Data-Only Emergency Calls
draft-ietf-ecrit-data-only-ea-05.txt

Abstract

RFC 6443 'Framework for Emergency Calling Using Internet Multimedia' describes how devices use the Internet to place emergency calls and how Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) can handle Internet multimedia emergency calls natively. The exchange of multimedia traffic typically involves a SIP session establishment starting with a SIP INVITE that negotiates various parameters for that session.

In some cases, however, the transmission of application data is everything that is needed. Examples of such environments include a temperature sensors issuing alerts, or vehicles sending crash data. Often these alerts are conveyed as one-shot data transmissions. These type of interactions are called 'data-only emergency calls'.

This document describes a container for the data based on the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) and its transmission using the SIP MESSAGE transaction.

Status of this Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 29, 2013.

Copyright Notice
1. Introduction

RFC 6443 [RFC6443] describes how devices use the Internet to place emergency calls and how Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) can handle Internet multimedia emergency calls natively. The exchange of multimedia traffic typically involves a SIP session establishment starting with a SIP INVITE that negotiates various parameters for that session.

In some cases, however, there is only application data to be conveyed from the end devices to a PSAP or some other intermediary. Examples of such environments includes sensors issuing alerts, or vehicles sending crash data. These messages may be one-shot alerts to emergency authorities and do not require establishment of a session. These type of interactions are called 'data-only emergency calls'. In this document, we use the term "call" so that similarities between full sessions with interactive media can be exploited.

Data-only emergency calls are similar to regular emergency calls in the sense that they require the emergency indications, emergency call routing functionality and may even have the same location requirements. However, the communication interaction will not lead to the exchange of interactive media, that is, Real-Time Protocol packets, such as voice, video data or real-time text.

This document does not define a mechanism for updates to the data contained in data-only emergency calls.

The Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) [cap] is a document format for exchanging emergency alerts and public warnings. CAP is mainly used for conveying alerts and warnings between authorities and from authorities to citizen/individuals. This document is concerned with citizen to authority "alerts", where the alert is sent without any interactive media.

CAP payload is used to convey the alert data which is contained in
the body of a SIP MESSAGE. Note that further data may be added using
the already available 'additional data' structure
[I-D.ietf-ecrit-additional-data]. Whenever data can be encoded in
the additional data structure it shall be used.

2. Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. Architectural Overview

This section illustrates two envisioned usage modes; targeted and location-based emergency alert routing.

1. Emergency alerts containing only data are targeted to an intermediary recipient responsible for evaluating the next steps. These steps could include:
   
   1. Sending an alert containing only data toward a Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP);
   
   2. Establishing a third-party initiated emergency call towards a PSAP that could include audio, video, and data.

2. Emergency alerts targeted to a Service URN used for IP-based emergency calls where the recipient is not known to the originator. In this scenario, the alert may contain only data (e.g., a CAP and a PIDF-LO payload in a SIP MESSAGE).

   Figure 1 shows a deployment variant where a sensor, is pre-configured (using techniques outside the scope of this document) to issue an
alert to an aggregator that processes these messages and performs whatever steps are necessary to appropriately react on the alert. For example, a security firm may use different sensor inputs to dispatch their security staff to a building they protect or to initiate a third-party emergency call.
In Figure 2 a scenario is shown whereby the alert is routed using location information and the Service URN. An emergency services routing proxy (ESRP) may use LoST to determine the next hop proxy to route the alert message to. A possible receiver is a PSAP and the recipient of the alert may be call taker. In the generic case, there is very likely no prior relationship between the originator and the receiver, e.g. PSAP. A PSAP, for example, is likely to receive and accept alerts from entities it cannot authorize. This scenario corresponds more to the classical emergency services use case and the description in [I-Dietf-ecrit-phonebcp] is applicable.
alert

MESSAGE with CAP
(including Service URN,
such as urn:service:sos)

ESRP performs
emergency alert
routing

MESSAGE with CAP
(including identity info)

PSAP
processes
emergency
alert

200 (OK)

Figure 2: Location-Based Emergency Alert Routing

4. Protocol Specification
4.1. CAP Transport

A CAP message may be sent on the initial message of any SIP transaction. However, this document only describes specific behavior when used with a SIP MESSAGE transaction for a one-shot, data-only emergency call. Behavior with other transactions is not defined. The CAP message is sent in the body of the message. The MIME type is set to 'application/cap+xml'.

If the server does not support the functionality required to fulfill the request then a 501 Not Implemented MUST be returned as specified in RFC 3261 ([RFC3261]). This is the appropriate response when a UAS does not recognize the request method and is not capable of supporting it for any user.

The 415 Unsupported Media Type error MUST be returned as specified in RFC 3261 ([RFC3261]) if the server is refusing to service the request because the message body of the request is in a format not supported by the server for the requested method. The server MUST return a list of acceptable formats using the Accept, Accept-Encoding, or Accept-Language header field, depending on the specific problem with the content.

4.2. Profiling of the CAP Document Content

The usage of CAP MUST conform to the specification provided with [cap]. For the usage with SIP the following additional requirements are imposed:

sender: A few sub-categories for putting a value in the <sender> element have to be considered:

Originator is a SIP entity, Author indication irrelevant: When the alert was created by a SIP-based originator and it is not useful to be explicit about the author of the alert then the <sender> element MUST be populated with the SIP URI of the user agent.

Originator is a non-SIP entity, Author indication irrelevant: In case that the alert was created by a non-SIP based entity and the identity of this original sender wants to be preserved then this identity MUST be placed into the <sender> element. In this category the it is not useful to be explicit about the author of the alert. The specific type of identity being used will depends on the technology being used by the original originator.
Author indication relevant: In case the author is different from the actual originator of the message and this distinction should be preserved then the <sender> element MUST NOT contain the SIP URI of the user agent.

incidents: The <incidents> element MUST be present. This incident identifier MUST be chosen in such a way that it is unique for a given <sender, expires, incidents> combination. Note that the <expires> element is optional and may not be present.

scope: The value of the <scope> element MAY be set to "Private" if the alert is not meant for public consumption. The <addresses> element is, however, not used by this specification since the message routing is performed by SIP and the respective address information is already available in other SIP headers. Populating information twice into different parts of the message may lead to inconsistency.

parameter: The <parameter> element MAY contain additional information specific to the sender.

area: It is RECOMMENDED to omit this element when constructing a message. In case that the CAP message already contained an <area> element then the specified location information SHOULD be copied into the PIDF-LO structure of the 'geolocation' header.

4.3. Sending a Data-Only Emergency Call

A data-only emergency call is sent using a SIP MESSAGE transaction with a CAP body as described above in a manner similar to how an emergency call with interactive media is sent, as described in [I-D.ietf-ecrit-phonebcp]. The MESSAGE transaction does not create a session or send media, but otherwise, the header content of the transaction, routing, and processing of data-only calls are the same as those of other emergency calls.
5. Error Handling

This section defines a new error response code and a header field for additional information.

5.1. 425 (Bad Alert Message) Response Code

This SIP extension creates a new location-specific response code, defined as follows,

425 (Bad Alert Message)

The 425 response code is a rejection of the request due to its included alert content, indicating that it was malformed or not satisfactory for the recipient's purpose.

A SIP intermediary can also reject an alert it receives from a UA when it understands that the provided alert is malformed.

Section 5.2 describes an AlertMsg-Error header field with more details about what was wrong with the alert message in the request. This header field MUST be included in the 425 response.

It is only appropriate to generate a 425 response when the responding entity has no other information in the request that are usable by the responder.

A 425 response code MUST NOT be sent in response to a request that lacks an alert message entirely, as the user agent in that case may not support this extension at all.

A 425 response is a final response within a transaction, and MUST NOT terminate an existing dialog.

5.2. The AlertMsg-Error Header Field

The AlertMsg-Error header provides additional information about what was wrong with the original request. In some cases the provided information will be used for debugging purposes.
The AlertMsg-Error header field has the following ABNF [RFC5234]:

```
message-header          /= AlertMsg-Error
                     ; (message-header from 3261)
AlertMsg-Error        = "AlertMsg-Error" HCOLON
                     ErrorValue
ErrorValue            =  error-code
                     *(SEMI error-params)
error-code            = 1*3DIGIT
error-params          = error-code-text
                     / generic-param ; from RFC3261
error-code-text       = "code" EQUAL quoted-string ; from RFC3261
```

HCOLON, SEMI, and EQUAL are defined in RFC3261 [RFC3261]. DIGIT is defined in RFC5234 [RFC5234].

The AlertMsg-Error header field MUST contain only one ErrorValue to indicate what was wrong with the alert payload the recipient determined was bad.

The ErrorValue contains a 3-digit error code indicating what was wrong with the alert in the request. This error code has a corresponding quoted error text string that is human understandable. The text string are OPTIONAL, but RECOMMENDED for human readability, similar to the string phrase used for SIP response codes. That said, the strings are complete enough for rendering to the user, if so desired. The strings in this document are recommendations, and are not standardized – meaning an operator can change the strings – but MUST NOT change the meaning of the error code. Similar to how RFC3261 specifies, there MUST NOT be more than one string per error code.

The AlertMsg-Error header field MAY be included in any response as an alert message was in the request part of the same transaction. For
example, a UA includes an alert in an MESSAGE to a PSAP. The PSAP can accept this MESSAGE, thus creating a dialog, even though his UA determined the alert message contained in the MESSAGE was bad. The PSAP merely includes an AlertMsg-Error header value in the 200 OK to the MESSAGE informing the UA that the MESSAGE was accepted but the alert provided was bad.

If, on the other hand, the PSAP cannot accept the transaction without a suitable alert message, a 425 response is sent.

A SIP intermediary that requires the UA's alert message in order to properly process the transaction may also sends a 425 with a AlertMsg-Error code.

This document defines an initial list of error code ranges for any SIP response, including provisional responses (other than 100 Trying) and the new 425 response. There MUST be no more than one AlertMsg-Error code in a SIP response.

AlertMsg-Error: 100 ; code="Cannot Process the Alert Payload"

AlertMsg-Error: 101 ; code="Alert Payload was not present or could not be found"

AlertMsg-Error: 102 ; code="Not enough information to determine the purpose of the alert"

AlertMsg-Error: 103 ; code="Alert Payload was corrupted"

Additionally, if an entity cannot or chooses not to process the alert message from a SIP request, a 500 (Server Internal Error) SHOULD be used with or without a configurable Retry-After header field.
6. Example

Figure 3 shows a CAP document indicating a BURGLARY alert issued by a sensor called 'sensor1@domain.com'. The location of the sensor can be obtained from the attached location information provided via the 'geolocation' header contained in the SIP MESSAGE structure. Additionally, the sensor provided some data long with the alert message using proprietary information elements only to be processed by the receiver, a SIP entity acting as an aggregator. This example reflects the description in Figure 1.

MESSAGE sip:aggregator@domain.com SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sensor1.domain.com;branch=z9hG4bK776sgdkse
Max-Forwards: 70
From: sip:sensor1@domain.com;tag=49583
To: sip:aggregator@domain.com
Call-ID: asd88asd77a@1.2.3.4
Geolocation: <cid:abcdef@domain.com>
    ;routing-allowed=yes
Supported: geolocation
Accept: application/pidf+xml, application/cap+xml
CSeq: 1 MESSAGE
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=boundary1
Content-Length: ...

--boundary1

Content-Type: cap+xml
Content-ID: <abcdef2@domain.com>
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<alert xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:emergency:cap:1.1">
    <identifier>S-1</identifier>
    <sender>sip:sensor1@domain.com</sender>
    <sent>2008-11-19T14:57:00-07:00</sent>
    <status>Actual</status>
    <msgType>Alert</msgType>
    <scope>Private</scope>
    <incidents>abc1234</incidents>
    <info>
        <category>Security</category>
        <event>BURGLARY</event>
        <urgency>Expected</urgency>
        <certainty>Likely</certainty>
        <severity>Moderate</severity>
        <senderName>SENSOR 1</senderName>
    </info>
</alert>
Figure 3: Example Message conveying an Alert to an Aggregator

Figure 4 shows the same CAP document sent as a data-only emergency call towards a PSAP.
MESSAGE urn:service:sos SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP sip:aggregator.1.example.com;branch=z9hG4bK776abssa
Max-Forwards: 70
From: sip:aggregator@example.com;tag=32336
To: 112
Call-ID: asdf33443a@example.com
Route: sip:psap1.example.gov
Geolocation: <cid:abcdef@example.com>;routing-allowed=yes
Supported: geolocation
Accept: application/pidf+xml, application/cap+xml
CSeq: 1 MESSAGE
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=boundary1
Content-Length: ...

--boundary1

Content-Type: cap+xml
Content-ID: <abcdef2@example.com>
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<alert xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:emergency:cap:1.1">
  <identifier>S-1</identifier>
  <sender>sip:sensor1@domain.com</sender>
  <sent>2008-11-19T14:57:00-07:00</sent>
  <status>Actual</status>
  <msgType>Alert</msgType>
  <scope>Private</scope>
  <incidents>abc1234</incidents>
  <info>
    <category>Security</category>
    <event>BURGLARY</event>
    <urgency>Expected</urgency>
    <certainty> Likely</certainty>
    <severity>Moderate</severity>
    <senderName>SENSOR 1</senderName>
    <parameter>
      <valueName>SENSOR-DATA-NAMESPACE1</valueName>
      <value>123</value>
    </parameter>
    <parameter>
      <valueName>SENSOR-DATA-NAMESPACE2</valueName>
      <value>TRUE</value>
    </parameter>
  </info>
</alert>
Content-Type: application/pidf+xml
Content-ID: <abcdef2@domain.com>
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<pres:device id="sensor">
  <gp:geopriv>
    <gp:location-info>
      <gml:location>
        <gml:Point srsName="urn:ogc:def:crs:EPSG::4326">
          <gml:pos>32.86726 -97.16054</gml:pos>
        </gml:Point>
      </gml:location>
    </gp:location-info>
    <gp:usage-rules>
      <gbp:retransmission-allowed>false
      </gbp:retransmission-allowed>
      <gbp:retention-expiry>2010-11-14T20:00:00Z
      </gbp:retention-expiry>
    </gp:usage-rules>
    <gp:method>802.11</gp:method>
  </gp:geopriv>
  <dm:timestamp>2010-11-04T20:57:29Z</dm:timestamp>
</dm:device>
</presence>

Figure 4: Example Message conveying an Alert to a PSAP
7. Security Considerations

This section discusses security considerations when SIP user agents issue emergency alerts utilizing MESSAGE and CAP. Location specific threats are not unique to this document and are discussed in [I-D.ietf-ecrit-trustworthy-location] and [RFC6442].

The ECRIT emergency services architecture [RFC6443] considers classical individual-to-authority emergency calling and the identity of the emergency caller does not play a role at the time of the call establishment itself, i.e., a response to the emergency call will not depend on the identity of the caller. In case of emergency alerts generated by devices, like sensors, the processing may be different in order to reduce the number of falsely generated emergency alerts. Alerts may get triggered based on certain sensor input that may have been caused by other factors than the actual occurrence of an alert relevant event. For example, a sensor may simply be malfunctioning. For this purpose not all alert messages are directly sent to a PSAP but rather may be pre-processed by a separate entity, potentially under supervision by a human, to filter alerts and potentially correlate received alerts with others to obtain a larger picture of the ongoing situation.

In any case, for alerts that are initiated by sensors the identity may play an important role in deciding whether to accept or ignore an incoming alert message. With the scenario shown in Figure 1 it is very likely that only authorized sensor input will be processed. For this purpose it needs to be ensured that no alert messages from an unknown origin are accepted. Two types of information elements can be used for this purpose:

1. SIP itself provides security mechanisms that allow the verification of the originator's identity. These mechanisms can be re-used, such as P-Asserted-Identity [RFC3325] or SIP Identity [RFC4474]. The latter provides a cryptographic assurance while the former relies on a chain of trust model.

2. CAP provides additional security mechanisms and the ability to carry additional information about the sender's identity. Section 3.3.2.1 of [cap] specifies the signing algorithms of CAP
In addition to the desire to perform identity-based access control the classical communication security threats need to be considered, including integrity protection to prevent forgery and replay of alert messages in transit. To deal with replay of alerts a CAP document contains the mandatory <identifier>, <sender>, <sent> elements and an optional <expire> element. These attributes make the CAP document unique for a specific sender and provide time restrictions. An entity that has received a CAP message already within the indicated timeframe is able to detect a replayed message and, if the content of that message is unchanged, then no additional security vulnerability is created. Additionally, it is RECOMMENDED to make use of SIP security mechanisms, such as SIP Identity [RFC4474], to tie the CAP message to the SIP message. To provide protection of the entire SIP message exchange between neighboring SIP entities the usage of TLS is mandatory.

Note that none of the security mechanism in this document protect against a compromised sensor sending crafted alerts.
8. IANA Considerations

8.1. Registration of the 'application/cap+xml' MIME type

To: ietf-types@iana.org

Subject: Registration of MIME media type application/cap+xml

MIME media type name: application

MIME subtype name: cap+xml

Required parameters: (none)

Optional parameters: charset; Indicates the character encoding of enclosed XML. Default is UTF-8 [RFC3629].

Encoding considerations: Uses XML, which can employ 8-bit characters, depending on the character encoding used. See RFC 3023 [RFC3023], Section 3.2.
Security considerations: This content type is designed to carry payloads of the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP).

Interoperability considerations: This content type provides a way to convey CAP payloads.

Published specification: RFC XXX [Replace by the RFC number of this specification].

Applications which use this media type: Applications that convey alerts and warnings according to the CAP standard.

Additional information: OASIS has published the Common Alerting Protocol at http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/documents.php&wg_abbrev=emergency


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Person and email address to contact for further information: Hannes Tschofenig, Hannes.Tschofenig@nsn.com

Intended usage: Limited use

Author/Change controller: IETF ECRIT working group

Other information: This media type is a specialization of application/xml RFC 3023 [RFC3023], and many of the considerations described there also apply to application/cap+xml.

8.2. IANA Registration for 425 Response Code

In the SIP Response Codes registry, the following is added
Reference: RFC-XXXX (i.e., this document)

Response code: 425 (recommended number to assign)

Default reason phrase: Bad Alert Message

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registry:</th>
<th>Response Code</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Request Failure 4xx</td>
<td>425 Bad Alert Message</td>
<td>[this doc]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This SIP Response code is defined in Section 5.

8.3. IANA Registration of New AlertMsg-Error Header Field

The SIP AlertMsg-error header field is created by this document, with its definition and rules in Section 5, to be added to the IANA sip-parameters registry with two actions:

1. Update the Header Fields registry with

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registry:</th>
<th>Header Name</th>
<th>compact</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

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AlertMsg-Error  [this doc]

2. In the portion titled "Header Field Parameters and Parameter Values", add

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Header Field</th>
<th>Parameter Name</th>
<th>Predefined Values</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AlertMsg-Error</td>
<td>code</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>[this doc]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
IANA Registration for the SIP AlertMsg-Error Codes

This document creates a new registry for SIP, called "AlertMsg-Error Codes". AlertMsg-Error codes provide reason for the error discovered by recipients, categorized by action to be taken by error recipient. The initial values for this registry are shown below.

Registry Name: AlertMsg-Error Codes

Reference: [this doc]

Registration Procedures: Specification Required

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Default Reason Phrase</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>&quot;Cannot Process the Alert Payload&quot;</td>
<td>[this doc]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>&quot;Alert Payload was not present or could not be found&quot;</td>
<td>[this doc]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>&quot;Not enough information to determine the purpose of the alert&quot;</td>
<td>[this doc]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>&quot;Alert Payload was corrupted&quot;</td>
<td>[this doc]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Details of these error codes are in Section 5.

Acknowledgments

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10. References

10.1. Normative References


10.2. Informative References

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draft-ietf-ecrit-trustworthy-location-04 (work in progress), October 2012.


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