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**Using DANE to Associate OpenPGP public keys with email addresses
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Abstract

OpenPGP is a message format for email (and file) encryption that lacks a standardized lookup mechanism to securely obtain OpenPGP public keys. This document specifies a method for publishing and locating OpenPGP public keys in DNS for a specific email address using a new OPENPGPKEY DNS Resource Record. Security is provided via DNSSEC.

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1. Introduction

OpenPGP [[RFC4880](#)] public keys are used to encrypt or sign email messages and files. To encrypt an email message, or verify a sender's OpenPGP signature, the email client or MTA needs to locate the recipient's OpenPGP public key.

OpenPGP clients have relied on centralized "well-known" key servers that are accessed using either the HTTP Keyserver Protocol [[HKP](#)]. Alternatively, users need to manually browse a variety of different front-end websites. These key servers do not validate the email address in the User ID of the uploaded OpenPGP public key. Attackers can - and have - uploaded rogue public keys with other people's email addresses to these key servers.

Once uploaded, public keys cannot be deleted. People who did not pre-sign a key revocation can never remove their OpenPGP public key from these key servers once they have lost access to their private key. This results in receiving encrypted email that cannot be decrypted.

Therefore, these key servers are not well suited to support email clients and MTA's to automatically encrypt email - especially in the absence of an interactive user.

This document describes a mechanism to associate a user's OpenPGP public key with their email address, using the OPENPGPKEY DNS RRtype. These records are published in the DNS zone of the user's email address. If the user loses their private key, the OPENPGPKEY DNS record can simply be updated or removed from the zone.

The proposed new DNS Resource Record type is secured using DNSSEC. This trust model is not meant to replace the Web Of Trust model.

[1.1.](#) Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

This document also makes use of standard DNSSEC and DANE terminology. See DNSSEC [[RFC4033](#)], [[RFC4034](#)], [[RFC4035](#)], and DANE [[RFC6698](#)] for these terms.

[2.](#) The OPENPGPKEY Resource Record

The OPENPGPKEY DNS resource record (RR) is used to associate an end entity OpenPGP Transferable Public Key (see [Section 11.1 of \[RFC4880\]](#)) with an email address, thus forming a "OpenPGP public key association". A user that wishes to specify more than one OpenPGP key, for example because they are transitioning to a newer stronger key, can do so by adding multiple OPENPGPKEY records. A single OPENPGPKEY DNS record MUST only contain one OpenPGP key.

The type value allocated for the OPENPGPKEY RR type is 61. The OPENPGPKEY RR is class independent. The OPENPGPKEY RR has no special TTL requirements.

2.1. The OPENPGPKEY RDATA component

The RDATA portion of an OPENPGPKEY Resource Record contains a single value consisting of a [[RFC4880](#)] formatted Transferable Public Key.

2.1.1. The OPENPGPKEY RDATA content

An OpenPGP Transferable Public Key can be arbitrarily large. DNS records are limited in size. When creating OPENPGPKEY DNS records, the OpenPGP Transferable Public Key should be filtered to only contain appropriate and useful data. At a minimum, an OPENPGPKEY Transferable Public Key for the user hugh@example.com should contain:

- o The primary key X
 - o One User ID Y, which SHOULD match 'hugh@example.com'
 - o self-signature from X, binding X to Y

If the primary key is not encryption-capable, a relevant subkey should be included resulting in an OPENPGPKEY Transferable Public Key containing:

- o The primary key X
 - o One User ID Y, which SHOULD match 'hugh@example.com'
 - o self-signature from X, binding X to Y
 - o encryption-capable subkey Z
 - o self-signature from X, binding Z to X
 - o [other subkeys if relevant ...]

The user can also elect to add a few third-party certifications which they believe would be helpful for validation in the traditional Web Of Trust. The resulting OPENPGPKEY Transferable Public Key would then look like:

- o The primary key X
 - o One User ID Y, which SHOULD match 'hugh@example.com'
 - o self-signature from X, binding X to Y
 - o third-party certification from V, binding Y to X
 - o [other third-party certifications if relevant ...]
 - o encryption-capable subkey Z
 - o self-signature from X, binding Z to X
 - o [other subkeys if relevant ...]

2.1.2. Reducing the Transferable Public Key size

When preparing a Transferable Public Key for a specific OPENPGPKEY RDATA format with the goal of minimizing certificate size, a user would typically want to:

- o Where one User ID from the certifications matches the looked-up address, strip away non-matching User IDs and any associated certifications (self-signatures or third-party certifications)
- o Strip away all User Attribute packets and associated certifications Strip away all expired subkeys. The user may want to keep revoked subkeys if these were revoked prior to their preferred expiration time to ensure that correspondents know about these earlier than expected revocations.
- o strip away all but the most recent self-sig for the remaining user IDs and subkeys
- o Optionally strip away any uninteresting or unimportant third-party User ID certifications. This is a value judgment by the user that is difficult to automate. At the very least, expired and superseded third-party certifications should be stripped out. The user should attempt to keep the most recent and most well connected certifications in the Web Of Trust in their Transferable Public Key.

2.2. The OPENPGPKEY RDATA wire format

The RDATA Wire Format consists of a single OpenPGP Transferable Public Key as defined in [Section 11.1 of \[RFC4880\]](#). Note that this format is without ASCII armor or base64 encoding.

2.3. The OPENPGPKEY RDATA presentation format

The RDATA Presentation Format, as visible in textual zone files, consists of a single OpenPGP Transferable Public Key as defined in [Section 11,1 of \[RFC4880\]](#) encoded in base64 as defined in [Section 4 of \[RFC4648\]](#).

3. Location of the OPENPGPKEY record

The DNS does not allow the use of all characters that are supported in the "local-part" of email addresses as defined in [\[RFC2822\]](#) and [\[RFC6530\]](#). Therefore, email addresses are mapped into DNS using the following method:

- o The user name (the "left-hand side" of the email address, called the "local-part" in the mail message format definition [[RFC2822](#)] and the local-part in the specification for internationalized email [[RFC6530](#)]) should already be encoded in UTF-8 (or its subset ASCII). If it is written in another encoding it should be converted to UTF-8 and then hashed using the SHA2-256 [[RFC5754](#)] algorithm, with the hash truncated to 28 octets and represented in its hexadecimal representation, to become the left-most label in the prepared domain name. Truncation comes from the right-most octets. This does not include the at symbol ("@") that separates the left and right sides of the email address.
- o The string "_openpgpkey" becomes the second left-most label in the prepared domain name.
- o The domain name (the "right-hand side" of the email address, called the "domain" in [RFC 2822](#)) is appended to the result of step 2 to complete the prepared domain name.

For example, to request an OPENPGPKEY resource record for a user whose email address is "hugh@example.com", an OPENPGPKEY query would be placed for the following QNAME: "c93f1e400f26708f98cb19d936620da35eec8f72e57f9eec01c1afd6._openpgpkey.example.com". The corresponding RR in the example.com zone might look like (key shortened for formatting):

```
c9[...].d6._openpgpkey.example.com. IN OPENPGPKEY <base64 public key>
```

4. Email address variants

Mail systems usually handle variant forms of local-parts. The most common variants are upper and lower case, often automatically corrected when a name is recognized as such. Other variants include systems that ignore "noise" characters such as dots, so that local parts johnsmith and John.Smith would be equivalent. Many systems allow "extensions" such as john-ext or mary+ext where john or mary is treated as the effective local-part, and the ext is passed to the recipient for further handling. This can complicate finding the OPENPGPKEY record associated with the dynamically created email address.

[RFC5321] and its predecessors have always made it clear that only the recipient MTA is allowed to interpret the local-part of an address. A client supporting OPENPGPKEY therefor MUST NOT perform any kind of mapping rules based on the email address.

5. Application use of OPENPGPKEY

The OPENPGPKEY record allows an application or service to obtain or verify an OpenPGP public key. The lookup result **MUST** pass DNSSEC validation; if validation reaches any state other than "Secure", the verification **MUST** be treated as a failure.

5.1. Obtaining an OpenPGP key for a specific email address

If no OpenPGP public keys are known for an email address, an OPENPGPKEY lookup **MAY** be performed to discover the OpenPGP public key that belongs to a specific email address. This public key can then be used to verify a received signed message or can be used to send out an encrypted email message. An application that confirms the lack of an OPENPGPKEY record **SHOULD** remember this for some time to avoid sending out a DNS request for each email message that is sent out as this constitutes a privacy leak.

5.2. Confirming the validity of an OpenPGP key

Locally stored OpenPGP public keys are not automatically refreshed. If the owner of that key creates a new OpenPGP public key, that owner is unable to securely notify all users and applications that have its old OpenPGP public key. Applications and users can perform an OPENPGPKEY lookup to confirm the locally stored OpenPGP public key is still the correct key to use. If verifying a locally stored OpenPGP public key and the OpenPGP public key found through DNS is different from the locally stored OpenPGP public key, the verification **MUST** be treated as a failure. An application that can interact with the user **MAY** ask the user for guidance. For privacy reasons, an application **MUST NOT** attempt to validate a locally stored OpenPGP key using an OPENPGPKEY lookup at every use of that key.

5.3. Verifying an unknown OpenPGP signature

Storage media can be signed using an OpenPGP public key. Even if the OpenPGP public key is included on the storage media, it needs to be independently validated. OpenPGP public keys contain one or more IDs than can have the syntax of an email address. An application can perform a lookup for an OPENPGPKEY at the expected location for the specific email address to confirm the validity of the OpenPGP public key. Once the key has been validated, all files on the storage media that have been signed by this key can now be verified.

6. OpenPGP Key size and DNS

Due to the expected size of the OPENPGPKEY record, applications SHOULD use TCP - not UDP - to perform queries for the OPENPGPKEY Resource Record.

Although the reliability of the transport of large DNS Resource Records has improved in the last years, it is still recommended to keep the DNS records as small as possible without sacrificing the security properties of the public key. The algorithm type and key size of OpenPGP keys should not be modified to accommodate this section.

OpenPGP supports various attributes that do not contribute to the security of a key, such as an embedded image file. It is recommended that these properties are not exported to OpenPGP public keyrings that are used to create OPENPGPKEY Resource Records. Some OpenPGP software, for example GnuPG, have support for a "minimal key export" that is well suited to use as OPENPGPKEY RDATA. See [Appendix A](#).

7. Security Considerations

OPENPGPKEY usage considerations are published in [\[OPENPGPKEY-USAGE\]](#).

7.1. Response size

To prevent amplification attacks, an Authoritative DNS server MAY wish to prevent returning OPENPGPKEY records over UDP unless the source IP address has been verified with [\[DNS-COOKIES\]](#). Such servers MUST NOT return REFUSED, but answer the query with an empty Answer Section and the truncation flag set ("TC=1").

7.2. Email address information leak

The hashing of the user name in this document is not a security feature. Publishing OPENPGPKEY records however, will create a list of hashes of valid email addresses, which could simplify obtaining a list of valid email addresses for a particular domain. It is desirable to not ease the harvesting of email addresses where possible.

The domain name part of the email address is not used as part of the hash so that hashes can be used in multiple zones deployed using DNAME [\[RFC6672\]](#). This does makes it slightly easier and cheaper to brute-force the SHA2-256 hashes into common and short user names, as single rainbow tables can be re-used across domains. This can be somewhat countered by using NSEC3.

DNS zones that are signed with DNSSEC using NSEC for denial of existence are susceptible to zone-walking, a mechanism that allows

someone to enumerate all the OPENPGPKEY hashes in a zone. This can be used in combination with previously hashed common or short user names (in rainbow tables) to deduce valid email addresses. DNSSEC-signed zones using NSEC3 for denial of existence instead of NSEC are significantly harder to brute-force after performing a zone-walk.

7.3. Storage of OPENPGPKEY data

Users may have a local key store with OpenPGP public keys. An application supporting the use of OPENPGPKEY DNS records **MUST NOT** modify the local key store without explicit confirmation of the user, as the application is unaware of the user's personal policy for adding, removing or updating their local key store. An application **MAY** warn the user if an OPENPGPKEY record does not match the OpenPGP public key in the local key store.

Applications that do not have users associated with, such as daemon processes, **SHOULD** store OpenPGP public keys obtained via OPENPGPKEY up to their DNS TTL value. This avoids repeated DNS lookups that third parties could monitor to determine when an email is being sent to a particular user. If TLS is in use between MTA's, only the DNS lookup could happen unencrypted.

7.4. Forward security of OpenPGP versus DNSSEC

DNSSEC key sizes are chosen based on the fact that these keys can be rolled with next to no requirement for security in the future. If one doubts the strength or security of the DNSSEC key for whatever reason, one simply rolls to a new DNSSEC key with a stronger algorithm or larger key size. On the other hand, OpenPGP key sizes are chosen based on how many years (or decades) their encryption should remain unbreakable by adversaries that own large scale computational resources.

This effectively means that anyone who can obtain a DNSSEC private key of a domain name via coercion, theft or brute force calculations, can replace any OPENPGPKEY record in that zone and all of the delegated child zones, irrespective of the key size of the OpenPGP keypair. Any future messages encrypted with the malicious OpenPGP key could then be read.

Therefore, an OpenPGP key obtained via an OPENPGPKEY record can only be trusted as much as the DNS domain can be trusted, and is no substitute for in-person key verification of the "Web of Trust". See [[OPENPGPKEY-USAGE](#)] for more in-depth information on safe usage of OPENPGPKEY based OpenPGP keys.

8. IANA Considerations

8.1. OPENPGPKEY RRtype

This document uses a new DNS RR type, OPENPGPKEY, whose value 61 has been allocated by IANA from the Resource Record (RR) TYPEs subregistry of the Domain Name System (DNS) Parameters registry.

9. Acknowledgments

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[Appendix A](#). Generating OPENPGPKEY records

The commonly available GnuPG software can be used to generate a minimum Transferable Public Key for the RRdata portion of an OPENPGPKEY record:

```
gpg --export --export-options export-minimal,no-export-attributes \  
hugh@example.com | base64
```

The --armor or -a option of the gpg command should NOT be used, as it adds additional markers around the armored key.

When DNS software reading or signing the zone file does not yet support the OPENPGPKEY RRtype, the Generic Record Syntax of [RFC3597](#) can be used to generate the RDATA. One needs to calculate the number of octets and the actual data in hexadecimal:

```
gpg --export --export-options export-minimal,no-export-attributes \  
hugh@example.com | wc -c
```

```
gpg --export --export-options export-minimal,no-export-attributes \  
hugh@example.com | hexdump -e \  
    '"\t" /1 "%.2x"' -e '/32 "\n"'
```

These values can then be used to generate a generic record (line break has been added for formatting):

```
<SHA2-256-trunc(hugh)>._openpgpkey.example.com. IN TYPE61 \# \  
    <numOctets> <keydata in hex>
```


The `openpgpkey` command in the `hash-slinger` software can be used to generate complete OPENPGPKEY records

```
~> openpgpkey --output rfc hugh@example.com  
c9[..]d6._openpgpkey.example.com. IN OPENPGPKEY mQCNAzIG[...]  
  
~> openpgpkey --output generic hugh@example.com  
c9[..]d6._openpgpkey.example.com. IN TYPE61 \# 2313 99008d03[...]
```

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