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DNS Query Name Minimisation to Improve Privacy
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Abstract

This document describes techniques called "QNAME minimisation" to improve DNS privacy, where the DNS resolver no longer always sends the full original QNAME to the upstream name server. This document obsoletes [RFC 7816](#).

This document is part of the IETF DNSOP (DNS Operations) Working Group. The source of the document, as well as a list of open issues, is at <<https://framagit.org/bortzmeyer/rfc7816-bis>>

NOTE FOR THE DNSOP WORKING GROUP: There is still much work to be done in this draft. Future versions of this draft will contain descriptions of different minimisation implementation choices that have been made since the [RFC 7816](#) first came out, as well as deployment experience.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of [BCP 78](#) and [BCP 79](#).

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Table of Contents

1.	Introduction and Background	2
1.1.	Terminology	3
2.	Description of QNAME Minimisation	3
2.1.	Algorithm to Perform Aggressive Method QNAME Minimisation	5
3.	QNAME Minimisation Examples	5
4.	Limit number of queries	6
5.	Operational Considerations	7
6.	Performance Considerations	9
7.	Alternative Methods for QNAME Minimisation	10
8.	Results of the Experimentation	10
9.	Security Considerations	10
10.	Implementation Status	11
11.	References	12
11.1.	Normative References	12
11.2.	Informative References	13
	Acknowledgments	14
	Changes from RFC 7816	14
	Authors' Addresses	14

[1.](#) Introduction and Background

The problem statement for this document and its predecessor [[RFC7816](#)] is described in [[I-D.bortzmeyer-dprive-rfc7626-bis](#)]. The terminology ("QNAME", "resolver", etc.) is defined in [[I-D.ietf-dnsop-terminology-bis](#)]. This specific solution is not intended to fully solve the DNS privacy problem; instead, it should be viewed as one tool amongst many.

QNAME minimisation follows the principle explained in [Section 6.1 of \[RFC6973\]](#): the less data you send out, the fewer privacy problems you have.

Before QNAME minimisation, when a resolver received the query "What is the AAAA record for www.example.com?", it sent to the root (assuming a resolver whose cache is empty) the very same question. Sending the full QNAME to the authoritative name server was a tradition, not a protocol requirement. In a conversation with the author in January 2015, Paul Mockapetris explained that this tradition comes from a desire to optimise the number of requests, when the same name server is authoritative for many zones in a given name (something that was more common in the old days, where the same name servers served .com and the root) or when the same name server is both recursive and authoritative (something that is strongly discouraged now). Whatever the merits of this choice at this time, the DNS is quite different now.

QNAME minimisation is compatible with the current DNS system and therefore can easily be deployed. Because it is only a change to the way that the resolver operates, it does not change the protocol. The behaviour suggested here (minimising the amount of data sent in QNAMEs from the resolver) is allowed by [Section 5.3.3 of \[RFC1034\]](#) or [Section 7.2 of \[RFC1035\]](#).

1.1. Terminology

A "cold" cache is one that is empty, having literally no entries in it. A "warm" cache is one that has some entries in it.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [BCP 14 \[RFC2119\]](#) [\[RFC8174\]](#) when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. Description of QNAME Minimisation

The idea behind QNAME minimisation is to minimise the amount of privacy sensitive data sent from the DNS resolver to the authoritative name server. This section describes the RECOMMENDED way to do QNAME minimisation -- the way that maximises privacy benefits. That algorithm is summarized in [Section 2.1](#).

When a resolver is not able to answer a query from cache it has to send a query to an authoritative nameserver. Traditionally these queries would contain the full QNAME and the original QTYPE as received in the client query. The full QNAME and original QTYPE are only needed at the nameserver that is authoritative for the record requested by the client. All other nameservers queried while resolving the query only need to receive enough of the QNAME to be able to answer with a delegation. The QTYPE in these queries is not

relevant, as the nameserver is not authoritative to answer with the records the client is looking for. Sending the full QNAME and original QTYPE to these nameservers therefore exposes more privacy sensitive data than necessary to resolve the client's request. A resolver that implements QNAME minimisation changes the QNAME and QTYPE in queries to authoritative nameserver that are not known to be responsible for the original QNAME. These request are done with:

- o a QTYPE selected by the resolver to hide the original QTYPE
- o the QNAME that is the original QNAME, stripped to just one label more than the longest matching domain name for which the nameserver is known to be authoritative

This method is called the "aggressive method" in this document because the resolver won't expose the original QTYPE to nameservers that are not known to be responsible for the desired name. This method is the safest from a privacy point of view, and is thus the RECOMMENDED method for this document. Other methods are described in [Section 7](#).

The QTYPE to use while minimising queries can be any possible data TYPE RRTYPE ([rfc6895](#) #3.1) for which the authority always lies below the zone cut (i.e. not DS, NSEC, NSEC3, OPT, TSIG, TKEY, ANY, MAILA, MAILB, AXFR, and IXFR), as long as there is no relation between the incoming QTYPE and the selection of the QTYPE to use while minimising. A good candidate is to always use the A QTYPE as this is the least likely to give issues at DNS software and middleboxes that do not properly support all QTYPES. The QTYPE=A queries will also blend into traffic from non-minimising resolvers, making it in some cases harder to observe that the resolving has QNAME minimisation enabled.

The minimising resolver works perfectly when it knows the zone cut (zone cuts are described in [Section 6 of \[RFC2181\]](#)). But zone cuts do not necessarily exist at every label boundary. In the name www.foo.bar.example, it is possible that there is a zone cut between "foo" and "bar" but not between "bar" and "example". So, assuming that the resolver already knows the name servers of example, when it receives the query "What is the AAAA record of www.foo.bar.example?", it does not always know where the zone cut will be. To find the zone cut, it will query the example name servers for a record for bar.example. It will get a non-referral answer, it has to query the example name servers again with one more label, and so on. ([Section 2.1](#) describes this algorithm in deeper detail.)

2.1. Algorithm to Perform Aggressive Method QNAME Minimisation

This algorithm performs name resolution with aggressive method QNAME minimisation in the presence of zone cuts that are not yet known.

Although a validating resolver already has the logic to find the zone cuts, implementers of other resolvers may want to use this algorithm to locate the zone cuts.

- (0) If the query can be answered from the cache, do so; otherwise, iterate as follows:
 - (1) Get the closest delegation point that can be used for QNAME from the cache. This is the NS RRset with the owner matching the most labels with the QNAME. The QNAME will be equal to or a subdomain of this NS RRset. Call this ANCESTOR.
 - (2) Initialise CHILD to the same as ANCESTOR.
 - (3) If CHILD is the same as the QNAME, resolve the original query using ANCESTOR's name servers, and finish.
 - (4) Otherwise, add a label from the QNAME to the start of CHILD.
 - (5) Look for a negative cache entry for the NS RRset at CHILD. If this entry is for an NXDOMAIN and the resolver has support for [RFC8020](#) the NXDOMAIN can be used in response to the original query, and stop. If the entry is for a NOERROR/NODATA answer go back to step 3
 - (6) Query for CHILD with the minimised QTYPE using ANCESTOR's name servers. The response can be:
 - (6a) A referral. Cache the NS RRset from the authority section, and go back to step 1.
 - (6b) A NOERROR answer. Cache this answer, and go back to step 3.
 - (6c) An NXDOMAIN answer. Return an NXDOMAIN answer in response to the original query, and stop.

3. QNAME Minimisation Examples

For example, a resolver receives a request to resolve foo.bar.baz.example. Assume that the resolver already knows that ns1.nic.example is authoritative for .example, and that the resolver does not know a more specific authoritative name server. It will send the query QTYPE=NS, QNAME=baz.example to ns1.nic.example.

Here are more detailed examples of queries with the aggressive method of QNAME minimisation:

Cold cache, traditional resolution algorithm without QNAME minimisation, request for A record of a.b.example.org:

QTYPE	QNAME	TARGET	NOTE
A	a.b.example.org	root nameserver	
A	a.b.example.org	org nameserver	
A	a.b.example.org	example.org nameserver	

Cold cache, aggressive QNAME minimisation method, request for A record of a.b.example.org, using NS QTYPE to hide the original QTYPE:

QTYPE	QNAME	TARGET	NOTE
NS	org	root nameserver	
NS	example.org	org nameserver	
NS	b.example.org	example.org nameserver	
NS	a.b.example.org	example.org nameserver	"a" may be delegated
A	a.b.example.org	example.org nameserver	

Warm cache with only org delegation known, (example.org's NS RRset is not known), aggressive QNAME minimisation method, request for A record of a.b.example.org, using NS QTYPE to hide the original QTYPE:

QTYPE	QNAME	TARGET	NOTE
NS	example.org	org nameserver	
NS	b.example.org	example.org nameserver	
NS	a.b.example.org	example.org nameserver	"a" may be delegated
A	a.b.example.org	example.org nameserver	

4. Limit number of queries

When using QNAME minimisation the number of labels in the received QNAME can influence the number of queries sent from the resolver. This opens an attack vector and can decrease performance. Resolvers supporting QNAME minimisation should implement a mechanism to limit the number of outgoing queries per user request.

Take for example an incoming QNAME with many labels, like `www.host.group.department.example.com`, where `host.group.department.example.com` is hosted on `example.com`'s name servers). Assume a resolver that knows only the name servers of `example.com`. Without QNAME minimisation, it would send these `example.com` name servers a query for `www.host.group.department.example.com` and immediately get a specific referral or an answer, without the need for more queries to probe for the zone cut. For such a name, a cold resolver with QNAME

minimisation will, depending on how QNAME minimisation is implemented, send more queries, one per label. Once the cache is warm, there will be no difference with a traditional resolver. Actual testing is described in [[Huque-QNAME-Min](#)]. Such deep domains are especially common under ip6.arpa.

This behaviour can be exploited by sending queries with a large number of labels in the QNAME that will be answered using a wildcard record. Take for example a record for *.example.com, hosted on example.com's name servers. An incoming query containing a QNAME with more than 100 labels, ending in example.com, will result in a query per label. By using random labels the attacker can bypass the caching and always require the resolver to send many queries upstream. Note that [RFC8198](#) can limit this attack in some cases.

One mechanism to reduce this attack vector is by sending more than one label per iteration for QNAMEs with a large number of labels. To do this a maximum number of QNAME minimisation iterations has to be selected (MAX_MINIMISE_COUNT), a good value is 10. Optionally a value for the number of queries that should only have one label appended can be selected (MINIMISE_ONE_LAB), a good value is 4. The assumption here is that the number of labels on delegations higher in the hierarchy are rather small, therefore not exposing too many labels early on has the most privacy benefit.

When a resolver needs to send out a query it will look for the closest known delegation point in its cache. The number of QNAME minimisation iterations is the difference between this closest nameserver and the incoming QNAME. The first MINIMISE_ONE_LAB iterations will be handled as described in [Section 2](#). The number of labels that are not exposed yet now need to be divided over the iterations that are left (MAX_MINIMISE_COUNT - MINIMISE_ONE_LAB). The remainder of the division should be added to the last iterations. For example, when resolving a QNAME with 18 labels, the number of labels added per iteration are: 1,1,1,1,2,2,2,2,3,3.

5. Operational Considerations

TODO may be remove the whole section now that it is no longer experimental?

QNAME minimisation is legal, since the original DNS RFCs do not mandate sending the full QNAME. So, in theory, it should work without any problems. However, in practice, some problems may occur (see [[Huque-QNAME-Min](#)] for an analysis and [[Huque-QNAME-Discuss](#)] for an interesting discussion on this topic).

Note that the aggressive method described in this document prevents authoritative servers other than the server for a full name from seeing information about the relative use of the various QTYPEs. That information may be interesting for researchers (for instance, if they try to follow IPv6 deployment by counting the percentage of AAAA vs. A queries).

Some broken name servers do not react properly to QTYPE=NS requests. For instance, some authoritative name servers embedded in load balancers reply properly to A queries but send REFUSED to NS queries. This behaviour is a protocol violation, and there is no need to stop improving the DNS because of such behaviour. However, QNAME minimisation may still work with such domains, since they are only leaf domains (no need to send them NS requests). Such a setup breaks more than just QNAME minimisation. It breaks negative answers, since the servers don't return the correct SOA, and it also breaks anything dependent upon NS and SOA records existing at the top of the zone.

Another way to deal with such incorrect name servers would be to try with QTYPE=A requests (A being chosen because it is the most common and hence a QTYPE that will always be accepted, while a QTYPE NS may ruffle the feathers of some middleboxes). Instead of querying name servers with a query "NS example.com", a resolver could use "A _example.com" and see if it gets a referral. TODO this is what Unbound does

A problem can also appear when a name server does not react properly to ENTs (Empty Non-Terminals). If ent.example.com has no resource records but foobar.ent.example.com does, then ent.example.com is an ENT. Whatever the QTYPE, a query for ent.example.com must return NODATA (NOERROR / ANSWER: 0). However, some name servers incorrectly return NXDOMAIN for ENTs. If a resolver queries only foobar.ent.example.com, everything will be OK, but if it implements QNAME minimisation, it may query ent.example.com and get an NXDOMAIN. See also Section 3 of [[DNS-Res-Improve](#)] for the other bad consequences of this bad behaviour.

A possible solution, currently implemented in Knot or Unbound, is to retry with the full query when you receive an NXDOMAIN. It works, but it is not ideal for privacy.

Other practices that do not conform to the DNS protocol standards may pose a problem: there is a common DNS trick used by some web hosts that also do DNS hosting that exploits the fact that the DNS protocol (pre-DNSSEC) allows certain serious misconfigurations, such as parent and child zones disagreeing on the location of a zone cut. Basically, they have a single zone with wildcards for each TLD, like:


```
*.example.          60  IN  A   192.0.2.6
```

(They could just wildcard all of ".*.", which would be sufficient. It is impossible to tell why they don't do it.)

This lets them have many web-hosting customers without having to configure thousands of individual zones on their name servers. They just tell the prospective customer to point their NS records at the hoster's name servers, and the web hoster doesn't have to provision anything in order to make the customer's domain resolve. NS queries to the hoster will therefore not give the right result, which may endanger QNAME minimisation (it will be a problem for DNSSEC, too).

TODO report by Akamai about why they return erroneous responses

<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/XIX16DCe2ln3ZnZai723v32ZIjE>

TODO what to do if the resolver forwards? Unbound disables QNAME minimisation in that case, since the forwarder will see everything, anyway. What should a minimising resolver do when forwarding the request to a forwarder, not to an authoritative name server? Send the full qname? Minimises? (But how since the resolver does not know the zone cut?)

The administrators of the forwarders, and of the authoritative name servers, will get less data, which will reduce the utility of the statistics they can produce (such as the percentage of the various QTYPES).

DNS administrators are reminded that the data on DNS requests that they store may have legal consequences, depending on your jurisdiction (check with your local lawyer).

6. Performance Considerations

The main goal of QNAME minimisation is to improve privacy by sending less data. However, it may have other advantages. For instance, if a resolver sends a root name server queries for A.example followed by B.example followed by C.example, the result will be three NXDOMAINs, since .example does not exist in the root zone. When using QNAME minimisation, the resolver would send only one question (for .example itself) to which they could answer NXDOMAIN, thus opening up a negative caching opportunity in which the full resolver could know a priori that neither B.example nor C.example could exist. Thus, in this common case, the total number of upstream queries under QNAME minimisation could be counterintuitively less than the number of queries under the traditional iteration (as described in the DNS

standard). TODO mention [[RFC8020](#)]? And [[RFC8198](#)], the latter depending on DNSSEC?

QNAME minimisation may also improve lookup performance for TLD operators. For a TLD that is delegation-only, a two-label QNAME query may be optimal for finding the delegation owner name, depending on the way domain matching is implemented.

QNAME minimisation can increase the number of queries based on the incoming QNAME. This is described in [Section 4](#).

7. Alternative Methods for QNAME Minimisation

One useful optimisation may be, in the spirit of the HAMMER idea [[HAMMER](#)], The resolver can probe in advance for the introduction of zone cuts where none previously existed to confirm their continued absence or to discover them.

To reduce the number of queries (an issue described in [Section 6](#)), a resolver could always use full name queries when the cache is cold and then to move to the aggressive method of QNAME minimisation when the cache is warm. (Precisely defining what is "warm" or "cold" is left to the implementer). This will decrease the privacy for initial queries but will guarantee no degradation of performance.

Another possible algorithm, not fully studied at this time, could be to "piggyback" on the traditional resolution code. At startup, it sends traditional full QNAMEs and learns the zone cuts from the referrals received, then switches to NS queries asking only for the minimum domain name. This leaks more data but could require fewer changes in the existing resolver codebase.

8. Results of the Experimentation

TODO various experiences from actual deployments, problems heard.
TODO the Knot bug #339 <https://gitlab.labs.nic.cz/knot/knot-resolver/issues/339?> TODO Problems with AWS <https://forums.aws.amazon.com/thread.jspa?threadID=269116?>

9. Security Considerations

QNAME minimisation's benefits are clear in the case where you want to decrease exposure to the authoritative name server. But minimising the amount of data sent also, in part, addresses the case of a wire sniffer as well as the case of privacy invasion by the servers. (Encryption is of course a better defense against wire sniffers, but, unlike QNAME minimisation, it changes the protocol and cannot be

deployed unilaterally. Also, the effect of QNAME minimisation on wire sniffers depends on whether the sniffer is on the DNS path.)

QNAME minimisation offers zero protection against the recursive resolver, which still sees the full request coming from the stub resolver.

All the alternatives mentioned in [Section 7](#) decrease privacy in the hope of improving performance. They must not be used if you want maximum privacy.

10. Implementation Status

\\[\\[Note to RFC Editor: Remove this entire section, and the reference to [RFC 7942](#), before publication. \\]\\]

This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [\[RFC7942\]](#). The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist.

According to [\[RFC7942\]](#), "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit".

Unbound has had a QNAME minimisation feature since version 1.5.7, December 2015, (see [\[Dolmans-Unbound\]](#)) and it has had QNAME minimisation turned default since version 1.7.2, June 2018. It has two modes set by the "qname-minimisation-strict" configuration option. In strict mode (option set to "yes"), there is no workaround for broken authoritative name servers. In lax mode, Unbound retries when there is a NXDOMAIN response from the minimized query. Since November 2016, Unbound uses only queries for the A RRtype and not the NS RRtype.

Knot Resolver has had a QNAME minimisation feature since version 1.0.0, May 2016, and it is activated by default.

BIND has had a QNAME minimisation feature since unstable development version 9.13.2, July 2018. It currently has several modes, with or without workarounds for broken authoritative name servers.

The Cloudflare's public resolver at IP address 1.1.1.1 has QNAME minimisation. (It currently uses Knot.)

Testing with one thousand RIPE Atlas probes [[atlas-qname-min](#)], one can see that QNAME minimisation is now common:

```
% blaeu-resolve --requested 1000 --type TXT qnamemintest.internet.nl
["no - qname minimisation is not enabled on your resolver :("] : 888
occurrences
["hooray - qname minimisation is enabled on your resolver :)!"] : 105
occurrences
[ERROR: SERVFAIL] : 3 occurrences
Test #16113243 done at 2018-09-14T13:01:47Z
```

10 % of the probes have a resolver with QNAME minimisation (it is not possible to infer the percentage of users having QNAME minimisation).

11. References

11.1. Normative References

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Acknowledgments

TODO (refer to 7816)

Changes from [RFC 7816](#)

- o Made changes to deal with errata #4644
- o Changed status to be on standards track
- o Major reorganization

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