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Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework

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Abstract

The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in [[RFC3748](#)], enables extensible network access authentication. This document provides a framework for the transport and usage of keying material generated by EAP authentication algorithms, known as "methods". It also specifies the EAP key hierarchy.

Table of Contents

1.	Introduction	3
1.1	Requirements Language	3
1.2	Terminology	3
1.3	Overview	6
1.4	EAP Key Hierarchy	9
1.5	Security Goals	13
1.6	EAP Invariants	14
2.	Lower Layer Operation	17
2.1	Transient Session Keys	18
2.2	Authenticator and Peer Architecture	19
2.3	Server Identification	24
3.	Security Association Management	26
3.1	Secure Association Protocol	26
3.2	Key Scope	29
3.3	Parent-Child Relationships	30
3.4	Local Key Lifetimes	31
3.5	Exported and Calculated Key Lifetimes	31
3.6	Key Cache Synchronization	33
3.7	Key Strength	34
3.8	Key Wrap	34
4.	Handoff Vulnerabilities	35
4.1	EAP Pre-authentication	36
4.2	Proactive Key Distribution	37
4.3	AAA Bypass	39
5.	Security Considerations	43
5.1	Authenticator Compromise	44
5.2	Spoofing	45
5.3	Downgrade Attacks	45
5.4	Unauthorized Disclosure	46
5.5	Replay Protection	48
5.6	Key Freshness	48
5.7	Elevation of Privilege	49
5.8	Man-in-the-Middle Attacks	50
5.9	Denial of Service Attacks	51
5.10	Impersonation	51
5.11	Channel Binding	52
6.	IANA Considerations	54
7.	References	54
7.1	Normative References	54
7.2	Informative References	54
	Acknowledgments	60
	Author's Addresses	60
	Appendix A - Exported Parameters in Existing Methods	61
	Intellectual Property Statement	63
	Disclaimer of Validity	63
	Copyright Statement	63

1. Introduction

The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in [[RFC3748](#)], was designed to enable extensible authentication for network access in situations in which the Internet Protocol (IP) protocol is not available. Originally developed for use with Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) [[RFC1661](#)], it has subsequently also been applied to IEEE 802 wired networks [[IEEE-802.1X](#)], IKEv2 [[RFC4306](#)] and wireless networks such as [IEEE-802.11i] and [[IEEE-802.16e](#)].

EAP is a two-party protocol spoken between the EAP peer and server. Within EAP, keying material is generated by EAP authentication algorithms, known as "methods". Part of this keying material may be used by EAP methods themselves and part of this material may be exported. In addition to export of keying material, EAP methods may also export associated parameters such as authenticated peer and server identities and a unique EAP conversation identifier, and may import and export lower layer parameters known as "Channel Bindings".

This document provides a framework for the transport and usage of keying material and parameters generated by EAP methods, as well as specifying the EAP key hierarchy. It also provides a system-level security analysis.

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

1.2. Terminology

The terms "Cryptographic binding", "Cryptographic separation", "Key strength" and "Mutual authentication" are defined in [[RFC3748](#)] and are used with the same meaning in this document, which also frequently uses the following terms:

4-Way Handshake

A pairwise Authentication and Key Management Protocol (AKMP) defined in [IEE-802.11i], which confirms mutual possession of a Pairwise Master Key by two parties and distributes a Group Key.

AAA Authentication, Authorization and Accounting. AAA protocols with EAP support include RADIUS [[RFC3579](#)] and Diameter [[RFC4072](#)]. In this document, the terms "AAA server" and "backend authentication server" are used interchangeably.

AAA-Key

The term AAA-Key is synonymous with MSK. Since multiple keys may be transported by AAA, the term is potentially confusing and is not used in this document.

authenticator

The end of the link initiating EAP authentication. The term Authenticator is used in [[IEEE-802.1X](#)], and authenticator has the same meaning in this document.

backend authentication server

A backend authentication server is an entity that provides an authentication service to an authenticator. When used, this server typically executes EAP methods for the authenticator. This terminology is also used in [[IEEE-802.1X](#)].

Channel Binding

A secure mechanism for ensuring that a subset of the parameters transmitted by the authenticator (such as authenticator identifiers and properties) are agreed upon by the EAP peer and server. It is expected that the parameters are also securely agreed upon by the EAP peer and authenticator via the lower layer if the authenticator advertised the parameters.

EAP pre-authentication

The use of EAP to pre-establish EAP keying material on an authenticator prior to arrival of the peer at the access network managed by that authenticator.

EAP re-authentication

EAP authentication between an EAP peer and a server with whom the EAP peer shares valid unexpired keying material.

EAP server

The entity that terminates the EAP authentication method with the peer. In the case where no backend authentication server is used, the EAP server is part of the authenticator. In the case where the authenticator operates in pass-through mode, the EAP server is located on the backend authentication server.

Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)

Additional keying material derived between the peer and server that is exported by the EAP method. The EMSK is at least 64 octets in length, and is never shared with a third party. The EMSK MUST be at least as long as the MSK in size.

Initialization Vector (IV)

A quantity of at least 64 octets, suitable for use in an

initialization vector field, that is derived between the peer and EAP server. Since the IV is a known value in methods such as EAP-TLS [[I-D.simon-emu-rfc2716bis](#)], it cannot be used by itself for computation of any quantity that needs to remain secret. As a result, its use has been deprecated and EAP methods are not required to generate it. However, when it is generated it MUST be unpredictable.

Key Scope

The parties to whom a key is available.

Key Wrap

The encryption of one symmetric cryptographic key in another. The algorithm used for the encryption is called a key wrap algorithm or a key encryption algorithm. The key used in the encryption process is called a key-encryption key (KEK).

Long Term Credential

EAP methods frequently make use of long term secrets in order to enable authentication between the peer and server. In the case of a method based on pre-shared key authentication, the long term credential is the pre-shared key. In the case of a public-key based method, the long term credential is the corresponding private key.

Lower Layer

The lower layer is responsible for carrying EAP frames between the peer and authenticator.

Lower Layer Identity

A name used to identify the EAP peer and authenticator within the lower layer.

Master Session Key (MSK)

Keying material that is derived between the EAP peer and server and exported by the EAP method. The MSK is at least 64 octets in length.

Network Access Server (NAS)

A device that provides an access service for a user to a network.

Pairwise Master Key (PMK)

Lower layers use the MSK in lower-layer dependent manner. For instance, in [IEEE-802.11i] Octets 0-31 of the MSK are known as the Pairwise Master Key (PMK). In [IEEE-802.11i] the TKIP and AES CCMP ciphersuites derive their Transient Session Keys (TSKs) solely from the PMK, whereas the WEP ciphersuite as noted in [[RFC3580](#)], derives its TSKs from both halves of the MSK. In [802.16e], the MSK is

truncated to 20 octets for PMK and 20 octets for PMK2.

peer The end of the link that responds to the authenticator.

security association

A set of policies and cryptographic state used to protect information. Elements of a security association may include cryptographic keys, negotiated ciphersuites and other parameters, counters, sequence spaces, authorization attributes, etc.

Secure Association Protocol

An exchange that occurs between the EAP peer and authenticator in order to manage security associations derived from EAP exchanges. The protocol establishes unicast and (optionally) multicast security associations, which include symmetric keys and a context for the use of the keys. An example of a Secure Association Protocol is the 4-way handshake defined within [IEEE-802.11i].

Session-Id

The EAP Session-Id uniquely identifies an EAP authentication exchange between an EAP peer (as identified by the Peer-Id) and server (as identified by the Server-Id). For more information, see [Section 1.4](#).

Transient EAP Keys (TEKs)

Session keys which are used to establish a protected channel between the EAP peer and server during the EAP authentication exchange. The TEKs are appropriate for use with the ciphersuite negotiated between EAP peer and server for use in protecting the EAP conversation. The TEKs are stored locally by the EAP method and are not exported. Note that the ciphersuite used to set up the protected channel between the EAP peer and server during EAP authentication is unrelated to the ciphersuite used to subsequently protect data sent between the EAP peer and authenticator.

Transient Session Keys (TSKs)

Keys used to protect data exchanged after EAP authentication has successfully completed, using the ciphersuite negotiated between the EAP peer and authenticator.

[1.3](#). Overview

Where EAP key derivation is supported, the conversation typically takes place in three phases:

Phase 0: Discovery

Phase 1: Authentication

1a: EAP authentication

- 1b: AAA Key Transport (optional)
- Phase 2: Secure Association Protocol
 - 2a: Unicast Secure Association
 - 2b: Multicast Secure Association (optional)

Of these phases, Phase 0, 1b and Phase 2 are handled external to EAP. Phases 0 and 2 are handled by the lower layer protocol and phase 1b is typically handled by a AAA protocol.

In the discovery phase (phase 0), peers locate authenticators and discover their capabilities. A peer may locate an authenticator providing access to a particular network, or a peer may locate an authenticator behind a bridge with which it desires to establish a Secure Association. Discovery can occur manually or automatically, depending on the lower layer over which EAP runs.

The authentication phase (phase 1) may begin once the peer and authenticator discover each other. This phase, if it occurs, always includes EAP authentication (phase 1a). Where the chosen EAP method supports key derivation, in phase 1a EAP keying material is derived on both the peer and the EAP server.

An additional step (phase 1b) is required in deployments which include a backend authentication server, in order to transport keying material from the backend authentication server to the authenticator. In order to obey the principle of mode independence (see [Section 1.6.1](#)), where a backend server is present, all keying material which is required by the lower layer needs to be transported from the EAP server to the authenticator. Since existing TSK derivation and transport techniques depend solely on the MSK, in existing implementations, this is the only keying material replicated in the AAA key transport phase 1b.

Successful completion of EAP authentication and key derivation by a peer and EAP server does not necessarily imply that the peer is committed to joining the network associated with an EAP server. Rather, this commitment is implied by the creation of a security association between the EAP peer and authenticator, as part of the Secure Association Protocol (phase 2). The Secure Association Protocol exchange (phase 2) occurs between the peer and authenticator in order to manage the creation and deletion of unicast (phase 2a) and multicast (phase 2b) security associations between the peer and authenticator. The conversation between the parties is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Conversation Overview

1.3.1. Examples

Existing EAP lower layers implement phase 0, 2a and 2b in different ways:

PPP Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP), defined in [RFC1661] does not support discovery, nor does it include a Secure Association Protocol.

PPPoE

PPP over Ethernet (PPPoE), defined in [RFC2516], includes support for a Discovery stage (phase 0). In this step, the EAP peer sends a PPPoE Active Discovery Initiation (PADI) packet to the broadcast address, indicating the service it is requesting. The Access Concentrator replies with a PPPoE Active Discovery Offer (PAD0) packet containing its name, the service name and an indication of the services offered by the concentrator. The discovery phase is not secured. PPPoE, like PPP, does not include a Secure Association Protocol.

IKEv2

IKEv2, defined in [RFC4306], includes support for EAP and handles the establishment of unicast security associations (phase 2a). However, the establishment of multicast security associations (phase 2b) typically does not involve EAP and needs to be handled by a group key management protocol such as GDOI [RFC3547], GSAKMP [GSAKMP], MIKEY [RFC3830], or GKDP [GKDP]. Several mechanisms have

been proposed for discovery of IPsec security gateways. [[RFC2230](#)] discusses the use of KX Resource Records (RRs) for IPsec gateway discovery; while KX RRs are supported by many DNS server implementations, they have not yet been widely deployed. Alternatively, DNS SRV [[RFC2782](#)] can be used for this purpose. Where DNS is used for gateway location, DNS security mechanisms such as DNSSEC ([[RFC2535](#)], [[RFC2931](#)]), TSIG [[RFC2845](#)], and Simple Secure Dynamic Update [[RFC3007](#)] are available.

IEEE 802.11i

IEEE 802.11, defined in [[IEEE-802.11](#)], handles discovery via the Beacon and Probe Request/Response mechanisms. IEEE 802.11 access points periodically announce their Service Set Identifiers (SSIDs) as well as capabilities using Beacon frames. Stations can query for access points by sending a Probe Request to the broadcast address. Neither Beacon nor Probe Request/Response frames are secured. The 4-way handshake defined in [IEEE-802.11i] enables the derivation of unicast (phase 2a) and multicast/broadcast (phase 2b) secure associations. Since the group key exchange transports a group key from the access point to the station, two 4-way handshakes may be required in order to support peer-to-peer communications. A proof of the security of the IEEE 802.11i 4-way handshake when used with EAP-TLS is provided in [[He](#)].

IEEE 802.1X

IEEE 802.1X-2004, defined in [[IEEE-802.1X](#)] does not support discovery (phase 0), nor does it provide for derivation of unicast or multicast secure associations.

1.4. EAP Key Hierarchy

As illustrated in Figure 2, the EAP method key derivation has at the root the long term credential utilized by the selected EAP method. If authentication is based on a pre-shared key, the parties store the EAP method to be used and the pre-shared key. The EAP server also stores the peer's identity as well as additional information. This information is typically used outside of the EAP method to determine if access to some service should be granted. The peer stores information necessary to choose which secret to use for which service.

If authentication is based on proof of possession of the private key corresponding to the public key contained within a certificate, the parties store the EAP method to be used and the trust anchors used to validate the certificates. The EAP server may also store additional information associated with the peer's identity and the peer stores information necessary to choose which certificate to use for which service.

If authentication is based on proof of possession of the private key corresponding to the public key contained within a certificate, the parties store the EAP method to be used and the trust anchors used to validate the certificates. The EAP server also stores the peer's identity and the peer stores information necessary to choose which certificate to use for which service. Based on the long term credential established between the peer and the server, EAP methods derive two types of keys:

- [a] Keys calculated locally by the EAP method but not exported by the EAP method, such as the TEKs.
- [b] Keying material exported by the EAP method: MSK, EMSK, IV.

As noted in [\[RFC3748\] Section 7.10](#), EAP methods generating keys are required to calculate and export the MSK and EMSK, which must be at least 64 octets in length. EAP methods also may export the IV; however, the use of the IV is deprecated.

The EMSK MUST NOT be provided to an entity outside the EAP server or peer, nor is it permitted to pass any quantity to an entity outside the EAP server or peer from which the EMSK could be computed without breaking some cryptographic assumption, such as inverting a one-way function.

EAP methods also MAY export method-specific peer and server identifiers (Peer-Id and Server-Id) and a method-specific EAP conversation identifier known as the Session-Id. EAP methods MAY also support the import and export of Channel Bindings. New EAP method specifications MUST define the Peer-Id, Server-Id and Session-Id. The combination of the Peer-Id and Server-Id uniquely specifies the endpoints of the EAP method exchange when they are provided. The Peer-Id, Server-Id, and Session-Id for existing EAP methods is defined in [Appendix A](#).

Peer-Id

As described in [\[RFC3748\] Section 7.3](#), the identity provided in the EAP-Response/Identity, may be different from the peer identity authenticated by the EAP method. Where the EAP method authenticates the peer identity, that identity is exported by the method as the Peer-Id. A suitable EAP peer name may not always be available. Where an EAP method does not define a method-specific peer identity, the Peer-Id is the null string.

Server-Id

Where the EAP method authenticates the server identity, that identity is exported by the method as the Server-Id. A suitable

EAP server name may not always be available. Where an EAP method does not define a method-specific server identity, the Server-Id is the null string.




Figure 2: EAP Method Parameter Import/Export

Session-Id

The Session-Id uniquely identifies an EAP session between an EAP peer (as identified by the Peer-Id) and server (as identified by the Server-Id). Where the EAP Type Code is less than 255, the EAP Session-Id consists of the concatenation of the EAP Type Code and a temporally unique identifier obtained from the method (known as the Method-Id). Where expanded EAP Type Codes are used, the EAP Session-Id consists of the Expanded Type Code (including the Type, Vendor-Id and Vendor-Type fields defined in [\[RFC3748\] Section 5.7](#)) concatenated with a temporally unique identifier obtained from the

method (Method-Id). This unique identifier is typically constructed from nonces or counters used within the EAP method exchange. The inclusion of the Type Code in the EAP Session-Id ensures that each EAP method has a distinct Session-Id space. Since an EAP session is not bound to a particular authenticator or specific ports on the peer and authenticator, the authenticator port or identity are not included in the Session-Id.

Channel Bindings

Channel Bindings include lower layer parameters that are verified for consistency between the EAP peer and server. In order to avoid introducing media dependencies, EAP methods that transport Channel Binding data MUST treat this data as opaque octets. See [Section 5.11](#) for further discussion.

1.4.1. Key Naming

Each key created within the EAP key management framework has a name (a unique identifier), as well as a scope (the parties to whom the key is available). The scope of exported parameters is defined by the EAP Peer-Id (if securely exchanged within the method) and the EAP Server-Id (also only if securely exchanged). Where a peer or server name is missing the null string is used.

MSK and EMSK Names

These parameters are exported by the EAP peer and EAP server, and can be referred to using the EAP Session-Id and a binary or textual indication of the parameter being referred to.

PMK Name

This document does not specify a naming scheme for the PMK. The PMK is only identified by the name of the key from which it is derived.

Note: IEEE 802.11i names the PMKID for the purposes of being able to refer to it in the Secure Association protocol; this naming is based on a hash of the PMK itself as well as some other parameters (see [Section 8.5.1.2](#) [IEEE-802.11i]).

TEK Name

The TEKs may or may not be named. Their naming is specified in the EAP method.

TSK Name

The TSKs are typically named. Their naming is specified in the lower layer so that the correct set of transient session keys can be identified for processing a given packet.

1.5. Security Goals

The goal of the EAP conversation is to derive fresh session keys between the EAP peer and authenticator that are known only to those parties, and for both the EAP peer and authenticator to demonstrate that they are authorized to perform their roles either by each other or by a trusted third party (the backend authentication server).

Completion of an EAP method exchange (Phase 1a) supporting key derivation results in the derivation of EAP keying material (MSK, EMSK, TEKS) known only to the EAP peer (identified by the Peer-Id) and server (identified by the Server-Id). Both the EAP peer and EAP server know the exported keying material to be fresh. Key freshness is discussed in Sections [3.4](#), [3.5](#) and [5.6](#).

Completion of the AAA exchange (Phase 1b) results in the transport of EAP keying material from the EAP server (identified by the Server-Id) to the EAP authenticator (identified by the NAS-Identifier) without disclosure to any other party. Both the EAP server and EAP authenticator know this keying material to be fresh. Disclosure issues are discussed in [Section 5.4](#); security properties of AAA protocols are discussed in Sections [5.1-5.7](#), and [5.10](#).

The backend authentication server is trusted to only transport EAP keying material to the authenticator that was established with the peer, and it is trusted to transport that EAP keying material to no other parties. In many systems, EAP keying material established by the EAP peer and EAP server are combined with publicly available data to derive other keys. The backend authentication server is trusted to refrain from deriving these same keys or acting as a man-in-the-middle even though it has access to the EAP keying material that is needed to do so. The authenticator is also a trusted party. It is trusted not to provide EAP keying material it obtains from the backend authentication server to any other parties.

Completion of the Secure Association Protocol (Phase 2) results in the derivation or transport of Transient Session Keys (TSKs) known only to the EAP peer (identified by the Peer-Id) and authenticator (identified by the NAS-Identifier). Both the EAP peer and authenticator know the TSKs to be fresh. Both the EAP peer and authenticator demonstrate that they are authorized to perform their roles. Authorization issues are discussed in [Section 5.7](#) and [5.8](#); security properties of Secure Association Protocols are discussed in [Section 3.1](#).

1.6. EAP Invariants

Certain basic characteristics, known as "EAP Invariants", hold true for EAP implementations on all media:

- Mode independence
- Media independence
- Method independence
- Ciphersuite independence

1.6.1. Mode Independence

EAP is typically deployed to support extensible network access authentication in situations where a peer desires network access via one or more authenticators. Where authenticators are deployed standalone, the EAP conversation occurs between the peer and authenticator, and the authenticator must locally implement an EAP method acceptable to the peer. However, when utilized in "pass-through" mode, EAP enables deployment of new authentication methods without requiring development of new code on the authenticator.

While the authenticator may implement some EAP methods locally and use those methods to authenticate local users, it may at the same time act as a pass-through for other users and methods, forwarding EAP packets back and forth between the backend authentication server and the peer. This is accomplished by encapsulating EAP packets within the Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) protocol, spoken between the authenticator and backend authentication server. AAA protocols supporting EAP include RADIUS [[RFC3579](#)] and Diameter [[RFC4072](#)].

It is a fundamental property of EAP that at the EAP method layer, the conversation between the EAP peer and server is unaffected by whether the EAP authenticator is operating in "pass-through" mode. EAP methods operate identically in all aspects, including key derivation and parameter import/export, regardless of whether the authenticator is operating as a pass-through or not.

The successful completion of an EAP method that supports key derivation results in the export of keying material and parameters on the EAP peer and server. Even though the EAP peer or server may import Channel Bindings that may include the identity of the EAP authenticator, this information is treated as opaque octets. As a result, within EAP the only relevant identities are the Peer-Id and Server-Id. Channel Bindings are only interpreted by the lower layer.

Within EAP, the primary function of the AAA protocol is to maintain the principle of mode independence, so that as far as the EAP peer is

concerned, its conversation with the EAP authenticator, and all consequences of that conversation, are identical, regardless of the authenticator mode of operation.

1.6.2. Media Independence

One of the goals of EAP is to allow EAP methods to function on any lower layer meeting the criteria outlined in [\[RFC3748\]](#), [Section 3.1](#). For example, as described in [\[RFC3748\]](#), EAP authentication can be run over PPP [\[RFC1661\]](#), IEEE 802 wired networks [\[IEEE-802.1X\]](#), and wireless networks such as 802.11 [\[IEEE-802.11i\]](#) and 802.16 [\[IEEE-802.16e\]](#).

In order to maintain media independence, it is necessary for EAP to avoid consideration of media-specific elements. For example, EAP methods cannot be assumed to have knowledge of the lower layer over which they are transported, and cannot be restricted to identifiers associated with a particular usage environment (e.g. MAC addresses).

Note that media independence may be retained within EAP methods that support Channel Bindings or method-specific identification. An EAP method need not be aware of the content of an identifier in order to use it. This enables an EAP method to use media-specific identifiers such as MAC addresses without compromising media independence. Channel Bindings are treated as opaque octets by EAP methods, so that handling them does not require media-specific knowledge.

1.6.3. Method Independence

By enabling pass-through, authenticators can support any method implemented on the peer and server, not just locally implemented methods. This allows the authenticator to avoid implementing code for each EAP method required by peers. In fact, since a pass-through authenticator is not required to implement any EAP methods at all, it cannot be assumed to support any EAP method-specific code.

As a result, as noted in [\[RFC3748\]](#), authenticators must by default be capable of supporting any EAP method. This is useful where there is no single EAP method that is both mandatory-to-implement and offers acceptable security for the media in use. For example, the [\[RFC3748\]](#) mandatory-to-implement EAP method (MD5-Challenge) does not provide dictionary attack resistance, mutual authentication or key derivation, and as a result is not appropriate for use in wireless LAN authentication [\[RFC4017\]](#). However, despite this it is possible for the peer and authenticator to interoperate as long as a suitable EAP method is supported on the EAP server.

1.6.4. Ciphersuite Independence

Ciphersuite Independence is a requirement for Media Independence. Since lower layer ciphersuites vary between media, media independence requires that EAP keying material needs to be large enough (with sufficient entropy) to handle any ciphersuite.

While EAP methods may negotiate the ciphersuite used in protection of the EAP conversation, the ciphersuite used for the protection of the data exchanged after EAP authentication has completed is negotiated between the peer and authenticator within the lower layer, outside of EAP.

For example, within PPP, the ciphersuite is negotiated within the Encryption Control Protocol (ECP) defined in [[RFC1968](#)], after EAP authentication is completed. Within [IEEE-802.11i], the AP ciphersuites are advertised in the Beacon and Probe Responses prior to EAP authentication, and are securely verified during a 4-way handshake exchange.

Since the ciphersuites used to protect data depend on the lower layer, requiring EAP methods have knowledge of lower layer ciphersuites would compromise the principle of Media Independence. Since ciphersuite negotiation occurs in the lower layer, there is no need for lower layer ciphersuite negotiation within EAP, and EAP methods generate keying material that is ciphersuite-independent.

In order to allow a ciphersuite to be usable within the EAP keying framework, a specification MUST be provided describing how TSKs suitable for use with the ciphersuite are derived from exported EAP keying parameters. To maintain Method Independence, algorithms for deriving TSKs MUST NOT depend on the EAP method, although algorithms for TEK derivation MAY be specific to the EAP method.

Advantages of ciphersuite-independence include:

Reduced update requirements

If EAP methods were to specify how to derive transient session keys for each ciphersuite, they would need to be updated each time a new ciphersuite is developed. In addition, backend authentication servers might not be usable with all EAP-capable authenticators, since the backend authentication server would also need to be updated each time support for a new ciphersuite is added to the authenticator.

Reduced EAP method complexity

Requiring each EAP method to include ciphersuite-specific code for transient session key derivation would increase method complexity

and result in duplicated effort.

Simplified configuration

The ciphersuite is negotiated between the peer and authenticator outside of EAP. Where the authenticator operates in "pass-through" mode, the EAP server is not a party to this negotiation, nor is it involved in the data flow between the EAP peer and authenticator. As a result, the EAP server may not have knowledge of the ciphersuites and negotiation policies implemented by the peer and authenticator, or be aware of the ciphersuite negotiated between them. For example, since ECP negotiation occurs after authentication, when run over PPP, the EAP peer and server may not anticipate the negotiated ciphersuite and therefore this information cannot be provided to the EAP method.

2. Lower Layer Operation

On completion of EAP authentication, keying material and material and parameters exported by the EAP method are provided to the lower layer and AAA layer (if present). These include the Master Session Key (MSK), Extended Master Session Key (EMSK), Peer-Id, Server-Id and Session-Id. The Initialization Vector (IV) is deprecated.

In order to preserve the security of keys derived within EAP methods, lower layers MUST NOT export keys passed down by EAP methods. This implies that EAP keying material passed down to a lower layer is for the exclusive use of that lower layer and MUST NOT be used within another lower layer. This prevents compromise of one lower layer from compromising other applications using EAP keying parameters.

EAP keying material provided to a lower layer MUST NOT be transported to another entity. For example, EAP keying material passed down to the EAP peer lower layer MUST NOT leave the peer; EAP keying material passed down or transported to the EAP authenticator lower layer MUST NOT leave the authenticator.

On the EAP server, keying material and parameters requested by and passed down to the AAA layer may be replicated to the AAA layer on the authenticator (with the exception of the EMSK). On the authenticator, the AAA layer provides the replicated keying material and parameters to the lower layer over which the EAP authentication conversation took place. This enables mode independence to be maintained.

The EAP layer as well as the peer and authenticator layers MUST NOT modify or cache keying material or parameters (including Channel Bindings) passing in either direction between the EAP method layer and the lower layer or AAA layer.

2.1. Transient Session Keys

Where explicitly supported by the lower layer, lower layers MAY cache the exported EAP keying material and parameters and/or TSKs. The structure of this key cache is defined by the lower layer. So as to enable interoperability, new lower layer specifications MUST describe EAP key caching behavior. Unless explicitly specified by the lower layer, the EAP peer, server and authenticator MUST assume that peers and authenticators do not cache exported EAP keying parameters or TSKs. Existing EAP lower layers and AAA layers handle the caching of EAP keying material and the generation of transient session keys in different ways:

IEEE 802.1X-2004

IEEE 802.1X-2004, defined in [[IEEE-802.1X](#)] does not support caching of EAP keying material or parameters. Once EAP authentication completes, it is assumed that EAP keying material and parameters are discarded.

PPP PPP, defined in [[RFC1661](#)] does not support caching of EAP keying material or parameters. PPP ciphersuites derive their TSKs directly from the MSK, as described in [[I-D.simon-emu-rfc2716bis](#)]. This method is NOT RECOMMENDED, since if PPP were to support caching, this could result in TSK reuse. As a result, once the PPP session is terminated, EAP keying material and parameters MUST be discarded. Since caching of EAP keying material is not permitted, within PPP there is no way to handle TSK re-key without EAP re-authentication. Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) is only possible if the negotiated EAP method supports this.

IKEv2

IKEv2, defined in [[RFC4306](#)] only uses the MSK for authentication purposes and not key derivation. The EMSK, IV, Peer-Id, Server-Id or Session-Id are not used. As a result, the keying material derived within IKEv2 is independent of the EAP keying material and re-key of IPsec SAs can be handled without requiring EAP re-authentication. Since generation of keying material is independent of EAP, within IKEv2 it is possible to negotiate PFS, regardless of the EAP method that is used. IKEv2 as specified in [[RFC4306](#)] does not cache EAP keying material or parameters; once IKEv2 authentication completes it is assumed that EAP keying material and parameters are discarded. The Session-Timeout attribute is therefore interpreted as a limit on the VPN session time, rather than an indication of the MSK key lifetime.

IEEE 802.11i

IEEE 802.11i enables caching of the MSK, but not the EMSK, IV, Peer-Id, Server-Id, or Session-Id. More details about the

structure of the cache are available in [IEEE-802.11i]. In IEEE 802.11i, TSKs are derived from the MSK using the 4-way handshake, which includes a nonce exchange. This guarantees TSK freshness even if the MSK is reused. The 4-way handshake also enables TSK re-key without EAP re-authentication. PFS is only possible within IEEE 802.11i if caching is not enabled and the negotiated EAP method supports PFS.

IEEE 802.16e

IEEE 802.16e, defined in [[IEEE-802.16e](#)] supports caching of the MSK, but not the EMSK, IV, Peer-Id, Server-Id or Session-Id. In IEEE 802.16e, TSKs are generated by the authenticator without any contribution by the peer. The TSKs are encrypted, authenticated and integrity protected using the MSK. As a result, TSK re-key is possible without EAP re-authentication. PFS is not possible even if the negotiated EAP method supports it.

AAA Existing implementations of RADIUS/EAP [[RFC3579](#)] or Diameter EAP [[RFC4072](#)] do not support caching of EAP keying material or parameters. In existing AAA client, proxy and server implementations, exported EAP keying material (MSK, EMSK and IV) as well as parameters and derived keys are not cached and MUST be presumed lost after the AAA exchange completes.

In order to avoid key reuse, the AAA layer MUST delete transported keys once they are sent. The AAA layer MUST NOT retain keys that it has previously sent. For example, a AAA layer that has transported the MSK MUST delete it, and keys MUST NOT be derived from the MSK from that point forward.

2.2. Authenticator and Peer Architecture

This specification does not impose constraints on the architecture of the EAP authenticator or peer. Any of the authenticator architectures described in [[RFC4118](#)] can be used. As a result, lower layers need to identify EAP peers and authenticators unambiguously, without incorporating implicit assumptions about peer and authenticator architectures.

For example, it is possible for multiple base stations and a "controller" (e.g. WLAN switch) to comprise a single EAP authenticator. In such a situation, the "base station identity" is irrelevant to the EAP method conversation, except perhaps as an opaque blob to be used in Channel Bindings. Many base stations can share the same authenticator identity. It should be understood that an EAP authenticator or peer:

[a] may contain one or more physical or logical ports;

- [b] may advertise itself as one or more "virtual" authenticators or peers;
- [c] may utilize multiple CPUs;
- [d] may support clustering services for load balancing or failover.

Both the EAP peer and authenticator may have more than one physical or logical port. A peer may simultaneously access the network via multiple authenticators, or via multiple physical or logical ports on a given authenticator. Similarly, an authenticator may offer network access to multiple peers, each via a separate physical or logical port. When a single physical authenticator advertises itself as multiple "virtual authenticators", it is possible for a single physical port to belong to multiple "virtual authenticators".

An authenticator may be configured to communicate with more than one EAP server, each of which is configured to communicate with a subset of the authenticators. The situation is illustrated in Figure 3.

2.2.1. Authenticator and Peer Identification

The EAP method conversation is between the EAP peer and server. The authenticator identity, if considered at all by the EAP method, is treated as an opaque blob for the purposes of Channel Bindings (see [Section 5.12](#)). However, the authenticator identity is important in two other exchanges - the AAA protocol exchange and the Secure Association Protocol conversation.

The AAA conversation is between the EAP authenticator and the backend authentication server. From the point of view of the backend authentication server, EAP keying material and parameters are transported to the EAP authenticator identified by the NAS-Identifier attribute. Since an EAP authenticator **MUST NOT** share EAP keying material or parameters with another party, if the EAP peer or backend authentication server detects use of EAP keying material and parameters outside the scope defined by the NAS-Identifier, the keying material **MUST** be considered compromised.

The Secure Association Protocol conversation is between the peer and the authenticator. For lower layers which support key caching it is particularly important for the EAP peer, authenticator and backend server to have a consistent view of the usage scope of the transported EAP keying material. In order to enable this, it is **RECOMMENDED** that the Secure Association Protocol explicitly communicate the usage scope of the EAP keying material passed down to the lower layer, rather than implicitly assuming that this is defined by the authenticator and peer endpoint addresses.

Since an authenticator may have multiple ports, the scope of the

authenticator key cache may not be described by a single endpoint address. Similarly, where a peer may have multiple ports and sharing of EAP keying material and parameters between peer ports of the same link type is allowed, the extent of the peer key cache cannot be communicated by using a single endpoint address. Instead, it is RECOMMENDED that the EAP peer and authenticator consistently identify themselves utilizing explicit identifiers, rather than endpoint addresses or port identifiers.

AAA protocols such as RADIUS [[RFC3579](#)] and Diameter [[RFC4072](#)] provide a mechanism for the identification of AAA clients; since the EAP authenticator and AAA client are always co-resident, this mechanism is applicable to the identification of EAP authenticators.




Figure 3: Relationship between EAP peer, authenticator and server

RADIUS [[RFC2865](#)] requires that an Access-Request packet contain one or more of the NAS-Identifier, NAS-IP-Address and NAS-IPv6-Address attributes. Since a NAS may have more than one IP address, the NAS-Identifier attribute is RECOMMENDED for explicit identification of the authenticator, both within the AAA protocol exchange and the Secure Association Protocol conversation.

Problems which may arise where the peer and authenticator implicitly identify themselves using endpoint addresses include the following:

- [a] It may not be obvious to the peer which authenticator ports are associated with which authenticators. The EAP peer will be unable to determine whether EAP keying material has been shared outside its authorized scope, and needs to be considered compromised. The EAP peer may also be unable to utilize the authenticator key cache in an efficient way.
- [b] It may not be obvious to the authenticator which peer ports are associated with which peers. As a result, the authenticator may not be able to enable a peer to communicate with it utilizing multiple peer ports.
- [c] It may not be obvious to the peer which "virtual authenticator" it is communicating with. For example, multiple "virtual authenticators" may share a MAC address, but utilize different NAS-Identifiers.
- [d] It may not be obvious to the authenticator which "virtual peer" it is communicating with. Multiple "virtual peers" may share a MAC address, but utilize different Peer-Ids.
- [e] It may not be possible for the EAP peer and server to verify the authenticator identity via channel bindings.

For example, problems [[a](#)], [[c](#)] and [[e](#)] occur in [IEEE-802.11i], which utilizes peer and authenticator MAC addresses within the 4-way handshake. Problems [[b](#)] and [[d](#)] do not occur since [IEEE-802.11i] only allows a peer to utilize a single port.

The following steps enable lower layer identities to be securely verified by all parties:

- [f] Specifying the lower layer parameters used to identify the authenticator and peer. As noted earlier, endpoint or port identifiers are not recommended for identification of the authenticator or peer when it is possible for them to have multiple ports.

- [g] Communicating the lower layer identities between the peer and authenticator within phase 0. This allows the peer and authenticator to determine the key scope if a key cache is utilized.
- [h] Communicating the lower layer authenticator identity between the authenticator and backend server within the NAS-Identifier attribute.
- [i] Including the lower layer identities within Channel Bindings (if supported) in phase 1a, ensuring that they are communicated between the EAP peer and server.
- [j] Supporting the integrity-protected exchange of identities within phase 2a.
- [k] Utilizing the advertised lower layer identities to enable the peer and authenticator to verify that keys are maintained within the advertised scope.

2.2.2. Virtual Authenticators

When a single physical authenticator advertises itself as multiple "virtual authenticators", if the virtual authenticators do not maintain logically separate key caches, then by authenticating to one virtual authenticator, the peer can gain access to the other virtual authenticators sharing a key cache.

For example, where a physical authenticator implements "Guest" and "Corporate Intranet" virtual authenticators, an attacker acting as a peer could authenticate with the "Guest" "virtual authenticator" and derive EAP keying material. If the "Guest" and "Corporate Intranet" virtual authenticators share a key cache, then the peer can utilize the EAP keying material derived for the "Guest" network to obtain access to the "Corporate Intranet" network.

In order to address this vulnerability:

- [a] Authenticators are REQUIRED to cache associated authorizations along with EAP keying material and parameters and to apply authorizations consistently. This ensures that an attacker cannot obtain elevated privileges even where the key cache is shared between "virtual authenticators".
- [b] It is RECOMMENDED that physical authenticators maintain separate key caches for each "virtual authenticator".

- [c] It is RECOMMENDED that each "virtual authenticator" identify itself consistently to the peer and to the backend authentication server, so as to enable the peer to verify the authenticator identity via Channel Bindings (see [Section 5.11](#)).
- [d] It is RECOMMENDED that each "virtual authenticator" identify itself distinctly, in order to enable the peer and backend server to tell them apart. For example, this can be accomplished by utilizing a distinct NAS-Identifier attribute.

2.3. Server Identification

The EAP method conversation is between the EAP peer and server, as identified by the Peer-Id and Server-Id. As shown in Figure 3, an authenticator may be configured to communicate with multiple EAP servers; the EAP server that an authenticator communicates with may vary according to configuration and network and server availability. While the EAP peer can assume that all EAP servers within a realm have access to the credentials necessary to validate an authentication attempt, it cannot assume that all EAP servers share persistent state.

Authenticators may be configured with different primary or secondary EAP servers, in order to balance the load. Also, the authenticator can dynamically determine the EAP server to which requests will be sent; in event of a communication failure, the authenticator may fail over to another EAP server. For example, in Figure 3, Authenticator2 may be initially configured with EAP server1 as its primary backend authentication server, and EAP server2 as the backup, but if EAP server1 becomes unavailable, EAP server2 may become the primary server.

In general, the EAP peer cannot direct an authentication attempt to a particular EAP server within a realm; this decision is made solely by the authenticator. Nor can it determine which EAP server it will be communicating with, prior to the start of the EAP method conversation. The Server-Id is not included in the EAP-Request/Identity, and since the authenticator determines the EAP server dynamically, it typically is not possible for the authenticator to advertise the Server-Id during the discovery phase. EAP methods may or may not export the Server-Id, and as a result, the EAP peer may not even learn which server it was conversing with after the EAP conversation completes successfully.

As a result, an EAP peer, on connecting to a new authenticator or reconnecting to the same authenticator, may find itself communicating with a different EAP server. Fast reconnect, defined in [\[RFC3748\]](#) [Section 7.2](#), may fail if the EAP server that the peer communicates

with is not the same one with which it initially established a security association. For example, an EAP peer attempting an EAP-TLS session resume may find that the new EAP-TLS server will not have access to the TLS Master Key identified by the TLS Session-Id, and therefore the session resumption attempt will fail, requiring completion of a full EAP-TLS exchange.

EAP methods that support mutual authentication may not allow the EAP peer to verify the EAP server identity. For example, the EAP peer may only verify that the EAP server possesses a long-term secret; in this case the EAP peer will only know that an authenticator has been authorized by an EAP server, but will not confirm the identity of the EAP server.

EAP methods that export the Server-Id MUST verify the server identity. As noted in [Appendix A](#), existing EAP methods exporting the Server-Id determine this from the subjectAltName in the server certificate, and as a result, the peer determines the identity of the server (expressed as a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN)) by validating the server certificate.

Validating the EAP server identity may help the EAP peer to decide whether a specific EAP server is authorized, and to determine whether the EAP server is sharing keying material outside the intended scope. In some cases, such as where the certificate extensions defined in [\[RFC4334\]](#) are included in the server certificate, it may even be possible for the peer to verify some Channel Binding parameters from the server certificate. Where the EAP peer does not verify the EAP server identity, it is not possible for the peer to determine whether the EAP server has shared keying material outside its authorized scope.

It is possible for problems to arise in situations where the EAP server identifies itself differently to the EAP peer and authenticator. For example, the Server-Id exported by EAP methods may not be identical to the Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) of the backend authentication server. Where certificate-based authentication is used within RADIUS or Diameter, the subjectAltName used in the backend server certificate may not be identical to the Server-Id or backend server FQDN.

Where the backend server FQDN differs from the subjectAltName in the certificate, the AAA client may not be able to successfully determine whether it is talking to the correct backend authentication server. Where the Server-Id and backend server FQDN differ, the combination of the key scope (Peer-Id, Server-Id) and EAP conversation identifier (Session-Id) may not be sufficient for the authenticator to determine where the key resides. For example, the authenticator may identify

backend servers by their IP address (as occurs in RADIUS), or using a Fully Qualified Domain Name (as in Diameter). If the Server-Id does not correspond to the IP address or FQDN of a known backend authentication server, then the authenticator will not know which backend authentication server possesses the key.

3. Security Association Management

EAP as defined in [[RFC3748](#)] supports key derivation, but does not provide for the management of lower layer security associations. Missing functionality includes:

- [a] Security Association negotiation. EAP does not negotiate lower layer unicast or multicast security associations, including cryptographic algorithms or traffic profiles. EAP methods only negotiate cryptographic algorithms for their own use, not for the underlying lower layers. EAP also does not negotiate the traffic profiles to be protected with the negotiated ciphersuites; in some cases the traffic to be protected may have lower layer source and destination addresses different from the lower layer peer or authenticator addresses.
- [b] Re-key. EAP does not support re-key of exported keys without EAP re-authentication, although EAP methods may support "fast reconnect" as defined in [[RFC3748](#)] [Section 7.2.1](#).
- [c] Key delete/install semantics. EAP does not synchronize installation or deletion of keying material on the EAP peer and authenticator.
- [d] Lifetime negotiation. EAP does not support lifetime negotiation for exported keys, and existing EAP methods also do not support key lifetime negotiation.
- [e] Guaranteed TSK freshness. Without a post-EAP handshake, TSKs can be reused if EAP keying material is cached.

These deficiencies are typically addressed via a post-EAP handshake known as the Secure Association Protocol.

3.1. Secure Association Protocol

Since neither EAP nor EAP methods provide for establishment of lower layer security associations, it is RECOMMENDED that these facilities be provided within the Secure Association Protocol. This includes:

- [a] Entity Naming. A basic feature of a Secure Association Protocol is the explicit naming of the parties engaged in the exchange.

Without explicit identification, the parties engaged in the exchange are not identified and the scope of the EAP keying parameters negotiated during the EAP exchange is undefined.

- [b] Mutual proof of possession of EAP keying material. During the Secure Association Protocol the EAP peer and authenticator **MUST** demonstrate possession of the keying material transported between the backend authentication server and authenticator (e.g. MSK), in order to demonstrate that the peer and authenticator have been authorized. Since mutual proof of possession is not the same as mutual authentication, the peer cannot verify authenticator assertions (including the authenticator identity) as a result of this exchange. Identity verification is discussed in [Section 2.2.1](#).
- [c] Secure capabilities negotiation. In order to protect against spoofing during the discovery phase, ensure selection of the "best" ciphersuite, and protect against forging of negotiated security parameters, the Secure Association Protocol **MUST** support secure capabilities negotiation. This includes the secure negotiation of usage modes, session parameters (such as security association identifiers (SAIDs) and key lifetimes), ciphersuites and required filters, including confirmation of security-relevant capabilities discovered during phase 0. The Secure Association Protocol **MUST** support integrity and replay protection of all capability negotiation messages.
- [d] Key naming and selection. Where key caching is supported, it may be possible for the EAP peer and authenticator to share more than one key of a given type. As a result, the Secure Association Protocol **MUST** explicitly name the keys used in the proof of possession exchange, so as to prevent confusion when more than one set of keying material could potentially be used as the basis for the exchange. Use of the key naming mechanism described in [Section 1.4.1](#) is RECOMMENDED.

In order to support the correct processing of phase 2 security associations, the Secure Association (phase 2) protocol **MUST** support the naming of phase 2 security associations and associated transient session keys, so that the correct set of transient session keys can be identified for processing a given packet. The phase 2 Secure Association Protocol also **MUST** support transient session key activation and **SHOULD** support deletion, so that establishment and re-establishment of transient session keys can be synchronized between the parties.

- [e] Generation of fresh transient session keys (TSKs). Where the lower layer supports caching of exported EAP keying material, the EAP

peer lower layer may initiate a new session using keying material that was derived in a previous session. Were the TSKs to be derived from a portion of the exported EAP keying material, this would result in reuse of the session keys which could expose the underlying ciphersuite to attack.

In lower layers where caching of EAP keying material is supported, the Secure Association Protocol phase is REQUIRED, and MUST support the derivation of fresh unicast and multicast TSKs, even when the keying material provided by the backend authentication server is not fresh. This is typically supported via the exchange of nonces or counters, which are then mixed with the exported keying material in order to generate fresh unicast (phase 2a) and possibly multicast (phase 2b) session keys. By not using EAP keying material directly to protect data, the Secure Association Protocol protects it against compromise.

- [f] Key lifetime management. This includes explicit key lifetime negotiation or seamless re-key. EAP does not support re-key without re-authentication and existing EAP methods do not support key lifetime negotiation. As a result, the Secure Association Protocol may handle re-key and determination of the key lifetime. Where key caching is supported, secure negotiation of key lifetimes is RECOMMENDED. Lower layers that support re-key, but not key caching, may not require key lifetime negotiation. For example, a difference between IKEv1 [[RFC2409](#)] and IKEv2 [[RFC4306](#)] is that in IKEv1 SA lifetimes were negotiated; in IKEv2, each end of the SA is responsible for enforcing its own lifetime policy on the SA and re-keying the SA when necessary.
- [g] Key state resynchronization. It is possible for the peer or authenticator to reboot or reclaim resources, clearing portions or all of the key cache. Therefore, key lifetime negotiation cannot guarantee that the key cache will remain synchronized, and the peer may not be able to determine before attempting to use a key whether it exists within the authenticator cache. It is therefore RECOMMENDED for the Secure Association Protocol to provide a mechanism for key state resynchronization. Since in this situation one or more of the parties initially do not possess a key with which to protect the resynchronization exchange, securing this mechanism may be difficult.
- [h] Key scope synchronization. To support key scope determination, the Secure Association Protocol SHOULD provide a mechanism by which the peer can determine the scope of the key cache on each authenticator, and by which the authenticator can determine the scope of the key cache on a peer. This includes negotiation of restrictions on key usage.

- [i] Traffic profile negotiation. The traffic to be protected by a lower layer security association may not necessarily have the same lower layer source or destination address as the EAP peer and authenticator, and it is possible for the peer and authenticator to negotiate multiple security associations, each with a different traffic profile. Where this is the case, the profile of protected traffic SHOULD be explicitly negotiated. For example, in IKEv2 it is possible for an Initiator and Responder to utilize EAP for authentication, then negotiate a Tunnel Mode Security Association (SA) which permits passing of traffic originating from hosts other than the Initiator and Responder. Similarly, in IEEE 802.16e a Subscriber Station (SS) may forward traffic to the Base Station (BS) which originates from the Local Area Network (LAN) to which it is attached. To enable this, Security Associations within IEEE 802.16e are identified by the Connection Identifier (CID), not by the EAP peer and authenticator MAC addresses. In both IKEv2 and IEEE 802.16e, multiple security associations may exist between the EAP peer and authenticator, each with their own traffic profile and quality of service parameters.
- [j] Direct operation. Since the phase 2 Secure Association Protocol is concerned with the establishment of security associations between the EAP peer and authenticator, including the derivation of transient session keys, only those parties have "a need to know" the transient session keys. The Secure Association Protocol MUST operate directly between the peer and authenticator, and MUST NOT be passed-through to the backend authentication server, or include additional parties.
- [k] Bi-directional operation. While some ciphersuites only require a single set of transient session keys to protect traffic in both directions, other ciphersuites require a unique set of transient session keys in each direction. The phase 2 Secure Association Protocol SHOULD provide for the derivation of unicast and multicast keys in each direction, so as not to require two separate phase 2 exchanges in order to create a bi-directional phase 2 security association. See [\[RFC3748\] Section 2.4](#) for more discussion.

3.2. Key Scope

Absent explicit specification within the lower layer, after the completion of phase 1b, EAP keying material and parameters are bound to the EAP peer and authenticator, but are not bound to a specific peer or authenticator port.

While EAP Keying Material passed down to the lower layer is not intrinsically bound to particular authenticator and peer ports, Transient Session Keys MAY be bound to particular authenticator and

peer ports by the Secure Association Protocol. However, a lower layer MAY also permit TSKs to be used on multiple peer and/or authenticator ports, providing that TSK freshness is guaranteed (such as by keeping replay counter state within the authenticator).

In order to further limit the key scope the following measures are suggested:

- [a] The lower layer MAY specify additional restrictions on key usage, such as limiting the use of EAP keying material and parameters on the EAP peer to the port over which on the EAP conversation was conducted.
- [b] The backend authentication server and authenticator MAY implement additional attributes in order to further restrict the scope of EAP keying material. For example, in 802.11, the backend authentication server may provide the authenticator with a list of authorized Called or Calling-Station-Ids and/or SSIDs for which EAP keying material is valid.
- [c] Where the backend authentication server provides attributes restricting the key scope, it is RECOMMENDED that restrictions be securely communicated by the authenticator to the peer. This can be accomplished using the Secure Association Protocol, but also can be accomplished via the EAP method or the lower layer.

3.3. Parent-Child Relationships

When an EAP re-authentication takes place, new keying material is derived and exported by the EAP method, which eventually results in replacement of TSKs, regardless of the way they are derived (see [Section 2.1](#)). While the maximum lifetime of TSKs or child keys can be less than or equal to that of the MSK/EMSK, it cannot be greater. This is true even where exported EAP keying material is only used for entity authentication and is not used for key derivation (such as in IKEv2), so that compromise of exported EAP keying material does not imply compromise of the TSKs or child keys. However, where child keys are derived from or are wrapped by EAP keying material, compromise of the MSK/EMSK does imply compromise of the child keys.

Child keys that are used frequently (such as TSKs which are used for traffic protection) can expire sooner than the exported EAP keying material they are dependent on, so that it is advantageous to support re-key of child keys prior to EAP re-authentication. Note that deletion of the MSK/EMSK does not necessarily imply deletion of TSKs or child keys.

Failure to mutually prove possession of exported EAP keying material

during the Secure Association Protocol exchange need not be grounds for deletion of the keying material by both parties; rate-limiting Secure Association Protocol exchanges could be used to prevent a brute force attack.

3.4. Local Key Lifetimes

The Transient EAP Keys (TEKs) are session keys used to protect the EAP conversation. The TEKs are internal to the EAP method and are not exported. TEKs are typically created during an EAP conversation, used until the end of the conversation and then discarded. However, methods may re-key TEKs during an EAP conversation.

When using TEKs within an EAP conversation or across conversations, it is necessary to ensure that replay protection and key separation requirements are fulfilled. For instance, if a replay counter is used, TEK re-key MUST occur prior to wrapping of the counter. Similarly, TSKs MUST remain cryptographically separate from TEKs despite TEK re-keying or caching. This prevents TEK compromise from leading directly to compromise of the TSKs and vice versa.

EAP methods may cache local keying material which may persist for multiple EAP conversations when fast reconnect is used [[RFC3748](#)]. For example, EAP methods based on TLS (such as EAP-TLS [I-D.simon-emu-rfc2716bis]) derive and cache the TLS Master Secret, typically for substantial time periods. The lifetime of other local keying material calculated within the EAP method is defined by the method. Note that in general, when using fast reconnect, there is no guarantee to that the original long-term credentials are still in the possession of the peer. For instance, a card hold holding the private key for EAP-TLS may have been removed. EAP servers SHOULD also verify that the long-term credentials are still valid, such as by checking that certificate used in the original authentication has not yet expired.

3.5. Exported and Calculated Key Lifetimes

The following mechanisms are available for communicating the lifetime of exported and calculated keying material between the EAP peer, server and authenticator:

- AAA protocols (backend server and authenticator)
- Lower layer mechanisms (authenticator and peer)
- EAP method-specific negotiation (peer and server)

Where the EAP method does not support the negotiation of the lifetime of exported keys, and a key lifetime negotiation mechanism is not provided by the lower layer, there may be no way for the peer to

learn the lifetime of exported and calculated keys. This can leave the peer uncertain how long the authenticator will maintain EAP keying material within the key cache. In this case the lifetime of exported keys can be managed as a system parameter on the peer and authenticator; a default lifetime of 8 hours is RECOMMENDED.

3.5.1. AAA Protocols

AAA protocols such as RADIUS [[RFC2865](#)] and Diameter [[RFC4072](#)] can be used to communicate the maximum exported key lifetime from the backend authentication server to the authenticator.

The Session-Timeout attribute is defined for RADIUS in [[RFC2865](#)] and for Diameter in [[RFC4005](#)]. Where EAP is used for authentication, [[RFC3580](#)] [Section 3.17](#) indicates that a Session-Timeout attribute sent in an Access-Accept along with a Termination-Action value of RADIUS-Request specifies the maximum number of seconds of service provided prior to EAP re-authentication.

However, there is also a need to be able to specify the maximum lifetime of cached keying material. Where EAP pre-authentication is supported, cached keys can be pre-established on the authenticator prior to session start, and will remain there until they expire. EAP lower layers supporting caching of exported keying material may also persist that material after the end of a session, enabling the peer to subsequently resume communication utilizing the cached keying material. In these situations it may be desirable for the backend authentication server to specify the maximum lifetime of cached keying material.

To accomplish this, [IEEE-802.11i] overloaded the Session-Timeout attribute, assuming that it represents the maximum time after which transported EAP keying material will expire on the authenticator, regardless of whether transported keying material is cached.

An IEEE 802.11 authenticator receiving keying material is expected to initialize a timer to the Session-Timeout value, and once the timer expires, the exported keying material expires. Whether this results in session termination or EAP re-authentication is controlled by the value of the Termination-Action attribute. Where EAP re-authentication occurs the exported keying material is replaced, and with it, new calculated keys are put in place. Where session termination occurs, exported and calculated keying material is deleted.

Overloading the Session-Timeout attribute is problematic in situations where it is necessary to control the maximum session time and key lifetime independently. For example, it might be desirable

to limit the lifetime of cached keys to 5 minutes while permitting a user once authenticated to remain connected for up to an hour without re-authenticating. As a result, in the future additional attributes may be specified to control the lifetime of cached keys; these attributes may modify the meaning of the Session-Timeout attribute in specific circumstances.

Since the TSK lifetime is often determined by authenticator resources, and the backend authentication server has no insight into the TSK derivation process, by the principle of ciphersuite independence, it is not appropriate for the backend authentication server to manage any aspect of the TSK derivation process, including the TSK lifetime.

3.5.2. Lower Layer Mechanisms

Lower layer mechanisms can be used to enable the lifetime of exported and calculated keys to be negotiated between the peer and authenticator. This can be accomplished either using the Secure Association Protocol or within the lower layer transport.

Where TSKs are established as the result of a Secure Association Protocol exchange, it is RECOMMENDED that the Secure Association Protocol include support for TSK re-key. Where the TSK is taken directly from the MSK, there is no need to manage the TSK lifetime as a separate parameter, since the TSK lifetime and MSK lifetime are identical.

3.5.3. EAP Method-Specific Negotiation

All EAP methods generating keys are required to generate the MSK and EMSK, and may optionally generate the IV. However, EAP, defined in [[RFC3748](#)], does not itself support the negotiation of lifetimes for exported keying material such as the MSK, EMSK and IV.

While EAP itself does not support lifetime negotiation, it would be possible to specify methods that do. However, systems that rely on such negotiation for exported keys would only function with these methods. Also, there is no guarantee that the lifetime negotiated within the EAP method would be compatible with backend authentication server policy. In the interest of method independence and compatibility with backend server implementations, key management of exported or derived keys SHOULD NOT be provided within EAP methods.

3.6. Key Cache Synchronization

Key lifetime negotiation alone cannot guarantee key cache synchronization. Even where a lower layer exchange is run

immediately after EAP in order to determine the lifetime of EAP keying material, it is still possible for the authenticator to purge all or part of the key cache prematurely (e.g. due to reboot or need to reclaim memory).

The lower layer may utilize the Discovery phase 0 to improve key cache synchronization. For example, if the authenticator manages the key cache by deleting the oldest key first, the relative creation time of the last key to be deleted could be advertised within the Discovery phase, enabling the peer to determine whether keying material had been prematurely expired from the authenticator key cache.

3.7. Key Strength

As noted in [Section 2.1](#), EAP lower layers determine TSKs in different ways. Where EAP keying material is utilized in the derivation, encryption or authentication of TSKs, it is possible for EAP key generation to represent the weakest link.

In order to ensure that EAP methods produce keying material of an appropriate symmetric key strength, it is RECOMMENDED that EAP methods utilizing public key cryptography choose a public key that has a cryptographic strength providing the required level of attack resistance. This is typically provided by configuring EAP methods, since there is no coordination between the lower layer and EAP method with respect to minimum required symmetric key strength.

[BCP 86 \[RFC3766\] Section 5](#) offers advice on the required RSA or DH module and DSA subgroup size in bits, for a given level of attack resistance in bits. The National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) also offers advice on appropriate key sizes in [\[SP800-57\]](#).

3.8. Key Wrap

The key wrap specified in [\[RFC2548\]](#), which is based on an MD5-based stream cipher, has known problems, as described in [\[RFC3579\] Section 4.3](#). RADIUS uses the shared secret for multiple purposes, including per-packet authentication and attribute hiding, considerable information is exposed about the shared secret with each packet. This exposes the shared secret to dictionary attacks. MD5 is used both to compute the RADIUS Response Authenticator and the Message-Authenticator attribute, and concerns exist relating to the security of this hash [\[MD5Collision\]](#).

As discussed in [\[RFC3579\] Section 4.3](#), the security vulnerabilities of RADIUS are extensive, and therefore development of an alternative

key wrap technique based on the RADIUS shared secret would not substantially improve security. As a result, [\[RFC3579\] Section 4.2](#) recommends running RADIUS over IPsec. The same approach is taken in Diameter EAP [\[RFC4072\]](#), which defines clear-text key attributes, to be protected by IPsec or TLS.

4. Handoff Vulnerabilities

Several mechanisms have been proposed for reducing handoff latency within networks utilizing EAP. These include:

EAP pre-authentication

In EAP pre-authentication, an EAP peer pre-establishes EAP keying material with an authenticator prior to arrival. EAP pre-authentication only affects the timing of EAP authentication, but does not shorten or eliminate EAP (phase 1a) or AAA (phase 1b) exchanges; Discovery (phase 0) and Secure Association Protocol (phase 2) exchanges occur as described in [Section 1.3](#). As a result, the primary benefit is to enable EAP authentication to be removed from the handoff critical path, thereby reducing latency. Use of EAP pre-authentication within IEEE 802.11 is described in [\[8021XPreAuth\]](#) and [\[IEEE-802.11i\]](#).

Proactive key distribution

In proactive key distribution, derived keying material and authorizations are transported from the backend authentication server to a candidate authenticator in advance of a handoff. As a result, EAP (phase 1a) is not required, but the Discovery (phase 0), and Secure Association Protocol exchanges (phase 2) are still necessary. Within the AAA exchange (phase 1b), authorization and key distribution functions are typically supported, but not authentication. Proactive key distribution is described in [\[MishraPro\]](#), [\[IEEE-03-084\]](#) and [\[I-D.irtf-aaaarch-handoff\]](#).

Key caching

Caching of EAP keying material enables an EAP peer to re-attach to an authenticator without requiring EAP (phase 1a) or AAA (phase 1b) exchanges. However, Discovery (phase 0) and Secure Association Protocol (phase 2) exchanges are still required. Use of key caching within IEEE 802.11 is described in [\[IEEE-802.11i\]](#).

Context transfer

In context transfer schemes, keying material and authorizations are transferred between a previous authenticator and a new authenticator. This can occur in response to a handoff request by the EAP peer, or in advance, as in proactive key distribution. As a result, EAP (phase 1a) is eliminated, but not the Discovery (phase 0) or Secure Association Protocol exchanges (phase 2). If a

secure channel can be established between the new and previous authenticator without assistance from the backend authentication server, then the AAA exchange (phase 1b) can be eliminated; otherwise, it is still required, although it may be shortened. Context transfer protocols are described in [[IEEE-802.11F](#)] (now deprecated) and "Context Transfer Protocol (CXTCP)" [[RFC4067](#)]. "Fast Authentication Methods for Handovers between IEEE 802.11 Wireless LANs" [[Bargh](#)] analyzes fast handoff techniques, including context transfer mechanisms.

Token distribution

In token distribution schemes the EAP peer is provided with a credential, subsequently enabling it to authenticate with one or more additional authenticators. During the subsequent authentications, EAP (phase 1a) is eliminated or shortened; the Discovery (phase 0) and Secure Association Protocol exchanges (phase 2) still occur, although the latter may be shortened. If the token includes authorizations and can be validated by an authenticator without assistance from the backend authentication server, then the AAA exchange (phase 1b) can be eliminated; otherwise it is still required, although it may be shortened. Token-based schemes are described in [[Token](#)] and [I-D.friedman-ike-short-term-certs].

The sections that follow discuss the security vulnerabilities introduced by the above schemes.

[4.1.](#) EAP Pre-authentication

EAP pre-authentication differs from a normal EAP conversation primarily with respect to the lower layer encapsulation. For example, in [[IEEE-802.11i](#)], EAP pre-authentication frames utilize a distinct Ethertype, but otherwise conform to the encapsulation described in [[IEEE-802.1X](#)]. As a result, an EAP pre-authentication conversation differs little from the model described in [Section 1.3](#), other than the introduction of a delay between phase 1 and phase 2.

EAP pre-authentication relies on lower layer mechanisms for discovery of candidate authenticators. Where discovery can provide information on candidate authenticators outside the immediate listening range, and the peer can determine whether it already possesses valid keying material with candidate authenticators, the peer can avoid unnecessary EAP pre-authentications and can establish keying material well in advance, regardless of the coverage overlap between authenticators. However, if the peer can only discover candidate authenticators within listening range and cannot determine whether it can reuse existing key material, then peer may not be able to complete EAP pre-authentication prior to connectivity loss or may

pre-authenticate multiple times with the same authenticator, increasing backend authentication server load.

Since a peer may complete EAP pre-authentication with an authenticator without eventually attaching to it, phase 2 may never occur. As a result, an Accounting-Request signifying the start of service may never be sent, or may only be sent with a substantial delay after the completion of authentication.

As noted in "IEEE 802.1X RADIUS Usage Guidelines" [[RFC3580](#)], the AAA exchange resulting from EAP pre-authentication differs little from an ordinary exchange described in "RADIUS Support for EAP" [[RFC3579](#)]. For example, since in IEEE 802.11i an Association exchange does not occur prior to EAP pre-authentication, the SSID is not known by the authenticator at authentication time, so that an Access-Request cannot include the SSID within the Called-Station-Id attribute as described in [[RFC3580](#)] [Section 3.20](#).

Since only the absence of an SSID in the Called-Station-Id attribute distinguishes an EAP pre-authentication attempt, if the authenticator does not always include the SSID for a normal EAP authentication attempt, the backend authentication server may not be able to determine whether a session constitutes an EAP pre-authentication attempt, potentially resulting in authorization or accounting problems. Where the number of simultaneous sessions is limited, the backend authentication server may refuse to authorize a valid EAP pre-authentication attempt or may enable the peer to engage in more simultaneous sessions than they are authorized for. Where EAP pre-authentication occurs with an authenticator which the peer never attaches to, the backend accounting server may not be able to determine whether the absence of an Accounting-Request was due to packet loss or a session that never started.

In order to enable pre-authentication requests to be handled more reliably, it is RECOMMENDED that AAA protocols explicitly identify EAP pre-authentication. In order to suppress unnecessary EAP pre-authentication exchanges, it is RECOMMENDED that authenticators unambiguously identify themselves as described in [Section 2.2.1](#).

[4.2](#). Proactive Key Distribution

In proactive key distribution schemes, the backend authentication server transports keying material and authorizations to an authenticator in advance of the arrival of the peer. The authenticators selected to receive the transported key material are selected based on past patterns of peer movement between authenticators known as the "neighbor graph". Since proactive key distribution schemes typically only demonstrate proof of possession

of transported keying material between the EAP peer and authenticator, the backend authentication server may not be provided with proof that the peer successfully authenticated to an authenticator. To compute the "neighbor graph" the backend authentication server therefore may need to rely on a stream of accounting messages without a corresponding set of authentication exchanges.

In order to prevent compromise of one authenticator from resulting in compromise of other authenticators, cryptographic separation needs to be maintained between the keying material transported to each authenticator. However, even where cryptographic separation is maintained, an attacker compromising an authenticator may still disrupt the operation of other authenticators. Since proactive key distribution schemes typically only demonstrate proof of possession of transported keying material between the EAP peer and authenticator, the backend authentication server is typically not provided with proof that the peer actually connected to an authenticator. To compute the "neighbor graph" it therefore may be necessary to rely on a stream of accounting messages without a corresponding set of authentication exchanges to verify against.

As noted in [\[RFC3579\] Section 4.3.7](#), in the absence of spoofing detection within the AAA infrastructure, it is possible for EAP authenticators to impersonate each other. By forging NAS identification attributes within accounting messages, an attacker compromising one authenticator could corrupt the neighbor graph, tricking the backend authentication server into transporting keying material to arbitrary authenticators. While this would not enable recovery of EAP keying material without breaking fundamental cryptographic assumptions, it could enable fraudulent charges or allow an attacker to disrupt service by increasing load on the backend authentication server or thrashing the authenticator key cache.

Since proactive key distribution requires the distribution of derived keying material to candidate authenticators, the effectiveness of this scheme depends on the ability of backend authentication server to anticipate the movement of the EAP peer. As described in [Mishra-Pro], knowledge of the "neighbor graph" can be established via static configuration or analysis of accounting messages. Since proactive key distribution relies on backend authentication server knowledge of the "neighbor graph" it is most applicable to intra-domain handoff scenarios. However, in inter-domain handoff where there may be many authenticators, the "neighbor graph" may not be readily derived on the backend authentication server, since peers may frequently connect to authenticators that have not previously been encountered.

Since proactive key distribution schemes typically require introduction of server-initiated messages as described in [[RFC3576](#)] and [[I-D.irtf-aaaarch-handoff](#)], security issues described in [[RFC3576](#)] [Section 5](#) are applicable, including authorization ([Section 5.1](#)) and replay detection ([Section 5.4](#)) problems.

[4.3.](#) AAA Bypass

Fast handoff techniques which enable elimination of the AAA exchange (phase 1b) differ fundamentally from typical network access scenarios (dial-up, wired LAN, etc.) which include user authentication as well as authorization for the offered service. Where the AAA exchange (phase 1b) is omitted, authorizations and keying material are not provided by the backend authentication server, and as a result they need to be supplied by other means. This section describes some of the implications.

[4.3.1.](#) Key Transport

Where transported keying material is not supplied by the backend authentication server, it needs to be provided by another party authorized to access that keying material. As noted in [Section 1.5](#), only the EAP peer, authenticator and server are authorized to possess transported EAP keying material. Since EAP peers do not trust each other, if the backend authentication server does not supply transported keying material to a new authenticator, it can only be provided by a previous authenticator.

As noted in [Section 1.5](#), the goal of the EAP conversation is to derive session keys known only to the peer and the authenticator. If EAP keying material is replicated between a previous authenticator and a new authenticator, then the previous authenticator may potentially know the session keys used between the peer and new authenticator. Also, the new authenticator may potentially know the session keys used between the peer and the previous authenticator.

If a one-way function is used to derive the keying material to be transported to the new authenticator, then the new authenticator is not longer able to know previous session keys without breaking a fundamental cryptographic assumption.

[4.3.2.](#) Authorization

As a part of the authentication process, the backend authentication server determines the user's authorization profile and transmits the authorizations to the authenticator along with the transported EAP key material. Typically, the profile is determined based on the user identity, but a certificate presented by the user may also provide

authorization information.

The backend authentication server is responsible for making a user authorization decision, which requires answering the following questions:

- [a] Is this a legitimate user of this network?
- [b] Is the user allowed to access this network?
- [c] Is the user permitted to access this network on this day and at this time?
- [d] Is the user within the concurrent session limit?
- [e] Are there any fraud, credit limit, or other concerns indicating that access should be denied?
- [f] If access is to be granted, what are the service parameters (mandatory tunneling, bandwidth, filters, and so on) to be provisioned for the user?

While the authorization decision is in principle simple, the distributed decision making process may add complexity. Where brokers or proxies are involved, all of the AAA entities in the chain from the authenticator to the home backend authentication server are involved in the decision. For example, a broker can deny access even if the home backend authentication server would allow it, or a proxy can add authorizations (e.g., bandwidth limits).

Decisions can be based on static policy definitions and profiles as well as dynamic state (e.g. time of day or concurrent session limits). In addition to the Accept/Reject decisions made by AAA entities, service parameters or constraints may be communicated to the authenticator.

The criteria for Accept/Reject decisions or the reasons for choosing particular authorizations are typically not communicated to the authenticator, only the final result. As a result, the authenticator has no way to know what the decision was based on. Was a set of authorization parameters sent because this service is always provided to the user, or was the decision based on the time of day and the capabilities of the authenticator?

4.3.3. Correctness

When the AAA exchange (phase 1b) is bypassed, several challenges arise in ensuring correct authorization:

- [a] Theft of service. Bypassing the AAA exchange (phase 1b) should not enable a user to extend their network access or gain access to services they are not entitled to.
- [b] Consideration of network-wide state. Handoff techniques should not render the backend authentication server incapable of keeping track of network-wide state. For example, a backend authentication server may need to keep track of simultaneous user sessions.
- [c] Elevation of privilege. Backend authentication servers often perform conditional evaluation, in which the authorizations returned in an Access-Accept message are contingent on the authenticator or on dynamic state such as the time of day. In this situation, bypassing the AAA exchange could enable unauthorized access unless the restrictions are explicitly encoded within the authorizations provided by the backend authentication server.

A handoff mechanism that provides proper authorization is said to be "correct". One condition for correctness is as follows:

For a handoff to be "correct" it MUST establish on the new authenticator the same authorizations as would have been created had the new authenticator completed a AAA conversation with the backend authentication server.

A properly designed handoff scheme will only succeed if it is "correct" in this way. If a successful handoff would establish "incorrect" authorizations, it is preferable for it to fail. Where the supported services differ between authenticators, a handoff that bypasses the backend authentication server is likely to fail.

[\[RFC2865\] section 1.1](#) states:

A authenticator that does not implement a given service MUST NOT implement the RADIUS attributes for that service. For example, a authenticator that is unable to offer ARAP service MUST NOT implement the RADIUS attributes for ARAP. A authenticator MUST treat a RADIUS access-accept authorizing an unavailable service as an access-reject instead.

This behavior applies to attributes that are known, but not implemented. For attributes that are unknown, [\[RFC2865\] Section 5](#) states:

A RADIUS server MAY ignore Attributes with an unknown Type. A RADIUS client MAY ignore Attributes with an unknown Type.

In order to perform a correct handoff, if a new authenticator is provided with RADIUS authorizations for a known but unavailable

service, then it MUST process these authorizations the same way it would handle a RADIUS Access-Accept requesting an unavailable service; this MUST cause the handoff to fail. However, if a new authenticator is provided with authorizations including unknown attributes, then these attributes MAY be ignored. The definition of a "known but unsupported service" MUST encompass requests for unavailable security services. This includes vendor-specific attributes related to security, such as those described in [\[RFC2548\]](#). Although it may seem somewhat counter-intuitive, failure is indeed the "correct" result where a known but unsupported service is requested.

Presumably a correctly configured backend authentication server would not request that an authenticator provide a service that it does not implement. This implies that if the new authenticator were to complete a AAA conversation, it would be likely to receive different service instructions. Failure of the handoff is the desired result since it will cause the new authenticator to go back to the backend server in order to receive the appropriate service definition.

Handoff mechanisms which bypass the backend authentication server are most likely to be successful when employed in a homogeneous deployment within a single administrative domain. In a heterogeneous deployment, the backend authentication server may return different authorizations depending on the authenticator making the request, in order to make sure that the requested service is consistent with the authenticator capabilities. Where a backend authentication server would send different authorizations to the new authenticator than were sent to a previous authenticator, transferring authorizations between the previous authenticator and the new authenticator will result in incorrect authorization.

Virtual LAN (VLAN) support is defined in [\[IEEE-802.1Q\]](#); RADIUS support for dynamic VLANs is described in [\[RFC3580\]](#) and [\[RFC4675\]](#). If some authenticators support dynamic VLANs while others do not, then attributes present in the Access-Request (such as the NAS-Port-Type, NAS-IP-Address, NAS-IPv6-Address and NAS-Identifier) could be examined by the backend authentication server to determine when VLAN attributes will be returned, and if so, which ones. However, if the backend authenticator is bypassed, then a handoff occurring between authenticators supporting different VLAN capabilities could result in a user obtaining access to an unauthorized VLAN (e.g. a user with access to a guest VLAN being given unrestricted access to the network).

Similarly, a handoff between an authenticator providing confidentiality and another that does not should fail, since if the handoff were successful, the user would be moved from a secure to an

insecure channel without permission from the backend authentication server.

5. Security Considerations

The EAP threat model is described in [\[RFC3748\] Section 7.1](#). The security properties of EAP methods (known as "security claims") are described in [\[RFC3748\] Section 7.2.1](#). EAP method requirements for applications such as Wireless LAN authentication are described in [\[RFC4017\]](#). The RADIUS threat model is described in [\[RFC3579\] Section 4.1](#), and responses to these threats are described in [\[RFC3579\] Sections 4.2 and 4.3](#).

However, in addition to threats against EAP and AAA, there are other system level threats. In developing the threat model, it is assumed that:

- All traffic is visible to the attacker.
- The attacker can alter, forge or replay messages.
- The attacker can reroute messages to another principal.
- The attacker may be a principal or an outsider.
- The attacker can compromise any key that is sufficiently old.

Threats arising from these assumptions include:

- [a] An attacker may compromise or steal an EAP authenticator, in an attempt to gain access to other EAP authenticators or obtain long-term secrets.
- [b] An attacker may try to modify or spoof packets, including Discovery or Secure Association Protocol frames, EAP or AAA packets.
- [c] An attacker may attempt a downgrade attack in order to exploit known weaknesses in an authentication method or cryptographic transform.
- [d] An attacker may attempt to induce an EAP peer, authenticator or server to disclose keying material to an unauthorized party, or utilize keying material outside the context that it was intended for.
- [e] An attacker may alter, forge or replay packets.
- [f] An attacker may cause an EAP peer, authenticator or server to reuse an stale key. Use of stale keys may also occur unintentionally. For example, a poorly implemented backend authentication server may provide stale keying material to an authenticator, or a poorly implemented authenticator may reuse nonces.

- [g] An authenticated attacker may attempt to obtain elevated privilege in order to access information that it does not have rights to.
- [h] An attacker may attempt a man-in-the-middle attack in order to gain access to the network.
- [i] An attacker may launch a denial of service attack against the EAP peer, authenticator or backend authentication server.
- [j] An attacker may compromise an EAP authenticator in an effort to commit fraud. For example, a compromised authenticator may provide incorrect information to the EAP peer and/or server via out-of-band mechanisms (such as via a AAA or lower layer protocol). This includes impersonating another authenticator, or providing inconsistent information to the peer and EAP server.

In order to address these threats, [[I-D.housley-aaa-key-mgmt](#)] provides a description of mandatory system security properties. Issues relating to system security requirements are discussed in the sections that follow.

5.1. Authenticator Compromise

In the event that an authenticator is compromised or stolen, an attacker may gain access to the network via that authenticator, or may obtain the credentials required for that authenticator/AAA client to communicate with one or more backend authentication servers. However, this should not allow the attacker to compromise other authenticators or the backend authentication server, or obtain long-term user credentials.

The implications of this requirement are many, but some of the more important are as follows:

No Key Sharing

An EAP authenticator MUST NOT share any keying material with another EAP authenticator, since if one EAP authenticator were compromised, this would enable the compromise of keying material on another authenticator. In order to be able to determine whether keying material has been shared, it is necessary for the identity of the EAP authenticator to be defined and understood by all parties that communicate with it.

No AAA Credential Sharing

AAA credentials (such as RADIUS shared secrets, IPsec pre-shared keys or certificates) MUST NOT be shared between AAA clients, since if one AAA client were compromised, this would enable an attacker to impersonate other AAA clients to the backend authentication

server, or even to impersonate a backend authentication server to other AAA clients.

No Compromise of Long-Term Credentials

An attacker obtaining TSKs, TEKs or EAP keying material such as the MSK MUST NOT be able to obtain long-term user credentials such as pre-shared keys, passwords or private-keys without breaking a fundamental cryptographic assumption.

5.2. Spoofing

The use of per-packet authentication and integrity protection provides protection against spoofing attacks. Diameter [\[RFC3588\]](#) provides support for per-packet authentication and integrity protection via use of IPsec or TLS. RADIUS/EAP [\[RFC3579\]](#) provides for per-packet authentication and integrity protection via use of the Message-Authenticator attribute.

[\[RFC3748\]](#) [Section 7.2.1](#) describes the "integrity protection" security claim and [\[RFC4017\]](#) requires use of EAP methods supporting this claim.

In order to prevent forgery of Secure Association Protocol frames, per-frame authentication and integrity protection is RECOMMENDED on all messages. [\[IEEE-802.11i\]](#) supports per-frame integrity protection and authentication on all messages within the 4-way handshake except the first message. An attack leveraging this omission is described in [\[Analysis\]](#).

5.3. Downgrade Attacks

The ability to negotiate the use of a particular cryptographic algorithm provides resilience against compromise of a particular cryptographic algorithm. This is usually accomplished by including an algorithm identifier in the protocol, and by specifying the algorithm requirements in the protocol specification. In order to prevent downgrade attacks, secure confirmation of the "best" ciphersuite is required.

[\[RFC3748\]](#) [Section 7.2.1](#) describes the "protected ciphersuite negotiation" security claim that refers to the ability of an EAP method to negotiate the ciphersuite used to protect the EAP conversation, as well as to integrity protect the negotiation. [\[RFC4017\]](#) requires EAP methods satisfying this security claim.

Diameter [\[RFC3588\]](#) provides support for cryptographic algorithm negotiation via use of IPsec or TLS. RADIUS [\[RFC3579\]](#) does not support the negotiation of cryptographic algorithms, and relies on

MD5 for integrity protection, authentication and confidentiality, despite known weaknesses in the algorithm [[MD5Collision](#)]. This issue can be addressed via use of RADIUS over IPsec, as described in [[RFC3579](#)] [Section 4.2](#).

As a result, EAP methods and AAA protocols are capable of addressing downgrade attacks. To ensure against downgrade attacks within lower layer protocols, algorithm independence is REQUIRED with lower layers using EAP for key derivation. For interoperability, at least one suite of mandatory-to-implement algorithm MUST be selected. Lower layer protocols supporting EAP for key derivation SHOULD also support secure ciphersuite negotiation. As described in [[RFC1968](#)], PPP ECP does not provide support for secure ciphersuite negotiation. However, [IEEE-802.11i] does support secure ciphersuite negotiation.

5.4. Unauthorized Disclosure

While preserving algorithm independence, confidentiality of all keying material MUST be maintained. To prevent unauthorized disclosure of keys, each party in the EAP conversation MUST be authenticated to the other parties with whom it communicates. Keying material MUST be bound to the appropriate context.

[[RFC3748](#)] [Section 7.2.1](#) describes the "mutual authentication" and "dictionary attack resistance" claims, and [[RFC4017](#)] requires EAP methods satisfying these claims. EAP methods complying with [[RFC4017](#)] therefore provide for mutual authentication between the EAP peer and server. Within EAP, binding of EAP keying material (MSK, EMSK) to the appropriate context is provided by the Peer-Id and Server-Id which are exported along with the keying material.

Diameter [[RFC3588](#)] provides for per-packet authentication and integrity protection via IPsec or TLS, and RADIUS/EAP [[RFC3579](#)] also provides for per-packet authentication and integrity protection. Where the NAS/authenticator and backend authentication server communicate directly and credible keywrap is used (see [Section 3.8](#)), this ensures that the AAA Key Transport phase achieves its security objectives: mutually authenticating the AAA client/authenticator and backend authentication server and providing EAP keying material to the EAP authenticator and to no other party. Within the AAA protocol, the authorization attributes provide the information binding the transported keying material to the appropriate context. For example, transported keying material is destined for the EAP authenticator identified by the NAS-Identifier attribute within the request, and relates to the EAP peer identified by the Peer-Id, User-Name [[RFC2865](#)] or CUI [[RFC4372](#)] attributes.

[[RFC2607](#)] [Section 7](#) describes the security issues occurring when the

authenticator and backend authentication server do not communicate directly. Where an untrusted AAA intermediary is present (such as a RADIUS proxy or a Diameter agent), and data object security is not used, transported keying material may be recovered by an attacker in control of the untrusted intermediary. As discussed in [Section 2.1](#), unless the TSKs are derived independently from EAP keying material (as in IKEv2), possession of transported keying material enables decryption of data traffic sent between the peer and a specific authenticator. However, as long as EAP keying material or keys derived from it are only utilized by a single authenticator, compromise of the transported keying material does not enable an attacker to impersonate the peer to another authenticator. Vulnerability to an untrusted AAA intermediary can be mitigated by implementation of redirect functionality, as described in [\[RFC3588\]](#) and [\[RFC4072\]](#).

As noted in [Section 3.1](#), the Secure Association Protocol does not by itself provide for mutual authentication between the EAP peer and authenticator, even if mutual possession of EAP keying material is proven. Where the NAS/authenticator and backend authentication server communicate directly, the backend authentication server can verify the correspondence between NAS identification attributes, the source address of packets sent by the NAS, and the AAA credentials. As long as the NAS has not shared its AAA credentials with another NAS, this allows the backend authentication server to authenticate the NAS. Using Channel Bindings, the EAP peer can then determine whether the NAS/authenticator has provided the same identifying information to the EAP peer and backend authentication server.

Peer and authenticator authorization MUST be performed.

Authorization is REQUIRED whenever a peer associates with a new authenticator. Authorization checking prevents an elevation of privilege attack, and ensures that an unauthorized authenticator is detected. Authorizations SHOULD be synchronized between the EAP peer, server, authenticator. Once the EAP conversation exchanges are complete, all of these parties should hold the same view of the authorizations associated the other parties. If peer authorization is restricted, then the peer SHOULD be made aware of the restriction.

The AAA exchange provides the EAP authenticator with authorizations relating to the EAP peer. However, neither the EAP nor AAA exchanges provides authorizations to the EAP peer. In order to ensure that all parties hold the same view of the authorizations it is RECOMMENDED that the Secure Association Protocol enable communication of authorizations between the EAP authenticator and peer.

Consistently identifying the EAP authenticator enables the EAP peer to determine whether EAP keying material has been shared between EAP

authenticators as well as to confirm with the backend authentication server that an EAP authenticator proving possession of EAP keying material during the Secure Association Protocol was authorized to obtain it. Identification issues are discussed in [Section 2.2](#) and key scope issues are discussed in [Section 3.2](#).

5.5. Replay Protection

Replay protection allows a protocol message recipient to discard any message that was recorded during a previous legitimate dialogue and presented as though it belonged to the current dialogue.

[RFC3748] [Section 7.2.1](#) describes the "replay protection" security claim and [\[RFC4017\]](#) requires use of EAP methods supporting this claim.

Diameter [\[RFC3588\]](#) provides support for replay protection via use of IPsec or TLS. RADIUS/EAP [\[RFC3579\]](#) protects against replay of keying material via the Request Authenticator. However, some RADIUS packets are not replay protected. In Accounting, Disconnect and CoA-Request packets the Request Authenticator contains a keyed MAC rather than a Nonce. The Response Authenticator in Accounting, Disconnect and CoA Response packets also contains a keyed MAC whose calculation does not depend on a Nonce in either the Request or Response packets. Therefore unless an Event-Timestamp attribute is included or IPsec is used, the recipient may not be able to determine whether these packets have been replayed.

In order to prevent replay of Secure Association Protocol frames, replay protection is REQUIRED on all messages. [\[IEEE-802.11i\]](#) supports replay protection on all messages within the 4-way handshake.

5.6. Key Freshness

A session key should be considered compromised if it remains in use too long. As noted in [\[I-D.housley-aaa-key-mgmt\]](#), session keys MUST be strong and fresh, while preserving algorithm independence. A fresh cryptographic key is one that is generated specifically for the intended use. Each session deserves an independent session key; disclosure of one session key MUST NOT aid the attacker in discovering any other session keys.

Fresh keys are required even when a long replay counter (that is, one that "will never wrap") is used to ensure that loss of state does not cause the same counter value to be used more than once with the same session key.

EAP, AAA and the lower layer each bear responsibility for ensuring the use of fresh, strong session keys:

EAP EAP methods need to ensure the freshness and strength of EAP keying material provided as an input to session key derivation. [\[RFC3748\]](#) [Section 7.10](#) states that "EAP methods SHOULD ensure the freshness of the MSK and EMSK, even in cases where one party may not have a high quality random number generator. A RECOMMENDED method is for each party to provide a nonce of at least 128 bits, used in the derivation of the MSK and EMSK." The contribution of nonces enables the EAP peer and server to ensure that exported EAP keying material is fresh.

[\[RFC3748\]](#) [Section 7.2.1](#) describes the "key strength" and "session independence" security claims, and [\[RFC4017\]](#) requires use of EAP methods supporting these claims as well as being capable of providing an equivalent key strength of 128 bits or greater.

AAA The AAA protocol needs to ensure that transported keying material is fresh and is not utilized outside its recommended lifetime. Replay protection is necessary for key freshness, but an attacker can deliver a stale (and therefore potentially compromised) key in a replay-protected message, so replay protection is not sufficient. As discussed in [Section 3.5](#), the Session-Timeout attribute enables the backend authentication server to limit the exposure of transported EAP keying material.

The EAP Session-Id, derived as described in [Section 1.4](#), enables the EAP peer, authenticator and server to distinguish EAP conversations. However, unless the authenticator keeps track of EAP Session-Ids, the authenticator cannot use the Session-Id to guarantee the freshness of EAP keying material.

Lower Layer

As described in [Section 3.1](#), the lower layer Secure Association Protocol MUST generate a fresh session key for each session, even if the keying material and parameters provided by EAP methods are cached, or either the peer or authenticator lack a high entropy random number generator. A RECOMMENDED method is for the peer and authenticator to each provide a nonce or counter used in session key derivation. If a nonce is used, it is RECOMMENDED that it be at least 128 bits.

[5.7.](#) Elevation of Privilege

Parties MUST NOT have access to keying material that is not needed to perform their own role. A party has access to a particular key if it has access to all of the secret information needed to derive it. If

a Secure Association Protocol is used to establish session keys, it MUST specify the scope for session keys.

Transported EAP keying material is permitted to be accessed by the EAP peer, authenticator and server. The EAP peer and server derive the transported keying material during the process of mutually authenticating each other using the selected EAP method. During the Secure Association Protocol, the EAP peer utilizes the transported EAP keying material to demonstrate to the authenticator that it is the same party that authenticated to the EAP server and was authorized by it. The EAP authenticator utilizes the transported EAP keying material to prove to the peer not only that the EAP conversation was transported through it (this could be demonstrated by a man-in-the-middle), but that it was uniquely authorized by the EAP server to provide the peer with access to the network. Unique authorization can only be demonstrated if the EAP authenticator does not share the transported keying material with a party other than the EAP peer and server.

TSKs are permitted to be accessed only by the EAP peer and authenticator (see [Section 1.5](#)). As discussed in [Section 2.1](#), PPP and 802.11i derive the TSKs from transported EAP keying material; 802.16e utilizes transported EAP keying material for TSK keywrap; IKEv2 utilizes transported EAP keying material only to authenticate the derivation of TSKs.

Where demonstration of authorization depends entirely on possession of transported EAP keying material (such as in PPP, 802.11i and 802.16e), this enables the backend server to masquerade as the authenticator, and possibly to obtain the TSKs unless the backend server deletes the transported EAP keying material after sending it.

5.8. Man-in-the-middle Attacks

As described in [[I-D.puthenkulam-eap-binding](#)], EAP method sequences and compound authentication mechanisms may be subject to man-in-the-middle attacks. When such attacks are successfully carried out, the attacker acts as an intermediary between a victim and a legitimate authenticator. This allows the attacker to authenticate successfully to the authenticator, as well as to obtain access to the network.

In order to prevent these attacks, [[I-D.puthenkulam-eap-binding](#)] recommends derivation of a compound key by which the EAP peer and server can prove that they have participated in the entire EAP exchange. Since the compound key must not be known to an attacker posing as an authenticator, and yet must be derived from quantities that are exported by EAP methods, it may be desirable to derive the compound key from a portion of the EMSK. In order to provide proper

key hygiene, it is recommended that the compound key used for man-in-the-middle protection be cryptographically separate from other keys derived from the EMSK.

5.9. Denial of Service Attacks

Key caching may result in vulnerability to denial of service attacks. For example, EAP methods that create persistent state may be vulnerable to denial of service attacks on the EAP server by a rogue EAP peer.

To address this vulnerability, EAP methods creating persistent state may wish to limit the persistent state created by an EAP peer. For example, for each peer an EAP server may choose to limit persistent state to a few EAP conversations, distinguished by the EAP Session-Id. This prevents a rogue peer from denying access to other peers.

Similarly, to conserve resources an authenticator may choose to limit the persistent state corresponding to each peer. This can be accomplished by limiting each peer to persistent state corresponding to a few EAP conversations, distinguished by the EAP Session-Id.

Depending on the media, creation of new TSKs may or may not imply deletion of previously derived TSKs. Where there is no implied deletion, the authenticator may choose to limit the number of TSKs and associated state that can be stored for each peer.

5.10. Impersonation

Both the RADIUS [[RFC2865](#)] and Diameter [[RFC3588](#)] protocols are potentially vulnerable to impersonation by a rogue authenticator. While both protocols support mutual authentication between the authenticator/AAA client and the backend authentication server, the security mechanisms vary.

In RADIUS, the shared secret used for authentication is determined by the source address of the RADIUS packet. As noted in [[RFC3579](#)] [Section 4.3.7](#), it is highly desirable that the source address be checked against one or more NAS identification attributes so as to detect and prevent impersonation attacks.

When RADIUS Access-Requests are forwarded by a proxy, the NAS-IP-Address or NAS-IPv6-Address attributes may not correspond to the source address. Since the NAS-Identifier attribute need not contain an FQDN, it also may not correspond to the source address, even indirectly. [[RFC2865](#)] [Section 3](#) states:

A RADIUS server MUST use the source IP address of the RADIUS

UDP packet to decide which shared secret to use, so that RADIUS requests can be proxied.

This implies that it is possible for a rogue authenticator to forge NAS-IP-Address, NAS-IPv6-Address or NAS-Identifier attributes within a RADIUS Access-Request in order to impersonate another authenticator. Among other things, this can result in messages (and transported keying material) being sent to the wrong authenticator. Since the rogue authenticator is authenticated by the RADIUS proxy or server purely based on the source address, other mechanisms are required to detect the forgery. In addition, it is possible for attributes such as the Called-Station-Id and Calling-Station-Id to be forged as well.

[RFC3579] [Section 4.3.7](#) describes how an EAP pass-through authenticator acting as a AAA client can be detected if it attempts to impersonate another authenticator (such by sending incorrect Called-Station-Id [[RFC2865](#)], NAS-Identifier [[RFC2865](#)], NAS-IP-Address [[RFC2865](#)] or NAS-IPv6-Address [[RFC3162](#)] attributes via the AAA protocol). This vulnerability can be mitigated by having RADIUS proxies check NAS identification attributes against the source address.

While [[RFC3588](#)] requires use of the Route-Record AVP, this utilizes Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs), so that impersonation detection requires DNS A, AAAA and PTR Resource Records (RRs) to be properly configured. As a result, Diameter is as vulnerable to this attack as RADIUS, if not more so. To address this vulnerability, it is necessary to allow the backend authentication server to communicate with the authenticator directly, such as via the redirect functionality supported in [[RFC3588](#)].

5.11. Channel Binding

It is possible for a compromised or poorly implemented EAP authenticator to communicate incorrect information to the EAP peer and/or server. This may enable an authenticator to impersonate another authenticator or communicate incorrect information via out-of-band mechanisms (such as via AAA or the lower layer).

Where EAP is used in pass-through mode, the EAP peer does not verify the identity of the pass-through authenticator. Within the Secure Association Protocol, the EAP peer and authenticator only demonstrate mutual possession of the transported EAP keying material. This creates a potential security vulnerability, described in [[RFC3748](#)] [Section 7.15](#).

As described in the previous section, it is possible for a proxy to

detect a AAA client attempting to impersonate another authenticator (such by sending incorrect Called-Station-Id [[RFC2865](#)], NAS-Identifier [[RFC2865](#)], NAS-IP-Address [[RFC2865](#)] or NAS-IPv6-Address [[RFC3162](#)] attributes via the AAA protocol). However, it is possible for a pass-through authenticator acting as a AAA client to provide correct information to the backend authentication server while communicating misleading information to the EAP peer via the lower layer.

For example, a compromised authenticator can utilize another authenticator's Called-Station-Id or NAS-Identifier in communicating with the EAP peer via the lower layer. Also, a pass-through authenticator acting as a AAA client can provide an incorrect peer Calling-Station-Id [[RFC2865](#)][RFC3580] to the backend authentication server via the AAA protocol.

As noted in [[RFC3748](#)] Section 7.15, this vulnerability can be addressed by EAP methods that support a protected exchange of channel properties such as endpoint identifiers, including (but not limited to): Called-Station-Id [[RFC2865](#)][RFC3580], Calling-Station-Id [[RFC2865](#)][RFC3580], NAS-Identifier [[RFC2865](#)], NAS-IP-Address [[RFC2865](#)], and NAS-IPv6-Address [[RFC3162](#)].

Using such a protected exchange, it is possible to match the channel properties provided by the authenticator via out-of-band mechanisms against those exchanged within the EAP method. Typically the EAP method imports Channel Bindings from the lower layer on the peer, and transmits them securely to the EAP server, which exports them to the lower layer or AAA layer. However, transport may occur from EAP server to peer, or may be bi-directional. On the side of the exchange (peer or server) where Channel Bindings are verified, the lower layer or AAA layer passes the result of the verification (TRUE or FALSE) up to the EAP method. While the verification can be done either by the peer or the server, typically only the server has the knowledge to determine the correctness of the values, as opposed to merely verifying their equality. For further discussion, see [I-D.arkko-eap-service-identity-auth].

It is also possible to achieve Channel Bindings without transporting data over EAP. For example, see [I-D.[draft-ohba-eap-channel-binding](#)]. In this approach the EAP method includes Channel Bindings in the calculation of exported EAP keying material, making it impossible for the peer and authenticator to complete the Secure Association Protocol if there is a mismatch in the Channel Bindings. However, this approach can only be applied where EAP methods generating key material are used along with lower layers that utilize the keying material. For example, this mechanism would not enable verification of Channel Bindings on wired IEEE 802 networks using

IEEE 802.1X.

6. IANA Considerations

This specification does not request the creation of any new parameter registries, nor does it require any other IANA assignments.

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Appendix A - Exported Parameters in Existing Methods

This Appendix specifies Session-Id, Peer-Id, Server-Id and Key-Lifetime for EAP methods that have been published prior to this specification. Future EAP method specifications MUST include a definition of the Session-Id, Peer-Id, and Server-Id (could be the empty string).

EAP-Identity

The EAP-Identity method is defined in [[RFC3748](#)]. It does not derive keys, and therefore does not define the Session-Id. The Peer-Id exported by the Identity method is determined by the octets included within the EAP- Response/Identity. The Server-Id is the empty string (zero length).

EAP-Notification

The EAP-Notification method is defined in [[RFC3748](#)]. It does not derive keys and therefore does not define the Session-Id. The Peer-Id and Server-Id are the empty string (zero length).

EAP-GTC

The EAP-GTC method is defined in [[RFC3748](#)]. It does not derive keys and therefore does not define the Session-Id. The Peer-Id and Server-Id are the empty string.

EAP-OTP

The EAP-OTP method is defined in [[RFC3748](#)]. It does not derive keys and therefore does not define the Session-Id. The Peer-Id and Server-Id are the empty string.

EAP-AKA

EAP-AKA is defined in [[RFC4187](#)]. The EAP-AKA Session-Id is the concatenation of the EAP Type Code (0x17) with the contents of the RAND field from the AT_RANDOM attribute, followed by the contents of the AUTN field in the AT_AUTN attribute.

The Peer-Id is the contents of the Identity field from the AT_IDENTITY attribute, using only the Actual Identity Length octets from the beginning, however. Note that the contents are used as they are transmitted, regardless of whether the transmitted identity was a permanent, pseudonym, or fast EAP re-authentication identity. The Server-Id is an empty string.

EAP-SIM

EAP-SIM is defined in [[RFC4186](#)]. The EAP-SIM Session-Id is the concatenation of the EAP Type Code (0x12) with the contents of the RAND field from the AT_RANDOM attribute, followed by the contents of the NONCE_MT field in the AT_NONCE_MT attribute.

The Peer-Id is the contents of the Identity field from the AT_IDENTITY attribute, using only the Actual Identity Length octets from the beginning, however. Note that the contents are used as they are transmitted, regardless of whether the transmitted identity was a permanent, pseudonym, or fast EAP re-authentication identity. The Server-Id is an empty string.

EAP-PSK

EAP-PSK is defined in [[RFCPSK](#)]. The EAP-PSK Session-Id is the concatenation of the EAP Type Code (0x2F) with the peer (RAND_P) and server (RAND_S) nonces. The Peer-Id is the contents of the ID_P field and the Server-Id is the contents of the ID_S field.

EAP-SAKE

EAP-SAKE is defined in [[RFC4763](#)]. The EAP-SAKE Session-Id is the concatenation of the EAP Type Code (0x30) with the contents of the RAND_S field from the AT_RANDOM_S attribute, followed by the contents of the RAND_P field in the AT_RANDOM_P attribute. Note that the EAP-SAKE Session-Id is not the same as the "Session ID" parameter chosen by the Server, which is sent in the first message, and replicated in subsequent messages. The Peer-Id is contained within the value field of the AT_PEERID attribute and the Server-Id, if available, is contained in the value field of the AT_SERVERID attribute.

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