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M. Kaeo  
Double Shot Security  
T. Van Herck  
Cisco Systems  
M. Bustos  
IXIA  
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**Terminology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices**  
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Abstract

This purpose of this document is to define terminology specific to measuring the performance of IPsec devices. It builds upon the tenets set forth in [[RFC1242](#)], [[RFC2544](#)], [[RFC2285](#)] and other IETF Benchmarking Methodology Working Group (BMWG) documents used for benchmarking routers and switches. This document seeks to extend

these efforts specific to the IPsec paradigm. The BMWG produces two major classes of documents: Benchmarking Terminology documents and Benchmarking Methodology documents. The Terminology documents present the benchmarks and other related terms. The Methodology documents define the procedures required to collect the benchmarks cited in the corresponding Terminology documents.

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## **1. Introduction**

Despite the need to secure communications over a public medium there is no standard method of performance measurement nor a standard in the terminology used to develop such hardware and software solutions. This results in varied implementations which challenge interoperability and direct performance comparisons. Standardized IPsec terminology and performance test methodologies will enable users to determine if the IPsec device they select will withstand loads of secured traffic that meet their requirements.

To appropriately define the parameters and scope of this document, this section will give a brief overview of the IPsec standard:

## **2. Document Scope**

The primary focus of this document is to establish useful performance testing terminology for IPsec devices that support manual keying and IKEv1. We want to constrain the terminology specified in this document to meet the requirements of the Methodology for Benchmarking IPsec Devices documented test methodologies.

Both IPv4 and IPv6 addressing will be taken into consideration.

The testing will be constrained to:

- o Devices acting as IPsec gateways whose tests will pertain to both IPsec tunnel and transport mode.
- o Devices acting as IPsec end-hosts whose tests will pertain to both IPsec tunnel and transport mode.

Any testing involving interoperability and/or conformance issues, L2TP [[RFC2661](#)], GRE [[RFC2784](#)], MPLS VPN's [[RFC2547](#)], multicast, and anything that does not specifically relate to the establishment and tearing down of IPsec tunnels is specifically out of scope. It is assumed that all relevant networking parameters that facilitate in the running of these tests are pre-configured (this includes at a minimum ARP caches, routing tables, neighbor tables, etc ...).

A separate document will be written specifically to address testing using the updated IKEv2 specification. Due to the dependency on IKEv2 of the updated IPsec architecture document [[RFC4301](#)], this document and the companion IPsec Benchmarking Methodology document will be based on the older IPsec architecture standard [[RFC2401](#)].



### **3. IPsec Fundamentals**

IPsec is a framework of open standards that provides data confidentiality, data integrity, and data origin authenticity between participating peers. IPsec provides these security services at the IP layer. IPsec uses IKE to handle negotiation of protocols and algorithms based on local policy, and to generate the encryption and authentication keys to be used. IPsec can be used to protect one or more data flows between a pair of hosts, between a pair of security gateways, or between a security gateway and a host. The IPsec protocol suite set of standards is documented in RFC's [[RFC2401](#)] through [[RFC2412](#)] and [[RFC2451](#)]. At this time [[RFC4301](#)] updates [[RFC2401](#)] (IPsec Architecture), [[RFC4302](#)] updates [[RFC2402](#)] (AH) and [[RFC4303](#)] updates [[RFC2406](#)] (ESP) and [[RFC4306](#)] updates [[RFC2409](#)] (IKE). The reader is assumed to be familiar with these documents.

IPsec itself defines the following:

Authentication Header (AH): A security protocol, defined in [[RFC4302](#)], which provides data authentication and optional anti-replay services. AH ensures the integrity and data origin authentication of the IP datagram as well as the invariant fields in the outer IP header.

Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP): A security protocol, defined in [[RFC4303](#)], which provides confidentiality, data origin authentication, connectionless integrity, an anti-replay service and limited traffic flow confidentiality. The set of services provided depends on options selected at the time of Security Association (SA) establishment and on the location of the implementation in a network topology. ESP authenticates only headers and data after the IP header.

Internet Key Exchange (IKE): A hybrid protocol which implements Oakley [[RFC2412](#)] and SKEME [[SKEME](#)] key exchanges inside the ISAKMP framework. While IKE can be used with other protocols, its initial implementation is with the IPsec protocol. IKE provides authentication of the IPsec peers, negotiates IPsec security associations, and establishes IPsec keys.

The AH and ESP protocols each support two modes of operation: transport mode and tunnel mode. In transport mode, two hosts provide protection primarily for upper-layer protocols. The cryptographic endpoints (where the encryption and decryption take place) are the source and destination of the data packet. In IPv4, a transport mode security protocol header appears immediately after the IP header and before any higher-layer protocols (such as TCP or UDP). In IPv6, the security protocol header appears after the base IP header and



selected extension headers. It may appear before or after destination options but must appear before next layer protocols (e.g., TCP, UDP, SCTP)

In the case of AH in transport mode, security services are provided to selected portions of the IP header preceding the AH header, selected portions of extension headers, and selected options (contained in the IPv4 header, IPv6 Hop-by-Hop extension header, or IPv6 Destination extension headers). Any fields in these headers/extension headers which are modified in transit are set to 0 before applying the authentication algorithm. If a field is mutable, but its value at the receiving IPsec peer is predictable, then that value is inserted into the field before applying the cryptographic algorithm.

In the case of ESP in transport mode, security services are provided only for the higher-layer protocols, not for the IP header or any extension headers preceding the ESP header.

A tunnel is a vehicle for encapsulating packets inside a protocol that is understood at the entry and exit points of a given network. These entry and exit points are defined as tunnel interfaces.

Both the AH and ESP protocols can be used in tunnel mode for data packet endpoints as well as by intermediate security gateways. In tunnel mode, there is an "outer" IP header that specifies the IPsec processing destination, plus an "inner" IP header that specifies the ultimate destination for the packet. The source address in the outer IP header is the initiating cryptographic endpoint; the source address in the inner header is the true source address of the packet. The security protocol header appears after the outer IP header and before the inner IP header.

If AH is employed in tunnel mode, portions of the new outer IP header are given protection (those same fields as for transport mode, described earlier in this section), as well as all of the tunneled IP packet (that is, all of the inner IP header is protected as are the higher-layer protocols). If ESP is employed, the protection is afforded only to the tunneled packet, not to the new outer IP header.

### **3.1. IPsec Operation**

#### **3.1.1. Security Associations**

The concept of a Security Association (SA) is fundamental to IPsec. An SA is a relationship between two or more entities that describes how the entities will use security services to communicate. The SA includes: an encryption algorithm, an authentication algorithm and a



shared session key.

Because an SA is unidirectional, two SA's (one in each direction) are required to secure typical, bidirectional communication between two entities. The security services associated with an SA can be used for AH or ESP, but not for both. If both AH and ESP protection is applied to a traffic stream, two (or more) SA's are created for each direction to protect the traffic stream.

The SA is uniquely identified by the Security Parameter Index (SPI) [[RFC2406](#)]. When a system sends a packet that requires IPsec protection, it looks up the SA in its database and applies the specified processing and security protocol (AH/ESP), inserting the SPI from the SA into the IPsec header. When the IPsec peer receives the packet, it looks up the SA in its database by destination address, protocol, and SPI and then processes the packet as required.

### **[3.1.2.](#) Key Management**

IPsec uses cryptographic keys for authentication, integrity and encryption services. Both manual provisioning and automatic distribution of keys is supported. IKE is specified as the public-key-based approach for automatic key management.

IKE authenticates each peer involved in IPsec, negotiates the security policy, and handles the exchange of session keys. IKE is a hybrid protocol, combining parts of the following protocols to negotiate and derive keying material for SA's in a secure and authenticated manner:

1. ISAKMP [[RFC2408](#)] (Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol), which provides a framework for authentication and key exchange but does not define them. ISAKMP is designed to be key exchange independent; it is designed to support many different key exchanges.
2. Oakley [[RFC2412](#)], which describes a series of key exchanges, called modes, and details the services provided by each (for example, perfect forward secrecy for keys, identity protection, and authentication).
3. [[SKEME](#)] (Secure Key Exchange Mechanism for Internet), which describes a versatile key exchange technique that provides anonymity, reputability, and quick key refreshment.

IKE creates an authenticated, secure tunnel between two entities and then negotiates the security association for IPsec. In the original IKE specification [[RFC2409](#)], this is performed in two phases.



In Phase 1, the two unidirectional SA's establish a secure, authenticated channel with which to communicate. Phase 1 has two distinct modes; Main Mode and Aggressive Mode. Main Mode for Phase 1 provides identity protection. When identity protection is not needed, Aggressive Mode can be used. The completion of Phase 1 is called an IKE SA.

The following attributes are used by IKE and are negotiated as part of the IKE SA:

- o Encryption algorithm.
- o Hash algorithm.
- o Authentication method (digital signature, public-key encryption or pre-shared key).
- o Diffie-Hellman group information.

After the attributes are negotiated, both parties must be authenticated to each other. IKE supports multiple authentication methods. The following mechanisms are generally implemented:

- o Pre-shared keys: The same key is pre-installed on each host. IKE peers authenticate each other by computing and sending a keyed hash of data that includes the pre-shared key. If the receiving peer can independently create the same hash using its pre-shared key, it knows that both parties must share the same secret, and thus the other party is authenticated.
- o Public key cryptography: Each party generates a pseudo-random number (a nonce) and encrypts it and its ID using the other party's public key. The ability for each party to compute a keyed hash containing the other peer's nonce and ID, decrypted with the local private key, authenticates the parties to each other. This method does not provide nonrepudiation; either side of the exchange could plausibly deny that it took part in the exchange.
- o Digital signature: Each device digitally signs a set of data and sends it to the other party. This method is similar to the public-key cryptography approach except that it provides nonrepudiation.

Note that both digital signature and public-key cryptography require the use of digital certificates to validate the public/private key mapping. IKE allows the certificate to be accessed independently or by having the two devices explicitly exchange certificates as part of IKE. Both parties must have a shared session key to encrypt the IKE



tunnel. The Diffie-Hellman protocol is used to agree on a common session key.

In Phase 2 of IKE, SA's are negotiated for ESP and/or AH. These SA's will be called IPsec SA's. These IPsec SA's use a different shared key than that used for the IKE\_SA. The IPsec SA shared key can be derived by using Diffie-Hellman again or by refreshing the shared key derived from the original Diffie-Hellman exchange that generated the IKE\_SA by hashing it with nonces. Once the shared key is derived and additional communication parameters are negotiated, the IPsec SA's are established and traffic can be exchanged using the negotiated parameters.

#### **4. Definition Format**

The definition format utilized by this document is described in [\[RFC1242\], Section 2](#).

Term to be defined.

Definition: The specific definition for the term.

Discussion: A brief discussion of the term, its application, or other information that would build understanding.

Issues: List of issues or conditions that affect this term. This field can present items that may impact the term's related methodology or otherwise restrict its measurement procedures.

[Measurement units:] Units used to record measurements of this term. This field is mandatory where applicable. This field is optional in this document.

[See Also:] List of other terms that are relevant to the discussion of this term. This field is optional in this document.

#### **5. Key Words to Reflect Requirements**

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#). [RFC 2119](#) defines the use of these key words to help make the intent of standards track documents as clear as possible. While this document uses these keywords, this document is not a standards track document.



## **6. Existing Benchmark Definitions**

It is recommended that readers consult [[RFC1242](#)], [[RFC2544](#)] and [[RFC2285](#)] before making use of this document. These and other IETF Benchmarking Methodology Working Group (BMWG) router and switch documents contain several existing terms relevant to benchmarking the performance of IPsec devices. The conceptual framework established in these earlier RFC's will be evident in this document.

This document also draws on existing terminology defined in other BMWG documents. Examples include, but are not limited to:

Throughput	[RFC 1242, <a href="#">section 3.17</a> ]
Latency	[RFC 1242, <a href="#">section 3.8</a> ]
Frame Loss Rate	[RFC 1242, <a href="#">section 3.6</a> ]
Forwarding Rates	[RFC 2285, <a href="#">section 3.6</a> ]
Loads	[RFC 2285, <a href="#">section 3.5</a> ]

## **7. Definitions**

### **7.1. IPsec**

Definition: IPsec or IP Security protocol suite which comprises a set of standards used to provide security services at the IP layer.

Discussion: IPsec is a framework of protocols that offer authentication, integrity and encryption services to the IP and/or upper layer protocols. The major components of the protocol suite are IKE, used for key exchanges, and IPsec protocols such as AH and ESP, which use the exchanged keys to protect payload traffic.

Issues: N/A

See Also: IPsec Device, IKE, ISAKMP, ESP, AH

### **7.2. ISAKMP**

Definition: The Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol, which provides a framework for authentication and key exchange but does not define them. ISAKMP is designed to be key exchange independent; it is designed to support many different key exchanges. ISAKMP is defined in [[RFC2407](#)].



Discussion: Though ISAKMP is only a framework for the IPsec standard key management protocol, it is often misused and interchanged with the term 'IKE', which is an implementation of ISAKMP.

Issues: When implementations refer to the term 'ISAKMP SA', it refers to an IKE Phase 1 SA.

See Also: IKE, Security Association

### **7.3. IKE**

Definition: A hybrid key management protocol that provides authentication of the IPsec peers, negotiates IPsec SAs and establishes IPsec keys.

Discussion: A hybrid protocol, defined in [[RFC2409](#)], from the following 3 protocols:

- \* ISAKMP (Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol), which provides a framework for authentication and key exchange but does not define them. ISAKMP is designed to be key exchange independent; it is designed to support many different key exchanges.
- \* Oakley, which describes a series of key exchanges, called modes, and details the services provided by each (for example, perfect forward secrecy for keys, identity protection, and authentication). [[RFC2412](#)]
- \* [[SKEME](#)] (Secure Key Exchange Mechanism for Internet), which describes a versatile key exchange technique that provides anonymity, reputability, and quick key refreshment.

Note that IKE is an optional protocol within the IPsec framework. IPsec SAs may also be manually configured. Manual keying is the most basic mechanism to establish IPsec SAs between two IPsec devices. However, it is not a scalable solution and often manually configured keys are not changed on a periodic basis which reduces the level of protection since the keys are effectively static and as a result are more prone to various attacks. When IKE is employed as a key management protocol, the keys are automatically renegotiated on a user-defined basis (time and/or traffic volume based) as part of the IKE rekeying mechanism.

Issues: During the first IPsec deployment experiences, ambiguities were found in the IKEv1 specification, which lead to interoperability problems. To resolve these issues, IKEv1 is being updated by IKEv2.



See Also: ISAKMP, IPsec, Security Association

### **7.3.1. IKE Phase 1**

**Definition:** The shared policy and key(s) used by negotiating peers to establish a secure authenticated "control channel" for further IKE communications.

**Discussion:** The IPsec framework mandates that SPI's are used to secure payload traffic. If IKE is employed all SPI information will be exchanged between the IPsec devices. This has to be done in a secure fashion and for that reason IKE will set up a secure "control channel" over which it can exchange this information.

Note that IKE is an optional protocol within the IPsec framework and that SPI information can also be manually configured.

**Issues:** In some documents often referenced as ISAKMP SA or IKE SA.

See Also: IKE, ISAKMP

### **7.3.2. IKE Phase 1 Main Mode**

**Definition:** Main Mode is an instantiation of the ISAKMP Identity Protect Exchange, defined in [[RFC2409](#)]. Upon successful completion it results in the establishment of an IKE Phase 1 SA.

**Discussion:** IKE Main Mode use 3 distinct message pairs, for a total of 6 messages. The first two messages negotiate policy; the next two represent Diffie-Hellman public values and ancillary data (e.g. nonces); and the last two messages authenticate the Diffie-Hellman Exchange. The authentication method negotiated as part of the initial IKE Phase 1 influence the composition of the payloads but not their purpose.

**Issues:** N/A

See Also: ISAKMP, IKE, IKE Phase 1, Phase 1 Aggressive Mode

### **7.3.3. IKE Phase 1 Aggressive Mode**

**Definition:** Aggressive Mode is an instantiation of the ISAKMP Aggressive Exchange, defined in [[RFC2409](#)]. Upon successful completion it results in the establishment of an IKE Phase 1 SA.



Discussion: IKE Aggressive Mode uses 3 messages. The first two messages negotiate policy, exchange Diffie-Hellman public values and ancillary data necessary for the exchange, and identities. In addition the second message authenticates the Responder. The third message authenticates the Initiator and provides proof of participation in the exchange.

Issues: For IKEv1 the standard specifies that all implementations use both main and aggressive mode, however, it is common to use only main mode.

See Also: ISAKMP, IKE, IKE Phase 1, Phase 1 Main Mode

#### **7.3.4. IKE Phase 2**

Definition: ISAKMP phase which upon successful completion establishes the shared keys used by the negotiating peers to set up a secure "data channel" for IPsec.

Discussion: The main purpose of Phase 2 is to produce the key for the IPsec tunnel. Phase 2 is also used for exchanging informational messages.

Issues: In other documents also referenced as IPsec SA.

See Also: IKE Phase 1, ISAKMP, IKE

#### **7.3.5. Phase 2 Quick Mode**

Definition: Quick Mode is an instantiation of IKE Phase 2. After successful completion it will result in one or typically two or more IPsec SA's

Discussion: Quick Mode is used to negotiate the SA's and keys that will be used to protect the user data. Three different messages are exchanged, which are protected by the security parameters negotiated by the IKE phase 1 exchange. An additional Diffie-Hellman exchange may be performed if PFS (Perfect Forward Secrecy) is enabled.

Issues: N/A

See Also: ISAKMP, IKE, IKE Phase 2



#### **7.4. Security Association (SA)**

Definition: A set of policy and key(s) used to protect traffic flows that require authentication and/or encryption services. It is a negotiation agreement between two IPsec devices, specifically the Initiator and Responder.

Discussion: A simplex (unidirectional) logical connection that links a traffic flow to a set of security parameters. All traffic traversing an SA is provided the same security processing and will be subjected to a common set of encryption and/or authentication algorithms. In IPsec, an SA is an Internet layer abstraction implemented through the use of AH or ESP as defined in [[RFC2401](#)].

Issues: N/A

See Also: Initiator, Responder

#### **7.5. Selectors**

Definition: A mechanism used for the classification of traffic flows that require authentication and/or encryption services.

Discussion: The selectors are a set of fields that will be extracted from the network and transport layer headers that provide the ability to classify the traffic flow and associate it with an SA.

After classification, a decision can be made if the traffic needs to be encrypted/decrypted and how this should be done depending on the SA linked to the traffic flow. Simply put, selectors classify IP packets that require IPsec processing and those packets that must be passed along without any intervention of the IPsec framework.

Selectors are flexible objects that can match on ranges of source and destination addresses and ranges of source and destination ports.

Issues: Both sides must agree exactly on both the networks being protected, and they both must agree on how to describe the networks (range, subnet, addresses). This is a common point of non-interoperability.

#### **7.6. IPsec Device**



**Definition:** Any implementation that has the ability to process data flows according to the IPsec protocol suite specifications.

**Discussion:** Implementations can be grouped by 'external' properties (e.g. software vs. hardware implementations) but more important is the subtle differences that implementations may have with relation to the IPsec Protocol Suite. Not all implementations will cover all RFC's that encompass the IPsec Protocol Suite, but the majority will support a large subset of features described in the suite, nor will all implementations utilize all of the cryptographic functions listed in the RFC's.

In that context, any implementation, that supports basic IP layer security services as described in the IPsec protocol suite shall be called an IPsec Device.

**Issues:** Due to the fragmented nature of the IPsec Protocol Suite RFC's, it is possible that IPsec implementations will not be able to interoperate. Therefore it is important to know which features and options are implemented in the IPsec Device.

See Also: IPsec

#### **7.6.1. Initiator**

**Definition:** An IPsec device which starts the negotiation of IKE Phase 1 and IKE Phase 2 SAs.

**Discussion:** When a traffic flow is offered at an IPsec device and it is determined that the flow must be protected, but there is no IPsec tunnel to send the traffic through, it is the responsibility of the IPsec device to start a negotiation process that will instantiate the IPsec tunnel. This process will establish an IKE Phase 1 SA and one, or more likely, a pair IKE phase 2 SA's, eventually resulting in secured data transport. The device that takes the action to start this negotiation process will be called an Initiator.

**Issues:** IPsec devices/implementations can be both an initiator as well as a responder. The distinction is useful from a test perspective.

See Also: Responder, IKE, IPsec



### **7.6.2. Responder**

Definition: An IPsec device which replies to incoming IKE Phase 1 and IKE Phase 2 requests and processes these messages in order to establish an IPsec tunnel.

Discussion: When an initiator attempts to establish SA's with another IPsec device, this peer will need to evaluate the proposals made by the initiator and either accept or deny them. In the former case, the traffic flow will be decrypted according to the negotiated parameters. Such a device will be called a Responder.

Issues: IPsec devices/implementations can usually be both an initiator as well as a responder. The distinction is useful from a test perspective.

See Also: Initiator, IKE

### **7.6.3. IPsec Client**

Definition: IPsec Devices that will only act as an Initiator.

Discussion: In some situations it is not needed or preferred to have an IPsec device respond to an inbound IKE SA or IPsec SA request. In the case of e.g. road warriors or home office scenarios the only property needed from the IPsec device is the ability to securely connect to a remote private network. The IPsec Client will initiate one or more IPsec tunnels to an IPsec Server on the network that needs to be accessed and to provide the required security services. An IPsec client will silently drop and ignore any inbound IPsec tunnel requests. IPsec clients are generally used to connect remote users in a secure fashion over the Internet to a private network.

Issues: N/A

See Also: IPsec device, IPsec Server, Initiator, Responder

### **7.6.4. IPsec Server**

Definition: IPsec Devices that can both act as an Initiator as well as a Responder.

Discussion: IPsec Servers are mostly positioned at private network edges and provide several functions:



- \* Responds to IPsec tunnel setup request from IPsec Clients.
- \* Responds to IPsec tunnel setup request from other IPsec devices (Initiators).
- \* Initiate IPsec tunnels to other IPsec servers inside or outside the private network.

Issues: IPsec Servers are also sometimes referred to as 'VPN Concentrators'.

See Also: IPsec Device, IPsec Client, Initiator, Responder

## **7.7. Tunnels**

The term "tunnel" is often used in a variety of contexts. To avoid any discrepancies, in this document, the following distinctions have been defined:

### **7.7.1. IPsec Tunnel**

Definition: The combination of an IKE Phase 1 SA and a pair of IKE Phase 2 SA's.

Discussion: An IPsec Tunnel will be defined as a single (1) Phase 1 SA and a pair (2) Phase 2 SA's. This construct will allow bidirectional traffic to be passed between two IPsec Devices where the traffic can benefit from the services offered in the IPsec framework.

Issues: Since it is implied that a Phase 1 SA is used, an IPsec Tunnel will be by definition a dynamically negotiated secured link. If manual keying is used to enable secure data transport, then this link will merely be referred to as a pair of IPsec SA's.

It is very likely that more than one pair of Phase 2 SA's are associated with a single Phase 1 SA. Also in this case, the IPsec Tunnel definition WILL NOT apply. Instead the ratio between Phase 1 SA's and Phase 2 SA's MUST be explicitly stated. The umbrella term of "IPsec Tunnel" MUST NOT be used in this context.

See Also: IKE Phase 1, IKE Phase 2

### **7.7.2. Configured Tunnel**



**Definition:** An IPsec tunnel or a pair of IPsec SAs in the case of manual keying that is provisioned in the IPsec device's configuration.

**Discussion:** Several steps are required before IPsec can be used to actually transport traffic. The very first step is to configure the IPsec Tunnel (or IPsec SAs in the case of manual keying) in the IPsec device. When using IKE there are no SA's associated with the IPsec Tunnel and no traffic is going through the IPsec device that matches the Selectors, which would instantiate the IPsec Tunnel. When using either manual keying or IKE, a configured tunnel will not have a populated SADB.

**Issues:** When using IKE, a configured tunnel will not have any SA's while with manual keying, the SAs will have simply been configured but not populated in the SADB.

**See Also:** IPsec Tunnel, Established Tunnel, Active Tunnel

### **7.7.3. Established Tunnel**

**Definition:** An IPsec device that has a populated SADB and is ready to provide security services to the appropriate traffic.

**Discussion:** When using IKE, a second step needed to ensure that an IPsec Tunnel can transport data is to complete the Phase 1 and Phase 2 negotiations. After the packet classification process has asserted that a packet requires security services, the negotiation is started to obtain both Phase 1 and Phase 2 SAs. After this is completed and the SADB is populated, the IPsec Tunnel is called 'Established'. Note that at this time there is still no traffic flowing through the IPsec Tunnel. Just enough packet(s) have been sent to the IPsec device that matched the selectors and triggered the IPsec Tunnel setup to result in a populated SADB. In the case of manual keying, populating the SADB is accomplished by a separate administrative command.

**Issues:** N/A

**See Also:** IPsec Tunnel, Configured Tunnel, Active Tunnel

### **7.7.4. Active Tunnel**

**Definition:** An IPsec device that is forwarding secured data.



Discussion: When a Tunnel is Established and it is transporting traffic that is authenticated and/or encrypted, the tunnel is called 'Active'.

Issues: The distinction between an Active Tunnel and Configured/Established Tunnel is made in the context of manual keyed Tunnels. In this case it would be possible to have an Established tunnel on an IPsec device which has no counterpart on it's corresponding peer. This will lead to encrypted traffic flows which will be discarded on the receiving peer. Only if both peers have an Established Tunnel that shows evidence of traffic transport, it may be called an Active Tunnel.

See Also: IPsec Tunnel, Configured Tunnel, Established Tunnel


7.8. Iterated Tunnels

Iterated Tunnels are a bundle of transport and/or tunnel mode SA's. The bundles are divided into two major groups :

7.8.1. Nested Tunnels

Definition: An SA bundle consisting of two or more 'tunnel mode' SA's.

Discussion: The process of nesting tunnels can theoretically be repeated multiple times (for example, tunnels can be many levels deep), but for all practical purposes, most implementations limit the level of nesting. Nested tunnels can use a mix of AH and ESP encapsulated traffic.



In the IP Cloud a packet would have a format like this :
[IP{2,3}][ESP][IP{1,4}][AH][IP][PAYLOAD][ESP TRAILER][ESP AUTH]

Nested tunnels can be deployed to provide additional security on already secured traffic. A typical example of this would be that the inner gateways (GW2 and GW3) are securing traffic between two branch offices and the outer gateways (GW1 & GW4) add an additional layer of security between departments within those



branch offices.

Issues: N/A


See Also: Transport Adjacency, IPsec Tunnel

**7.8.2. Transport Adjacency**

Definition: An SA bundle consisting of two or more transport mode SA's.

Discussion: Transport adjacency is a form of tunnel nesting. In this case two or more transport mode IPsec tunnels are set side by side to enhance applied security properties.

Transport adjacency can be used with a mix of AH and ESP tunnels although some combinations are not preferred. If AH and ESP are mixed, the ESP tunnel should always encapsulate the AH tunnel. The reverse combination is a valid combination but doesn't make cryptographical sense.



In the IP Cloud a packet would have a format like this :  
[IP][ESP][AH][PAYLOAD][ESP TRAILER][ESP AUTH]

Issues: This is rarely used in the way it is depicted. It is more common, but still not likely, that SA's are established from different gateways as depicted in the Nested Tunnels figure. The packet format in the IP Cloud would remain unchanged.

See Also: Nested Tunnels, IPsec Tunnel

**7.9. Transform protocols**

Definition: Encryption and authentication algorithms that provide cryptographic services to the IPsec Protocols.



Discussion: Some algorithms run significantly slower than others. A decision for which algorithm to use is usually based on the tradeoff between performance and security strength. For example, 3DES encryption is generally slower than DES encryption.

Issues: N/A

See Also: Authentication protocols, Encryption protocols

### **7.9.1. Authentication Protocols**

Definition: Algorithms which provide data integrity and data source authentication.

Discussion: Authentication protocols provide no confidentiality. Commonly used authentication algorithms/protocols are:

- \* MD5-HMAC
- \* SHA-HMAC
- \* AES-HMAC

Issues: N/A

See Also: Transform protocols, Encryption protocols

### **7.9.2. Encryption Protocols**

Definition: Algorithms which provide data confidentiality.

Discussion: Encryption protocols provide no authentication. Commonly used encryption algorithms/protocols are:

- \* NULL encryption
- \* DES-CBC
- \* 3DES-CBC
- \* AES-CBC

Issues: The null-encryption option is a valid encryption mechanism to provide an alternative to using AH. There is no confidentiality protection with null-encryption. Note also that when using ESP null-encryption the authentication and integrity services only apply for the upper layer protocols and not for the IP header itself.

DES has been officially deprecated by NIST, though it is still mandated by the IPsec framework and is still commonly implemented and used due to its speed advantage over 3DES. AES will be the successor of 3DES due to its superior encryption and performance



advantage.

See Also: Transform protocols, Authentication protocols

### **7.10. IPsec Protocols**

Definition: A suite of protocols which provide a framework of open standards that provides data origin confidentiality, data integrity, and data origin authenticity between participating peers at the IP layer. The original IPsec protocol suite set of standards is documented in [[RFC2401](#)] through [[RFC2412](#)] and [[RFC2451](#)]. At this time [[RFC4301](#)] updates [[RFC2401](#)] (IPsec Architecture), [[RFC4302](#)] updates [[RFC2402](#)] (AH) and [[RFC4303](#)] updates [[RFC2406](#)] (ESP)

Discussion: The IPsec Protocol suite is modular and forward compatible. The protocols that comprise the IPsec protocol suite can be replaced with new versions of those protocols as the older versions become obsolete. For example, IKEv2 will soon replace IKEv1.

Issues: N/A

See Also: AH, ESP

#### **7.10.1. Authentication Header (AH)**

Definition: Provides data origin authentication and data integrity (including replay protection) security services as defined in [[RFC4302](#)].

Discussion: The AH protocol supports two modes of operation i.e. tunnel mode and transport mode.

In transport mode, AH is inserted after the IP header and before a next layer protocol, e.g., TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc. or before any other IPsec headers that have already been inserted. In the context of IPv4, this calls for placing AH after the IP header (and any options that it contains), but before the next layer protocol. In the IPv6 context, AH is viewed as an end-to-end payload, and thus should appear after hop-by-hop, routing, and fragmentation extension headers. The destination options extension header(s) could appear before or after or both before and after the AH header depending on the semantics desired.



In tunnel mode, the "inner" IP header carries the ultimate (IP) source and destination addresses, while an "outer" IP header contains the addresses of the IPsec "peers," e.g., addresses of security gateways. In tunnel mode, AH protects the entire inner IP packet, including the entire inner IP header. The position of AH in tunnel mode, relative to the outer IP header, is the same as for AH in transport mode.

Issues: AH is rarely used to secure traffic over the Internet.

See Also: Transform protocols, IPsec protocols, Encapsulated Security Payload

### **7.10.2. Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP)**

Definition: Provides data origin authentication, data integrity (including replay protection) and data confidentiality as defined in [[RFC4303](#)].

Discussion: The ESP protocol supports two modes of operation i.e. tunnel mode and transport mode.

In transport mode, ESP is inserted after the IP header and before a next layer protocol, e.g., TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc. In the context of IPv4, this translates to placing ESP after the IP header (and any options that it contains), but before the next layer protocol. In the IPv6 context, ESP is viewed as an end-to-end payload, and thus should appear after hop-by-hop, routing, and fragmentation extension headers. Destination options extension header(s) could appear before, after, or both before and after the ESP header depending on the semantics desired. However, since ESP protects only fields after the ESP header, it generally will be desirable to place the destination options header(s) after the ESP header.

In tunnel mode, the "inner" IP header carries the ultimate (IP) source and destination addresses, while an "outer" IP header contains the addresses of the IPsec "peers", e.g., addresses of security gateways. Mixed inner and outer IP versions are allowed, i.e., IPv6 over IPv4 and IPv4 over IPv6. In tunnel mode, ESP protects the entire inner IP packet, including the entire inner IP header. The position of ESP in tunnel mode, relative to the outer IP header, is the same as for ESP in transport mode.

Issues: N/A



See Also: Transform protocols, IPsec protocols, Authentication Header

### **7.11. NAT Traversal (NAT-T)**

Definition: The capability to support IPsec functionality in the presence of NAT devices.

Discussion: NAT-Traversal requires some modifications to IKE as defined in [[RFC3947](#)]. Specifically, in phase 1, it requires detecting if the other end supports NAT-Traversal, and detecting if there are one or more NAT instances along the path from host to host. In IKE Quick Mode, there is a need to negotiate the use of UDP encapsulated IPsec packets.

NAT-T also describes how to transmit the original source and destination addresses to the corresponding IPsec Device. The original source and destination addresses are used in transport mode to incrementally update the TCP/IP checksums so that they will match after the NAT transform (The NAT cannot do this, because the TCP/IP checksum is inside the UDP encapsulated IPsec packet).

Issues: N/A

See Also: IKE, ISAKMP, IPsec Device

### **7.12. IP Compression**

Definition: A mechanism as defined in [[RFC2393](#)] that reduces the size of the payload that needs to be encrypted.

Discussion: IP payload compression is a protocol to reduce the size of IP datagrams. This protocol will increase the overall communication performance between a pair of communicating hosts/gateways ("nodes") by compressing the datagrams, provided the nodes have sufficient computation power, through either CPU capacity or a compression coprocessor, and the communication is over slow or congested links.

IP payload compression is especially useful when encryption is applied to IP datagrams. Encrypting the IP datagram causes the data to be random in nature, rendering compression at lower protocol layers (e.g., PPP Compression Control Protocol [[RFC1962](#)]) ineffective. If both compression and encryption are required, compression must be applied before encryption.



Issues: N/A

See Also: IKE, ISAKMP, IPsec Device

### **7.13. Security Context**

**Definition:** A security context is a collection of security parameters that describe the characteristics of the path that an IPsec Tunnel will take, all of the IPsec Tunnel parameters and the effects it has on the underlying protected traffic. Security Context encompasses protocol suite and security policy.

**Discussion:** In order to fairly compare multiple IPsec devices it is imperative that an accurate overview is given of all security parameters that were used to establish the IPsec Tunnels or manually created SAs and to secure the traffic between protected networks. Security Context is not a metric; it is included to accurately reflect the test environment variables when reporting the methodology results. To avoid listing too much information when reporting metrics, we have divided the security context into an IKE context and an IPsec context.

When merely discussing the behavior of traffic flows through IPsec devices, an IPsec context **MUST** be provided. In other cases the scope of a discussion or report may focus on a more broad set of behavioral characteristics of the IPsec device, in which case both an IPsec and an IKE context **MUST** be provided.

The IPsec context **MUST** consist of the following elements:

- \* Manual Keyed Tunnels versus IKE negotiated Tunnels
- \* Number of IPsec Tunnels or IPsec SA's
- \* IPsec protocol (AH or ESP)
- \* IPsec protocol mode (tunnel or transport)
- \* Authentication algorithm used by AH/ESP
- \* Encryption algorithm used ESP (if applicable)
- \* IPsec SA lifetime (traffic and time based)



The IPsec Context MAY also list:

- \* Selectors
- \* Fragmentation handling

The IKE Context MUST consist of the following elements:

- \* Number of IPsec Tunnels.
  - + IKE Phase 1 SA to IKE Phase 2 SA ratio (if applicable)
  - + IKE Phase 1 parameters
    - Authentication algorithm
    - Encryption algorithm
    - DH-Group
    - SA lifetime (traffic and time based)
    - Authentication mechanism (pre-shared key, RSA-sig, certificate, etc)
  - + IKE Phase 2 parameters
    - IPsec protocol (part of IPsec context)
    - IPsec protocol mode (part of IPsec context)
    - Authentication algorithm (part of IPsec context)
    - Encryption algorithm (part of IPsec context)
    - DH-Group
    - PFS used
    - SA Lifetime (part of IPsec context)
- \* Keepalive or DPD values as defined in [[I-D.ietf-ipsec-dpd](#)]
- \* IP Compression [[RFC2393](#)]



The IKE context MUST also list:

- \* Phase 1 mode (main or aggressive)
- \* Available bandwidth and latency to Certificate Authority server (if applicable)

Issues: A Security Context will be an important element in describing the environment where protected traffic is traveling through.

See Also: IPsec Protocols, Transform Protocols, IKE Phase 1, IKE phase 2, Selectors, IPsec Tunnel

## **8. Framesizes**

### **8.1. Layer3 clear framesize**

Definition: The total size of the unencrypted L3 PDU.

Discussion: In relation to IPsec this is the size of the IP header and its payload. It SHALL NOT include any encapsulations that MAY be applied before the PDU is processed for encryption.

IPv4 example: 46 bytes PDU = 20 bytes IP header + 26 bytes payload.

The following table represents the min/max packet sizes for a variety of IP packet types, including raw IPv6, IPv6 with typical transport headers, and IPv6 with IPsec.



			MIN	MAX
IPv6	40	1500*		
IPv6+UDP	48			
IPv6+TCP	60			
ICMPv6	88			
IPv6+AH+C	64		(transport mode compressed)	
IPv6+ESP+C	74		(transport mode compressed)	
IPv6+T+AH+C	70		(tunnel mode compressed)	
IPv6+T+ESP+C	80		(tunnel mode compressed)	

Given robust header compression (ROHC), the minimum packet size is derived as follows, e.g., for tunnel mode ESP:

```

IPv6      40 bytes
IPsec     34 (ESP, 192-bit ICV)
  -+
IPv6     |- 6 byte ROHC of tunnel and transport headers
TCP      |
  -+
total -----
          80 bytes

```

This 80 bytes assumes that the TCP payload is 0 bytes; it may be 1 byte (e.g., data sent reliably but with "NAGLE" off). Similar ROHC sizes result from UDP sources.

Measurement Units: Bytes

Issues: N/A

See Also: Layer3 Encrypted Framesize, Layer2 Clear Framesize, Layer2 Encrypted Framesize.

### 8.2. Layer3 encrypted framesize

Definition: The total size of the encrypted L3 PDU.

Discussion: The size of the IP packet and its payload after encapsulations MAY be applied and the PDU is being processed by the transform.

For example, in IPv4, after a tunnel mode ESP 3DES/SHA1 transform has been applied an unencrypted or clear layer3 framesize of 46 bytes Becomes 96 bytes:



20 bytes outer IP header (tunnel mode)  
4 bytes SPI (ESP header)  
4 bytes Sequence (ESP Header)  
8 bytes IV (IOS ESP-3DES)  
46 bytes payload  
0 bytes pad (ESP-3DES 64 bit)  
1 byte Pad length (ESP Trailer)  
1 byte Next Header (ESP Trailer)  
12 bytes ESP-HMAC SHA1 96 digest

Measurement Units: Bytes

Issues: N/A

See Also: Layer3 Clear Framesize, Layer2 Clear Framesize, Layer2 Encrypted Framesize.

## **9. Performance Metrics**

### **9.1. IPsec Tunnels Per Second (TPS)**

Definition: The measurement unit for the IPsec Tunnel Setup Rate tests. The rate at which IPsec Tunnels are established per second.

Discussion: According to [[RFC2401](#)] two IPsec Tunnels cannot be established between the same gateways with the same selectors. This is to prevent overlapping IPsec Tunnels. If overlapping IPsec Tunnels are attempted, the error will cause the IPsec Tunnel setup time to take longer than if the IPsec Tunnel setup was successful. For this reason, a unique pair of selector sets are required for IPsec Tunnel Setup Rate testing.

Issues: A unique pair of selector sets are required for TPS testing.

See Also: IPsec Tunnel Setup Rate Behavior, IPsec Tunnel Setup Rate, IKE Setup Rate, IPsec Setup Rate

### **9.2. Tunnel Rekeys Per Seconds (TRPS)**

Definition: A metric that quantifies the number of IKE Phase 1 or Phase 2 rekeys per seconds a DUT can correctly process.

Discussion: This metric will be will be primary used with Tunnel Rekey behavior tests.



TRPS will provide a metric used to see system behavior under stressful conditions where large volumes of SA's are being rekeyed at the same time or in a short timespan.

Issues: N/A

See Also: Tunnel Rekey Behavior, Phase 1 Rekey Rate, Phase 2 Rekey Rate

### **9.3. IPsec Tunnel Attempts Per Second (TAPS)**

Definition: A metric that quantifies the number of successful and unsuccessful IPsec Tunnel establishment requests per second.

Discussion: This metric can be used to measure IKE DOS Resilience behavior test.

TAPS provides an important metric to validate the stability of an IPsec device, if stressed with valid (large number of IPsec tunnel establishments per seconds or TPS) or invalid (IKE DOS attacks of any style) tunnel establishment requests. IPsec Tunnel setups offered to an IPsec devices can either fail due to lack of resources in the IPsec device to process all the requests or due to an IKE DOS attack (usually the former is a result of the latter).

Issues: If the TAPS increases, the TPS usually decreases, due to burdening of the DUT with the DOS attack traffic.

See Also: N/A

## **10. Test Definitions**

### **10.1. Capacity**

#### **10.1.1. IKE SA Capacity**

Definition: The maximum number of IKE SA's that can be sustained on an IPsec Device.

Discussion: This metric will represent the quantity of peer a given IPsec device can establish. It is the maximum number of Active Tunnels that can be sustained by an IPsec Device.



Measurement Units: IKE SA's

Issues: N/A

See Also: IPsec SA Capacity

### **10.1.2. IPsec SA Capacity**

Definition: The maximum number of IPsec SA's that can be sustained on an IPsec Device.

Discussion: This metric will represent the quantity of traffic flows a given IPsec Device can protect. In contrast with the IKE SA Capacity, the emphasis for this test lies on the number of IPsec SA's that can be established in the worst case scenario. This scenario would be a case where 1 IKE SA is used to negotiate multiple IPsec SA's. It is the maximum number of Active Tunnels that can be sustained by an IPsec Device where only 1 IKE SA is used to exchange keying material.

Measurement Units: IPsec SA's

Issues: N/A

See Also: IKE SA Capacity

## **10.2. Throughput**

### **10.2.1. IPsec Throughput**

Definition: The maximum rate through an Active Tunnel at which none of the offered frames are dropped by the device under test.

Discussion: The IPsec Throughput is almost identically defined as Throughput in [\[RFC1242\], section 3.17](#). The only difference is that the throughput is measured with a traffic flow getting encrypted and decrypted by an IPsec device. IPsec Throughput is an end-to-end measurement.

The metric can be represented in two variations depending on where measurement is taken in the SUT. One can look at throughput from a cleartext point of view i.e. find the maximum rate where clearpackets no longer get dropped. This resulting rate can be recalculated with an encrypted framesize to represent the encryption throughput rate. The latter is the preferred method of representation and shall be called the IPsec Throughput.



Measurement Units: Packets per seconds (pps)

Issues: N/A

See Also: IPsec Encryption Throughput, IPsec Decryption Throughput

### **10.2.2. IPsec Encryption Throughput**

Definition: The maximum encryption rate through an Active Tunnel at which none of the offered cleartext frames are dropped by the device under test.

Discussion: Since encryption throughput is not necessarily equal to the decryption throughput, both of the forwarding rates must be measured independently. The independent forwarding rates have to be measured with the help of an IPsec aware test device that can originate and terminate IPsec and IKE SA. As defined in [\[RFC1242\]](#), measurements should be taken with an assortment of frame sizes.

Measurement Units: Packets per seconds (pps)

Issues: In some cases packets are offered to an IPsec Device that have a framesize that is larger than the MTU of the ingress interface of the IPsec Tunnel that is transporting the packet. In this case fragmentation will be required before IPsec services are applied.

In other cases, the packet is of a size very close to the MTU of the egress interface of the IPsec Tunnel. Here, the mere addition of the IPsec header will create enough overhead to make the IPsec packet larger than the MTU of the egress interface. In such instance, the original payload packet must be fragmented either before or after the IPsec overhead is applied.

Note that the two aforementioned scenario's can happen simultaneously on a single packet, creating multiple small fragments.

When measuring the IPsec Encryption Throughput, one has to consider that when probing with packets of a size near MTU's associated with the IPsec Tunnel, fragmentation may occur and the decrypting IPsec Device (either a tester or a corresponding IPsec peer) has to reassemble the IPsec and/or payload fragments to validate its content.



The end points (i.e. hosts, subnets) should NOT see any fragments at ANY time. Only on the IPsec link, fragments MAY occur.

See Also: IPsec Throughput, IPsec Decryption Throughput

### **10.2.3. IPsec Decryption Throughput**

Definition: The maximum decryption rate through an Active Tunnel at which none of the offered encrypted frames are dropped by the device under test.

Discussion: Since encryption throughput is not necessarily equal to the decryption throughput, both of the forwarding rates must be measured independently.

The independent forwarding rates have to be measured with the help of an IPsec aware test device that can originate and terminate IPsec and IKE SA. As defined in [[RFC1242](#)], measurements should be taken with an assortment of frame sizes.

Measurement Units: Packets per seconds (pps)

Issues: When measuring the IPsec Decryption Throughput, one has to consider that it is likely that the encrypting IPsec Device has to fragment certain packets that have a frame size near MTU's associated with the IPsec Tunnel.

The decrypting IPsec Device has to reassemble the IPsec and/or payload fragments to validate its content.

The end points (i.e. hosts, subnets) should NOT see any fragments at ANY time. Only on the IPsec link, fragments MAY occur.

See Also: IPsec Throughput, IPsec Encryption Throughput

## **10.3. Latency**

### **10.3.1. IPsec Latency**

Definition: Time required to propagate a cleartext frame from the input interface of an initiator, through an Active Tunnel, to the output interface of the responder.

Discussion: The IPsec Latency is the time interval starting when the end of the first bit of the cleartext frame reaches the input interface of the initiator and ending when the start of the first bit of the same cleartext frame is detected on the output interface of the responder. The frame has passed through an



Active Tunnel between an initiator and a responder and has been through an encryption and decryption cycle.

Measurement Units: Time units with enough precision to reflect latency measurement.

Issues: N/A

See Also: IPsec Encryption Latency, IPsec Decryption Latency

### **10.3.2. IPsec Encryption Latency**

Definition: The IPsec Encryption Latency is the time interval starting when the end of the first bit of the cleartext frame reaches the input interface, through an Active Tunnel, and ending when the start of the first bit of the encrypted output frame is seen on the output interface.

Discussion: IPsec Encryption Latency is the latency introduced when encrypting traffic through an IPsec tunnel.

Like encryption/decryption throughput, it is not always the case that encryption latency equals the decryption latency. Therefore a distinction between the two has to be made in order to get a more accurate view of where the latency is the most pronounced.

The independent encryption/decryption latencies have to be measured with the help of an IPsec aware test device that can originate and terminate IPsec and IKE SA. As defined in [[RFC1242](#)], measurements should be taken with an assortment of frame sizes.

Measurement Units: Time units with enough precision to reflect latency measurement.

Issues: N/A

See Also: IPsec Latency, IPsec Decryption Latency

### **10.3.3. IPsec Decryption Latency**

Definition: The IPsec decryption Latency is the time interval starting when the end of the first bit of the encrypted frame reaches the input interface, through an Active Tunnel, and ending when the start of the first bit of the decrypted output frame is seen on the output interface.



Discussion: IPsec Decryption Latency is the latency introduced when decrypting traffic through an Active Tunnel. Like encryption/decryption throughput, it is not always the case that encryption latency equals the decryption latency. Therefore a distinction between the two has to be made in order to get a more accurate view of where the latency is the most pronounced.

The independent encryption/decryption latencies have to be measured with the help of an IPsec aware test device that can originate and terminate IPsec and IKE SA's. As defined in [[RFC1242](#)], measurements should be taken with an assortment of frame sizes.

Measurement Units: Time units with enough precision to reflect latency measurement.

Issues: N/A

See Also: IPsec Latency, IPsec Encryption Latency

#### **10.3.4. Time To First Packet**

Definition: The Time To First Packet (TTFP) is the time required to process a cleartext packet from a traffic stream that requires encryption services when no IPsec Tunnel is present.

Discussion: The Time To First Packet addresses the issue of responsiveness of an IPsec device by looking how long it takes to transmit a packet over Configured Tunnel. The Time To First Packet MUST include the time to set up the established tunnel, triggered by the traffic flow (both phase 1 and phase 2 setup times SHALL be included) and the time it takes to encrypt and decrypt the packet on a corresponding peer. In short it is the IPsec Tunnel setup time plus the propagation delay of the packet through the Active Tunnel.

It must be noted that it is highly unlikely that the first packet of the traffic flow will be the packet that will be used to measure the TTFP. There MAY be several protocol layers in the stack before the tunnel is formed and the traffic is forwarded, hence several packets COULD be lost during negotiation, for example, ARP and/or IKE.

Measurement Units: Time units with enough precision to reflect a TTFP measurement.



Issues: Only relevant when using IKE for tunnel negotiation.

#### **10.4. Frame Loss**

##### **10.4.1. IPsec Frame Loss**

Definition: Percentage of cleartext frames that should have been forwarded through an Active Tunnel under steady state (constant) load but were dropped before encryption or after decryption.

Discussion: The IPsec Frame Loss is almost identically defined as Frame Loss Rate in [\[RFC1242\], section 3.6](#). The only difference is that the IPsec Frame Loss is measured with a traffic flow getting encrypted and decrypted by an IPsec Device. IPsec Frame Loss is an end-to-end measurement.

Measurement Units: Percent (%)

Issues: N/A

See Also: IPsec Encryption Frame Loss, IPsec Decryption Frame Loss

##### **10.4.2. IPsec Encryption Frame Loss**

Definition: Percentage of cleartext frames that should have been encrypted through an Active Tunnel under steady state (constant) load but were dropped.

Discussion: A DUT will always have an inherent forwarding limitation. This will be more pronounced when IPsec is employed on the DUT. There is a possibility that the offered traffic rate at the Active Tunnel is too high to be transported through the Active Tunnel and not all cleartext packets will get encrypted. In that case, some percentage of the cleartext traffic will be dropped. This drop percentage is called the IPsec Encryption Frame Loss.

Measurement Units: Percent (%)

Issues: N/A

See Also: IPsec Frame Loss, IPsec Decryption Frame Loss

##### **10.4.3. IPsec Decryption Frame Loss**



**Definition:** Percentage of encrypted frames that should have been decrypted through an Active Tunnel under steady state (constant) load but were dropped.

**Discussion:** A DUT will also have an inherent forwarding limitation when decrypting packets. When Active Tunnel encrypted traffic is offered at a constant load, there might be a possibility that the IPsec Device that needs to decrypt the traffic will not be able to perform this action on all of the packets due to limitations of the decryption performance. The percentage of encrypted frames that would get dropped under these conditions is called the IPsec Decryption Frame Loss.

**Measurement Units:** Percent (%)

**Issues:** N/A

**See Also:** IPsec Frame Loss, IPsec Encryption Frame Loss

#### **10.4.4. IKE Phase 2 Rekey Frame Loss**

**Definition:** Number of frames dropped as a result of an inefficient IKE Phase 2 rekey.

**Discussion:** Normal operation of an IPsec Device would require that a rekey does not create temporary IPsec Frame Loss of a traffic stream that is protected by the IKE Phase 2 SA's (i.e. IPsec SA's). Nevertheless there can be situations where IPsec Frame Loss occurs during this rekey process.

This metric should be ideally zero but this may not be the case on IPsec Devices where IPsec functionality is not a core feature.

**Measurement Units:** Number of N-octet frames

**Issues:** N/A

**See Also:** IKE Phase 2 Rekey Rate

#### **10.5. Back-to-back Frames**

##### **10.5.1. IPsec Back-to-back Frames**

**Definition:** A burst of cleartext frames, offered at a constant load that can be sent through an Active Tunnel without losing a single cleartext frame after decryption.



Discussion: The IPsec Back-to-back Frames is almost identically defined as Back-to-back in [\[RFC1242\], section 3.1](#). The only difference is that the IPsec Back-to-back Frames is measured with a traffic flow getting encrypted and decrypted by an IPsec Device. IPsec Back-to-back Frames is an end-to-end measurement.

Measurement Units: Number of N-octet frames in burst.

Issues: Recommended test frame sizes will be addressed in methodology document.

See Also: IPsec Encryption Back-to-back frames, IPsec Decryption Back-to-back frames

### **[10.5.2.](#) IPsec Encryption Back-to-back Frames**

Definition: A burst of cleartext frames, offered at a constant load that can be sent through an Active Tunnel without losing a single encrypted frame.

Discussion: IPsec Encryption back-to-back frames is the measure of the maximum burst size that an IPsec Device can handle for encrypting traffic that it receives as plaintext. Since it is not necessarily the case that the maximum burst size a DUT can handle for encryption is equal to the maximum burst size a DUT can handle for decryption, both of these capabilities must be measured independently. The IPsec Encryption Back-to-back frame measurement has to be measured with the help of an IPsec aware test device that can decrypt the traffic to determine the validity of the encrypted frames.

Measurement Units: Number of N-octet frames in burst.

Issues: Recommended test frame sizes will be addressed in future methodology document.

See Also: IPsec Back-to-back frames, IPsec Decryption Back-to-back frames

### **[10.5.3.](#) IPsec Decryption Back-to-back Frames**

Definition: The number of encrypted frames, offered at a constant load, that can be sent through an Active Tunnel without losing a single cleartext frame.



Discussion: IPsec Decryption Back-to-back frames is the measure of the maximum burst size that an IPsec Device can handle for decrypting traffic that it receives as encrypted traffic. Since it is not necessarily the case that the maximum burst size a DUT can handle for decryption is equal to the maximum burst size a DUT can handle for encryption, both of these capabilities must be measured independently. The IPsec Decryption Back-to-back frame measurement has to be measured with the help of an IPsec aware testdevice that can determine the validity of the decrypted frames.

Measurement Units: Number of N-octet frames in burst.

Issues: Recommended test frame sizes will be addressed in methodology document.

See Also: IPsec Back-to-back frames, IPsec Encryption back-to-back frames

## **10.6. Tunnel Setup Behavior**

### **10.6.1. IPsec Tunnel Setup Rate**

Definition: The maximum number of IPsec Tunnels per second that an IPsec Device can successfully establish.

Discussion: The Tunnel Setup Rate SHOULD be measured at varying number of IPsec Tunnels (1 Phase 1 SA and 2 Phase 2 SA's) on the DUT. Several factors may influence Tunnel Setup Rate, such as: TAPS rate, Background cleartext traffic load on the secure interface, Already established IPsec Tunnels, Authentication method such as pre-shared keys, RSA-encryption, RSA-signature, DSS Key sizes used (when using RSA/DSS).

Measurement Units: Tunnels Per Second (TPS)

Issues: N/A

See Also: IKE Phase 1 Setup Rate, IKE Phase 2 Setup Rate, IPsec Tunnel Rekey Behavior

### **10.6.2. IKE Phase 1 Setup Rate**

Definition: The maximum number of successful IKE Phase 1 SA's per second that an IPsec Device can establish.



Discussion: The Phase 1 Setup Rate is a portion of the IPsec Tunnel Setup Rate. In the process of establishing an IPsec Tunnel, it is interesting to know what the limiting factor of the IKE Finite State Machine (FSM) is i.e. is it limited by the Phase 1 processing delays or rather by the Phase 2 processing delays.

Measurement Units: Tunnels Per Second (TPS)

Issues: N/A

See Also: IPsec Tunnel Setup Rate, IKE Phase 2 Setup Rate, IPsec Tunnel Rekey Behavior

### **10.6.3. IKE Phase 2 Setup Rate**

Definition: The maximum number of successfully IKE Phase 2 SA's per second that an IPsec Device can Only relevant when using IKE establish.

Discussion: The IKE Phase 2 Setup Rate is a portion of the IPsec Tunnel Setup Rate. For identical reasons why it is required to quantify the IKE Phase 1 Setup Rate, it is a good practice to know the processing delays involved in setting up an IKE Phase 2 SA for each direction of the protected traffic flow.

IKE Phase 2 Setup Rates will ALWAYS be measured for multiples of two IKE Phase 2 SA's.

Note that once you have the IPsec Tunnel Setup Rate and either the IKE Phase 1 or the IKE Phase 2 Setup Rate data, you can extrapolate the unmeasured metric. It is however highly RECOMMENDED to measure all three metrics.

Measurement Units: Tunnels Per Second (TPS)

Issues: N/A

See Also: IPsec Tunnel Setup Rate, IKE Phase 1 Setup Rate, IPsec Tunnel Rekey Behavior

## **10.7. IPsec Tunnel Rekey Behavior**

### **10.7.1. IKE Phase 1 Rekey Rate**

Definition: The number of IKE Phase 1 SA's that can be successfully re-establish per second.



Discussion: Although the IKE Phase 1 Rekey Rate has less impact on the forwarding behavior of traffic that requires security services than the IKE Phase 2 Rekey Rate, it can pose a large burden on the CPU or network processor of the IPsec Device. Due to the highly computational nature of a Phase 1 exchange, it may impact the stability of Active Tunnels in the network when the IPsec Device fails to properly rekey an IKE Phase 1 SA.

Measurement Units: Tunnel Rekeys per second (TRPS)

Issues: N/A

See Also: IKE Phase 2 Rekey Rate

#### **10.7.2. IKE Phase 2 Rekey Rate**

Definition: The number of IKE Phase 2 SA's that can be successfully re-negotiated per second.

Discussion: Although many implementations will usually derive new keying material before the old keys expire, there may still be a period of time where frames get dropped before the IKE Phase 2 tunnels are successfully re-established. There may also be some packet loss introduced when the handover of traffic is done from the expired IPsec SA's to the newly negotiated IPsec SA's. To measure the IKE Phase 2 rekey rate, the measurement will require an IPsec aware test device to act as a responder when negotiating the new IKE Phase 2 keying material.

The test methodology report must specify if PFS is enabled in reported security context.

Measurement Units: Tunnel Rekeys per second (TRPS)

Issues: N/A

See Also: IKE Phase 1 Rekey Rate

#### **10.8. IPsec Tunnel Failover Time**

Definition: Time required to recover all IPsec Tunnels on a standby IPsec Device, after a catastrophic failure occurs on the active IPsec Device.

Discussion: Recovery time required to re-establish all IPsec Tunnels and reroute all traffic on a standby node or other failsafe system after a failure has occurred in the DUT/SUT. Failure can include but are not limited to a catastrophic IPsec Device failure, a



encryption engine failure, link outage, etc ... . The recovery time is delta between the point of failure and the time the first packet is seen on the last restored IPsec Tunnel on the backup device.

Measurement Units: Time units with enough precision to reflect IPsec Tunnel Failover Time.

Issues: N/A

## **10.9. DoS Attack Resiliency**

### **10.9.1. Phase 1 DoS Resiliency Rate**

Definition: The Phase 1 Denial of Service (DoS) Resilience Rate quantifies the rate of invalid or malicious IKE tunnels that can be directed at a DUT before the Responder stops accepting valid tunnel attempts.

Discussion: Phase 1 DoS attacks can present themselves in various forms and do not necessarily have to have a malicious background. It is sufficient to make a typographical error in a shared secret in an IPsec Device to be susceptible to a large number of IKE attempts that need to be turned down. Due to the intense computational nature of an IKE exchange every single IKE tunnel attempt that has to be denied will take non-negligible CPU cycles in the IPsec Device.

Depending on the quantity of these messages that have to be processed, a system might end up in a state that the burden on the CPU of doing key exchanges is high enough that the entire CPU is consumed by this process. At this point it will be no longer possible to process a valid IKE tunnel setup request and thus a Phase 1 DoS Attack is in effect.

The scope of the attack profile for this test will include mismatched pre-shared keys as well as invalid digital certificates.

Measurement Units: Tunnel Attempts Per Seconds (TAPS)

Issues: N/A

### **10.9.2. Phase 2 DoS Resiliency Rate**



**Definition:** The Phase 2 Denial of Service (DoS) Resilience Rate quantifies the rate of invalid ESP/AH packets that a DUT can drop without affecting the traffic flow of valid ESP/AH packets.

**Discussion:** Phase 2 DoS attacks can present themselves in various forms and do not necessarily have to have a malicious background, but usually are. A well know case where there is no malicious intent is when packets are dropped due to anti-replay errors, which can be caused by applying a queueing mechanism after encryption. More typical are cases where there is a true malicious intent in the ESP/AH traffic flow by e.g. having an invalid hash in the IPsec data packets.

Depending on the quantity of these packets that have to be processed, a system might end up in a state that the burden on the IPsec Device becomes large enough that it will impact valid traffic flows. At this point it will be no longer possible to forward valid IPsec payload without packetloss and thus a Phase 2 DoS Attack is in effect.

**Measurement Units:** Packets per seconds (pps)

**Issues:** N/A

## **11. Security Considerations**

As this document is solely for the purpose of providing test benchmarking terminology and describes neither a protocol nor a protocol's implementation; there are no security considerations associated with this document.

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#### Authors' Addresses

Merike Kaeo  
Double Shot Security  
3518 Fremont Ave N #363  
Seattle, WA 98103  
USA

Phone: +1(310)866-0165  
Email: kaeo@merike.com

Tim Van Herck  
Cisco Systems  
170 West Tasman Drive  
San Jose, CA 95134-1706  
USA

Phone: +1(408)853-2284  
Email: herckt@cisco.com

Michele Bustos  
IXIA  
26601 W. Agoura Rd.  
Calabasas, CA 91302  
USA

Phone: +1(818)444-3244  
Email: mbustos@ixiacom.com



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