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BFD for VXLAN
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Abstract

This document describes the use of the Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) protocol in Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network (VXLAN) overlay networks.

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[1.](#) Introduction

"Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network" (VXLAN) [[RFC7348](#)]. provides an encapsulation scheme that allows virtual machines (VMs) to communicate in a data center network.

VXLAN is typically deployed in data centers interconnecting virtualized hosts, which may be spread across multiple racks. The individual racks may be part of a different Layer 3 network, or they could be in a single Layer 2 network. The VXLAN segments/overlays are overlaid on top of Layer 3 network.

A VM can communicate with another VM only if they are on the same VXLAN segment. VMs are unaware of VXLAN tunnels as a VXLAN tunnel is terminated on a VXLAN Tunnel End Point (VTEP) (hypervisor/TOR). VTEPs (hypervisor/TOR) are responsible for encapsulating and decapsulating frames exchanged among VMs.

Ability to monitor path continuity, i.e., perform proactive continuity check (CC) for these tunnels, is important. The asynchronous mode of BFD, as defined in [[RFC5880](#)], can be used to

monitor a VXLAN tunnel. Use of [[I-D.ietf-bfd-multipoint](#)] is for future study.

Also, BFD in VXLAN can be used to monitor the particular service nodes that are designated to properly handle Layer 2 broadcast, unknown unicast, and multicast traffic. Such nodes, often referred "replicators", are usually virtual VTEPs and can be monitored by physical VTEPs to minimize BUM traffic directed to the unavailable replicator.

This document describes the use of Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) protocol VXLAN to enable monitoring continuity of the path between Network Virtualization Edges (NVEs) and/or availability of a replicator service node using BFD.

In this document, the terms NVE and VTEP are used interchangeably.

[2.](#) Conventions used in this document

[2.1.](#) Terminology

BFD - Bidirectional Forwarding Detection

CC - Continuity Check

NVE - Network Virtualization Edge

TOR - Top of Rack

VM - Virtual Machine

VTEP - VXLAN Tunnel End Point

VXLAN - Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network

[2.2.](#) Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [BCP 14](#) [[RFC2119](#)] [[RFC8174](#)] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

[3.](#) Use cases

The primary use case of BFD for VXLAN is for continuity check of a tunnel. By exchanging BFD control packets between VTEPs, an operator exercises the VXLAN path in both the underlay and overlay thus

ensuring the VXLAN path availability and VTEPs reachability. BFD failure detection can be used for maintenance. There are other use cases such as the following:

Layer 2 VMs:

Most deployments will have VMs with only L2 capabilities that may not support L3. BFD being an L3 protocol can be used as a tunnel CC mechanism, where BFD will start and terminate at the NVEs, e.g., VTEPs.

It is possible to aggregate the CC sessions for multiple tenants by running a BFD session between the VTEPs over VxLAN tunnel.

Fault localization:

It is also possible that VMs are L3 aware and can host a BFD session. In these cases, BFD sessions can be established among VMs for CC. Also, BFD sessions can be created among VTEPs for tunnel CC. Having a hierarchical OAM model helps localize faults though it requires additional consideration.

Service node reachability:

The service node is responsible for sending BUM traffic. In case a service node tunnel terminates at a VTEP, and that VTEP might not even host VM. BFD session between TOR/hypervisor and service node can be used to monitor service node reachability.

4. Deployment

Figure 1 illustrates the scenario with two servers, each of them hosting two VMs. The servers host VTEPs that terminate two VXLAN tunnels with VNI number 100 and 200 respectively. Separate BFD sessions can be established between the VTEPs (IP1 and IP2) for monitoring each of the VXLAN tunnels (VNI 100 and 200). No BFD packets intended for a Hypervisor VTEP should be forwarded to a VM as a VM may drop BFD packets leading to a false negative. This method is applicable whether the VTEP is a virtual or physical device.




Figure 1: Reference VXLAN domain

5. BFD Packet Transmission over VXLAN Tunnel

BFD packet MUST be encapsulated and sent to a remote VTEP as explained in [Section 5.1](#). Implementations SHOULD ensure that the BFD packets follow the same lookup path as VXLAN data packets within the sender system.

5.1. BFD Packet Encapsulation in VXLAN

BFD packets are encapsulated in VXLAN as described below. The VXLAN packet format is defined in [Section 5 of \[RFC7348\]](#). The Outer IP/UDP and VXLAN headers MUST be encoded by the sender as defined in [\[RFC7348\]](#).



Figure 2: VXLAN Encapsulation of BFD Control Message

The BFD packet MUST be carried inside the inner MAC frame of the VXLAN packet. The inner MAC frame carrying the BFD payload has the following format:

Ethernet Header:

Destination MAC: This MUST be the dedicated MAC TBA ([Section 9](#)) or the MAC address of the destination VTEP. The details of how the MAC address of the destination VTEP is obtained are outside the scope of this document.

Source MAC: MAC address of the originating VTEP

IP header:

Source IP: IP address of the originating VTEP.

Destination IP: IP address of the terminating VTEP.

TTL: MUST be set to 1 to ensure that the BFD packet is not routed within the L3 underlay network.

The fields of the UDP header and the BFD control packet are encoded as specified in [[RFC5881](#)] for p2p VXLAN tunnels.

6. Reception of BFD packet from VXLAN Tunnel

Once a packet is received, VTEP MUST validate the packet as described in [Section 4.1 of \[RFC7348\]](#). If the Destination MAC of the inner MAC frame matches the dedicated MAC or the MAC address of the VTEP the packet MUST be processed further.

The UDP destination port and the TTL of the inner IP packet MUST be validated to determine if the received packet can be processed by BFD. BFD packet with inner MAC set to VTEP or dedicated MAC address MUST NOT be forwarded to VMs.

To ensure BFD detects the proper configuration of VXLAN Network Identifier (VNI) in a remote VTEP, a lookup SHOULD be performed with the MAC-DA and VNI as key in the Virtual Forwarding Instance (VFI) table of the originating/terminating VTEP to exercise the VFI associated with the VNI.

6.1. Demultiplexing of the BFD packet

Demultiplexing of IP BFD packet has been defined in [Section 3 of \[RFC5881\]](#). Since multiple BFD sessions may be running between two VTEPs, there needs to be a mechanism for demultiplexing received BFD

packets to the proper session. The procedure for demultiplexing packets with Your Discriminator equal to 0 is different from [RFC5880]. For such packets, the BFD session MUST be identified using the inner headers, i.e., the source IP and the destination IP present in the IP header carried by the payload of the VXLAN encapsulated packet. The VNI of the packet SHOULD be used to derive interface-related information for demultiplexing the packet. If BFD packet is received with non-zero Your Discriminator, then BFD session MUST be demultiplexed only with Your Discriminator as the key.

7. Use of reserved VNI

BFD session MAY be established for the reserved VNI 0. One way to aggregate BFD sessions between VTEP's is to establish a BFD session with VNI 0. A VTEP MAY also use VNI 0 to establish a BFD session with a service node.

8. Echo BFD

Support for echo BFD is outside the scope of this document.

9. IANA Considerations

IANA has assigned TBA as a dedicated MAC address from the IANA 8-bit unicast MAC address registry to be used as the Destination MAC address of the inner Ethernet of VXLAN when carrying BFD control packets.

10. Security Considerations

The document requires setting the inner IP TTL to 1 which could be used as a DDoS attack vector. Thus the implementation MUST have throttling in place to control the rate of BFD control packets sent to the control plane. Throttling MAY be relaxed for BFD packets based on port number.

Other than inner IP TTL set to 1 this specification does not raise any additional security issues beyond those of the specifications referred to in the list of normative references.

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