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Email Authentication Status Codes draft-ietf-appsawg-email-auth-codes-03

Abstract

There is at present no way to return a status code to an email client that indicates a message is being rejected or deferred specifically because of email authentication failures. This document registers codes for this purpose.

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Email Auth Status Codes

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	Tab1	.e	of	Con	tei	nts
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<u>1</u> .	Int	roduct	ion																			3
<u>2</u> .	Key	Words																				3
<u>3</u> .	New	Statu	s Cod	es																		3
3	<u>.1</u> .	DKIM	Failu	re	Coc	les																3
3	<u>. 2</u> .	SPF F	ailur	e C	Code	S																4
3	<u>.3</u> .	Rever	se DN	S F	ai]	ur	е	Cc	de	è												4
3	<u>. 4</u> .	Multi	ple A	uth	nent	ic	at	ic	n	Fa	ai]	Lur	es	6 (Coc	le						5
<u>4</u> .	Gene	eral C	onsid	era	atio	ns																5
<u>5</u> .	Secu	urity	Consi	der	ati	on	S															6
<u>6</u> .	IANA	A Cons	idera	tic	ons																	6
<u>7</u> .	Norn	native	Refe	rer	nces	3																6
Appe	endi	κ A.	Ackno	w1e	edan	ien	ts	3														7

1. Introduction

[RFC3463] introduced Enhanced Mail System Status Codes, and [RFC5248] created an IANA registry for these.

[RFC6376] and [RFC7208] introduced, respectively, DomainKeys Identified Mail and Sender Policy Framework, two protocols for conducting email authentication. Another common email acceptance test is the reverse Domain Name System check on an email client's IP address, as described in Section 3 of [RFC7001].

The current set of enhanced status codes does not include any code for indicating that a message is being rejected or deferred due to local policy reasons related to any of these mechanisms. This is potentially useful information to agents that need more than rudimentary handling information about the reason a message was rejected on receipt. This document introduces enhanced status codes for reporting those cases to clients.

2. Key Words

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. New Status Codes

The following new status codes are defined:

3.1. DKIM Failure Codes

Code: X.7.20

Sample Text: No valid DKIM signature found

Associated basic status code: 5

Description: This status code is returned when a message

did not contain a valid DKIM signature, contrary to local policy requirements.

(Note that this violates the advice of

Section 6.1 of RFC6376.)

Reference: [this document]; RFC6376

Submitter: M. Kucherawy

Change controller: IESG

Code: X.7.21

Sample Text: No valid author-aligned DKIM signature found

Associated basic status code: 5

Description: This status code is returned when a message

did not contain a valid DKIM signature matching the domain(s) found in the From header field, contrary to local policy requirements. (Note that this violates the

advice of Section 6.1 of RFC6376.)

Reference: [this document]; RFC6376

Submitter: M. Kucherawy

Change controller: IESG

3.2. SPF Failure Codes

Code: X.7.22

Sample Text: SPF validation failed

Associated basic status code: 5

Description: This status code is returned when a message

completed an SPF check that produced a "fail" result, contrary to local policy requirements. Used in place of 5.7.1 as

described in Section 8.4 of RFC7208.

Reference: [this document]; RFC7208

Submitter: M. Kucherawy

Change controller: IESG

Code: X.7.23

Sample Text: SPF validation error

Associated basic status code: 4/5

Description: This status code is returned when evaluation

of SPF relative to an arriving message resulted in an error. Used in place of 4.4.3 or 5.5.2 as described in Sections

8.6 and 8.6 of <u>RFC7208</u>.

Reference: [this document]; RFC7208

Submitter: M. Kucherawy

Change controller: IESG

3.3. Reverse DNS Failure Code

Code: X.7.24

Sample Text: Reverse DNS validation failed

Associated basic status code: 5

Description: This status code is returned when an SMTP

client's IP address failed a reverse DNS validation check, contrary to local policy

requirements.

Reference: [this document]; <u>Section 3 of RFC7001</u>

Submitter: M. Kucherawy

Change controller: IESG

3.4. Multiple Authentication Failures Code

Code: X.7.25

Sample Text: Multiple authentication checks failed

Associated basic status code: 5

Description: This status code is returned when a message

failed more than one message authentication check, contrary to local policy requirements. The specific mechanisms that failed are not

specified.

Reference: [this document]
Submitter: M. Kucherawy

Change controller: IESG

4. General Considerations

By the nature of the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), only one enhanced status code can be returned for a given exchange between client and server. However, an operator might decide to defer or reject a message for a plurality of reasons. Clients receiving these codes need to consider that the failure reflected by one of these status codes might not reflect the only reason, or the most important reason, for non-acceptance of the message or command.

It is important to note that <u>Section 6.1 of [RFC6376]</u> discourages special treatment of messages bearing no valid signature. There are some operators that disregard this advice, a few of which go so far as to require a valid Author Domain signature (that is, one matching the domain(s) in the From header field) in order to accept the message. Moreover, some nascent technologies built atop SPF and DKIM depend on such authentications. This work does not endorse configurations that violate DKIM's recommendations, but rather acknowledges that they do exist and merely seeks to provide for improved interoperability with such operators.

A specific use case is mailing list software, which processes

rejections in order to remove from the subscriber set those addresses that are no longer valid. There is a need in that case to distinguish authentication failures versus indications that the recipient address is no longer valid.

When multiple authentication methods fail, the SMTP server SHOULD use the code that indicates multiple methods failed rather than only the first one that failed. It may be the case that one method is always expected to fail, and thus returning that method's specific code is not information useful to the sending agent.

The reverse IP DNS check is defined in Section 2.6.3 of [RFC7001].

5. Security Considerations

Use of these codes reveals local policy with respect to email authentication, which can be useful information to actors attempting to deliver undesirable mail. It should be noted that there is no specific obligation to use these codes; if an operator wishes not to reveal this aspect of local policy, it can continue using a generic result code such as 5.7.7, 5.7.1, or even 5.7.0.

6. IANA Considerations

Registration of new enhanced status codes, for addition to the SMTP Enhanced Status Codes Registry, can be found in Section 3.

7. Normative References

- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", <u>BCP 14</u>, <u>RFC 2119</u>, March 1997.
- [RFC3463] Vaudreuil, G., "Enhanced Mail System Status Codes", RFC 3463, January 2003.
- [RFC5248] Hansen, T. and J. Klensin, "A Registry for SMTP Enhanced Mail System Status Codes", BCP 138, RFC 5248, June 2008.
- [RFC6376] Crocker, D., Hansen, T., and M. Kucherawy, "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", STD 76, RFC 6376, September 2011.
- [RFC7001] Kucherawy, M., "Message Header Field for Indicating Message Authentication Status", <u>RFC 7001</u>, September 2013.
- [RFC7208] Kitterman, S., "Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for Authorizing Use of Domains in Email, Version 1", RFC 7208, April 2014.

<u>Appendix A</u>. Acknowledgments

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Author's Address

Murray S. Kucherawy 270 Upland Drive San Francisco, CA 94127 USA

EMail: superuser@gmail.com