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## **User to User Kerberos Authentication using GSS-API**

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### **ABSTRACT**

This draft proposes a simple extension to the Kerberos GSS-API mechanism to support user to user authentication both in the case where the client application explicitly requests user to user authentication and when it does not know whether the server supports user to user authentication.

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## [1.](#)     **Introduction**

The Kerberos user to user authentication mechanism allows for a client application to connect to a service that is not in possession of a long term secret key. Instead, the authentication request (AP request) is encrypted using the session key from the service's ticket granting ticket. According to [RFC 1510](#) [1]:

If the ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY option has been specified and an additional ticket has been included in the request, the KDC will decrypt the additional ticket using the key for the server to which the additional ticket was issued and verify that it is a ticket-granting ticket. ... If the request succeeds, the session key from the additional ticket will be used to encrypt the new ticket that is issued instead of using the key of the server for which the new ticket will be used (This allows easy implementation of user-to-user authentication, which uses ticket-granting ticket session keys in lieu of secret server keys in situations where such secret keys could be easily compromised.).

The current Kerberos GSS-API mechanism does not support this flavor of authentication, and new messages and flags are defined to add this support. For the case that the client knows that the service requires user-to-user authentication, a new message (KERB-TGT-REQUEST) is defined. In the case that a client sends a normal AP request but the service only supports user-to-user authentication, a new Kerberos error as well as error data type is defined.

## [2.](#)     **User to User as a New Mechanism**

In the case that the client application knows that the server only supports user-to-user authentication, then it

is easiest to add this functionality as a new mechanism. The new protocol extends the existing Kerberos GSS-API protocol by adding an additional round trip to request the TGT from the service. As with all Kerberos GSS-API messages, the following tokens are encapsulated in the GSS-API framing. The first token of the exchange is as follows:

```
KERB-TGT-REQUEST ::= SEQUENCE {  
    pvno[0]                INTEGER,  
    msg-type[1]            INTEGER,  
    server-name[2]         PrincipalName  
    OPTIONAL,  
    realm[3]               Realm OPTIONAL  
}
```

The TGT request consists of four fields:

pvno and msg-type are as defined in [RFC1510 section 5.4.1](#). msg-type is KRB\_TGT\_REQ (16).

server-name - this field optionally contains the name of the server. If the client application doesn't know the server name this can be left blank and the server application will pick the appropriate server credentials.

realm - this field optionally contains the realm of the server. If the client application doesn't know the server realm this field can be left blank and the server application will pick the appropriate server credentials.

The server name and realm are included to allow a server application to act for multiple principles in different realms and to choose which credentials to use. Depending on the implementation of the Kerberos mechanism, the application may call gss\_accept\_sec\_context() multiple times until the token is accepted.

The response to the KERB-TGT-REQUEST message is as follows:

```
KERB-TGT-REPLY ::= SEQUENCE {  
  
    pvno[0]                INTEGER,  
    msg-type[1]            INTEGER,  
    ticket[2]              Ticket,  
    server-name[4]         PrincipalName  
    OPTIONAL,
```

}

The TGT reply contains the following fields:

pvno and msg-type are as defined in [RFC1510 section 5.4.1](#). msg-type is KRB\_TGT\_REP (17)

ticket - contains the TGT for the service specified by the server name and realm passed by the client or the default service.

server-name - server's principal name. If the client does not supply the server name, the server will return the name. This allows the client to discover the server's principal name in situations where it isn't known. However, if the client doesn't know the server's principal name then authentication is not mutual - any server can respond to the client. The server realm is not returned separately because it is in the ticket structure.

If the service does not possess a ticket granting ticket, it should return the error KRB\_AP\_ERR\_NO\_TGT (0x42).

If the server name and realm in the TGT request message do not match the name of the service, then the service should return the error KRB\_AP\_ERR\_NOT\_US.

The mechanism ID for user to user GSS-API Kerberos, in accordance with the mechanism proposed by SPNEGO for negotiating protocol variations, is:

```
{iso(1) member-body(2) United States(840) mit(113554)
infosys(1) gssapi(2) krb5(2) usertouser(3)}
```

Following the exchange of the TGT request messages, the rest of the authentication is identical to the Kerberos GSS-API mechanism defined in [RFC 1964 \[2\]](#).

As with the Kerberos GSS-API mechanism, the innerContextToken field of the context establishment tokens contain context message (KERB-TGT-REQUEST, KERB-TGT-REPLY) preceded by a 2-byte TOK\_ID field containing 04 03 for the KERB\_TGT\_REQUEST message and 05 03 for the KERB\_TGT\_REPLY message

### **[3.](#) User to User With The Existing Mechanism**

In the case that the client application doesn't know that a service requires user-to-user authentication and sends a normal AP request, it may be useful to recover and have the server return the TGT in the error message. In this case, the server returns a KRB-ERROR message with the KRB\_AP\_ERR\_USER\_TO\_USER\_REQUIRED (0x42). The error data contains a KERB-TGT-REPLY structure without the server name and realm fields, as they are already included in the KERB-ERROR message. The Kerberos mechanism then continues as in [2] but with a user-to-user ticket instead of a normal session ticket.

#### **4. Security Considerations**

There is some risk in a server handing out its ticket-granting-ticket to any client that requests it, in that it gives an attacker a piece of encrypted material to decrypt. However, the same material may be obtained from listening to any legitimate client connect. In addition, the server may divulge its name in the KERB-TGT-RESPONSE message allowing, but again this may be obtained from capturing any legitimate request to the server.

#### **5. References**

- [1] J. Kohl, C. Neuman. The Kerberos Network Authentication Service(V5). Request for Comments 1510.
- [2] J. Linn. The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism. Request for Comments 1964
- [3] J. Linn. Generic Security Service Application Programming Interface. Request For Comments 1508.

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