

**Use of SHA-2 algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records
for DNSSEC
draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-rsasha256-03**

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Abstract

This document describes how to produce RSA/SHA-256 and RSA/SHA-512 DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records for use in the Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC, [RFC 4033](#), [RFC 4034](#), and [RFC 4035](#)).

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1. Introduction

The Domain Name System (DNS) is the global hierarchical distributed database for Internet Addressing. The DNS has been extended to use cryptographic keys and digital signatures for the verification of the integrity of its data. [RFC 4033](#) [1], [RFC 4034](#) [2], and [RFC 4035](#) [3] describe these DNS Security Extensions, called DNSSEC.

[RFC 4034](#) describes how to store DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records, and specifies a list of cryptographic algorithms to use. This document extends that list with the algorithms RSA/SHA-256 and RSA/SHA-512, and specifies how to store DNSKEY data and how to produce RRSIG resource records with these hash algorithms.

Familiarity with DNSSEC, RSA [7] and the SHA-2 [5] family of algorithms is assumed in this document.

To refer to both SHA-256 and SHA-512, this document will use the name SHA-2. This is done to improve readability. When a part of text is specific for either SHA-256 or SHA-512, their specific names are used. The same goes for RSA/SHA-256 and RSA/SHA-512, which will be grouped using the name RSA/SHA-2.

2. DNSKEY Resource Records

The format of the DNSKEY RR can be found in [RFC 4034](#) [2] and [RFC 3110](#) [6].

2.1. RSA/SHA-256 DNSKEY Resource Records

RSA public keys for use with RSA/SHA-256 are stored in DNSKEY resource records (RRs) with the algorithm number {TBA1}.

For use with NSEC3, the algorithm number of RSA/SHA-256 will be {TBA2}.

The key size for RSA/SHA-256 keys MUST NOT be less than 512 bits, and MUST NOT be more than 4096 bits.

2.2. RSA/SHA-512 DNSKEY Resource Records

RSA public keys for use with RSA/SHA-512 are stored in DNSKEY resource records (RRs) with the algorithm number {TBA3}.

For use with NSEC3, the algorithm number of RSA/SHA-512 will be {TBA4}.

The key size for RSA/SHA-512 keys MUST NOT be less than 1024 bits, and MUST NOT be more than 4096 bits.

3. RRSIG Resource Records

The value of the signature field in the RRSIG RR follow the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme, and is calculated as follows. The values for the RDATA fields that precede the signature data are specified in [RFC 4034](#) [2].

hash = SHA-XXX(data)

Where XXX is either 256 or 512, depending on the algorithm used.

signature = (00 | 01 | FF* | 00 | prefix | hash) ** e (mod n)

Where SHA-XXX is the message digest algorithm as specified in FIPS PUB 180-2 [5], "|" is concatenation, "00", "01", "FF" and "00" are fixed octets of corresponding hexadecimal value, "e" is the private exponent of the signing RSA key, and "n" is the public modulus of the signing key. The FF octet MUST be repeated the maximum number of times so that the total length of the signature equals the length of the modulus of the signer's public key ("n"). "data" is the data of the resource record set that is signed, as specified in [RFC 4034](#) [2].

The "prefix" is intended to make the use of standard cryptographic libraries easier. These specifications are taken directly from the specification of EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 encoding in PKCS #1 v2.1 [section 9.2](#) [4]. The prefixes for the different algorithms are specified below.

3.1. RSA/SHA-256 RRSIG Resource Records

RSA/SHA-256 signatures are stored in the DNS using RRSIG resource records (RRs) with algorithm number {TBA1} for use with NSEC, or {TBA2} for use with NSEC3.

The prefix is the ASN.1 BER SHA-256 algorithm designator prefix as specified in PKCS #1 v2.1 [4]:

hex 30 31 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 01 05 00 04 20

3.2. RSA/SHA-512 RRSIG Resource Records

RSA/SHA-512 signatures are stored in the DNS using RRSIG resource records (RRs) with algorithm number {TBA3} for use with NSEC, or {TBA4} for use with NSEC3.

The prefix is the ASN.1 BER SHA-512 algorithm designator prefix as specified in PKCS #1 v2.1 [4]:

```
hex 30 51 30 0d 06 09 60 86 48 01 65 03 04 02 03 05 00 04 40
```

4. Deployment Considerations

4.1. Key Sizes

Apart from prohibiting RSA/SHA-512 signatures smaller than 1024 bytes, this document will not specify what size of keys to use. That is more an operational issue and depends largely on the environment and intended use. Some good starting points might be DNSSEC Operational Practises [9], section 3.5, and NIST SP 800-57 Part 1 [10] and Part 3 [11].

4.2. Signature Sizes

In this family of signing algorithms, the size of signatures is related to the size of the key, and not the hashing algorithm used in the signing process. Therefore, RRSIG resource records produced with RSA/SHA256 or RSA/SHA512 shall have the same size as those produced with RSA/SHA1, if the keys have the same length.

5. Implementation Considerations

DNSSEC aware implementations SHOULD be able to support RRSIG resource records with the RSA/SHA-2 algorithms.

If both RSA/SHA-2 and RSA/SHA-1 RRSIG resource records are available for a certain RRset, with a secure path to their keys, the validator SHOULD ignore the SHA-1 signature. If the RSA/SHA-2 signature does not verify the data, and the RSA/SHA-1 signature does, the validator SHOULD mark the data with the security status from the RSA/SHA-2 signature.

6. IANA Considerations

IANA has not yet assigned an algorithm number for RSA/SHA-256 and RSA/SHA-512.

The algorithm list from [RFC 4034 Appendix A.1](#) [2] is extended with the following entries:

Value	Algorithm	[Mnemonic]	Zone Signing	References	Status
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
{TBA1}	RSA/SHA-256	RSASHA256	y	{this memo}	OPTIONAL
{TBA2}	RSA/SHA-256-NSEC3	RSASHA256NSEC3	y	{this memo}	OPTIONAL
{TBA3}	RSA/SHA-512	RSASHA512	y	{this memo}	OPTIONAL
{TBA4}	RSA/SHA-512-NSEC3	RSASHA512NSEC3	y	{this memo}	OPTIONAL

7. Security Considerations

7.1. SHA-1 versus SHA-2 Considerations for RRSIG Resource Records

Users of DNSSEC are encouraged to deploy SHA-2 as soon as software implementations allow for it. SHA-2 is widely believed to be more resilient to attack than SHA-1, and confidence in SHA-1's strength is being eroded by recently-announced attacks. Regardless of whether or not the attacks on SHA-1 will affect DNSSEC, it is believed (at the time of this writing) that SHA-2 is the better choice for use in DNSSEC records.

SHA-2 is considered sufficiently strong for the immediate future, but predictions about future development in cryptography and cryptanalysis are beyond the scope of this document.

The signature scheme RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 is chosen to match the one used for RSA/SHA-1 signatures. This should ease implementation of the new hashing algorithms in DNSSEC software.

7.2. Signature Type Downgrade Attacks

Since each RRset MUST be signed with each algorithm present in the DNSKEY RRset at the zone apex (see [3] [Section 2.2](#)), a malicious party cannot filter out the RSA/SHA-2 RRSIG, and force the validator to use the RSA/SHA-1 signature if both are present in the zone. Together with the implementation considerations from [Section 5](#) of this document, this provides resilience against algorithm downgrade attacks, if the validator supports RSA/SHA-2.

8. Acknowledgments

This document is a minor extension to [RFC 4034](#) [2]. Also, we try to follow the documents [RFC 3110](#) [6] and [RFC 4509](#) [8] for consistency. The authors of and contributors to these documents are gratefully acknowledged for their hard work.

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