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## **DMARC Aggregate Reporting**

### **Abstract**

DMARC allows for domain holders to request aggregate reports from receivers. This report is an XML document, and contains extensible elements that allow for other types of data to be specified later. The aggregate reports can be submitted to the domain holder's specified destination as supported by the receiver.

This document (along with others) obsoletes RFC7489.

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## 1. Introduction

A key component of DMARC is the ability for domain holders to request that receivers provide various types of reports. These reports allow domain holders to have insight into which IP addresses are sending on their behalf, and some insight into whether or not the volume may be legitimate. These reports expose information relating to the DMARC policy, as well as the outcome of SPF [[RFC7208](#)] & DKIM [[RFC6376](#)] validation.

## 1.1. Terminology

In many IETF documents, several words, when they are in all capitals as shown below, are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These capitalized words can bring significant clarity and consistency to documents because their meanings are well defined. This document defines how those words are interpreted in IETF documents when the words are in all capitals.

\*These words can be used as defined here, but using them is not required. Specifically, normative text does not require the use of these key words. They are used for clarity and consistency when that is what's wanted, but a lot of normative text does not use them and is still normative.

\*The words have the meanings specified herein only when they are in all capitals.

\*When these words are not capitalized, they have their normal English meanings and are not affected by this document.

Authors who follow these guidelines should incorporate this phrase near the beginning of their document:

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

## 2. DMARC Feedback

Providing Domain Owners with visibility into how Mail Receivers implement and enforce the DMARC mechanism in the form of feedback is critical to establishing and maintaining accurate authentication deployments. When Domain Owners can see what effect their policies and practices are having, they are better willing and able to use quarantine and reject policies.

### 2.1. Aggregate Reports

The DMARC aggregate feedback report is designed to provide Domain Owners with precise insight into:

\*authentication results,

\*corrective action that needs to be taken by Domain Owners, and

\*the effect of Domain Owner DMARC policy on email streams processed by Mail Receivers.

Aggregate DMARC feedback provides visibility into real-world email streams that Domain Owners need to make informed decisions regarding the publication of DMARC policy. When Domain Owners know what legitimate mail they are sending, what the authentication results are on that mail, and what forged mail receivers are getting, they can make better decisions about the policies they need and the steps they need to take to enable those policies. When Domain Owners set policies appropriately and understand their effects, Mail Receivers can act on them confidently.

Visibility comes in the form of daily (or more frequent) Mail Receiver-originated feedback reports that contain aggregate data on message streams relevant to the Domain Owner. This information includes data about messages that passed DMARC authentication as well as those that did not.

The report may include the following data:

- \*The DMARC policy discovered and applied, if any
- \*The selected message disposition
- \*The identifier evaluated by SPF and the SPF result, if any
- \*The identifier evaluated by DKIM and the DKIM result, if any
- \*For both DKIM and SPF, an indication of whether the identifier was in alignment
- \*A separate report should be generated for each Policy Domain encountered during the reporting period. If there are multiple 5322.From domains that are included, those should result in distinct records within the report. See below for further explanation in "Handling Domains in Reports".
- \*Sending and receiving domains
- \*The policy requested by the Domain Owner and the policy actually applied (if different)
- \*The number of successful authentications
- \*The counts of messages based on all messages received, even if their delivery is ultimately blocked by other filtering agents.

The format for these reports is defined in Appendix A.

DMARC Aggregate Reports MUST contain three primary sections; one consisting of descriptive information (with two subsections), and the other a set of IP-focused row-based data. Each report MUST

contain data for only one Author Domain. A single report MUST contain data for one policy configuration. If multiple configurations were observed during a single reporting period, a reporting entity MAY choose to send multiple reports, otherwise the reporting entity SHOULD note only the final configuration observed during the period. See below for further information.

The informative section MUST contain two sub-sections. One will be the metadata section which MUST contain the fields related to org\_name, email, report\_id, and date\_range. Optional fields MAY include extra\_contact\_info, an error field, and an optional version field. The version field, if present, MUST contain a 1.0 [[RFC7489](#)] or 2.0 [RefNeeded], noting to which version of the aggregate reporting specification the report adheres. The date\_range section which will note begin and end values as epoch timestamps. The other sub-section will be the policy\_published, and record the policy configuration observed by the receiving system. Mandatory fields are domain, p, sp. Optional fields are fo, adkim, aspf, testing, and version\_published. There MAY be an optional third section for extensions.

Within the data section, the report will contain row(s) of data stating which IPs were seen to have delivered messages for the Author Domain to the receiving system. For each IP that is being reported, there will be at least one record element, which will then have each of a row, identifiers, and auth\_results sub-element. Within the row element, there MUST be source\_ip and count. There MUST also exist a policy\_evaluated, with sub-elements of disposition, dkim, and spf. There MAY be an element for reason, meant to include any notes the reporter might want to include as to why the disposition policy does not match the policy\_published, such as a Local Policy override (possible values listed in Appendix A). The dkim and spf elements MUST be the evaluated values as they relate to DMARC, not the values the receiver may have used when overriding the policy. Within the identifiers element, there MUST exist the data that was used to apply policy for the given IP. In most cases, this will be a header\_from element, which will contain the 5322.From domain from the message.

There MUST be an auth\_results element within the 'record' element. This will contain the data related to authenticating the messages associated with this sending IP. The dkim sub-element is optional as not all messages are signed, while there MUST be one spf sub-element. These elements MUST have a domain that was used during validation, as well as result. The dkim element MUST include a selector element that was observed during validation. For the spf element, the result element MUST contain a lower-case string where the value is one of none/neutral/pass/fail/softfail/temperror/permererror. The dkim result MUST contain a lower-case string where

the value is one of none/pass/fail/policy/neutral/temperror/permererror. Both the spf and dkim results may optionally include a human\_readable field meant for the report to convey more descriptive information back to the domain holder relating to evaluation failures. There MAY exist an optional section for extensions.

#### **2.1.1. Handling Domains in Reports**

In the same report, there MUST be a single Policy Domain, though there could be multiple 5322.From Domains. Each 5322.From domain will create its own record within the report. Consider the case where there are three domains with traffic volume to report: example.com, foo.example.com, and bar.example.com. There will be explicit DMARC records for example.com and bar.example.com, with distinct policies. There is no explicit DMARC record for foo.example.com, so it will be reliant on the policy described for example.com. For a report period, there would now be two reports. The first will be for bar.example.com, and contain only one record, for bar.example.com. The second report would be for example domain contain multiple record elements, one for example.com and one for foo.example.com (and extensibly, other record elements for subdomains which likewise did not have an explicit DMARC policy declared).

#### **2.1.2. DKIM Signatures in Aggregate Report**

Within a single message, the possibility exists that there could be multiple DKIM signatures. When validation of the message occurs, some signatures may pass, while some may not. As these pertain to DMARC, and especially to aggregate reporting, reporters may not find it clear which DKIM signatures they should include in a report. Signatures, regardless of outcome, could help the report ingester determine the source of a message. However, there is a preference as to which signatures are included.

1. A signature that passes DKIM, in strict alignment with the 5322.From domain
2. A signature that passes DKIM, in relaxed alignment with the 5322.From domain
3. Any other DKIM signatures that pass
4. DKIM signatures that do not pass

A report SHOULD contain no more than 100 signatures for a given row, in decreasing priority.

### **2.1.3. Unique Identifiers in Aggregate Reporting**

There are a few places where a unique identifier is specified as part of the body of the report, the subject, and so on. These unique identifiers should be consistent per each report. Specified below, the reader will see a msg-id, Report-ID, unique-id. These are the fields that MUST be identical when used.

NOTE, this no longer seems to be the case given changes to the Report-ID now used in the subject? If we allow "<>" in the Subject, those characters are illegal in Windows filenames I believe. We could say that the "unique-id" and the "ridtxt" are identical, other than the "<>" characters. Should/Could we add a MUST to the format? Could we just point at RFC4122 (is it still used/valid)?

### **2.2. Extensions**

There MAY be optional sections for extensions within the document. The absence or existence of this section SHOULD NOT create an error when processing reports. This will be covered in a separate section.

### **2.3. Changes in Policy During Reporting Period**

Note that Domain Owners or their agents may change the published DMARC policy for a domain or subdomain at any time. From a Mail Receiver's perspective, this will occur during a reporting period and may be noticed during that period, at the end of that period when reports are generated, or during a subsequent reporting period, all depending on the Mail Receiver's implementation. Under these conditions, it is possible that a Mail Receiver could do any of the following:

- \*generate for such a reporting period a single aggregate report that includes message dispositions based on the old policy, or a mix of the two policies, even though the report only contains a single "policy\_published" element;
- \*generate multiple reports for the same period, one for each published policy occurring during the reporting period;
- \*generate a report whose end time occurs when the updated policy was detected, regardless of any requested report interval.

Such policy changes are expected to be infrequent for any given domain, whereas more stringent policy monitoring requirements on the Mail Receiver would produce a very large burden at Internet scale. Therefore, it is the responsibility of report consumers and Domain Owners to be aware of this situation and allow for such mixed reports during the propagation of the new policy to Mail Receivers.

## **2.4. Recommended Reporting Periods**

Aggregate reports are most useful when they all cover a common time period. By contrast, correlation of these reports from multiple generators when they cover incongruent time periods is difficult or impossible. Report generators SHOULD, wherever possible, adhere to hour boundaries for the reporting period they are using. For example, starting a per-day report at 00:00; starting per-hour reports at 00:00, 01:00, 02:00; etc. Report generators using a 24-hour report period are strongly encouraged to begin that period at 00:00 UTC, regardless of local timezone or time of report production, in order to facilitate correlation.

## **2.5. Report Request Discovery**

A Mail Receiver discovers reporting requests when it looks up a DMARC policy record that corresponds to an RFC5322.From domain on received mail. The presence of the "rua" tag specifies where to send feedback.

## **2.6. Transport**

Where the URI specified in a "rua" tag does not specify otherwise, a Mail Receiver generating a feedback report SHOULD employ a secure transport mechanism.

The Mail Receiver, after preparing a report, MUST evaluate the provided reporting URIs in the order given. Any reporting URI that includes a size limitation exceeded by the generated report (after compression and after any encoding required by the particular transport mechanism) MUST NOT be used. An attempt MUST be made to deliver an aggregate report to every remaining URI, up to the Receiver's limits on supported URIs.

If transport is not possible because the services advertised by the published URIs are not able to accept reports (e.g., the URI refers to a service that is unreachable, or all provided URIs specify size limits exceeded by the generated record), the Mail Receiver MAY send a short report (see Section 7.2.2) indicating that a report is available but could not be sent. The Mail Receiver MAY cache that data and try again later, or MAY discard data that could not be sent.

### **2.6.1. Email**

The message generated by the Mail Receiver MUST be a [\[RFC5322\]](#) message formatted per [\[RFC2045\]](#). The aggregate report itself MUST be included in one of the parts of the message. A human-readable portion MAY be included as a MIME part (such as a text/plain part).



The aggregate data MUST be an XML file that SHOULD be subjected to GZIP compression. Declining to apply compression can cause the report to be too large for a receiver to process (a commonly observed receiver limit is ten megabytes); doing the compression increases the chances of acceptance of the report at some compute cost. The aggregate data MUST be present using the media type "application/ gzip" if compressed (see [[RFC6713](#)]), and "text/xml" otherwise. The filename MUST be constructed using the following ABNF:

```
filename = receiver "!" policy-domain "!" begin-timestamp
          "!" end-timestamp [ "!" unique-id ] "." extension

receiver = domain
          ; imported from [RFC5322]

policy-domain    = domain

begin-timestamp = 1*DIGIT
                  ; seconds since 00:00:00 UTC January 1, 1970
                  ; indicating start of the time range contained
                  ; in the report

end-timestamp = 1*DIGIT
               ; seconds since 00:00:00 UTC January 1, 1970
               ; indicating end of the time range contained
               ; in the report

unique-id = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT)

extension = "xml" / "xml.gz"
```

The extension MUST be "xml" for a plain XML file, or "xml.gz" for an XML file compressed using GZIP.

"unique-id" allows an optional unique ID generated by the Mail Receiver to distinguish among multiple reports generated simultaneously by different sources within the same Domain Owner.

If a report generator needs to re-send a report, the system MUST use the same filename as the original report. This would allow the receiver to overwrite the data from the original, or discard second instance of the report.

For example, this is a sample filename for the gzip file of a report to the Domain Owner "example.com" from the Mail Receiver "mail.receiver.example":

```
mail.receiver.example!example.com!1013662812!1013749130.gz
```

No specific MIME message structure is required. It is presumed that the aggregate reporting address will be equipped to extract MIME parts with the prescribed media type and filename and ignore the rest.

Email streams carrying DMARC feedback data MUST conform to the DMARC mechanism, thereby resulting in an aligned "pass" (see Section 3.1). This practice minimizes the risk of report consumers processing fraudulent reports.

The RFC5322.Subject field for individual report submissions MUST conform to the following ABNF:

```
dmARC-subject = %x52.65.70.6f.72.74 1*FWS      ; "Report"
               %x44.6f.6d.61.69.6e.3a 1*FWS    ; "Domain:"
               domain-name 1*FWS                ; from RFC 6376
               %x53.75.62.6d.69.74.74.65.72.3a ; "Submitter:"
               1*FWS domain-name 1*FWS
               %x52.65.70.6f.72.74.2d.49.44.3a ; "Report-ID:"
               ridtxt                            ; defined below
```

The first domain-name indicates the DNS domain name about which the report was generated. The second domain-name indicates the DNS domain name representing the Mail Receiver generating the report. The purpose of the Report-ID: portion of the field is to enable the Domain Owner to identify and ignore duplicate reports that might be sent by a Mail Receiver.

For instance, this is a possible Subject field for a report to the Domain Owner "example.com" from the Mail Receiver "mail.receiver.example". It is line-wrapped as allowed by [\[RFC5322\]](#):

```
Subject: Report Domain: example.com
       Submitter: mail.receiver.example
       Report-ID: <2002.02.15.1>
```

This transport mechanism potentially encounters a problem when feedback data size exceeds maximum allowable attachment sizes for either the generator or the consumer. See Section 7.2.2 for further discussion.

Optionally, the report sender MAY choose to use the same ridtxt as a part or whole of the 5322.Message-Id header included with the report. Doing so may help receivers distinguish when a message is a re-transmission or duplicate report.

### 2.6.2. Definition of Report-ID

As noted elsewhere, this identifier MUST be unique among reports to the same domain to aid receivers in identifying duplicate reports should they happen.

```
ridtxt = ("<" *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "." / "-") ["@" (ALPHA / DIGIT / "." / "-") ] ">") / ((ALPHA / DIGIT / "." / "-") ["@" *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "." / "-") ])
```

The format specified here is not very strict as the key goal is uniqueness.

### 2.6.3. Other Methods

The specification as written allows for the addition of other registered URI schemes to be supported in later versions.

### 2.6.4. Handling of Duplicates

There may be a situation where the report generator attempts to deliver duplicate information to the receiver. This may manifest as an exact duplicate of the report, or as duplicate information between two reports. In these situations, the decision of how to handle the duplicate data lies with the receiver. As noted above, the sender MUST use the same unique identifiers when sending the report. This allows the receiver to better understand when duplicates happen. A few options on how to handle that duplicate information:

- \*Reject back to sender, ideally with a permfail error noting the duplicate receipt
- \*Discard upon receipt
- \*Inspect the contents to evaluate the timestamps and reported data, act as appropriate
- \*Accept the duplicate data

When accepting the data, that's likely in a situation where it's not yet noticed, or a one-off experience. Long term, duplicate data is not ideal. In the situation of a partial time frame overlap, there is no clear way to distinguish the impact of the overlap. The receiver would need to accept or reject the duplicate data in whole.

## 3. Verifying External Destinations

It is possible to specify destinations for the different reports that are outside the authority of the Domain Owner making the

request. This allows domains that do not operate mail servers to request reports and have them go someplace that is able to receive and process them.

Without checks, this would allow a bad actor to publish a DMARC policy record that requests that reports be sent to a victim address, and then send a large volume of mail that will fail both DKIM and SPF checks to a wide variety of destinations; the victim will in turn be flooded with unwanted reports. Therefore, a verification mechanism is included.

When a Mail Receiver discovers a DMARC policy in the DNS, and the Organizational Domain at which that record was discovered is not identical to the Organizational Domain of the host part of the authority component of a [[RFC3986](#)] specified in the "rua" or "ruf" tag, the following verification steps MUST be taken:

1. Extract the host portion of the authority component of the URI. Call this the "destination host", as it refers to a Report Receiver.
2. Prepend the string "*report.dmarc*".
3. Prepend the domain name from which the policy was retrieved, after conversion to an A-label if needed.
4. Query the DNS for a TXT record at the constructed name. If the result of this request is a temporary DNS error of some kind (e.g., a timeout), the Mail Receiver MAY elect to temporarily fail the delivery so the verification test can be repeated later.
5. For each record returned, parse the result as a series of "tag=value" pairs, i.e., the same overall format as the policy record (see Section 6.4). In particular, the "v=DMARC1" tag is mandatory and MUST appear first in the list. Discard any that do not pass this test.
6. If the result includes no TXT resource records that pass basic parsing, a positive determination of the external reporting relationship cannot be made; stop.
7. If at least one TXT resource record remains in the set after parsing, then the external reporting arrangement was authorized by the Report Receiver.
8. If a "rua" or "ruf" tag is thus discovered, replace the corresponding value extracted from the domain's DMARC policy record with the one found in this record. This permits the Report Receiver to override the report destination. However, to

prevent loops or indirect abuse, the overriding URI MUST use the same destination host from the first step.

For example, if a DMARC policy query for "blue.example.com" contained "rua=mailto:reports@red.example.net", the host extracted from the latter ("red.example.net") does not match "blue.example.com", so this procedure is enacted. A TXT query for "blue.example.com.*report.dmarc*.red.example.net" is issued. If a single reply comes back containing a tag of "v=DMARC1", then the relationship between the two is confirmed. Moreover, "red.example.net" has the opportunity to override the report destination requested by "blue.example.com" if needed.

Where the above algorithm fails to confirm that the external reporting was authorized by the Report Receiver, the URI MUST be ignored by the Mail Receiver generating the report. Further, if the confirming record includes a URI whose host is again different than the domain publishing that override, the Mail Receiver generating the report MUST NOT generate a report to either the original or the override URI. A Report Receiver publishes such a record in its DNS if it wishes to receive reports for other domains.

A Report Receiver that is willing to receive reports for any domain can use a wildcard DNS record. For example, a TXT resource record at "*\*.report.dmarc.example.com*" containing at least "v=DMARC1" confirms that example.com is willing to receive DMARC reports for any domain.

If the Report Receiver is overcome by volume, it can simply remove the confirming DNS record. However, due to positive caching, the change could take as long as the time-to-live (TTL) on the record to go into effect.

A Mail Receiver might decide not to enact this procedure if, for example, it relies on a local list of domains for which external reporting addresses are permitted.

#### **4. Extensible Reporting**

DMARC reports allow for some extensibility, as defined by future documents that utilize DMARC as a foundation. These extensions MUST be properly formatted XML and meant to exist within the structure of a DMARC report. Two positions of type <any> are provided in the existing DMARC structure, one at file level, in an <extension> element after <policy\_published> and one at record level, after <auth\_results>. In either case, the extensions MUST contain a URI to the definition of the extension so that the receiver understands how to interpret the data.

At file level:

```

<feedback xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:dmarc-2.0"
          xmlns:ext="URI for an extension-supplied name space">
  ...
  <policy_published>
    <domain>example.com</domain>
    <p>quarantine</p>
    <sp>none</sp>
    <testing>n</testing>
  </policy_published>
  <extension>
    <ext:arc-override>never</ext:arc-override>
  </extension>

```

Within the record element:

```

<record>
  <row>
    ...
  </row>
  <identifiers>
    ...
  </identifiers>
  <auth_results>
    ...
  </auth_results>
  <ext:arc-results>
    ...
  </ext:arc-results>
</record>
<record>
  ...

```

Here "arc-override" and "arc-results" are hypothetical element names defined in the extension's name space.

Extension elements are optional. Any number of extensions is allowed. If a processor is unable to handle an extension in a report, it SHOULD ignore the data and continue to the next extension.

## 5. IANA Considerations

This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemas conforming to a registry mechanism described in [[RFC3688](#)]. Two URI assignments will be registered by the IANA.

### 5.1. Registration request for the DMARC namespace:

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:dmarc-2.0

Registrant Contact: See the "Author's Address" section of this document.

XML: None. Namespace URIs do not represent an XML specification.

## **5.2. Registration request for the DMARC XML schema:**

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:dmARC-2.0

Registrant Contact: See the "Author's Address" section of this document.

XML: See Appendix A. DMARC XML Schema in this document.

## **6. Privacy Considerations**

This section will discuss exposure related to DMARC aggregate reporting.

### **6.1. Data Exposure Considerations**

Aggregate reports are limited in scope to DMARC policy and disposition results, to information pertaining to the underlying authentication mechanisms, and to the identifiers involved in DMARC validation.

Aggregate report may expose sender and recipient identifiers, specifically the RFC5322.From addresses.

Domain Owners requesting reports will receive information about mail claiming to be from them, which includes mail that was not, in fact, from them. Information about the final destination of mail where it might otherwise be obscured by intermediate systems will therefore be exposed.

When message-forwarding arrangements exist, Domain Owners requesting reports will also receive information about mail forwarded to domains that were not originally part of their messages' recipient lists. This means that destination domains previously unknown to the Domain Owner may now become visible.

Disclosure of information about the messages is being requested by the entity generating the email in the first place, i.e., the Domain Owner and not the Mail Receiver, so this may not fit squarely within existing privacy policy provisions. For some providers, aggregate reporting is viewed as a function similar to complaint reporting about spamming or phishing and are treated similarly under the privacy policy. Report generators (i.e., Mail Receivers) are encouraged to review their reporting limitations under such policies before enabling DMARC reporting.

## **6.2. Report Recipients**

A DMARC record can specify that reports should be sent to an intermediary operating on behalf of the Domain Owner. This is done when the Domain Owner contracts with an entity to monitor mail streams for abuse and performance issues. Receipt by third parties of such data may or may not be permitted by the Mail Receiver's privacy policy, terms of use, or other similar governing document. Domain Owners and Mail Receivers should both review and understand if their own internal policies constrain the use and transmission of DMARC reporting.

Some potential exists for report recipients to perform traffic analysis, making it possible to obtain metadata about the Receiver's traffic. In addition to verifying compliance with policies, Receivers need to consider that before sending reports to a third party.

## **6.3. Data Contained Within Reports (Tkt64)**

Aggregate feedback reports contain aggregated data relating to messages purportedly originating from the Domain Owner. The data does not contain any identifying characteristics about individual users. No personal information such as individual email addresses, IP addresses of individuals, or the content of any messages, is included in reports.

Mail Receivers should have no concerns in sending reports as they do not contain personal information. In all cases, the data within the reports relates to the domain-level authentication information provided by mail servers sending messages on behalf of the Domain Owner. This information is necessary to assist Domain Owners in implementing and maintaining DMARC.

Domain Owners should have no concerns in receiving reports as they do not contain personal information. The reports only contain aggregated data related to the domain-level authentication details of messages claiming to originate from their domain. This information is essential for the proper implementation and operation of DMARC. Domain Owners who are unable to receive reports for organizational reasons, can choose to exclusively direct the reports to an external processor.

## **6.4. Feedback Leakage**

Providing feedback reporting to PSOs can, in some cases, cause information to leak out of an organization to the PSO. This leakage could potentially be utilized as part of a program of pervasive surveillance (see [[RFC7624](#)])). There are roughly three cases to consider:



**Single Organization PSDs (e.g., ".mil"):**

RUA reports based on PSD DMARC have the potential to contain information about emails related to entities managed by the organization. Since both the PSO and the Organizational Domain Owners are common, there is no additional privacy risk for either normal or non-existent domain reporting due to PSD DMARC.

**Multi-organization PSDs that require DMARC usage (e.g., ".bank"):**

Reports based on PSD DMARC will only be generated for domains that do not publish a DMARC policy at the organizational or host level. For domains that do publish the required DMARC policy records, the feedback reporting addresses of the organization (or hosts) will be used. The only direct risk of feedback leakage for these PSDs are for Organizational Domains that are out of compliance with PSD policy. Data on non-existent cousin domains would be sent to the PSO.

**Multi-organization PSDs (e.g., ".com") that do not mandate DMARC usage:**

Privacy risks for Organizational Domains that have not deployed DMARC within such PSDs are significant. For non-DMARC Organizational Domains, all DMARC feedback will be directed to the PSO. Any non-DMARC Organizational Domain would have its Feedback Reports redirected to the PSO. The content of such reports, particularly for existing domains, is privacy sensitive.

PSOs will receive feedback on non-existent domains, which may be similar to existing Organizational Domains. Feedback related to such cousin domains have a small risk of carrying information related to an actual Organizational Domain. To minimize this potential concern, PSD DMARC feedback MUST be limited to Aggregate Reports. Feedback Reports carry more detailed information and present a greater risk.

Due to the inherent privacy and security risks associated with DMARC at the PSD level for Organizational Domains in multi-organization PSDs that do not participate in DMARC, any feedback reporting related to multi- organizational PSDs MUST be limited to non-existent domains except in cases where the reporter knows that PSO requires use of DMARC.

## **7. Security Considerations**

TBD

## 8. Appendix A. DMARC XML Schema

```

<?xml version="1.0"?>
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:dmarc-2.0"
  xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:dmarc-2.0"
  elementFormDefault="qualified">

  <!-- The time range in UTC covered by messages in this report,
    specified in seconds since epoch. -->
  <xs:complexType name="DateRangeType">
    <xs:all>
      <xs:element name="begin" type="xs:integer"
        minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
      <xs:element name="end" type="xs:integer"
        minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
    </xs:all>
  </xs:complexType>

  <!-- Report generator metadata. -->
  <!--
  org_name: Reporting Organization
  email: Contact to be used when contacting
    the Reporting Organization
  extra_contact_info: Additional contact details
  report_id: UUID, specified elsewhere
  date_range: Timestamps used when forming report data
  error: ?
  -->
  <xs:complexType name="ReportMetadataType">
    <xs:all>
      <xs:element name="org_name" type="xs:string"
        minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
      <xs:element name="email" type="xs:string"
        minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
      <xs:element name="extra_contact_info" type="xs:string"
        minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
      <xs:element name="report_id" type="xs:string"
        minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
      <xs:element name="date_range" type="DateRangeType"
        minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
      <xs:element name="error" type="xs:string"
        minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    </xs:all>
  </xs:complexType>

  <!-- Alignment mode (relaxed or strict) for DKIM and SPF. -->
  <xs:simpleType name="AlignmentType">
    <xs:restriction base="xs:string">

```

```

    <xs:enumeration value="r"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="s"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<!-- The policy actions specified by p and sp in the
      DMARC record. -->
<xs:simpleType name="DispositionType">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
    <xs:enumeration value="none"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="quarantine"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="reject"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<!-- The policy actions utilized on messages for this record. -->
<!--
  "none": No action taken
  "pass": No action, passing DMARC w/enforcing policy
  "quarantine": Failed DMARC, message marked for quarantine
  "reject": Failed DMARC, marked as reject
-->
<xs:simpleType name="ActionDispositionType">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
    <xs:enumeration value="none"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="pass"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="quarantine"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="reject"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<!-- The published DMARC policy. Unspecified tags have their
      default values. -->
<xs:complexType name="PolicyPublishedType">
  <xs:all>
    <!-- The domain at which the DMARC record was found. -->
    <xs:element name="domain" type="xs:string"
      minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
    <!-- The version declared in the DMARC record found. -->
    <xs:element name="version_published" type="xs:decimal"
      minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
    <!-- The DKIM alignment mode. -->
    <xs:element name="adkim" type="AlignmentType"
      minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
    <!-- The SPF alignment mode. -->
    <xs:element name="aspf" type="AlignmentType"
      minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
    <!-- The policy published for messages from the domain. -->
    <xs:element name="p" type="DispositionType"

```

```

        minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<!-- The policy published for messages from subdomains. -->
<xs:element name="sp" type="DispositionType"
    minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<!-- The percent declared in the DMARC record -->
<xs:element name="testing" type="TestingType"
    minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<!-- Failure reporting options in effect. -->
<xs:element name="fo" type="xs:string"
    minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
</xs:all>
</xs:complexType>

<!-- Values for Testing mode attached to Policy -->
<xs:simpleType name="TestingType">
    <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
        <xs:enumeration value="n"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="y"/>
    </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<!-- The DMARC-aligned authentication result. -->
<xs:simpleType name="DMARCResultType">
    <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
        <xs:enumeration value="pass"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="fail"/>
    </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<!-- Reasons that may affect DMARC disposition or execution
    thereof. -->
<xs:simpleType name="PolicyOverrideType">
    <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
        <xs:enumeration value="forwarded"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="sampled_out"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="trusted_forwarder"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="mailing_list"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="local_policy"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="other"/>
    </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<!-- Override reason consists of pre-defined override type and
    free-text comment. -->
<xs:complexType name="PolicyOverrideReason">
    <xs:all>
        <xs:element name="type" type="PolicyOverrideType"
            minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
        <xs:element name="comment" type="xs:string"

```

```

minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
</xs:all>
</xs:complexType>

<!-- Taking into account everything else in the record,
the results of applying DMARC. If alignment fails
and the policy applied does not match the domain's
configured policy, the reason element MUST be specified -->

<xs:complexType name="PolicyEvaluatedType">
  <xs:sequence>
    <xs:element name="disposition" type="ActionDispositionType"/>
    <xs:element name="dkim" type="DMARCResultType"/>
    <xs:element name="spf" type="DMARCResultType"/>
    <xs:element name="reason" type="PolicyOverrideReason"
      minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
  </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>

<!-- The Internet Protocol Address
from which messages were received -->
<xs:simpleType name="IPAddress">
  <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
    <!-- IPv4 -->
    <xs:pattern value=
      "((1?\d?\d|2[0-4]\d|25[0-5])\.){3}(1?\d?\d|2[0-4]\d|25[0-5])"/>
    <!-- IPv6 -->
    <xs:pattern value="([A-Fa-f0-9]{1,4}:){7}[A-Fa-f0-9]{1,4}"/>
    <!-- RFC 5952 zero compression IPv6 (lax) -->
    <xs:pattern value="([A-Fa-f0-9]{1,4}:){1,7}:"/>
    <xs:pattern value="([A-Fa-f0-9]{1,4}:){1,6}:[A-Fa-f0-9]{1,4}"/>
    <xs:pattern value=
      "([A-Fa-f0-9]{1,4}:){1,5}:[A-Fa-f\d]{1,4}:[A-Fa-f\d]{1,4}"/>
    <xs:pattern value=
      "([A-Fa-f\d]{1,4}:){1,4}:([A-Fa-f\d]{1,4}:){1,2}[A-Fa-f\d]{1,4}"/>
    <xs:pattern value=
      "([A-Fa-f\d]{1,4}:){1,3}:([A-Fa-f\d]{1,4}:){1,3}[A-Fa-f\d]{1,4}"/>
    <xs:pattern value=
      "([A-Fa-f\d]{1,4}:){1,2}:([A-Fa-f\d]{1,4}:){1,4}[A-Fa-f\d]{1,4}"/>
    <xs:pattern value=
      "[A-Fa-f\d]{1,4}::([A-Fa-f\d]{1,4}:){1,5}[A-Fa-f\d]{1,4}"/>
    <xs:pattern value="::([A-Fa-f\d]{1,4}:){1,6}[A-Fa-f\d]{1,4}"/>
    <xs:pattern value="::[A-Fa-f\d]{1,4}"/>
  </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:complexType name="RowType">
  <xs:sequence>
    <!-- The connecting IP. -->

```

```

<xs:element name="source_ip" type="IPAddress"
    minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<!-- The number of messages for which the
PolicyEvaluatedType was applied. -->
<xs:element name="count" type="xs:integer"
    minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<!-- The DMARC disposition applied to matching messages. -->
<xs:element name="policy_evaluated"
    type="PolicyEvaluatedType"
    minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="IdentifierType">
<xs:all>
    <!-- The envelope recipient domain. -->
    <xs:element name="envelope_to" type="xs:string"
        minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
    <!-- The RFC5321.MailFrom domain or, if that value is empty,
        the RFC5321.Helo domain. -->
    <xs:element name="envelope_from" type="xs:string"
        minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
    <!-- The RFC5322.From domain. -->
    <xs:element name="header_from" type="xs:string"
        minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
</xs:all>
</xs:complexType>

<!-- DKIM verification result, according to RFC 8601
    Section 2.7.1. -->
<xs:simpleType name="DKIMResultType">
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
    <xs:enumeration value="none"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="pass"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="fail"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="policy"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="neutral"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="temperror"/>
    <xs:enumeration value="permerror"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:complexType name="DKIMAuthResultType">
<xs:all>
    <!-- The "d=" parameter in the signature. -->
    <xs:element name="domain" type="xs:string"
        minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
    <!-- The "s=" parameter in the signature. -->
    <xs:element name="selector" type="xs:string"

```

```

        minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<!-- The DKIM verification result. -->
<xs:element name="result" type="DKIMResultType"
    minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<!-- Any extra information (e.g., from
    Authentication-Results). -->
<xs:element name="human_result" type="xs:string"
    minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
</xs:all>
</xs:complexType>

<!-- SPF domain scope. -->
<xs:simpleType name="SPFDomainScope">
    <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
        <xs:enumeration value="helo"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="mfrom"/>
    </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<!-- SPF result. -->
<xs:simpleType name="SPFResultType">
    <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
        <xs:enumeration value="none"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="neutral"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="pass"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="fail"/>
        <xs:enumeration value="softfail"/>
        <!-- "TempError" commonly implemented as "unknown". -->
        <xs:enumeration value="temperror"/>
        <!-- "PermError" commonly implemented as "error". -->
        <xs:enumeration value="permerror"/>
    </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>

<xs:complexType name="SPFAuthResultType">
    <xs:all>
        <!-- The checked domain. -->
        <xs:element name="domain" type="xs:string"
            minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
        <!-- The scope of the checked domain. -->
        <xs:element name="scope" type="SPFDomainScope"
            minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
        <!-- The SPF verification result. -->
        <xs:element name="result" type="SPFResultType"
            minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
        <!-- Any extra information
            (e.g., from Authentication-Results).
            The information in the field below should be for a
            person to be provided with additional information

```



that may be useful when debugging SPF authentication issues. This could include broken records, invalid DNS responses, etc.

```
-->
<xs:element name="human_result" type="xs:string"
  minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
</xs:all>
</xs:complexType>

<!-- This element contains DKIM and SPF results, uninterpreted
  with respect to DMARC. -->
<xs:complexType name="AuthResultType">
  <xs:sequence>
    <!-- There may be no DKIM signatures, or multiple DKIM
      signatures. -->
    <xs:element name="dkim" type="DKIMAuthResultType"
      minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
    <!-- There will always be at least one SPF result. -->
    <xs:element name="spf" type="SPFAuthResultType" minOccurs="1"
      maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
  </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>

<!-- This element contains all the authentication results that
  were evaluated by the receiving system for the given set of
  messages. -->
<xs:complexType name="RecordType">
  <xs:sequence>
    <xs:element name="row" type="RowType"/>
    <xs:element name="identifiers" type="IdentifierType"
      minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
    <xs:element name="auth_results" type="AuthResultType"
      minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
    <!-- Extension at row level-->
    <xs:any processContents="lax"
      minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
  </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>

<xs:complexType name="ExtensionType">
  <xs:sequence>
    <xs:any processContents="lax"
      minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
  </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>

<!-- Parent -->
<xs:element name="feedback">
  <xs:complexType>
```

```
<xs:sequence>
  <xs:element name="version"
    minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1" type="xs:decimal"/>
  <xs:element name="report_metadata"
    minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"
    type="ReportMetadataType"/>
  <xs:element name="policy_published"
    minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"
    type="PolicyPublishedType"/>
  <!-- Extension at top level -->
  <xs:element name="extension" type="ExtensionType"
    minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
  <!-- One record per (IP, result, IDs Auths) tuples -->
  <xs:element name="record" type="RecordType"
    minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:schema>
```

## 9. Appendix B. Sample Report

```
<feedback xmlns="http://dmarc.org/dmarc-xml/0.2">
  <version>2.0</version>
  <report_metadata>
    <org_name>Sample Reporter</org_name>
    <email>report_sender@example-reporter.com</email>
    <extra_contact_info>...</extra_contact_info>
    <report_id>3v98abbp8ya9n3va8yr8oa3ya</report_id>
    <date_range>
      <begin>161212415</begin>
      <end>161221511</end>
    </date_range>
  </report_metadata>
  <policy_published>
    <domain>example.com</domain>
    <p>quarantine</p>
    <sp>none</sp>
    <testing>n</testing>
  </policy_published>
  <record>
    <row>
      <source_ip>192.168.4.4</source_ip>
      <count>123</count>
      <policy_evaluated>
        <disposition>quarantine</disposition>
        <dkim>pass</dkim>
        <spf>fail</spf>
      </policy_evaluated>
    </row>
    <identifiers>
      <envelope_from>example.com</envelope_from>
      <header_from>example.com</header_from>
    </identifiers>
    <auth_results>
      <dkim>
        <domain>example.com</domain>
        <result>pass</result>
        <selector>abc123</selector>
      </dkim>
      <spf>
        <domain>example.com</domain>
        <result>fail</result>
      </spf>
    </auth_results>
  </record>
</feedback>
```

## 10. Normative References

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**[RFC3986]**

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Crocker, D., Ed., Hansen, T., Ed., and M. Kucherawy, Ed., "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", STD 76, RFC 6376, DOI 10.17487/RFC6376, September 2011, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6376>>.

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