by this document, it may also omit the ct attributes in the discovery query response. For example as in the following interaction:

```
REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=brski*
```

```
RES: 2.05 Content
```

```
Content-Format: 40
```

```
Payload:
```

```
</b>;rt=brski,
```

```
</b/rv>;rt=brski.rv,
```

```
</b/vs>;rt=brski.vs,
```

```
</b/es>;rt=brski.es
```

#### 14.4. EST-coaps Resource Discovery

The Pledge can also use CoAP discovery to identify enrollment options, for example enrollment using EST-coaps or other methods. The below example shows a Pledge that wants to identify EST-coaps enrollment options by sending a discovery query:

REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=ace.est\*

RES: 2.05 Content

Content-Format: 40

Payload:

```
</e/crts>;rt=ace.est.crts;ct="62 281 287",  
</e/sen>;rt=ace.est.sen;ct="281 287",  
</e/sren>;rt=ace.est.sren;ct="281 287",  
</e/att>;rt=ace.est.att,  
</e/skg>;rt=ace.est.skg,  
</e/skc>;rt=ace.est.skc
```

The response indicates that EST-coaps enrollment (/sen) and re-enrollment (/sren) is supported, with a choice of two Content-Formats for the return payload: either a PKCS#7 container with a single LDevID certificate ("application/pkcs7-mime;smime-type=certs-only", content-format 281) or just a single LDevID certificate ("application/pkix-cert", content-format 287).

For the EST cacerts resources (/crts) there are three Content-Formats supported: a multipart-core container (62) per [Section 6.5.5](#), a PKCS#7 container with all CA certificates (287), or a single (most relevant) CA certificate.

The Pledge can now send a CoAP request to one or more of the discovered resources, with the Accept Option to indicate which return payload format the Pledge wants to receive.

## 15. Security Considerations

### 15.1. Duplicate serial-numbers

In the absence of correct use of idevid-issuer by the Registrar as detailed in [Section 8.4](#), it would be possible for a malicious Registrar to use an unauthorized voucher for a device. This would apply only to the case where a Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA) is trusted by different products from the same manufacturer, and the manufacturer has duplicated serial numbers as a result of a merge, acquisition or mis-management.

For example, imagine the same manufacturer makes light bulbs as well as gas centrifuges, and said manufacturer does not uniquely allocate product serial numbers. This attack only works for nonceless vouchers. The attacker has obtained a light bulb which happens to have the same serial-number as a gas centrifuge which it wishes to obtain access. The attacker performs a normal BRSKI onboarding for the light bulb, but then uses the resulting voucher to onboard the gas centrifuge. The attack requires that the gas centrifuge be returned to a state where it is willing to perform a new onboarding operation.

This attack is prevented by the mechanism of having the Registrar include the idevid-issuer in the RVR, and the MASA including it in the resulting voucher. The idevid-issuer is not included by default: a MASA needs to be aware if there are parts of the organization which duplicates serial numbers, and if so, include it.

## 15.2. IDevID security in Pledge

The security of this protocol depends upon the Pledge identifying itself to the Registrar using its manufacturer installed certificate: the IDevID certificate. Associated with this certificate is the IDevID private key, known only to the Pledge. Disclosure of this private key to an attacker would permit the attacker to impersonate the Pledge towards the Registrar, probably gaining access credentials to that Registrar's network.

If the IDevID private key disclosure is known to the manufacturer, there is little recourse other than recall of the relevant part numbers. The process for communicating this recall would be within the BRSKI-MASA protocol. Neither this specification nor [\[RFC8995\]](#) provides for consultation of a Certification Revocation List (CRL) or Open Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) by a Registrar when evaluating an IDevID certificate. However, the BRSKI-MASA protocol submits the IDevID from the Registrar to the manufacturer's MASA and a manufacturer would have an opportunity to decline to issue a voucher for a device which they believe has become compromised.

It may be difficult for a manufacturer to determine when an IDevID private key has been disclosed. Two situations present themselves: in the first situation a compromised private key might be reused in a counterfeit device, which is sold to another customer. This would present itself as an onboarding of the same device in two different networks. The manufacturer may become suspicious seeing two voucher requests for the same device from different Registrars. Such activity could be indistinguishable from a device which has been resold from one operator to another, or re-deployed by an operator from one location to another.

In the second situation, an attacker having compromised the IDevID private key of a device might then install malware into the same device and attempt to return it to service. The device, now blank, would go through a second onboarding process with the original Registrar. Such a Registrar could notice that the device has been "factory reset" and alert the operator to this situation. One remedy against the presence of malware is through the use of Remote Attestation such as described in [\[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture\]](#). Future work will need to specify a background-check Attestation flow as part of the voucher-request/voucher-response process. Attestation may still require access to a private key (e.g. IDevID private key)

in order to sign Evidence, so a primary goal should be to keep any private key safe within the Pledge.

In larger, more expensive, systems there is budget (power, space, and bill of materials) to include more specific defenses for a private key. For instance, this includes putting the IDevID private key in a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), or use of Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) for access to the key. On smaller IoT devices, the cost and power budget for an extra part is often prohibitive.

It is becoming more and more common for CPUs to have an internal set of one-time fuses that can be programmed (often they are "burnt" by a laser) at the factory. This section of memory is only accessible in some privileged CPU state. The use of this kind of CPU is appropriate as it provides significant resistance against key disclosure even when the device can be disassembled by an attacker.

In a number of industry verticals, there is increasing concern about counterfeit parts. These may be look-alike parts created in a different factory, or parts which are created in the same factory during an illegal night-shift, but which are not subject to the appropriate level of quality control. The use of a manufacturer-signed IDevID certificate provides for discovery of the pedigree of each part, and this often justifies the cost of the security measures associated with storing the private key.

### **15.3. Security of CoAP and UDP protocols**

[Section 7.1](#) explains that no CoAPS version of the BRSKI-MASA protocol is proposed. The connection from the Registrar to the MASA continues to be HTTPS as in [\[RFC8995\]](#). This has been done to simplify the MASA deployment for the manufacturer, because no new protocol needs to be enabled on the server.

The use of UDP protocols across the open Internet is sometimes fraught with security challenges. Denial-of-service attacks against UDP based protocols are trivial as there is no three-way handshake as done for TCP. The three-way handshake of TCP guarantees that the node sending the connection request is reachable using the origin IP address. While DTLS contains an option to do a stateless challenge -- a process actually stronger than that done by TCP -- it is not yet common for this mechanism to be available in hardware at multigigabit speeds. It is for this reason that this document defines using HTTPS for the Registrar to MASA connection.

### **15.4. Registrar Certificate may be self-signed**

The provisional (D)TLS connection formed by the Pledge with the Registrar does not authenticate the Registrar's identity. This Registrar's identity is validated by the [\[RFC8366bis\]](#) voucher that

is issued by the MASA, signed with an anchor that was built-in to the Pledge.

The Registrar may therefore use any certificate, including a self-signed one. The only restrictions on the certificate is that it MUST have EKU bits set as detailed in [Section 6.1.5](#) and [Section 7.4](#).

#### **15.5. Use of RPK alternatives to proximity-registrar-cert**

In [[RFC8366bis](#)], [Part voucher-request-artifact](#) two compact alternative fields for proximity-registrar-cert are defined that include an RPK: proximity-registrar-pubk and proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256. The Pledge can use these fields in its PVR to identify the Registrar based on its public key only. Since the full certificate of the proximate Registrar is not included, use of these fields by a Pledge implies that a Registrar could insert another certificate with the same public key identity into the RVR. For example, an older or a newer version of its certificate. The MASA will not be able to detect such act by the Registrar. But since any 'other' certificate the Registrar could insert in this way still encodes its identity the additional risk of using the RPK alternatives is negligible.

When a Registrar sees a PVR that uses one of proximity-registrar-pubk or proximity-registrar-pubk-sha256 fields, this implies the Registrar must include the certificate identified by these fields into its RVR. Otherwise, the MASA is unable to verify proximity. This requirement is already implied by the "MUST" requirement in [Section 8.1](#).

#### **15.6. MASA support of CoAPS**

The use of CoAP for the BRSKI-MASA connection is not in scope of the current document. The following security considerations have led to this choice of scope:

- \*the technology and experience to build secure Internet-scale HTTPS responders (which the MASA is) is common, while the experience in doing the same for CoAP is much less common.
- \*in many enterprise networks, outgoing UDP connections are often treated as suspicious, which could effectively block CoAP connections for some firewall configurations.
- \*reducing the complexity of MASA (i.e. less protocols supported) would also reduce its potential attack surface, which is relevant since the MASA is 24/7 exposed on the Internet and accepting (untrusted) incoming connections.

## 16. IANA Considerations

### 16.1. Resource Type Link Target Attribute Values Registry

Additions to the sub-registry "Resource Type Link Target Attribute Values", within the "CoRE Parameters" IANA registry are specified below.

Reference: [This RFC]

Attribute	Description
brski	Root path of Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI) resources
brski.rv	BRSKI request voucher resource
brski.vs	BRSKI voucher status telemetry resource
brski.es	BRSKI enrollment status telemetry resource

Table 2: Resource Type (rt) link target attribute values for IANA registration

### 16.2. Media Types Registry

This section registers the media type "application/voucher+cose" in the IANA "Media Types" registry. This media type is used to indicate that the content is a CBOR voucher or voucher request signed with a COSE\_Sign1 structure [[RFC9052](#)].

### 16.2.1. application/voucher+cose

Type name: application  
Subtype name: voucher+cose  
Required parameters: N/A  
Optional parameters: N/A  
Encoding considerations: binary (CBOR)  
Security considerations: Security Considerations of [This RFC].  
Interoperability considerations: The format is designed to be broadly interoperable.  
Published specification: [This RFC]  
Applications that use this media type: ANIMA, 6TiSCH, and other zero-touch onboarding systems  
Fragment identifier considerations: N/A  
Additional information:  
  Deprecated alias names for this type: N/A  
  Magic number(s): N/A  
  File extension(s): .vch  
  Macintosh file type code(s): N/A  
Person & email address to contact for further information: IETF ANIMA Working Group (anima@ietf.org) or IETF Operations and Management Area Working Group (opsawg@ietf.org)  
Intended usage: COMMON  
Restrictions on usage: N/A  
Author: ANIMA WG  
Change controller: IETF  
Provisional registration? (standards tree only): NO

### 16.3. CoAP Content-Format Registry

IANA has allocated ID 836 from the sub-registry "CoAP Content-Formats".

Media type	Encoding	ID	Reference
-----	-----	-----	-----
application/voucher+cose	-	836	[This RFC]

IANA Note (to be removed by RFC editor): the TEMPORARY registration of 836 is made under the old name of "application/voucher-cose+cbor".

### 16.4. Update to BRSKI Parameters Registry

This section updates the BRSKI Well-Known URIs sub-registry of the IANA Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI) Parameters Registry by adding a new column "Short URI". The contents of this field MUST be specified for any newly registered URI as follows:



Short URI: A short name for the "URI" resource that can be used by a cBRSKI ([This RFC]) Pledge in a CoAP request to the Registrar. In case the "URI" resource is only used between Registrar and MASA, the value "--" is registered denoting that a short name is not applicable.

The initial contents of the sub-registry including the new column are as follows:

URI	Short URI	Description	Reference
requestvoucher	rv	Request voucher: Pledge to Registrar, and Registrar to MASA	[ <a href="#">RFC8995</a> ], [This RFC]
voucher_status	vs	Voucher status telemetry: Pledge to Registrar	[ <a href="#">RFC8995</a> ], [This RFC]
requestauditlog	--	Request audit log: Registrar to MASA	[ <a href="#">RFC8995</a> ]
enrollstatus	es	Enrollment status telemetry: Pledge to Registrar	[ <a href="#">RFC8995</a> ], [This RFC]

Table 3: Update of the BRSKI Well-Known URI Sub-Registry

#### 16.5. Structured Syntax Suffixes Registry

This section registers the "+cose" suffix in the IANA Structured Syntax Suffixes Registry based on the [[RFC6838](#)] procedure.

Name: CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE) object

+suffix: +cose

References: the "application/cose" media type [RFC9052]

Encoding considerations: binary (CBOR)

Interoperability considerations:

the "application/cose" media type has an optional parameter "cose-type". Any new media type that uses the +cose suffix and allows use of this parameter MUST specify this explicitly, per Section 4.3 of [RFC6838]. If the parameter "cose-type" is allowed, its usage MUST be identical to the usage defined for the "application/cose" media type in Section 2 of [RFC9052].

A COSE processor handling a media type "foo+cose" and which does not know the specific type "foo" SHOULD use the cose-type tag, if present, or cose-type parameter, if present, to determine the specific COSE object type during processing. If the specific type cannot be determined, it MUST assume only the generic COSE object structure and it MUST NOT perform security-critical operations using the COSE object.

Fragment identifier considerations: N/A

Security considerations: see [RFC9052]

Contact:

IETF COSE Working Group (cose@ietf.org) or IESG (iesg@ietf.org)

Author/Change controller:

IETF ANIMA Working Group (anima@ietf.org).  
IESG has change control over this registration.

## 17. Acknowledgements

We are very grateful to Jim Schaad for explaining COSE/CMS choices and for correcting early versions of the COSE\_Sign1 objects.

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Darrel Miller , Ori Steele and Manu Sporny provided review feedback on the registration of the +cose structured syntax suffix.

## 18. Changelog

-24: Rephrased well-known URL requirement in 14.1 (#292, #293); Added paragraph on future certificate formats like C509 (#281, #294); Add formal specification for CoAP discovery of Join Proxy by Pledge, instead of only showing examples (#296, #300); Enable mDNS discovery of Join Proxy by Pledge (also in mesh networks) and list service name to use (#297, #299); Add requirement to support Content-Format 287 in /sen and /sren response (#295, #298).

-23:

Removed Update tag for RFC 8366 (#285, #288); Introduced cBRSKI acronym (#284, #286); Added Update tag for RFC 9148 (#283, #289); Keep CoAP discovery as only mechanism and refer to future discovery work (#279, #282, #290); Introduce formal CBOR diagnostics ellipsis elision syntax (#281, #287); Support for multi-tier CAs by introducing multipart-core /crts format (#275, #291); Terminology updated for consistency with RFC 8366-bis (#274, #280); Rename voucher media type to application/voucher+cose and register +cose SSS (#264, #277); Editorial changes including section restructuring.

-22:

Streamlined text to focus mostly on the default flow, with optional functions moved to their own sections (#269, #273); For DTLS 1.3 client, use the record\_size\_limit extensions RFC 8449 (#270); Editorial updates; Reference rfc6125bis updated to RFC 9525.

-11 to -21:

(For change details see GitHub issues <https://github.com/anima-wg/constrained-voucher/issues> , related Pull Requests and commits.)

-10:

Design considerations extended; Examples made consistent.

-08:

Examples for cose\_sign1 are completed and improved.

-06:

New SID values assigned; regenerated examples.

-04:

voucher and request-voucher MUST be signed; examples for signed request are added in appendix; IANA SID registration is updated; SID values in examples are aligned; signed cms examples aligned with new SIDs.

-03:

Examples are inverted.

-02:

Example of requestvoucher with unsigned application/cbor is added; attributes of voucher "refined" to optional; CBOR serialization of vouchers improved; Discovery port numbers are specified.

-01:

application/json is optional, application/cbor is compulsory; Cms and cose mediatypes are introduced.

-00:

Initial version.

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## Appendix A. Library Support for BRSKI

For the implementation of BRSKI, the use of a software library to manipulate PKIX certificates and use crypto algorithms is often beneficial. Two C-based examples are OpenSSL and mbedtls. Others more targeted to specific platforms or languages exist. It is important to realize that the library interfaces differ significantly between libraries.

Libraries do not support all known crypto algorithms. Before deciding on a library, it is important to look at their supported crypto algorithms and the roadmap for future support. Apart from

availability, the library footprint, and the required execution cycles should be investigated beforehand.

The handling of certificates usually includes the checking of a certificate chain. In some libraries, chains are constructed and verified on the basis of a set of certificates, the trust anchor (usually a self signed root CA), and the target certificate. In other libraries, the chain must be constructed beforehand and obey ordering criteria. Verification always includes the checking of the signatures. Less frequent is the checking the validity of the dates or checking the existence of a revoked certificate in the chain against a set of revoked certificates. Checking the chain on the consistency of the certificate extensions which specify the use of the certificate usually needs to be programmed explicitly.

A library can be used to construct a (D)TLS connection. It is useful to realize that differences between (D)TLS implementations will occur due to the differences in the certificate checks supported by the library. On top of that, checks between client and server certificates enforced by (D)TLS are not always helpful for a BRSKI implementation. For example, the certificates of Pledge and Registrar are usually not related when the BRSKI protocol is started. It must be verified that checks on the relation between client and server certificates do not hamper a successful DTLS connection establishment.

#### **A.1. OpensSSL**

From openssl's apps/verify.c :

```

<CODE BEGINS>
X509 *x = NULL;
int i = 0, ret = 0;
X509_STORE_CTX *csc;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
int num_untrusted;

x = load_cert(file, "certificate file");
if (x == NULL)
    goto end;

csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
if (csc == NULL) {
    BIO_printf(bio_err, "error %s: X.509 store context"
               "allocation failed\n",
               (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
    goto end;
}

X509_STORE_set_flags(ctx, vflags);
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, ctx, x, uchain)) {
    X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
    BIO_printf(bio_err,
               "error %s: X.509 store context"
               "initialization failed\n",
               (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
    goto end;
}
if (tchain != NULL)
    X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(csc, tchain);
if (crls != NULL)
    X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(csc, crls);

i = X509_verify_cert(csc);
X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);

<CODE ENDS>

```

## A.2. mbedTLS

```

<CODE BEGINS>
mbedtls_x509_crt cert;
mbedtls_x509_crt caCert;
uint32_t          certVerifyResultFlags;
// ...
int result = mbedtls_x509_crt_verify(&cert, &caCert, NULL, NULL,
                                     &certVerifyResultFlags, NULL, NULL);

<CODE ENDS>

```

## Appendix B. cBRSKI Message Examples

This appendix extends the EST-coaps message examples from Appendix A of [[RFC9148](#)] with cBRSKI messages. The CoAP headers are only fully worked out for the first example, enrollstatus.

### B.1. enrollstatus

A coaps enrollstatus message from Pledge to Registrar can be as follows:

```
REQ: POST coaps://192.0.2.1:8085/b/es
Content-Format: 60
Payload: <binary CBOR encoding of an enrollstatus map>
```

The corresponding CoAP header fields for this request are shown below.

```
Ver = 1
T = 0 (CON)
TKL = 1
Code = 0x02 (0.02 is POST method)
Message ID = 0xab0f
Token = 0x4d
Options
Option (Uri-Path)
  Option Delta = 0xb (option nr = 11)
  Option Length = 0x1
  Option Value = "b"
Option (Uri-Path)
  Option Delta = 0x0 (option nr = 11)
  Option Length = 0x2
  Option Value = "es"
Option (Content-Format)
  Option Delta = 0x1 (option nr = 12)
  Option Length = 0x1
  Option Value = 60 (application/cbor)
Payload Marker = 0xFF
Payload = A26776657273696F6E0166737461747573F5 (18 bytes binary)
```

The Uri-Host and Uri-Port Options are omitted because they coincide with the transport protocol (UDP) destination address and port respectively.

The above binary CBOR enrollstatus payload looks as follows in CBOR diagnostic notation, for the case of enrollment success:

```
{
  "version": 1,
  "status": true
}
```

Alternatively the payload could look as follows in case of enrollment failure, using the reason field to describe the failure:

```
Payload = A36776657273696F6E0166737461747573F466726561736F6E782A3C
          496E666F726D61746976652068756D616E207265616461626C652065
          72726F72206D6573736167653E    (69 bytes binary)
```

```
{
  "version": 1,
  "status": false,
  "reason": "<Informative human readable error message>"
}
```

To indicate successful reception of the enrollmentstatus telemetry report, a response from the Registrar may then be:

#### 2.04 Changed

Which in case of a piggybacked response has the following CoAP header fields:

```
Ver=1
T=2 (ACK)
TKL=1
Code = 0x44 (2.04 Changed)
Message ID = 0xab0f
Token = 0x4d
```

### B.2. voucher\_status

A coaps voucher\_status message from Pledge to Registrar can be as follows:

```
REQ: POST coaps://[2001:db8::2:1]/.well-known/brski/vs
Content-Format: 60 (application/cbor)
Payload =
A46776657273696F6E0166737461747573F466726561736F6E7828496E66
6F726D61746976652068756D616E2D7265616461626C65206572726F7220
6D6573736167656E726561736F6E2D636F6E74657874A100764164646974
696F6E616C20696E666F726D6174696F6E
```

The request payload above is binary CBOR but represented here in hexadecimal for readability. Below is the equivalent CBOR diagnostic format.

```
{
  "version": 1,
  "status": false,
  "reason": "Informative human-readable error message",
  "reason-context": { 0: "Additional information" }
}
```

A success response without payload will then be sent by the Registrar back to the Pledge to indicate reception of the telemetry report:

2.04 Changed

## Appendix C. COSE-signed Voucher (Request) Examples

This appendix provides examples of COSE-signed voucher requests and vouchers. First, the used test keys and PKIX certificates are described, followed by examples of a constrained PVR, RVR and voucher.

### C.1. Pledge, Registrar and MASA Keys

This section documents the public and private keys used for all examples in this appendix. These keys are not used in any production system, and must only be used for testing purposes.

#### C.1.1. Pledge IDevID private key

```
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MHcCAQEEIMv+C4dbzeyrEH20qkpFlWIH2FFACGZv9kw7rNwtSlYtoAoGCCqGSM49
AwEHOuQDQgAESH6OUiYFRhfIgwL4GG8jHoj8a+8rf6t5s1mZ/4SePlKom39GQ34p
VYryJ9aHmboLLfz69bzICQFKbkoQ5oaiew==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
```

Private-Key: (256 bit)

priv:

```
cb:fe:0b:87:5b:cd:ec:ab:10:7d:b4:aa:4a:45:95:
62:07:d8:51:40:08:66:6f:f6:45:bb:ac:d5:ad:4a:
56:2d
```

pub:

```
04:48:7e:8e:52:26:05:46:17:c8:81:69:78:18:6f:
23:1e:88:fc:6b:ef:2b:7f:ab:79:b3:59:99:ff:84:
9e:3e:52:a8:9b:7f:46:43:7e:29:55:8a:f2:27:d6:
87:99:ba:0b:2d:fc:fa:f5:bc:c8:09:01:4a:6e:4a:
10:e6:86:a2:7b
```

ASN1 OID: prime256v1

NIST CURVE: P-256

### C.1.2. Registrar private key

```
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MIGHAgEAMBMGBByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgYJ/MP0dWA9BkYd4W
s6oRY62hDddaEmrAVm5dtAXE/UGhRANCAAQgMIVb6EaRCz7LFcr4Vy0+tWW9x1Sh
Xvr27euqi54WCMXJEMk6IIaPyFBNNw8bJvqXWfZ5g7t4hj7amsvqUST2
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
```

Private-Key: (256 bit)

priv:

```
60:9f:cc:3f:47:56:03:d0:64:61:de:16:b3:aa:11:
63:ad:a1:0d:d7:5a:12:6a:c0:56:6e:5d:b4:05:c4:
fd:41
```

pub:

```
04:20:30:85:5b:e8:46:91:0b:3e:cb:15:ca:f8:57:
2d:3e:b5:65:bd:c6:54:a1:5e:fa:f6:ed:eb:aa:8b:
9e:16:08:c5:c9:10:c9:3a:20:86:8f:c8:50:4d:37:
0f:1b:26:fa:97:59:f6:79:83:bb:78:86:3e:da:9a:
cb:ea:51:24:f6
```

ASN1 OID: prime256v1

NIST CURVE: P-256

### C.1.3. MASA private key

```
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MIGHAgEAMBMGBByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgrbJ1oU+HIJ2SWYAk
DkBTl+YNPxQG+gwsMsZB94N8mZ2hRANCAASS9NVlWJdztwNY81yP1H2UODYWh1YA
ZfsqnEPSFZKnq8mq8gF78ZVbYi6q2FEg8kkORY/rpIU/X7SQsRuD+wMW
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
```

Private-Key: (256 bit)

priv:

```
ad:b2:75:a1:4f:87:20:9d:92:59:80:24:0e:40:53:
2f:e6:0d:3f:14:06:fa:0c:2c:32:c6:41:f7:83:7c:
99:9d
```

pub:

```
04:92:f4:d5:65:58:97:73:b7:03:58:f3:5c:8f:94:
7d:94:38:36:16:86:56:00:65:fb:2a:9c:43:d2:15:
92:a7:ab:c9:aa:f2:01:7b:f1:95:5b:62:2e:aa:d8:
51:20:f2:49:0e:45:8f:eb:a4:85:3f:5f:b4:90:b1:
1b:83:fb:03:16
```

ASN1 OID: prime256v1

NIST CURVE: P-256

## C.2. Pledge, Registrar, Domain CA and MASA Certificates

All keys and PKIX certificates used for the examples have been generated with OpenSSL - see [Appendix D](#) for more details on

certificate generation. Below the certificates are listed that accompany the keys shown above. Each certificate description is followed by the hexadecimal representation of the X.509 ASN.1 DER encoded certificate. This representation can be for example decoded using an online ASN.1 decoder.

### C.2.1. Pledge IDevID Certificate

Certificate:

Data:

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number: 32429 (0x7ead)

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

Issuer: CN = masa.stok.nl, O = vanderstok, L = Helmond,  
C = NL

Validity

Not Before: Dec 9 12:50:47 2022 GMT

Not After : Dec 31 12:50:47 9999 GMT

Subject: CN = Stok IoT sensor Y-42, serialNumber = JADA123456789

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey

Public-Key: (256 bit)

pub:

04:48:7e:8e:52:26:05:46:17:c8:81:69:78:18:6f:

23:1e:88:fc:6b:ef:2b:7f:ab:79:b3:59:99:ff:84:

9e:3e:52:a8:9b:7f:46:43:7e:29:55:8a:f2:27:d6:

87:99:ba:0b:2d:fc:fa:f5:bc:c8:09:01:4a:6e:4a:

10:e6:86:a2:7b

ASN1 OID: prime256v1

NIST CURVE: P-256

X509v3 extensions:

X509v3 Key Usage: critical

Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment,  
Data Encipherment

X509v3 Basic Constraints:

CA:FALSE

X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:

CB:8D:98:CA:74:C5:1B:58:DD:E7:AC:EF:86:9A:94:43:A8:D6:66:A6

1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.32:

hl=2 l= 12 prim: IA5STRING :masa.stok.nl

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

Signature Value:

30:45:02:20:4d:89:90:7e:03:fb:52:56:42:0c:3f:c1:b1:f1:

47:b5:b3:93:65:45:2e:be:50:db:67:85:8f:23:89:a2:3f:9e:

02:21:00:95:33:69:d1:c6:db:f0:f1:f6:52:24:59:d3:0a:95:

4e:b2:f4:96:a1:31:3c:7b:d9:2f:28:b3:29:71:bb:60:df



Below is the hexadecimal representation of the binary X.509 DER-encoded certificate:

```
308201CE30820174A00302010202027EAD300A06082A8648CE3D040302304B31
15301306035504030C0C6D6173612E73746F6B2E6E6C31133011060355040A0C
0A76616E64657273746F6B3110300E06035504070C0748656C6D6F6E64310B30
09060355040613024E4C3020170D3232313230393132353034375A180F393939
39313233313132353034375A3037311D301B06035504030C1453746F6B20496F
542073656E736F7220592D3432311630140603550405130D4A41444131323334
35363738393059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D03010703420004
487E8E5226054617C8816978186F231E88FC6BEF2B7FAB79B35999FF849E3E52
A89B7F46437E29558AF227D68799BA0B2DFCF5BCC809014A6E4A10E686A27B
A35A3058300E0603551D0F0101FF0404030204F030090603551D130402300030
1F0603551D23041830168014CB8D98CA74C51B58DDE7ACEF869A9443A8D666A6
301A06082B06010505070120040E160C6D6173612E73746F6B2E6E6C300A0608
2A8648CE3D040302034800304502204D89907E03FB5256420C3FC1B1F147B5B3
9365452EBE50DB67858F2389A23F9E022100953369D1C6DBF0F1F6522459D30A
954EB2F496A1313C7BD92F28B32971BB60DF
```

### C.2.2. Registrar Certificate

Certificate:

Data:

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number:

c3:f6:21:49:b2:e3:0e:3e

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

Issuer: CN = Custom-ER Global CA, OU = IT, O = "Custom-ER, Inc.",  
L = San Jose, ST = CA, C = US

Validity

Not Before: Dec 9 12:50:47 2022 GMT

Not After : Dec 8 12:50:47 2025 GMT

Subject: CN = Custom-ER Registrar, OU = Office dept, O = "Custom-ER,  
Inc.", L = Ottawa, ST = ON, C = CA

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey

Public-Key: (256 bit)

pub:

04:20:30:85:5b:e8:46:91:0b:3e:cb:15:ca:f8:57:

2d:3e:b5:65:bd:c6:54:a1:5e:fa:f6:ed:eb:aa:8b:

9e:16:08:c5:c9:10:c9:3a:20:86:8f:c8:50:4d:37:

0f:1b:26:fa:97:59:f6:79:83:bb:78:86:3e:da:9a:

cb:ea:51:24:f6

ASN1 OID: prime256v1

NIST CURVE: P-256

X509v3 extensions:

X509v3 Key Usage: critical

Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment,  
Data Encipherment

X509v3 Basic Constraints:

CA:FALSE

X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:

C9:08:0B:38:7D:8D:D8:5B:3A:59:E7:EC:10:0B:86:63:93:A9:CA:4C

X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:

92:EA:76:40:40:4A:8F:AB:4F:27:0B:F3:BC:37:9D:86:CD:72:80:F8

X509v3 Extended Key Usage: critical

CMC Registration Authority, TLS Web Server Authentication,  
TLS Web Client Authentication

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

Signature Value:

30:45:02:21:00:d8:4a:7c:69:2f:f9:58:6e:82:22:87:18:f6:

3b:c3:05:f0:ae:b8:ae:ec:42:78:82:38:79:81:2a:5d:15:61:

64:02:20:08:f2:3c:13:69:13:b0:2c:e2:63:09:d5:99:4f:eb:

75:70:af:af:ed:98:cd:f1:12:11:c0:37:f7:18:4d:c1:9d

Below is the hexadecimal representation of the binary X.509 DER-  
encoded certificate:

3082026D30820213A003020102020900C3F62149B2E30E3E300A06082A8648CE  
3D0403023072311C301A06035504030C13437573746F6D2D455220476C6F6261  
6C204341310B3009060355040B0C02495431183016060355040A0C0F43757374  
6F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300F06035504070C0853616E204A6F7365310B  
300906035504080C024341310B3009060355040613025553301E170D32323132  
30393132353034375A170D3235313230383132353034375A3079311C301A0603  
5504030C13437573746F6D2D4552205265676973747261723114301206035504  
0B0C0B4F6666696365206465707431183016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2D  
45522C20496E632E310F300D06035504070C064F74746F7761310B3009060355  
04080C024F4E310B30090603550406130243413059301306072A8648CE3D0201  
06082A8648CE3D030107034200042030855BE846910B3ECB15CAF8572D3EB565  
BDC654A15EFAF6EDEBAA8B9E1608C5C910C93A20868FC8504D370F1B26FA9759  
F67983BB78863EDA9ACBEA5124F6A3818A308187300E0603551D0F0101FF0404  
030204F030090603551D1304023000301D0603551D0E04160414C9080B387D8D  
D85B3A59E7EC100B866393A9CA4C301F0603551D2304183016801492EA764040  
4A8FAB4F270BF3BC379D86CD7280F8302A0603551D250101FF0420301E06082B  
0601050507031C06082B0601050507030106082B06010505070302300A06082A  
8648CE3D0403020348003045022100D84A7C692FF9586E82228718F63BC305F0  
AEB8AEEC4278823879812A5D156164022008F23C136913B02CE26309D5994FEB  
7570AFAFED98CDF11211C037F7184DC19D

### C.2.3. Domain CA Certificate

The Domain CA certificate is the CA of the owner's domain. It has signed the Registrar (RA) certificate.

Certificate:

Data:

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number: 3092288576548618702 (0x2aea0413a42dc1ce)

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

Issuer: CN = Custom-ER Global CA, OU = IT, O = "Custom-ER, Inc.",  
L = San Jose, ST = CA, C = US

Validity

Not Before: Dec 9 12:50:47 2022 GMT

Not After : Dec 6 12:50:47 2032 GMT

Subject: CN = Custom-ER Global CA, OU = IT, O = "Custom-ER, Inc.",  
L = San Jose, ST = CA, C = US

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey

Public-Key: (256 bit)

pub:

04:97:b1:ed:96:91:64:93:09:85:bb:b8:ac:9a:2a:

f9:45:5c:df:ee:a4:b1:1d:e2:e7:9d:06:8b:fa:80:

39:26:b4:00:52:51:b3:4f:1c:08:15:a4:cb:e0:3f:

bd:1b:bc:b6:35:f6:43:1a:22:de:78:65:3b:87:b9:

95:37:ec:e1:6c

ASN1 OID: prime256v1

NIST CURVE: P-256

X509v3 extensions:

X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:

email:help@custom-er.example.com

X509v3 Key Usage: critical

Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign

X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical

CA:TRUE

X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:

92:EA:76:40:40:4A:8F:AB:4F:27:0B:F3:BC:37:9D:86:CD:72:80:F8

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

Signature Value:

30:44:02:20:66:15:df:c3:70:11:f6:73:78:d8:fd:1c:2a:3f:

bd:d1:3f:51:f6:b6:6f:2d:7c:e2:7a:13:18:21:bb:70:f0:c0:

02:20:69:86:d8:d2:28:b2:92:6e:23:9e:19:0b:8f:18:25:c9:

c1:4c:67:95:ff:a0:b3:24:bd:4d:ac:2e:cb:68:d7:13

Below is the hexadecimal representation of the binary X.509 DER-  
encoded certificate:

30820242308201E9A00302010202082AEA0413A42DC1CE300A06082A8648CE3D  
0403023072311C301A06035504030C13437573746F6D2D455220476C6F62616C  
204341310B3009060355040B0C02495431183016060355040A0C0F437573746F  
6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300F06035504070C0853616E204A6F7365310B30  
0906035504080C024341310B3009060355040613025553301E170D3232313230  
393132353034375A170D3332313230363132353034375A3072311C301A060355  
04030C13437573746F6D2D455220476C6F62616C204341310B3009060355040B  
0C02495431183016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111  
300F06035504070C0853616E204A6F7365310B300906035504080C024341310B  
30090603550406130255533059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D03  
01070342000497B1ED969164930985BBB8AC9A2AF9455CDFEEA4B11DE2E79D06  
8BFA803926B4005251B34F1C0815A4CBE03FBD1BBCB635F6431A22DE78653B87  
B99537ECE16CA369306730250603551D11041E301C811A68656C704063757374  
6F6D2D65722E6578616D706C652E636F6D300E0603551D0F0101FF0404030201  
86300F0603551D130101FF040530030101FF301D0603551D0E0416041492EA76  
40404A8FAB4F270BF3BC379D86CD7280F8300A06082A8648CE3D040302034700  
304402206615DFC37011F67378D8FD1C2A3FBDD13F51F6B66F2D7CE27A131821  
BB70F0C002206986D8D228B2926E239E190B8F1825C9C14C6795FFA0B324BD4D  
AC2ECB68D713

#### **C.2.4. MASA Certificate**

The MASA CA certificate is the CA that signed the Pledge's IDevID certificate.

Certificate:

Data:

Version: 3 (0x2)

Serial Number:

e3:9c:da:17:e1:38:6a:0a

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

Issuer: CN = masa.stok.nl, O = vanderstok, L = Helmond,  
C = NL

Validity

Not Before: Dec 9 12:50:47 2022 GMT

Not After : Dec 6 12:50:47 2032 GMT

Subject: CN = masa.stok.nl, O = vanderstok, L = Helmond,  
C = NL

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey

Public-Key: (256 bit)

pub:

04:92:f4:d5:65:58:97:73:b7:03:58:f3:5c:8f:94:

7d:94:38:36:16:86:56:00:65:fb:2a:9c:43:d2:15:

92:a7:ab:c9:aa:f2:01:7b:f1:95:5b:62:2e:aa:d8:

51:20:f2:49:0e:45:8f:eb:a4:85:3f:5f:b4:90:b1:

1b:83:fb:03:16

ASN1 OID: prime256v1

NIST CURVE: P-256

X509v3 extensions:

X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:

email:info@masa.stok.nl

X509v3 Key Usage: critical

Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign

X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical

CA:TRUE, pathlen:3

X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:

CB:8D:98:CA:74:C5:1B:58:DD:E7:AC:EF:86:9A:94:43:A8:D6:66:A6

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

Signature Value:

30:46:02:21:00:94:3f:a5:26:51:68:16:38:5b:78:9a:d8:c3:

af:8e:49:28:22:60:56:26:43:4a:14:98:3e:e1:e4:81:ad:ca:

1b:02:21:00:ba:4d:aa:fd:fa:68:42:74:03:2b:a8:41:6b:e2:

90:0c:9e:7b:b8:c0:9c:f7:0e:3f:b4:36:8a:b3:9c:3e:31:0e

Below is the hexadecimal representation of the binary X.509 DER-  
encoded certificate:

```
308201F130820196A003020102020900E39CDA17E1386A0A300A06082A8648CE
3D040302304B3115301306035504030C0C6D6173612E73746F6B2E6E6C311330
11060355040A0C0A76616E64657273746F6B3110300E06035504070C0748656C
6D6F6E64310B3009060355040613024E4C301E170D3232313230393132353034
375A170D3332313230363132353034375A304B3115301306035504030C0C6D61
73612E73746F6B2E6E6C31133011060355040A0C0A76616E64657273746F6B31
10300E06035504070C0748656C6D6F6E64310B3009060355040613024E4C3059
301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D0301070342000492F4D565589773
B70358F35C8F947D9438361686560065FB2A9C43D21592A7ABC9AAF2017BF195
5B622EAAD85120F2490E458FEBA4853F5FB490B11B83FB0316A3633061301C06
03551D11041530138111696E666F406D6173612E73746F6B2E6E6C300E060355
1D0F0101FF04040302018630120603551D130101FF040830060101FF02010330
1D0603551D0E04160414CB8D98CA74C51B58DDE7ACEF869A9443A8D666A6300A
06082A8648CE3D0403020349003046022100943FA526516816385B789AD8C3AF
8E492822605626434A14983EE1E481ADCA1B022100BA4DAAFDF6A684274032BA8
416BE2900C9E7BB8C09CF70E3FB4368AB39C3E310E
```

### C.3. COSE-signed Pledge Voucher Request (PVR)

In this example, the voucher request (PVR) has been signed by the Pledge using the IDevID private key of [Appendix C.1.1](#), and has been sent to the link-local constrained Join Proxy (JP) over CoAPS to the JP's join port. The join port happens to use the default CoAPS UDP port 5684.

```
REQ: POST coaps://[JP-link-local-address]/b/rv
Content-Format: 836
Payload: <signed_pvr>
```

When the Join Proxy receives the DTLS handshake messages from the Pledge, it will relay these messages to the Registrar. The payload `signed_voucher_request` is shown as hexadecimal dump (with lf added) below:

```
D28443A10126A0587EA11909C5A40102074823BFBBC9C2BCF2130C585B305930
1306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107034200042030855BE846910B
3ECB15CAF8572D3EB565BDC654A15EFAF6EDEBAA8B9E1608C5C910C93A20868F
C8504D370F1B26FA9759F67983BB78863EDA9ACBEA5124F60D6D4A4144413132
33343536373839584068987DE8B007F4E9416610BBE2D48E1D7EA1032092B8BF
CE611421950F45B22F17E214820C07E777ADF86175E25D3205568404C25FCEEC
1B817C7861A6104B3D
```

The representation of `signed_pvr` in CBOR diagnostic format (with lf added) is:

```
18([h'A10126', {}, h'A11909C5A40102074823BFBBC9C2BCF2130C585B3059301
306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107034200042030855BE846910B3ECB1
5CAF8572D3EB565BDC654A15EFAF6EDEBAA8B9E1608C5C910C93A20868FC8504D370
F1B26FA9759F67983BB78863EDA9ACBEA5124F60D6D4A41444131323334353637383
9', h'68987DE8B007F4E9416610BBE2D48E1D7EA1032092B8BFCE611421950F45B2
2F17E214820C07E777ADF86175E25D3205568404C25FCEEC1B817C7861A6104B3D']
)
```

The COSE payload is the PVR voucher data, encoded as a CBOR byte string. The diagnostic representation of it is shown below:

```
{2501: {1: 2, 7: h'23BFBBC9C2BCF213', 12: h'3059301306072A8648CE3D02
0106082A8648CE3D030107034200042030855BE846910B3ECB15CAF8572D3EB565BD
C654A15EFAF6EDEBAA8B9E1608C5C910C93A20868FC8504D370F1B26FA9759F67983
BB78863EDA9ACBEA5124F6', 13: "JADA123456789"}}
```

The Pledge uses the "proximity" (key '1', SID 2502, enum value 2) assertion together with an included proximity-registrar-pubk field (key '12', SID 2513) to inform MASA about its proximity to the specific Registrar.

#### C.4. COSE-signed Registrar Voucher Request (RVR)

In this example the Registrar's voucher request has been signed by the JRC (Registrar) using the private key from [Appendix C.1.2](#). Contained within this voucher request is the voucher request PVR that was made by the Pledge to JRC. Note that the RVR uses the HTTPS protocol (not CoAP) and corresponding long URI path names as defined in [\[RFC8995\]](#). The Content-Type and Accept headers indicate the constrained voucher format that is defined in the present document. Because the Pledge used this format in the PVR, the JRC must also use this format in the RVR.

```
REQ: POST https://masa.stok.nl/.well-known/brski/requestvoucher
Content-Type: application/voucher+cose
Accept: application/voucher+cose
Body: <signed_rvr>
```

The payload `signed_rvr` is shown as hexadecimal dump (with lf added):



D28443A10126A11820825902843082028030820225A003020102020900C3F621  
49B2E30E3E300A06082A8648CE3D0403023072311C301A06035504030C134375  
73746F6D2D455220476C6F62616C204341310B3009060355040B0C0249543118  
3016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300F06035504  
070C0853616E204A6F7365310B300906035504080C024341310B300906035504  
0613025553301E170D3232313230363131333735395A170D3235313230353131  
333735395A30818D3131302F06035504030C28437573746F6D2D455220436F6D  
6D65726369616C204275696C64696E6773205265676973747261723113301106  
0355040B0C0A4F6666696365206F707331183016060355040A0C0F437573746F  
6D2D45522C20496E632E310F300D06035504070C064F74746F7761310B300906  
035504080C024F4E310B30090603550406130243413059301306072A8648CE3D  
020106082A8648CE3D030107034200042030855BE846910B3ECB15CAF8572D3E  
B565BDC654A15EFAF6EDEBAA8B9E1608C5C910C93A20868FC8504D370F1B26FA  
9759F67983BB78863EDA9ACBEA5124F6A3818730818430090603551D13040230  
00300B0603551D0F0404030204F0301D0603551D0E04160414C9080B387D8DD8  
5B3A59E7EC100B866393A9CA4C301F0603551D2304183016801492EA7640404A  
8FAB4F270BF3BC379D86CD7280F8302A0603551D250101FF0420301E06082B06  
01050507031C06082B0601050507030106082B06010505070302300A06082A86  
48CE3D040302034900304602210091A2033692EB81503D53505FFC8DA326B1EE  
7DEA96F29174F0B3341A07812201022100FF7339288108B712F418530A18025A  
895408CC45E0BB678B46FBAB37DDB4D36B59024730820243308201E9A0030201  
0202082AEA0413A42DC1CE300A06082A8648CE3D0403023072311C301A060355  
04030C13437573746F6D2D455220476C6F62616C204341310B3009060355040B  
0C02495431183016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111  
300F06035504070C0853616E204A6F7365310B300906035504080C024341310B  
3009060355040613025553301E170D3232313230363131333735395A170D3332  
313230333131333735395A3072311C301A06035504030C13437573746F6D2D45  
5220476C6F62616C204341310B3009060355040B0C0249543118301606035504  
0A0C0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300F06035504070C0853616E  
204A6F7365310B300906035504080C024341310B300906035504061302555330  
59301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D0301070342000497B1ED969164  
930985BBB8AC9A2AF9455CDFEEA4B11DE2E79D068BFA803926B4005251B34F1C  
0815A4CBE03FBD1BBCB635F6431A22DE78653B87B99537ECE16CA3693067300F  
0603551D130101FF040530030101FF30250603551D11041E301C811A68656C70  
40637573746F6D2D65722E6578616D706C652E636F6D300E0603551D0F0101FF  
040403020186301D0603551D0E0416041492EA7640404A8FAB4F270BF3BC379D  
86CD7280F8300A06082A8648CE3D0403020348003045022100D6D813B390BD3A  
7B4E85424BCB1ED933AD1E981F2817B59083DD6EC1C5E3FADF02202CEE440619  
2BC767E98D7CFAE044C6807481AD8564A7D569DCA3D1CDF1E5E843590124A119  
09C5A60102027818323032322D31322D30365432303A30343A31352E3735345A  
05581A041830168014CB8D98CA74C51B58DDE7ACEF869A9443A8D666A6074823  
BFBBC9C2BCF2130958C9D28443A10126A0587EA11909C5A40102074823BFBBC9  
C2BCF2130C585B3059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D0301070342  
00042030855BE846910B3ECB15CAF8572D3EB565BDC654A15EFAF6EDEBAA8B9E  
1608C5C910C93A20868FC8504D370F1B26FA9759F67983BB78863EDA9ACBEA51  
24F60D6D4A414441313233343536373839584068987DE8B007F4E9416610BBE2  
D48E1D7EA1032092B8BFCE611421950F45B22F17E214820C07E777ADF86175E2  
5D3205568404C25FCEEC1B817C7861A6104B3D0D6D4A41444131323334353637  
38395840B1DD40B10787437588AEAC9036899191C16CCDBECA31C197855CCB6B

BA142D709FE329CBC3F76297D6063ACB6759EAB98E96EA4C4AA2135AA48A247B  
AC1D6A3F

The representation of `signed_rvr` in CBOR diagnostic format (with `lf` added) is:

18([h'A10126', {32: [h'3082028030820225A003020102020900C3F62149B2E30  
E3E300A06082A8648CE3D0403023072311C301A06035504030C13437573746F6D2D4  
55220476C6F62616C204341310B3009060355040B0C02495431183016060355040A0  
C0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300F06035504070C0853616E204A6F7  
365310B300906035504080C024341310B3009060355040613025553301E170D32323  
13230363131333735395A170D3235313230353131333735395A30818D3131302F060  
35504030C28437573746F6D2D455220436F6D6D65726369616C204275696C64696E6  
7732052656769737472617231133011060355040B0C0A4F6666696365206F7073311  
83016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E310F300D06035504070  
C064F74746F7761310B300906035504080C024F4E310B30090603550406130243413  
059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D030107034200042030855BE846910  
B3ECB15CAF8572D3EB565BDC654A15EFAF6EDEBAA8B9E1608C5C910C93A20868FC85  
04D370F1B26FA9759F67983BB78863EDA9ACBEA5124F6A3818730818430090603551  
D1304023000300B0603551D0F0404030204F0301D0603551D0E04160414C9080B387  
D8DD85B3A59E7EC100B866393A9CA4C301F0603551D2304183016801492EA7640404  
A8FAB4F270BF3BC379D86CD7280F8302A0603551D250101FF0420301E06082B06010  
50507031C06082B0601050507030106082B06010505070302300A06082A8648CE3D0  
40302034900304602210091A2033692EB81503D53505FFC8DA326B1EE7DEA96F2917  
4F0B3341A07812201022100FF7339288108B712F418530A18025A895408CC45E0BB6  
78B46FBAB37DDB4D36B', h'30820243308201E9A00302010202082AEA0413A42DC1  
CE300A06082A8648CE3D0403023072311C301A06035504030C13437573746F6D2D45  
5220476C6F62616C204341310B3009060355040B0C02495431183016060355040A0C  
0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300F06035504070C0853616E204A6F73  
65310B300906035504080C024341310B3009060355040613025553301E170D323231  
3230363131333735395A170D3332313230333131333735395A3072311C301A060355  
04030C13437573746F6D2D455220476C6F62616C204341310B3009060355040B0C02  
495431183016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300F0603  
5504070C0853616E204A6F7365310B300906035504080C024341310B300906035504  
06130255533059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D0301070342000497B1  
ED969164930985BBB8AC9A2AF9455CDFEEA4B11DE2E79D068BFA803926B4005251B3  
4F1C0815A4CBE03FBD1BBCB635F6431A22DE78653B87B99537ECE16CA3693067300F  
0603551D130101FF040530030101FF30250603551D11041E301C811A68656C704063  
7573746F6D2D65722E6578616D706C652E636F6D300E0603551D0F0101FF04040302  
0186301D0603551D0E0416041492EA7640404A8FAB4F270BF3BC379D86CD7280F830  
0A06082A8648CE3D0403020348003045022100D6D813B390BD3A7B4E85424BCB1ED9  
33AD1E981F2817B59083DD6EC1C5E3FADF02202CEE4406192BC767E98D7CFAE044C6  
807481AD8564A7D569DCA3D1CDF1E5E843']}], h'A11909C5A601020278183230323  
22D31322D30365432303A30343A31352E3735345A05581A041830168014CB8D98CA7  
4C51B58DDE7ACEF869A9443A8D666A6074823BFBBC9C2BCF2130958C9D28443A1012  
6A0587EA11909C5A40102074823BFBBC9C2BCF2130C585B3059301306072A8648CE3  
D020106082A8648CE3D030107034200042030855BE846910B3ECB15CAF8572D3EB56  
5BDC654A15EFAF6EDEBAA8B9E1608C5C910C93A20868FC8504D370F1B26FA9759F67  
983BB78863EDA9ACBEA5124F60D6D4A414441313233343536373839584068987DE8B  
007F4E9416610BBE2D48E1D7EA1032092B8BFCE611421950F45B22F17E214820C07E  
777ADF86175E25D3205568404C25FCEEC1B817C7861A6104B3D0D6D4A41444131323  
3343536373839', h'B1DD40B10787437588AEAC9036899191C16CCDBECA31C19785  
5CCB6BBA142D709FE329CBC3F76297D6063ACB6759EAB98E96EA4C4AA2135AA48A24  
7BAC1D6A3F']])

### C.5. COSE-signed Voucher from MASA

The resulting voucher is created by the MASA and returned to the Registrar:

```
RES: 200 OK
Content-Type: application/voucher+cose
Body: <signed_voucher>
```

The Registrar then returns the voucher to the Pledge:

```
RES: 2.04 Changed
Content-Format: 836
Body: <signed_voucher>
```

It is signed by the MASA's private key (see [Appendix C.1.3](#)) and can be verified by the Pledge using the MASA's public key that it stores.

Below is the binary signed\_voucher, encoded in hexadecimal (with lf added):

```
D28443A10126A0590288A1190993A60102027818323032322D31322D30365432
303A32333A33302E3730385A03F4074857EED786AD4049070859024730820243
308201E9A00302010202082AEA0413A42DC1CE300A06082A8648CE3D04030230
72311C301A06035504030C13437573746F6D2D455220476C6F62616C20434131
0B3009060355040B0C02495431183016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2D4552
2C20496E632E3111300F06035504070C0853616E204A6F7365310B3009060355
04080C024341310B3009060355040613025553301E170D323231323036313133
3735395A170D3332313230333131333735395A3072311C301A06035504030C13
437573746F6D2D455220476C6F62616C204341310B3009060355040B0C024954
31183016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300F0603
5504070C0853616E204A6F7365310B300906035504080C024341310B30090603
550406130255533059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D0301070342
000497B1ED969164930985BBB8AC9A2AF9455CDFEEA4B11DE2E79D068BFA8039
26B4005251B34F1C0815A4CBE03FBD1BBCB635F6431A22DE78653B87B99537EC
E16CA3693067300F0603551D130101FF040530030101FF30250603551D11041E
301C811A68656C7040637573746F6D2D65722E6578616D706C652E636F6D300E
0603551D0F0101FF040403020186301D0603551D0E0416041492EA7640404A8F
AB4F270BF3BC379D86CD7280F8300A06082A8648CE3D04030203480030450221
00D6D813B390BD3A7B4E85424BCB1ED933AD1E981F2817B59083DD6EC1C5E3FA
DF02202CEE4406192BC767E98D7CFAE044C6807481AD8564A7D569DCA3D1CDF1
E5E8430B6D4A4144413132333435363738395840DF31B21A6AD3F5AC7F4C8B02
6F551BD28FBCE62330D3E262AC170F6BFEDDBA5F2E8FBAA2CAACFED9E8614EAC
5BF2450DADC53AC29DFA30E8787A1400B2E7C832
```

The representation of signed\_voucher in CBOR diagnostic format (with lf added) is:

```
18([h'A10126', {}, h'A1190993A60102027818323032322D31322D30365432303
A32333A33302E3730385A03F4074857EED786AD4049070859024730820243308201E
9A00302010202082AEA0413A42DC1CE300A06082A8648CE3D0403023072311C301A0
6035504030C13437573746F6D2D455220476C6F62616C204341310B3009060355040
B0C02495431183016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300
F06035504070C0853616E204A6F7365310B300906035504080C024341310B3009060
355040613025553301E170D3232313230363131333735395A170D333231323033313
1333735395A3072311C301A06035504030C13437573746F6D2D455220476C6F62616
C204341310B3009060355040B0C02495431183016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2
D45522C20496E632E3111300F06035504070C0853616E204A6F7365310B300906035
504080C024341310B30090603550406130255533059301306072A8648CE3D0201060
82A8648CE3D0301070342000497B1ED969164930985BBB8AC9A2AF9455CDFEEA4B11
DE2E79D068BFA803926B4005251B34F1C0815A4CBE03FBD1BBCB635F6431A22DE786
53B87B99537ECE16CA3693067300F0603551D130101FF040530030101FF302506035
51D11041E301C811A68656C7040637573746F6D2D65722E6578616D706C652E636F6
D300E0603551D0F0101FF040403020186301D0603551D0E0416041492EA7640404A8
FAB4F270BF3BC379D86CD7280F8300A06082A8648CE3D0403020348003045022100D
6D813B390BD3A7B4E85424BCB1ED933AD1E981F2817B59083DD6EC1C5E3FADF02202
CEE4406192BC767E98D7CFAE044C6807481AD8564A7D569DCA3D1CDF1E5E8430B6D4
A414441313233343536373839', h'DF31B21A6AD3F5AC7F4C8B026F551BD28FBCE6
2330D3E262AC170F6BFEDDBA5F2E8FBAA2CAACFED9E8614EAC5BF2450DADC53AC29D
FA30E8787A1400B2E7C832']])
```

In the above, the third element in the array is the voucher data encoded as a CBOR byte string. When decoded, it can be represented by the following CBOR diagnostic notation:

```
{2451: {1: 2, 2: "2022-12-06T20:23:30.708Z", 3: false, 7: h'57EED786
AD404907', 8: h'30820243308201E9A00302010202082AEA0413A42DC1CE300A06
082A8648CE3D0403023072311C301A06035504030C13437573746F6D2D455220476C
6F62616C204341310B3009060355040B0C02495431183016060355040A0C0F437573
746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300F06035504070C0853616E204A6F7365310B30
0906035504080C024341310B3009060355040613025553301E170D32323132303631
31333735395A170D3332313230333131333735395A3072311C301A06035504030C13
437573746F6D2D455220476C6F62616C204341310B3009060355040B0C0249543118
3016060355040A0C0F437573746F6D2D45522C20496E632E3111300F06035504070C
0853616E204A6F7365310B300906035504080C024341310B30090603550406130255
533059301306072A8648CE3D020106082A8648CE3D0301070342000497B1ED969164
930985BBB8AC9A2AF9455CDFEEA4B11DE2E79D068BFA803926B4005251B34F1C0815
A4CBE03FBD1BBCB635F6431A22DE78653B87B99537ECE16CA3693067300F0603551D
130101FF040530030101FF30250603551D11041E301C811A68656C7040637573746F
6D2D65722E6578616D706C652E636F6D300E0603551D0F0101FF040403020186301D
0603551D0E0416041492EA7640404A8FAB4F270BF3BC379D86CD7280F8300A06082A
8648CE3D0403020348003045022100D6D813B390BD3A7B4E85424BCB1ED933AD1E98
1F2817B59083DD6EC1C5E3FADF02202CEE4406192BC767E98D7CFAE044C6807481AD
8564A7D569DCA3D1CDF1E5E843', 11: "JADA123456789"}}}
```

The largest element in the voucher is identified by key 8, which decodes to SID 2459 (pinned-domain-cert). It contains the complete PKIX (DER-encoded X.509v3) certificate of the Registrar's domain CA. This certificate is shown in [Appendix C.2.3](#).

#### **Appendix D. Generating Certificates with OpenSSL**

This informative appendix shows example Bash shell scripts to generate test PKIX certificates for the Pledge IDevID, the Registrar and the MASA. The shell scripts cannot be run stand-alone because they depend on input files which are not all included in this appendix. Nevertheless, these scripts may provide guidance on how OpenSSL can be configured for generating cBRSKI certificates.

The scripts were tested with OpenSSL 3.0.2. Older versions may not work -- OpenSSL 1.1.1 for example does not support all extensions used.

```
<CODE BEGINS>
#!/bin/bash
# File: create-cert-Pledge.sh
# Create new cert for: Pledge IDevID

# days certificate is valid - try to get close to the 802.1AR
# specified 9999-12-31 end date.
SECONDS1=`date +%s` # time now
SECONDS2=`date --date="9999-12-31 23:59:59Z" +%s` # target end time
let VALIDITY="(${SECONDS2}-${SECONDS1})/(24*3600)"
echo "Using validity param -days ${VALIDITY}"

NAME=pledge

# create csr for device
# conform to 802.1AR guidelines, using only CN + serialNumber when
# manufacturer is already present as CA.
# CN is not even mandatory, but just good practice.
openssl req -new -key keys/privkey_pledge.pem -out $NAME.csr -subj \
    "/CN=Stok IoT sensor Y-42/serialNumber=JADA123456789"

# sign csr - it uses faketime only to get endtime to 23:59:59Z
faketime '23:59:59Z' \
openssl x509 -set_serial 32429 -CAform PEM -CA output/masa_ca.pem \
    -CAkey keys/privkey_masa_ca.pem -extfile x509v3.ext -extensions \
    pledge_ext -req -in $NAME.csr -out output/$NAME.pem \
    -days $VALIDITY -sha256

# Note: alternative method using 'ca' command. Currently
# doesn't work without 'country' subject field.
# openssl ca -rand_serial -enddate 99991231235959Z -certform PEM \
# -cert output/masa_ca.pem -keyfile keys/privkey_masa_ca.pem \
# -extfile x509v3.ext -extensions pledge_ext -in $NAME.csr \
# -out $NAME.pem -outdir output

# delete temp files
rm -f $NAME.csr

# convert to .der format
openssl x509 -in output/$NAME.pem -inform PEM -out output/$NAME.der \
    -outform DER

<CODE ENDS>
```



```
<CODE BEGINS>
# File: x509v3.ext
# This file contains all X509v3 extension definitions for OpenSSL
# certificate generation. Each certificate has its own _ext
# section below.

[ req ]
prompt = no

[ masa_ca_ext ]
subjectAltName=email:info@masa.stok.nl
keyUsage = critical,digitalSignature, keyCertSign, cRLSign
basicConstraints = critical,CA:TRUE,pathlen:3
subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid

[ pledge_ext ]
keyUsage = critical,digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, \
           keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment
# basicConstraints for a non-CA cert MAY be marked either
# non-critical or critical.
basicConstraints = CA:FALSE
# Don't include subjectKeyIdentifier (SKI) - see 802.1AR-2018
subjectKeyIdentifier = none
authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid
# Include the MASA URI
1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.32 = ASN1:IA5STRING:masa.stok.nl

[ domain_ca_ext ]
subjectAltName=email:help@custom-er.example.com
keyUsage = critical, keyCertSign, digitalSignature, cRLSign
basicConstraints=critical,CA:TRUE
# RFC 5280 4.2.1.1 : AKI MAY be omitted, and MUST be non-critical;
# SKI MUST be non-critical
subjectKeyIdentifier=hash

[ registrar_ext ]
keyUsage = critical, digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, \
           keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment
basicConstraints=CA:FALSE
subjectKeyIdentifier=hash
authorityKeyIdentifier=keyid
# Set Registrar 'RA' flag along with TLS client/server usage
# see draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher#section-7.3
# see tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6402#section-2.10
# see www.openssl.org/docs/man1.1.1/man5/x509v3_config.html
extendedKeyUsage = critical,1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.28, serverAuth, \
                  clientAuth
```

<CODE ENDS>

```
<CODE BEGINS>
#!/bin/bash
# File: create-cert-Registrar.sh
# Create new cert for: Registrar in a company domain

# days certificate is valid
VALIDITY=1095

# cert filename
NAME=registrar

# create csr
openssl req -new -key keys/privkey_registrar.pem -out $NAME.csr \
  -subj "/CN=Custom-ER Registrar/OU=Office dept/O=Custom-ER, Inc./\
L=Ottowa/ST=ON/C=CA"

# sign csr
openssl x509 -set_serial 0xC3F62149B2E30E3E -CAform PEM -CA \
  output/domain_ca.pem -extfile x509v3.ext -extensions registrar_ext \
  -req -in $NAME.csr -CAkey keys/privkey_domain_ca.pem \
  -out output/$NAME.pem -days $VALIDITY -sha256

# delete temp files
rm -f $NAME.csr

# convert to .der format
openssl x509 -in output/$NAME.pem -inform PEM -out output/$NAME.der \
  -outform DER

<CODE ENDS>
```

```
<CODE BEGINS>
#!/bin/bash
# File: create-cert-MASA.sh
# Create new cert for: MASA CA, self-signed CA certificate

# days certificate is valid
VALIDITY=3650

NAME=masa_ca

# create csr
openssl req -new -key keys/privkey_masa_ca.pem -out $NAME.csr \
    -subj "/CN=masa.stok.nl/O=vanderstok/L=Helmond/C=NL"

# sign csr
mkdir output >& /dev/null
openssl x509 -set_serial 0xE39CDA17E1386A0A -extfile x509v3.ext \
    -extensions masa_ca_ext -req -in $NAME.csr \
    -signkey keys/privkey_masa_ca.pem -out output/$NAME.pem \
    -days $VALIDITY -sha256

# delete temp files
rm -f $NAME.csr

# convert to .der format
openssl x509 -in output/$NAME.pem -inform PEM -out output/$NAME.der \
    -outform DER

<CODE ENDS>
```

## **Appendix E. Pledge Device Class Profiles**

This specification allows implementers to select between various functional options for the Pledge, yielding different code size footprints and different requirements on Pledge hardware. Thus for each product an optimal trade-off between functionality, development/maintenance cost and hardware cost can be made.

This appendix illustrates different selection outcomes by means of defining different example "profiles" of constrained Pledges. In the following subsections, these profiles are defined and a comparison is provided.

### E.1. Minimal Pledge

The Minimal Pledge profile (Min) aims to reduce code size and hardware cost to a minimum. This comes with some severe functional restrictions, in particular:

\*No support for EST re-enrollment: whenever this would be needed, a factory reset followed by a new onboarding process is required.

\*No support for change of Registrar: for this case, a factory reset followed by a new onboarding process is required.

This profile would be appropriate for single-use devices which must be replaced rather than re-deployed. That might include medical devices, but also sensors used during construction, such as concrete temperature sensors.

### E.2. Typical Pledge

The Typical Pledge profile (Typ) aims to support a typical cBRSKI feature set including EST re-enrollment support and Registrar changes.

### E.3. Full-featured Pledge

The Full-featured Pledge profile (Full) illustrates a Pledge category that supports multiple onboarding methods, hardware real-time clock, BRSKI/EST resource discovery, and CSR Attributes request/response. It also supports most of the optional features defined in this specification.

### E.4. Comparison Chart of Pledge Classes

The below table specifies the functions implemented in the three example Pledge classes Min ([Appendix E.1](#)), Typ ([Appendix E.2](#)) and Full ([Appendix E.3](#)).

Functions Implemented	Min	Typ	Full
<b>General</b>			
Support cBRSKI onboarding	Y	Y	Y
Support other onboarding method(s)	-	-	Y
Real-time clock and cert time checks	-	-	Y
<b>cBRSKI</b>			
Discovery for rt=brski*	-	-	Y
Support pinned Registrar public key (RPK)	Y	-	Y
Support pinned Registrar certificate	-	Y	Y
Support pinned Domain CA	-	Y	Y
<b>EST-coaps</b>			
Explicit TA database size (#certs)	0	3	8

Functions Implemented	Min	Typ	Full
Discovery for rt=ace.est*	-	-	Y
GET /att and response parsing	-	-	Y
GET /crtcs format 62 (multiple CA certs)	-	Y	Y
GET /crtcs format 281 (multiple CA certs)	-	-	Y
ETag handling support for GET /crtcs	-	Y	Y
Re-enrollment supported	- (*)	Y	Y
6.6.1 optimized procedure	Y	Y	-
Pro-active re-enrollment at own initiative	-	-	Y
Periodic trust anchor retrieval GET /crtcs	- (*)	Y	Y
Supports change of Registrar identity	- (*)	Y	Y

Table 4

Notes: (\*) means only possible via a factory-reset followed by a new cBRSKI onboarding procedure.

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