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**BFD for VXLAN
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Abstract

This document describes the use of the Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) protocol in point-to-point Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network (VXLAN) tunnels used to form an overlay network.

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[1](#). Introduction

"Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network" (VXLAN) [[RFC7348](#)] provides an encapsulation scheme that allows building an overlay network by decoupling the address space of the attached virtual hosts from that of the network.

One use of VXLAN is in data centers interconnecting virtual machines (VMs) of a tenant. VXLAN addresses requirements of the Layer 2 and Layer 3 data center network infrastructure in the presence of VMs in a multi-tenant environment by providing a Layer 2 overlay scheme on

a

Layer 3 network [[RFC7348](#)]. Another use is as an encapsulation for Ethernet VPN [[RFC8365](#)].

This document is written assuming the use of VXLAN for virtualized hosts and refers to VMs and VXLAN Tunnel End Points (VTEPs) in hypervisors. However, the concepts are equally applicable to non-virtualized hosts attached to VTEPs in switches.

In the absence of a router in the overlay, a VM can communicate with another VM only if they are on the same VXLAN segment. VMs are unaware of VXLAN tunnels as a VXLAN tunnel is terminated on a VTEP.

VTEPs are responsible for encapsulating and decapsulating frames exchanged among VMs.

The ability to monitor path continuity, i.e., perform proactive continuity check (CC) for point-to-point (p2p) VXLAN tunnels, is important. The asynchronous mode of BFD, as defined in [[RFC5880](#)], is used to monitor a p2p VXLAN tunnel.

In the case where a Multicast Service Node (MSN) (as described in [Section 3.3 of \[RFC8293\]](#)) resides behind a Network Virtualization Endpoint (NVE), the mechanisms described in this document apply and can, therefore, be used to test the connectivity from the source NVE to the MSN.

This document describes the use of Bidirectional Forwarding Detection

(BFD) protocol to enable monitoring continuity of the path between VXLAN VTEPs, performing as Network Virtualization Endpoints, and/or availability of a replicator multicast service node.

2. Conventions used in this document

2.1. Terminology

BFD Bidirectional Forwarding Detection

CC Continuity Check

p2p Point-to-point

MSN Multicast Service Node

NVE Network Virtualization Endpoint

VFI Virtual Forwarding Instance

VM Virtual Machine

VNI VXLAN Network Identifier (or VXLAN Segment ID)

VTEP VXLAN Tunnel End Point

VXLAN Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network

2.2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in

BCP

14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. Deployment

Figure 1 illustrates the scenario with two servers, each of them hosting two VMs. The servers host VTEPs that terminate two VXLAN tunnels with VXLAN Network Identifier (VNI) number 100 and 200 respectively. Separate BFD sessions can be established between the VTEPs (IP1 and IP2) for monitoring each of the VXLAN tunnels (VNI

100

and 200). Using a BFD session to monitor a set of VXLAN VNIs between

the same pair of VTEPs might help to detect and localize problems caused by misconfiguration. An implementation that supports this specification MUST be able to control the number of BFD sessions that

can be created between the same pair of VTEPs. BFD packets intended for a VTEP MUST NOT be forwarded to a VM, as a VM may drop BFD packets, leading to a false negative. This method is applicable whether the VTEP is a virtual or physical device.




Figure 1: Reference VXLAN Domain

At the same time, a service layer BFD session may be used between the tenants of VTEPs IP1 and IP2 to provide end-to-end fault management (this use case is outside the scope of this document). In such case, for VTEPs BFD Control packets of that session are indistinguishable from data packets.

For BFD Control packets encapsulated in VXLAN (Figure 2), the inner destination IP address SHOULD be set to one of the loopback addresses from 127/8 range for IPv4 or to one of IPv4-mapped IPv4 loopback addresses from ::ffff:127.0.0.0/104 range for IPv6. There could be a firewall configured on VTEP to block loopback addresses if set as the destination IP in the inner IP header. It is RECOMMENDED to allow addresses from the loopback range through a firewall only if they are used as the destination IP addresses in the inner IP header and the destination UDP port is set to 3784 [RFC5881].

4. BFD Packet Transmission over VXLAN Tunnel

BFD packets MUST be encapsulated and sent to a remote VTEPs as explained in this section. Implementations SHOULD ensure that the BFD packets follow the same forwarding path as VXLAN data packets within the sender system.

BFD packets are encapsulated in VXLAN as described below. The VXLAN packet format is defined in [Section 5 of \[RFC7348\]](#). The Outer IP/UDP and VXLAN headers MUST be encoded by the sender as defined in [\[RFC7348\]](#).




Figure 2: VXLAN Encapsulation of BFD Control Packet

The BFD packet MUST be carried inside the inner Ethernet frame of the VXLAN packet. The choice of Destination MAC and Destination IP addresses for the inner Ethernet frame MUST ensure that the BFD Control packet is not forwarded to a tenant but is processed locally at the remote VTEP. The inner Ethernet frame carrying the BFD Control packet- has the following format:

Ethernet Header:

Destination MAC: This MUST NOT be of one of tenant's MAC addresses. The destination MAC address MAY be the address associated with the destination VTEP. The MAC address may be either configured or learned via a control plane protocol.

The

details of how the MAC address is obtained are outside the scope of this document.

Source MAC: MAC address associated with the originating VTEP

IP header:

Destination IP: IP address MUST NOT be of one of tenant's IP addresses. The IP address SHOULD be selected from the range 127/8 for IPv4, for IPv6 - from the range ::ffff:

127.0.0.0/104.

Alternatively, the destination IP address MAY be set to VTEP's IP address.

Source IP: IP address of the originating VTEP.

TTL or Hop Limit: MUST be set to 1 to ensure that the BFD packet is not routed within the Layer 3 underlay network.

This

addresses the scenario when the inner IP destination address

is

of the VXLAN gateway and there is a router in the underlay which removes the VXLAN header, then it is possible to route the packet as VXLAN gateway address is routable address.

The fields of the UDP header and the BFD Control packet are encoded as specified in [[RFC5881](#)].

5. Reception of BFD Packet from VXLAN Tunnel

Once a packet is received, the VTEP MUST validate the packet. If the

Destination MAC of the inner Ethernet frame matches one of the MAC addresses associated with the VTEP the packet MUST be processed further. If the Destination MAC of the inner Ethernet frame doesn't match any of VTEP's MAC addresses, then the processing of the received VXLAN packet MUST follow the procedures described in [Section 4.1 of \[RFC7348\]](#). If the BFD session is using the

Management

VNI ([Section 6](#)), BFD Control packets with unknown MAC address MUST NOT be forwarded to VMs.

The UDP destination port and the TTL or Hop Limit of the inner IP packet MUST be validated to determine if the received packet can be processed by BFD.

5.1. Demultiplexing of the BFD Packet

Demultiplexing of IP BFD packet has been defined in [Section 3 of \[RFC5881\]](#). Since multiple BFD sessions may be running between two VTEPs, there needs to be a mechanism for demultiplexing received BFD packets to the proper session. For demultiplexing packets with Your Discriminator equal to 0, a BFD session MUST be identified using the logical link over which the BFD Control packet is received. In the case of VXLAN, the VNI number identifies that logical link. If BFD packet is received with non-zero Your Discriminator, then the BFD session MUST be demultiplexed only with Your Discriminator as the key.

6. Use of the Specific VNI

In most cases, a single BFD session is sufficient for the given VTEP to monitor the reachability of a remote VTEP, regardless of the number of VNIs. When the single BFD session is used to monitor the reachability of the remote VTEP, an implementation SHOULD choose any of the VNIs. An implementation MAY support the use of the Management

VNI as control and management channel between VTEPs. The selection of the VNI number of the Management VNI MUST be controlled through management plane. An implementation MAY use VNI number 1 as the default value for the Management VNI. All VXLAN packets received on the Management VNI MUST be processed locally and MUST NOT be forwarded to a tenant.

7. Echo BFD

Support for echo BFD is outside the scope of this document.

8. IANA Considerations

This specification has no IANA action requested. This section may be deleted before the publication.

9. Security Considerations

The document requires setting the inner IP TTL or Hop Limit to 1, which could be used as a DDoS attack vector. Thus the implementation

MUST have throttling in place to control the rate of BFD Control packets sent to the control plane. On the other hand, over-aggressive throttling of BFD Control packets may become the cause of the inability to form and maintain BFD session at scale. Hence, throttling of BFD Control packets SHOULD be adjusted to permit BFD to work according to its procedures.

This document recommends using an address from the Internal host loopback addresses 127/8 range for IPv4 or an IP4-mapped IPv4 loopback address from ::ffff:127.0.0.0/104 range for IPv6 as the destination IP address in the inner IP header. Using such an address

prevents the forwarding of the encapsulated BFD control message by a transient node in case the VXLAN tunnel is broken as according to [\[RFC1812\]](#):

A router SHOULD NOT forward, except over a loopback interface, any packet that has a destination address on network 127. A router MAY have a switch that allows the network manager to disable these checks. If such a switch is provided, it MUST default to performing the checks.

If the implementation supports establishing multiple BFD sessions between the same pair of VTEPs, there SHOULD be a mechanism to control the maximum number of such sessions that can be active at the same time.

Other than setting the value of inner IP TTL or Hop Limit to 1 and limit the number of BFD sessions between the same pair of VTEPs, this specification does not raise any additional security issues beyond those discussed in [\[RFC5880\]](#), [\[RFC5881\]](#), and [\[RFC7348\]](#).

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