

Network Working Group
Internet Draft
Intended Status: Standards Track
Expires: October 03, 2014

D. McGrew
Cisco Systems, Inc.
K. Igoe
National Security Agency
April 01, 2014

AES-GCM and AES-CCM Authenticated Encryption in Secure RTP (SRTP)
draft-ietf-avtcore-srtp-aes-gcm-11

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the provisions of [BCP 78](#) and [BCP 79](#).

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at <http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current>.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on October 03, 2014.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

This document is subject to [BCP 78](#) and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (<http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info>) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Abstract

This document defines how AES-GCM and AES-CCM Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data algorithms can be used to provide confidentiality and data authentication in the SRTP protocol.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction.....	3
2. Conventions Used In This Document.....	4
3. Overview of the SRTP/SRTCP AEAD security Architecture.....	4
4. Terminology.....	5
5. Generic AEAD Processing.....	5
5.1. Types of Input Data.....	5
5.2. AEAD Invocation Inputs and Outputs.....	5
5.2.1. Encrypt Mode.....	6
5.2.2. Decrypt Mode.....	6
5.3. Handling of AEAD Authentication.....	7
6. Counter Mode Encryption.....	7
7. AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12 and AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12.....	8
8. Unneeded SRTP/SRTCP Fields.....	8
8.1. SRTP/SRTCP Authentication Field.....	9
8.2. RTP Padding.....	9
9. AES-GCM/CCM processing for SRTP.....	9
9.1. SRTP IV formation for AES-GCM and AES-CCM.....	9
9.2. Data Types in SRTP Packets.....	10
9.3. Handling Header Extensions.....	12
9.4. Prevention of SRTP IV Reuse.....	13
10. AES-GCM/CCM Processing of SRTCP Compound Packets.....	14
10.1. SRTCP IV formation for AES-GCM and AES-CCM.....	14
10.2. Data Types in Encrypted SRTCP Compound Packets.....	14
10.3. Data Types in Unencrypted SRTCP Compound Packets.....	16
10.4. Prevention of SRTCP IV Reuse.....	17
11. Constraints on AEAD for SRTP and SRTCP.....	17
12. Key Derivation Functions.....	18
13. Summary of Algorithm Characteristics.....	19
13.1. AES-GCM for SRTP/SRTCP.....	19
13.2. AES-CCM for SRTP/SRTCP.....	21
14. Security Considerations.....	24
14.1. Handling of Security Critical Parameters.....	24
14.2. Size of the Authentication Tag.....	25
15. IANA Considerations.....	26
15.1. SDDES.....	26
15.2. DTLS.....	27
15.3. MIKEY.....	30
15.4. AEAD registry.....	31
16. Parameters for use with MIKEY.....	31

17.	Acknowledgements.....	32
18.	References.....	33
18.1.	Normative References.....	33
18.2.	Informative References.....	35

1. Introduction

The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) [[RFC3711](#)] is a profile of the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [[RFC3550](#)], which can provide confidentiality, message authentication, and replay protection to the RTP traffic and to the control traffic for RTP, the Real-time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP). It is important to note that the outgoing SRTP packets from a single endpoint may be originating from several independent data sources.

Authenticated encryption [[BN00](#)] is a form of encryption that, in addition to providing confidentiality for the plaintext that is encrypted, provides a way to check its integrity and authenticity. Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data, or AEAD [[R02](#)], adds the ability to check the integrity and authenticity of some Associated Data (AD), also called "additional authenticated data", that is not encrypted. This specification makes use of the interface to a generic AEAD algorithm as defined in [[RFC5116](#)].

The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a block cipher that provides a high level of security, and can accept different key sizes. Two families of AEAD algorithm families, AES Galois/Counter Mode (AES-GCM) [[GCM](#)] and AES Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code (AES-CCM) [[RFC3610](#)] are based upon AES. This specification makes use of the AES versions that use 128-bit and 256-bit keys, which we call AES-128 and AES-256, respectively.

Any AEAD algorithm provides an intrinsic authentication tag. In many applications the authentication tag is truncated to less than full length. This document only allows three values for the length of the authentication tag: the length of the authentication tags MUST be either 8 octets, 12 octets, or 16 octets in length. As with the size of the key, the length of the authentication tag size is set when the session is initiated and SHOULD NOT be altered. Thus each algorithm AEAD will have a total of six configurations, reflecting the two choices for key size (either 128 or 256 bits) and the three choices for the length of the authentication tag (either 8, 12 or 16 octets).

The Galois/Counter Mode of operation (GCM) and the Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code mode of operation (CCM) are both AEAD modes of operation for block ciphers. Both use counter mode to encrypt the data, an operation that can be efficiently pipelined. Further, GCM authentication uses operations that are particularly well suited to efficient implementation in hardware, making it especially appealing for high-speed

implementations, or for implementations in an efficient and compact circuit. CCM is well suited for use in compact software implementations. This specification uses GCM and CCM with both AES-128 and AES-256.

In summary, this document defines how to use AEAD algorithms, particularly AES-GCM and AES-CCM, to provide confidentiality and message authentication within SRTP and SRTCP packets.

2. Conventions Used In This Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [\[RFC2119\]](#).

3. Overview of the SRTP/SRTCP AEAD security Architecture

SRTP/SRTCP AEAD security is based upon the following principles:

- a) Both privacy and authentication are based upon the use of symmetric algorithms. An AEAD algorithm such as AES-CCM or AES-GCM combines privacy and authentication into a single process.
- b) A secret master key is shared by all participating endpoints, both those originating SRTP/SRTCP packets and those receiving these packets. Any given master key MAY be used simultaneously by several endpoints to originate SRTP/SRTCP packets (as well one or more endpoints using this master key to process inbound data).
- c) A Key Derivation Function is applied to the shared master key value to form separate encryption keys, authentication keys and salting keys for SRTP and for SRTCP (a total of six keys). This process is described in [section 4.3 of \[RFC3711\]](#). Since AEAD algorithms such as AES-CCM and AES-GCM combine encryption and authentication into a single process, AEAD algorithms do not make use of the authentication keys. The master key MUST be at least as large as the encryption key derived from it.
- d) Aside from making modifications to IANA registries to allow AES-GCM and AES-CCM to work with SDP, DTLS and MIKEY, the details of how the master key is established and shared between the participants are outside the scope of this document. Similarly any mechanism for rekeying an existing session is outside the scope of the document.
- e) Each time an instantiation of AES-GCM or AES-CCM is invoked to encrypt and authenticate an SRTP or SRTCP data packet a

new IV is used. SRTP combines the 4-octet synchronization source (SSRC) identifier, the 4-octet rollover counter (ROC), and the 2-octet sequence number (SEQ) with the 12-octet

encryption salt to form a 12-octet IV (see [section 9.1](#)).
SRTCP combines the SSRC and 31-bit SRTCP index with the
encryption salt to form a 12-octet IV (see [section 10.1](#)).

4. Terminology

The following terms have very specific meanings in the context of this RFC:

Instantiation: In AEAD, an instantiation is an (Encryption_key, salt) pair together with all of the data structures (for example, counters) needed for it to function properly. In SRTP/SRTCP, each endpoint will need two instantiations of the AEAD algorithm for each master key in its possession, one instantiation for SRTP traffic and one instantiation for SRTCP traffic.

Invocation: SRTP/SRTCP data streams are broken into packets. Each packet is processed by a single invocation of the appropriate instantiation of the AEAD algorithm.

In many applications, each endpoint will have one master key for processing outbound data but may have one or more separate master keys for processing inbound data.

5. Generic AEAD Processing

5.1. Types of Input Data

Associated Data: This is data that is to be authenticated but not encrypted.

Plaintext: Data that is to be both encrypted and authenticated.

Raw Data: Data that is to be neither encrypted nor authenticated.

Which portions of SRTP/SRTCP packets that are to be treated as associated data, which are to be treated as plaintext, and which are to be treated as raw data are covered in sections [9.2](#), [10.2](#) and [10.3](#).

[5.2.](#) AEAD Invocation Inputs and Outputs

5.2.1. Encrypt Mode**Inputs:**

Encryption_key	Octet string, either 16 or 32 octets long
Initialization_Vector	Octet string, 12 octets long
Associated_Data	Octet string of variable length
Plaintext	Octet string of variable length
Tag_Size_Flag (CCM only*)	One Octet

Outputs

Ciphertext	Octet string, length = length(Plaintext)+tag_length
------------	--

(*) CCM mode requires tag length to be explicitly input to the algorithm, whereas with GCM, the tag is simply truncated. For GCM, the algorithm choice determines the tag size.

In both CCM and GCM, the algorithm negotiation selects what tag size is to be used. In GCM, the authentication tag is simply truncated to the appropriate length, but CCM requires that the tag length be an explicitly input to the algorithm as the Tag_Size_Field. For the three tag lengths allowed in this document the corresponding Tag_Size_Flag values are as follows:

Tag Length		Tag_Size_Flag (hex)
-----		-----
8 octets		5A
12 octets		6A
16 octets		7A

Once an SRTP/SRTCP session has been initiated the length of the tag is a fixed value and MUST NOT be altered.

5.2.2. Decrypt Mode**Inputs:**

Encryption_key	Octet string, either 16 or 32 octets long
Initialization_Vector	Octet string, 12 octets long
Associated_Data	Octet string of variable length
Ciphertext	Octet string of variable length
Tag_Size_Flag (CCM only*)	One octet

Outputs

Plaintext	Octet string, length = length(Ciphertext)-tag_length
-----------	---

Validity_Flag

Boolean, TRUE if valid,
FALSE otherwise

Igoe and McGrew

Standards Track

[Page 6]

(*) For GCM, the algorithm choice determines the tag size.

As mentioned in [section 5.2.1](#), only three tag lengths are supported for use in SRTP/SRTCP, namely 8 octets, 12 octets and 16 octets.

5.3. Handling of AEAD Authentication

AEAD requires that all incoming packets MUST pass AEAD authentication before any other action takes place. Plaintext and associated data MUST NOT be released until the AEAD authentication tag has been validated. Further the ciphertext MUST NOT be decrypted until the AEAD tag has been validated.

Should the AEAD tag prove to be invalid, the packet in question is to be discarded and a Validation Error flag raised. Local policy determines how this flag is to be handled and is outside the scope of this document.

6. Counter Mode Encryption

In both GCM and CCM, each outbound packet uses a 12-octet IV and an encryption key to form two outputs, a 16-octet first_key_block which is used in forming the authentication tag and a keystream of octets which is XORed to the plaintext to form cipher.

When GCM is used, the concatenation of a 12-octet IV (see sections 9.1 and 10.1) with a 4-octet block counter forms the input to AES. This is used to build a key_stream as follows:

```
def GCM_keystream( Plaintext_len, IV, Encryption_key ):
    assert Plaintext_len <= (2**36) - 32 ## measured in octets
    key_stream = ""
    block_counter = 1
    first_key_block = AES_ENC( data=IV||block_counter,
                               key=Encryption_key )
    while len(key_stream) < Plaintext_len:
        block_counter = block_counter + 1
        key_block = AES_ENC( data=IV||block_counter,
                             key=Encryption_key )
        key_stream = key_stream || key_block
    key_stream = truncate( key_stream, Plaintext_len )
    return (first_key_block, key_stream )
```

In AES-CCM counter mode encryption, the AES data input consists of the concatenation of a 1-octet flag, a 12-octet IV, and a 3-octet block counter. Note that in this application the flag octet will

always have the value 0x02 (see [section 2.3 of \[RFC3610\]](#)). A (first_key_block, key_stream) pair is formed as follows:

```
def CCM_keystream( Plaintext_len, IV, Encryption_key ):
    assert Plaintext_len <= (2**28)-16  ## measured in octets
    key_stream = ""
    block_counter = 0
    first_key_block = AES_ENC( data=0x02||IV||block_counter,
                              key=Encryption_key
                            )
    while len(key_stream)<Plaintext_len:
        block_counter = block_counter + 1
        key_block = AES_ENC( data=0x02||IV||block_counter,
                            key=Encryption_key
                          )
        key_stream = key_stream || key_block
    key_stream = truncate( key_stream, Plaintext_len )
    return (first_key_block, key_stream )
```

These keystream generation processes allow for a keystream of length up to $(2^{28})-16$ octets for AES-CCM and up to $(2^{36})-32$ octets for AES-GCM.

With any counter mode, if the same (IV, Encryption_key) pair is used twice, precisely the same keystream is formed. As explained in [section 9.1 of RFC 3711](#), this is a cryptographic disaster. For GCM the consequences are even worse as also the integrity is compromised, and not only for the current packet stream, but for all future use of encryption_key.

7. AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12 and AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12

AEAD_AES_128_CCM and AEAD_AES_256_CCM are defined in [\[RFC5116\]](#) with an authentication tag length of 16-octets. AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 and AEAD_AES_256_CCM_8 are defined in [\[RFC6655\]](#) with an authentication tag length of 8-octets. We require two new variants, AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12 and AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12, with 12-octet authentication tags. In each case the authentication tag is formed by taking the 12 most significant octets (in network order) of the AEAD_AES_128/256_CCM authentication tag:

+=====+=====+=====+			
Name		Key Size	tag size (t)
+=====+=====+=====+			
AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12		256 bits	12 octets
AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12		128 bits	12 octets
+=====+=====+=====+			

8. Unneeded SRTP/SRTCP Fields

AEAD counter mode encryption removes the need for certain existing

SRTP/SRTCP mechanisms.

8.1. SRTP/SRTCP Authentication Field

The AEAD message authentication mechanism MUST be the primary message authentication mechanism for AEAD SRTP/SRTCP. Additional SRTP/SRTCP authentication mechanisms SHOULD NOT be used with any AEAD algorithm and the optional SRTP/SRTCP Authentication Tags are NOT RECOMMENDED and SHOULD NOT be present. Note that this contradicts [section 3.4 of \[RFC3711\]](#) which makes the use of the SRTCP Authentication field mandatory, but the presence of the AEAD authentication renders the older authentication methods redundant.

Rationale. Some applications use the SRTP/SRTCP Authentication Tag as a means of conveying additional information, notably [\[RFC4771\]](#). This document retains the Authentication Tag field primarily to preserve compatibility with these applications.

8.2. RTP Padding

Neither AES-GCM nor AES-CCM requires that the data be padded out to a specific block size, reducing the need to use the padding mechanism provided by RTP. It is RECOMMENDED that the RTP padding mechanism not be used unless it is necessary to disguise the length of the underlying plaintext.

9. AES-GCM/CCM processing for SRTP

9.1. SRTP IV formation for AES-GCM and AES-CCM

The 12 octet initialization vector used by both AES-GCM and AES-CCM SRTP is formed by first concatenating 2-octets of zeroes, the 4-octet SSRC, the 4-octet Rollover Counter (ROC) and the two octet sequence number SEQ. The resulting 12-octet value is then XORed to the 12-octet salt to form the 12-octet IV.





Figure 1: AES-GCM and AES-CCM SRTP
Initialization Vector formation.

9.2. Data Types in SRTP Packets

All SRTP packets MUST be both authenticated and encrypted. The data fields within the SRTP packets are broken into Associated Data, Plaintext and Raw Data as follows (see Figure 2):


- Associated Data: The version V (2 bits), padding flag P (1 bit), extension flag X (1 bit), CSRC count CC (4 bits), marker M (1 bit), the Payload Type PT (8 bits), the sequence number (16 bits), timestamp (32 bits), SSRC (32 bits), optional contributing source identifiers (CSRCs, 32 bits each), and optional RTP extension (variable length).
- Plaintext: The RTP payload (variable length), RTP padding (if used, variable length), and RTP pad count (if used, 1 octet).
- Raw Data: The optional variable length SRTP MKI and SRTP authentication tag (whose use is NOT RECOMMENDED). These fields are appended after encryption has been performed.



P = Plaintext (to be encrypted and authenticated)

A = Associated Data (to be authenticated only)

Figure 2: Structure of an SRTP packet before Authenticated Encryption



RTP header extensions were first defined in [RFC 3550](#). [RFC 6904](#) [[RFC6904](#)] describes how these header extensions are to be encrypted in SRTP.

When [RFC 6904](#) is in use, a separate keystream is generated to encrypt selected RTP header extension elements. For the AEAD_AES_128_GCM and the AEAD_AES_128_CCM algorithms, this keystream MUST be generated in

the manner defined in [[RFC6904](#)] using the AES_128_CM transform. For the AEAD_AES_256_GCM and the AEAD_AES_256_CCM algorithms, the keystream MUST be generated in the manner defined for the AES_256_CM transform. The originator must perform any required header extension encryption before the AEAD algorithm is invoked.

As with the other fields contained within the RTP header, both encrypted and unencrypted header extensions are to be treated by the AEAD algorithm as Associated Data (AD). Thus the AEAD algorithm does not provide any additional privacy for the header extensions, but does provide integrity and authentication.

9.4. Prevention of SRTP IV Reuse

In order to prevent IV reuse, we must ensure that the (ROC,SEQ,SSRC) triple is never used twice with the same master key. There are two phases to this issue.

Counter Management: A rekey MUST be performed to establish a new master key before the (ROC,SEQ) pair cycles back to its original value. Note that implicitly assumes that either the outgoing RTP process is trusted to not attempt to repeat a SEQ value, or that the encryption process ensures that the SEQ number of the packets presented to it are always incremented in the proper fashion. This is particularly important for GCM since using the same SEQ value twice compromises the authentication mechanism. For GCM, the SEQ and SSRC values used MUST either be generated or checked by the SRTP implementation, or by a module (e.g. the RTP application) that can be considered equally trusted as the SRTP implementation. While [[RFC3711](#)] allows detecting SSRC collisions after they happen, SRTP using GCM with shared master keys MUST prevent SSRC collision from happening even once.

SSRC Management: For a given master key, the set of all SSRC values used with that master key must be partitioned into disjoint pools, one pool for each endpoint using that master key to originate outbound data. Each such originating endpoint MUST only issue SSRC values from the pool it has been assigned. Further, each originating endpoint MUST maintain a history of

outbound SSRC identifiers that it has issued within the lifetime of the current master key, and when a new synchronization source requests an SSRC identifier it MUST NOT be given an

identifier that has been previously issued. A rekey MUST be performed before any of the originating endpoints using that master key exhausts its pool of SSRC values. Further, the identity of the entity giving out SSRC values MUST be verified, and the SSRC signaling MUST be integrity protected.

10. AES-GCM/CCM Processing of SRTCP Compound Packets

All SRTCP compound packets MUST be authenticated, but unlike SRTP, SRTCP packet encryption is optional. A sender can select which packets to encrypt, and indicates this choice with a 1-bit encryption flag (located just before the 31-bit SRTCP index)

10.1. SRTCP IV formation for AES-GCM and AES-CCM

The 12-octet initialization vector used by both AES-GCM and AES-CCM SRTCP is formed by first concatenating 2-octets of zeroes, the 4-octet Synchronization Source identifier (SSRC), 2-octets of zeroes, a single zero bit, and the 31-bit SRTCP Index. The resulting 12-octet value is then XORed to the 12-octet salt to form the 12-octet IV.




Figure 4: SRTCP Initialization Vector formation

10.2. Data Types in Encrypted SRTCP Compound Packets

When the encryption flag is set to 1, the SRTCP packet is broken into plaintext, associated data, and raw (untouched) data as listed below (see figure 5):

Associated Data: The packet version V (2 bits), padding flag P (1 bit), reception report count RC (5 bits), packet type (8 bits), length (2 octets), SSRC (4

octets), encryption flag (1 bit) and SRTCP index (31 bits).

Raw Data: The 32-bit optional SRTCP MKI index and 32-bit SRTCP authentication tag (whose use is NOT RECOMMENDED).

Plaintext: All other data.

Note that the plaintext comes in one contiguous field. Since the AEAD cipher is larger than the plaintext by exactly the length of the AEAD authentication tag, the corresponding SRTCP encrypted packet replaces the plaintext field with a slightly larger field containing the cipher. Even if the plaintext field is empty, AEAD encryption must still be performed, with the resulting cipher consisting solely of the authentication tag. This tag is to be placed immediately before the encryption flag and SRTCP index.




Figure 5: AEAD SRTCP inputs when encryption flag = 1.

10.3. Data Types in Unencrypted SRTCP Compound Packets

When the encryption flag is set to 0, the SRTCP compound packet is broken into plaintext, associated data, and raw (untouched) data as follows (see figure 6):


Plaintext: None.

Raw Data: The variable length optional SRTCP MKI index and SRTCP authentication tag (whose use is NOT RECOMMENDED).

Associated Data: All other data.

Even though there is no plaintext in this RTCP packet, AEAD

encryption returns a cipher field which is precisely the length of the AEAD authentication tag. This cipher is to be placed before the Encryption flag and the SRTCP index in the authenticated SRTCP packet.



A = Associated Data (to be authenticated only)

R = neither encrypted nor authenticated, added after encryption

Figure 6: AEAD SRTCP inputs when encryption flag = 0

10.4. Prevention of SRTCP IV Reuse

A new master key MUST be established before the 31-bit SRTCP index cycles back to its original value. Ideally, a rekey should be performed and a new master key put in place well before the SRTCP cycles back to the starting value.

The comments on SSRC management in [section 9.4](#) also apply.

11. Constraints on AEAD for SRTP and SRTCP

In general, any AEAD algorithm can accept inputs with varying lengths, but each algorithm can accept only a limited range of lengths for a specific parameter. In this section, we describe the constraints on the parameter lengths that any AEAD algorithm must support to be used in AEAD-SRTP. Additionally, we specify a complete parameter set for two specific AEAD algorithms, namely AES-GCM and AES-CCM.

All AEAD algorithms used with SRTP/SRTCP MUST satisfy the three constraints listed below:

PARAMETER	Meaning	Value
A_MAX	maximum associated data length	MUST be at least 12 octets.
N_MIN	minimum nonce (IV) length	MUST be 12 octets.
N_MAX	maximum nonce (IV) length	MUST be 12 octets.
C_MAX	maximum ciphertext length per invocation	GCM: MUST be $\leq 2^{36}-16$ octets. CCM: MUST be $\leq 2^{28}$ octets.

The values for C_MAX are based on purely cryptographic considerations.

For sake of clarity we specify two additional parameters:

AEAD Authentication Tag Length	MUST be either 8, 12, or 16 octets
Maximum number of invocations for a given instantiation	MUST be at most 2^{48} for SRTP MUST be at most 2^{31} for SRTCP
Block Counter size	MUST be 24 bits for CCM, MUST be 32 bits for GCM

The reader is reminded that the ciphertext is longer than the plaintext by exactly the length of the AEAD authentication tag.

12. Key Derivation Functions

A Key Derivation Function (KDF) is used to derive all of the required encryption and authentication keys from a secret value shared by the endpoints. Both the AEAD_AES_128_GCM algorithms and the AEAD_AES_128_CCM algorithms MUST use the (128-bit) AES_CM_PRK Key Derivation Function described in [\[RFC3711\]](#). Both the AEAD_AES_256_GCM algorithms and the AEAD_AES_256_CCM algorithms MUST use the AES_256_CM_PRK Key Derivation Function described in [\[RFC6188\]](#)

13. Summary of Algorithm Characteristics

For convenience, much of the information about the use of AES-GCM and AES-CCM algorithms in SRTP is collected in the tables contained in this section.

13.1. AES-GCM for SRTP/SRTCP

AES-GCM is a family of AEAD algorithms built around the AES block cipher algorithm. AES-GCM uses AES counter mode for encryption and Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) for authentication. A detailed description of the AES-GCM family can be found in [\[RFC5116\]](#). The following members of the AES-GCM family may be used with SRTP/SRTCP:

Name	Key Size	AEAD Tag Size	Reference
=====	=====	=====	=====
AEAD_AES_128_GCM	16 octets	16 octets	[RFC5116]
AEAD_AES_256_GCM	32 octets	16 octets	[RFC5116]
AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8	16 octets	8 octets	[RFC5282]
AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8	32 octets	8 octets	[RFC5282]
AEAD_AES_128_GCM_12	16 octets	12 octets	[RFC5282]
AEAD_AES_256_GCM_12	32 octets	12 octets	[RFC5282]

Table 1: AES-GCM algorithms for SRTP/SRTCP

Any implementation of AES-GCM SRTP MUST support both AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM (the versions with 16 octet AEAD authentication tags), and it MAY support the four other variants shown in table 1. Below we summarize parameters associated with these six GCM algorithms:

+-----+-----+	
Parameter	Value
+-----+-----+	
Master key length	128 bits
Master salt length	96 bits
Key Derivation Function	AES_CM_PRF [RFC3711]
Default key lifetime (SRTP)	2 ⁴⁸ packets
Default key lifetime (SRTCP)	2 ³¹ packets
Cipher (for SRTP and SRTCP)	AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8
AEAD authentication tag length	64 bits
+-----+-----+	

Table 2: The AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8 Crypto Suite

Parameter	Value
Master key length	128 bits
Master salt length	96 bits
Key Derivation Function	AES_CM_PRF [RFC3711]
Default key lifetime (SRTP)	2^{48} packets
Default key lifetime (SRTCP)	2^{31} packets
Cipher (for SRTP and SRTCP)	AEAD_AES_128_GCM_12
AEAD authentication tag length	96 bits

Table 3: The AEAD_AES_128_GCM_12 Crypto Suite

Parameter	Value
Master key length	128 bits
Master salt length	96 bits
Key Derivation Function	AES_CM_PRF [RFC3711]
Default key lifetime (SRTP)	2^{48} packets
Default key lifetime (SRTCP)	2^{31} packets
Cipher (for SRTP and SRTCP)	AEAD_AES_128_GCM
AEAD authentication tag length	128 bits

Table 4: The AEAD_AES_128_GCM Crypto Suite

Parameter	Value
Master key length	256 bits
Master salt length	96 bits
Key Derivation Function	AES_256_CM_PRF [RFC6188]
Default key lifetime (SRTP)	2^{17} packets
Default key lifetime (SRTCP)	2^{17} packets
Cipher (for SRTP and SRTCP)	AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8
AEAD authentication tag length	64 bits

Table 5: The AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8 Crypto Suite

Parameter	Value
Master key length	256 bits
Master salt length	96 bits
Key Derivation Function	AES_256_CM_PRF [RFC6188]
Default key lifetime (SRTP)	2 ⁴⁸ packets
Default key lifetime (SRTCP)	2 ³¹ packets
Cipher (for SRTP and SRTCP)	AEAD_AES_256_GCM_12
AEAD authentication tag length	96 bits

Table 6: The AEAD_AES_256_GCM_12 Crypto Suite

Parameter	Value
Master key length	256 bits
Master salt length	96 bits
Key Derivation Function	AES_256_CM_PRF [RFC6188]
Default key lifetime (SRTP)	2 ⁴⁸ packets
Default key lifetime (SRTCP)	2 ³¹ packets
Cipher (for SRTP and SRTCP)	AEAD_AES_256_GCM
AEAD authentication tag length	128 bits

Table 7: The AEAD_AES_256_GCM Crypto Suite

13.2. AES-CCM for SRTP/SRTCP

AES-CCM is another family of AEAD algorithms built around the AES block cipher algorithm. AES-CCM uses AES counter mode for encryption and AES Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) for authentication. A detailed description of the AES-CCM family can be found in [[RFC5116](#)]. Four of the six CCM algorithms used in this document are defined in previous RFCs, while two, AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12 and AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12, are defined in [section 7](#) of this document.

Name	Key Size	AEAD Tag Size	Reference
AEAD_AES_128_CCM	128 bits	16 octets	[RFC5116]
AEAD_AES_256_CCM	256 bits	16 octets	[RFC5116]
AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12	128 bits	12 octets	see section 7

AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12	256 bits	12 octets	see section 7
AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8	128 bits	8 octets	[RFC6655]
AEAD_AES_256_CCM_8	256 bits	8 octets	[RFC6655]

Table 8: AES-CCM algorithms for SRTP/SRTCP

Any implementation of AES-CCM SRTP/SRTCP MUST support both AEAD_AES_128_CCM and AEAD_AES_256_CCM (the versions with 16 octet AEAD authentication tags), and MAY support the other four variants.

In addition to the flag octet used in counter mode encryption, AES-CCM authentications also uses a flag octet that conveys information about the length of the authentication tag, length of the block counter, and presence of additional authenticated data (see [section 2.2 of \[RFC3610\]](#)). For AES-CCM in SRTP/SRTCP, the flag octet has the hex value 5A if an 8-octet AEAD authentication tag is used, 6A if a 12-octet AEAD authentication tag is used, and 7A if a 16-octet AEAD authentication tag is used. The flag octet is one of the inputs to AES during the counter mode encryption of the plaintext.

Parameter	Value
Master key length	128 bits
Master salt length	96 bits
Key Derivation Function	AES_CM_PRF [RFC3711]
Maximum key lifetime (SRTP)	2 ⁴⁸ packets
Maximum key lifetime (SRTCP)	2 ³¹ packets
Cipher (for SRTP and SRTCP)	AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8
AEAD authentication tag length	64 bits

Table 9: The AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 Crypto Suite

Parameter	Value
Master key length	128 bits
Master salt length	96 bits
Key Derivation Function	AES_CM_PRF [RFC3711]
Maximum key lifetime (SRTP)	2 ⁴⁸ packets
Maximum key lifetime (SRTCP)	2 ³¹ packets
Cipher (for SRTP and SRTCP)	AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12
AEAD authentication tag length	96 bits

Table 10: The AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12 Crypto Suite

Parameter	Value
Master key length	128 bits
Master salt length	96 bits
Key Derivation Function	AES_CM_PRF [RFC3711]
Maximum key lifetime (SRTP)	2^{48} packets
Maximum key lifetime (SRTCP)	2^{31} packets
Cipher (for SRTP and SRTCP)	AEAD_AES_128_CCM
AEAD authentication tag length	128 bits

Table 11: The AEAD_AES_128_CCM Crypto Suite

Parameter	Value
Master key length	256 bits
Master salt length	96 bits
Key Derivation Function	AES_256_CM_PRF [RFC6188]
Maximum key lifetime (SRTP)	2^{48} packets
Maximum key lifetime (SRTCP)	2^{31} packets
Cipher (for SRTP and SRTCP)	AEAD_AES_256_CCM_8
AEAD authentication tag length	64 bits

Table 12: The AEAD_AES_256_CCM_8 Crypto Suite

Parameter	Value
Master key length	256 bits
Master salt length	96 bits
Key Derivation Function	AES_256_CM_PRF [RFC6188]
Maximum key lifetime (SRTP)	2^{48} packets
Maximum key lifetime (SRTCP)	2^{31} packets
Cipher (for SRTP and SRTCP)	AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12
AEAD authentication tag length	96 bits

Table 13: The AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12 Crypto Suite

Parameter	Value
Master key length	256 bits
Master salt length	96 bits
Key Derivation Function	AES_256_CM_PRF [RFC6188]
Maximum key lifetime (SRTP)	2^{48} packets
Maximum key lifetime (SRTCP)	2^{31} packets
Cipher (for SRTP and SRTCP)	AEAD_AES_256_CCM
AEAD authentication tag length	128 bits

Table 14: The AEAD_AES_256_CCM Crypto Suite

14. Security Considerations

14.1. Handling of Security Critical Parameters

As with any security process, the implementer must take care to ensure cryptographically sensitive parameters are properly handled. Many of these recommendations hold for all SRTP cryptographic algorithms, but we include them here to emphasize their importance.

- If the master salt is to be kept secret, it MUST be properly erased when no longer needed.
- The secret master key and all keys derived from it MUST be kept secret. All keys MUST be properly erased when no longer needed.
- At the start of each packet, the block counter MUST be reset (to 0 for CCM, to 1 for GCM). The block counter is incremented after each block key has been produced, but it MUST NOT be allowed to exceed $2^{32}-1$ for GCM and $2^{24}-1$ for CCM. Note that even though the block counter is reset at the start of each packet, IV uniqueness is ensured by the inclusion of SSRC/ROC/SEQ or SRTCP Index in the IV. (The reader is reminded that in both GCM and CCM the first block of key produced is reserved for use in authenticating the packet and is not used to encrypt plaintext.)
- Each time a rekey occurs, the initial values of the SRTCP index and the SRTP packet indices MUST be saved in order to prevent IV reuse.
- Processing MUST cease if the 31-bit SRTCP index or any of the 48-bit packet indices cycle back their initial values . Processing MUST NOT resume until a new SRTP/SRTCP session has

been established using a new SRTP master key. Ideally, a rekey should be done well before any of these counters cycle.

14.2. Size of the Authentication Tag

We require that the AEAD authentication tag must be at least 8 octets, significantly reducing the probability of an adversary successfully introducing fraudulent data. The goal of an authentication tag is to reduce the probability of a successful forgery occurring anywhere in the network we are attempting to defend. There are three relevant factors: how low we wish the probability of successful forgery to be (*prob_success*), how many attempts the adversary can make (*N_tries*) and the size of the authentication tag in bits (*N_tag_bits*). Then

$$\begin{aligned} \text{prob_success} &\leq \text{expected number of successes} \\ &= N_tries * 2^{-N_tag_bits}. \end{aligned}$$

When the expected number of successes is much less than one, the probability of success is well approximated by the expected number of successes.

Suppose an adversary wishes to introduce a forged or altered packet into a target network by randomly selecting an authentication value until by chance they hit a valid authentication tag. The table below summarizes the relationship between the number of forged packets the adversary has tried, the size of the authentication tag, and the probability of a compromise occurring (i.e. at least one of the attempted forgeries having a valid authentication tag). The reader is reminded that the forgery attempts can be made over the entire network, not just a single link, and that frequently changing the key does not decrease the probability of a compromise occurring.

It should be noted that the cryptographic properties of the GHASH algorithm used in GCM reduces the effective authentication tag size (in bits) by the log base 2 of the of blocks of encrypted and/or authenticated data in a packet. In practice an SRTP payload will be less than 2¹⁶ bytes, because of the 16-bit IPv4 and UDP length fields. The exception to this case is IPv6 jumbograms [[RFC2675](#)], which is unlikely to be used for RTP-based multimedia traffic [[RFC3711](#)]. This corresponds to 2¹² blocks of data, so the effective GCM authentication tag size is reduced by at most 12 bits.

Auth. Tag Size (bytes)	Eff. Tag Tag Size (bits)	Number of Forgery Attempts Needed to Achieve a Given Probability of Success		
		prob= 2^{-30}	prob= 2^{-20}	prob= 2^{-10}
4	32 (CCM)	2^2 tries	2^{12} tries	2^{22} tries
	20 (GCM)	1 try	1 try	2^{10} tries
8	64 (CCM)	2^{34} tries	2^{44} tries	2^{54} tries
	52 (GCM)	2^{22} tries	2^{32} tries	2^{42} tries
12	96 (CCM)	2^{66} tries	2^{76} tries	2^{86} tries
	84 (GCM)	2^{54} tries	2^{64} tries	2^{74} tries
16	128 (CCM)	2^{86} tries	2^{96} tries	2^{106} tries
	116 (GCM)	2^{98} tries	2^{108} tries	2^{118} tries

Table 15: Number of forgery attempts needed to achieve a given probability of success for various tag sizes.

15. IANA Considerations

15.1. SDPS

SDP Security Descriptions [RFC4568] defines SRTP "crypto suites". A crypto suite corresponds to a particular AEAD algorithm in SRTP. In order to allow Security Descriptions to signal the use of the algorithms defined in this document, IANA will register the following crypto suites into the "SRTP Crypto Suite Registrations" subregistry of the "Session Description Protocol (SDP) Security Descriptions" registry.

```

srtp-crypto-suite-ext = "AEAD_AES_128_GCM"      /
                        "AEAD_AES_256_GCM"      /
                        "AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8"     /
                        "AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8"     /
                        "AEAD_AES_128_GCM_12"    /
                        "AEAD_AES_256_GCM_12"    /
                        "AEAD_AES_128_CCM"       /

```

"AEAD_AES_256_CCM" /
"AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8" /
"AEAD_AES_256_CCM_8" /

```
"AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12" /  
"AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12" /  
srtp-crypto-suite-ext
```

15.2. DTLS

DTLS-SRTP [[RFC5764](#)] defines a DTLS-SRTP "SRTP Protection Profile". These also correspond to the use of an AEAD algorithm in SRTP. In order to allow the use of the algorithms defined in this document in DTLS-SRTP, we request IANA register the following SRTP Protection Profiles:

```
AEAD_AES_128_GCM      = {TBD, TBD }  
AEAD_AES_256_GCM      = {TBD, TBD }  
AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8    = {TBD, TBD }  
AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8    = {TBD, TBD }  
AEAD_AES_128_GCM_12   = {TBD, TBD }  
AEAD_AES_256_GCM_12   = {TBD, TBD }  
AEAD_AES_128_CCM      = {TBD, TBD }  
AEAD_AES_256_CCM      = {TBD, TBD }  
AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8    = {TBD, TBD }  
AEAD_AES_256_CCM_8    = {TBD, TBD }  
AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12   = {TBD, TBD }  
AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12   = {TBD, TBD }
```

Below we list the SRTP transform parameters for each of these protection profile. Unless separate parameters for SRTCP and SRTP are explicitly listed, these parameters apply to both SRTCP and SRTP. Note that GCM with an 8 octet auth_tag_length has a smaller than anticipated maximum lifetime due to the constraints imposed by NIST SP 800-38D [appendix C](#).

```
AEAD_AES_128_CCM  
  cipher:                AES_128_CCM  
  cipher_key_length:     128 bits  
  cipher_salt_length:    96 bits  
  aead_auth_tag_length:  16 octets  
  auth_function:         NULL  
  auth_key_length:       N/A  
  auth_tag_length:       N/A  
  maximum lifetime:      at most 2^31 SRTCP packets and  
                        at most 2^48 SRTP packets
```

```
AEAD_AES_256_CCM  
  cipher:                AES_256_CCM  
  cipher_key_length:     256 bits  
  cipher_salt_length:    96 bits
```

aead_auth_tag_length:	16 octets
auth_function:	NULL
auth_key_length:	N/A

auth_tag_length:	N/A
maximum lifetime:	at most 2^{31} SRTCP packets and at most 2^{48} SRTP packets
AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8	
cipher:	AES_128_CCM
cipher_key_length:	128 bits
cipher_salt_length:	96 bits
aead_auth_tag_length:	8 octets
auth_function:	NULL
auth_key_length:	N/A
auth_tag_length:	N/A
maximum lifetime:	at most 2^{31} SRTCP packets and at most 2^{48} SRTP packets
AEAD_AES_256_CCM_8	
cipher:	AES_256_CCM
cipher_key_length:	256 bits
cipher_salt_length:	96 bits
aead_auth_tag_length:	8 octets
auth_function:	NULL
auth_key_length:	N/A
auth_tag_length:	N/A
maximum lifetime:	at most 2^{31} SRTCP packets and at most 2^{48} SRTP packets
AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12	
cipher:	AES_128_CCM
cipher_key_length:	128 bits
cipher_salt_length:	96 bits
aead_auth_tag_length:	12 octets
auth_function:	NULL
auth_key_length:	N/A
auth_tag_length:	N/A
maximum lifetime:	at most 2^{31} SRTCP packets and at most 2^{48} SRTP packets
AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12	
cipher:	AES_256_CCM
cipher_key_length:	256 bits
cipher_salt_length:	96 bits
aead_auth_tag_length:	12 octets
auth_function:	NULL
auth_key_length:	N/A
auth_tag_length:	N/A
maximum lifetime:	at most 2^{31} SRTCP packets and at most 2^{48} SRTP packets

AEAD_AES_128_GCM

cipher:	AES_128_GCM
cipher_key_length:	128 bits
cipher_salt_length:	96 bits

aead_auth_tag_length: 16 octets
auth_function: NULL
auth_key_length: N/A
auth_tag_length: N/A
maximum lifetime: at most 2^{31} SRTCP packets and
at most 2^{48} SRTP packets

AEAD_AES_256_GCM

cipher: AES_256_GCM
cipher_key_length: 256 bits
cipher_salt_length: 96 bits
aead_auth_tag_length: 16 octets
auth_function: NULL
auth_key_length: N/A
auth_tag_length: N/A
maximum lifetime: at most 2^{31} SRTCP packets and
at most 2^{48} SRTP packets

AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8

cipher: AES_128_GCM
cipher_key_length: 128 bits
cipher_salt_length: 96 bits
aead_auth_tag_length: 8 octets
auth_function: NULL
auth_key_length: N/A
auth_tag_length: N/A
maximum lifetime: at most 2^{17} SRTCP packets and
at most 2^{17} SRTP packets

AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8

cipher: AES_256_GCM
cipher_key_length: 256 bits
cipher_salt_length: 96 bits
aead_auth_tag_length: 8 octets
auth_function: NULL
auth_key_length: N/A
auth_tag_length: N/A
maximum lifetime: at most 2^{17} SRTCP packets and
at most 2^{17} SRTP packets

AEAD_AES_128_GCM_12

cipher: AES_128_GCM
cipher_key_length: 128 bits
cipher_salt_length: 96 bits
aead_auth_tag_length: 12 octets
auth_function: NULL
auth_key_length: N/A
auth_tag_length: N/A

maximum lifetime: at most 2^{31} SRTCP packets and
at most 2^{48} SRTP packets

AEAD_AES_256_GCM_12

```

cipher:                AES_256_GCM
cipher_key_length:     256 bits
cipher_salt_length:    96 bits
aead_auth_tag_length:  12 octets
auth_function:         NULL
auth_key_length:       N/A
auth_tag_length:       N/A
maximum lifetime:      at most 2^31 SRTCP packets and
                        at most 2^48 SRTP packets

```

Note that these SRTP Protection Profiles do not specify an `auth_function`, `auth_key_length`, or `auth_tag_length` because all of these profiles use AEAD algorithms, and thus do not use a separate `auth_function`, `auth_key`, or `auth_tag`. The term `aead_auth_tag_length` is used to emphasize that this refers to the authentication tag provided by the AEAD algorithm and that this tag is not located in the authentication tag field provided by SRTP/SRTCP.

15.3. MIKEY

In accordance with "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing" [[RFC3830](#)], IANA maintains several subregistries under "Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY) Payload Name Spaces". This document requires additions to two of the MIKEY subregistries.

In the "MIKEY Security Protocol Parameters" subregistry we request the following addition:

Type	Meaning	Possible values
TBD	AEAD authentication tag length	8, 12, or 16 (in octets)

This list is, of course, intended for use with CM and GCM. It is conceivable that new AEAD algorithms introduced at some point in the future may require a different set of Authentication tag lengths.

In the "Encryption Algorithm" subregistry (derived from Table 6.10.1.b of [[RFC3830](#)]) we request the following additions:

SRTP encr Algorithm	Value	Default Session Encr. Key Length	Default Auth. Tag Length
AES-CCM	TBD	16 octets	16 octets
AES-GCM	TBD	16 octets	16 octets

The SRTP encryption algorithm, session encryption key length, and

AEAD authentication tag values received from MIKEY fully determine the AEAD algorithm (e.g., AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8). The exact mapping is described in [section 16](#).

15.4. AEAD registry

We request that IANA make the following additions to the IANA "Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) Parameters" page's registry for "AEAD Algorithms":

```

AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12      = TBD
AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12      = TBD

```

16. Parameters for use with MIKEY

MIKEY specifies the algorithm family separately from the key length (which is specified by the Session Encryption key length) and the authentication tag length (specified by AEAD Auth. tag length).

	Encryption Algorithm	Encryption Key Length	AEAD Auth. Tag Length
AEAD_AES_128_GCM	AES-GCM	16 octets	16 octets
AEAD_AES_128_CCM	AES-CCM	16 octets	16 octets
AEAD_AES_128_GCM_12	AES-GCM	16 octets	12 octets
AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12	AES-CCM	16 octets	12 octets
AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8	AES-GCM	16 octets	8 octets
AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8	AES-CCM	16 octets	8 octets
AEAD_AES_256_GCM	AES-GCM	32 octets	16 octets
AEAD_AES_256_CCM	AES-CCM	32 octets	16 octets
AEAD_AES_256_GCM_12	AES-GCM	32 octets	12 octets
AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12	AES-CCM	32 octets	12 octets
AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8	AES-GCM	32 octets	8 octets
AEAD_AES_256_CCM_8	AES-CCM	32 octets	8 octets

Table 16: Mapping MIKEY parameters to AEAD algorithm

[Section 12](#) in this document restricts the choice of Key Derivation Function for AEAD algorithms. To enforce this restriction in MIKEY,

we require that the SRTP PRF has value AES-CM whenever an AEAD algorithm is used. Note that, according to [Section 6.10.1 in \[RFC3830\]](#), the input key length of the Key Derivation Function (i.e. the SRTP master key length) is always equal to the session encryption key length. This means, for example, that AEAD_AES_256_GCM will use AES_256_CM_PRF as the Key Derivation Function.

[17.](#) Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Michael Peck, Michael Torla, Qin Wu, Magnus Westerland, Oscar Ohlsson, Woo-Hwan Kim, John Mattsson, Richard Barnes and many other reviewers who provided valuable comments on earlier drafts of this document.

18. References

18.1. Normative References

- [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", [BCP 14](#), [RFC 2119](#), March 1997.
- [RFC3550] Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V. Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications", [RFC 3550](#), July 2003.
- [RFC3610] Whiting, D., Housley, R., and N. Ferguson, "Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM)", [RFC 3610](#), March 2004.
- [RFC3711] Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K. Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", [RFC 3711](#), September 2003.
- [RFC3830] Arkko, J., Carrara, E., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M., and Norrman, K, "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", [RFC 3830](#), August 2004.
- [RFC4568] Andreasen, F., Baugher, M., and D. Wing, "Session Description Protocol (SDP): Security Descriptions for Media Streams", [RFC 4568](#), July 2006.
- [RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data", [RFC 5116](#), January 2008.
- [RFC5282] McGrew, D. and D. Black, "Using Authenticated Encryption Algorithms with the Encrypted Payload of the Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) Protocol", [RFC 5282](#), August 2008.
- [RFC5764] McGrew, D. and E. Rescorla, "Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", [RFC 5764](#), May 2010.
- [RFC6188] D. McGrew, "The Use of AES-192 and AES-256 in Secure RTP", [RFC 6188](#), March 2011.
- [RFC6655] McGrew, D. and D. Bailey, "AES-CCM Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", [RFC 6655](#), July 2012.
- [RFC6904] J. Lennox, "Encryption of Header Extensions in the Secure

Real-Time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", January 2013.

, January 2013.

Igoe and McGrew

Standards Track

[Page 33]

[RFC6904] J. Lennox, "Encryption of Header Extensions in the Secure Real-Time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", January 2013.

18.2. Informative References

- [BN00] Bellare, M. and C. Namprempre, "Authenticated encryption: Relations among notions and analysis of the generic composition paradigm", Proceedings of ASIACRYPT 2000, Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1976, pp. 531-545 <http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/papers/oem.html>.
- [GCM] Dworkin, M., "NIST Special Publication 800-38D: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC.", U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP800-38D.pdf>.
- [R02] Rogaway, P., "Authenticated encryption with Associated-Data", ACM Conference on Computer and Communication Security (CCS'02), pp. 98-107, ACM Press, 2002. <http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/ad.html>.
- [RFC3550] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V. Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications", STD 64, [RFC 3550](#), July 2003.
- [RFC4771] Lehtovirta, V., Naslund, M., and K. Norrman, "Integrity Transform Carrying Roll-Over Counter for the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", [RFC 4771](#), January 2007.

Author's Address

David A. McGrew
Cisco Systems, Inc.
510 McCarthy Blvd.
Milpitas, CA 95035
US
Phone: (408) 525 8651
Email: mcgrew@cisco.com
URI: <http://www.mindspring.com/~dmcgrew/dam.htm>

Kevin M. Igoe
NSA/CSS Commercial Solutions Center
National Security Agency
EMail: kmigoe@nsa.gov

Acknowledgement

Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
Administrative Support Activity (IASA).

