Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry
draft-ietf-dots-telemetry-25

Abstract

This document aims to enrich the DOTS signal channel protocol with various telemetry attributes, allowing for optimal Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack mitigation. It specifies the normal traffic baseline and attack traffic telemetry attributes a DOTS client can convey to its DOTS server in the mitigation request, the mitigation status telemetry attributes a DOTS server can communicate to a DOTS client, and the mitigation efficacy telemetry attributes a DOTS client can communicate to a DOTS server. The telemetry attributes can assist the mitigator to choose the DDoS mitigation techniques and perform optimal DDoS attack mitigation.

This document specifies a YANG module for representing DOTS telemetry message types. It also specifies a second YANG module to share the attack mapping details over the DOTS data channel.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

IT organizations and service providers are facing Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks that fall into two broad categories:

1. Network/Transport layer attacks target the victim's infrastructure. These attacks are not necessarily aimed at taking down the actual delivered services, but rather to prevent various network elements (routers, switches, firewalls, transit links, and so on) from serving legitimate users' traffic.

   The main method of such attacks is to send a large volume or high packet per second (pps) of traffic toward the victim's infrastructure. Typically, attack volumes may vary from a few 100 Mbps to 100s of Gbps or even Tbps. Attacks are commonly carried out leveraging botnets and attack reflectors for amplification attacks (Section 3.1 of [RFC4732]) such as NTP (Network Time Protocol), DNS (Domain Name System), SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol), or SSDP (Simple Service Discovery Protocol).

2. Application layer attacks target various applications. Typical examples include attacks against HTTP/HTTPS, DNS, SIP (Session Initiation Protocol), or SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol). However, all applications with their port numbers open at network edges can be attractive attack targets.

   Application layer attacks are considered more complex and harder to categorize, and therefore harder to detect and mitigate efficiently.

To compound the problem, attackers also leverage multi-vectored attacks. These attacks are assembled from dynamic attack vectors (Network/Application) and tactics. As such, multiple attack vectors formed by multiple attack types and volumes are launched simultaneously towards a victim. Multi-vector attacks are harder to detect and defend against. Multiple and simultaneous mitigation techniques are needed to defeat such attack campaigns. It is also common for attackers to change attack vectors right after a successful mitigation, burdening their opponents with changing their
defense methods.

The conclusion derived from the aforementioned attack scenarios is that modern attacks detection and mitigation are most certainly complicated and highly convoluted tasks. They demand a comprehensive knowledge of the attack attributes, the normal behavior of the targeted systems (including normal traffic patterns), as well as the attacker's ongoing and past actions. Even more challenging, retrieving all the analytics needed for detecting these attacks is not simple with the industry's current reporting capabilities.

The DOTS signal channel protocol [RFC9132] is used to carry information about a network resource or a network (or a part thereof) that is under a DDoS attack. Such information is sent by a DOTS client to one or multiple DOTS servers so that appropriate mitigation actions are undertaken on traffic deemed suspicious. Various use cases are discussed in [RFC8903].

DOTS clients can be integrated within a DDoS attack detector, or network and security elements that have been actively engaged with ongoing attacks. The DOTS client mitigation environment determines that it is no longer possible or practical for it to handle these attacks itself. This can be due to a lack of resources or security capabilities, as derived from the complexities and the intensity of these attacks. In this circumstance, the DOTS client has invaluable knowledge about the actual attacks that need to be handled by its DOTS server(s). By enabling the DOTS client to share this comprehensive knowledge of an ongoing attack under specific circumstances, the DOTS server can drastically increase its ability to accomplish successful mitigation. While the attack is being handled by the mitigation resources associated with the DOTS server, the DOTS server has knowledge about the ongoing attack mitigation. The DOTS server can share this information with the DOTS client so that the client can better assess and evaluate the actual mitigation realized.

DOTS clients can send mitigation hints derived from attack details to DOTS servers, with the full understanding that the DOTS server may ignore mitigation hints, as described in [RFC8612] (Gen-004). Mitigation hints will be transmitted across the DOTS signal channel,
as the data channel may not be functional during an attack. How a DOTS server is handling normal and attack traffic attributes, and mitigation hints, is implementation specific.

Both DOTS clients and servers can benefit from this information by presenting various information in relevant management, reporting, and portal systems.

This document defines DOTS telemetry attributes that can be conveyed by DOTS clients to DOTS servers, and vice versa. The DOTS telemetry attributes are not mandatory attributes of the DOTS signal channel protocol [RFC9132]. When no limitation policy is provided to a DOTS agent, it can signal available telemetry attributes to its peers in order to optimize the overall mitigation service provisioned using DOTS. The aforementioned policy can be, for example, agreed during a service subscription (that is out of scope) to identify a subset of DOTS clients among those deployed in a DOTS client domain that are allowed to send or receive telemetry data.

Also, the document specifies a YANG module (Section 11.2) that augments the DOTS data channel [RFC8783] with attack details information. Sharing such details during 'idle' time is meant to optimize the data exchanged over the DOTS signal channel.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119][RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The reader should be familiar with the terms defined in [RFC8612].

"DOTS Telemetry" is defined as the collection of attributes that are used to characterize the normal traffic baseline, attacks and their mitigation measures, and any related information that may help in enforcing countermeasures. DOTS Telemetry is an optional set of attributes that can be signaled in the DOTS signal channel protocol.
Telemetry Setup Identifier (tsid) is an identifier that is generated by DOTS clients to uniquely identify DOTS telemetry setup configuration data. See Section 7.1.2 for more details.

Telemetry Identifier (tmid) is an identifier that is generated by DOTS clients to uniquely identify DOTS telemetry data that is communicated prior to or during a mitigation. See Section 8.2 for more details.

When two telemetry requests overlap, "overlapped" lower numeric 'tsid' (or 'tmid') refers to the lower 'tsid' (or 'tmid') value of these overlapping requests.

The term "pipe" represents the maximum level of traffic that the DOTS client domain can receive. Whether a "pipe" is mapped to one or a group of network interfaces is deployment-specific. For example, each interconnection link may be considered as a specific pipe if the DOTS server is hosted by each upstream provider, while the aggregate of all links to connect to upstream network providers can be considered by a DOTS client domain as a single pipe when communicating with a DOTS server not hosted by these upstream providers.

The document uses IANA-assigned Enterprise Numbers. These numbers are also known as "Private Enterprise Numbers" and "SMI (Structure of Management Information) Network Management Private Enterprise Codes" [Private-Enterprise-Numbers].

The meaning of the symbols in YANG tree diagrams are defined in [RFC8340] and [RFC8791].
3. DOTS Telemetry: Overview and Purpose

Timely and effective signaling of up-to-date DDoS telemetry to all elements involved in the mitigation process is essential and improves the overall DDoS mitigation service effectiveness. Bidirectional feedback between DOTS agents is required for increased awareness by each party of the attack and mitigation efforts, supporting a superior and highly efficient attack mitigation service.

3.1. Need More Visibility

When signaling a mitigation request, it is most certainly beneficial for DOTS clients to signal to DOTS servers any knowledge regarding ongoing attacks. This can happen in cases where DOTS clients are asking DOTS servers for support in defending against attacks that they have already detected and/or (partially) mitigated.

If attacks are already detected and categorized within a DOTS client domain, the DOTS server, and its associated mitigation services, can proactively benefit from this information and optimize the overall service delivery. It is important to note that DOTS client domains' and DOTS server domains' detection and mitigation approaches can be different, and can potentially result in different results and attack classifications. The DDoS mitigation service treats the ongoing attack details received from DOTS clients as hints and cannot completely rely or trust the attack details conveyed by DOTS clients.
operational hints, the DOTS server security operation team also
benefits from telemetry data. A basic requirement of security
operation teams is to be aware of and get visibility into the attacks
they need to handle. This holds especially for the case of ongoing
attacks, where DOTS telemetry provides data about the current attack
status. Even if some mitigation can be automated, operational teams
can use the DOTS telemetry information to be prepared for attack
mitigation and to assign the correct resources (operation staff,
networking and mitigation) for the specific service. Similarly,
security operations personnel at the DOTS client side ask for
feedback about their requests for protection. Therefore, it is
valuable for DOTS servers to share DOTS telemetry with DOTS clients.

Mutual sharing of information is thus crucial for "closing the
mitigation loop" between DOTS clients and servers. For the server
side team, it is important to confirm that the same attacks that the
DOTS server's mitigation resources are seeing are those that a DOTS
client is asking for mitigation of. For the DOTS client side team,
it is important to realize that the DOTS clients receive the required
service. For example, understanding that "I asked for mitigation of
two attacks and my DOTS server detects and mitigates only one of
them". Cases of inconsistency in attack classification between DOTS
clients and servers can be highlighted, and maybe handled, using the
DOTS telemetry attributes.

In addition, management and orchestration systems, at both DOTS
client and server sides, can use DOTS telemetry as feedback to
automate various control and management activities derived from
signaled telemetry information.

If the DOTS server's mitigation resources have the capabilities to
facilitate the DOTS telemetry, the DOTS server adapts its protection
strategy and activates the required countermeasures immediately
(automation enabled) for the sake of optimized attack mitigation
decisions and actions. The interface from the DOTS server to the
mitigator to signal the telemetry data is out of scope.

3.2. Enhanced Detection

DOTS telemetry can also be used as input for determining what values
to use for the tuning parameters available on the mitigation
resources. During the last few years, DDoS attack detection
technologies have evolved from threshold-based detection (that is,
cases when all or specific parts of traffic cross a predefined
threshold for a certain period of time is considered as an attack) to
an "anomaly detection" approach. For the latter, it is required to
maintain rigorous learning of "normal" behavior, and an "anomaly" (or
an attack) is identified and categorized based on the knowledge about
the normal behavior and a deviation from this normal behavior.
Statistical and artificial intelligence algorithms (e.g., machine
learning) are used such that the actual traffic thresholds are
automatically calculated by learning the protected entity's normal
traffic behavior during 'idle' time (i.e., no mitigation is active).
The normal traffic characterization learned is referred to as the
"normal traffic baseline". An attack is detected when the victim's
actual traffic is deviating from this normal baseline pattern.

In addition, subsequent activities toward mitigating an attack are
much more challenging. The ability to distinguish legitimate traffic
from attacker traffic on a per-packet basis is complex. For example,
a packet may look "legitimate" and no attack signature can be
identified. The anomaly can be identified only after detailed
statistical analysis. DDoS attack mitigators use the normal baseline
during the mitigation of an attack to identify and categorize the
expected appearance of a specific traffic pattern. Particularly, the
mitigators use the normal baseline to recognize the "level of
normality" that needs to be achieved during the various mitigation
process.

Normal baseline calculation is performed based on continuous learning
of the normal behavior of the protected entities. The minimum
learning period varies from hours to days and even weeks, depending
on the protected application behavior. The baseline cannot be
learned during active attacks because attack conditions do not
characterize the protected entities' normal behavior.

If the DOTS client has calculated the normal baseline of its
protected entities, signaling such information to the DOTS server
along with the attack traffic levels provides value. The DOTS server
benefits from this telemetry by tuning its mitigation resources with
the DOTS client's normal baseline. The DOTS server mitigators use
the baseline to familiarize themselves with the attack victim's
normal behavior and target the baseline as the level of normality
they need to achieve. Fed with this information, the overall
mitigation performances is expected to be improved in terms of time
to mitigate, accuracy, and false-negative and false-positive rates.

Mitigation of attacks without having certain knowledge of normal
traffic can be inaccurate at best. This is especially true for
recursive signaling (see Section 3.2.3 of [RFC8811]). Given that
DOTS clients can be integrated in a highly diverse set of scenarios
and use cases, this emphasizes the need for knowledge of each DOTS
client domain behavior, especially given that common global
thresholds for attack detection practically cannot be realized. Each DOTS client domain can have its own levels of traffic and normal behavior. Without facilitating normal baseline signaling, it may be very difficult for DOTS servers in some cases to detect and mitigate the attacks accurately:

It is important to emphasize that it is practically impossible for the DOTS server's mitigators to calculate the normal baseline in cases where they do not have any knowledge of the traffic beforehand.

Of course, this information can be provided using out-of-band mechanisms or manual configuration at the risk of unmaintained information becoming inaccurate as the network evolves and "normal" patterns change. The use of a dynamic and collaborative means between the DOTS client and server to identify and share key parameters for the sake of efficient DDoS protection is valuable.

3.3. Efficient Mitigation

During a high volume attack, DOTS client pipes can be totally saturated. DOTS clients ask their DOTS servers to handle the attack upstream so that DOTS client pipes return to a reasonable load level (normal pattern, ideally). At this point, it is essential to ensure that the mitigator does not overwhelm the DOTS client pipes by sending back large volumes of "clean traffic", or what it believes is "clean". This can happen when the mitigator has not managed to detect and mitigate all the attacks launched towards the DOTS client domain.

In this case, it can be valuable to DOTS clients to signal to DOTS servers the total pipe capacity, which is the level of traffic the DOTS client domain can absorb from its upstream network. This usually is the circuit size which includes all the packet overheads. Dynamic updates of the condition of pipes between DOTS agents while they are under a DDoS attack is essential (e.g., where multiple DOTS clients share the same physical connectivity pipes). The DOTS server should activate other mechanisms to ensure it does not allow the DOTS client domain's pipes to be saturated unintentionally. The rate-limit action defined in [RFC8783] is a reasonable candidate to achieve this objective; the DOTS client can indicate the type(s) of
4. Design Overview

4.1. Overview of Telemetry Operations

The DOTS protocol suite is divided into two logical channels: the signal channel [RFC9132] and data channel [RFC8783]. This division is due to the vastly different requirements placed upon the traffic they carry. The DOTS signal channel must remain available and usable even in the face of attack traffic that might, e.g., saturate one direction of the links involved, rendering acknowledgment-based mechanisms unreliable and strongly incentivizing messages to be small enough to be contained in a single IP packet (Section 2.2 of [RFC8612]). In contrast, the DOTS data channel is available for high-bandwidth data transfer before or after an attack, using more conventional transport protocol techniques (Section 2.3 of [RFC8612]). It is generally preferable to perform advance configuration over the DOTS data channel, including configuring aliases for static or nearly static data sets such as sets of network addresses/prefixes that might be subject to related attacks. This design helps to optimize the use of the DOTS signal channel for the small messages that are important to deliver during an attack. As a reminder, both DOTS signal and data channels require secure communication channels (Section 11 of [RFC9132] and Section 10 of [RFC8783]).

Telemetry information has aspects that correspond to both operational modes (i.e., signal and data channels): there is certainly a need to convey updated information about ongoing attack traffic and targets during an attack, so as to convey detailed information about mitigation status and inform updates to mitigation strategy in the face of adaptive attacks. However, it is also useful to provide mitigation services with a picture of normal or "baseline" traffic towards potential targets to aid in detecting when incoming traffic deviates from normal into being an attack. Also, one might populate
a "database" of classifications of known types of attack so that a short attack identifier can be used during attack time to describe an observed attack. This specification does make provision for use of the DOTS data channel for the latter function (Section 8.1.6), but otherwise retains most telemetry functionality in the DOTS signal channel.

Note that it is a functional requirement to convey information about ongoing attack traffic during an attack, and information about baseline traffic uses an essentially identical data structure that is naturally defined to sit next to the description of attack traffic. The related telemetry setup information used to parameterize actual traffic data is also sent over the signal channel, out of expediency.

This document specifies an extension to the DOTS signal channel protocol. Considerations about how to establish, maintain, and make use of the DOTS signal channel are specified in [RFC9132].

Once the DOTS signal channel is established, DOTS clients that support the DOTS telemetry extension proceed with the telemetry setup configuration (e.g., measurement interval, telemetry notification interval, pipe capacity, normal traffic baseline) as detailed in Section 7. DOTS agents can then include DOTS telemetry attributes using the DOTS signal channel (Section 8.1). A DOTS client can use separate messages to share with its DOTS server(s) a set of telemetry data bound to an ongoing mitigation (Section 8.2). Also, a DOTS client that is interested in receiving telemetry notifications related to some of its resources follows the procedure defined in Section 8.3. The DOTS client can then decide to send a mitigation request if the notified attack cannot be mitigated locally within the DOTS client domain.

Aggregate DOTS telemetry data can also be included in efficacy update (Section 9.1) or mitigation update (Section 9.2) messages.

4.2. Block-wise Transfer

DOTS clients can use block wise transfer [RFC7959] with the recommendation detailed in Section 4.4.2 of [RFC9132] to control the
size of a response when the data to be returned does not fit within a single datagram.

DOTS clients can also use CoAP Block1 Option in a PUT request (Section 2.5 of [RFC7959]) to initiate large transfers, but these Block1 transfers are likely to fail if the inbound "pipe" is running full because the transfer requires a message from the server for each block, which would likely be lost in the incoming flood. Consideration needs to be made to try to fit this PUT into a single transfer or to separate out the PUT into several discrete PUTs where each of them fits into a single packet.

Q-Block1 and Q-Block2 Options that are similar to the CoAP Block1 and Block2 Options, but enable robust transmissions of big blocks of data with less packet interchanges using NON messages, are defined in [I-D.ietf-core-new-block]. DOTS implementations can consider the use of Q-Block1 and Q-Block2 Options [I-D.ietf-dots-robust-blocks].

4.3. DOTS Multi-homing Considerations

Considerations for multi-homed DOTS clients to select which DOTS server to contact and which IP prefixes to include in a telemetry message to a given peer DOTS server are discussed in [I-D.ietf-dots-multihoming]. For example, if each upstream network exposes a DOTS server and the DOTS client maintains DOTS channels with all of them, only the information related to prefixes assigned by an upstream network to the DOTS client domain will be signaled via the DOTS channel established with the DOTS server of that upstream network.

Considerations related to whether (and how) a DOTS client gleans some telemetry information (e.g., attack details) it receives from a first DOTS server and share it with a second DOTS server are implementation and deployment specific.

4.4. YANG Considerations
Telemetry messages exchanged between DOTS agents are serialized using Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) [RFC8949]. CBOR-encoded payloads are used to carry signal-channel-specific payload messages which convey request parameters and response information such as errors.

This document specifies a YANG module [RFC7950] for representing DOTS telemetry message types (Section 11.1). All parameters in the payload of the DOTS signal channel are mapped to CBOR types as specified in Section 12. As a reminder, Section 3 of [RFC9132] defines the rules for mapping YANG-modeled data to CBOR.

The DOTS telemetry module (Section 11.1) is not intended to be used via NETCONF/RESTCONF for DOTS server management purposes. It serves only to provide a data model and encoding following [RFC8791]. Server deviations (Section 5.6.3 of [RFC7950]) are strongly discouraged, as the peer DOTS agent does not have means to retrieve the list of deviations and thus interoperability issues are likely to be encountered.

The DOTS telemetry module (Section 11.1) uses "enumerations" rather than "identities" to define units, samples, and intervals because otherwise the namespace identifier "ietf-dots-telemetry" must be included when a telemetry attribute is included (e.g., in a mitigation efficacy update). The use of "identities" is thus suboptimal from a message compactness standpoint; one of the key requirements for DOTS Signal Channel messages.

Some parameters (e.g., low percentile values) may be associated with different YANG types (e.g., decimal64 and yang:gauge64). To easily distinguish the types of these parameters while using meaningful
names, the following suffixes are used:

+--------+==============+==================+
| Suffix | YANG Type    | Example           |
+--------+==============+------------------+
| -g     | yang:gauge64 | low-percentile-g |
+--------+--------------+------------------+
| -c     | container    | connection-c     |
+--------+--------------+------------------+
| -ps    | per second   | connection-ps    |
+--------+--------------+------------------+

Table 1

The full tree diagram of the DOTS telemetry module can be generated using the "pyang" tool [PYANG]. That tree is not included here because it is too long (Section 3.3 of [RFC8340]). Instead, subtrees are provided for the reader's convenience.

In order to optimize the data exchanged over the DOTS signal channel, the document specifies a second YANG module ("ietf-dots-mapping", Section 11.2) that augments the DOTS data channel [RFC8783]. This augmentation can be used during 'idle' time to share the attack mapping details (Section 8.1.5). DOTS clients can use tools, e.g., YANG Library [RFC8525], to retrieve the list of features and deviations supported by the DOTS server over the data channel.

5. Generic Considerations

5.1. DOTS Client Identification

Following the rules in Section 4.4.1 of [RFC9132], a unique identifier is generated by a DOTS client to prevent request collisions ('cuid').
DOTS gateways may be located between DOTS clients and servers. The considerations elaborated in Section 4.4.1 of [RFC9132] must be followed. In particular, 'cdid' attribute is used to unambiguously identify a DOTS client domain.

As a reminder, Section 4.4.1.3 of [RFC9132] forbids 'cdid' (if present) to be returned in a response message body.

5.3. Empty URI Paths

Uri-Path parameters and attributes with empty values MUST NOT be present in a request. The presence of such an empty value renders the entire containing message invalid.

5.4. Controlling Configuration Data

The DOTS server follows the same considerations discussed in Section of 4.5.3 of [RFC9132] for managing DOTS telemetry configuration freshness and notification.

Likewise, a DOTS client may control the selection of configuration and non-configuration data nodes when sending a GET request by means of the 'c' Uri-Query option and following the procedure specified in Section of 4.4.2 of [RFC9132]. These considerations are not reiterated in the following sections.

5.5. Message Validation

The authoritative reference for validating telemetry messages exchanged over the DOTS signal channel are Sections 7, 8, and 9 together with the mapping table established in Section 12. The structure of telemetry message bodies is represented as a YANG data structure (Section 11.1).

5.6. A Note About Examples

Examples are provided for illustration purposes. The document does not aim to provide a comprehensive list of message examples.
The examples use the Enterprise Number 32473 defined for documentation use [RFC5612].

6. Telemetry Operation Paths

As discussed in Section 4.2 of [RFC9132], each DOTS operation is indicated by a path suffix that indicates the intended operation. The operation path is appended to the path prefix to form the URI used with a CoAP request to perform the desired DOTS operation. The following telemetry path suffixes are defined (Table 2):

```
+-----------------+----------------+-----------+
| Operation       | Operation Path | Details   |
| Telemetry Setup | /tm-setup      | Section 6 |
| Telemetry       | /tm            | Section 7 |
+-----------------+----------------+-----------+
```

Table 2: DOTS Telemetry Operations

Consequently, the "ietf-dots-telemetry" YANG module defined in Section 11.1 defines data structure to represent new DOTS message types called 'telemetry-setup' and 'telemetry'. The tree structure is shown in Figure 1. More details are provided in Sections 7 and 8 about the exact structure of 'telemetry-setup' and 'telemetry' message types.

```
structure dots-telemetry:
  +-- (telemetry-message-type)?
    +--:(telemetry-setup)
    |    ...  
    |    |  +-- telemetry* []
    |    |    ...  
    |    |    |  +-- (setup-type)?
    |    |    |    +--:(telemetry-config)
    |    |    |    |  ...  
    |    |    |    |  +--:(pipe)
    |    |    |    |    ...  
    |    |    |    |    +--:(baseline)
    |    |    |    |    |  ...  
    |    |    |    |    |  +--:(telemetry)
    |    |    |    |    |    ...  
    |    |    |    |    |    +-- (telemetry-message-type)?
    |    |    |    |    |    |  ...  
    |    |    |    |    |    | +--:(telemetry-setup)
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    ...  
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    |  +-- telemetry* []
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | |  ...  
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | |  +-- (setup-type)?
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | |    +--:(telemetry-config)
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | | |  ...  
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | | |  +--:(pipe)
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | | |    ...  
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | | |    |  +--:(baseline)
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | | |    | |  ...  
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | | |    | |  +--:(telemetry)
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | | |    | | |  ...  
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | | |    | | | |  +-- (telemetry-message-type)?
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | | |    | | | | |  ...  
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | | |    | | | | | |  +--:(telemetry-setup)
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | | |    | | | | | | |  ...  
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | | |    | | | | | | | |  +-- telemetry* []
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | | |    | | | | | | | | |  ...  
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | | |    | | | | | | | | | |  +-- (setup-type)?
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | | |    | | | | | | | | | | |  +--:(telemetry-config)
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | | |    | | | | | | | | | | | |  ...  
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | | |    | | | | | | | | | | | | |  +--:(pipe)
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | | |    | | | | | | | | | | | | | |  ...  
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | | |    | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |  +--:(baseline)
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | | |    | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |  ...  
    |    |    |    |    |    | |    | | | |    | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |  +--:(telemetry)
```

JSON encoding of YANG-modeled data is used to illustrate the various telemetry operations. To ease readability, parameter names and their JSON types are, thus, used in the examples rather than their CBOR key values and CBOR types following the mappings in Section 12. These conventions are inherited from [RFC9132].
Figure 1: New DOTS Message Types (YANG Tree Structure)

DOTS implementations MUST support the Observe Option [RFC7641] for 'tm' (Section 8).

7. DOTS Telemetry Setup Configuration

In reference to Figure 1, a DOTS telemetry setup message MUST include only telemetry-related configuration parameters (Section 7.1) or information about DOTS client domain pipe capacity (Section 7.2) or telemetry traffic baseline (Section 7.3). As such, requests that include a mix of telemetry configuration, pipe capacity, and traffic baseline MUST be rejected by DOTS servers with a 4.00 (Bad Request).

A DOTS client can reset all installed DOTS telemetry setup configuration data following the considerations detailed in Section 7.4.

A DOTS server may detect conflicts when processing requests related to DOTS client domain pipe capacity or telemetry traffic baseline with requests from other DOTS clients of the same DOTS client domain. More details are included in Section 7.5.

Telemetry setup configuration is bound to a DOTS client domain. DOTS servers MUST NOT expect DOTS clients to send regular requests to refresh the telemetry setup configuration. Any available telemetry setup configuration is valid till the DOTS server ceases to service a DOTS client domain. DOTS servers MUST NOT reset 'tsid' because a session failed with a DOTS client. DOTS clients update their telemetry setup configuration upon change of a parameter that may impact attack mitigation.

DOTS telemetry setup configuration request and response messages are marked as Confirmable messages (Section 2.1 of [RFC7252]).

7.1. Telemetry Configuration

DOTS telemetry uses several percentile values to provide a picture of a traffic distribution overall, as opposed to just a single snapshot of observed traffic at a single point in time. Modeling raw traffic
flow data as a distribution and describing that distribution entails choosing a measurement period that the distribution will describe, and a number of sampling intervals, or "buckets", within that measurement period. Traffic within each bucket is treated as a single event (i.e., averaged), and then the distribution of buckets is used to describe the distribution of traffic over the measurement period. A distribution can be characterized by statistical measures (e.g., mean, median, and standard deviation), and also by reporting the value of the distribution at various percentile levels of the data set in question (e.g., "quartiles" that correspond to 25th, 50th, and 75th percentile). More details about percentile values and their computation are found in Section 11.3 of [RFC2330].

DOTS telemetry uses up to three percentile values, plus the overall peak, to characterize traffic distributions. Which percentile thresholds are used for these "low", "medium", and "high" percentile values is configurable. Default values are defined in Section 7.1.2.

A DOTS client can negotiate with its server(s) a set of telemetry configuration parameters to be used for telemetry. Such parameters include:

* Percentile-related measurement parameters. In particular, 'measurement-interval' defines the period on which percentiles are computed, while 'measurement-sample' defines the time distribution for measuring values that are used to compute percentiles.

* Measurement units

* Acceptable percentile values

* Telemetry notification interval

* Acceptable Server-originated telemetry

7.1.1. Retrieve Current DOTS Telemetry Configuration

A GET request is used to obtain acceptable and current telemetry configuration parameters on the DOTS server. This request may include a 'cdid' Uri-Path when the request is relayed by a DOTS...
gateway. An example of such a GET request (without gateway) is depicted in Figure 2.

Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"

Figure 2: GET to Retrieve Current and Acceptable DOTS Telemetry Configuration

Upon receipt of such a request, and assuming no error is encountered when processing the request, the DOTS server replies with a 2.05 (Content) response that conveys the telemetry parameters that are acceptable by the DOTS server, any pipe information (Section 7.2), and the current baseline information (Section 7.3) maintained by the DOTS server for this DOTS client. The tree structure of the response message body is provided in Figure 3.

DOTS servers that support the capability of sending telemetry information to DOTS clients prior to or during a mitigation (Section 9.2) sets 'server-originated-telemetry' under 'max-config-values' to 'true' ('false' is used otherwise). If 'server-originated-telemetry' is not present in a response, this is equivalent to receiving a response with 'server-originated-telemetry' set to 'false'.

structure dots-telemetry:
  +++ (telemetry-message-type)?
  |  +++:(telemetry-setup)
  |    |  +++ (direction)?
  |    |    |  +++:(server-to-client-only)
  |    |    |    +++ max-config-values
  |    |    |    |  +++ measurement-interval? interval
  |    |    |    |  +++ measurement-sample? sample
  |    |    |    |  +++ low-percentile? percentile
  |    |    |    |  +++ mid-percentile? percentile
  |    |    |    |  +++ high-percentile? percentile
  |    |    |    |  +++ server-originated-telemetry? boolean
  |    |    |    |  +++ telemetry-notify-interval? uint16
When both 'min-config-values' and 'max-config-values' attributes are present, the values carried in 'max-config-values' attributes MUST be greater or equal to their counterpart in 'min-config-values'
attributes.

7.1.2. Conveying DOTS Telemetry Configuration

A PUT request is used to convey the configuration parameters for the telemetry data (e.g., low, mid, or high percentile values). For example, a DOTS client may contact its DOTS server to change the default percentile values used as baseline for telemetry data. Figure 3 lists the attributes that can be set by a DOTS client in such a PUT request. An example of a DOTS client that modifies all percentile reference values is shown in Figure 4.

Note: The payload of the message depicted in Figure 4 is CBOR-encoded as indicated by the Content-Format set to "application/dots+cbor" ([Section 10.3 of RFC9132]). However, and for the sake of better readability, the example (and other similar figures depicting a DOTS telemetry message body) follows the conventions set in [Section 5.6]: use the JSON names and types defined in Section 12.
"current-config": {
    "low-percentile": "5.00",
    "mid-percentile": "65.00",
    "high-percentile": "95.00"
}
}
]
}

Figure 4: PUT to Convey the DOTS Telemetry Configuration, depicted as per Section 5.6

'cuid' is a mandatory Uri-Path parameter for PUT requests.

The following additional Uri-Path parameter is defined:

tsid: Telemetry Setup Identifier is an identifier for the DOTS telemetry setup configuration data represented as an integer. This identifier MUST be generated by DOTS clients. 'tsid' values MUST increase monotonically whenever new configuration parameters (not just for changed values) need to be conveyed by the DOTS client.

The procedure specified in Section 4.4.1 of [RFC9132] for 'mid' rollover MUST also be followed for 'tsid' rollover.

This is a mandatory attribute. 'tsid' MUST appear after 'cuid' in the Uri-Path options.

'cuid' and 'tsid' MUST NOT appear in the PUT request message body.

At least one configurable attribute MUST be present in the PUT request.

A PUT request with a higher numeric 'tsid' value overrides the DOTS telemetry configuration data installed by a PUT request with a lower numeric 'tsid' value. To avoid maintaining a long list of 'tsid' requests for requests carrying telemetry configuration data from a DOTS client, the lower numeric 'tsid' MUST be automatically deleted.
and no longer be available at the DOTS server.

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the PUT request using the following Response Codes:

* If the request is missing a mandatory attribute, does not include 'cuid' or 'tsid' Uri-Path parameters, or contains one or more invalid or unknown parameters, 4.00 (Bad Request) MUST be returned in the response.

* If the DOTS server does not find the 'tsid' parameter value conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data and if the DOTS server has accepted the configuration parameters, then a 2.01 (Created) Response Code MUST be returned in the response.

* If the DOTS server finds the 'tsid' parameter value conveyed in the PUT request in its configuration data and if the DOTS server has accepted the updated configuration parameters, 2.04 (Changed) MUST be returned in the response.

* If any of the enclosed configurable attribute values are not acceptable to the DOTS server (Section 7.1.1), 4.22 (Unprocessable Entity) MUST be returned in the response.

The DOTS client may retry and send the PUT request with updated attribute values acceptable to the DOTS server.

By default, low percentile (10th percentile), mid percentile (50th percentile), high percentile (90th percentile), and peak (100th percentile) values are used to represent telemetry data. Nevertheless, a DOTS client can disable some percentile types (low, mid, high). In particular, setting 'low-percentile' to '0.00' indicates that the DOTS client is not interested in receiving low-percentiles. Likewise, setting 'mid-percentile' (or 'high-percentile') to the same value as 'low-percentile' (or 'mid-percentile') indicates that the DOTS client is not interested in receiving mid-percentiles (or high-percentiles). For example, a DOTS client can send the request depicted in Figure 5 to inform the server that it is interested in receiving only high-percentiles. This assumes that the client will only use that percentile type when sharing telemetry data with the server.
Figure 5: PUT to Disable Low- and Mid-Percentiles, depicted as per Section 5.6

DOTS clients can also configure the unit class(es) to be used for traffic-related telemetry data among the following supported unit classes: packets per second, bits per second, and bytes per second. Supplying both bits per second and bytes per second unit-classes is allowed for a given telemetry data. However, receipt of conflicting values is treated as invalid parameters and rejected with 4.00 (Bad Request).

DOTS clients that are interested to receive pre or ongoing mitigation telemetry (pre-or-ongoing-mitigation) information from a DOTS server (Section 9.2) MUST set 'server-originated-telemetry' to 'true'. If 'server-originated-telemetry' is not present in a PUT request, this is equivalent to receiving a request with 'server-originated-telemetry' set to 'false'. An example of a request to enable pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry from DOTS servers is shown in Figure 6.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=125"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

```
{
    "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup": {
        "telemetry": [
            {
                "current-config": {
                    "server-originated-telemetry": true
                }
            }
        ]
    }
}
```

Figure 6: PUT to Enable Pre-or-ongoing-mitigation Telemetry from the DOTS server, depicted as per Section 5.6

### 7.1.3. Retrieve Installed DOTS Telemetry Configuration

A DOTS client may issue a GET message with 'tsid' Uri-Path parameter to retrieve the current DOTS telemetry configuration. An example of such a request is depicted in Figure 7.

Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=123"

Figure 7: GET to Retrieve Current DOTS Telemetry Configuration

If the DOTS server does not find the 'tsid' Uri-Path value conveyed in the GET request in its configuration data for the requesting DOTS
7.1.4. Delete DOTS Telemetry Configuration

A DELETE request is used to delete the installed DOTS telemetry configuration data (Figure 8). 'cuid' and 'tsid' are mandatory Uri-Path parameters for such DELETE requests.

Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)  
Uri-Path: ".well-known"  
Uri-Path: "dots"  
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"  
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"  
Uri-Path: "tsid=123"

Figure 8: Delete Telemetry Configuration

The DOTS server resets the DOTS telemetry configuration back to the default values and acknowledges a DOTS client's request to remove the DOTS telemetry configuration using 2.02 (Deleted) Response Code. A 2.02 (Deleted) Response Code is returned even if the 'tsid' parameter value conveyed in the DELETE request does not exist in its configuration data before the request.

Section 7.4 discusses the procedure to reset all DOTS telemetry setup configuration.

7.2. Total Pipe Capacity

A DOTS client can communicate to the DOTS server(s) its DOTS client domain pipe information. The tree structure of the pipe information is shown in Figure 9.
structure dots-telemetry:
  +++ (telemetry-message-type)?
  +++:(telemetry-setup)
   ...
   | +++ telemetry* []
   |   +++ (direction)?
   |   |   +++:(server-to-client-only)
   |   |   |   +++ tsid? uint32
   |   +++ (setup-type)?
   |   | +++:(telemetry-config)
   |   | ...
   |   +++:(pipe)
   |   |   +++ total-pipe-capacity* [link-id unit]
   |   |   |   +++ link-id nt:link-id
   |   |   |   +++ capacity uint64
   |   |   |   +++ unit unit
   |   +++:(baseline)
   |   ...
   +++:(telemetry)
   ...

Figure 9: Pipe Tree Structure

A DOTS client domain pipe is defined as a list of limits of (incoming) traffic volume ('total-pipe-capacity') that can be forwarded over ingress interconnection links of a DOTS client domain. Each of these links is identified with a 'link-id' [RFC8345].
The unit used by a DOTS client when conveying pipe information is captured in the 'unit' attribute. The DOTS client MUST auto-scale so that the appropriate unit is used. That is, for a given unit class, the DOTS client uses the largest unit that gives a value greater than one. As such, only one unit per unit class is allowed.

7.2.1. Conveying DOTS Client Domain Pipe Capacity

Similar considerations to those specified in Section 7.1.2 are followed with one exception:

The relative order of two PUT requests carrying DOTS client domain pipe attributes from a DOTS client is determined by comparing their respective 'tsid' values. If such two requests have overlapping 'link-id' and 'unit', the PUT request with higher numeric 'tsid' value will override the request with a lower numeric 'tsid' value. The overlapped lower numeric 'tsid' MUST be automatically deleted and no longer be available.

DOTS clients SHOULD minimize the number of active 'tsid's used for pipe information. In order to avoid maintaining a long list of 'tsid's for pipe information, it is RECOMMENDED that DOTS clients include in any request to update information related to a given link the information of other links (already communicated using a lower 'tsid' value). Doing so, this update request will override these existing requests and hence optimize the number of 'tsid' request per DOTS client.

* Note: This assumes that all link information can fit in one single message.

As an example of configuring pipe information, a DOTS client managing a single homed domain (Figure 10) can send a PUT request (shown in Figure 11) to communicate the capacity of "link1" used to connect to its ISP.

```
(   DOTS Client   )=====(     ISP#A      )
  `-.. Domain ,-' link1 `-..
```
Figure 10: Single Homed DOTS Client Domain

Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=126"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

```
{
  "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup": {
    "telemetry": [
      { "total-pipe-capacity": [
          { "link-id": "link1",
            "capacity": "500",
            "unit": "megabit-ps"
          }
        ]
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 11: Example of a PUT Request to Convey Pipe Information
(Single Homed), depicted as per Section 5.6

DOTS clients may be instructed to signal a link aggregate instead of individual links. For example, a DOTS client that manages a DOTS client domain having two interconnection links with an upstream ISP (Figure 12) can send a PUT request (shown in Figure 13) to communicate the aggregate link capacity with its ISP. Signaling individual or aggregate link capacity is deployment specific.
Figure 12: DOTS Client Domain with Two Interconnection Links

Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=hmcpH87lmPGsSTjkhXCbin"
Uri-Path: "tsid=896"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

```
{
   "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup": {
       "telemetry": [
         {
           "total-pipe-capacity": [
             {
               "link-id": "aggregate",
               "capacity": "700",
               "unit": "megabit-ps"
             }
           ]
         }
       ]
   }
}
```

Figure 13: Example of a PUT Request to Convey Pipe Information (Aggregated Link), depicted as per Section 5.6

Now consider that the DOTS client domain was upgraded to connect to an additional ISP (e.g., ISP#B of Figure 14); the DOTS client can inform a DOTS server that is not hosted with ISP#A and ISP#B domains about this update by sending the PUT request depicted in Figure 15. This request also includes information related to "link1" even if that link is not upgraded. Upon receipt of this request, the DOTS server removes the request with 'tsid=126' and updates its configuration base to maintain two links (link#1 and link#2).
Figure 14: Multi-Homed DOTS Client Domain
A DOTS client can delete a link by sending a PUT request with the 'capacity' attribute set to "0" if other links are still active for the same DOTS client domain (see Section 7.2.3 for other delete cases). For example, if a DOTS client domain re-homes (that is, it changes its ISP), the DOTS client can inform its DOTS server about this update (e.g., from the network configuration in Figure 10 to the one shown in Figure 16) by sending the PUT request depicted in Figure 17. Upon receipt of this request, and assuming no error is encountered when processing the request, the DOTS server removes "link1" from its configuration bases for this DOTS client domain. Note that if the DOTS server receives a PUT request with a 'capacity' attribute set to "0" for all included links, it MUST reject the request with a 4.00 (Bad Request). Instead, the DOTS client can use a DELETE request to delete all links (Section 7.2.3).
Figure 16: Multi-Homed DOTS Client Domain

Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=128"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

```json
{
  "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup": {
    "telemetry": [
      {
        "total-pipe-capacity": [
          {
            "link-id": "link1",
            "capacity": "0",
            "unit": "megabit-ps"
          },
          {
            "link-id": "link2",
            "capacity": "500",
            "unit": "megabit-ps"
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}
```
7.2.2. Retrieve Installed DOTS Client Domain Pipe Capacity

A GET request with 'tsid' Uri-Path parameter is used to retrieve a specific installed DOTS client domain pipe related information. The same procedure as defined in Section 7.1.3 is followed.

To retrieve all pipe information bound to a DOTS client, the DOTS client proceeds as specified in Section 7.1.1.

7.2.3. Delete Installed DOTS Client Domain Pipe Capacity

A DELETE request is used to delete the installed DOTS client domain pipe related information. The same procedure as defined in Section 7.1.4 is followed.

7.3. Telemetry Baseline

A DOTS client can communicate to its DOTS server(s) its normal traffic baseline and connections capacity:

Total traffic normal baseline: The percentile values representing the total traffic normal baseline. It can be represented for a target using 'total-traffic-normal'.

The traffic normal per-protocol ('total-traffic-normal-per-protocol') baseline is represented for a target and is transport-protocol specific.

The traffic normal per-port-number ('total-traffic-normal-per-port') baseline is represented for each port number bound to a target.

If the DOTS client negotiated percentile values and units (Section 7.1), these negotiated parameters will be used instead of the default ones. For each used unit class, the DOTS client MUST auto-scale so that the appropriate unit is used.
Total connections capacity: If the target is susceptible to resource-consuming DDoS attacks, the following optional attributes for the target per transport protocol are useful to detect resource-consuming DDoS attacks:

* The maximum number of simultaneous connections that are allowed to the target.

* The maximum number of simultaneous connections that are allowed to the target per client.

* The maximum number of simultaneous embryonic connections that are allowed to the target. The term "embryonic connection" refers to a connection whose connection handshake is not finished. Embryonic connection is only possible in connection-oriented transport protocols like TCP or Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) \([\text{RFC}4960]\).

* The maximum number of simultaneous embryonic connections that are allowed to the target per client.

* The maximum number of connections allowed per second to the target.

* The maximum number of connections allowed per second to the target per client.

* The maximum number of requests (e.g., HTTP/DNS/SIP requests) allowed per second to the target.

* The maximum number of requests allowed per second to the target per client.

* The maximum number of outstanding partial requests allowed to the target. Attacks relying upon partial requests create a connection with a target but do not send a complete request (e.g., HTTP request).

* The maximum number of outstanding partial requests allowed to the target per client.
The aggregate per transport protocol is captured in 'total-connection-capacity', while port-specific capabilities are represented using 'total-connection-capacity-per-port'.

Note that a target resource is identified using the attributes 'target-prefix', 'target-port-range', 'target-protocol', 'target-fqdn', 'target-uri', or 'alias-name' defined in Section 4.4.1.1 of [RFC9132].

The tree structure of the normal traffic baseline is shown in Figure 18.

```
structure dots-telemetry:
    +++ (telemetry-message-type)?
    +++:(telemetry-setup)
        ++ ... telemetry* []
        ++ (direction)?
```

```
|        | +++ (server-to-client-only)
|        | | +++ tsid? uint32
|        | | ++ (setup-type)?
|        | | | +++:(telemetry-config)
|        | | | | ... telemetry* []
|        | | | | ++ (pipe)
|        | | ... baseline)
|        | | | +++ baseline* [id]
|        | | | | +++ id uint32
|        | | | | +++ target-prefix* inet:ip-prefix
|        | | | | +++ target-port-range* [lower-port]
|        | | | | | +++ lower-port inet:port-number
|        | | | | | ++ upper-port? inet:port-number
|        | | | | +++ target-protocol* uint8
|        | | | | +++ target-fqdn* inet:domain-name
|        | | | | +++ target-uri* inet:uri
|        | | | | +++ alias-name*
```
Figure 18: Telemetry Baseline Tree Structure

A DOTS client can share one or multiple normal traffic baselines (e.g., aggregate or per-prefix baselines), each are uniquely identified within the DOTS client domain with an identifier 'id'. This identifier can be used to update a baseline entry, delete a specific entry, etc.

7.3.1. Conveying DOTS Client Domain Baseline Information

Similar considerations to those specified in Section 7.1.2 are followed with one exception:

The relative order of two PUT requests carrying DOTS client domain baseline attributes from a DOTS client is determined by comparing their respective 'tsid' values. If such two requests have overlapping targets, the PUT request with higher numeric 'tsid' value will override the request with a lower numeric 'tsid' value. The overlapped lower numeric 'tsid' MUST be automatically deleted and no longer be available.

Two PUT requests from a DOTS client have overlapping targets if there is a common IP address, IP prefix, FQDN, URI, or alias-name. Also, two PUT requests from a DOTS client have overlapping targets from the perspective of the DOTS server if the addresses associated with the FQDN, URI, or alias are overlapping with each other or with 'target-prefix'.

DOTS clients SHOULD minimize the number of active 'tsid's used for
baseline information. In order to avoid maintaining a long list of 'tsid's for baseline information, it is RECOMMENDED that DOTS clients include in a request to update information related to a given target, the information of other targets (already communicated using a lower 'tsid' value) (assuming this fits within one single datagram). This update request will override these existing requests and hence optimize the number of 'tsid' request per DOTS client.

If no target attribute is included in the request, this is an indication that the baseline information applies for the DOTS client domain as a whole.

An example of a PUT request to convey the baseline information is shown in Figure 19.
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tsid=129"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

```
{
  "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup": {
    "telemetry": [
      {
        "baseline": [
          {
            "id": 1,
            "target-prefix": [
              "2001:db8:6401::1/128",
              "2001:db8:6401::2/128"
            ],
            "total-traffic-normal": [
              {
                "unit": "megabit-ps",
                "peak-g": "60"
              }
            ]
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 19: PUT to Conveying the DOTS Traffic Baseline, depicted as per Section 5.6

The DOTS client may share protocol specific baseline information (e.g., TCP and UDP) as shown in Figure 20.
Header: PUT (Code=0.03)  
Uri-Path: ".well-known"  
Uri-Path: "dots"  
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"  
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"  
Uri-Path: "tsid=130"  
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

```
{
   "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup": {
      "telemetry": [
         {
            "baseline": [
               {
                  "id": 1,
                  "target-prefix": [
                     "2001:db8:6401::1/128",
                     "2001:db8:6401::2/128"
                  ],
                  "total-traffic-normal-per-protocol": [
                     {
                        "unit": "megabit-ps",
                        "protocol": 6,
                        "peak-g": "50"
                     },
                     {
                        "unit": "megabit-ps",
                        "protocol": 17,
                        "peak-g": "10"
                     }
                  ]
               }
            ]
         }
      ]
   }
}
```

Figure 20: PUT to Convey the DOTS Traffic Baseline (2), depicted as per Section 5.6

The normal traffic baseline information should be updated to reflect legitimate overloads (e.g., flash crowds) to prevent unnecessary mitigation.
7.3.2. Retrieve Installed Normal Traffic Baseline

A GET request with 'tsid' Uri-Path parameter is used to retrieve a specific installed DOTS client domain baseline traffic information. The same procedure as defined in Section 7.1.3 is followed.

To retrieve all baseline information bound to a DOTS client, the DOTS client proceeds as specified in Section 7.1.1.

7.3.3. Delete Installed Normal Traffic Baseline

A DELETE request is used to delete the installed DOTS client domain normal traffic baseline. The same procedure as defined in Section 7.1.4 is followed.

7.4. Reset Installed Telemetry Setup

Upon bootstrapping (or reboot or any other event that may alter the DOTS client setup), a DOTS client MAY send a DELETE request to set the telemetry parameters to default values. Such a request does not include any 'tsid'. An example of such a request is depicted in Figure 21.

Header: DELETE (Code=0.04)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm-setup"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"

Figure 21: Delete Telemetry Configuration

7.5. Conflict with Other DOTS Clients of the Same Domain

A DOTS server may detect conflicts between requests conveying pipe and baseline information received from DOTS clients of the same DOTS client domain. 'conflict-information' is used to report the conflict to the DOTS client following similar conflict handling discussed in Section 4.4.1 of [RFC9132]. The conflict cause can be set to one of these values:
8. DOTS Pre-or-Ongoing Mitigation Telemetry

There are two broad types of DDoS attacks: one is a bandwidth consuming attack, the other is a target-resource-consuming attack. This section outlines the set of DOTS telemetry attributes (Section 8.1) that covers both types of attack. The objective of these attributes is to allow for the complete knowledge of attacks and the various particulars that can best characterize attacks.

The "ietf-dots-telemetry" YANG module (Section 11.1) defines the data structure of a new message type called 'telemetry'. The tree structure of the 'telemetry' message type is shown in Figure 24.

The pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry attributes are indicated by the path suffix '/tm'. The '/tm' is appended to the path prefix to form the URI used with a CoAP request to signal the DOTS telemetry. Pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry attributes specified in Section 8.1 can be signaled between DOTS agents.

Pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry attributes may be sent by a DOTS client or a DOTS server.

DOTS agents SHOULD bind pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry data to mitigation requests associated with the resources under attack. In particular, a telemetry PUT request sent after a mitigation request may include a reference to that mitigation request ('mid-list') as shown in Figure 22. An example illustrating request correlation by means of 'target-prefix' is shown in Figure 23.

Many of the pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry data use a unit that falls under the unit class that is configured following the procedure described in Section 7.1.2. When generating telemetry data to send
to a peer, the DOTS agent MUST auto-scale so that appropriate unit(s) are used.

DOTS agents MUST NOT send pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry notifications to the same peer more frequently than once every 'telemetry-notify-interval' (Section 7.1). If a telemetry notification is sent using a block-like transfer mechanism (e.g., [I-D.ietf-core-new-block]), this rate limit policy MUST NOT consider these individual blocks as separate notifications, but as a single notification.

DOTS pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry request and response messages MUST be marked as Non-Confirmable messages (Section 2.1 of [RFC7252]).
structure dots-telemetry:
  +++ (telemetry-message-type)?
  ++++:(telemetry-setup)
         ...
         |  +++ telemetry* []
         |    +++ (direction)?
         |    |      +++:(server-to-client-only)
         |    |      |        +++ tsid?   uint32
         |    +++ (setup-type)?
         |    |      +++:(telemetry-config)
         |    |      ...
         |    +++:(pipe)
         |    |      ...
         |    +++:(baseline)
         |    ...
         +++:(telemetry)
  +++ pre-or-ongoing-mitigation* []
     +++ (direction)?
8.1. Pre-or-Ongoing-Mitigation DOTS Telemetry Attributes

The description and motivation behind each attribute are presented in Section 3.

8.1.1. Target

A target resource (Figure 25) is identified using the attributes 'target-prefix', 'target-port-range', 'target-protocol', 'target-fqdn', 'target-uri', 'alias-name', or a pointer to a mitigation request ('mid-list').
At least one of the attributes 'target-prefix', 'target-fqdn', 'target-uri', 'alias-name', or 'mid-list' MUST be present in the target definition.

If the target is susceptible to bandwidth-consuming attacks, the attributes representing the percentile values of the 'attack-id' attack traffic are included.
If the target is susceptible to resource-consuming DDoS attacks, the attributes defined in Section 8.1.4 are applicable for representing the attack.

At least the 'target' attribute and one other pre-or-ongoing-mitigation attribute MUST be present in the DOTS telemetry message.

8.1.2. Total Traffic

The 'total-traffic' attribute (Figure 26) conveys the percentile values (including peak and current observed values) of the total observed traffic. More fine-grained information about the total traffic can be conveyed in the 'total-traffic-protocol' and 'total-traffic-port' attributes.

The 'total-traffic-protocol' attribute represents the total traffic for a target and is transport-protocol specific.

The 'total-traffic-port' represents the total traffic for a target per port number.
++--:(telemetry)
++-- pre-or-ongoing-mitigation* []
   ++-- (direction)?
   |   ++--:(server-to-client-only)
   |       ++-- tmid?  uint32
   +-- target
   |...
++-- total-traffic* [unit]
   | ++-- unit  unit
   |  ++-- low-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
   |  ++-- mid-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
   |  ++-- high-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
   |  ++-- peak-g?  yang:gauge64
   |  ++-- current-g?  yang:gauge64
++-- total-traffic-protocol* [unit protocol]
   | ++-- protocol  uint8
   |  ++-- unit  unit
   |  ++-- low-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
   |  ++-- mid-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
   |  ++-- high-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
   |  ++-- peak-g?  yang:gauge64
   |  ++-- current-g?  yang:gauge64
++-- total-traffic-port* [unit port]
   | ++-- port  inet:port-number
   |  ++-- unit  unit
   |  ++-- low-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
   |  ++-- mid-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
   |  ++-- high-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
   |  ++-- peak-g?  yang:gauge64
   |  ++-- current-g?  yang:gauge64
++-- total-attack-traffic* [unit]
   |...
++-- total-attack-traffic-protocol* [unit protocol]
   |...
++-- total-attack-traffic-port* [unit port]
   |...
++-- total-attack-connection-protocol* [protocol]
   |...
++-- total-attack-connection-port* [protocol port]
   |...
++-- attack-detail* [vendor-id attack-id]
   ...

Figure 26: Total Traffic Tree Structure
8.1.3. Total Attack Traffic

The 'total-attack-traffic' attribute (Figure 27) conveys the total observed attack traffic. More fine-grained information about the total attack traffic can be conveyed in the 'total-attack-traffic-protocol' and 'total-attack-traffic-port' attributes.

The 'total-attack-traffic-protocol' attribute represents the total attack traffic for a target and is transport-protocol specific.

The 'total-attack-traffic-port' attribute represents the total attack traffic for a target per port number.
---:(telemetry)
  +-- pre-or-ongoing-mitigation* []
    +-- (direction)?
      |  +--:(server-to-client-only)
      |      +-- tmid? uint32
      |  +-- target
      |      ...
    +-- total-traffic* [unit]
      |      ...
    +-- total-traffic-protocol* [unit protocol]
      |      ...
    +-- total-traffic-port* [unit port]
      |      ...
    +-- total-attack-traffic* [unit]
      |      unit
      |      low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
      |      mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
      |      high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
      |      peak-g? yang:gauge64
      |      current-g? yang:gauge64
    +-- total-attack-traffic-protocol* [unit protocol]
      |      protocol uint8
      |      unit
      |      low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
      |      mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
      |      high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
      |      peak-g? yang:gauge64
      |      current-g? yang:gauge64
    +-- total-attack-traffic-port* [unit port]
      |      port inet:port-number
      |      unit
      |      low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
      |      mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
8.1.4. Total Attack Connections

If the target is susceptible to resource-consuming DDoS attacks, the 'total-attack-connection-protocol' attribute is used to convey the percentile values (including peak and current observed values) of various attributes related to the total attack connections. The following optional sub-attributes for the target per transport protocol are included to represent the attack characteristics:

* The number of simultaneous attack connections to the target.
* The number of simultaneous embryonic connections to the target.
* The number of attack connections per second to the target.
* The number of attack requests per second to the target.
* The number of attack partial requests to the target.

The total attack connections per port number is represented using the 'total-attack-connection-port' attribute.
+- total-traffic-protocol* [unit protocol]
  
+- total-traffic-port* [unit port]
  
+- total-attack-traffic* [unit]
  
+- total-attack-traffic-protocol* [unit protocol]
  
+- total-attack-traffic-port* [unit port]
  
+- total-attack-connection-protocol* [protocol]
  
  ++ protocol uint8
  
  ++ connection-c
  
  +++ low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
  
  +++ mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
  
  +++ high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
  
  +++ peak-g? yang:gauge64
  
  +++ current-g? yang:gauge64
  
  +++ embryonic-c
  
  +++ low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
  
  +++ mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
  
  ++ connection-ps-c
  
  +++ low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
  
  +++ mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
  
  +++ high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
  
  +++ peak-g? yang:gauge64
  
  +++ current-g? yang:gauge64
  
  ++ request-ps-c
  
  +++ low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
  
  +++ mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
  
  +++ high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
  
  +++ peak-g? yang:gauge64
  
  +++ current-g? yang:gauge64
  
  ++ partial-request-c
  
  +++ low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
  
  +++ mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
  
  +++ high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
--- total-attack-connection-port* [protocol port]
  +-- protocol          uint8
  +-- port              inet:port-number
  +-- connection-c
    |  +-- low-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
    |  +-- mid-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
    |  +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
    |  +-- peak-g?           yang:gauge64
    |  +-- current-g?        yang:gauge64
  +-- embryonic-c
    |  +-- low-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
    |  +-- mid-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
    |  +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
    |  +-- peak-g?           yang:gauge64
    |  +-- current-g?        yang:gauge64
  +-- connection-ps-c
    |  +-- low-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
    |  +-- mid-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
    |  +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
    |  +-- peak-g?           yang:gauge64
    |  +-- current-g?        yang:gauge64
  +-- request-ps-c
    |  +-- low-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
    |  +-- mid-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
    |  +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
    |  +-- peak-g?           yang:gauge64
    |  +-- current-g?        yang:gauge64
  +-- partial-request-c
    |  +-- low-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
    |  +-- mid-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
    |  +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
    |  +-- peak-g?           yang:gauge64
    |  +-- current-g?        yang:gauge64
  +-- attack-detail* [vendor-id attack-id]

Figure 28: Total Attack Connections Tree Structure

8.1.5. Attack Details
This attribute (depicted in Figure 29) is used to signal a set of details characterizing an attack. The following sub-attributes describing the ongoing attack can be signalled as attack details:

**vendor-id**: Vendor ID is a security vendor's enterprise number as registered in the IANA's "Private Enterprise Numbers" registry [Private-Enterprise-Numbers].

**attack-id**: Unique identifier assigned for the attack by a vendor. This parameter MUST be present independent of whether 'attack-description' is included or not.

**description-lang**: Indicates the language tag that is used for the text that is included in the 'attack-description' attribute. The attribute is encoded following the rules in Section 2.1 of [RFC5646]. The default language tag is "en-US".

**attack-description**: Textual representation of the attack description. This description is related to the class of attack rather than a specific instance of it. Natural Language Processing techniques (e.g., word embedding) might provide some utility in mapping the attack description to an attack type. Textual representation of attack solves two problems: (a) avoids the need to create mapping tables manually between vendors and (b) avoids the need to standardize attack types which keep evolving.

**attack-severity**: Attack severity level. This attribute takes one of the values defined in Section 3.12.2 of [RFC7970].

**start-time**: The time the attack started. The attack's start time is expressed in seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z (Section 3.4.2 of [RFC8949]). The CBOR encoding is modified so that the leading tag 1 (epoch-based date/time) MUST be omitted.

**end-time**: The time the attack ended. The attack end time is expressed in seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00Z (Section 3.4.2 of [RFC8949]). The CBOR encoding is modified so that the leading tag 1 (epoch-based date/time) MUST be omitted.

**source-count**: A count of sources involved in the attack targeting
the victim.

top-talker: A list of attack sources that are involved in an attack and which are generating an important part of the attack traffic. The top talkers are represented using the 'source-prefix'.

'spoofed-status' indicates whether a top talker is a spoofed IP address (e.g., reflection attacks) or not. If no 'spoofed-status' data node is included, this means that the spoofing status is unknown.

If the target is being subjected to a bandwidth-consuming attack, a statistical profile of the attack traffic from each of the top talkers is included ('total-attack-traffic', Section 8.1.3).

If the target is being subjected to a resource-consuming DDoS attack, the same attributes defined in Section 8.1.4 are applicable for characterizing the attack on a per-talker basis.

```plaintext
+++:(telemetry)
  +++ pre-or-ongoing-mitigation* []
  +++ (direction)?
   |   +++:(server-to-client-only)
   |     +++ tmid? uint32
   +++ target
   |   ...
   +++ total-traffic* [unit]
   |   ...
   +++ total-traffic-protocol* [unit protocol]
   |   ...
   +++ total-traffic-port* [unit port]
   |   ...
   +++ total-attack-traffic* [unit]
   |   ...
   +++ total-attack-traffic-protocol* [unit protocol]
   |   ...
   +++ total-attack-traffic-port* [unit port]
   |   ...
   +++ total-attack-connection-protocol* [protocol]
   |   ...
   +++ total-attack-connection-port* [protocol port]
   |   ...
   +++ attack-detail* [vendor-id attack-id]
```
--- vendor-id            uint32
--- attack-id            uint32
--- description-lang?    string
--- attack-description?   string
--- attack-severity?      attack-severity
--- start-time?           uint64
--- end-time?             uint64
--- source-count
  | --- low-percentile-g?   yang:gauge64
  | --- mid-percentile-g?   yang:gauge64
  | --- high-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
  | --- peak-g?             yang:gauge64
  | --- current-g?          yang:gauge64
--- top-talker
  --- talker* [source-prefix]
    | --- spoofed-status?    boolean
    | --- source-prefix      inet:ip-prefix
    | --- source-port-range* [lower-port]
    |     | --- lower-port        inet:port-number
    |     | --- upper-port?       inet:port-number
    | --- source-icmp-type-range* [lower-type]
    |     | --- lower-type        uint8
    |     | --- upper-type?       uint8
    | --- total-attack-traffic* [unit]
    |     | --- unit              unit
    |     | --- low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
    |     | --- mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
    |     | --- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
    |     | --- peak-g?           yang:gauge64
    |     | --- current-g?        yang:gauge64
    | --- total-attack-connection-protocol* [protocol]
    |     | --- protocol          uint8
    |     | --- connection-c
    |     |     | --- low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
    |     |     | --- mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
    |     |     | --- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
    |     |     | --- peak-g?           yang:gauge64
    |     |     | --- current-g?        yang:gauge64
    |     | --- embryonic-c
    |     |     | --- low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
    |     |     | --- mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
    |     |     | --- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
    |     |     | --- peak-g?           yang:gauge64
    |     |     | --- current-g?        yang:gauge64
    | --- connection-ps-c
    |     | --- low-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
    |     | --- mid-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
In order to optimize the size of telemetry data conveyed over the DOTS signal channel, DOTS agents MAY use the DOTS data channel [RFC8783] to exchange vendor specific attack mapping details (that is, \{vendor identifier, attack identifier\} \rightarrow textual representation of the attack description). As such, DOTS agents do not have to convey systematically an attack description in their telemetry messages over the DOTS signal channel. Refer to Section 8.1.6.

8.1.6. Vendor Attack Mapping

Multiple mappings for different vendor identifiers may be used; the DOTS agent transmitting telemetry information can elect to use one or more vendor mappings even in the same telemetry message.

Note: It is possible that a DOTS server is making use of multiple DOTS mitigators; each from a different vendor. How telemetry information and vendor mappings are exchanged between DOTS servers and DOTS mitigators is outside the scope of this document.

DOTS clients and servers may be provided with mappings from different vendors and so have their own different sets of vendor attack mappings. A DOTS agent MUST accept receipt of telemetry data with a vendor identifier that is different to the one it uses to transmit telemetry data. Furthermore, it is possible that the DOTS client and
DOTS server are provided by the same vendor, but the vendor mapping tables are at different revisions. The DOTS client SHOULD transmit telemetry information using any vendor mapping(s) that it provided to the DOTS server (e.g., using a POST as depicted in Figure 34) and the DOTS server SHOULD use any vendor mappings(s) provided to the DOTS client when transmitting telemetry data to the peer DOTS agent.

The "ietf-dots-mapping" YANG module defined in Section 11.2 augments the "ietf-dots-data-channel" [RFC8783] module. The tree structure of the "ietf-dots-mapping" module is shown in Figure 30.

```
module: ietf-dots-mapping
  augment /data-channel:dots-data/data-channel:dots-client:
    +--rw vendor-mapping {dots-telemetry}?
      +--rw vendor* [vendor-id]
        +--rw vendor-id          uint32
        +--rw vendor-name?       string
        +--rw description-lang?  string
        +--rw last-updated       uint64
        +--rw attack-mapping* [attack-id]
          +--rw attack-id         uint32
          +--rw attack-description string
  augment /data-channel:dots-data/data-channel:capabilities:
    +--ro vendor-mapping-enabled?   boolean {dots-telemetry}?
  augment /data-channel:dots-data:
    +--ro vendor-mapping {dots-telemetry}?
      +--ro vendor* [vendor-id]
        +--ro vendor-id          uint32
        +--ro vendor-name?       string
        +--ro description-lang?  string
        +--ro last-updated       uint64
        +--ro attack-mapping* [attack-id]
          +--ro attack-id         uint32
          +--ro attack-description string
```

Figure 30: Vendor Attack Mapping Tree Structure

A DOTS client sends a GET request over the DOTS data channel to retrieve the capabilities supported by a DOTS server as per Section 7.1 of [RFC8783]. This request is meant to assess whether the capability of sharing vendor attack mapping details is supported by the server (i.e., check the value of 'vendor-mapping-enabled').
If 'vendor-mapping-enabled' is set to 'true', a DOTS client MAY send a GET request to retrieve the DOTS server's vendor attack mapping details. An example of such a GET request is shown in Figure 31.

GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\  /ietf-dots-mapping:vendor-mapping HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Accept: application/yang-data+json

Figure 31: GET to Retrieve the Vendor Attack Mappings of a DOTS Server

A DOTS client can retrieve only the list of vendors supported by the DOTS server. It does so by setting the "depth" parameter (Section 4.8.2 of [RFC8040]) to "3" in the GET request as shown in Figure 32. An example of a response body received from the DOTS server as a response to such a request is illustrated in Figure 33.

GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\  /ietf-dots-mapping:vendor-mapping?depth=3 HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Accept: application/yang-data+json

Figure 32: GET to Retrieve the Vendors List used by a DOTS Server

```json
{
  "ietf-dots-mapping:vendor-mapping": {
    "vendor": [
      {
        "vendor-id": 32473,
        "vendor-name": "mitigator-s",
        "last-updated": "1629898758",
        "attack-mapping": []
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 33: Response Message Body to a GET to Retrieve the Vendors List used by a DOTS Server
The DOTS client repeats the above procedure regularly (e.g., once a week) to update the DOTS server's vendor attack mapping details.

If the DOTS client concludes that the DOTS server does not have any reference to the specific vendor attack mapping details, the DOTS client uses a POST request to install its vendor attack mapping details. An example of such a POST request is depicted in Figure 34.

```plaintext
POST /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data\ /dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/yang-data+json

{
    "ietf-dots-mapping:vendor-mapping": {
        "vendor": [
            {
                "vendor-id": 345,
                "vendor-name": "mitigator-c",
                "last-updated": "1629898958",
                "attack-mapping": [
                    {
                        "attack-id": 1,
                        "attack-description": "Include a description of this attack"
                    },
                    {
                        "attack-id": 2,
                        "attack-description": "Include a description of this attack"
                    }
                ]
            }
        ]
    }
}
```
The DOTS server indicates the result of processing the POST request using the status-line. A "201 Created" status-line MUST be returned in the response if the DOTS server has accepted the vendor attack mapping details. If the request is missing a mandatory attribute or contains an invalid or unknown parameter, "400 Bad Request" status-line MUST be returned by the DOTS server in the response. The error-tag is set to "missing-attribute", "invalid-value", or "unknown-element" as a function of the encountered error.

If the request is received via a server-domain DOTS gateway, but the DOTS server does not maintain a 'cdid' for this 'cuid' while a 'cdid' is expected to be supplied, the DOTS server MUST reply with "403 Forbidden" status-line and the error-tag "access-denied". Upon receipt of this message, the DOTS client MUST register (Section 5.1 of [RFC8783]).

The DOTS client uses the PUT request to modify its vendor attack mapping details maintained by the DOTS server (e.g., add a new mapping entry, update an existing mapping).

A DOTS client uses a GET request to retrieve its vendor attack mapping details as maintained by the DOTS server (Figure 35).

GET /restconf/data/ietf-dots-data-channel:dots-data/ /dots-client=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw/ /ietf-dots-mapping:vendor-mapping?/ content=all HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Accept: application/yang-data+json
When conveying attack details in DOTS telemetry messages (Sections 8.2, 8.3, and 9), DOTS agents MUST NOT include the 'attack-description' attribute unless the corresponding attack mapping details were not previously shared with the peer DOTS agent.

8.2. From DOTS Clients to DOTS Servers

DOTS clients use PUT requests to signal pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry to DOTS servers. An example of such a request is shown in Figure 36.

Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: "./.well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tmid=123"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"
Figure 36: PUT to Send Pre-or-Ongoing-Mitigation Telemetry, depicted as per Section 5.6

'cuid' is a mandatory Uri-Path parameter for DOTS PUT requests.

The following additional Uri-Path parameter is defined:

tmid: Telemetry Identifier is an identifier for the DOTS pre-or-
ongoing-mitigation telemetry data represented as an integer. This identifier MUST be generated by DOTS clients. 'tmid' values MUST increase monotonically whenever a DOTS client needs to convey new set of pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry.

The procedure specified in Section 4.4.1 of [RFC9132] for 'mid' rollover MUST be followed for 'tmid' rollover.

This is a mandatory attribute. 'tmid' MUST appear after 'cuid' in the Uri-Path options.

'cuid' and 'tmid' MUST NOT appear in the PUT request message body.

At least the 'target' attribute and another pre-or-ongoing-mitigation attribute (Section 8.1) MUST be present in the PUT request. If only the 'target' attribute is present, this request is handled as per Section 8.3.

The relative order of two PUT requests carrying DOTS pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry from a DOTS client is determined by comparing their respective 'tmid' values. If two such requests have an overlapping 'target', the PUT request with higher numeric 'tmid' value will override the request with a lower numeric 'tmid' value. The overlapped lower numeric 'tmid' MUST be automatically deleted and no longer be available.

The DOTS server indicates the result of processing a PUT request using CoAP Response Codes. In particular, the 2.04 (Changed) Response Code is returned if the DOTS server has accepted the pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry. The 5.03 (Service Unavailable) Response Code is returned if the DOTS server has erred. 5.03 uses the Max-Age Option to indicate the number of seconds after which to retry.

How long a DOTS server maintains a 'tmid' as active or logs the enclosed telemetry information is implementation specific. Note that if a 'tmid' is still active, then logging details are updated by the DOTS server as a function of the updates received from the peer DOTS client.

A DOTS client that lost the state of its active 'tmid's or has to set 'tmid' back to zero (e.g., crash or restart) MUST send a GET request to the DOTS server to retrieve the list of active 'tmid' values. The DOTS client may then delete 'tmid's that should not be active anymore (Figure 37). Sending a DELETE with no 'tmid' indicates that all 'tmid's must be deactivated (Figure 38).
8.3. From DOTS Servers to DOTS Clients

The pre-or-ongoing-mitigation data (attack details, in particular) can also be signaled from DOTS servers to DOTS clients. For example, a DOTS server co-located with a DDoS detector can collect monitoring information from the target network, identify a DDoS attack using statistical analysis or deep learning techniques, and signal the attack details to the DOTS client.

The DOTS client can use the attack details to decide whether to trigger a DOTS mitigation request or not. Furthermore, the security operations personnel at the DOTS client domain can use the attack details to determine the protection strategy and select the appropriate DOTS server for mitigating the attack.

In order to receive pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry notifications from a DOTS server, a DOTS client MUST send a PUT (followed by a GET) with the target filter. An example of such a PUT request is shown in Figure 39. In order to avoid maintaining a long list of such requests, it is RECOMMENDED that DOTS clients include all targets in the same request (assuming this fits within one single datagram). DOTS servers may be instructed to restrict the number of pre-or-ongoing-mitigation requests per DOTS client domain. The pre-or-ongoing mitigation requests MUST be maintained in an active state by the DOTS server until a delete request is received from the same DOTS client to clear this pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry or when the
DOTS client is considered inactive (e.g., Section 3.5 of [RFC8783]).

The relative order of two PUT requests carrying DOTS pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry from a DOTS client is determined by comparing their respective 'tmid' values. If such two requests have overlapping 'target', the PUT request with higher numeric 'tmid' value will override the request with a lower numeric 'tmid' value. The overlapped lower numeric 'tmid' MUST be automatically deleted and no longer be available.

Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: "./well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "tmid=567"
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

```
{
  "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry": {
    "pre-or-ongoing-mitigation": [
      {
        "target": {
          "target-prefix": ["2001:db8::/32"
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

Figure 39: PUT to Request Pre-or-Ongoing-Mitigation Telemetry, depicted as per Section 5.6

DOTS clients of the same domain can request to receive pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry bound to the same target without being considered to be "overlapping" and in conflict.

Once the PUT request to instantiate request state on the server has succeeded, the DOTS client issues a GET request to receive ongoing
telemetry updates. The client uses the Observe Option, set to '0' (register), in the GET request to receive asynchronous notifications carrying pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry data from the DOTS server. The GET request can specify a specific 'tmid' (Figure 40) or omit the 'tmid' (Figure 41) to receive updates on all active requests from that client.

The DOTS client can use a filter to request a subset of the asynchronous notifications from the DOTS server by indicating one or more Uri-Query options in its GET request. A Uri-Query option can include the following parameters to restrict the notifications based on the attack target: 'target-prefix', 'target-port', 'target-protocol', 'target-fqdn', 'target-uri', 'alias-name', 'mid', and 'c' (content) (Section 5.4). Furthermore:
If more than one Uri-Query option is included in a request, these options are interpreted in the same way as when multiple target attributes are included in a message body (Section 4.4.1 of [RFC9132]).

If multiple values of a query parameter are to be included in a request, these values MUST be included in the same Uri-Query option and separated by a "," character without any spaces.

Range values (i.e., a contiguous inclusive block) can be included for the 'target-port', 'target-protocol', and 'mid' parameters by indicating the two boundary values separated by a "-" character.

Wildcard names (i.e., a name with the leftmost label is the "*" character) can be included in 'target-fqdn' or 'target-uri' parameters. DOTS clients MUST NOT include a name in which the "*" character is included in a label other than the leftmost label. "*.example.com" is an example of a valid wildcard name that can be included as a value of the 'target-fqdn' parameter in an Uri-Query option.

DOTS clients may also filter out the asynchronous notifications from the DOTS server by indicating information about a specific attack source. To that aim, a DOTS client may include 'source-prefix', 'source-port', or 'source-icmp-type' in a Uri-Query option. The same considerations (ranges, multiple values) specified for target attributes apply for source attributes. Special care SHOULD be taken when using these filters as their use may cause some attacks may be hidden to the requesting DOTS client (e.g., if the attack changes its source information).

Requests with invalid query types (e.g., not supported, malformed) received by the DOTS server MUST be rejected with a 4.00 (Bad Request) response code.
An example of a request to subscribe to asynchronous telemetry notifications regarding UDP traffic is shown in Figure 42. This filter will be applied for all 'tmid's.

Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "tm"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Query: "target-protocol=17"
Observe: 0

Figure 42: GET Request to Receive Telemetry Asynchronous Notifications Filtered using Uri-Query

The DOTS server will send asynchronous notifications to the DOTS client when an attack event is detected following similar considerations as in Section 4.4.2.1 of [RFC9132]. An example of a pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry notification is shown in Figure 43.

```json
{
  "ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry": {
    "pre-or-ongoing-mitigation": [
      {
        "tmid": 567,
        "target": {
          "target-prefix": [
            "2001:db8::1/128"
          ],
          "target-protocol": [17]
        },
        "total-attack-traffic": [
          {
            "total-attack-traffic": [1]
          }
        ]
      }
    ]
  }
}
```
Figure 43: Message Body of a Pre-or-Ongoing-Mitigation Telemetry Notification from the DOTS Server, depicted as per Section 5.6

A DOTS server sends the aggregate data for a target using 'total-attack-traffic' attribute. The aggregate assumes that Uri-Query filters are applied on the target. The DOTS server MAY include more fine-grained data when needed (that is, 'total-attack-traffic-protocol' and 'total-attack-traffic-port'). If a port filter (or protocol filter) is included in a request, 'total-attack-traffic-protocol' (or 'total-attack-traffic-port') conveys the data with the port (or protocol) filter applied.

A DOTS server may aggregate pre-or-ongoing-mitigation data (e.g., 'top-talker') for all targets of a domain, or when justified, send specific information (e.g., 'top-talker') per individual targets.

The DOTS client may log pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry data with an alert sent to an administrator or a network controller. The DOTS client may send a mitigation request if the attack cannot be handled locally.

A DOTS client that is not interested to receive pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry data for a target sends a delete request similar to the one depicted in Figure 37.
9. DOTS Telemetry Mitigation Status Update

9.1. DOTS Clients to Servers Mitigation Efficacy DOTS Telemetry Attributes

The mitigation efficacy telemetry attributes can be signaled from DOTS clients to DOTS servers as part of the periodic mitigation efficacy updates to the server (Section 4.4.3 of [RFC9132]).

Total Attack Traffic: The overall attack traffic as observed from the DOTS client perspective during an active mitigation. See Figure 27.

Attack Details: The overall attack details as observed from the DOTS client perspective during an active mitigation. See Section 8.1.5.

The "ietf-dots-telemetry" YANG module (Section 11.1) augments the 'mitigation-scope' message type defined in the "ietf-dots-signal" module [RFC9132] so that these attributes can be signalled by a DOTS client in a mitigation efficacy update (Figure 44).

```
augment-structure /dots-signal:dots-signal/dots-signal:message-type
  /dots-signal:mitigation-scope/dots-signal:scope:
    +-- total-attack-traffic* [unit]
      |   | +-- unit               unit
      |   | +-- low-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
      |   | +-- mid-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
      |   | +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
      |   | +-- peak-g?            yang:gauge64
      |   | +-- current-g?         yang:gauge64
      +-- attack-detail* [vendor-id attack-id]
        |   | +-- vendor-id           uint32
        |   | +-- attack-id           uint32
        |   | +-- attack-description? string
        |   | +-- attack-severity?    attack-severity
        |   | +-- start-time?         uint64
        |   | +-- end-time?           uint64
        +-- source-count
```
In order to signal telemetry data in a mitigation efficacy update, it is RECOMMENDED that the DOTS client has already established a DOTS telemetry setup session with the server in 'idle' time. Such a session is primarily meant to assess whether the peer DOTS server supports telemetry extensions and, thus, prevent message processing failure (Section 3.1 of [RFC9132]).
An example of an efficacy update with telemetry attributes is depicted in Figure 45.

Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
Uri-Path: ".well-known",
Uri-Path: "dots",
Uri-Path: "mitigate",
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw",
Uri-Path: "mid=123",
If-Match:
Content-Format: "application/dots+cbor"

```
{
    "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
        "scope": [
            {
                "alias-name": [
                    "https1",
                    "https2"
                ],
                "attack-status": "under-attack",
                "ietf-dots-telemetry:total-attack-traffic": [
                    {
                        "unit": "megabit-ps",
                        "mid-percentile-g": "900"
                    }
                ]
            }
        ]
    }
}
```

Figure 45: An Example of Mitigation Efficacy Update with Telemetry Attributes, depicted as per Section 5.6

### 9.2. DOTS Servers to Clients Mitigation Status DOTS Telemetry Attributes

The mitigation status telemetry attributes can be signaled from the DOTS server to the DOTS client as part of the periodic mitigation status update (Section 4.4.2 of [RFC9132]). In particular, DOTS clients can receive asynchronous notifications of the attack details from DOTS servers using the Observe option defined in [RFC7641].

In order to make use of this feature, DOTS clients MUST establish a telemetry session with the DOTS server in 'idle' time and MUST set
the 'server-originated-telemetry' attribute to 'true'.

DOTS servers MUST NOT include telemetry attributes in mitigation status updates sent to DOTS clients for telemetry sessions in which the 'server-originated-telemetry' attribute is set to 'false'.

As defined in [RFC8612], the actual mitigation activities can include several countermeasure mechanisms. The DOTS server signals the current operational status of relevant countermeasures. A list of attacks detected by these countermeasures MAY also be included. The same attributes defined in Section 8.1.5 are applicable for describing the attacks detected and mitigated at the DOTS server domain.

The "ietf-dots-telemetry" YANG module (Section 11.1) augments the 'mitigation-scope' message type defined in "ietf-dots-signal" [RFC9132] with telemetry data as depicted in Figure 46.

```
augment-structure /dots-signal:dots-signal/dots-signal:message-type
    /dots-signal:mitigation-scope/dots-signal:scope:
        +++ (direction)?
        | +++:(server-to-client-only)
        |     +++ total-traffic* [unit]
        |         | --- unit               unit
        |         | --- low-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
        |         | --- mid-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
        |         | --- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
        |         | --- peak-g?             yang:gauge64
        |         | --- current-g?          yang:gauge64
        |     +++ total-attack-connection
        |         | --- connection-c
        |         |     | --- low-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
        |         |     | --- mid-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
        |         |     | --- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
        |         |     | --- peak-g?             yang:gauge64
        |         |     | --- current-g?          yang:gauge64
        |         |     | --- embryonic-c
        |         |     |     ...               ...
        |         |     | --- connection-ps-c    ...
        |         |     |     ...               ...
        |     +++ request-ps-c
```
|        |  ...
|        |   +-- partial-request-c
|        |   ...
|--- total-attack-traffic* [unit]
|   +-- unit    unit
|   +-- low-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
|   +-- mid-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
|   +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
|   +-- peak-g?  yang:gauge64

--- attack-detail* [vendor-id attack-id]
|   +-- vendor-id  uint32
|   +-- attack-id  uint32
|   +-- attack-description?  string
|   +-- attack-severity?  attack-severity
|   +-- start-time?  uint64
|   +-- end-time?  uint64
|   +-- source-count
|   |   +-- low-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
|   |   +-- mid-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
|   |   +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
|   |   +-- peak-g?  yang:gauge64
|   |   +-- current-g?  yang:gauge64
|   +-- top-talker
|   |   +-- spoofed-status?  boolean
|   |   +-- source-prefix  inet:ip-prefix
|   |   +-- source-port-range* [lower-port]
|   |   |   +-- lower-port  inet:port-number
|   |   |   +-- upper-port?  inet:port-number
|   |   +-- source-icmp-type-range* [lower-type]
|   |   |   +-- lower-type  uint8
|   |   |   +-- upper-type?  uint8
|   +-- total-attack-traffic* [unit]
|   |   +-- unit    unit
|   |   +-- low-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
|   |   +-- mid-percentile-g?  yang:gauge64
|   |   +-- high-percentile-g? yang:gauge64
|   |   +-- peak-g?  yang:gauge64
|   |   +-- current-g?  yang:gauge64
|   +-- total-attack-connection
Figure 47 shows an example of an asynchronous notification of attack mitigation status from the DOTS server. This notification signals both the mid-percentile value of processed attack traffic and the peak count of unique sources involved in the attack.

{
    "ietf-dots-signal-channel:mitigation-scope": {
        "scope": {
            "mid": 12332,
            "mitigation-start": "1507818434",
            "alias-name": [
                "https1",
                "https2",
            ],
            "lifetime": 1600,
            "status": "attack-successfully-mitigated",
            "bytes-dropped": "134334555",
            "bps-dropped": "43344",
            "pkts-dropped": "333334444",
            "pps-dropped": "432432",
            "ietf-dots-telemetry:total-attack-traffic": [
                "134334555",
                "43344",
                "333334444",
                "432432",
                "134334555",
                "43344",
                "333334444",
                "432432",
                "134334555",
                "43344",
                "333334444",
                "432432",
                "134334555",
                "43344",
                "333334444",
                "432432",
            ],
        }
    }
}
DOTS clients can filter out the asynchronous notifications from the DOTS server by indicating one or more Uri-Query options in its GET request. A Uri-Query option can include the following parameters: 'target-prefix', 'target-port', 'target-protocol', 'target-fqdn', 'target-uri', 'alias-name', and 'c' (content) (Section 5.4). The considerations discussed in Section 8.3 MUST be followed to include multiple query values, ranges ('target-port', 'target-protocol'), and wildcard names ('target-fqdn', 'target-uri').

An example of request to subscribe to asynchronous notifications bound to the "https1" alias is shown in Figure 48.

Header: GET (Code=0.01)
Uri-Path: ".well-known"
Uri-Path: "dots"
Uri-Path: "mitigate"
Uri-Path: "cuid=dz6pHjaADkaFTbjr0JGBpw"
Uri-Path: "mid=12332"
Figure 48: GET Request to Receive Asynchronous Notifications
Filtered using Uri-Query

If the target query does not match the target of the enclosed 'mid'
as maintained by the DOTS server, the latter MUST respond with a 4.04
(Not Found) error Response Code. The DOTS server MUST NOT add a new
observe entry if this query overlaps with an existing one. In such a
case, the DOTS server replies with 4.09 (Conflict).

10. Error Handling

A list of common CoAP errors that are implemented by DOTS servers are
provided in Section 9 of [RFC9132]. The following additional error
cases apply for the telemetry extension:

* 4.00 (Bad Request) is returned by the DOTS server when the DOTS
client has sent a request that violates the DOTS telemetry
extension.

* 4.04 (Not Found) is returned by the DOTS server when the DOTS
client is requesting a 'tsid' or 'tmid' that is not valid.

* 4.00 (Bad Request) is returned by the DOTS server when the DOTS
client has sent a request with invalid query types (e.g., not
supported, malformed).

* 4.04 (Not Found) is returned by the DOTS server when the DOTS
client has sent a request with a target query that does not match
the target of the enclosed 'mid' as maintained by the DOTS server.

As indicated in Section 9 of [RFC9132], an additional plain text
diagnostic payload (Section 5.5.2 of [RFC7252]) to help
troubleshooting is returned in the body of the response.

11. YANG Modules
11.1. DOTS Signal Channel Telemetry YANG Module

This module uses types defined in [RFC6991] and [RFC8345].

```yang
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-dots-telemetry@2022-02-04.yang"
module ietf-dots-telemetry {
  yang-version 1.1;
  prefix dots-telemetry;

  import ietf-dots-signal-channel {
    prefix dots-signal;
    reference "RFC 9132: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification";
  }

  import ietf-dots-data-channel {
    prefix data-channel;
    reference "RFC 8783: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification";
  }

  import ietf-yang-types {
    prefix yang;
    reference "Section 3 of RFC 6991";
  }

  import ietf-inet-types {
    prefix inet;
    reference "Section 4 of RFC 6991";
  }

  import ietf-network-topology {
    prefix nt;
    reference "Section 6.2 of RFC 8345: A YANG Data Model for Network Topologies";
  }

  import ietf-yang-structure-ext {
    prefix sx;
    reference
```
This module contains YANG definitions for the signaling of DOTS telemetry data exchanged between a DOTS client and a DOTS server by means of the DOTS signal channel.

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This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see the RFC itself for full legal notices.

revision 2022-02-04 {
  description
    "Initial revision.";
  reference
    "RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry";
}

typedef attack-severity {
  type enumeration {
    enum none {
      value 1;
    }
  }
}
"No effect on the DOTS client domain."
}
enum low {
  value 2;
  description
  "Minimal effect on the DOTS client domain."
}
enum medium {
  value 3;
  description
  "A subset of DOTS client domain resources are
  out of service."
}
enum high {
  value 4;
  description
  "The DOTS client domain is under extremely severe
  conditions."
}
enum unknown {
  value 5;
  description
  "The impact of the attack is not known."
}

description
  "Enumeration for attack severity."
reference
  "RFC 7970: The Incident Object Description Exchange
  Format Version 2, Section 3.12.2";
}
typedef unit-class {
  type enumeration {
    enum packet-ps {
      value 1;
      description
      "Packets per second (pps)."
    }
    enum bit-ps {
      value 2;
      description
      "Bits per Second (bit/s)."
    }
    enum byte-ps {
      value 3;
typedef unit {
    type enumeration {
        enum packet-ps {
            value 1;
            description
                "Packets per second (pps).";
        }
        enum bit-ps {
            value 2;
            description
                "Bits per Second (bps).";
        }
        enum byte-ps {
            value 3;
            description
                "Bytes per second (Bps).";
        }
        enum kilopacket-ps {
            value 4;
            description
                "Kilo packets per second (kpps).";
        }
        enum kilobit-ps {
            value 5;
            description
                "Kilobits per second (kbps).";
        }
        enum kilobyte-ps {
            value 6;
            description
                "Kilobytes per second (kBps).";
        }
    }
}
enum megapacket-ps {
    value 7;
    description
        "Mega packets per second (Mpps).";
}
enum megabit-ps {
    value 8;
    description
        "Megabits per second (Mbps).";
}
enum megabyte-ps {
    value 9;
    description
        "Megabytes per second (MBps).";
}
enum gigapacket-ps {
    value 10;
    description
        "Giga packets per second (Gpps).";
}
enum gigabit-ps {
    value 11;
    description
        "Gigabits per second (Gbps).";
}
enum gigabyte-ps {
    value 12;
    description
        "Gigabytes per second (GBps).";
}
enum terapacket-ps {
    value 13;
    description
        "Tera packets per second (Tpps).";
}
enum terabit-ps {
    value 14;
    description
        "Terabits per second (Tbps).";
}
enum terabyte-ps {
value 15;
   description
   "Terabytes per second (TBps).";
}
enum petapacket-ps {
   value 16;
   description
   "Peta packets per second (Ppps).";
}
enum petabit-ps {
   value 17;
   description
   "Petabits per second (Pbps).";
}
enum petabyte-ps {
   value 18;
   description
   "Petabytes per second (PBps).";
}
enum exapacket-ps {
   value 19;
   description
   "Exa packets per second (Epps).";
}
enum exabit-ps {
   value 20;
   description
   "Exabits per second (Ebps).";
}
enum exabyte-ps {
   value 21;
   description
   "Exabytes per second (EBps).";
}
enum zettapacket-ps {
   value 22;
   description
   "Zetta packets per second (Zpps).";
}
enum zettabit-ps {
   value 23;
description
"Zettabits per second (Zbps).";
}
enum zettabyte-ps {
value 24;
description
"Zettabytes per second (ZBps).";
}

description
"Enumeration to indicate which unit is used.
Only one unit per unit class is used owing to
unit auto-scaling.";
}
typedef interval {
type enumeration {
enum 5-minutes {
value 1;
description
"5 minutes.";
}
enum 10-minutes {
value 2;
description
"10 minutes.";
}
enum 30-minutes {
value 3;
description
"30 minutes.";
}
enum hour {
value 4;
description
"Hour.";
}
enum day {
value 5;
description
"Day.";
}
enum week {
    value 6;
    description
    "Week.";
}
enum month {
    value 7;
    description
    "Month.";
}

description
"Enumeration to indicate the overall measurement period."
}
typedef sample {
    type enumeration {
        enum second {
            value 1;
            description
            "A one-second measurement period.";
        }
        enum 5-seconds {
            value 2;
            description
            "5-second measurement period.";
        }
        enum 30-seconds {
            value 3;
            description
            "30-second measurement period.";
        }
        enum minute {
            value 4;
            description
            "One-minute measurement period.";
        }
        enum 5-minutes {
            value 5;
            description
            "5-minute measurement period.";
        }
    }
}
"5-minute measurement period."

enum 10-minutes {
  value 6;
  description "10-minute measurement period."
}

enum 30-minutes {
  value 7;
  description "30-minute measurement period."
}

enum hour {
  value 8;
  description "One-hour measurement period."
}

description
"Enumeration to indicate the sampling period."

typedef percentile {
  type decimal64 {
    fraction-digits 2;
  }
  description "The nth percentile of a set of data is the value at which n percent of the data is below it."
}

typedef query-type {
  type enumeration {
    enum target-prefix {
      value 1;
      description "Query based on target prefix."
    }
    enum target-port {
      value 2;
      description
"
"Query based on target port number."

enum target-protocol {
    value 3;
    description "Query based on target protocol."
}

enum target-fqdn {
    value 4;
    description "Query based on target FQDN."
}

enum target-uri {
    value 5;
    description "Query based on target URI."
}

enum target-alias {
    value 6;
    description "Query based on target alias."
}

enum mid {
    value 7;
    description "Query based on mitigation identifier (mid)."
}

enum source-prefix {
    value 8;
    description "Query based on source prefix."
}

enum source-port {
    value 9;
    description "Query based on source port number."
}

enum source-icmp-type {
    value 10;
    description "Query based on ICMP type"
}

enum content {

value 11;

description
"Query based on 'c' Uri-Query option that is used
to control the selection of configuration
and non-configuration data nodes."

reference
"Section 4.4.2 of RFC 9132."

}

description
"Enumeration of support for query types that can be used
in a GET request to filter out data. Requests with
invalid query types (e.g., not supported, malformed)
received by the DOTS server are rejected with
a 4.00 (Bad Request) response code."

}

grouping telemetry-parameters {

description
"A grouping that includes a set of parameters that
are used to prepare the reported telemetry data.

The grouping indicates a measurement interval,
a measurement sample period, and low/mid/high
percentile values."

leaf measurement-interval {

type interval;

description
"Defines the period on which percentiles are computed."

}

leaf measurement-sample {

type sample;

description
"Defines the time distribution for measuring
values that are used to compute percentiles.

The measurement sample value must be less than the
measurement interval value."

}

leaf low-percentile {

type percentile;

default "10.00";

description
"Low percentile. If set to '0', this means low-percentiles
are disabled."

}

leaf mid-percentile {

type percentile;
must '. >= ../low-percentile' {
  error-message
  "The mid-percentile must be greater than or equal to the low-percentile.";
}
default "50.00";
description
  "Mid percentile. If set to the same value as low-percentile, this means mid-percentiles are disabled.";
}
leaf high-percentile {
  type percentile;
  must '. >= ../mid-percentile' {
    error-message
    "The high-percentile must be greater than or equal to the mid-percentile.";
  }
default "90.00";
description
  "High percentile. If set to the same value as mid-percentile, this means high-percentiles are disabled.";
}
}
grouping percentile-and-peak {
  description
  "Generic grouping for percentile and peak values.";
  leaf low-percentile-g {
    type yang:gauge64;
description
    "Low percentile value.";
  }
  leaf mid-percentile-g {
    type yang:gauge64;
description
    "Mid percentile value.";
  }
  leaf high-percentile-g {
    type yang:gauge64;
description
    "High percentile value.";
  }
}
leaf peak-g {
    type yang:gauge64;
    description
        "Peak value.";
}

}  

}  


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grouping percentile-peak-and-current {
    description
        "Generic grouping for percentile and peak values.";
    uses percentile-and-peak;
    leaf current-g {
        type yang:gauge64;
        description
            "Current value.";
    }
}

}  

}  

}  

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}  

}
Grouping of traffic as a function of the measurement unit.

leaf unit {
  type unit;
  description "The traffic can be measured using unit classes: packet-ps, bit-ps, or byte-ps. DOTS agents auto-scale to the appropriate units (e.g., megabit-ps, kilobit-ps).";
}

uses percentile-and-peak;

}

grouping traffic-unit-all {
  description
  
  leaf current-g {
    type yang:gauge64;
    description "Current observed value."
  }
}

grouping traffic-unit-protocol {
  description "Grouping of traffic of a given transport protocol as a function of the measurement unit."
leaf protocol {
  type uint8;

  For example, this parameter contains 6 for TCP, 17 for UDP, 33 for DCCP, or 132 for SCTP.";
}
uses traffic-unit;
}

grouping traffic-unit-protocol-all {
description
"Grouping of traffic of a given transport protocol as
a function of the measurement unit, including current
values."
uses traffic-unit-protocol;
leaf current-g {
  type yang:gauge64;
  description
  "Current observed value.";
}
}
grouping traffic-unit-port {
  description
  "Grouping of traffic bound to a port number as
  a function of the measurement unit.";
  leaf port {
    type inet:port-number;
    description
    "Port number used by a transport protocol.";
  }
}
grouping traffic-unit-port-all {
  description
  "Grouping of traffic bound to a port number as
  a function of the measurement unit, including
  current values.";
  uses traffic-unit-port;
  leaf current-g {
    type yang:gauge64;
    description
    "Current observed value.";
  }
}
grouping total-connection-capacity {
  description
  "Total connection capacities for various types of
  connections, as well as overall capacity. These data nodes are
useful to detect resource-consuming DDoS attacks.

leaf connection {
  type uint64;
  description
    "The maximum number of simultaneous connections that are allowed to the target server."
}

leaf connection-client {
  type uint64;
  description
    "The maximum number of simultaneous connections that are allowed to the target server per client."
}

leaf embryonic {
  type uint64;
  description
    "The maximum number of simultaneous embryonic connections that are allowed to the target server. The term 'embryonic connection' refers to a connection whose connection handshake is not finished. Embryonic connections are only possible in connection-oriented transport protocols like TCP or SCTP."
}

leaf embryonic-client {
  type uint64;
  description
    "The maximum number of simultaneous embryonic connections that are allowed to the target server per client."
}

leaf connection-ps {
  type uint64;
  description
    "The maximum number of new connections allowed per second to the target server."
}

leaf connection-client-ps {
  type uint64;
  description
    "The maximum number of new connections allowed per second to the target server per client."
}
leaf request-ps {
  type uint64;
  description
   "The maximum number of requests allowed per second to the target server.";
}
leaf request-client-ps {
  type uint64;
  description
   "The maximum number of requests allowed per second to the target server per client.";
}
leaf partial-request-max {
  type uint64;
  description
   "The maximum number of outstanding partial requests that are allowed to the target server.";
}
leaf partial-request-client-max {
  type uint64;
  description
   "The maximum number of outstanding partial requests that are allowed to the target server per client.";
}

grouping total-connection-capacity-protocol {
  description
   "Total connections capacity per protocol. These data nodes are useful to detect resource consuming DDoS attacks.";
  leaf protocol {
    type uint8;
    description
     "The transport protocol.

Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry: <https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
  }
  uses total-connection-capacity;
}

grouping connection-percentile-and-peak {
A set of data nodes which represent the attack characteristics.

container connection-c {
    uses percentile-and-peak;
    description
        "The number of simultaneous attack connections to the target server.";
}

container embryonic-c {
    uses percentile-and-peak;
    description
        "The number of simultaneous embryonic connections to the target server.";
}

container connection-ps-c {
    uses percentile-and-peak;
    description
        "The number of attack connections per second to the target server.";
}

container request-ps-c {
    uses percentile-and-peak;
    description
        "The number of attack requests per second to the target server.";
}

container partial-request-c {
    uses percentile-and-peak;
    description
        "The number of attack partial requests to the target server.";
}

}

grouping connection-all {
    description
        "Total attack connections including current values.";
    container connection-c {
        uses percentile-peak-and-current;
        description
}
"The number of simultaneous attack connections to the target server."
}
card embryonic-c {
    uses percentile-peak-and-current;
    description
        "The number of simultaneous embryonic connections to the target server."
}
card connection-ps-c {
    uses percentile-peak-and-current;
    description
        "The number of attack connections per second to the target server."
}
card request-ps-c {
    uses percentile-peak-and-current;
    description
        "The number of attack requests per second to the target server."
}
card partial-request-c {
    uses percentile-peak-and-current;
    description
        "The number of attack partial requests to the target server."
}

grouping connection-protocol {
    description
        "Total attack connections."
    leaf protocol {
        type uint8;
        description
            "The transport protocol. Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry: <https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>."
    }
    uses connection-percentile-and-peak;
}

grouping connection-port {
    description
        "Total attack connections per port number."
    leaf protocol {
        type uint8;
        description
            "The transport protocol. Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry: <https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
    }
}
"The transport protocol.
Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
}
leaf port {
  type inet:port-number;
  description
    "Port number.";
}
uses connection-percentile-and-peak;
}

grouping connection-protocol-all {
  description
    "Total attack connections per protocol, including current values.";
  leaf protocol {
    type uint8;
    description
      "The transport protocol.
Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
  }
  uses connection-all;
}

grouping connection-protocol-port-all {
  description
    "Total attack connections per port number, including current values.";
  leaf protocol {
    type uint8;
    description
      "The transport protocol.
Values are taken from the IANA Protocol Numbers registry:
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/protocol-numbers/>.";
  }
  leaf port {
    type inet:port-number;
    description
      "Port number.";
  }
  uses connection-all;
Various details that describe the ongoing attacks that need to be mitigated by the DOTS server. The attack details need to cover well-known and common attacks (such as a SYN Flood) along with new emerging or vendor-specific attacks.

Vendor ID is a security vendor's Private Enterprise Number as registered with IANA.

Vendor ID is a security vendor's Private Enterprise Number as registered with IANA.

Unique identifier assigned by the vendor for the attack.

"IANA: Private Enterprise Numbers"
}'attack-description'.';"
reference
"RFC 5646: Tags for Identifying Languages, Section 2.1";
}
leaf attack-description {
  type string;
  description
  "Textual representation of attack description. Natural
  Language Processing techniques (e.g., word embedding)
  might provide some utility in mapping the attack
  description to an attack type.";
}
leaf attack-severity {
  type attack-severity;
  description
  "Severity level of an attack. How this level is determined
  is implementation-specific.";
}
leaf start-time {
  type uint64;
  description
  "The time the attack started. Start time is represented in
  seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z.";
}
leaf end-time {
  type uint64;
  description
  "The time the attack ended. End time is represented in
  seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z.";
container source-count {
  description
    "Indicates the count of unique sources involved
    in the attack.";
  uses percentile-and-peak;
  leaf current-g {
    type yang:gauge64;
    description
      "Current observed value.";
  }
}

grouping talker {
  description
    "Defines generic data related to top-talkers.";
  leaf spoofed-status {
    type boolean;
    description
      "When set to 'true', it indicates whether this address
      is spoofed.";
  }
  leaf source-prefix {
    type inet:ip-prefix;
    description
      "IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
  }
  list source-port-range {
    key "lower-port";
    description
      "Port range. When only lower-port is
      present, it represents a single port number.";
    leaf lower-port {
      type inet:port-number;
      description
        "Lower port number of the port range.";
    }
    leaf upper-port {
      type inet:port-number;
      must '. >= ../lower-port' {

error-message
  "The upper port number must be greater than or equal to lower port number.";
}
description
  "Upper port number of the port range.";
}
list source-icmp-type-range {
  key "lower-type";
  description
    "ICMP type range. When only lower-type is present, it represents a single ICMP type.";
  leaf lower-type {
    type uint8;
    description
      "Lower ICMP type of the ICMP type range.";
  }
  leaf upper-type {
    type uint8;
    must '. >= ../lower-type' {
      error-message
        "The upper ICMP type must be greater than or equal to lower ICMP type.";
    }
    description
      "Upper type of the ICMP type range.";
  }
}
list total-attack-traffic {
  key "unit";
  description
    "Total attack traffic issued from this source.";
  uses traffic-unit-all;
}
}
grouping top-talker-aggregate {
  description
    "An aggregate of top attack sources. This aggregate is typically used when included in a mitigation request.";
list talker {
  key "source-prefix";
  description
    "Refers to a top-talker that is identified by an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
  uses talker;
  container total-attack-connection {
    description
      "Total attack connections issued from this source."
    uses connection-all;
  }
}
}

grouping top-talker {
  description
    "Top attack sources with detailed per-protocol structure."
  list talker {
    key "source-prefix";
    description
      "Refers to a top-talker that is identified by an IPv4 or IPv6 prefix identifying the attacker(s).";
    uses talker;
    list total-attack-connection-protocol {
      key "protocol";
      description
        "Total attack connections issued from this source."
      uses connection-protocol-all;
    }
  }
}


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grouping baseline {
  description
    "Grouping for the telemetry baseline."
  uses data-channel:target;
  leaf-list alias-name {
    type string;
    description
      "An alias name that points to an IP resource."
An IP resource can be a router, a host, an IoT object, a server, etc.;

```plaintext
list total-traffic-normal {
    key "unit";
    description
        "Total traffic normal baselines.";
    uses traffic-unit;
}
list total-traffic-normal-per-protocol {
    key "unit protocol";
    description
        "Total traffic normal baselines per protocol.";
    uses traffic-unit-protocol;
}
list total-traffic-normal-per-port {
    key "unit port";
    description
        "Total traffic normal baselines per port number.";
    uses traffic-unit-port;
}
list total-connection-capacity {
    key "protocol";
    description
        "Total connection capacity.";
    uses total-connection-capacity-protocol;
}
list total-connection-capacity-per-port {
    key "protocol port";
    description
        "Total connection capacity per port number.";
    leaf port {
        type inet:port-number;
        description
            "The target port number.";
    }
    uses total-connection-capacity-protocol;
}
```


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description
    "Grouping for the telemetry data."
list total-traffic {
    key "unit";
    description
        "Total traffic."
    uses traffic-unit-all;
}
list total-traffic-protocol {
    key "unit protocol";
    description
        "Total traffic per protocol."
    uses traffic-unit-protocol-all;
}
list total-traffic-port {
    key "unit port";
    description
        "Total traffic per port number."
    uses traffic-unit-port-all;
}
list total-attack-traffic {
    key "unit";
    description
        "Total attack traffic."
    uses traffic-unit-all;
}
list total-attack-traffic-protocol {
    key "unit protocol";
    description
        "Total attack traffic per protocol."
    uses traffic-unit-protocol-all;
}
list total-attack-traffic-port {
    key "unit port";
    description
        "Total attack traffic per port number."
    uses traffic-unit-port-all;
}
list total-attack-connection-protocol {
    key "protocol";
    description
        "Total attack connections."
    uses connection-protocol-all;
}
list total-attack-connection-port {
    key "protocol port";
    description
"Total attack connections per target port number."
uses connection-protocol-port-all;
}
list attack-detail {
  key "vendor-id attack-id";
description
  "Provides a set of attack details."
uses attack-detail;
container top-talker {
  description
    "Lists the top attack sources."
uses top-talker;
}
}

sx:augment-structure "/dots-signal:dots-signal"
  + "/dots-signal:message-type"
  + "/dots-signal:mitigation-scope"
  + "/dots-signal:scope" {
description
  "Extends mitigation scope with telemetry update data."
choice direction {
  description
    "Indicates the communication direction in which the
data nodes can be included."
  case server-to-client-only {
    description
      "These data nodes appear only in a mitigation message
sent from the server to the client."
    list total-traffic {
      key "unit";
description
        "Total traffic."
uses traffic-unit-all;
    }
  }
  }
}
list total-attack-traffic {
  key "unit";
description
"Total attack traffic."
uses traffic-unit-all;

list attack-detail {
  key "vendor-id attack-id";
  description
    "Attack details";
  uses attack-detail;
  container top-talker {
    description
      "Top attack sources.";
    uses top-talker-aggregate;
  }
}

sx:structure dots-telemetry {
  description
    "Main structure for DOTS telemetry messages.";
  choice telemetry-message-type {
    description
      "Can be a telemetry-setup or telemetry data.";
    case telemetry-setup {
      description
        "Indicates the message is about telemetry steup.";
      choice direction {
        description
          "Indicates the communication direction in which the data nodes can be included.";
        case server-to-client-only {
          description
            "These data nodes appear only in a telemetry message sent from the server to the client.";
          container max-config-values {
            description
              "Maximum acceptable configuration values.";
            uses telemetry-parameters;
            leaf server-originated-telemetry {
              type boolean;
              default "false";
              description
                "Indicates whether the DOTS server can be
instructed to send pre-or-ongoing-mitigation
telemetry. If set to 'false' or the data node
is not present, this is an indication that
the server does not support this capability.

leaf telemetry-notify-interval {
  type uint16 {
    range "1 .. 3600";
  }
}

container min-config-values {
  description
    "Minimum acceptable configuration values."
  uses telemetry-parameters;
  leaf telemetry-notify-interval {
    type uint16 {
      range "1 .. 3600";
    }
    units "seconds";
    description
      "Minimum number of seconds between successive
telemetry notifications.";
  }
}

container supported-unit-classes {
  description
    "Supported unit classes and default activation
    status.";
  uses unit-config;
leaf-list supported-query-type {
  type query-type;
  description
    "Indicates which query types are supported by
    the server. If the server does not announce
    the query types it supports, the client will
    be unable to use any of the potential
    query-type values to reduce the returned data
    content from the server."
}

list telemetry {
  description
    "The telemetry data per DOTS client. The keys
    of the list are 'cuid' and 'tsid', but these keys are
    not represented here because these keys are conveyed
    as mandatory Uri-Paths in requests. Omitting keys
    is compliant with RFC8791."
choice direction {
  description
    "Indicates the communication direction in which the
data nodes can be included.";
  case server-to-client-only {
    description
      "These data nodes appear only in a telemetry message
      sent from the server to the client."
    leaf tsid {
      type uint32;
      description
        "A client-assigned identifier for the DOTS
        telemetry setup data."
    }
  }
}
choice setup-type {
  description
    "Can be a mitigation configuration, a pipe capacity,
or baseline message."
  case telemetry-config {

description
"Used to set telemetry parameters such as setting low, mid, and high percentile values."
container current-config {
  description
  "Current telemetry configuration values."
  uses telemetry-parameters;
  uses unit-config;
  leaf server-originated-telemetry {
    type boolean;
    description
    "Used by a DOTS client to enable/disable whether it requests pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry from the DOTS server."
  }
  leaf telemetry-notify-interval {
    type uint16 {
      range "1 .. 3600"
    }
    units "seconds";
    description
    "Minimum number of seconds between successive telemetry notifications."
  }
}
}
}
}
}
case pipe {
  description
  "Total pipe capacity of a DOTS client domain."
  list total-pipe-capacity {
    key "link-id unit";
    description
    "Total pipe capacity of a DOTS client domain."
    leaf link-id {
      type nt:link-id;
      description
      "Identifier of an interconnection link of the DOTS client domain."
    }
    leaf capacity {
      type uint64;
    }
  }
}
}
mandatory true;
  description
  "Pipe capacity. This attribute is mandatory when
total-pipe-capacity is included in a message.";
}
leaf unit {
  type unit;
  description
  "The traffic can be measured using unit classes:
packets per second (pps), bits per second
(bit/s), and/or bytes per second (Byte/s).

For a given unit class, the DOTS agents
auto-scales to the appropriate units (e.g.,
megabit-ps, kilobit-ps).";
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}


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description
  "An identifier that uniquely identifies a
  baseline entry communicated by a DOTS client.";
}
uses baseline;
}
}
}
}
}
}
case telemetry {

description
"Telemetry information."
list pre-or-ongoing-mitigation {
  description
  "Pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry per DOTS client. The keys of the list are 'cuid' and 'tmid', but these keys are not represented here because these keys are conveyed as mandatory Uri-Paths in requests. Omitting keys is compliant with RFC8791.";
  choice direction {
    description
    "Indicates the communication direction in which the data nodes can be included.";
    case server-to-client-only {
      description
      "These data nodes appear only in a telemetry message sent from the server to the client.";
      leaf tmid {
        type uint32;
        description
        "A client-assigned identifier for the DOTS telemetry data.";
      }
    }
  }
  container target {
    description
    "Indicates the target. At least one of the attributes 'target-prefix', 'target-fqdn', 'target-uri', 'alias-name', or 'mid-list' must be present in the target definition.";
    uses data-channel:target;
    leaf-list alias-name {
      type string;
      description
      "An alias name that points to a resource.";
    }
    leaf-list mid-list {
      type uint32;
      description
      "Reference a list of associated mitigation
requests.

"RFC 9132": Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Signal Channel Specification, Section 4.4.1,

uses pre-or-ongoing-mitigation;

11.2. Vendor Attack Mapping Details YANG Module

module ietf-dots-mapping {
  yang-version 1.1;
  namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-dots-mapping";
  prefix dots-mapping;

  import ietf-dots-data-channel {
    prefix data-channel;
    reference
      "RFC 8783": Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Data Channel Specification";
  }

  organization
    "IETF DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) Working Group";
  contact
    "WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/dots/>
    WG List: <mailto:dots@ietf.org>
    Author: Mohamed Boucadair
      <mailto:mohamed.boucadair@orange.com>
    Author: Jon Shallow
      <mailto:supjps-ietf@jpshallow.com>"

  description
    "This module contains YANG definitions for the sharing DDoS attack mapping details between a DOTS client and
a DOTS server, by means of the DOTS data channel.

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authors of the code. All rights reserved.

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forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
Relating to IETF Documents

This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
the RFC itself for full legal notices."

revision 2022-02-04 {
  description
    "Initial revision.";
  reference
    "RFC XXXX: Distributed Denial-of-Service Open Threat
     Signaling (DOTS) Telemetry";
}

feature dots-telemetry {
  description
    "This feature indicates that DOTS telemetry data can be
     shared between DOTS clients and servers.";
}

grouping attack-mapping {
  description
    "A set of information used for sharing vendor attack mapping
     information with a peer.";
  list vendor {
    key "vendor-id";
    description
      "Vendor attack mapping information of the client/server";
    leaf vendor-id {
      type uint32;
      description
        "Vendor ID is a security vendor's Private Enterprise Number
         as registered with IANA.";
      reference
        "IANA: Private Enterprise Numbers";
    }
    leaf vendor-name {
      type string;
"The name of the vendor (e.g., company A)."

leaf description-lang {
  type string {
    pattern '(([A-Za-z]{2,3}(-[A-Za-z]{3}(-[A-Za-z]{3})' + '{0,2})?|[A-Za-z]{4}|[A-Za-z]{5,8})([-A-Za-z]{4})?' + '(-([A-Za-z]{2})[0-9]{3}))?(-([A-Za-z0-9]{5,8}' + '|([0-9]{9})([-A-Za-z0-9]{3}))*)*(-[0-9A-WY-Wy-w-z]' + '(-([A-Za-z0-9]{2,8}))+([-Xx](-([A-Za-z0-9]{1,8}))'| + '{1,8})+)?|[Xx](-([A-Za-z0-9]{1,8}))+|' + '(([Ee][Nn]-[Gg][Bb]-[Oo][Ee][Dd])[Ii]-' + '[Aa][Mm][Ii][Ii]-[Bb][Nn][Nn]|Nn][Nn]||Ii]' + '+[Dd][Ee][Ff][Aa][Uu][Ll][Tt][Ii]-' + '([Ee][Nn]-[Gg][Bb]-[Oo][Ee][Dd])[Ii]-' + '([Aa][Mm][Ii][Ii]-[Bb][Nn][Nn][Nn]|Nn]' + '+[Ii]-[Hh][Aa][Kk]' + '+[Ii]-[Kk][Ll][Ii][Nn][Gg][Oo][Nn]' + '+[Ii]-[Ll][Uu][Xx][Ii]-[Mm][Ii][Nn][Gg][Oo]' + '+[Ii]-[Nn][Aa][Aa][Jj][Oo][Ii]-[Pp][Ww][Nn]' + '+[Ii]-[Tt][Aa][Oo][Ii]-[Tt][Aa][Yy]' + '+[Ss][Gg][Nn]-[Bb][Ee]-[Ff][Rr]' + '+[Ss][Gg][Nn]-[Bb][Ee]-[Nn][Ll][Ss][Gg][Nn]' + '+[Cc][Hh]-[Dd][Ee]|([Aa][Rr][Tt][Ii]-' + '+[Ll][Oo][Jj][Bb][Aa][Nn]|[Cc][Ee][Ll]-' + '+[Gg][Aa][Uu][Ll][Ii][Ss][Hh]' + '+[Nn][Oo]-[Bb][Oo][Kk][Nn][Oo]' + '+[Nn][Yy][Nn][Zz][Hh]-[Gg][Uu][Oo][Yy][Uu]' + '+[Zz][Hh]-[Hh][Aa][Kk][Kk][Aa][Zz][Hh]' + '+[Mm][Ii][Nn][Zz][Hh]-[Mm][Ii][Nn]' + '+[Nn][Aa][Nn][Zz][Hh]-[Xx][Ii][Aa][Nn][Gg])
  }
  default "en-US"
  description
      "Indicates the language tag that is used for 'attack-description'."
  reference
      "RFC 5646: Tags for Identifying Languages, Section 2.1"
}
leaf last-updated {
  type uint64;
  mandatory true;
description
"The time the mapping table was updated. It is represented
in seconds relative to 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z."
}

list attack-mapping {
  key "attack-id";
  description
  "Attack mapping details.";
}

leaf attack-id {
  type uint32;
  description
  "Unique identifier assigned by the vendor for the attack.";
}

leaf attack-description {
  type string;
  mandatory true;
  description
  "Textual representation of attack description. Natural Language Processing techniques (e.g., word embedding) might provide some utility in mapping the attack description to an attack type.";
}

augment "/data-channel:dots-data/data-channel:dots-client" {
  if-feature "dots-telemetry";
  description
  "Augments the data channel with a vendor attack mapping table of the DOTS client.";
  container vendor-mapping {
    description
    "Used by DOTS clients to share their vendor attack mapping information with DOTS servers.";
    uses attack-mapping;
  }
}

augment "/data-channel:dots-data/data-channel:capabilities" {

if-feature "dots-telemetry";
description
"Augments the DOTS server capabilities with a
parameter to indicate whether they can share
attack mapping details.";
leaf vendor-mapping-enabled {
  type boolean;
  config false;
  description
  "Indicates that the DOTS server supports sharing
  attack vendor mapping details with DOTS clients.";
}
}

augment "/data-channel:dots-data" {

12. YANG/JSON Mapping Parameters to CBOR

All DOTS telemetry parameters in the payload of the DOTS signal
channel MUST be mapped to CBOR types as shown in Table 3:

* Note: Implementers must check that the mapping output provided by
  their YANG-to-CBOR encoding schemes is aligned with the content of
  Table 2.

+----------------------+-------------+------+---------------+--------+
| Parameter Name       | YANG        | CBOR | CBOR Major    | JSON   |
+----------------------+-------------+------+---------------+--------+
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
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<td>0 unsigned</td>
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<td>4 array</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>decimal64</td>
<td>TBA3</td>
<td>6 tag 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>decimal64</td>
<td>TBA4</td>
<td>6 tag 4</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<td>yang:gauge64</td>
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</tr>
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<td>connection-c</td>
<td>container</td>
<td>TBA31</td>
<td>5 map</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<td>5 map</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7 bits 21</td>
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<td>baseline</td>
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<td>5 map</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>


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| measurement-sample          | enumeration | TBA58 | 0 unsigned  | String |
| talker                      | list        | TBA59 | 4 array     | Array  |
| source-prefix               | inet:       | TBA60 | 3 text string| String |
|                             | ip-prefix   |       |             |        |
| mid-list                    | leaf-list   | TBA61 | 4 array     | Array  |
|                             | uint32      |       | 0 unsigned  | Number |
| source-port-range           | list        | TBA62 | 4 array     | Array  |
| source-icmp-type-range      | list        | TBA63 | 4 array     | Array  |
| target                      | container   | TBA64 | 5 map       | Object |
| capacity                    | uint64      | TBA65 | 0 unsigned  | String |
| protocol                    | uint8       | TBA66 | 0 unsigned  | Number |
| total-traffic-normal-per-protocol | list | TBA67 | 4 array | Array |
| total-traffic-normal-per-port | list | TBA68 | 4 array | Array |
| total-connection-capacity-per-port | list | TBA69 | 4 array | Array |
| total-traffic-protocol | list | TBA70 | 4 array | Array |
| total-traffic-port | list | TBA71 | 4 array | Array |
| total-attack-traffic-protocol | list | TBA72 | 4 array | Array |
| total-attack-traffic-port | list | TBA73 | 4 array | Array |
| port | inet: | port-number | TBA75 | 0 unsigned | Number |
| supported-query-type | leaf-list | TBA76 | 4 array | Array |
| vendor-id | uint32 | TBA77 | 0 unsigned | String |
| ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup | container | TBA78 | 5 map | Object |
| ietf-dots-telemetry:total-traffic | list | TBA79 | 4 array | Array |
| ietf-dots-telemetry:total-attack-traffic | list | TBA80 | 4 array | Array |
| ietf-dots-telemetry:total-attack-connection | container | TBA81 | 5 map | Object |
| ietf-dots-telemetry:attack-detail | list | TBA82 | 4 array | Array |
| ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry | container | TBA83 | 5 map | Object |
| current-g | yang:gauge64 | TBA84 | 0 unsigned | String |
| description-lang | string | TBA85 | 3 text string | String |
| lower-type | uint8 | 32771 | 0 unsigned | Number |

Table 3: YANG/JSON Mapping Parameters to CBOR
13. IANA Considerations

13.1. DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Key Values

This specification registers the DOTS telemetry attributes in the IANA "DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Key Values" registry [Key-Map].

The DOTS telemetry attributes defined in this specification are comprehension-optional parameters.

* Note to the IANA: CBOR keys are assigned from the "128-255" range. This specification meets the requirements listed in Section 3.1 [RFC9132] for assignments in the "128-255" range.

* Note to the RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "TBA1-TBA84" with the assigned values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter Name</th>
<th>CBOR Key Value</th>
<th>CBOR Major Type</th>
<th>Change Controller</th>
<th>Specification Document(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tsid</td>
<td>TBA1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
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<td>telemetry</td>
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<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
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<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
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<td>end-time</td>
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<td>source-count</td>
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<tr>
<td>top-talker</td>
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<tr>
<td>spoofed-status</td>
<td>TBA44</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>partial-request-c</td>
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<td>total-attack</td>
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<td>connection-protocol</td>
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<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
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<td>baseline</td>
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<td>current-config</td>
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<td>max-config-value</td>
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<td>min-config-values</td>
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<td>supported-unit-classes</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>server-originated-telemetry</td>
<td>TBA54</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>IESG</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>telemetry-notify-interval</td>
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<td>tmid</td>
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<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
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<td>measurement-interval</td>
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<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
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<td>measurement-sample</td>
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<tr>
<td>talker</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
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<td>source-prefix</td>
<td>TBA60</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
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<tr>
<td>mid-list</td>
<td>TBA61</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>source-port-range</td>
<td>TBA62</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>source-icmp-type-range</td>
<td>TBA63</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 4: Registered DOTS Signal Channel CBOR Key Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>target</td>
<td>TBA64</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
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<tr>
<td>capacity</td>
<td>TBA65</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>protocol</td>
<td>TBA66</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total-traffic-normal-per-protocol</td>
<td>TBA67</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total-traffic-normal-per-port</td>
<td>TBA68</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total-connection-capacity-per-port</td>
<td>TBA69</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total-traffic-protocol</td>
<td>TBA70</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total-traffic-traffic-port</td>
<td>TBA71</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total-traffic-traffic-protocol</td>
<td>TBA72</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total-attack-traffic-port</td>
<td>TBA73</td>
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<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
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<tr>
<td>total-attack-traffic-connection-port</td>
<td>TBA74</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
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<tr>
<td>port</td>
<td>TBA75</td>
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<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
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<tr>
<td>supported-query-type</td>
<td>TBA76</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vendor-id</td>
<td>TBA77</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry-setup</td>
<td>TBA78</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ietf-dots-telemetry:total-traffic</td>
<td>TBA79</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ietf-dots-telemetry:total-attack-traffic</td>
<td>TBA80</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ietf-dots-telemetry:total-attack-connection</td>
<td>TBA81</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ietf-dots-telemetry:attack-detail</td>
<td>TBA82</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ietf-dots-telemetry:telemetry</td>
<td>TBA83</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>current-g</td>
<td>TBA84</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
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<tr>
<td>description-lang</td>
<td>TBA85</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>IESG</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 13.2. DOTS Signal Channel Conflict Cause Codes
This specification requests IANA to assign a new code from the "DOTS Signal Channel Conflict Cause Codes" registry [Cause].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TBA</td>
<td>overlapping-pipes</td>
<td>Overlapping pipe scope</td>
<td>[RFCXXXX]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Registered DOTS Signal Channel Conflict Cause Code

* Note to the RFC Editor: Please replace all occurrences of "TBA" with the assigned value.

13.3. DOTS Signal Telemetry YANG Module

This document requests IANA to register the following URIs in the "ns" subregistry within the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:

Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

Registrant Contact: The IESG.
XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

This document requests IANA to register the following YANG modules in the "YANG Module Names" subregistry [RFC6020] within the "YANG Parameters" registry.

name: ietf-dots-telemetry
maintained by IANA: N
prefix: dots-telemetry
reference: RFC XXXX

name: ietf-dots-mapping
14. Security Considerations

14.1. DOTS Signal Channel Telemetry

The security considerations for the DOTS signal channel protocol are discussed in Section 11 of [RFC9132]. The following discusses the security considerations that are specific to the DOTS signal channel extension defined in this document.

The DOTS telemetry information includes DOTS client network topology, DOTS client domain pipe capacity, normal traffic baseline and connections' capacity, and threat and mitigation information. Such information is sensitive; it MUST be protected at rest by the DOTS server domain to prevent data leakage. Note that sharing this sensitive data with a trusted DOTS server does not introduce any new significant considerations other that the need for the aforementioned protection. Such a DOTS server is already trusted to have access to that kind of information by being in the position to observe and mitigate attacks.

DOTS clients are typically considered to be trusted devices by the DOTS client domain. DOTS clients may be co-located on network security services (e.g., firewall devices), and a compromised security service potentially can do a lot more damage to the network than just the DOTS client component. This assumption differs from the often held view that devices are untrusted, often referred to as the "zero-trust model". A compromised DOTS client can send fake DOTS telemetry data to a DOTS server to mislead the DOTS server. This attack can be prevented by monitoring and auditing DOTS clients to detect misbehavior and to deter misuse, and by only authorizing the
DOTS client to convey DOTS telemetry information for specific target resources (e.g., an application server is authorized to exchange DOTS telemetry for its IP addresses but a DDoS mitigator can exchange DOTS telemetry for any target resource in the network). As a reminder, this is a variation of dealing with compromised DOTS clients as discussed in Section 11 of [RFC9132].

DOTS servers must be capable of defending themselves against DoS attacks from compromised DOTS clients. The following non-comprehensive list of mitigation techniques can be used by a DOTS server to handle misbehaving DOTS clients:

* The probing rate (defined in Section 4.5 of [RFC9132]) can be used to limit the average data rate to the DOTS server.

* Rate-limiting DOTS telemetry, including those with new 'tmid' values, from the same DOTS client defends against DoS attacks that would result in varying the 'tmid' to exhaust DOTS server resources. Likewise, the DOTS server can enforce a quota and time-limit on the number of active pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry data items (identified by 'tmid') from the DOTS client.

Note also that telemetry notification interval may be used to rate-limit the pre-or-ongoing-mitigation telemetry notifications received by a DOTS client domain.

### 14.2. Vendor Attack Mapping

The security considerations for the DOTS data channel protocol are discussed in Section 10 of [RFC8783]. The following discusses the security considerations that are specific to the DOTS data channel extension defined in this document.

All data nodes defined in the YANG module specified in Section 11.2 which can be created, modified, and deleted (i.e., config true, which is the default) are considered sensitive. Write operations to these
data nodes without proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations. Appropriate security measures are recommended to prevent illegitimate users from invoking DOTS data channel primitives as discussed in [RFC8783]. Nevertheless, an attacker who can access a DOTS client is technically capable of undertaking various attacks, such as:

* Communicating invalid attack mapping details to the server ('/data-channel:dots-data/data-channel:dots-client/dots-telemetry:vendor-mapping'), which will mislead the server when correlating attack details.

Some of the readable data nodes in the YANG module specified in Section 11.2 may be considered sensitive. It is thus important to control read access to these data nodes. These are the data nodes and their sensitivity:

* '/data-channel:dots-data/data-channel:dots-client/dots-telemetry:vendor-mapping' can be misused to infer the DDoS protection technology deployed in a DOTS client domain.

* '/data-channel:dots-data/dots-telemetry:vendor-mapping' can be used by a compromised DOTS client to leak the attack detection capabilities of the DOTS server. This is a variation of the compromised DOTS client attacks discussed in Section 14.1.

15. Contributors

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