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Key Exchange (KEX) Method Updates and Recommendations for Secure Shell (SSH)
draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-kex-sha2-04

Abstract

This document adds recommendations for adoption of ssh-curves from the [I-D.ietf-curdle-ssh-curves], adds some new Modular Exponential (MODP) Groups, and deprecates some previously specified Key Exchange Method algorithm names for the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol. It also updates [RFC4253], [RFC4419], [RFC4462], and [RFC5656] by specifying the set key exchange algorithms that currently exist and which ones MUST, SHOULD, MAY, and SHOULD NOT be implemented. New key exchange methods use the SHA-2 family of hashes.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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1. Overview and Rationale

Secure Shell (SSH) is a common protocol for secure communication on the Internet. In [RFC4253], SSH originally defined the Key Exchange Method Name diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 which used [RFC2409] Oakley Group 1 (a 768-bit MODP group) and SHA-1 [RFC3174]. Due to recent security concerns with SHA-1 [RFC6194] and with MODP groups with less than 2048 bits [NIST-SP-800-131Ar1] implementer and users request support for larger MODP group sizes with data integrity verification using the SHA-2 family of secure hash algorithms as well as MODP groups providing more security.

The United States Information Assurance Directorate (IAD) at the National Security Agency (NSA) has published a FAQ [MFQ-U-OO-815099-15] suggesting that the use of Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) using the nistp256 curve and SHA-2 based hashes less than SHA2-384 are no longer sufficient for transport of Top Secret information. It is for this reason that this draft moves ecdh-sha2-nistp256 from a REQUIRED to OPTIONAL as a key exchange method. This is the same reason that the stronger MODP groups being introduced are using SHA2-512 as the hash algorithm. Group14 is already present in most SSH implementations and most implementations already have a SHA2-256 implementation, so diffie-hellman-group14-sha256 is provided as an easy to implement and faster to use key exchange. Small embedded applications may find this KEX desirable to use.

The NSA Information Assurance Directorate (IAD) has also published the Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite (CNSA Suite) [CNSA-SUITE] in which the 3072-bit MODP Group 15 in RFC 3526 is explicitly mentioned as the minimum modulus to protect Top Secret communications.

It has been observed in [safe-curves] that the NIST recommended Elliptic Curve Prime Curves (P-256, P-384, and P-521) are perhaps not the best available for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Security.

For this reason, none of the [RFC5656] curves are marked as a MUST implement. However, the requirement that "every compliant SSH ECC implementation MUST implement ECDH key exchange" is now taken to mean that if ecdsa-sha2-[identifier] is implemented, then ecdh-sha2-[identifier] MUST be implemented.

Please send comments on this draft to curdle@ietf.org.

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Key Exchange Algorithms

This memo adopts the style and conventions of [RFC4253] in specifying how the use of new data key exchange is indicated in SSH.

A new set of Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman ssh-curves exist. The curve25519-sha256 MUST be adopted where possible.

As a hedge against uncertainty raised by the NSA IAD FAQ publication, five new MODP Diffie-Hellman based key exchanges are proposed for inclusion in the set of key exchange method names as well as the curve448-sha512 curve.

The following new key exchange algorithms are defined:

Key Exchange Method Name	Note
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256	SHOULD/RECOMMENDED
diffie-hellman-group15-sha512	MAY/OPTIONAL
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512	SHOULD/RECOMMENDED
diffie-hellman-group17-sha512	MAY/OPTIONAL
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512	MAY/OPTIONAL

Figure 1

The SHA-2 family of secure hash algorithms are defined in [FIPS-180-4].

The method of key exchange used for the name "diffie-hellman-

group14-sha256" is the same as that for "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" except that the SHA2-256 hash algorithm is used. This new method is desirable for interoperability with resource-constrained devices.

The group15 through group18 names are the same as those specified in [RFC3526] 3072-bit MODP Group 15, 4096-bit MODP Group 16, 6144-bit MODP Group 17, and 8192-bit MODP Group 18. All of these groups are within the guidelines for CNSA Suite for Top Secret.

The SHA2-512 algorithm is to be used when "sha512" is specified as a part of the key exchange method name.

4. IANA Considerations

This document augments the Key Exchange Method Names in [RFC4253]. It downgrades the use of SHA-1 hashing for key exchange methods in [RFC4419], [RFC4432], and [RFC4462]. It also moves from MUST to MAY the ecdh-sha2-nistp256 given in [RFC5656].

It is desirable to also include the ssh-curves from the [I-D.ietf-curdle-ssh-curves] in this list. The "curve25519-sha256" is currently available in some Secure Shell implementations under the name "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org" and is the best candidate for a fast, safe, and secure key exchange method.

IANA is requested to update the SSH algorithm registry with the following entries:

Key Exchange Method Name	Reference	Note
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1	RFC4419	SHOULD NOT
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256	RFC4419	MAY
diffie-hellman-group1-sha1	RFC4253	SHOULD NOT
diffie-hellman-group14-sha1	RFC4253	SHOULD
ecdh-sha2-nistp256	RFC5656	MAY
ecdh-sha2-nistp384	RFC5656	SHOULD
ecdh-sha2-nistp521	RFC5656	SHOULD
ecdh-sha2-*	RFC5656	MAY
ecmqv-sha2	RFC5656	MAY
gss-gex-sha1-*	RFC4462	SHOULD NOT
gss-group1-sha1-*	RFC4462	SHOULD NOT
gss-group14-sha1-*	RFC4462	MAY

gss-*	RFC4462	MAY
rsa1024-sha1	RFC4432	SHOULD NOT
rsa2048-sha256	RFC4432	MAY
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256	This Draft	SHOULD
diffie-hellman-group15-sha512	This Draft	MAY
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512	This Draft	SHOULD
diffie-hellman-group17-sha512	This Draft	MAY
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512	This Draft	MAY
curve25519-sha256	ssh-curves	MUST
curve448-sha512	ssh-curves	MAY

Figure 2

The Note column in the above table is an implementation suggestion/ recommendation for the listed key exchange method. It is up to the end-user as to what algorithms they choose to be able to negotiate.

The guidance of his document is that the SHA-1 algorithm hashing SHOULD NOT be used. If it is used, it should only be provided for

backwards compatibility, should not be used in new designs, and should be phased out of existing key exchanges as quickly as possible because of its known weaknesses. Any key exchange using SHA-1 SHOULD NOT be in a default key exchange list if at all possible. If they are needed for backward compatibility, they SHOULD be listed after all of the SHA-2 based key exchanges.

The RFC4253 REQUIRED diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 method SHOULD be retained for compatibility with older Secure Shell implementations. It is intended that this key exchange be phased out as soon as possible.

5. Acknowledgements

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Thanks to the following people for code to implement interoperable exchanges using some of these groups as found in an this draft: Darren Tucker for OpenSSH and Matt Johnston for Dropbear. And thanks to Iwamoto Kouichi for information about RLogin, Tera Term (ttssh)

and Poderosa implementations also adopting new Diffie-Hellman groups based on this draft.

6. Security Considerations

The security considerations of [RFC4253] apply to this document.

The security considerations of [RFC3526] suggest that these MODP groups have security strengths given in this table. They are based on [RFC3766] Determining Strengths For Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric Keys.

Group modulus security strength estimates (RFC3526)

Group	Modulus	Strength Estimate 1		Strength Estimate 2	
		in bits	exponent size	in bits	exponent size
14	2048-bit	110	220-	160	320-
15	3072-bit	130	260-	210	420-
16	4096-bit	150	300-	240	480-
17	6144-bit	170	340-	270	540-
18	8192-bit	190	380-	310	620-

Figure 3

Many users seem to be interested in the perceived safety of using larger MODP groups and hashing with SHA2-based algorithms.

7. References

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