

DNS Extensions  
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Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions  
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Abstract

This document is part of a family of documents which describe the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC). The DNS Security Extensions are a collection of new resource records and protocol modifications which add data origin authentication and data integrity to the DNS. This document describes the DNSSEC protocol modifications. This document

defines the concept of a signed zone, along with the requirements for serving and resolving using DNSSEC. These techniques allow a security-aware resolver to authenticate both DNS resource records and authoritative DNS error indications.

This document obsoletes [RFC 2535](#) and incorporates changes from all updates to [RFC 2535](#).

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## [1.](#) Introduction

The DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) are a collection of new resource records and protocol modifications which add data origin authentication and data integrity to the DNS. This document defines the DNSSEC protocol modifications. [Section 2](#) of this document defines the concept of a signed zone and lists the requirements for zone signing. [Section 3](#) describes the modifications to authoritative name server behavior necessary to handle signed zones. [Section 4](#) describes the behavior of entities which include security-aware resolver functions. Finally, [Section 5](#) defines how to use DNSSEC RRs to authenticate a response.

### [1.1](#) Background and Related Documents

The reader is assumed to be familiar with the basic DNS concepts described in [\[RFC1034\]](#) and [\[RFC1035\]](#).

This document is part of a family of documents that define DNSSEC. An introduction to DNSSEC and definition of common terms can be found in [\[I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro\]](#). A definition of the DNSSEC resource records can be found in [\[I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records\]](#).

### [1.2](#) Reserved Words

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#). [\[RFC2119\]](#).

## [1.3](#) Editors' Notes

### [1.3.1](#) Open Technical Issues

### [1.3.2](#) Technical Changes or Corrections

Please report technical corrections to [dnsssec-editors@east.isi.edu](mailto:dnsssec-editors@east.isi.edu). To assist the editors, please indicate the text in error and point out the RFC that defines the correct behavior. For a technical change where no RFC that defines the correct behavior, or if there's more than one applicable RFC and the definitions conflict, please post the issue to [namedroppers](#).

An example correction to [dnsssec-editors](mailto:dnsssec-editors) might be: Page X says "DNSSEC RRs SHOULD be automatically returned in responses." This was true in [RFC 2535](#), but [RFC 3225](#) ([Section 3](#), 3rd paragraph) says the DNSSEC RR types MUST NOT be included in responses unless the resolver indicated support for DNSSEC.

Arends, et al.

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DNSSEC Protocol Modifications

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### [1.3.3](#) Typos and Minor Corrections

Please report any typos corrections to [dnsssec-editors@east.isi.edu](mailto:dnsssec-editors@east.isi.edu). To assist the editors, please provide enough context for us to find the incorrect text quickly.

An example message to [dnsssec-editors](mailto:dnsssec-editors) might be: page X says "the DNSSEC standard has been in development for over 1 years". It should read "over 10 years".

## [2.](#) Zone Signing

DNSSEC introduces the concept of signed zones. A signed zone includes DNSKEY, RRSIG, NSEC and (optionally) DS records according to the rules specified in [Section 2.1](#), [Section 2.2](#), [Section 2.3](#) and [Section 2.4](#), respectively. A zone that does not include these records according to the rules in this section is an unsigned zone.

DNSSEC requires a change to the definition of the CNAME resource record [[RFC1035](#)]. [Section 2.5](#) changes the CNAME RR to allow RRSIG and NSEC RRs to appear at the same owner name as a CNAME RR.

### [2.1](#) Including DNSKEY RRs in a Zone

To sign a zone, the zone's administrator generates one or more public/private key pairs and uses the private key(s) to sign authoritative RRsets in the zone. For each private key used to create RRSIG RRs, there SHOULD be a corresponding zone DNSKEY RR with the public component stored in the zone. A zone key DNSKEY RR MUST have the Zone Key bit of the flags RDATA field set to one -- see Section 2.1.1 of [[I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records](#)]. Public keys associated with other DNS operations MAY be stored in DNSKEY RRs that are not marked as zone keys but MUST NOT be used to verify RRSIGs.

If the zone is delegated and does not wish to act as an island of security, the zone MUST have at least one DNSKEY RR at the apex to act as a secure entry point into the zone. This DNSKEY would then be used to generate a DS RR at the delegating parent (see [[I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records](#)]).

DNSKEY RRs MUST NOT appear at delegation points.

## [2.2](#) Including RRSIG RRs in a Zone

For each authoritative RRset in a signed zone, there MUST be at least one RRSIG record that meets all of the following requirements:

- o The RRSIG owner name is equal to the RRset owner name;
- o The RRSIG class is equal to the RRset class;
- o The RRSIG Type Covered field is equal to the RRset type;
- o The RRSIG Original TTL field is equal to the TTL of the RRset;
- o The RRSIG RR's TTL is equal to the TTL of the RRset;
- o The RRSIG Labels field is equal to the number of labels in the RRset owner name, not counting the null root label and not counting the leftmost label if it is a wildcard;
- o The RRSIG Signer's Name field is equal to the name of the zone containing the RRset; and
- o The RRSIG Algorithm, Signer's Name, and Key Tag fields identify a zone key DNSKEY record at the zone apex.

The process for constructing the RRSIG RR for a given RRset is described in [[I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records](#)]. An RRset MAY have multiple RRSIG RRs associated with it.

An RRSIG RR itself MUST NOT be signed, since signing an RRSIG RR would add no value and would create an infinite loop in the signing process.

The NS RRset that appears at the zone apex name MUST be signed, but the NS RRsets that appear at delegation points (that is, the NS RRsets in the parent zone that delegate the name to the child zone's name servers) MUST NOT be signed. Glue address RRsets associated with delegations MUST NOT be signed.

There MUST be an RRSIG for each RRset using at least one DNSKEY of each algorithm in the zone apex DNSKEY RRset. The apex DNSKEY RRset itself MUST be signed by each algorithm appearing in the DS RRset located at the delegating parent (if any).

### [2.3](#) Including NSEC RRs in a Zone

Each owner name in the zone which has authoritative data or a delegation point NS RRset MUST have an NSEC resource record. The process for constructing the NSEC RR for a given name is described in [\[I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records\]](#).

The TTL value for any NSEC RR SHOULD be the same as the minimum TTL value field in the zone SOA RR.

An NSEC record (and its associated RRSIG RRset) MUST NOT be the only RRset at any particular owner name. That is, the signing process MUST NOT create NSEC or RRSIG RRs for owner names nodes which were not the owner name of any RRset before the zone was signed. The main reasons for this are a desire for namespace consistency between signed and unsigned versions of the same zone and a desire to reduce the risk of response inconsistency in security oblivious recursive name servers.

The type bitmap of every NSEC resource record in a signed zone MUST indicate the presence of both the NSEC record itself and its corresponding RRSIG record.

The difference between the set of owner names that require RRSIG records and the set of owner names that require NSEC records is subtle and worth highlighting. RRSIG records are present at the owner names of all authoritative RRsets. NSEC records are present at the owner names of all names for which the signed zone is authoritative and also at the owner names of delegations from the

signed zone to its children. Neither NSEC nor RRSIG records are present (in the parent zone) at the owner names of glue address RRsets. Note, however, that this distinction is for the most part is only visible during the zone signing process, because NSEC RRsets are authoritative data, and are therefore signed, thus any owner name which has an NSEC RRset will have RRSIG RRs as well in the signed zone.

The bitmap for the NSEC RR at a delegation point requires special attention. Bits corresponding to the delegation NS RRset and the RR types for which the parent zone has authoritative data MUST be set to 1; bits corresponding to any non-NS RRset for which the parent is not authoritative MUST be set to 0.

## [2.4](#) Including DS RRs in a Zone

The DS resource record establishes authentication chains between DNS zones. A DS RRset SHOULD be present at a delegation point when the child zone is signed. The DS RRset MAY contain multiple records, each referencing a public key in the child zone used to verify the RRSIGs in that zone. All DS RRsets in a zone MUST be signed and DS RRsets MUST NOT appear at a zone's apex.

A DS RR SHOULD point to a DNSKEY RR which is present in the child's apex DNSKEY RRset, and the child's apex DNSKEY RRset SHOULD be signed by the corresponding private key.

The TTL of a DS RRset SHOULD match the TTL of the delegating NS RRset (i.e., the NS RRset from the same zone containing the DS RRset).

Construction of a DS RR requires knowledge of the corresponding DNSKEY RR in the child zone, which implies communication between the child and parent zones. This communication is an operational matter not covered by this document.

## [2.5](#) Changes to the CNAME Resource Record.

If a CNAME RRset is present at a name in a signed zone, appropriate RRSIG and NSEC RRsets are REQUIRED at that name. A KEY RRset at that name for secure dynamic update purposes is also allowed. Other types MUST NOT be present at that name.

This is a modification to the original CNAME definition given in [\[RFC1034\]](#). The original definition of the CNAME RR did not allow any other types to coexist with a CNAME record, but a signed zone requires NSEC and RRSIG RRs for every authoritative name. To resolve this conflict, this specification modifies the definition of the CNAME resource record to allow it to coexist with NSEC and RRSIG RRs.

## [2.6](#) Example of a Secure Zone

[Appendix A](#) shows a complete example of a small signed zone.

### [3.](#) Serving

This section describes the behavior of entities that include security-aware name server functions. In many cases such functions will be part of a security-aware recursive name server, but a security-aware authoritative name server has some of the same requirements. Functions specific to security-aware recursive name servers are described in [Section 3.2](#); functions specific to authoritative servers are described in [Section 3.1](#).

The terms "SNAME", "SCLASS", and "STYPE" in the following discussion are as used in [\[RFC1034\]](#).

A security-aware name server MUST support the EDNS0 [\[RFC2671\]](#) message size extension, MUST support a message size of at least 1220 octets, and SHOULD support a message size of 4000 octets [\[RFC3226\]](#).

A security-aware name server that receives a DNS query that does not include the EDNS OPT pseudo-RR or that has the DO bit set to zero MUST treat the RRSIG, DNSKEY, and NSEC RRs as it would any other RRset, and MUST NOT perform any of the additional processing described below. Since the DS RR type has the peculiar property of only existing in the parent zone at delegation points, DS RRs always require some special processing, as described in [Section 3.1.4.1](#).

Security aware name servers that receive queries for security RR types which match the content of more than one zone that it serves (e.g. NSEC and RRSIG RRs above and below a delegation point where the server is authoritative for both zones) are encouraged to behave self-consistently. The name server MAY return one of the following:

- o The above-delegation RRsets
- o The below-delegation RRsets
- o Both above and below-delegation RRsets
- o Empty answer section (i.e. no records)
- o Some other response
- o An error

As long as the response is always consistent for each query to the name server.

DNSSEC allocates two new bits in the DNS message header: the CD (Checking Disabled) bit and the AD (Authentic Data) bit. The CD bit is controlled by resolvers; a security-aware name server MUST copy the CD bit from a query into the corresponding response. The AD bit is controlled by name servers; a security-aware name server MUST ignore the setting of the AD bit in queries. See [Section 3.1.6](#), [Section 3.2.2](#), [Section 3.2.3](#), [Section 4](#), and [Section 4.9](#) for details on the behavior of these bits.

A security aware name server which synthesizes CNAME RRs from DNAME RRs as described in [\[RFC2672\]](#) SHOULD NOT generate signatures for the synthesized CNAME RRs.

### [3.1](#) Authoritative Name Servers

Upon receiving a relevant query that has the EDNS [\[RFC2671\]](#) OPT pseudo-RR DO bit [\[RFC3225\]](#) set to one, a security-aware authoritative name server for a signed zone MUST include additional RRSIG, NSEC, and DS RRs according to the following rules:

- o RRSIG RRs that can be used to authenticate a response MUST be included in the response according to the rules in [Section 3.1.1](#);
- o NSEC RRs that can be used to provide authenticated denial of existence MUST be included in the response automatically according to the rules in [Section 3.1.3](#);
- o Either a DS RRset or an NSEC RR proving that no DS RRs exist MUST be included in referrals automatically according to the rules in [Section 3.1.4](#).

DNSSEC does not change the DNS zone transfer protocol. [Section 3.1.5](#) discusses zone transfer requirements.

#### [3.1.1](#) Including RRSIG RRs in a Response

When responding to a query that has the DO bit set to one, a security-aware authoritative name server SHOULD attempt to send RRSIG RRs that a security-aware resolver can use to authenticate the RRsets in the response. A name server SHOULD make every attempt to keep the RRset and its associated RRSIG(s) together in a response. Inclusion

of RRSIG RRs in a response is subject to the following rules:

- o When placing a signed RRset in the Answer section, the name server MUST also place its RRSIG RRs in the Answer section. The RRSIG RRs have a higher priority for inclusion than any other RRsets that may need to be included. If space does not permit inclusion of these RRSIG RRs, the name server MUST set the TC bit.
- o When placing a signed RRset in the Authority section, the name server MUST also place its RRSIG RRs in the Authority section. The RRSIG RRs have a higher priority for inclusion than any other RRsets that may need to be included. If space does not permit inclusion of these RRSIG RRs, the name server MUST set the TC bit.
- o When placing a signed RRset in the Additional section, the name server MUST also place its RRSIG RRs in the Additional section. If space does not permit inclusion of both the RRset and its associated RRSIG RRs, the name server MAY drop the RRSIG RRs. If this happens, the name server MUST NOT set the TC bit solely because these RRSIG RRs didn't fit.

### [3.1.2](#) Including DNSKEY RRs In a Response

When responding to a query that has the DO bit set to one and that requests the SOA or NS RRs at the apex of a signed zone, a security-aware authoritative name server for that zone MAY return the zone apex DNSKEY RRset in the Additional section. In this situation, the DNSKEY RRset and associated RRSIG RRs have lower priority than any other information that would be placed in the additional section. The name server SHOULD NOT include the DNSKEY RRset unless there is enough space in the response message for both the DNSKEY RRset and its associated RRSIG RR(s). If there is not enough space to include these DNSKEY and RRSIG RRs, the name server MUST omit them and MUST NOT set the TC bit solely because these RRs didn't fit (see [Section 3.1.1](#)).

### [3.1.3](#) Including NSEC RRs In a Response

When responding to a query that has the DO bit set to one, a security-aware authoritative name server for a signed zone MUST include NSEC RRs in each of the following cases:

No Data: The zone contains RRsets that exactly match <SNAME, SCLASS>,

but does not contain any RRsets that exactly match <SNAME, SCLASS, STYPE>.

Name Error: The zone does not contain any RRsets that match <SNAME, SCLASS> either exactly or via wildcard name expansion.

Wildcard Answer: The zone does not contain any RRsets that exactly match <SNAME, SCLASS> but does contain an RRset that matches <SNAME, SCLASS, STYPE> via wildcard name expansion.

Wildcard No Data: The zone does not contain any RRsets that exactly match <SNAME, SCLASS>, does contain one or more RRsets that match <SNAME, SCLASS> via wildcard name expansion, but does not contain any RRsets that match <SNAME, SCLASS, STYPE> via wildcard name expansion.

In each of these cases, the name server includes NSEC RRs in the response to prove that an exact match for <SNAME, SCLASS, STYPE> was not present in the zone and that the response that the name server is returning is correct given the data that are in the zone.

#### [3.1.3.1](#) Including NSEC RRs: No Data Response

If the zone contains RRsets matching <SNAME, SCLASS> but contains no RRset matching <SNAME, SCLASS, STYPE>, then the name server MUST include the NSEC RR for <SNAME, SCLASS> along with its associated

RRSIG RR(s) in the Authority section of the response (see [Section 3.1.1](#)). If space does not permit inclusion of the NSEC RR or its associated RRSIG RR(s), the name server MUST set the TC bit (see [Section 3.1.1](#)).

Since the search name exists, wildcard name expansion does not apply to this query, and a single signed NSEC RR suffices to prove the requested RR type does not exist.

#### [3.1.3.2](#) Including NSEC RRs: Name Error Response

If the zone does not contain any RRsets matching <SNAME, SCLASS> either exactly or via wildcard name expansion, then the name server MUST include the following NSEC RRs in the Authority section, along with their associated RRSIG RRs:

- o An NSEC RR proving that there is no exact match for <SNAME, SCLASS>; and
- o An NSEC RR proving that the zone contains no RRsets that would match <SNAME, SCLASS> via wildcard name expansion.

In some cases a single NSEC RR may prove both of these points, in that case the name server SHOULD only include the NSEC RR and its RRSIG RR(s) once in the Authority section.

If space does not permit inclusion of these NSEC and RRSIG RRs, the name server MUST set the TC bit (see [Section 3.1.1](#)).

The owner names of these NSEC and RRSIG RRs are not subject to wildcard name expansion when these RRs are included in the Authority section of the response.

Note that this form of response includes cases in which SNAME corresponds to an empty non-terminal name within the zone (a name which is not the owner name for any RRset but which is the parent name of one or more RRsets).

#### [3.1.3.3](#) Including NSEC RRs: Wildcard Answer Response

If the zone does not contain any RRsets which exactly match <SNAME, SCLASS> but does contain an RRset which matches <SNAME, SCLASS, STYPE> via wildcard name expansion, the name server MUST include the wildcard-expanded answer and the corresponding wildcard-expanded RRSIG RRs in the Answer section, and MUST include in the Authority section an NSEC RR and associated RRSIG RR(s) proving that the zone does not contain a closer match for <SNAME, SCLASS>. If space does not permit inclusion of the answer, NSEC and RRSIG RRs, the name server MUST set the TC bit (see [Section 3.1.1](#)).

#### [3.1.3.4](#) Including NSEC RRs: Wildcard No Data Response

This case is a combination of the previous cases. The zone does not contain an exact match for <SNAME, SCLASS>, and while the zone does contain RRsets which match <SNAME, SCLASS> via wildcard expansion, none of those RRsets match STYPE. The name server MUST include the following NSEC RRs in the Authority section, along with their associated RRSIG RRs:

- o An NSEC RR proving that there are no RRsets matching STYPE at the wildcard owner name which matched <SNAME, SCLASS> via wildcard expansion; and
- o An NSEC RR proving that there are no RRsets in the zone which would have been a closer match for <SNAME, SCLASS>.

In some cases a single NSEC RR may prove both of these points, in which case the name server SHOULD only include the NSEC RR and its RRSIG RR(s) once in the Authority section.

The owner names of these NSEC and RRSIG RRs are not subject to wildcard name expansion when these RRs are included in the Authority section of the response.

If space does not permit inclusion of these NSEC and RRSIG RRs, the name server MUST set the TC bit (see [Section 3.1.1](#)).

#### [3.1.3.5](#) Finding The Right NSEC RRs

As explained above, there are several situations in which a security-aware authoritative name server needs to locate an NSEC RR which proves that no RRsets matching a particular SNAME exist. Locating such an NSEC RR within an authoritative zone is relatively simple, at least in concept. The following discussion assumes that the name server is authoritative for the zone which would have held the nonexistent RRsets matching SNAME. The algorithm below is written for clarity, not efficiency.

To find the NSEC which proves that no RRsets matching name N exist in the zone Z which would have held them, construct sequence S consisting of the owner names of every RRset in Z, sorted into canonical order [[I-D.ietf-dnssec-dnssec-records](#)], with no duplicate names. Find the name M which would have immediately preceded N in S if any RRsets with owner name N had existed. M is the owner name of the NSEC RR which proves that no RRsets exist with owner name N.

The algorithm for finding the NSEC RR which proves that a given name is not covered by any applicable wildcard is similar, but requires an extra step. More precisely, the algorithm for finding the NSEC proving that no RRsets exist with the applicable wildcard name is

precisely the same as the algorithm for finding the NSEC RR which

proves that RRsets with any other owner name do not exist: the part that's missing is how to determine the name of the nonexistent applicable wildcard. In practice, this is easy, because the authoritative name server has already checked for the presence of precisely this wildcard name as part of step (1)(c) of the normal lookup algorithm described in [Section 4.3.2 of \[RFC1034\]](#).

#### [3.1.4](#) Including DS RRs In a Response

When responding to a query which has the DO bit set to one, a security-aware authoritative name server returning a referral includes DNSSEC data along with the NS RRset.

If a DS RRset is present at the delegation point, the name server MUST return both the DS RRset and its associated RRSIG RR(s) in the Authority section along with the NS RRset. The name server MUST place the NS RRset before the DS RRset and its associated RRSIG RR(s).

If no DS RRset is present at the delegation point, the name server MUST return both the NSEC RR which proves that the DS RRset is not present and the NSEC RR's associated RRSIG RR(s) along with the NS RRset. The name server MUST place the NS RRset before the NSEC RRset and its associated RRSIG RR(s).

Including these DS, NSEC, and RRSIG RRs increases the size of referral messages, and may cause some or all glue RRs to be omitted. If space does not permit inclusion of the DS or NSEC RRset and associated RRSIG RRs, the name server MUST set the TC bit (see [Section 3.1.1](#)).

##### [3.1.4.1](#) Responding to Queries for DS RRs

The DS resource record type is unusual in that it appears only on the parent zone's side of a zone cut. For example, the DS RRset for the delegation of "foo.example" is stored in the "example" zone rather than in the "foo.example" zone. This requires special processing rules for both name servers and resolvers, since the name server for the child zone is authoritative for the name at the zone cut by the normal DNS rules but the child zone does not contain the DS RRset.

A security-aware resolver sends queries to the parent zone when looking for a needed DS RR at a delegation point (see [Section 4.2](#)). However, special rules are necessary to avoid confusing security-oblivious resolvers which might become involved in processing such a query (for example, in a network configuration that forces a security-aware resolver to channel its queries through a

security-oblivious recursive name server). The rest of this section describes how a security-aware name server processes DS queries in order to avoid this problem.

The need for special processing by a security-aware name server only arises when all the following conditions are met:

- o the name server has received a query for the DS RRset at a zone cut; and
- o the name server is authoritative for the child zone; and
- o the name server is not authoritative for the parent zone; and
- o the name server does not offer recursion.

In all other cases, the name server either has some way of obtaining the DS RRset or could not have been expected to have the DS RRset even by the pre-DNSSEC processing rules, so the name server can return either the DS RRset or an error response according to the normal processing rules.

If all of the above conditions are met, however, the name server is authoritative for SNAME but cannot supply the requested RRset. In this case, the name server **MUST** return an authoritative "no data" response showing that the DS RRset does not exist in the child zone's apex. See [Appendix B.8](#) for an example of such a response.

### [3.1.5](#) Responding to Queries for Type AXFR or IXFR

DNSSEC does not change the DNS zone transfer process. A signed zone will contain RRSIG, DNSKEY, NSEC, and DS resource records, but these records have no special meaning with respect to a zone transfer operation.

An authoritative name server is not required to verify that a zone is properly signed before sending or accepting a zone transfer. However, an authoritative name server **MAY** choose to reject the entire zone transfer if the zone fails to meet any of the signing requirements described in [Section 2](#). The primary objective of a zone transfer is to ensure that all authoritative name servers have identical copies of the zone. An authoritative name server that chooses to perform its own zone validation **MUST NOT** selectively reject some RRs and accept others.

DS RRsets appear only on the parental side of a zone cut and are authoritative data in the parent zone. As with any other authoritative RRset, the DS RRset **MUST** be included in zone transfers of the zone in which the RRset is authoritative data: in the case of the DS RRset, this is the parent zone.

NSEC RRs appear in both the parent and child zones at a zone cut, and

are authoritative data in both the parent and child zones. The parental and child NSEC RRs at a zone cut are never identical to each other, since the NSEC RR in the child zone's apex will always indicate the presence of the child zone's SOA RR while the parental NSEC RR at the zone cut will never indicate the presence of an SOA RR. As with any other authoritative RRs, NSEC RRs MUST be included in zone transfers of the zone in which they are authoritative data: the parental NSEC RR at a zone cut MUST be included zone transfers of the parent zone, while the NSEC at the zone apex of the child zone MUST be included in zone transfers of the child zone.

RRSIG RRs appear in both the parent and child zones at a zone cut, and are authoritative in whichever zone contains the authoritative RRset for which the RRSIG RR provides the signature. That is, the RRSIG RR for a DS RRset or a parental NSEC RR at a zone cut will be authoritative in the parent zone, while the RRSIG for any RRset in the child zone's apex will be authoritative in the child zone. As with any other authoritative RRs, RRSIG RRs MUST be included in zone transfers of the zone in which they are authoritative data.

#### [3.1.6](#) The AD and CD Bits in an Authoritative Response

The CD and AD bits are designed for use in communication between security-aware resolvers and security-aware recursive name servers. These bits are for the most part not relevant to query processing by security-aware authoritative name servers.

A security-aware name server does not perform signature validation for authoritative data during query processing even when the CD bit is set to zero. A security-aware name server SHOULD clear the CD bit when composing an authoritative response.

A security-aware name server MUST NOT set the AD bit in a response unless the name server considers all RRsets in the Answer and Authority sections of the response to be authentic. A security-aware name server's local policy MAY consider data from an authoritative zone to be authentic without further validation, but the name server MUST NOT do so unless the name server obtained the authoritative zone via secure means (such as a secure zone transfer mechanism), and MUST

NOT do so unless this behavior has been configured explicitly.

A security-aware name server which supports recursion MUST follow the rules for the CD and AD bits given in [Section 3.2](#) when generating a response that involves data obtained via recursion.

## [3.2](#) Recursive Name Servers

As explained in [[I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro](#)], a security-aware

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recursive name server is an entity which acts in both the security-aware name server and security-aware resolver roles. This section uses the terms "name server side" and "resolver side" to refer to the code within a security-aware recursive name server which implements the security-aware name server role and the code which implements the security-aware resolver role, respectively.

The resolver side follows the usual rules for caching and negative caching which would apply to any security-aware resolver.

### [3.2.1](#) The DO bit

The resolver side of a security-aware recursive name server MUST set the DO bit when sending requests, regardless of the state of the DO bit in the initiating request received by the name server side. If the DO bit in an initiating query is not set, the name server side MUST strip any authenticating DNSSEC RRs from the response, but MUST NOT strip any DNSSEC RR types that the initiating query explicitly requested.

### [3.2.2](#) The CD bit

The CD bit exists in order to allow a security-aware resolver to disable signature validation in a security-aware name server's processing of a particular query.

The name server side MUST copy the setting of the CD bit from a query to the corresponding response.

The name server side of a security-aware recursive name server MUST pass the sense of the CD bit to the resolver side along with the rest of an initiating query, so that the resolver side will know whether

or not it is required to verify the response data it returns to the name server side. If the CD bit is set to one, it indicates that the originating resolver is willing to perform whatever authentication its local policy requires, thus the resolver side of the recursive name server need not perform authentication on the RRsets in the response. When the CD bit is set to one the recursive name server SHOULD, if possible, return the requested data to the originating resolver even if the recursive name server's local authentication policy would reject the records in question. That is, by setting the CD bit, the originating resolver has indicated that it takes responsibility for performing its own authentication, and the recursive name server should not interfere.

If the resolver side implements a BAD cache (see [Section 4.7](#)) and the name server side receives a query which matches an entry in the resolver side's BAD cache, the name server side's response depends on

the sense of the CD bit in the original query. If the CD bit is set, the name server side SHOULD return the data from the BAD cache; if the CD bit is not set, the name server side MUST return RCODE 2 (server failure).

The intent of the above rule is to provide the raw data to clients which are capable of performing their own signature verification checks while protecting clients which depend on the resolver side of a security-aware recursive name server to perform such checks. Several of the possible reasons why signature validation might fail involve conditions which may not apply equally to the recursive name server and the client which invoked it: for example, the recursive name server's clock may be set incorrectly, or the client may have knowledge of a relevant island of security which the recursive name server does not share. In such cases, "protecting" a client which is capable of performing its own signature validation from ever seeing the "bad" data does not help the client.

### [3.2.3](#) The AD bit

The name server side of a security-aware recursive name server MUST NOT set the AD bit in a response unless the name server considers all RRsets in the Answer and Authority sections of the response to be authentic. The name server side SHOULD set the AD bit if and only if the resolver side considers all RRsets in the Answer section and any

relevant negative response RRs in the Authority section to be authentic. The resolver side MUST follow the procedure described in [Section 5](#) to determine whether the RRs in question are authentic. However, for backwards compatibility, a recursive name server MAY set the AD bit when a response includes unsigned CNAME RRs if those CNAME RRs demonstrably could have been synthesized from an authentic DNAME RR which is also included in the response according to the synthesis rules described in [\[RFC2672\]](#).

### [3.3](#) Example DNSSEC Responses

See [Appendix B](#) for example response packets.

## [4.](#) Resolving

This section describes the behavior of entities that include security-aware resolver functions. In many cases such functions will be part of a security-aware recursive name server, but a stand-alone security-aware resolver has many of the same requirements. Functions specific to security-aware recursive name servers are described in [Section 3.2](#).

### [4.1](#) EDNS Support

A security-aware resolver MUST include an EDNS [\[RFC2671\]](#) OPT pseudo-RR with the DO [\[RFC3225\]](#) bit set to one when sending queries.

A security-aware resolver MUST support a message size of at least 1220 octets, SHOULD support a message size of 4000 octets, and MUST advertise the supported message size using the "sender's UDP payload size" field in the EDNS OPT pseudo-RR. A security-aware resolver MUST

handle fragmented UDP packets correctly regardless of whether any such fragmented packets were received via IPv4 or IPv6. Please see [\[RFC3226\]](#) for discussion of these requirements.

## [4.2](#) Signature Verification Support

A security-aware resolver MUST support the signature verification mechanisms described in [Section 5](#), and MUST apply them to every received response except when:

- o The security-aware resolver is part of a security-aware recursive name server, and the response is the result of recursion on behalf of a query received with the CD bit set;
- o The response is the result of a query generated directly via some form of application interface which instructed the security-aware resolver not to perform validation for this query; or
- o Validation for this query has been disabled by local policy.

A security-aware resolver's support for signature verification MUST include support for verification of wildcard owner names.

Security aware resolvers MAY query for missing security RRs in an attempt to perform validation; implementations that choose to do so must be aware of the fact that the answers received may not be sufficient to validate the original response.

When attempting to retrieve missing NSEC RRs which reside on the parental side at a zone cut, a security-aware iterative-mode resolver MUST query the name servers for the parent zone, not the child zone.

When attempting to retrieve a missing DS, a security-aware

iterative-mode resolver MUST query the name servers for the parent zone, not the child zone. As explained in [Section 3.1.4.1](#), security-aware name servers need to apply special processing rules to handle the DS RR, and in some situations the resolver may also need to apply special rules to locate the name servers for the parent zone if the resolver does not already have the parent's NS RRset. To locate the parent NS RRset, the resolver can start with the delegation name, strip off the leftmost label, and query for an NS RRset by that name; if no NS RRset is present at that name, the resolver then strips off the leftmost remaining label and retries the query for that name, repeating this process of walking up the tree

until it either finds the NS RRset or runs out of labels.

#### [4.3](#) Determining Security Status of Data

A security-aware resolver MUST be able to determine whether or not it should expect a particular RRset to be signed. More precisely, a security-aware resolver must be able to distinguish between four cases:

**Secure:** An RRset for which the resolver is able to build a chain of signed DNSKEY and DS RRs from a trusted security anchor to the RRset. In this case, the RRset should be signed, and is subject to signature validation as described above.

**Insecure:** An RRset for which the resolver knows that it has no chain of signed DNSKEY and DS RRs from any trusted starting point to the RRset. This can occur when the target RRset lies in an unsigned zone or in a descendent of an unsigned zone. In this case, the RRset may or may not be signed, but the resolver will not be able to verify the signature.

**Bogus:** An RRset for which the resolver believes that it ought to be able to establish a chain of trust but is unable to do so, either due to signatures that for some reason fail to validate or due to missing data which the relevant DNSSEC RRs indicate should be present. This case may indicate an attack, but may also indicate a configuration error or some form of data corruption.

**Indeterminate:** An RRset for which the resolver is not able to determine whether or not the RRset should be signed, because the resolver is not able to obtain the necessary DNSSEC RRs. This can occur when the security-aware resolver is not able to contact security-aware name servers for the relevant zones.

#### [4.4](#) Configured Trust Anchors

A security-aware resolver MUST be capable of being configured with at

least one trusted public key or DS RR, and SHOULD be capable of being configured with multiple trusted public keys or DS RRs. Since a security-aware resolver will not be able to validate signatures without such a configured trust anchor, the resolver SHOULD have some

reasonably robust mechanism for obtaining such keys when it boots; examples of such a mechanism would be some form of non-volatile storage (such as a disk drive) or some form of trusted local network configuration mechanism.

Note that trust anchors also covers key material that is updated in a secure manner. This secure manner could be through physical media, a key exchange protocol, or some other out of band means.

#### [4.5](#) Response Caching

A security-aware resolver SHOULD cache each response as a single atomic entry containing the entire answer, including the named RRset and any associated DNSSEC RRs. The resolver SHOULD discard the entire atomic entry when any of the RRs contained in it expire. In most cases the appropriate cache index for the atomic entry will be the triple <QNAME, QTYPE, QCLASS>, but in cases such as the response form described in [Section 3.1.3.2](#) the appropriate cache index will be the double <QNAME,QCLASS>.

#### [4.6](#) Handling of the CD and AD bits

A security-aware resolver MAY set the CD bit in a query to one in order to indicate that the resolver takes responsibility for performing whatever authentication its local policy requires on the RRsets in the response. See [Section 3.2](#) for the effect this bit has on the behavior of security-aware recursive name servers.

A security-aware resolver MUST zero the AD bit when composing query messages to protect against buggy name servers which blindly copy header bits which they do not understand from the query message to the response message.

A resolver MUST disregard the meaning of the CD and AD bits in a response unless the response was obtained using a secure channel or the resolver was specifically configured to regard the message header bits without using a secure channel.

#### [4.7](#) Caching BAD Data

While many validation errors will be transient, some are likely to be more persistent, such as those caused by administrative error (failure to re-sign a zone, clock skew, and so forth). Since requerying will not help in these cases, validating resolvers might

generate a significant amount of unnecessary DNS traffic as a result of repeated queries for RRsets with persistent validation failures.

To prevent such unnecessary DNS traffic, security-aware resolvers MAY cache data with invalid signatures, with some restrictions.

Conceptually, caching such data is similar to negative caching [[RFC2308](#)], except that instead of caching a valid negative response, the resolver is caching the fact that a particular answer failed to validate. This document refers to a cache of data with invalid signatures as a "BAD cache".

Resolvers which implement a BAD cache MUST take steps to prevent the cache from being useful as a denial-of-service attack amplifier. In particular:

- o Since RRsets which fail to validate do not have trustworthy TTLs, the implementation MUST assign a TTL. This TTL SHOULD be small, in order to mitigate the effect of caching the results of an attack.
- o In order to prevent caching of a transient validation failure (which might be the result of an attack), resolvers SHOULD track queries that result in validation failures, and SHOULD only answer from the BAD cache after the number of times that responses to queries for that particular <QNAME, QTYPE, QCLASS> have failed to validate exceeds a threshold value.

Resolvers MUST NOT return RRsets from the BAD cache unless the resolver is not required to validate the signatures of the RRsets in question under the rules given in [Section 4.2](#) of this document. See [Section 3.2.2](#) for discussion of how the responses returned by a security-aware recursive name server interact with a BAD cache.

#### [4.8](#) Synthesized CNAMEs

A validating security-aware resolver MUST treat the signature of a valid signed DNAME RR as also covering unsigned CNAME RRs which could have been synthesized from the DNAME RR as described in [[RFC2672](#)], at least to the extent of not rejecting a response message solely because it contains such CNAME RRs. The resolver MAY retain such CNAME RRs in its cache or in the answers it hands back, but is not required to do so.

#### [4.9](#) Stub resolvers

A security-aware stub resolver MUST support the DNSSEC RR types, at least to the extent of not mishandling responses just because they contain DNSSEC RRs.

#### [4.9.1](#) Handling of the DO Bit

A non-validating security-aware stub resolver MAY include the DNSSEC RRs returned by a security-aware recursive name server as part of the data that the stub resolver hands back to the application which invoked it but is not required to do so. A non-validating stub resolver that wishes to do this will need to set the DO bit in receive DNSSEC RRs from the recursive name server.

A validating security-aware stub resolver MUST set the DO bit, since otherwise it will not receive the DNSSEC RRs it needs to perform signature validation.

#### [4.9.2](#) Handling of the CD Bit

A non-validating security-aware stub resolver SHOULD NOT set the CD bit when sending queries unless requested by the application layer, since by definition, a non-validating stub resolver depends on the security-aware recursive name server to perform validation on its behalf.

A validating security-aware stub resolver SHOULD set the CD bit, since otherwise the security-aware recursive name server will answer the query using the name server's local policy, which may prevent the stub resolver from receiving data which would be acceptable to the stub resolver's local policy.

#### [4.9.3](#) Handling of the AD Bit

A non-validating security-aware stub resolver MAY chose to examine the setting of the AD bit in response messages that it receives in order to determine whether the security-aware recursive name server which sent the response claims to have cryptographically verified the data in the Answer and Authority sections of the response message. Note, however, that the responses received by a security-aware stub resolver are heavily dependent on the local policy of the security-aware recursive name server, so as a practical matter there may be little practical value to checking the status of the AD bit except perhaps as a debugging aid. In any case, a security-aware stub resolver MUST NOT place any reliance on signature validation

allegedly performed on its behalf except when the security-aware stub resolver obtained the data in question from a trusted security-aware recursive name server via a secure channel.

A validating security-aware stub resolver SHOULD NOT examine the setting of the AD bit in response messages, since, by definition, the stub resolver performs its own signature validation regardless of the setting of the AD bit.

## [5.](#) Authenticating DNS Responses

In order to use DNSSEC RRs for authentication, a security-aware resolver requires configured knowledge of at least one authenticated DNSKEY or DS RR. The process for obtaining and authenticating this initial trust anchors is achieved via some external mechanism. For example, a resolver could use some off-line authenticated exchange to obtain a zone's DNSKEY RR or obtain a DS RR that identifies and authenticates a zone's DNSKEY RR. The remainder of this section assumes that the resolver has somehow obtained an initial set of trust anchors.

An initial DNSKEY RR can be used to authenticate a zone's apex DNSKEY RRset. To authenticate an apex DNSKEY RRset using an initial key, the resolver MUST:

1. Verify that the initial DNSKEY RR appears in the apex DNSKEY RRset, and verify that the DNSKEY RR MUST have the Zone Key Flag (DNSKEY RDATA bit 7) set to one.
2. Verify that there is some RRSIG RR that covers the apex DNSKEY RRset, and that the combination of the RRSIG RR and the initial DNSKEY RR authenticates the DNSKEY RRset. The process for using an RRSIG RR to authenticate an RRset is described in [Section 5.3](#).

Once the resolver has authenticated the apex DNSKEY RRset using an initial DNSKEY RR, delegations from that zone can be authenticated using DS RRs. This allows a resolver to start from an initial key, and use DS RRsets to proceed recursively down the DNS tree obtaining other apex DNSKEY RRsets. If the resolver were configured with a root DNSKEY RR, and if every delegation had a DS RR associated with it, then the resolver could obtain and validate any apex DNSKEY RRset. The process of using DS RRs to authenticate referrals is described in [Section 5.2](#).

Once the resolver has authenticated a zone's apex DNSKEY RRset, [Section 5.3](#) shows how the resolver can use DNSKEY RRs in the apex DNSKEY RRset and RRSIG RRs from the zone to authenticate any other RRsets in the zone. [Section 5.4](#) shows how the resolver can use authenticated NSEC RRsets from the zone to prove that an RRset is not present in the zone.

When a resolver indicates support for DNSSEC (by setting the DO bit), a security-aware name server should attempt to provide the necessary DNSKEY, RRSIG, NSEC, and DS RRsets in a response (see [Section 3](#)). However, a security-aware resolver may still receive a response that lacks the appropriate DNSSEC RRs, whether due to configuration issues such as an upstream security-oblivious recursive name server that accidentally interferes with DNSSEC RRs or due to a deliberate attack in which an adversary forges a response, strips DNSSEC RRs

from a response, or modifies a query so that DNSSEC RRs appear not to be requested. The absence of DNSSEC data in a response MUST NOT by itself be taken as an indication that no authentication information exists.

A resolver SHOULD expect authentication information from signed zones. A resolver SHOULD believe that a zone is signed if the resolver has been configured with public key information for the zone, or if the zone's parent is signed and the delegation from the parent contains a DS RRset.

### [5.1](#) Special Considerations for Islands of Security

Islands of security (see [[I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro](#)]) are signed zones for which it is not possible to construct an authentication chain to the zone from its parent. Validating signatures within an island of security requires the validator to have some other means of obtaining an initial authenticated zone key for the island. If a validator cannot obtain such a key, it SHOULD switch to operating as if the zones in the island of security are unsigned.

All the normal processes for validating responses apply to islands of security. The only difference between normal validation and validation within an island of security is in how the validator obtains a trust anchor for the authentication chain.

## [5.2](#) Authenticating Referrals

Once the apex DNSKEY RRset for a signed parent zone has been authenticated, DS RRsets can be used to authenticate the delegation to a signed child zone. A DS RR identifies a DNSKEY RR in the child zone's apex DNSKEY RRset, and contains a cryptographic digest of the child zone's DNSKEY RR. A strong cryptographic digest algorithm ensures that an adversary can not easily generate a DNSKEY RR that matches the digest. Thus, authenticating the digest allows a resolver to authenticate the matching DNSKEY RR. The resolver can then use this child DNSKEY RR to authenticate the entire child apex DNSKEY RRset.

Given a DS RR for a delegation, the child zone's apex DNSKEY RRset can be authenticated if all of the following hold:

- o The DS RR has been authenticated using some DNSKEY RR in the parent's apex DNSKEY RRset (see [Section 5.3](#));
- o The Algorithm and Key Tag in the DS RR match the Algorithm field and the key tag of a DNSKEY RR in the child zone's apex DNSKEY RRset and, when hashed using the digest algorithm specified in the DS RR's Digest Type field, results in a digest value that matches the Digest field of the DS RR; and

- o The matching DNSKEY RR in the child zone has the Zone Flag bit set to one, the corresponding private key has signed the child zone's apex DNSKEY RRset, and the resulting RRSIG RR authenticates the child zone's apex DNSKEY RRset.

If the referral from the parent zone did not contain a DS RRset, the response should have included a signed NSEC RRset proving that no DS RRset exists for the delegated name (see [Section 3.1.4](#)). A security-aware resolver MUST query the name servers for the parent zone for the DS RRset if the referral includes neither a DS RRset nor a NSEC RRset proving that the DS RRset does not exist (see [Section 4](#)).

If the validator authenticates an NSEC RRset that proves that no DS RRset is present for this zone, then there is no authentication path leading from the parent to the child. If the resolver has an initial DNSKEY or DS RR that belongs to the child zone or to any delegation below the child zone, this initial DNSKEY or DS RR MAY be used to re-establish an authentication path. If no such initial DNSKEY or DS

RR exists, the validator can not authenticate RRsets in or below the child zone.

If the validator does not support any of the algorithms listed in an authenticated DS RRset, then the resolver has no supported authentication path leading from the parent to the child. The resolver should treat this case as it would the case of an authenticated NSEC RRset proving that no DS RRset exists, as described above.

Note that, for a signed delegation, there are two NSEC RRs associated with the delegated name. One NSEC RR resides in the parent zone, and can be used to prove whether a DS RRset exists for the delegated name. The second NSEC RR resides in the child zone, and identifies which RRsets are present at the apex of the child zone. The parent NSEC RR and child NSEC RR can always be distinguished, since the SOA bit will be set in the child NSEC RR and clear in the parent NSEC RR. A security-aware resolver MUST use the parent NSEC RR when attempting to prove that a DS RRset does not exist.

If the resolver does not support any of the algorithms listed in an authenticated DS RRset, then the resolver will not be able to verify the authentication path to the child zone. In this case, the resolver SHOULD treat the child zone as if it were unsigned.

### [5.3](#) Authenticating an RRset Using an RRSIG RR

A validator can use an RRSIG RR and its corresponding DNSKEY RR to attempt to authenticate RRsets. The validator first checks the RRSIG

RR to verify that it covers the RRset, has a valid time interval, and identifies a valid DNSKEY RR. The validator then constructs the canonical form of the signed data by appending the RRSIG RDATA (excluding the Signature Field) with the canonical form of the covered RRset. Finally, the validator uses the public key and signature to authenticate the signed data. [Section 5.3.1](#), [Section 5.3.2](#), and [Section 5.3.3](#) describe each step in detail.

#### [5.3.1](#) Checking the RRSIG RR Validity

A security-aware resolver can use an RRSIG RR to authenticate an RRset if all of the following conditions hold:

- o The RRSIG RR and the RRset MUST have the same owner name and the same class;
- o The RRSIG RR's Signer's Name field MUST be the name of the zone that contains the RRset;
- o The RRSIG RR's Type Covered field MUST equal the RRset's type;
- o The number of labels in the RRset owner name MUST be greater than or equal to the value in the RRSIG RR's Labels field;
- o The validator's notion of the current time MUST be less than or equal to the time listed in the RRSIG RR's Expiration field;
- o The validator's notion of the current time MUST be greater than or equal to the time listed in the RRSIG RR's Inception field;
- o The RRSIG RR's Signer's Name, Algorithm, and Key Tag fields MUST match the owner name, algorithm, and key tag for some DNSKEY RR in the zone's apex DNSKEY RRset;
- o The matching DNSKEY RR MUST be present in the zone's apex DNSKEY RRset, and MUST have the Zone Flag bit (DNSKEY RDATA Flag bit 7) set to one.

It is possible for more than one DNSKEY RR to match the conditions above. In this case, the validator cannot predetermine which DNSKEY RR to use to authenticate the signature, MUST try each matching DNSKEY RR until either the signature is validated or the validator has run out of matching public keys to try.

Note that this authentication process is only meaningful if the validator authenticates the DNSKEY RR before using it to validate signatures. The matching DNSKEY RR is considered to be authentic if:

- o The apex DNSKEY RRset containing the DNSKEY RR is considered authentic; or
- o The RRset covered by the RRSIG RR is the apex DNSKEY RRset itself, and the DNSKEY RR either matches an authenticated DS RR from the parent zone or matches a trust anchor.

### [5.3.2](#) Reconstructing the Signed Data

Once the RRSIG RR has met the validity requirements described in

[Section 5.3.1](#), the validator needs to reconstruct the original signed data. The original signed data includes RRSIG RDATA (excluding the Signature field) and the canonical form of the RRset. Aside from being ordered, the canonical form of the RRset might also differ from the received RRset due to DNS name compression, decremented TTLs, or

wildcard expansion. The validator should use the following to reconstruct the original signed data:

`signed_data = RRSIG_RDATA | RR(1) | RR(2)...` where

`"|"` denotes concatenation

RRSIG\_RDATA is the wire format of the RRSIG RDATA fields with the Signature field excluded and the Signer's Name in canonical form.

`RR(i) = name | type | class | OrigTTL | RDATA length | RDATA`

name is calculated according to the function below

class is the RRset's class

type is the RRset type and all RRs in the class

OrigTTL is the value from the RRSIG Original TTL field

All names in the RDATA field are in canonical form

The set of all RR(i) is sorted into canonical order.

To calculate the name:

let `rrsig_labels` = the value of the RRSIG Labels field

let `fqdn` = RRset's fully qualified domain name in canonical form

let `fqdn_labels` = Label count of the fqdn above.

if `rrsig_labels` = `fqdn_labels`,  
    `name` = `fqdn`

if `rrsig_labels` < `fqdn_labels`,  
    `name` = `"*."` | the rightmost `rrsig_label` labels of the `fqdn`

if `rrsig_labels` > `fqdn_labels`  
    the RRSIG RR did not pass the necessary validation checks and MUST NOT be used to authenticate this

RRset.

The canonical forms for names and RRsets are defined in [\[I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records\]](#).

NSEC RRsets at a delegation boundary require special processing. There are two distinct NSEC RRsets associated with a signed delegated name. One NSEC RRset resides in the parent zone, and specifies which RRset are present at the parent zone. The second NSEC RRset resides at the child zone, and identifies which RRsets are present at the apex in the child zone. The parent NSEC RRset and child NSEC RRset can always be distinguished since only the child NSEC RRs will specify an SOA RRset exists at the name. When reconstructing the original NSEC RRset for the delegation from the parent zone, the NSEC RRs MUST NOT be combined with NSEC RRs from the child zone, and when reconstructing the original NSEC RRset for the apex of the child zone, the NSEC RRs MUST NOT be combined with NSEC RRs from the parent zone.

Note also that each of the two NSEC RRsets at a delegation point has a corresponding RRSIG RR with an owner name matching the delegated name, and each of these RRSIG RRs is authoritative data associated with the same zone that contains the corresponding NSEC RRset. If necessary, a resolver can tell these RRSIG RRs apart by checking the Signer's Name field.

### [5.3.3](#) Checking the Signature

Once the resolver has validated the RRSIG RR as described in [Section 5.3.1](#) and reconstructed the original signed data as described in [Section 5.3.2](#), the validator can attempt to use the cryptographic signature to authenticate the signed data, and thus (finally!) authenticate the RRset.

The Algorithm field in the RRSIG RR identifies the cryptographic algorithm used to generate the signature. The signature itself is contained in the Signature field of the RRSIG RDATA, and the public key used to verify the signature is contained in the Public Key field of the matching DNSKEY RR(s) (found in [Section 5.3.1](#)).

[\[I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records\]](#) provides a list of algorithm types and provides pointers to the documents that define each algorithm's use.

Note that it is possible for more than one DNSKEY RR to match the conditions in [Section 5.3.1](#). In this case, the validator can only determine which DNSKEY RR by trying each matching public key until the validator either succeeds in validating the signature or runs out of keys to try.

If the Labels field of the RRSIG RR is not equal to the number of labels in the RRset's fully qualified owner name, then the RRset is either invalid or the result of wildcard expansion. The resolver MUST verify that wildcard expansion was applied properly before considering the RRset to be authentic. [Section 5.3.4](#) describes how to determine whether a wildcard was applied properly.

If other RRSIG RRs also cover this RRset, the local resolver security policy determines whether the resolver also needs to test these RRSIG RRs, and determines how to resolve conflicts if these RRSIG RRs lead to differing results.

If the resolver accepts the RRset as authentic, the validator MUST set the TTL of the RRSIG RR and each RR in the authenticated RRset to a value no greater than the minimum of:

- o The RRset's TTL as received in the response;
- o The RRSIG RR's TTL as received in the response;
- o The value in the RRSIG RR's Original TTL field; and
- o The difference of the RRSIG RR's Signature Expiration time and the current time.

#### [5.3.4](#) Authenticating A Wildcard Expanded RRset Positive Response

If the number of labels in an RRset's owner name is greater than the Labels field of the covering RRSIG RR, then the RRset and its covering RRSIG RR were created as a result of wildcard expansion. Once the validator has verified the signature as described in [Section 5.3](#), it must take additional steps to verify the non-existence of an exact match or closer wildcard match for the query. [Section 5.4](#) discusses these steps.

Note that the response received by the resolver should include all NSEC RRs needed to authenticate the response (see [Section 3.1.3](#)).

#### [5.4](#) Authenticated Denial of Existence

A resolver can use authenticated NSEC RRs to prove that an RRset is not present in a signed zone. Security-aware name servers should automatically include any necessary NSEC RRs for signed zones in their responses to security-aware resolvers.

Security-aware resolvers MUST first authenticate NSEC RRsets

according to the standard RRset authentication rules described in [Section 5.3](#), then apply the NSEC RRsets as follows:

- o If the requested RR name matches the owner name of an authenticated NSEC RR, then the NSEC RR's type bit map field lists all RR types present at that owner name, and a resolver can prove that the requested RR type does not exist by checking for the RR

type in the bit map. If the number of labels in an authenticated NSEC RR's owner name equals the Labels field of the covering RRSIG RR, then the existence of the NSEC RR proves that wildcard expansion could not have been used to match the request.

- o If the requested RR name would appear after an authenticated NSEC RR's owner name and before the name listed in that NSEC RR's Next Domain Name field according to the canonical DNS name order defined in [[I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records](#)], then no RRsets with the requested name exist in the zone. However, it is possible that a wildcard could be used to match the requested RR owner name and type, so proving that the requested RRset does not exist also requires proving that no possible wildcard RRset exists that could have been used to generate a positive response.

To prove non-existence of an RRset, the resolver must be able to verify both that the queried RRset does not exist and that no relevant wildcard RRset exists. Proving this may require more than one NSEC RRset from the zone. If the complete set of necessary NSEC RRsets is not present in a response (perhaps due to message truncation), then a security-aware resolver MUST resend the query in order to attempt to obtain the full collection of NSEC RRs necessary to verify non-existence of the requested RRset. As with all DNS operations, however, the resolver MUST bound the work it puts into answering any particular query.

Since a validated NSEC RR proves the existence of both itself and its corresponding RRSIG RR, a validator MUST ignore the settings of the NSEC and RRSIG bits in an NSEC RR.

## [5.5](#) Resolver Behavior When Signatures Do Not Validate

If for whatever reason none of the RRSIGs can be validated, the response SHOULD be considered BAD. If the validation was being done to service a recursive query, the name server MUST return RCODE 2 to the originating client. However, it MUST return the full response if

and only if the original query had the CD bit set. See also [Section 4.7](#) on caching responses that do not validate.

## [5.6](#) Authentication Example

[Appendix C](#) shows an example the authentication process.

## [6.](#) IANA Considerations

[I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records] contains a review of the IANA considerations introduced by DNSSEC. The additional IANA considerations discussed in this document:

[RFC2535] reserved the CD and AD bits in the message header. The meaning of the AD bit was redefined in [\[RFC3655\]](#) and the meaning of both the CD and AD bit are restated in this document. No new bits in the DNS message header are defined in this document.

[RFC2671] introduced EDNS and [\[RFC3225\]](#) reserved the DNSSEC OK bit and defined its use. The use is restated but not altered in this document.

## 7. Security Considerations

This document describes how the DNS security extensions use public key cryptography to sign and authenticate DNS resource record sets. Please see [[I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro](#)] for terminology and general security considerations related to DNSSEC; see [[I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro](#)] for considerations specific to the DNSSEC resource record types.

An active attacker who can set the CD bit in a DNS query message or the AD bit in a DNS response message can use these bits to defeat the protection which DNSSEC attempts to provide to security-oblivious recursive-mode resolvers. For this reason, use of these control bits by a security-aware recursive-mode resolver requires a secure channel. See [Section 3.2.2](#) and [Section 4.9](#) for further discussion.

The protocol described in this document attempts to extend the benefits of DNSSEC to security-oblivious stub resolvers. However, since recovery from validation failures is likely to be specific to particular applications, the facilities that DNSSEC provides for stub resolvers may prove inadequate. Operators of security-aware

recursive name servers will need to pay close attention to the behavior of the applications which use their services when choosing a local validation policy; failure to do so could easily result in the recursive name server accidentally denying service to the clients it is intended to support.

## 8. Acknowledgements

This document was created from the input and ideas of the members of the DNS Extensions Working Group and working group mailing list. The editors would like to express their thanks for the comments and suggestions received during the revision of these security extension specifications. While explicitly listing everyone who has contributed during the decade during which DNSSEC has been under development would be an impossible task, [\[I-D.ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro\]](#) includes a list of some of the participants who were kind enough to comment on these documents.

## [9.](#) References

### [9.1](#) Normative References

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## [9.2](#) Informative References

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DNSSEC Protocol Modifications

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[Appendix A](#). Signed Zone Example

The following example shows a (small) complete signed zone.

```
example.      3600 IN SOA ns1.example. bugs.x.w.example. (
                1081539377
                3600
                300
                3600000
                3600
                )
3600 RRSIG    SOA 5 1 3600 20040509183619 (
                20040409183619 38519 example.
                ONx0k36rcjaxYtcNgq6iQnpNV5+drqYAsC9h
                7TSJaHCqbhE67Sr6aH2xDUGcqQWu/n0UVzrF
                vkg09ebarZ0GWDKcuwlM6eNB5SiX2K74l5LW
                DA7S/Un/IbtDq4Ay8NMNLQI7Dw7n4p8/rjkB
                jV7j86HyQgM5e7+miRAz8V01b0I= )
3600 NS       ns1.example.
3600 NS       ns2.example.
3600 RRSIG    NS 5 1 3600 20040509183619 (
                20040409183619 38519 example.
                gl13F00f2U0R+SWiXXLHwsMY+qStYy5k6zfd
                EuivWc+wd1fmbNCyql0Tk7lHTX6U0xc8AgNf
                4ISFve8XqF4q+o9qlnqIzmppU3LiNeKT4FZ8
                R05urF0voMRTbQxW3U0hXWuggE4g3ZpsHv48
                0HjMeRaZB/FRPGfJPajngcq6Kwg= )
3600 MX       1 xx.example.
3600 RRSIG    MX 5 1 3600 20040509183619 (
                20040409183619 38519 example.
                HyDHYVT5KHSZ7Ht0/vypumPmSZQrcOP3tzWB
                2qaKkHVPfau/DgLgS/IKENkY0GL95G4N+NzE
                VyNU8dcT0ckT+ChPcGeVjguQ7a3Ao9Z/ZkU0
                6gmmUW4b89rz1PUxW4jzUxj66PTwoVtUU/iM
                W60ISukd1EQt7a0kygkg+PEDxdI= )
3600 NSEC     a.example. NS SOA MX RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY
```

```

3600 RRSIG NSEC 5 1 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
00k558jHhyrC97ISHnisl4kLMW48C7U7cBm
FTfhke5iVqNRVTB1STLMpgpbDIC9hcryo00V
Z9ME5xPzUEhbnGnHd5sfzgFVeGxr5Nyyq4tW
SDBgIBiLQUv1ivvy29vhXy7WgR62dPrZ0PWvm
jFFJ5arXf4nPxp/kEowGgBRzY/U= )
3600 DNSKEY 256 3 5 (
AQ0y1bZVvpPqhg4j7EJoM9rI3ZmyEx20zDBV
rZy/lvI5CQePxXHZS4i8dANH4DX3tbHol61e
k8EFMcSGXxKciJFHyhl94C+NwILQdzsUlsFo
vBZsyl/NX6yEbtw/xN9ZNcrbYvgjjZ/UVPI

```

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```

ySFNsgEYvh0z2542lzMKR4Dh8uZffQ==
)
3600 DNSKEY 257 3 5 (
AQ0eX7+baTmvpVHb2CcLnL1dMRWbuscRvHXl
LnXwDzvqp4tZVKp1sZMepFb8MvxhhW3y/0QZ
syCjczGJ1qk8vJe52i0hInKROVLRwxGpMfzP
RLMlGybr51b0V/1se00Dacj3DomyB4QB5gKT
Yot/K9alk5/j8vfd4jWCWD+E1Sze0Q==
)
3600 RRSIG DNSKEY 5 1 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 9465 example.
ZxgauAuIj+k1YoVEOSlZfx41fcmKzTFHoweZ
xYnz99JVQZJ33wFS0Q0jcP7VXKkaElXk9nYJ
Xev0/7nAbo88iWsMkSpSR6jWzYYKwfrBI/L9
hjYmyV09m6FjQ7uwM4dCP/bIuV/DKqQAK9NY
NC3AHfvCV1Tp4VKDqxqG7R5tTVM= )
3600 RRSIG DNSKEY 5 1 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
eGL0s90glUqc0mloo/2y+bSzyEfKV0QViD9Z
DNhLz/Yn9CQZLDVRJffACQDAUhXpU/oP34ri
bKBpysRXosczFrKqS50a0bzM0fXCXup9qHAp
eFIku28Vqfr8Nt7cigZLxjK+u0Ws/4lIRjKk
7z50XogYVaFzHKillDt3HRxHIZM= )
a.example. 3600 IN NS ns1.a.example.
3600 IN NS ns2.a.example.
3600 DS 57855 5 1 (
B6DCD485719ADCA18E5F3D48A2331627FDD3
636B )
3600 RRSIG DS 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (

```

```

20040409183619 38519 example.
oXIKit/QtdG64J/CB+Gi8dOvnwRvqrto1AdQ
oRkAN15FP3iZ7suB7gvTBmXzCjL7XUgQVcoH
kdhyCuzp8W9qJHgRUSwKKkczSyuL64nhgjuD
EML8l9wlWVsl7PR2VnZduM9bLyBhaaPmRKX/
Fm+v6ccF2EGNLRiY08kdkz+XHHo= )
3600 NSEC ai.example. NS DS RRSIG NSEC
3600 RRSIG NSEC 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
c0LYgqJLqLRqmBQ3iap2SyIsK405aqpKSoba
U9fQ5SMApZmHfq3AgLfLkrkXRXvgxTQSKkG2
039/cRUs6Jk/25+fi7Xr5nOVJsb0lq4zsB3I
BBdjyGDAHE0F5R0Jj87996vJupdm1fbH481g
sdk0W6Zyqtz3Zos8N0BBkEx+2G4= )
ns1.a.example. 3600 IN A 192.0.2.5
ns2.a.example. 3600 IN A 192.0.2.6
ai.example. 3600 IN A 192.0.2.9
3600 RRSIG A 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.

```

```

pA0tzLP2MU0tDJUwH0KE5FPiIHmdYsCgTb5B
ERGgpnJluA9ix0yf6xxVCgrEJW0WNZSsJicd
hBHxfDmAGKUajUULYSAH8tS4ZnrhyymIvk3u
ArDu2wfT130e9UHnumaHHMpUTosKe22Pbl0y
6zrTpg9FkS0XGVmYRvOTNYx2HvQ= )
3600 HINFO "KLH-10" "ITS"
3600 RRSIG HINFO 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
Iq/RGcbBdKzcYzlGE4ovbr5YcB+ezxbZ9W0l
e/7Wqyvvh009J16HxhhL7VY/IKmTUY0GGdcfh
ZEOckf4lEyKZF9NPok1/R/fWrtzNp8jobuY7
AZEczadp1WdDF3jc2/ndCa5XZhLKD3Jz0sBw
FvL8sqlS5QS6FY/ijFEDnI4RkZA= )
3600 AAAA 2001:db8::f00:baa9
3600 RRSIG AAAA 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
nLcpFuXdT35AcE+EoafOUkl69KB+/e56XmFK
kewXG2IadYLKA0BIoR5+VoQV3XgtCofTJNsh
1rnF6Eav2zpZB3byI6yo2bwY8MNkr4A7cL9T
cMmDwV/hWFKsbGBsj8xSCN/caEL2CWY/5XP2
sZM6QjBBLmukH30+w1z3h8PUP2o= )
3600 NSEC b.example. A HINFO AAAA RRSIG NSEC

```

```

3600 RRSIG NSEC 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
QoshyPevLcJ/xcRpEtMft1uoIrcrieVcc9pG
CScIn5Glnib40T6ayV0imXwdSTZ/8ISXGj4p
P8Sh0PlA6oLZQ84L453/BUqB8Bpd0Gky4hsN
3AGcLEv1Gr0QMvirQaFcjz0ECfnGyBm+wpFL
AhS+JOVfDI/79QtyTI0SaDWcg8U= )
b.example. 3600 IN NS ns1.b.example.
3600 IN NS ns2.b.example.
3600 NSEC ns1.example. NS RRSIG NSEC
3600 RRSIG NSEC 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
GNuxHn844wfmUhPzGWKJCPY5ttEX/RfjDo0x
9ueK1PtYkOWK00diJ/PJKCYB3hYX+858dDWS
xb2qnV/LSTCNVBnkm6owOpysY97MVj5VQEWs
0lm9tFojcptQkmQKYPrwUnCSNwvvcLSF1xZ
vhRXgWT70uFXldoCG6TfVFMs9xE= )
ns1.b.example. 3600 IN A 192.0.2.7
ns2.b.example. 3600 IN A 192.0.2.8
ns1.example. 3600 IN A 192.0.2.1
3600 RRSIG A 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
F1C9HVhIcs10cZU09G5yIVfKJy5yRQQ3qVet
5pGhp82pzhAOMZ3K22JnmK4c+IjUeFp/to06
im5FVpHtbFisdjyPq84bhTv8vrXt5AB1wNB+
+iAqvIfdgW4sFNC6oADb1hK8QNauw9VePJhK

```

```

v/iVXSYC0b7mPSU+E0lknFpVECs= )
3600 NSEC ns2.example. A RRSIG NSEC
3600 RRSIG NSEC 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
I4hj+Kt6+8rCcHcUdolks2S+Wzri9h3fHas8
1rGN/eILdJHN7JpV6LLGPIh/8fIBkfvdyWnB
jjf1q307JgY01UdI7FvBNWqaaEPJK3UkddbQ
ZiALi8Qr2XHkjq38BeQsbp8X0+6h4ETWSGT8
IZaIGBLryQWGLw6Y6X8dqhlNxJM= )
ns2.example. 3600 IN A 192.0.2.2
3600 RRSIG A 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
V7cQRw1TR+knlaL1z/psxLS1PcD37JJDacMq
Qo6/u1qFQu6x+wuDHRH22Ap9uLJPQjFwMKOu
yfPGQPC8KzGdE3vt5snFEAoE1Vn3mQqtu7S0

```

```

6amIjk13Kj/jyJ4nGmdRIc/3cM3ipXFhNTKq
rdhx8SZ0yy40bIRzIzvBFLiSS8o= )
3600 NSEC *.w.example. A RRSIG NSEC
3600 RRSIG NSEC 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
N0QzHvaJf5NRw1rE9uxS1Ltb2LZ73Qb9bKGE
VyaISkqzGpP3jYJXZJPVTq4UVEsgT3CgeHvb
3QbeJ5Dfb2V9NGCHj/OvF/LBxFFWwhLwzngH
l+bQAgAcMsLu/nL3nDi1y/JSQjAcdZNDl4bw
Ymx28EtgIpo9A0qmP08rMBqs1Jw= )
*.w.example. 3600 IN MX 1 ai.example.
3600 RRSIG MX 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
OMK8rAZlepFzLWW75Dxd63jy2wswESzxDKG2
f9AMN1CytCd10cYISAxAdvXSZ7xujKAtPbc
tvOQ2of07AZJ+d01EeeQTVBPq4/6KCWhqe2X
TjnkVLNvvhnc0u28aoSsG0+4Invkk0HknKxw
4kX18MMR34i8lC36SR5xBni8vHI= )
3600 NSEC x.w.example. MX RRSIG NSEC
3600 RRSIG NSEC 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
r/mZnRC3I/VicrelgIcteSxDhtsd1TDt8ng9
HSB1AB0lzLxQtfgTnn8f+a0wJIAFe1Ee5RvU
5cVhQJNP5XpXMJHfyps8tVvfxSAXfahpYqtx
91gsmcV/1V9/bZAG55CefP9cM4Z9Y9NT9XQ8
s1InQ2UoIv6tJEaaKkP701j80LA= )
x.w.example. 3600 IN MX 1 xx.example.
3600 RRSIG MX 5 3 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
I12WTZ+Bkv+OytBx4LItnW5mjB4RCwh008y1
XzPHZmZUTVYL7LaA63f6T9ysVBzJRI3KRjAP
H3U1qaYnDoN1DrWqmi9RJJe4FoObkbcdm7P3I
kx70ePCoFgRz1Yq+bVVXCvGuAU4xALv3W/Y1

```

```

jNSlwZ2mSWKHfxFQxPtLj8s32+k= )
3600 NSEC x.y.w.example. MX RRSIG NSEC
3600 RRSIG NSEC 5 3 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
aRbpHftxggzgMXdDlym9SsADqMZovZZl2QWK
vw8J0tZEUNQByH5Qfnf5N1FqH/pS46UA7A4E
mcWBN9PUA1pdPY6RVearLzLcr1IkVctvbtaI
NJUBba/VHm+pebTbKcAPIvL9tB0oh+to1h6e

```

```

x.y.w.example. 3600 IN MX      IjgiM8PXkBQtxPq37wDKALkyn7Q= )
3600 RRSIG      1 xx.example.
                MX 5 4 3600 20040509183619 (
                20040409183619 38519 example.
                k2bJHbwP5LH5qN4is39UiPzjAWYmJA38Hhia
                t7i9t7nbX/e0FPnvDSQXzcK7UL+zrVA+3MDj
                q1ub4q3SZgcbLMgexxIW3Va//LVrxkP6Xupq
                Gt0B9prkK54QTl/qZTXfMQpW480Y0vVknhvb
                +gLcMZBnHJ326nb/T00mrqNmQQE= )
3600 NSEC      xx.example. MX RRSIG NSEC
3600 RRSIG      NSEC 5 4 3600 20040509183619 (
                20040409183619 38519 example.
                OvE6WUzN2ziieJcvKPWbCAyXyP6ef8cr6Csp
                ArVSTzKSquNwbezZmkU7E34o5lmb6CWSSSpq
                xw098kNUFnHcQf/LzY2zqRomubrNqHJTidTX
                a0ArunJQCzPj0Yq5t0SLjm6qp6McJI1AP5Vr
                QoKqJDCLnoAlcPOPkAm/jJkn3jk= )
xx.example.    3600 IN A      192.0.2.10
3600 RRSIG      A 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
                20040409183619 38519 example.
                kBF4YxMGWF0D8r0cztL+2fWW0vN1U/GYSpYP
                7SoKoNQ4fZKyK+weWGLKLIUM+uE1zjVTPXoa
                0Z6WG0oZp46rkl1EzMcdMgoaeUzzAJ2BMq+Y
                VdxG9IK1yZkYGY9AgbTOGPoAgbJy09EPULsx
                kbIDV6GPPSZVusnZU60MgdgzHV4= )
3600 HINFO      "KLH-10" "TOPS-20"
3600 RRSIG      HINFO 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
                20040409183619 38519 example.
                GY2PLSXmMHkWHfLdggiox8+chWpeMNJLkML0
                t+U/SXSUsoUdR91KNdNUkTDWamwcF8oFRjhq
                BcPZ6EqrF+vL5v5oGuvSF7U52epfVTC+wWF8
                3yCUeUw8YklhLWlvk8gQ15YKth0ITQy8/wI+
                RgNvuwbioFSEuv2pNlkq0goYxNY= )
3600 AAAA      2001:db8::f00:baaa
3600 RRSIG      AAAA 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
                20040409183619 38519 example.
                Zzj0yodDxcBLnn0IwDsuKo5WqiaK24DlKg9C
                aGaxDFiKgKobUj2jilyQHpGFn2poFRetZd4z
                ulyQkssz2QHrVrPuTMS22knudCiwP4LWpVTr
                U4zfeA+rDz9stmSBP/4PekH/x2IoAYnwctd/

```

```

3600 NSEC    example. A HINFO AAAA RRSIG NSEC
3600 RRSIG   NSEC 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
                20040409183619 38519 example.
                ZFWUln6Avc8bmGl5GFjD3BwT530DUZKHNUoY
                9A8lgXYrxu+pqgFiRVbyZRQvVB5pccEOT3k
                mvHgEa/HzbDB4PIYY79W+VHrg0xzdQGGCZzi
                asXrpSGOWwSOElghPnMIi8xdF7qtCntr382W
                GghLahumFIpg4M03LS/prgzVVWo= )

```

The apex DNSKEY set includes two DNSKEY RRs, and the DNSKEY RDATA Flags indicate that each of these DNSKEY RRs is a zone key. One of these DNSKEY RRs also has the SEP flag set and has been used to sign the apex DNSKEY RRset; this is the key which should be hashed to generate a DS record to be inserted into the parent zone. The other DNSKEY is used to sign all the other RRsets in the zone.

The zone includes a wildcard entry "\*.w.example". Note that the name "\*.w.example" is used in constructing NSEC chains, and that the RRSIG covering the "\*.w.example" MX RRset has a label count of 2.

The zone also includes two delegations. The delegation to "b.example" includes an NS RRset, glue address records, and an NSEC RR; note that only the NSEC RRset is signed. The delegation to "a.example" provides a DS RR; note that only the NSEC and DS RRsets are signed.

## [Appendix B](#). Example Responses

The examples in this section show response messages using the signed zone example in [Appendix A](#).

### [B.1](#) Answer

A successful query to an authoritative server.

```
;; Header: QR AA DO RCODE=0
;;
;; Question
x.w.example.      IN MX
```

```
;; Answer
x.w.example.      3600 IN MX  1 xx.example.
x.w.example.      3600 RRSIG  MX 5 3 3600 20040509183619 (
                        20040409183619 38519 example.
                        Il2WTZ+Bkv+OytBx4LItnW5mjB4RCwh008y1
                        XzPHZmZUTVYL7LaA63f6T9ysVBzJRI3KRjAP
                        H3U1qaYnDoN1DrWqmi9RJJe4Fo0bkbcdm7P3I
                        kx70ePCoFgRz1Yq+bVVXCvGuAU4xALv3W/Y1
                        jNSlwZ2mSWKHfxFQxPtLj8s32+k= )
```

```
;; Authority
example.          3600 NS      ns1.example.
example.          3600 NS      ns2.example.
example.          3600 RRSIG  NS 5 1 3600 20040509183619 (
                        20040409183619 38519 example.
                        gl13F00f2U0R+SWiXXLHwsMY+qStYy5k6zfd
                        EuivWc+wd1fmbNCyql0Tk7lHTX6U0xc8AgNf
                        4ISFve8XqF4q+o9qlnqIzmppU3LiNeKT4FZ8
                        RO5urFOvoMRTbQxW3U0hXWuggE4g3ZpsHv48
                        0HjMeRaZB/FRPGfJPajngcq6Kwg= )
```

```
;; Additional
xx.example.       3600 IN A     192.0.2.10
xx.example.       3600 RRSIG  A 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
                        20040409183619 38519 example.
                        kBF4YxMGWF0D8r0cztL+2fWW0vN1U/GYSpYP
                        7SoKoNQ4fZKyK+weWGlKLIUM+uE1zjVTPXoa
                        0Z6WG0oZp46rkl1EzMcdMgoaeUzzAJ2BMq+Y
                        VdxG9IK1yZkYGY9AgbTOGPoAgbJy09EPULsx
                        kbIDV6GPPSZVusnZU60MgdgzHV4= )
xx.example.       3600 AAAA     2001:db8::f00:baaa
xx.example.       3600 RRSIG  AAAA 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
```

20040409183619 38519 example.  
Zzj0yodDxcBLnn0IwDsuKo5WqiaK24DlKg9C

```

aGaxDFiKgKobUj2jilyQHpGFn2poFRetZd4z
ulyQkssz2QHrVrPuTMS22knudCiwP4LWpVTr
U4zfeA+rDz9stmSBP/4PekH/x2IoAYnwctd/
xS9cL2QgW7FChw16mzlkH6/vsfs= )
ns1.example.  3600 IN A 192.0.2.1
ns1.example.  3600 RRSIG A 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
F1C9HVhIcs10cZU09G5yIVfKJy5yRQQ3qVet
5pGhp82pzhAOMZ3K22JnmK4c+IjUeFp/to06
im5FVpHtbFisdjyPq84bhTv8vrXt5AB1wNB+
+iAqvIfdgW4sFNC6oADb1hK8QNauw9VePJhK
v/iVXSYC0b7mPSU+E0lknFpVECs= )
ns2.example.  3600 IN A 192.0.2.2
ns2.example.  3600 RRSIG A 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
V7cQRw1TR+knlaL1z/psxlS1PcD37JJDaCMq
Qo6/u1qFQu6x+wuDHRH22Ap9ulJPQjFwMKOu
yFPGQPC8KzGdE3vt5snFEAoE1Vn3mQqtu7S0
6amIjk13Kj/jyJ4nGmdRIc/3cM3ipXFhNTKq
rdhx8SZ0yy40bIRzIzvBFLiSS8o= )
```

## [B.2](#) Name Error

An authoritative name error. The NSEC RRs prove that the name does not exist and that no covering wildcard exists.

```
;; Header: QR AA DO RCODE=3
;;
;; Question
ml.example.      IN A
```

```
;; Answer
;; (empty)
```

```
;; Authority
example. 3600 IN SOA ns1.example. bugs.x.w.example. (
1081539377
3600
```

```

300
3600000
3600
)
example.      3600 RRSIG  SOA 5 1 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
ONx0k36rcjaxYtcNgq6iQnpNV5+drqYAsC9h
7TSJaHCqbhE67Sr6aH2xDUGcqQWu/n0UVzrF
vkg09ebarZ0GWDKcuwLM6eNB5SiX2K74l5LW

```

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```

DA7S/Un/IbtDq4Ay8NMNLQI7Dw7n4p8/rjKB
jV7j86HyQgM5e7+miRAz8V01b0I= )
b.example.    3600 NSEC  ns1.example. NS RRSIG NSEC
b.example.    3600 RRSIG NSEC 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
GNuxHn844wfmUhPzGWKJCPY5ttEX/RfjDo0x
9ueK1PtYkOWK00diJ/PJKCYB3hYX+858dDWS
xb2qnV/LSTCNVBnkm6owOpysY97MVj5VQEWs
0lm9tFoqjcptQkmQKYPrwUnCSNwvvc1SF1xZ
vhRXgWT7OuFXldoCG6TfVFMs9xE= )
example.      3600 NSEC  a.example. NS SOA MX RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY
example.      3600 RRSIG NSEC 5 1 3600 20040509183619 (
20040409183619 38519 example.
00k558jHhyrC97ISHnisl4kLMW48C7U7cBm
FTfhke5iVqNRVTB1STLMpgpbDIC9hcryo00V
Z9ME5xPzUEhvvGnHd5sfzgFVeGxr5Nyyq4tW
SDBgIBiLQUv1ivy29vhXy7WgR62dPrZ0PWvm
jFFJ5arXf4nPxp/kEowGgBRzY/U= )

;; Additional
;; (empty)

```

### [B.3](#) No Data Error

A "NODATA" response. The NSEC RR proves that the name exists and that the requested RR type does not.

```
;; Header: QR AA DO RCODE=0
;;
;; Question
ns1.example.          IN MX

;; Answer
;; (empty)

;; Authority
example.              3600 IN SOA ns1.example. bugs.x.w.example. (
                        1081539377
                        3600
                        300
                        3600000
                        3600
                        )
example.              3600 RRSIG SOA 5 1 3600 20040509183619 (
                        20040409183619 38519 example.
                        ONx0k36rcjaxYtcNgq6iQnpNV5+drqYAsC9h
                        7TSJaHCqbhE67Sr6aH2xDUGcqQUw/n0UVzrF
                        vkg09ebarZ0GWDKcuwlM6eNB5SiX2K74l5LW
                        DA7S/Un/IbtDq4Ay8NMNLQI7Dw7n4p8/rjKB
                        jV7j86HyQgM5e7+miRAz8V01b0I= )
ns1.example.         3600 NSEC  ns2.example. A RRSIG NSEC
ns1.example.         3600 RRSIG NSEC 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
```



```
kdhyCuzp8W9qJHgRUSwKKkczSyuL64nhgjuD
EML8l9wlWVsl7PR2VnZduM9bLyBhaaPmRKX/
Fm+v6ccF2EGNLRiY08kdkz+XHHo= )
```

```
;; Additional
ns1.a.example. 3600 IN A    192.0.2.5
ns2.a.example. 3600 IN A    192.0.2.6
```

## [B.5](#) Referral to Unsigned Zone

Referral to an unsigned zone. The NSEC RR proves that no DS RR for this delegation exists in the parent zone.

```
;; Header: QR DO RCODE=0
;;
;; Question
mc.b.example.      IN MX

;; Answer
;; (empty)

;; Authority
b.example.         3600 IN NS  ns1.b.example.
b.example.         3600 IN NS  ns2.b.example.
```



```

                                gl13F00f2U0R+SWiXXLHwsMY+qStYy5k6zfd
                                EuivWc+wd1fmbNCyql0Tk7LHTX6U0xc8AgNf
                                4ISFve8XqF4q+o9qlnqIzmppU3LiNeKT4FZ8
                                RO5urF0voMRTbQxW3U0hXWuggE4g3ZpsHv48
                                0HjMeRaZB/FRPGfJPajngcq6Kwg= )
x.y.w.example. 3600 NSEC xx.example. MX RRSIG NSEC
x.y.w.example. 3600 RRSIG NSEC 5 4 3600 20040509183619 (
                                20040409183619 38519 example.
                                OvE6WUZn2ziieJcvKPWbCAyXyP6ef8cr6Csp
                                ArVSTzKSquNwbezZmkU7E34o5lmb6CWSSSpG
                                xw098kNUFnHcQf/LzY2zqRomubrNQhJTIDTX
                                a0ArunJQCzPj0Yq5t0SLjm6qp6McJI1AP5Vr
                                QoKqJDCLnoAlcPOPkAm/jJkn3jk= )

;; Additional
ai.example.      3600 IN A      192.0.2.9
ai.example.      3600 RRSIG    A 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
                                20040409183619 38519 example.
                                pA0tzLP2MU0tDJUwH0KE5FPIIHmdYsCgTb5B
                                ERGgpnJluA9ix0yf6xxVCgrEJW0WNZSsJicd
                                hBHxfDmAGKUajUULYSAH8tS4ZnrhyymIvk3u
                                ArDu2wfT130e9UHnumaHHMpUTosKe22Pbl0y
                                6zrTpg9FkS0XGVmYRv0TNYx2HvQ= )
ai.example.      3600 AAAA     2001:db8::f00:baa9
ai.example.      3600 RRSIG    AAAA 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
                                20040409183619 38519 example.
                                nLcpFuXdT35AcE+EoafOUkl69KB+/e56XmFK
                                kewXG2IadYLKA0BIO5+VoQV3XgTcofTJNsh
                                1rnF6Eav2zpZB3byI6yo2bwY8MNkr4A7cL9T
                                cMmDwV/hWFKsbGBsj8xSCN/caEL2CWY/5XP2
                                sZM6QjBBLmukH30+w1z3h8PUP2o= )

```

## B.7 Wildcard No Data Error

A "NODATA" response for a name covered by a wildcard. The NSEC RRs prove that the matching wildcard name does not have any RRs of the requested type and that no closer match exists in the zone.

```

;; Header: QR AA DO RCODE=0
;;
;; Question
a.z.w.example.      IN AAAA

```

```

;; Answer
;; (empty)

;; Authority
example.      3600 IN SOA ns1.example. bugs.x.w.example. (
                                1081539377
                                3600
                                300
                                3600000
                                3600
                                )
example.      3600 RRSIG SOA 5 1 3600 20040509183619 (
                                20040409183619 38519 example.
                                ONx0k36rcjaxYtcNgq6iQnpNV5+drqYAsC9h
                                7TSJaHCqbhE67Sr6aH2xDUGcqQUw/n0UVzrF
                                vkg09ebarZ0GWDKcuwLM6eNB5SiX2K74l5LW
                                DA7S/Un/IbtDq4Ay8NMNLQI7Dw7n4p8/rjKB
                                jV7j86HyQgM5e7+miRAz8V01b0I= )
x.y.w.example. 3600 NSEC xx.example. MX RRSIG NSEC
x.y.w.example. 3600 RRSIG NSEC 5 4 3600 20040509183619 (
                                20040409183619 38519 example.
                                OvE6WUzN2ziieJcvKPWbCAyXyP6ef8cr6Csp
                                ArVSTzKSquNwbezZmkU7E34o5lmb6CWSSSpG
                                xw098kNUFnHcQf/LzY2zqRomubrNQhJTtDTX
                                a0ArunJQCzPj0Yq5t0SLjm6qp6McJI1AP5Vr
                                QoKqJDCLnoAlcPOPKAm/jJkn3jk= )
*.w.example.  3600 NSEC x.w.example. MX RRSIG NSEC
*.w.example.  3600 RRSIG NSEC 5 2 3600 20040509183619 (
                                20040409183619 38519 example.
                                r/mZnRC3I/VicrelgIcteSxDhtsdLTdt8ng9
                                HSBLAB0LzLxQtfgTnn8f+aOwJIAFe1Ee5RvU
                                5cVhQJNP5XpXMJHfyps8tVvfxSAXfahpYqtx
                                91gsmcV/1V9/bZAG55CefP9cM4Z9Y9NT9XQ8
                                s1InQ2UoIv6tJEaaKkP701j80LA= )

;; Additional
;; (empty)

```

### [B.8](#) DS Child Zone No Data Error

A "NODATA" response for a QTYPE=DS query which was mistakenly sent to a name server for the child zone.

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```
;; Header: QR AA DO RCODE=0
;;
;; Question
example.          IN DS

;; Answer
;; (empty)

;; Authority
example.          3600 IN SOA ns1.example. bugs.x.w.example. (
                                1081539377
                                3600
                                300
                                36000000
                                3600
                                )
example.          3600 RRSIG SOA 5 1 3600 20040509183619 (
                                20040409183619 38519 example.
                                ONx0k36rcjaxYtcNgq6iQnpNV5+drqYAsC9h
                                7TSJaHCqbhE67Sr6aH2xDUGcqQWu/n0UVzrF
                                vkg09ebarZ0GWDKcuwlM6eNB5SiX2K74l5LW
                                DA7S/Un/IbtDq4Ay8NMNLQI7Dw7n4p8/rjKB
                                jV7j86HyQgM5e7+miRAz8V01b0I= )
example.          3600 NSEC a.example. NS SOA MX RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY
example.          3600 RRSIG NSEC 5 1 3600 20040509183619 (
                                20040409183619 38519 example.
                                00k558jHhyrC97ISHnislM4kLMW48C7U7cBm
                                FTfhke5iVqNRVTB1STLMpgpbDIC9hcryo00V
                                Z9ME5xPzUEhvvGnHd5sfzgFVeGxr5Nyyq4tW
                                SDBgIBiLQUv1ivy29vhXy7WgR62dPrZ0PWvm
                                jfFJ5arXf4nPxp/kEowGgBRzY/U= )

;; Additional
;; (empty)
```

## [Appendix C](#). Authentication Examples

The examples in this section show how the response messages in [Appendix B](#) are authenticated.

### [C.1](#) Authenticating An Answer

The query in section [Appendix B.1](#) returned an MX RRset for "x.w.example.com". The corresponding RRSIG indicates the MX RRset was signed by an "example" DNSKEY with algorithm 5 and key tag 38519. The resolver needs the corresponding DNSKEY RR in order to authenticate this answer. The discussion below describes how a resolver might obtain this DNSKEY RR.

The RRSIG indicates the original TTL of the MX RRset was 3600 and, for the purpose of authentication, the current TTL is replaced by 3600. The RRSIG labels field value of 3 indicates the answer was not the result of wildcard expansion. The "x.w.example.com" MX RRset is placed in canonical form and, assuming the current time falls between the signature inception and expiration dates, the signature is authenticated.

#### [C.1.1](#) Authenticating the example DNSKEY RR

This example shows the logical authentication process that starts from the a configured root DNSKEY (or DS RR) and moves down the tree to authenticate the desired "example" DNSKEY RR. Note the logical order is presented for clarity and an implementation may choose to construct the authentication as referrals are received or may choose to construct the authentication chain only after all RRsets have been obtained, or in any other combination it sees fit. The example here demonstrates only the logical process and does not dictate any implementation rules.

We assume the resolver starts with an configured DNSKEY RR for the root zone (or a configured DS RR for the root zone). The resolver checks this configured DNSKEY RR is present in the root DNSKEY RRset (or the DS RR matches some DNSKEY in the root DNSKEY RRset), this DNSKEY RR has signed the root DNSKEY RRset and the signature lifetime is valid. If all these conditions are met, all keys in the DNSKEY RRset are considered authenticated. The resolver then uses one (or more) of the root DNSKEY RRs to authenticate the "example" DS RRset. Note the resolver may need to query the root zone to obtain the root DNSKEY RRset or "example" DS RRset.

Once the DS RRset has been authenticated using the root DNSKEY, the resolver checks the "example" DNSKEY RRset for some "example" DNSKEY RR that matches one of the authenticated "example" DS RRs. If such a

matching "example" DNSKEY is found, the resolver checks this DNSKEY RR has signed the "example" DNSKEY RRset and the signature lifetime is valid. If all these conditions are met, all keys in the "example" DNSKEY RRset are considered authenticated.

Finally the resolver checks that some DNSKEY RR in the "example" DNSKEY RRset uses algorithm 5 and has a key tag of 38519. This DNSKEY is used to authenticated the RRSIG included in the response. If multiple "example" DNSKEY RRs match this algorithm and key tag, then each DNSKEY RR is tried and the answer is authenticated if any of the matching DNSKEY RRs validates the signature as described above.

## [C.2](#) Name Error

The query in section [Appendix B.2](#) returned NSEC RRs that prove the requested data does not exist and no wildcard applies. The negative reply is authenticated by verifying both NSEC RRs. The NSEC RRs are authenticated in a manner identical to that of the MX RRset discussed above.

## [C.3](#) No Data Error

The query in section [Appendix B.3](#) returned an NSEC RR that proves the requested name exists, but the requested RR type does not exist. The negative reply is authenticated by verifying the NSEC RR. The NSEC RR is authenticated in a manner identical to that of the MX RRset

discussed above.

#### [C.4](#) Referral to Signed Zone

The query in section [Appendix B.4](#) returned a referral to the signed "a.example." zone. The DS RR is authenticated in a manner identical to that of the MX RRset discussed above. This DS RR is used to authenticate the "a.example" DNSKEY RRset.

Once the "a.example" DS RRset has been authenticated using the "example" DNSKEY, the resolver checks the "a.example" DNSKEY RRset for some "a.example" DNSKEY RR that matches the DS RR. If such a matching "a.example" DNSKEY is found, the resolver checks this DNSKEY RR has signed the "a.example" DNSKEY RRset and the signature lifetime is valid. If all these conditions are met, all keys in the "a.example" DNSKEY RRset are considered authenticated.

#### [C.5](#) Referral to Unsigned Zone

The query in section [Appendix B.5](#) returned a referral to an unsigned "b.example." zone. The NSEC proves that no authentication leads from "example" to "b.example" and the NSEC RR is authenticated in a manner

identical to that of the MX RRset discussed above.

#### [C.6](#) Wildcard Expansion

The query in section [Appendix B.6](#) returned an answer that was produced as a result of wildcard expansion. The RRset expanded as the similar to The corresponding RRSIG indicates the MX RRset was signed by an "example" DNSKEY with algorithm 5 and key tag 38519. The RRSIG indicates the original TTL of the MX RRset was 3600 and, for the purpose of authentication, the current TTL is replaced by 3600. The RRSIG labels field value of 2 indicates the answer the result of wildcard expansion since the "a.z.w.example" name contains 4 labels. The name "a.z.w.w.example" is replaced by "\*.w.example", the MX RRset is placed in canonical form and, assuming the current time falls between the signature inception and expiration dates, the signature is authenticated.

The NSEC proves that no closer match (exact or closer wildcard) could have been used to answer this query and the NSEC RR must also be

authenticated before the answer is considered valid.

#### [C.7](#) Wildcard No Data Error

The query in section [Appendix B.7](#) returned NSEC RRs that prove the requested data does not exist and no wildcard applies. The negative reply is authenticated by verifying both NSEC RRs.

#### [C.8](#) DS Child Zone No Data Error

The query in section [Appendix B.8](#) returned NSEC RRs that shows the requested was answered by a child server ("example" server). The NSEC RR indicates the presence of an SOA RR, showing the answer is from the child . Queries for the "example" DS RRset should be sent to the parent servers ("root" servers).

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