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Message Digest for DNS Zones
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Abstract

This document describes an experimental protocol and new DNS Resource Record that can be used to provide a message digest over DNS zone data. The ZONEMD Resource Record conveys the message digest data in the zone itself. When a zone publisher includes an ZONEMD record, recipients can verify the zone contents for accuracy and completeness. This provides assurance that received zone data matches published data, regardless of how the zone data has been transmitted and received.

ZONEMD is not designed to replace DNSSEC. Whereas DNSSEC protects individual RRSets (DNS data with fine granularity), ZONEMD protects a zone's data as a whole, whether consumed by authoritative name servers, recursive name servers, or any other applications.

As specified at this time, ZONEMD is not designed for use in large, dynamic zones due to the time and resources required for digest calculation. The ZONEMD record described in this document includes fields reserved for future work to support large, dynamic zones.

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1. Introduction

In the DNS, a zone is the collection of authoritative resource records (RRs) sharing a common origin ([RFC7719]). Zones are often stored as files on disk in the so-called master file format [RFC1034]. Zones are generally distributed among name servers using the AXFR [RFC5936], and IXFR [RFC1995] protocols. Zone files can also be distributed outside of the DNS, with such protocols as FTP, HTTP, rsync, and even via email. Currently there is no standard way to verify the authenticity of a stand-alone zone.

This document introduces a new RR type that serves as a cryptographic message digest of the data in a zone. It allows a receiver of the zone to verify the zone's authenticity, especially when used in combination with DNSSEC. This technique makes the message digest a part of the zone itself, allowing verification the zone as a whole, no matter how it is transmitted. Furthermore, the digest is based on the wire format of zone data. Thus, it is independent of presentation format, such as changes in whitespace, capitalization, and comments.

DNSSEC provides three strong security guarantees relevant to this protocol:

1. whether or not to expect DNSSEC records in the zone,
2. whether or not to expect a ZONEMD record in a signed zone, and
3. whether or not the ZONEMD record has been altered since it was signed.

This specification is OPTIONAL to implement by both publishers and consumers of zone data.

1.1. Motivation

The motivation for this protocol enhancement is the desire for the ability to verify the authenticity of a stand-alone zone, regardless of how it is transmitted. A consumer of zone data should be able to verify that the data is as-published by the zone operator.

One approach to preventing data tampering and corruption is to secure the distribution channel. The DNS has a number of features that can already be used for channel security. Perhaps the most widely used is DNS transaction signatures (TSIG [[RFC2845](#)]). TSIG uses shared secret keys and a message digest to protect individual query and response messages. It is generally used to authenticate and validate UPDATE [[RFC2136](#)], AXFR [[RFC5936](#)], and IXFR [[RFC1995](#)] messages.

DNS Request and Transaction Signatures (SIG(0) [[RFC2931](#)]) is another protocol extension designed to authenticate individual DNS transactions. Whereas SIG records were originally designed to cover specific RR types, SIG(0) is used to sign an entire DNS message. Unlike TSIG, SIG(0) uses public key cryptography rather than shared secrets.

The Transport Layer Security protocol suite is also designed to provide channel security. One can easily imagine the distribution of zones over HTTPS-enabled web servers, as well as DNS-over-HTTPS [[dns-over-https](#)], and perhaps even a future version of DNS-over-TLS ([[RFC7858](#)]).

Unfortunately, the protections provided by these channel security techniques are (in practice) ephemeral and are not retained after the data transfer is complete. They can ensure that the client receives the data from the expected server, and that the data sent by the server is not modified during transmission. However, they do not guarantee that the server transmits the data as originally published, and do not provide any methods to verify data that is read after

transmission is complete. For example, a name server loading saved zone data upon restart cannot guarantee that the on-disk data has not been modified. For these reasons, it is preferable to secure the data itself.

Why not simply rely on DNSSEC, which provides certain data security guarantees? Certainly for zones that are signed, a recipient could validate all of the signed RRSets. Additionally, denial-of-existence records can prove that RRSets have not been added or removed. However, not all RRSets in a zone are signed. The design of DNSSEC stipulates that delegations (non-apex NS records) are not signed, and neither are any glue records. Thus, changes to delegation and glue records cannot be detected by DNSSEC alone. Furthermore, zones that employ NSEC3 with opt-out are susceptible to the removal or addition of names between the signed nodes. Whereas DNSSEC is primarily designed to protect consumers of DNS response messages, this protocol is designed to protect consumers of zones.

There are existing tools and protocols that provide data security, such as OpenPGP [[RFC4880](#)] and S/MIME [[RFC3851](#)]. In fact, the `internic.net` site publishes PGP signatures along side the root zone and other files available there. However, this is a detached signature with no strong association to the corresponding zone file other than its timestamp. Non-detached signatures are, of course, possible, but these necessarily change the format of the file being distributed. That is, a zone signed with OpenPGP or S/MIME no longer looks like a DNS zone and could not directly be loaded into a name server. Once loaded the signature data is lost, so it does not survive further propagation.

It seems the desire for data security in DNS zones was envisioned as far back as 1997. [[RFC2065](#)] is an obsoleted specification of the first generation DNSSEC Security Extensions. It describes a zone transfer signature, aka AXFR SIG, which is similar to the technique proposed by this document. That is, it proposes ordering all (signed) RRSets in a zone, hashing their contents, and then signing the zone hash. The AXFR SIG is described only for use during zone transfers. It did not postulate the need to validate zone data distributed outside of the DNS. Furthermore, its successor, [[RFC2535](#)], omits the AXFR SIG, while at the same time introducing an IXFR SIG.

1.2. Design Overview

This document introduces a new Resource Record type designed to convey a message digest of the content of a zone. The digest is calculated at the time of zone publication. Ideally the zone is signed with DNSSEC to guarantee that any modifications of the digest

can be detected. The procedures for digest calculation and DNSSEC signing are similar (i.e., both require the same ordering of RRs) and can be done in parallel.

The zone digest is designed to be used on zones that are relatively stable and have infrequent updates. As currently specified, the digest is re-calculated over the entire zone content each time. This specification does not provide an efficient mechanism for incremental updates of zone data. It does, however, reserve a field in the ZONEMD record for future work to support incremental zone digest algorithms (e.g. using Merkle trees).

It is expected that verification of a zone digest would be implemented in name server software. That is, a name server can verify the zone data it was given and refuse to serve a zone which fails verification. For signed zones, the name server needs a trust anchor to perform DNSSEC validation. For signed non-root zones, the name server may need to send queries to validate a chain-of-trust. Digest verification could also be performed externally.

1.3. Use Cases

1.3.1. Root Zone

The root zone [[InterNIC](#)] is one of the most widely distributed DNS zone on the Internet, served by 930 separate instances [[RootServers](#)] at the time of this writing. Additionally, many organizations configure their own name servers to serve the root zone locally. Reasons for doing so include privacy and reduced access time. [[RFC7706](#)] describes one, but not the only, way to do this. As the root zone spreads beyond its traditional deployment boundaries, the need for verification of the completeness of the zone contents becomes increasingly important.

1.3.2. Providers, Secondaries, and Anycast

Since its very early days, the developers of the DNS recognized the importance of secondary name servers and service diversity. However, they may not have anticipated the complexity of modern DNS service provisioning which can include multiple third-party providers and hundreds of anycast instances. Instead of a simple primary-to-secondary zone distribution system, today it is possible to have multiple levels, multiple parties, and multiple protocols involved in the distribution of zone data. This complexity introduces new places for problems to arise. The zone digest protects the integrity of data that flows through such systems.

1.3.3. Response Policy Zones

DNS Response Policy Zones is "a method of expressing DNS response policy information inside specially constructed DNS zones..." [[RPZ](#)]. A number of companies provide RPZ feeds, which can be consumed by name server and firewall products. Since these are zones, AXFR is often, but not necessarily used for transmission. While RPZ zones can certainly be signed with DNSSEC, the data is not queried directly, and would not be subject to DNSSEC validation.

1.3.4. Centralized Zone Data Service

ICANN operates the Centralized Zone Data Service [[CZDS](#)], which is a repository of top-level domain zone files. Users request access to the system, and to individual zones, and are then able to download zone data for certain uses. Adding a zone digest to these would provide CZDS users with assurances that the data has not been modified. Note that ZONEMD could be added to CZDS zone data independently of the zone served by production name servers.

1.3.5. General Purpose Comparison Check

Since the zone digest does not depend on presentation format, it could be used to compare multiple copies of a zone received from different sources, or copies generated by different processes.

1.4. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [BCP 14](#) [[RFC2119](#)] [[RFC8174](#)] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. The ZONEMD Resource Record

This section describes the ZONEMD Resource Record, including its fields, wire format, and presentation format. The Type value for the ZONEMD RR is 63. The ZONEMD RR is class independent. The RDATA of the resource record consists of four fields: Serial, Digest Type, Reserved, and Digest.

This specification utilizes ZONEMD RRs located at the zone apex. Non-apex ZONEMD RRs are not forbidden, but have no meaning in this specification.

A zone MAY contain multiple ZONEMD RRs to support algorithm agility [[RFC7696](#)] and rollovers. Each ZONEMD RR MUST specify a unique Digest

Type. It is RECOMMENDED that a zone include only one ZONEMD RR, unless the zone publisher is in the process of transitioning to a new Digest Type.

2.1. ZONEMD RDATA Wire Format

The ZONEMD RDATA wire format is encoded as follows:

```

          1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|                               Serial                               |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
| Digest Type |   Reserved   |                                     |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
|                               Digest                               |
/                                                                    /
/                                                                    /
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+

```

2.1.1. The Serial Field

The Serial field is a 32-bit unsigned integer in network order. It is equal to the serial number from the zone's SOA record ([\[RFC1035\]](#) [section 3.3.13](#)) for which the message digest was generated.

The zone's serial number is included here in order to make DNS response messages of type ZONEMD meaningful. Without the serial number, a stand-alone ZONEMD digest has no association to any particular instance of a zone.

2.1.2. The Digest Type Field

The Digest Type field is an 8-bit unsigned integer that identifies the algorithm used to construct the digest.

At the time of this writing, SHA384, with value 1, is the only standardized Digest Type defined for ZONEMD records. The Digest Type registry is further described in [Section 6](#).

Digest Type values 240-254 are allocated for Private Use as described in [\[RFC8126\]](#).

2.1.3. The Reserved Field

The Reserved field is an 8-bit unsigned integer, which is always set to zero. This field is reserved for future work to support efficient incremental updates.

2.1.4. The Digest Field

The Digest field is a variable-length sequence of octets containing the message digest. The Digest field **MUST NOT** be empty. [Section 3](#) describes how to calculate the digest for a zone. [Section 4](#) describes how to use the digest to verify the contents of a zone.

2.2. ZONEMD Presentation Format

The presentation format of the RDATA portion is as follows:

The Serial field **MUST** be represented as an unsigned decimal integer.

The Digest Type field **MUST** be represented as an unsigned decimal integer.

The Reserved field **MUST** be represented as an unsigned decimal integer set to zero.

The Digest **MUST** be represented as a sequence of case-insensitive hexadecimal digits. Whitespace is allowed within the hexadecimal text.

2.3. ZONEMD Example

The following example shows a ZONEMD RR.

```
example.com. 86400 IN ZONEMD 2018031500 1 0 (  
    FEBE3D4CE2EC2FFA4BA99D46CD69D6D29711E55217057BEE  
    7EB1A7B641A47BA7FED2DD5B97AE499FAFA4F22C6BD647DE )
```

3. Calculating the Digest

3.1. Canonical Format and Ordering

Calculation of the zone digest **REQUIRES** the RRs in a zone to be processed in a consistent format and ordering. Correct ordering of the zone depends on (1) ordering of owner names in the zone, (2) ordering of RRsets with the same owner name, and (3) ordering of RRs within an RRset.

This specification adopts DNSSEC's canonical ordering for names ([Section 6.1 of \[RFC4034\]](#)), and canonical ordering for RRs within an RRset ([Section 6.3 of \[RFC4034\]](#)). It also adopts DNSSEC's canonical RR form ([Section 6.2 of \[RFC4034\]](#)). However, since DNSSEC does not define a canonical ordering for RRsets having the same owner name, that ordering is defined here.

3.1.1. Order of RRSets Having the Same Owner Name

For the purposes of calculating the zone digest, RRSets having the same owner name **MUST** be numerically ordered, in ascending order, by their numeric RR TYPE.

3.1.2. Duplicate RRs

As stated in [Section 5 of \[RFC2181\]](#), it is meaningless for a zone to have multiple RRs with equal owner name, class, type, and RDATA. In the interest of consistency and interoperability, such duplicate RRs **MUST NOT** be included in the calculation of a zone digest.

3.2. Add ZONEMD Placeholder

In preparation for calculating the zone digest, any existing ZONEMD records at the zone apex **MUST** first be deleted.

Prior to calculation of the digest, and prior to signing with DNSSEC, a placeholder ZONEMD record **MUST** be added to the zone apex. This serves two purposes: (1) it allows the digest to cover the Serial, Digest Type, and Reserved field values, and (2) ensures that appropriate denial-of-existence (NSEC, NSEC3) records are created if the zone is signed with DNSSEC.

It is **RECOMMENDED** that the TTL of the ZONEMD record match the TTL of the SOA.

In the placeholder record, the Serial field **MUST** be set to the current SOA Serial. The Digest Type field **MUST** be set to the value for the chosen digest algorithm. The Reserved field **MUST** be set to zero. The Digest field **MUST** be set to all zeroes and of length appropriate for the chosen digest algorithm.

If multiple digests are to be published in the zone, e.g., during an algorithm rollover, there **MUST** be one placeholder record for each Digest Type.

3.3. Optionally Sign the Zone

Following addition of placeholder records, the zone **MAY** be signed with DNSSEC. Note that when the digest calculation is complete, and the ZONEMD record is updated, the signature(s) for the ZONEMD RRSset **MUST** be recalculated and updated as well. Therefore, the signer is not required to calculate a signature over the placeholder record at this step in the process, but it is harmless to do so.

3.4. Calculate the Digest

The zone digest is calculated by concatenating the canonical on-the-wire form (without name compression) of all RRs in the zone, in the order described above, subject to the inclusion/exclusion rules described below, and then applying the digest algorithm:

```
digest = digest_algorithm( RR(1) | RR(2) | RR(3) | ... )
```

where "|" denotes concatenation, and

```
RR(i) = owner | type | class | TTL | RDATA length | RDATA
```

3.4.1. Inclusion/Exclusion Rules

When calculating the digest, the following inclusion/exclusion rules apply:

- o All records in the zone, including glue records, MUST be included.
- o Occluded data ([\[RFC5936\] Section 3.5](#)) MUST be included.
- o Duplicate RRs with equal owner, class, type, and RDATA MUST NOT be included.
- o The placeholder ZONEMD RR(s) MUST be included.
- o If the zone is signed, DNSSEC RRs MUST be included, except:
- o The RRSIG covering ZONEMD MUST NOT be included because the RRSIG will be updated after all digests have been calculated.

3.5. Update ZONEMD RR

Once the zone digest has been calculated, its value is then copied to the Digest field of the ZONEMD record.

If the zone is signed with DNSSEC, the appropriate RRSIG records covering the ZONEMD RRSet MUST then be added or updated. Because the ZONEMD placeholder was added prior to signing, the zone will already have the appropriate denial-of-existence (NSEC, NSEC3) records.

Some implementations of incremental DNSSEC signing might update the zone's serial number for each resigning. However, to preserve the calculated digest, generation of the ZONEMD signature at this time MUST NOT also result in a change of the SOA serial number.

4. Verifying Zone Message Digest

The recipient of a zone that has a message digest record can verify the zone by calculating the digest as follows:

1. The verifier SHOULD first determine whether or not to expect DNSSEC records in the zone. This can be done by examining locally configured trust anchors, or querying for (and validating) DS RRs in the parent zone. For zones that are provably insecure, digest validation continues at step 4 below.
2. For zones that are provably secure, the existence of the apex ZONEMD record MUST be verified. If the ZONEMD record provably does not exist, digest verification cannot be done. If the ZONEMD record does provably exist, but is not found in the zone, digest verification MUST NOT be considered successful.
3. For zones that are provably secure, the SOA and ZONEMD RRSets MUST have valid signatures, chaining up to a trust anchor. If DNSSEC validation of the SOA or ZONEMD records fails, digest verification MUST NOT be considered successful.
4. If the zone contains more than one apex ZONEMD RR, digest verification MUST NOT be considered successful.
5. The SOA Serial field MUST exactly match the ZONEMD Serial field. If the fields do not match, digest verification MUST NOT be considered successful.
6. The ZONEMD Digest Type field MUST be checked. If the verifier does not support the given digest type, it SHOULD report that the zone digest could not be verified due to an unsupported algorithm.
7. The Reserved field MUST be checked. If the Reserved field value is not zero, verification MUST NOT be considered successful.
8. The received Digest Type and Digest values are copied to a temporary location.
9. The ZONEMD RR's RDATA is reset to the placeholder values described in [Section 3.2](#).
10. The zone digest is computed over the zone data as described in [Section 3.4](#).
11. The calculated digest is compared to the received digest stored in the temporary location. If the two digest values match,

verification is considered successful. Otherwise, verification MUST NOT be considered successful.

12. The ZONEMD RR's RDATA is reset to the received Digest Type and Digest stored in the temporary location. Thus, any downstream clients can similarly verify the zone.

4.1. Verifying Multiple Digests

If multiple digests are present in the zone, e.g., during an algorithm rollover, a match using any one of the recipient's supported Digest Type algorithms is sufficient to verify the zone.

5. Scope of Experimentation

This memo is published as an Experimental RFC. The purpose of the experimental period is to provide the community time to analyze and evaluate the methods defined in this document, particularly with regard to the wide variety of DNS zones in use on the Internet.

Additionally, the ZONEMD record defined in this document includes a Reserved field in the form of an 8-bit integer. The authors have a particular future use in mind for this field, namely to support efficient digests in large, dynamic zones. We intend to conduct future experiments using Merkle trees of varying depth. The choice of tree depth can be encoded in this reserved field. We expect values for tree depth to range from 0 to 10, requiring at most four bits of this field. This leaves another four bits available for other future uses, if absolutely necessary.

The duration of the experiment is expected to be no less than two years from the publication of this document. If the experiment is successful, it is expected that the findings of the experiment will result in an updated document for Standards Track approval.

6. IANA Considerations

6.1. ZONEMD RRtype

This document defines a new DNS RR type, ZONEMD, whose value 63 has been allocated by IANA from the "Resource Record (RR) TYPES" subregistry of the "Domain Name System (DNS) Parameters" registry:

Type: ZONEMD

Value: 63

Meaning: Message Digest Over Zone Data

Reference: This document

6.2. ZONEMD Digest Type

This document asks IANA to create a new "ZONEMD Digest Types" registry with initial contents as follows:

Value	Description	Status	Reference
1	SHA384	Mandatory	[RFC6605]
240-254	Private Use		[RFC8126]

Table 1: ZONEMD Digest Types

7. Security Considerations

7.1. Attacks Against the Zone Digest

The zone digest allows the receiver to verify that the zone contents haven't been modified since the zone was generated/published. Verification is strongest when the zone is also signed with DNSSEC. An attacker, whose goal is to modify zone content before it is used by the victim, may consider a number of different approaches.

The attacker might perform a downgrade attack to an unsigned zone. This is why [Section 4](#) RECOMMENDS that the verifier determine whether or not to expect DNSSEC signatures for the zone in step 1.

The attacker might perform a downgrade attack by removing the ZONEMD record. This is why [Section 4](#) REQUIRES that the verifier checks DNSSEC denial-of-existence proofs in step 2.

The attacker might alter the Digest Type or Digest fields of the ZONEMD record. Such modifications are detectable only with DNSSEC validation.

7.2. Attacks Utilizing the Zone Digest

Nothing in this specification prevents clients from making, and servers from responding to, ZONEMD queries. One might consider how well ZONEMD responses could be used in a distributed denial-of-service amplification attack.

The ZONEMD RR is moderately sized, much like the DS RR. A single ZONEMD RR contributes approximately 40 to 65 octets to a DNS

response, for currently defined digest types. Certainly other query types result in larger amplification effects (i.e., DNSKEY).

8. Privacy Considerations

This specification has no impacts on user privacy.

9. Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank David Blacka, Scott Hollenbeck, and Rick Wilhelm for providing feedback on early drafts of this document. Additionally, they thank Joe Abley, Mark Andrews, Olafur Gudmundsson, Paul Hoffman, Evan Hunt, Shumon Huque, Tatuya Jinmei, Burt Kaliski, Shane Kerr, Matt Larson, John Levine, Ed Lewis, Matt Pounsett, Mukund Sivaraman, Petr Spacek, Ondrej Sury, Florian Weimer, Tim Wicinski, Paul Wouters, and other members of the dnsop working group for their input.

10. Implementation Status

10.1. Authors' Implementation

The authors have an open source implementation in C, using the `ldns` library [[ldns-zone-digest](#)]. This implementation is able to perform the following functions:

- o Read an input zone and output a zone with the ZONEMD placeholder.
- o Compute zone digest over signed zone and update the ZONEMD record.
- o Re-compute DNSSEC signature over the ZONEMD record.
- o Verify the zone digest from an input zone.

This implementation does not:

- o Perform DNSSEC validation of the ZONEMD record during verification.

10.2. Shane Kerr's Implementation

Shane Kerr wrote an implementation of this specification during the IETF 102 hackathon [[ZoneDigestHackathon](#)]. This implementation is in Python and is able to perform the following functions:

- o Read an input zone and a output zone with ZONEMD record.
- o Verify the zone digest from an input zone.

- o Output the ZONEMD record in its defined presentation format.

This implementation does not:

- o Re-compute DNSSEC signature over the ZONEMD record.
- o Perform DNSSEC validation of the ZONEMD record.

11. Change Log

RFC Editor: Please remove this section.

This section lists substantial changes to the document as it is being worked on.

From -00 to -01:

- o Removed requirement to sort by RR CLASS.
- o Added Kumari and Hardaker as coauthors.
- o Added Change Log section.
- o Minor clarifications and grammatical edits.

From -01 to -02:

- o Emphasize desire for data security over channel security.
- o Expanded motivation into its own subsection.
- o Removed discussion topic whether or not to include serial in ZONEMD.
- o Clarified that a zone's NS records always sort before the SOA record.
- o Clarified that all records in the zone must be digested, except as specified in the exclusion rules.
- o Added for discussion out-of-zone and occluded records.
- o Clarified that update of ZONEMD signature must not cause a serial number change.
- o Added persons to acknowledgments.

From -02 to -03:

- o Added recommendation to set ZONEMD TTL to SOA TTL.
- o Clarified that digest input uses uncompressed names.
- o Updated Implementations section.
- o Changed intended status from Standards Track to Experimental and added Scope of Experiment section.
- o Updated Motivation, Introduction, and Design Overview sections in response to working group discussion.
- o Gave ZONEMD digest types their own status, separate from DS digest types. Request IANA to create a registry.
- o Added Reserved field for future work supporting dynamic updates.
- o Be more rigorous about having just ONE ZONEMD record in the zone.
- o Expanded use cases.

From -03 to -04:

- o Added an appendix with example zones and digests.
- o Clarified that only apex ZONEMD RRs shall be processed.

From -04 to -05:

- o Made SHA384 the only supported ZONEMD digest type.
- o Disassociated ZONEMD digest types from DS digest types.
- o Updates to Introduction based on list feedback.
- o Changed "zone file" to "zone" everywhere.
- o Restored text about why ZONEMD has a Serial field.
- o Clarified ordering of RRSets having same owner to be numerically ascending.
- o Clarified that all duplicate RRs (not just SOA) must be suppressed in digest calculation.
- o Clarified that the Reserved field must be set to zero and checked for zero in verification.

- o Clarified that occluded data must be included.
- o Clarified procedure for verification, using temporary location for received digest.
- o Explained why Reserved field is 8-bits.
- o IANA Considerations section now more specific.
- o Added complex zone to examples.
- o

From -05 to -06:

- o RR type code 63 was assigned to ZONEMD by IANA.

From -06 to -07:

- o Fixed mistakes in ZONEMD examples.
- o Added private use Digest Type values 240-254.
- o Clarified that Digest field must not be empty.

From -07 to [draft-ietf-dnsop-dns-zone-digest-00](#):

- o Adopted by dnsop.
- o Clarified further that non-apex ZONEMD RRs have no meaning.
- o Changed "provably [un]signed" to "provably [in]secure".
- o Allow multiple ZONEMD RRs to support algorithm agility/rollovers.
- o Describe verification when there are multiple ZONEMD RRs.

From -00 to -01:

- o Simplified requirements around verifying multiple digests. Any one match is sufficient.
- o Updated implementation notes.
- o Both implementations produce expected results on examples given in this document.

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[Appendix A](#). Example Zones With Digests

This appendix contains example zones with accurate ZONEMD records. These can be used to verify an implementation of the zone digest protocol.

[A.1.](#) Simple EXAMPLE Zone

Here, the EXAMPLE zone contains an SOA record, NS and glue records, and a ZONEMD record.

```
example.      86400    IN   SOA      ns1 admin 2018031900 (
                                1800 900 604800 86400 )
              86400    IN   NS       ns1
              86400    IN   NS       ns2
              86400    IN   ZONEMD   2018031900 1 0 (
                                379ec2587d4fff35
                                0062b9385a641476
                                6f9c028e8cf09d8a
                                7965537a68a2f149
                                4e1c151f8cf6be05
                                5bef4f27e6a87b13 )
ns1            3600     IN   A        127.0.0.1
ns2            3600     IN   AAAA     ::1
```

[A.2.](#) Complex EXAMPLE Zone

Here, the EXAMPLE zone contains duplicate RRs, and an occluded RR, and one out-of-zone RR.


```

example.      86400   IN   SOA      ns1 admin 2018031900 (
                                1800 900 604800 86400 )
              86400   IN   NS       ns1
              86400   IN   NS       ns2
              86400   IN   ZONEMD   2018031900 1 0 (
                                c36e77eafdb7f3f6
                                dcfac8bca1121e17
                                2a7b57db2c88409a
                                5c3d9247ba72b759
                                6c735c1a76fc817a
                                ad5c834f5a4bce16 )
ns1            3600    IN   A        127.0.0.1
ns2            3600    IN   AAAA     ::1
occluded.sub   7200    IN   TXT      "I'm occluded but must be digested"
sub            7200    IN   NS       ns1
duplicate      300     IN   TXT      "I must be digested just once"
duplicate      300     IN   TXT      "I must be digested just once"
foo.test.      555     IN   TXT      "out-of-zone data must be excluded"
non-apex       900     IN   ZONEMD   2018031900 1 0 (
                                616c6c6f77656420
                                6275742069676e6f
                                7265642e20616c6c
                                6f77656420627574
                                2069676e6f726564
                                2e20616c6c6f7765 )

```

[A.3.](#) EXAMPLE Zone with multiple digests

Here, the EXAMPLE zone contains multiple ZONEMD records. Since only one Digest Type is defined at this time (SHA384), this example utilizes additional ZONEMD records with Digest Type values in the private range (240-254). These additional private-range digests are not verifiable, but note that their other fields (Serial, Reserved, Digest Type) are included in the calculation of all ZONEMD digests.


```

example.      86400   IN   SOA      ns1 admin 2018031900 (
                                1800 900 604800 86400 )
example.      86400   IN   NS       ns1.example.
example.      86400   IN   NS       ns2.example.
example.      86400   IN   ZONEMD   2018031900 1 0 (
                                c0218e8eeb4f0275
                                d54c0e5ce7791f4d
                                23742b4756708d50
                                d7121a11d434baa8
                                f869ebbb071a4bbb
                                0457c87870bc8cdd )
example.      86400   IN   ZONEMD   2018031900 240 0 (
                                e2d523f654b9422a
                                96c5a8f44607bbee )
example.      86400   IN   ZONEMD   2018031900 241 0 (
                                5732dd91240611f8
                                314adb6b4769bdd2 )
example.      86400   IN   ZONEMD   2018031900 242 0 (
                                7c32e06779315c7d
                                81ba8c72f5cf9116
                                496b6395 )
example.      86400   IN   ZONEMD   2018031900 243 0 (
                                183770af4a629f80
                                2e674e305b8d0d11
                                3dfe0837 )
example.      86400   IN   ZONEMD   2018031900 244 0 (
                                e1846540e33a9e41
                                89792d18d5d131f6
                                05fc283e )
ns1.example.  3600    IN   A         127.0.0.1
ns2.example.  86400   IN   TXT      "This example has multiple digests"
ns2.example.  3600    IN   AAAA     ::1

```

[A.4.](#) The URI.ARPA Zone

The URI.ARPA zone retrieved 2018-10-21.

```

; <<>> DiG 9.9.4 <<>> @lax.xfr.dns.icann.org uri.arpa axfr
; (2 servers found)
;; global options: +cmd
uri.arpa.      3600    IN      SOA      sns.dns.icann.org. (
                noc.dns.icann.org. 2018100702 10800 3600 1209600 3600 )
uri.arpa.      3600    IN      RRSIG     NSEC 8 2 3600 (
                20181028142623 20181007205525 47155 uri.arpa.
                eEC4w/oXLR1Epwgv4MBiDtSBsXhqrJVvJWUpbX8XpetAvD35bxwNCUTi
                /pAJVUXefegWeiriD2rkTgCBCMmn7YQIm3gdR+HjY/+o3BXNQnz97f+e
                HAE9EDDzoNVfL1PyV/2fde9tDeUuAGVvWmD399NGq9jWYMRpyri2kysr q/g= )
uri.arpa.      86400   IN      RRSIG     NS 8 2 86400 (

```



```

20181028172020 20181007175821 47155 uri.arpa.
ATyV2A2A8ZoggC+68u4GuP5M0UuR+2rr3eW0kEU55zAHld/7FiBx14ln
4byJYy7NudUw1M0EXajqFZE7DVl8PpcvrP3HeeGaVzKqaWj+aus0jbKF
Bsvs2b1qDZemBfkz/IfAhUTJKnto0vSUicJKfItu0GjyYNJCz2CqEuGD Wxc= )
uri.arpa.          600      IN          RRSIG      MX 8 2 600 (
20181028170556 20181007175821 47155 uri.arpa.
e7/r3KXDohX1lyVavetFF0bp8fB8aXT76HnN9KCQDxSnSghNM83UQV0t
lTtD8JVeN1mCvcNFZpagwIgB7XhTtm6Beur/m5ES+4uSnVeS6Q66HBZK
A3mR95IpevuVIZvvJ+GcCAQpBo6KR0DYvJ/c/ZG6sfYwkZ7qg/Em5/+3 4UI= )
uri.arpa.          3600     IN          RRSIG      DNSKEY 8 2 3600 (
20181028152832 20181007175821 15796 uri.arpa.
nzbpbh00qsgBBP8St28pLvPEQ3wZAUdEBuUwil+rtjjwLYYiqjPxZ286
XF4Rq1usfV5x71jZz5Iqsw0aQgia91ylodFpLuXD6FTGs2nXGhNkkg1V
chHgtwj70mXU72GefVgo8TxFYzXuEFP5ZTP92t97FVwVvyyFd86sbbR
6DZj3uA2wEvqBVEcGjLrMQ9Yy7MueJl3UA4h4E6z02JY9Yp0W9woq0B
dqkkwYTwzogyYffPmGAJG91RJ2h6cHtFjEZe2MnaY2glqniZ0WT9vXXd
uFPm0KD9U77Ac+ZtctAF9tsZwSdAoL365E2L1usZbA+K0BnPPqGFJRJK
5R0A1w== )
uri.arpa.          3600     IN          RRSIG      DNSKEY 8 2 3600 (
20181028152832 20181007175821 55480 uri.arpa.
lwtQV/5szQjkXmbcD47/+rOW8kJPksRFHlzxmxzt906+DBYyfrH6uq5X
nHvrUlQ06M12uhqDeL+bDFVgqSpNy+42/0aZvaK3J8EzPZVBHPJykKMV
63T83aAiJrAyHz0aEdmzLCpalqcEE2Imz1LHSafManRfJL8Yuv+JDZFj
2WDWfEcUuwkmIZWX11zxp+DxwzyUlRl7x4+ok5iKZWig5UnBAf6B8T75
WnXzlhCw3F2pXI0a5LYg71L3Tp/xhjN6Yy9jG1IRf5BjB59X2zra3a2R
PkI09SSnuEwHyF1mDaV5BmQrLGRnCjvwXA7ho2m+vv4SP5dUdXf+GTaA
1HeBfw== )
uri.arpa.          3600     IN          RRSIG      SOA 8 2 3600 (
20181029114753 20181008222815 47155 uri.arpa.
qn8yBNOHdjGdT79U2Wu9IIahoS0YPOgYP8lG+qwPcrZ1BwGiHywuoUa2
Mx6BWZlg+HDYaxj2i0mox+IIqoUHHXUb07IUKJF1gr0KCgAR2twDHRXu
9BUQHy9SoV16wYm3kBTEPyxW5FFm8vcdnKAF7sxSY8BbaYNpRIEjDx4A JUC= )
uri.arpa.          3600     IN          NSEC       ftp.uri.arpa. NS SOA (
MX RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY )
uri.arpa.          86400    IN          NS          a.iana-servers.net.
uri.arpa.          86400    IN          NS          b.iana-servers.net.
uri.arpa.          86400    IN          NS          c.iana-servers.net.
uri.arpa.          86400    IN          NS          ns2.lacnic.net.
uri.arpa.          86400    IN          NS          sec3.apnic.net.
uri.arpa.          600      IN          MX          10 pechora.icann.org.
uri.arpa.          3600     IN          DNSKEY      256 3 8 (
AwEAAcBi7tSart2J599zbYWspMNGN70IBWb4ziqyQYH9MTB/VCz6WyUK
uXunwiJJbbQ3bcLqTLWEw134B6cTMHrZpjTab5WAwg4XcwUu8mdcPTiL
Bl6qVRlRD0WiFCTzuYUfkwsh1Rbr7rvrxSQhF5rh71zSpwV5jjjp65Wx
SdJjlH0B )
uri.arpa.          3600     IN          DNSKEY      257 3 8 (
AwEAAbNVv6ulgRd031MtAehz7j3ALRjwZglWesnzvllQl/+hBRZr9QoY
c02I+Dk04Q1NKxox4DUIxj8SxP03GwDu0FR9q2/CFi200mZjafbdYtWc

```



```

3zSdBbi3q0cwCIx7GuG9eq1L+pg7mdk9dgdNZfHwB0LnqTD8ebLPsr0/
Id7kBaIQY0fM1Znh2fp+2h600JZHtY0DK1U1ssyB5PKsE0tVzo5s6zo9
iXKe5u+8WTMaGDY49vG80JPAKE7ezMiH/NZcUMiE0PRZ8D3foq2dYuS5
ym+vA83Z7v8A+Rwh4UGnjxKB8zmr803V0ASAmHz/gwH5Vb0nH+LObwFt
l3wpbp+Wpm8= )
uri.arpa.      3600      IN          DNSKEY  257 3 8 (
AwEAAbwnFTakCvaUKsXji4mgmxZUJi1IygbnGahbkmFEa0L16J+TchKR
wczVfsxUGa2MmeA4hgkAooC3uy+tTmoMsgy8uq/JAaj24DjiHzd46LfD
FK/qMidVqFpYSHeq2Vv5ojkuIsx4oe4KsafGWYN0czKZgH5loGjN2aJG
mrIm++XCph0skgCsQYl65MIzuXffzJyxlAut+ecAIiVeqRaqQfr8LRU
7wIsLxinXirprtQrbor+EtvlHp9qXE6ARTZDzf4jvsNpKvLFZtmxzFf3
e/UJz5eHjpwDSiZL7xE8aE1o1nGfPtJx9ZnB3bap1taJ5wY+5XOCKgY0
xmJVvNQ1wdE= )
ftp.uri.arpa.  3600      IN          RRSIG    NSEC 8 3 3600 (
20181028080856 20181007175821 47155 uri.arpa.
HCLGAqPxzkYkAT7Q/QNtQeB6YrkP6EP0ef+9Qo5/2zngwAewXEAQiyF9
jD1USJiroM11QqBS3v3aIdW/LX0Rs4Ez3hLcKN01cKHS0uWAqzmE+BPP
Arfh8N95jqh/q6vpaB9UtMkQ53tM2fYU1GsZ0LN0knxbHgDHah2axMGH lqM= )
ftp.uri.arpa.  604800   IN          RRSIG    NAPTR 8 3 604800 (
20181028103644 20181007205525 47155 uri.arpa.
WoLi+vZzkxaoLr2IGZnwKrvCdF6KxiWQd1WZP/U+AWnV+7MiqsWPZaf0
9toRErerGoF0i0ASNxZjBGJrRgjmavOM9U+LZSconP9zrNFd4dIu6kp5
YxlQJ0uH0vx1ZHFCj6lAt1ACUIw04ZhMydTmi27c8MzE0Mepvn7iH7r7 k7k= )
ftp.uri.arpa.  3600      IN          NSEC      http.uri.arpa. NAPTR (
RRSIG NSEC )
ftp.uri.arpa.  604800   IN          NAPTR    0 0 "" "" (
"!^ftp://([^:/?#]*).*$!\\1!i" . )
http.uri.arpa. 3600      IN          RRSIG    NSEC 8 3 3600 (
20181029010647 20181007175821 47155 uri.arpa.
U03NntQ73LHwpfLmUK8nMsqkwVsOGW2KdsyuHYAjqQSZvKbtmbv7HBmE
H1+Ii3Z+wtfdMZBy5aC/6sHdx69BfZJs16xumycMlAy6325DKTQbIMN+
ift9GrKBC7cgCd2msF/uzSrYxxg4MJQzBPv1kwXnY3b7eJSliXisBI7 3b8= )
http.uri.arpa. 604800   IN          RRSIG    NAPTR 8 3 604800 (
20181029011815 20181007205525 47155 uri.arpa.
T7mRrdag+WSmG+n22mtBSQ/0Y3v+rdDnfQV90LN5Fq32N5K2iYFajF7F
Tp56o0znytfcL4fHrq0E0wRc9NW0CCUec9C7Wa1gJQc1lEvgoAM+L6f0
RsEjWq6+9jv1LKMXQv0xQuMX17338uoD/xiAFQSnDbiQKxwWMqVAimv5 7Zs= )
http.uri.arpa. 3600      IN          NSEC      mailto.uri.arpa. NAPTR (
RRSIG NSEC )
http.uri.arpa. 604800   IN          NAPTR    0 0 "" "" (
"!^http://([^:/?#]*).*$!\\1!i" . )
mailto.uri.arpa. 3600      IN          RRSIG    NSEC 8 3 3600 (
20181028110727 20181007175821 47155 uri.arpa.
GvxzVL85rEukwGqtuLxek9ipwjbBMfT0FIEyJ7afC8HxVMs6mfFa/nEM/
IdFvvFg+lcYoJSQYuSAVYfL3xPbgrxVSLK125QutCFMdC/YjuZENq5cl
fQciMRD7R3+znZfm8d8u/snLV9w4D+1TBZrJJUBe1Efc8vum5vvV7819 ZoY= )
mailto.uri.arpa. 604800   IN          RRSIG    NAPTR 8 3 604800 (
20181028141825 20181007205525 47155 uri.arpa.

```



```

MaADUgc3fc5v++M0YmqjGk3jBdfIA5RuP62hUSlPsFZ04k37erjIGcFf
j+g84yc+QgbSde0PQHszl9fE/+SU5ZXiS9YdcbzSZxp2erFpZ0Tchrpg
916T4vx6i59scodjb0l6bDyZ+mtIPrc1w6b4hUy0UTsDQoAJYxdfEuMg Vy4= )
mailto.uri.arpa. 3600 IN NSEC urn.uri.arpa. NAPTR (
RRSIG NSEC )
mailto.uri.arpa. 604800 IN NAPTR 0 0 "" "" (
"!^mailto:(.*)@(.*)$!\2!i" . )
urn.uri.arpa. 3600 IN RRSIG NSEC 8 3 3600 (
20181028123243 20181007175821 47155 uri.arpa.
HgsW4Deops108uWyELGe6hpR/OEqCnTHvahLwiQkHh05CSEQrbhmFAWe
U0kmGAdTEYrSz+skLRQuITRMwzyFf4oUkZihGyhZyzHbcxWfuDc/Pd/9
DSl56gdeBwy1evn5wBTms8yWQVknTphbJH395gRqZuaJs3LD/qTyJ5Dp LvA= )
urn.uri.arpa. 604800 IN RRSIG NAPTR 8 3 604800 (
20181029071816 20181007205525 47155 uri.arpa.
ALIZD0vBqAQQt40GQ0Efaj80CyE9xSRJRdyvyn/H/wZVXFRFKrQYrLAS
D/K7q6CMT0xTRCu2J8yes63WJiaJEdnh+dscXzZkm0g4n5PsgZbkvUSW
BiGtxvz5jNncM0xVbkjbtByrvJQA01cU1mn1DKe1FmVB1uLpVdA9Ib4J hMU= )
urn.uri.arpa. 3600 IN NSEC uri.arpa. NAPTR RRSIG (
NSEC )
urn.uri.arpa. 604800 IN NAPTR 0 0 "" "" (
"/urn:([^\:]+)/\1/i" . )
uri.arpa. 3600 IN SOA sns.dns.icann.org. (
noc.dns.icann.org. 2018100702 10800 3600 1209600 3600 )
;; Query time: 66 msec
;; SERVER: 192.0.32.132#53(192.0.32.132)
;; WHEN: Sun Oct 21 20:39:28 UTC 2018
;; XFR size: 34 records (messages 1, bytes 3941)
uri.arpa. 3600 IN ZONEMD 2018100702 1 0 (
e4de6ed36e5d95706756932fae3ecbc6aeb76e16ce486a5553c7e4
c9974d03323e7cd39ccc5e70e797179633f4007bad )

```

[A.5.](#) The ROOT-SERVERS.NET Zone

The ROOT-SERVERS.NET zone retrieved 2018-10-21.


```

root-servers.net.      3600000 IN  SOA      a.root-servers.net. (
    nstld.verisign-grs.com. 2018091100 14400 7200 1209600 3600000 )
root-servers.net.      3600000 IN  NS       a.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net.      3600000 IN  NS       b.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net.      3600000 IN  NS       c.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net.      3600000 IN  NS       d.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net.      3600000 IN  NS       e.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net.      3600000 IN  NS       f.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net.      3600000 IN  NS       g.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net.      3600000 IN  NS       h.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net.      3600000 IN  NS       i.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net.      3600000 IN  NS       j.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net.      3600000 IN  NS       k.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net.      3600000 IN  NS       l.root-servers.net.
root-servers.net.      3600000 IN  NS       m.root-servers.net.
a.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  AAAA     2001:503:ba3e::2:30
a.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  A        198.41.0.4
b.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  MX       20 mail.isi.edu.
b.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  AAAA     2001:500:200::b
b.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  A        199.9.14.201
c.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  AAAA     2001:500:2::c
c.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  A        192.33.4.12
d.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  AAAA     2001:500:2d::d
d.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  A        199.7.91.13
e.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  AAAA     2001:500:a8::e
e.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  A        192.203.230.10
f.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  AAAA     2001:500:2f::f
f.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  A        192.5.5.241
g.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  AAAA     2001:500:12::d0d
g.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  A        192.112.36.4
h.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  AAAA     2001:500:1::53
h.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  A        198.97.190.53
i.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  MX       10 mx.i.root-servers.org.
i.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  AAAA     2001:7fe::53
i.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  A        192.36.148.17
j.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  AAAA     2001:503:c27::2:30
j.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  A        192.58.128.30
k.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  AAAA     2001:7fd::1
k.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  A        193.0.14.129
l.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  AAAA     2001:500:9f::42
l.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  A        199.7.83.42
m.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  AAAA     2001:dc3::35
m.root-servers.net.    3600000 IN  A        202.12.27.33
root-servers.net.      3600000 IN  SOA      a.root-servers.net. (
    nstld.verisign-grs.com. 2018091100 14400 7200 1209600 3600000 )
root-servers.net.      3600000 IN  ZONEMD   2018091100 1 0 (
    0c1839d86088062868c1ed79aed6a301dc7b08b02ba2f67cbc62edd4a0
    291f4132b8840da47ddab4401cc9088d04a14a )

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