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    Use cases for DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DDoS) Open Threat Signaling
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Abstract

   The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to provide a
   dynamic solution for DDoS cooperation between networks to
   appropriately react to DDoS attacks. This document presents use
   cases to evaluate the interactions expected between the DOTS
   components as well as the DOTS exchanges. The purpose of the use
   cases is to identify the interacting DOTS components, how they
   collaborate and what are the types of information to be exchanged.

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1. Introduction

   Currently, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack mitigation
   solutions are largely based upon siloed, proprietary communications
   schemes which result in vendor lock-in. As a side-effect, this makes
   the configuration, provisioning, operation, and activation of these
   solutions a highly manual and often time-consuming process.
   Additionally, coordination of multiple DDoS mitigation solutions
   simultaneously engaged in defending the same organization (resources)
   against DDoS attacks is fraught with both technical and process-
   related hurdles. This greatly increase operational complexity and
   often results in suboptimal DDoS attack mitigation efficacy.

The DDoS Open Threat Signaling (DOTS) effort is intended to specify a
protocol that facilitates interoperability between multivendor DDoS
mitigation solutions and ensures more automation in term of
mitigation requests and attack characterization patterns. As DDoS
solutions are broadly heterogeneous among different vendors, the
primary goal for DOTS is to provide a high level interaction with
these DDoS solutions such as initiating or terminating DDoS
mitigation assistance.

It should be noted that DOTS is not in and of itself intended to
perform orchestration functions duplicative of the functionality
being developed by the [I2NSF] WG; rather, DOTS is intended to allow
devices, services, and applications to request DDoS attack mitigation
assistance and receive mitigation status updates.

These use cases are expected to provide inputs for the design of the
DOTS protocol(s).

2. Terminology and Acronyms

This document makes use of the terms defined in
[I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

In addition, this document introduces the following terms:

   Inter-domain: a DOTS communications relationship between distinct
   organizations with separate spans of administrative control.
   Typical inter-domain DOTS communication relationships would be
   between a DDoS mitigation service provider and an end-customer who
   requires DDoS mitigation assistance; between multiple DDoS
   mitigation service providers coordinating mutual defense of a
   mutual end-customer; or between DDoS mitigation service providers
   which are requesting additional DDoS mitigation assistance in for
   attacks which exceed their inherent DDoS mitigation capacities
   and/or capabilities.

   Intra- domain: a DOTS communications relationship between various
   (network) elements that are owned and operated by the same
   administrative entity. A typical intra-domain DOTS communications
   relationship would be between DOTS agents [I-D.ietf-dots-
   requirements] within the same organization.

3. Use Cases Scenarios

This section provides a high-level description of scenarios addressed
by DOTS. In both sub-sections, the scenarios are provided in order
to illustrate the use of DOTS in typical DDoS attack scenarios. They

are not definitive, and other use cases are expected to emerge with widespread DOTS deployment.

All scenarios present a coordination between the targeted organization, the DDoS attack telemetry and the mitigator. The coordination and communication between these entities depends, for example, on the characteristic or functionality of the entity itself, the reliability of the information provided by DDoS attack telemetry, and the business relationship between the DDoS target domain and the mitigator.

More explicitly, in some cases, the DDoS attack telemetry may simply activate a DDoS mitigation, whereas in other cases, it may collaborate by providing some information about an attack. In some cases, the DDoS mitigation may be orchestrated, which includes selecting a specific appliance as well as starting/ending a mitigation.

3.1. Inter-domain Use Cases

3.1.1. Enterprise with an upstream transit provider DDoS mitigation Service

In this scenario, an enterprise network with self-hosted Internet-facing properties such as Web servers, authoritative DNS servers, and VoIP service platforms has a DDoS mitigation system (DMS) deployed to protect those servers, applications, and network resources from DDoS attacks. In addition to their on-premise DDoS defense capability, they have contracted with their Internet access provider for DDoS mitigation services which threaten to overwhelm their WAN interconnection link(s) bandwidth.

The DMS is configured such that if the incoming Internet traffic volume exceeds, e.g., 50% of the provisioned upstream Internet interconnection link(s) capacity, the DMS will request DDoS mitigation assistance from the upstream access provider.

Before any communication takes place between DOTS agents, security credentials are provisioned on these agents so that only authorized entities can trigger mitigation actions.

The communication to trigger, manage, and terminate a DDoS mitigation between the enterprise DMS and the access provider(s) is performed using DOTS. The enterprise DMS implements a DOTS client while the access provider implements a DOTS server. A DOTS client can establish communications with multiple DOTS servers, if the enterprise is multi-homed or of distinct access technologies are used (e.g., fixed, LTE).

When the DMS detects an inbound DDoS attack targeting the enterprise
resources, it immediately begins mitigating the attack.

During the course of the attack, the inbound traffic volume exceeds
the 50% threshold; the DMS DOTS client signals its DOTS server(s) on
the upstream access provider network(s) to initiate DDoS mitigation
immediately. The DOTS server signals the DOTS client that it can
service this request, and mitigation is initiated on the access
provider network.

Over the course of the attack, the DOTS server on the transit
provider network periodically signals the DOTS client on the
enterprise DMS in order to provide mitigation status information,
statistics related to DDoS attack traffic mitigation, and related
information . Such information are collected by the DOTS server, but
the way these are collected are outside of DOTS. Once the DDoS
attack has ended, the DOTS server signals the enterprise DMS DOTS
client that the attack has subsided. This signal may not be sent
immediately, but once the peace time is judged stable; the duration
observation of the peace time after an attack is deployment-specific.

The enterprise DMS then requests that DDoS mitigation services on the
upstream access provider network be terminated. The DOTS server on
the access provider network receives this request, communicates with
the access provider orchestration system controlling its DDoS
mitigation system to terminate attack mitigation, and once the
mitigation has ended, confirms the end of upstream DDoS mitigation
service to the enterprise DMS DOTS client.

Request termination will be repeated with each of the upstream DOTS
servers reachable through links that were under DDoS attack.

3.1.2. Enterprise with a Cloud DDoS Mitigation Provider

This use case details an enterprise that has a local DDoS detection
and classification capability and may or may not have a mitigation
capability. The enterprise is contracted with a cloud DDoS
mitigation provider who can redirect (off-ramp) traffic away from the
enterprise, provide scrubbing services, and return "clean" traffic
back to the enterprise (on-ramp) on an ad-hoc, on demand basis.

The enterprise may, either by hard coding or on a case by case basis,
determine thresholds at which a request for mitigation is triggered
indicating to the cloud provider that traffic should be redirected
and scrubbed.

The communication to trigger, manage, and terminate a DDoS mitigation
between the enterprise and the Cloud provider is performed using

DOTS. The enterprise implements a DOTS client while the Cloud
Provider implements a DOTS server.

The enterprise detection and classification systems encompass a DOTS
client and the cloud provider a DOTS server.

When an attack is detected an automated or manual DOTS mitigation
request will be generated and sent to the cloud provider. The cloud
provider will assess the request for validity and if passed a
mitigation action may then be initiated. This action will usually
involve the off-ramp of all traffic destined to the target for
further scrutiny and filtering by the cloud provider. This should
not only result in an alleviation of pressure on the enterprise
network but also on its upstream provider and peers. How traffic
redirection is implemented is out of scope.

The cloud provider should signal via DOTS to the enterprise that a
mitigation request has been received and acted upon and should also
include a basic situational status of the attack. The cloud provider
may respond periodically with additional updates on the status to
enable the enterprise to make an informed decision on whether to
maintain or cancel the mitigation. An alternative approach would be
for the DOTS client mitigation request to include a time to live
(TTL) for the mitigation which may be extended by the client should
the attack still be ongoing as the TTL reaches expiration.

A variation of this use case may be that the enterprise is providing
a flow-based monitoring and analysis service to customers whose
networks may be protected by any one of a number of 3rd party
providers. The enterprise in question may integrate with these 3rd
party providers using DOTS and signal accordingly when a customer is
attacked - the enterprise may then manage the life-cycle of the
attack on behalf of the enterprise.

3.2. Intra-domain Use Cases

3.2.1. Homenet DDoS Detection Collaboration for ISP network management

Home networks run with (limited) bandwidth as well as limited routing
resources, while they are expected to provide services reachable from
the outside [RFC7368]. This makes such networks some easy targets to
DDoS attacks via their WAN interface. As these DDoS attacks are easy
to perform, they may remain undetected by the upstream ISP. When the
CPE is congested, the customer is likely to call the ISP hotline. In
order to improve the quality of experience of the connectivity as
well as to automate the request for DDoS mitigation, ISPs are likely
to consider a standard mean for CPEs to automatically inform a

dedicated service mitigation platform when they are under a suspected
DDoS.

Note also that this section only considers DDoS attacks CPE or
services in the home network are encountering. This differs from
DDoS attacks the CPE or any device within the home network may take
part of - such as botnets. In the later attacks, the home network
generates traffic under the control of a botmaster. Such attacks may
only be detected once the attacks have been characterized. It would
be tempting to consider a feature in the DOTS protocol to allow a
DOTS server to inform a CPE that some suspect traffic is being sent
by the CPE so that appropriate actions are undertaken by the CPE/
user. Nevertheless, this feature would require some interaction with
the CPE administrator. Such scenario is outside the scope of this
document.

In this use case, ISPs are willing to prevent their customer
undergoing DDoS attacks in order to enhance the quality of experience
of their customers, to avoid unnecessary costly call on hot lines as
well as to optimize the bandwidth of their network. A key challenge
for the ISP is to detect DDoS attacks. In fact, DDoS detection is
not only fine grained but is also expected to be different for each
home network or small businesses networks (SOHO), and the ISP is
unlikely to have sufficient resource to inspect the traffic of all
its customers.

In order to address these challenges, ISPs are delegating the DDoS
detection to CPE of home network or SOHO. Outsourcing the detection
on the CPE provides the following advantages to the ISP: 1) Avoid the
ISP to dedicate a huge amount of resource for deep packet inspection
over a large amount of traffic with a specific security policies
associated to each home network. It is expected that such traffic
only constitutes a small fraction of the total traffic the ISP is
responsible for. 2) DDoS detection is deployed in a scalable way. 3)
Provide more deterministic DDoS attack detection. For example, what
could be suspected to be an UDP flood by the ISP may be consented by
the terminating point hosted in the home network or SOHO. In fact,
without specific home network security policies, the ISP is likely to
detect DDoS attack over regular traffic or to miss DDoS attacks
targeting a specific home network or CPE. In the first case, this
would result in the ISP spending unnecessary resources and in the
second case this would directly impact the quality of experience of
the customer.

Note that in this scenario slightly differs from the "Enterprise with
an upstream transit provider DDoS mitigation Service" scenario
described in Section 3.1.1. In this scenario, the detection DDoS is
motivated by the ISP in order to operate appropriately its network.

For that purpose, it requires some collaboration with the home
network. In Section 3.1.1, the target network requests a mitigation
service from the upstream transit provider in order to operate its
services.

Even though the motivations differ, there are still significant
advantages for the home network to collaborate. On the home network
or SOHO perspective such collaboration provides the following
advantages: 1) If it removes the flows contributing to a DDoS
attacks, then it enhances the quality of experience of the users of
the targeted services or the entire home network. 2) If mitigation is
being handled by the ISP rather then the home network, then it
reduces the management of DDoS attacks by the network administrator
which involves detection as well as mitigation as well as the
provisioning of extra resources. 3) If the DDoS detection is based on
information specific to the home network, such as for example the
description of the services, the hosts capacities or the network
topology, then performing the DDoS detection by the home network
instead of the ISP avoids the home network to leak private
information to the ISP. In that sense, it better preserves the home
network or SOHO privacy while enabling a better detection. However,
the request for mitigation may still leak some informations. ISPs
must not retrieve sensitive data without the consent of the user.
This is usually captured in administrative contracts that are out of
scope of this document.

When the CPE suspects an attack, it notifies automatically or the
ISP. The contact address of the DDoS Mitigation service of the ISP
may be hard coded or may be configured manually or automatically
(e.g., eventually the DHCP server may provide the DDoS mitigation
service via specific DHCP options).

The communication to trigger a DDoS mitigation between the home
network and the ISP is performed using DOTS. The home network CPE
implements a DOTS client while the ISP implements a DOTS server.

The DOTS client on the CPE monitors the status of CPE's resource and
WAN link bandwidth usage. If something unusual happens based on
preconfigured throughput, traffic patter, explicit action from the
user, or some heuristics methods, the DOTS client sends a DOTS
mitigation request to the ISP DOTS server. Typically, a default
configuration with no additional information associated to the DOTS
mitigation request is expected. The ISP derives traffic to mitigate
from the CPE IP address.

In some cases, the DOTS mitigation request contains options such as
some IP addresses or prefixes that belongs to a whitelist or a
blacklist. In this case, the white and black lists are not

associated to some analysis performed by the CPE -- as the CPE is
clearly not expected to analyze such attacks. Instead these are part
of some configuration parameters. For example, in the case of small
business, one may indicate specific legitimate IP addresses such as
those used for VPNs, or third party services the company is likely to
set a session. Similarly, the CPE may provide the IP addresses
targeting the assets to be protected inside the network. Note that
the IP address is the IP address used to reach the asset from the
internet, and as such is expected to be globally routable. Such
options may include the IP address as well as a service description.
Similarly to the previous blacklist and whitelist, such information
are likely not derived from a traffic analysis performed by the CPE,
but instead are more related to configuration parameters.

Upon receiving the DOTS mitigation request, the DOTS server
acknowledges its reception and confirms DDoS mitigation starts or
not. Such feed back is mostly to avoid retransmission of the
request.

Note that the ISP is connected to multiple CPEs and as such the CPE
can potentially perform DDoS attack to the DOTS server. ISP may use
gateways to absorbs the traffic. These gateways, will typically
aggregate a smaller number of CPEs and retransmit to the destination
DOTS Server a selected information. Note that such gateways may
somehow act as a DOTS relay, which is implemented with a DOTS Server
and a DOTS Client. Note also that the case of a large DDoS attack
targeting simultaneously multiple CPEs is expected to be detected and
mitigated by the upstream architecture, eventually without DOTS
alerts sent by each single CPE.

ISP may activate mitigation for the traffic associated to the CPE
sending the alert or instead to the traffic associated to all CPE.
Such decisions are not part of DOTS, but instead depend on the
policies of the ISP.

It is unlikely the CPE will follow the status of the mitigation. The
ISP is only expected to inform the CPE the mitigation has been
stopped.

Upon receipt of such notification the CPE may, for example, re-
activate the monitoring jobs and thus is likely to provide some
further DOTS alert.

3.2.2. DDoS Orchestration

In this use case, one or multiple DDoS telemetry systems like a flow
collector monitor a network -- typically an ISP network. Upon
detection of a DDoS attack, these telemetry systems alert an

orchestrator in charge of coordinating the various DDoS mitigation
systems within the domain. The telemetry systems may be configured
to provide some necessary or useful pieces of information, such as a
preliminary analysis of the observation to the orchestrator.

The orchestrator analyses the various information it receives from
specialized equipment, and elaborates one or multiple DDoS mitigation
strategies. In some case, a manual confirmation may also be required
to choose a proposed strategy or to start the DDoS mitigation. The
DDoS mitigation may consists in multiple steps such as configuring
the network, the various hardware or already instantiated DDoS
mitigation functions. In some cases, some specific virtual DDoS
mitigation functions need to be instantiated and properly chained
between each other. Eventually, the coordination of the mitigation
may involve external DDoS resources such as a transit provider
([Section 3.1](#)) or a cloud provider ([Section 3.1.2](#)).

The communication to trigger a DDoS mitigation between the telemetry
and monitoring systems and the orchestrator is performed using DOTS.
The telemetry systems implements a DOTS client while the Orchestrator
implements a DOTS server.

The communication between a network administrator and the
orchestrator is also performed using DOTS. The network administrator
via its web interfaces implements a DOTS client while the
Orchestrator implements a DOTS server.

The communication between the Orchestrator and the DDoS mitigation
systems is performed using DOTS. The Orchestrator implements a DOTS
client while the DDoS mitigation systems implement a DOTS server.

The configuration aspects of each DDoS mitigation systems, as well as
the instantiations of DDoS mitigation functions or network
configuration is not part of DOTS. Similarly the discovery of the
available DDoS mitigation functions is not part of DOTS.

```
           +----------+
           | network  |C
           | adminis  |<-+
           | trator   |  |
           +----------+  |
                         |                     (internal)
           +----------+  | S+--------------+    +-----------+
           |telemetry/|  +->|              |C  S| DDoS      |+
           |monitoring|<--->| Orchestrator |<--->| mitigation||
           |systems   |C  S|              |<-+  | systems   ||
           +----------+     +--------------+C |  +-----------+|
                                             |    +----------+
                                             |
                                             |  (external)
                                             |  +-----------+
                                             | S| DDoS      |
                                           +->| mitigation|
                                             |  | systems   |
                                             +-----------+
           * C is for DOTS client functionality
           * S is for DOTS server functionality
```

Figure 1: DDoS Orchestration

The telemetry systems monitor various traffic network and perform
their measurement tasks. They are configured so that when an event
or some measurements reach a predefined level to report a DOTS
mitigation request to the Orchestrator. The DOTS mitigation request
may be associated with some element such as specific reporting.

Upon receipt of the DOTS mitigation request from the telemetry
system, the Orchestrator responds with an acknowledgement, to avoid
retransmission of the request for mitigation. The status of the DDoS
mitigation indicates the Orchestrator is in an analysing phase. The
Orchestrator begins collecting various information from various
telemetry systems in order to correlate the measurements and provide
an analysis of the event. Eventually, the Orchestrator may ask
additional information to the telemetry system, however, the
collection of these information is performed outside DOTS.

The Orchestrator may be configured to start a DDoS mitigation upon
approval from a network administrator. The analysis from the
orchestrator is reported to the network administrator via a web
interface. If the network administrator decides to start the
mitigation, she orders through her web interface a DOTS client to
send a request for DDoS mitigation. This request is expected to be
associated with a context that identifies the DDoS mitigation
selected.

Upon receiving the DOTS request for DDoS mitigation from the network administrator, the orchestrator orchestrates the DDoS mitigation according to the specified strategy. Its status indicates the DDoS mitigation is starting while not effective.

Orchestration of the DDoS mitigation systems works similarly as described in Section 3.1 and Section 3.1.2. The Orchestrator indicates with its status whether the DDoS mitigation is effective.

When the DDoS mitigation is finished on the DDoS mitigation systems, the Orchestrator indicates to the telemetry systems as well as to the network administrator the DDoS mitigation is finished.

4. Security Considerations

DOTS is at risk from three primary attacks: DOTS agent impersonation, traffic injection, and signaling blocking. Associated security requirements and additional ones are defined in [I-D.ietf-dots-requirements].

Impersonation and traffic injection mitigation can be managed through current secure communications best practices. DOTS is not subject to anything new in this area. One consideration could be to minimize the security technologies in use at any one time. The more needed, the greater the risk of failures coming from assumptions on one technology providing protection that it does not in the presence of another technology.

5. IANA Considerations

No IANA considerations exist for this document at this time.

6. Acknowledgments

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