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Using ChaCha20-Poly1305 Authenticated Encryption  
in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)

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## Abstract

This document describes the conventions for using ChaCha20-Poly1305 Authenticated Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). ChaCha20-Poly1305 is a construction of the ChaCha stream cipher and Poly1305 authenticator.

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## 1. Introduction

This document specifies the conventions for using the ChaCha20-Poly1305 Authenticated Encryption as the content-authenticated-encryption algorithm with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [[CMS](#)] authenticated-enveloped-data content type [[AUTHENV](#)].

ChaCha [[CHACHA](#)] is a stream cipher developed by D. J. Bernstein in 2008. It is a refinement of Salsa20, which is one of the ciphers in the eSTREAM portfolio [[ESTREAM](#)].

ChaCha20 is the 20-round variant of ChaCha; it requires a 256-bit key and a 96-bit nonce. ChaCha20 is described in [[FORIETF](#)].

Poly1305 [[POLY1305](#)] is a Wegman-Carter, one-time authenticator designed by D. J. Bernstein. Poly1305 produces a 16-byte authentication tag; it requires a 256-bit, single-use key. Poly1305 is also described in [[FORIETF](#)].

ChaCha20 and Poly1305 have been designed for high performance in software implementations. They can typically be implemented with few resources and inexpensive operations, making them suitable on a wide range of systems. They have also been designed to minimize leakage of information through side channels.

### 1.1. The ChaCha20 and Poly1305 AEAD Construction

ChaCha20 and Poly1305 have been combined to create an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm [[AEAD](#)]. This AEAD algorithm is often referred to as AEAD\_CHACHA20\_POLY1305, and it is described in [[FORIETF](#)].

AEAD\_CHACHA20\_POLY1305 accepts four inputs: a 256-bit key, a 96-bit nonce, an arbitrary length plaintext, and an arbitrary length additional authenticated data (AAD). A nonce value cannot be used securely more than once with the same key.

A high-level summary of AEAD\_CHACHA20\_POLY1305 authenticated encryption processing is:

- 1) A Poly1305 one-time key is generated from the 256-bit key and nonce using the procedure described in Section 2.6 of

[[FORIETF](#)].

- 2) The ChaCha20 encryption function is used to encrypt the plaintext, using the same key and nonce, and with the initial counter set to 1.

- 3) The Poly1305 function is used with the Poly1305 key from step 1, and a buffer constructed as a concatenation of the AAD, padding1, the ciphertext, padding2, the length of the AAD in octets, and the length of the ciphertext in octets. The padding fields contain up to 15 octets, with all bits set to zero, and the padding brings the total length of the buffer so far to an integral multiple of 16. If the buffer length was already an integral multiple of 16 octets, then the padding field is zero octets. The length fields contain 64-bit little-endian integers.

AEAD\_CHACHA20\_POLY1305 produces ciphertext of the same length as the plaintext and a 128-bit authentication tag.

AEAD\_CHACHA20\_POLY1305 authenticated decryption processing is similar to the encryption processing. Of course, the roles of ciphertext and plaintext are reversed, so the ChaCha20 encryption function is applied to the ciphertext, producing the plaintext. The Poly1305 function is run over the AAD and the ciphertext, not the plaintext, and the resulting authentication tag is bitwise compared to the received authentication tag. The message is authenticated if and only if the calculated and received authentication tags match.

## [1.2.](#) Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[STDWORDS](#)].

## [1.3.](#) ASN.1

CMS values are generated using ASN.1 [[X680](#)], which uses the Basic Encoding Rules (BER) and the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) [[X690](#)].

## [2.](#) Automated Key Management

The reuse of an ChaCha20 and Poly1305 AEAD nonce/key combination destroys the security guarantees. As a result, it can be extremely difficult to use the ChaCha20 and Poly1305 AEAD securely when using statically configured keys. For safety's sake, implementations MUST use an automated key management system [[KEYMGMT](#)].

The CMS authenticated-enveloped-data content type supports four general key management techniques:

**Key Transport:** the content-authenticated-encryption key is encrypted in the recipient's public key;

**Key Agreement:** the recipient's public key and the sender's private key are used to generate a pairwise symmetric key, then the content-authenticated-encryption key is encrypted in the pairwise symmetric key;

**Symmetric Key-Encryption Keys:** the content-authenticated-encryption key is encrypted in a previously distributed symmetric key-encryption key; and

**Passwords:** the content-authenticated-encryption key is encrypted in a key-encryption key that is derived from a password or other shared secret value.

All of these key management techniques meet the automated key management system requirement as long as a fresh content-authenticated-encryption key is generated for the protection of each content. Note that some of these key management techniques use one key-encryption key to encrypt more than one content-authenticated-encryption key during the system life cycle. As long as fresh content-authenticated-encryption key is used each time, AEAD\_CHACHA20\_POLY1305 can be used safely with the CMS authenticated-enveloped-data content type.

In addition to these four general key management techniques, CMS supports other key management techniques. See Section 6.2.5 of [CMS]. Since the properties of these key management techniques are unknown, no statement can be made about whether these key management techniques meet the automated key management system requirement. Designers and implementers must perform their own analysis if one of these other key management techniques is supported.

### 3. Using the AEAD\_CHACHA20\_POLY1305 Algorithm with AuthEnvelopedData

This section specifies the conventions employed by CMS implementations that support content authenticated encryption using the AEAD\_CHACHA20\_POLY1305 algorithm.

Content authenticated encryption algorithm identifiers are located in the AuthEnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo contentEncryptionAlgorithm field.

Content authenticated encryption algorithms are used to encipher the content located in the AuthEnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContent field and to provide the message authentication code for the AuthEnvelopedData mac field. Note that the message authentication code provides integrity protection for both the AuthEnvelopedData authAttrs and the AuthEnvelopedData EncryptedContentInfo encryptedContent.

Neither the plaintext content nor the optional AAD inputs need to be padded prior to invoking the AEAD\_CHACHA20\_POLY1305 algorithm.

There is one algorithm identifiers for the AEAD\_CHACHA20\_POLY1305 algorithm:

```
id-alg-AEADChaCha20Poly1305 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
  { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
    pkcs9(9) smime(16) alg(3) TBD1 }
```

The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field MUST be present, and the parameters field must contain a AEADChaCha20Poly1305Nonce:

```
AEADChaCha20Poly1305Nonce ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(12))
```

The AEADChaCha20Poly1305Nonce contains a 12-octet nonce. With the CMS, the content-authenticated-encryption key is normally used for a single content. Within the scope of any content-authenticated-encryption key, the nonce value MUST be unique. That is, the set of nonce values used with any given key MUST NOT contain any duplicate values.

#### 4. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to add the following entry in the SMI Security for S/MIME Algorithms (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.3) registry:

TBD1 id-alg-AEADChaCha20Poly1305 [This Document]

IANA is requested to add the following entry in the SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.0) registry:

TBD2 id-mod-CMS-AEADChaCha20Poly1305 [This Document]

#### 5. Security Considerations

The CMS AuthEnvelopedData provides all of the tools needed to avoid reuse of the same nonce value under the same key. Automated key management is discussed in [Section 2](#).

When using AEAD\_CHACHA20\_POLY1305, the resulting ciphertext is always the same size as the original plaintext. Some other mechanism needs to be used in conjunction with AEAD\_CHACHA20\_POLY1305 if disclosure of the size of the plaintext is a concern.

The amount of encrypted data possible in a single invocation of AEAD\_CHACHA20\_POLY1305 is  $2^{32}-1$  blocks of 64 octets each, because of the size of the block counter field in the ChaCha20 block function. This gives a total of 247,877,906,880 octets, which likely ot be

sufficient to handle the size of any CMS content type. Note that ciphertext length field in the authentication buffer will accommodate  $2^{64}$  octets, which is much larger than necessary.

The AEAD\_CHACHA20\_POLY1305 construction is a novel composition of ChaCha20 and Poly1305. A security analysis of this composition is given in [[PROCTER](#)].

Implementations must randomly generate content-authenticated-encryption keys. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate cryptographic keys can result in little or no security. An attacker may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the keys, searching the resulting small set of possibilities, rather than brute force searching the whole key space. The generation of quality random numbers is difficult. [RFC 4086](#) [[RANDOM](#)] offers important guidance in this area.

## [6](#). Acknowledgements

Thanks to Jim Schaad for his review and insightful comments.

## [7](#). Normative References

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- [X680] ITU-T, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", ITU-T Recommendation X.680, 2002.
- [X690] ITU-T, "Information technology -- ASN.1 encoding rules:

Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, 2002.

## 8. Informative References

- [AEAD] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption", [RFC 5116](#), January 2008.
- [CHACHA] Bernstein, D., "ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20", January 2008,  
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- [KEYMGMT] Bellare, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic Key Management", [BCP 107](#), [RFC 4107](#), June 2005.
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<<http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/613.pdf>>.
- [RANDOM] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", [BCP 106](#), [RFC 4086](#), June 2005.

```

CMS-AEADChaCha20Poly1305
  { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
    pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) TBD2 }

DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN

IMPORTS
  CONTENT-ENCRYPTION
  FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
    { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
      security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
      id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) };

-- EXPORTS All

AEADContentEncryptionAlgs CONTENT-ENCRYPTION ::=
  { cea-AEADChaCha20Poly1305, ... }

cea-AEADChaCha20Poly1305 CONTENT-ENCRYPTION ::= {
  IDENTIFIER id-alg-AEADChaCha20Poly1305
  PARAMS TYPE AEADChaCha20Poly1305Nonce ARE required
  SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-AEADChaCha20Poly1305 } }

id-alg-AEADChaCha20Poly1305 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
  { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
    pkcs9(9) smime(16) alg(3) TBD1 }

AEADChaCha20Poly1305Nonce ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(12))

END

```

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