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T. Harding  
Cyclone Software  
R. Drummond  
Drummond Group  
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## MIME-based Secure EDI

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### Abstract

This document describes how to securely exchange EDI and other business related documents using MIME and public key cryptography.

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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#).

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- Be specific as to what section you are referring to, preferably quoting the portion that needs modification, after which you state your comments.
- If you are recommending some text to be replaced with your suggested text, again, quote the section to be replaced, and be clear on the section in question.

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## Security Considerations

This document discusses the mechanisms, requirements and Technologies necessary to conduct secure EDI over Internet using either PGP/MIME or S/MIME. It further discusses the implementation of encryption, digital signature, integrity and signed-receipt for MIME objects transported over SMTP, HTTP or FTP.

## [1.0](#) Introduction

Previous work on Internet EDI focused on specifying MIME content Types for EDI data ([2] [RFC 1767](#)). This Applicability Statement expands on [RFC 1767](#) to specify use of a comprehensive set of data security features, specifically data privacy, data integrity/authenticity, non-repudiation of origin and non-repudiation of receipt. This draft recognizes contemporary RFCs and Internet drafts and is attempting to "re-invent" as little as possible.

With an enhancement in the area of "receipts", as described below (3.1.8), secure Internet MIME based EDI can be accomplished by using and complying with the following RFCs:

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- RFC 821 SMTP
- RFC 822 Text Message Formats
- RFC 1767 EDI Content Type
- RFC 1847 Security Multiparts for MIME
- RFC 1892 Multipart/Report
- RFC 2015 MIME/PGP
- RFC 2045 to 2049 MIME RFCs
- RFC 2298 Message Disposition Notification
- RFC 2630, 2633 S/MIME v3 Specification

Our intent here is to define clearly and precisely how these are Used together, and what is required by user agents to be compliant with this Applicability Statement.

## [2.0](#) Overview

### [2.1](#) Purpose of a security guideline for MIME EDI

The purpose of these specifications is to ensure interoperability between EDI user agents, invoking some or all of the commonly expected security features. This standard is also NOT limited to strict EDI use, but applies to any electronic commerce application where business data needs to be exchanged over the Internet in a secure manner.

### [2.2](#) Definitions

#### [2.2.1](#). Terms

EDI	Electronic Data Interchange
EC	Electronic Commerce
Receipt	The functional message that is sent from a receiver to a sender to acknowledge receipt of an EDI/EC interchange.
Signed Receipt	Same as above, but with a digital signature.
Message Disposition Notification	The Internet messaging format used to convey a receipt. This term is used interchangeably with receipt. A signed MDN is a signed receipt.
Non-repudiation of Receipt (NRR)	NRR is a "legal event" that occurs when the original sender of an EDI/EC interchange has verified the signed receipt coming back from the receiver. NRR IS NOT a functional or a technical message.

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PGP/MIME	Digital envelope security based on the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) standard (Zimmerman), integrated with MIME Security Multiparts [6].
S/MIME	A format and protocol for adding Cryptographic signature and/or encryption services to Internet MIME messages.

### 2.2.2 The secure transmission loop

The functional requirements document, [9] "Requirements for Inter-operable Internet EDI" (can be found at [www.ietf.org](http://www.ietf.org)), Provides extensive information on EDI security and the user/business related processes surrounding the need for and use of EDI security. In this document, it is assumed that the reader is familiar with the requirements document.

This document's focus is on the formats and protocols for Exchanging EDI content that has had security applied to it using

the Internet's messaging transport.

The "secure transmission loop" for EDI involves one organization sending a signed and encrypted EDI interchange to another organization, requesting a signed receipt, followed later by the receiving organization sending this signed receipt back to the sending organization. In other words, the following transpires:

- The organization sending EDI/EC data signs and encrypts the data using either PGP/MIME or S/MIME. In addition, the message will request a signed receipt to be returned to the sender of the message.
- The receiving organization decrypts the message and verifies the signature, resulting in verified integrity of the data and authenticity of the sender.
- The receiving organization then returns a signed receipt to the sending organization in the form of a message disposition notification message. This signed receipt will contain the hash of the signature from the received message, indicating to the sender that the received message was verified and/or decrypted properly.

The above describes functionality which if implemented, would Satisfy all security requirements. This specification, however, leaves full flexibility for users to decide the degree to which they want to deploy those security features with their EDI

trading partners.

### [2.2.3](#) Definition of receipts

The term used for both the functional activity and message for acknowledging receipt of an EDI/EC interchange is receipt, or signed receipt. The first term is used if the acknowledgment is for an interchange resulting in a receipt which is NOT signed. The second term is used if the acknowledgment is for an interchange resulting in a receipt which IS signed.

The "rule" is:

- If a receipt is requested, explicitly specifying that the receipt be signed, then the receipt MUST be returned with a

signature.

- If a receipt is requested, explicitly specifying that the receipt be signed, but the recipient cannot support the requested protocol format or requested MIC algorithms, then a receipt, either signed or unsigned SHOULD be returned.
- If a signature is not explicitly requested, or if the signed receipt request parameter is not recognized by the UA, a receipt may or may not be returned. This behavior is consistent with the MDN [RFC 2298](#).

A term often used in combination with receipts is "Non-Repudiation of Receipt (NRR). NRR refers to a legal event which occurs only when the original sender of an interchange has verified the signed receipt coming back from recipient of the message. Note that NRR is not possible without signatures.

## [2.3](#) Assumptions

### [2.3.1](#) EDI process assumptions

- Encrypted object is an EDI Interchange

This specification assumes that a typical EDI interchange is the lowest level object that will be subject to security services.

In ANSI X12, this means anything between, and including segments ISA and IEA. In EDIFACT, this means anything between, and including, segments UNA/UNB and UNZ. In other words, the EDI interchanges including envelope segments remain intact and unreadable during secure transport.

- EDI envelope headers are encrypted

Congruent with the above statement, EDI envelope headers are NOT visible in the MIME package. In order to optimize VAN-to-Internet routing, work may need to be done in the future to define ways to pull out some of the envelope information to make them visible, however, this specification does not go into any detail on that.

- X12.58 and UN/EDIFACT security considerations

The most common EDI standards bodies, ANSI X12 and EDIFACT, have defined internal provisions for security. X12.58 is the security mechanism for ANSI X12 and AUTACK provides security for EDIFACT. This specification DOES NOT dictate use or non-use of these security standards. They are both fully compatible, though possibly redundant, with this specification.

### [2.3.2](#) Flexibility assumptions

#### -Encrypted or un-encrypted data

This specification allows for EDI message exchange where the EDI Data can either be un-protected or protected by means of encryption.

#### -Signed or un-signed data

This specification allows for EDI message exchange with or Without digital signature of the original EDI transmission.

#### -Use of receipt or not

This specification allows for EDI message transmission with or Without a request for receipt notification. If a signed receipt notification is requested however, a mic value is REQUIRED as part of the returned receipt, unless an error condition occurs in which a mic value cannot be returned. In error cases, an un-signed receipt or MDN SHOULD be returned with the correct "disposition modifier" error value.

#### -Formatting choices

This specification defines the use of two methods for formatting EDI contents that have security applied to it:

-PGP/MIME

-S/MIME

This specification relies on the guidelines set forth in [RFC 2015](#), as reflected in [4] "MIME Security with Pretty Good Privacy" (PGP), and [RFC 2633](#)/ 2630 [8] "S/MIME Version 3



with this specification REQUIRES the use of PGP/MIME or S/MIME as defined in this Applicability statement, and the [\[9\]](#) "Requirements for Inter-operable Internet EDI" draft.

-Hash function, message digest choices

When a signature is used, it is RECOMMENDED that the SHA1 hash algorithm be used for all outgoing messages, and that both MD5 and SHA1 be supported for incoming messages.

In summary, the following eight permutations are possible in any given trading relationship:

- (1) Sender sends un-encrypted data, does NOT request a receipt.
- (2) Sender sends un-encrypted data, requests a signed or unsigned receipt. The receiver sends back the signed or unsigned receipt.
- (3) Sender sends encrypted data, does NOT request a receipt.
- (4) Sender sends encrypted data, requests a signed or unsigned receipt. The receiver sends back the signed or un-signed receipt.
- (5) Sender sends signed data, does NOT request a signed or un-signed receipt.
- (6) Sender sends signed data, requests a signed or un-signed receipt. Receiver sends back the signed or un-signed receipt.
- (7) Sender sends encrypted and signed data, does NOT request a signed or un-signed receipt.
- (8) Sender sends encrypted and signed data, requests a signed or un-signed receipt. Receiver sends back the signed or un-signed receipt.

NOTE: Users can choose any of the eight possibilities, but only example (8), when a signed receipt is requested, offers the whole suite of security features described in the "Secure transmission loop" above.

### [3.0](#) Referenced RFCs and their contribution

#### [3.1](#) [RFC 821](#) SMTP [\[7\]](#)

This is the core mail transfer standard that all MTAs need to Adhere to.

### [3.2 RFC 822](#) Text Message Format [[3](#)]

Defines message header fields and the parts making up a message.

### [3.3 RFC 1847](#) MIME Security Multiparts [[6](#)]

This document defines security multiparts for MIME: multipart/encrypted and multipart/signed.

### [3.4 RFC 1892](#) Multipart/report [[10](#)]

This RFC defines the use of the multipart/report content type, something that the MDN [RFC 2298](#) builds upon.

### [3.5 RFC 1767](#) EDI Content [[2](#)]

This RFC defines the use of content type "application" for ANSI X12 (application/EDI-X12), EDIFACT (application/EDIFACT) and Mutually defined EDI (application/EDI-Consent).

### [3.6 RFC 2015](#) PGP/MIME [[4](#)]

This RFC defines the use of content types "multipart/encrypted", "multipart/signed", "application/pgp encrypted" and "application/pgp-signature" for defining MIME PGP content.

### [3.7 RFC 2045](#), 2046, and 2049 MIME [[1](#)]

These are the basic MIME standards, upon which all MIME related RFCs build, including this one. Key contributions include definition of "content type", "sub-type" and "multipart", as well as encoding guidelines, which establishes 7-bit US-ASCII as the canonical character set to be used in Internet messaging.

### [3.8 RFC 2298](#) Message Disposition Notification [[5](#)]

This Internet RFC defines how a message disposition notification (MDN) is requested, and the format and syntax of the MDN. The MDN is the basis upon which receipts and signed receipts are defined in this and the "Requirements" specification.

### [3.9 RFC 2633](#) and 2630 S/MIME Version 3 Message Specifications [[8](#)]

This specification describes how MIME shall carry CMS Objects.

## [4.0](#) Structure of an EDI MIME message - Applicability

### [4.1](#) Introduction

The structures below are described hierarchically in terms of

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Which RFC's are applied to form the specific structure. For details of how to code in compliance with all RFC's involved, turn directly to the RFC's referenced. The "requirements document" has several examples described in an Appendix for those interested.

Also, these structures describe the initial transmission only. Receipts, and requests for receipts are handled in [section 5](#).

## [4.2](#) Structure of an EDI MIME message - PGP/MIME

### [4.2.1](#) No encryption, no signature

- RFC822/2045
- RFC1767 (application/EDIxxxx)

### [4.2.2](#) No encryption, signature

- RFC822/2045
- RFC1847 (multipart/signed)
  - RFC1767 (application/EDIxxxx)
  - RFC2015 (application/pgp-signature)

### [4.2.3](#) Encryption, no signature

- RFC822/2045
- RFC1847 (multipart/encrypted)
  - RFC2015 (application/pgp-encrypted)
    - "Version: 1"
  - RFC2015 (application/octet-stream)
    - RFC1767 (application/EDIxxxx) (encrypted)

### [4.2.4](#) Encryption, signature

- RFC822/2045
- RFC1847 (multipart/encrypted)

- RFC2015 (application/pgp-encrypted)
  - "Version: 1"
- RFC2015 (application/octet-stream)
  - RFC1847 (multipart/signed)(encrypted)
    - RFC1767 (application/EDIXxxx)(encrypted)
    - RFC2015 (application/pgp-signature)(encrypted)

### [4.3](#) Structure of an EDI MIME message - S/MIME

#### [4.3.1](#) No encryption, no signature

- RFC822/2045
- RFC1767 (application/EDIXxxx)

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#### [4.3.2](#) No encryption, signature

- RFC822/2045
- RFC1847 (multipart/signed)
  - RFC1767 (application/EDIXxxx)
  - RFC2633 (application/pkcs7-signature)

#### [4.3.3](#) Encryption, no signature

- RFC822/2045
- RFC2633 (application/pkcs7-mime)
  - RFC1767 (application/EDIXxxx) (encrypted)

#### [4.3.4](#) Encryption, signature

- RFC822/2045
- RFC2633 (application/pkcs7-mime)
  - RFC1847 (multipart/signed) (encrypted)
    - RFC1767 (application/EDIXxxx) (encrypted)
    - RFC2633 (application/pkcs7-signature) (encrypted)

## [5.0](#) Receipts

### [5.1](#) Introduction

In order to support non-repudiation of receipt (NRR), a signed receipt, based on digitally signing a message disposition notification, is to be implemented by a receiving trading partner's UA (User Agent). The message disposition notification, specified by [RFC 2298](#) is digitally signed by a receiving trading

partner as part of a multipart/signed MIME message.

The following support for signed receipts is REQUIRED:

- 1). The ability to create a multipart/report; where the report-type = disposition-notification.
- 2). The ability to calculate a message integrity check (MIC) on the received message. The calculated MIC value will be returned to the sender of the message inside the signed receipt.
- 4). The ability to create a multipart/signed content with the message disposition notification as the first body part, and the signature as the second body part.
- 5). The ability to return the signed receipt to the sending trading partner.

The signed receipt is used to notify a sending trading partner that requested the signed receipt that:

- 1). The receiving trading partner acknowledges receipt of the sent EDI Interchange.
- 2). If the sent message was signed, then the receiving trading partner has authenticated the sender of the EDI Interchange.
- 3). If the sent message was signed, then the receiving trading partner has verified the integrity of the sent EDI Interchange.

Regardless of whether the EDI Interchange was sent in S/MIME or PGP/MIME format, the receiving trading partner's UA MUST provide the following basic processing:

- 1). If the sent EDI Interchange is encrypted, then the encrypted symmetric key and initialization vector (if applicable) is decrypted using the receiver's private key.
- 2). The decrypted symmetric encryption key is then used to decrypt the EDI Interchange.
- 3). The receiving trading partner authenticates signatures in a

message using the sender's public key. The authentication algorithm performs the following:

- a). The message integrity check (MIC or Message Digest), is decrypted using the sender's public key.
  - b). A MIC on the signed contents (the MIME header and encoded EDI object, as per [RFC 1767](#)) in the message received is calculated using the same one-way hash function that the sending trading partner used.
  - c). The MIC extracted from the message that was sent, and the MIC calculated using the same one-way hash function that the sending trading partner used is compared for equality.
- 4). The receiving trading partner formats the MDN and sets the calculated MIC into the "Received-content-MIC" extension field.
  - 5). The receiving trading partner creates a multipart/signed MIME message according to [RFC 1847](#).
  - 6). The MDN is the first part of the multipart/signed message, and the digital signature is created over this MDN, including its MIME headers.
  - 7). The second part of the multipart/signed message contains the

digital signature. The "protocol" option specified in the second part of the multipart/signed is as follows:

S/MIME: protocol = "application/pkcs-7-signature"

PGP/MIME: protocol = "application/pgp-signature"

- 8). The signature information is formatted according to S/MIME or PGP/MIME specifications.

The EDI Interchange and the [RFC 1767](#) MIME EDI content header, can actually be part of a multi-part MIME content-type. When the EDI Interchange is part of a multi-part MIME content-type, the MIC MUST be calculated across the entire multi-part content, including the MIME headers.

The signed MDN, when received by the sender of the EDI Interchange can be used by the sender:

- 1). As an acknowledgment that the EDI Interchange sent, was delivered and acknowledged by the receiving trading partner. The receiver does this by returning the original message id of the sent message in the MDN portion of the signed receipt.
- 2). As an acknowledgment that the integrity of the EDI Interchange was verified by the receiving trading partner. The receiver does this by returning the calculated MIC of the received EDI Interchange (and 1767 MIME headers) in the "Received-content-MIC" field of the signed MDN.
- 3). As an acknowledgment that the receiving trading partner has authenticated the sender of the EDI Interchange.
- 4). As a non-repudiation of receipt when the signed MDN is successfully verified by the sender with the receiving trading partner's public key and the returned mic value inside the MDN is the same as the digest of the original message.

## [5.2](#) Requesting a signed receipt

Message Disposition Notifications are requested as per [RFC 2298](#), "An Extensible Message Format for Message Disposition Notification". A request that the receiving user agent issue a message disposition notification is made by placing the following header into the message to be sent:

```
MDN-request-header = "Disposition-notification-to" ":"  
                    mail-address
```

The mail-address field is specified as an [RFC 822](#) user@domain address, and is the return address for the message disposition notification.

In addition to requesting a message disposition notification, a message disposition notification that is digitally signed, or what has been referred to as a signed receipt, can be requested by placing the following in the message header following the

"Disposition-Notification-To" line.

```
Disposition-notification-options =  
    "Disposition-Notification-Options" ":"  
    disposition-notification-parameters
```

where

```
disposition-notification-parameters =  
    parameter *(";" parameter)
```

where

```
parameter = attribute "=" importance ", " 1#value"
```

where

```
importance = "required" | "optional"
```

So the Disposition-notification-options string could be:

```
signed-receipt-protocol=optional, <protocol symbol>;  
signed-receipt-micalg=optional, <micalg1>, <micalg2>,...
```

The currently supported values for <protocol symbol> are "pkcs7-signature", for the S/MIME detached signature format, or "pgp-signature", for the pgp signature format.

The currently supported values for MIC algorithm values are:

Algorithm	Value
-----------	-------

MD5	md5
SHA-1	sha1

(Historical note: some early implementations of EDIINT emitted and expected "rsa-md5" and "rsa-sha1" for the micalg parameter.) Receiving agents SHOULD be able to recover gracefully from a micalg parameter value that they do not recognize.

An example of a formatted options line would be as follows:



Disposition-notification-options:

signed-receipt-protocol=optional, pkcs7-signature;  
signed-receipt-micalg=optional, sha1, md5

The semantics of the "signed-receipt-protocol" parameter is as follows:

- 1). The "signed-receipt-protocol" parameter is used to request a signed receipt from the recipient trading partner. The "signed-receipt-protocol" parameter also specifies the format in which the signed receipt should be returned to the requester.

The "signed-receipt-micalg" parameter is a list of MIC Algorithms preferred by the requester for use in signing the returned receipt. The list of MIC algorithms should be honored by the recipient from left to right.

Both the "signed-receipt-protocol" and the "signed-receipt-micalg" option parameters are REQUIRED when requesting a signed receipt.

- 2). The "importance" attribute of "Optional" is defined in the MDN [RFC 2298](#) and has the following meaning:

Parameters with an importance of "Optional" permit a UA that does not understand the particular options parameter to still generate a MDN in response to a request for a MDN. A UA that does not understand the "signed-receipt-protocol" parameter, or the "signed-receipt-micalg" will obviously not return a signed receipt.

The importance of "Optional" is used for the signed receipt parameters because it is RECOMMENDED that an MDN be returned to the requesting trading partner even if the recipient could not sign it.

The returned MDN will contain information on the disposition of the message as well as why the MDN could not be signed. See the Disposition field in [section 5.3](#) for more information.

Within an EDI trading relationship, if a signed receipt is expected and is not returned, then the validity of the transaction is up to the trading partners to resolve. In general, if a signed receipt is required in the trading relationship and is not received, the transaction will likely not be considered valid.

### [5.2.1](#) Additional Signed Receipt Considerations

The "rules" stated in [Section 2.2.3](#) for signed receipts are as follows:

- 1). When a receipt is requested, explicitly specifying that the receipt be signed, then the receipt **MUST** be returned with a signature.
- 2). When a receipt is requested, explicitly specifying that the receipt be signed, but the recipient cannot support either the requested protocol format, or requested MIC algorithms, then either a signed or unsigned receipt **SHOULD** be returned.
- 3). When a signature is not explicitly requested, or if the signed receipt request parameter is not recognized by the UA, then no receipt, an unsigned receipt, or a signed receipt **MAY** be returned by the recipient.

NOTE: For Internet EDI, it is **RECOMMENDED** that when a signature is not explicitly requested, or if parameters are not recognized, that the UA send back at a minimum, an unsigned receipt. If a signed receipt however was always returned as a policy, whether requested or not, then any false unsigned receipts can be repudiated.

When a request for a signed receipt is made, but there is an error in processing the contents of the message, a signed receipt **MUST** still be returned. The request for a signed receipt **SHALL** still be honored, though the transaction itself may not be valid. The reason for why the contents could not be processed **MUST** be set in the "disposition-field".

When a request for a signed receipt is made, the "Received-content-MIC" **MUST** always be returned to the requester. The "Received-content-MIC" **MUST** be calculated as follows:

- For any signed messages, the MIC to be returned is calculated on the [RFC1767](#) MIME header and content. Canonicalization as specified in [RFC 1848](#) **MUST** be performed before the MIC is calculated, since the sender requesting the signed receipt was also **REQUIRED** to canonicalize.
- For encrypted, unsigned messages, the MIC to be returned is calculated on the decrypted [RFC 1767](#) MIME header and content. The content after decryption **MUST** be canonicalized before the MIC is calculated.

- For unsigned, unencrypted messages, the MIC MUST be calculated over the message contents prior to Content-Transfer-Encoding or Content-Encoding, and without the MIME or any other [RFC 822](#)

headers, since these are sometimes altered or reordered by MTAs.

### [5.3](#) Message Disposition Notification Format

The format of a message disposition notification is specified in [RFC 2298](#). For use in Internet EDI, the following format will be used:

- content-type - per [RFC 1892](#) and the [RFC 2298](#) specification
- reporting-ua-field - per [RFC 2298](#) specification
- MDN-gateway-field - per [RFC 2298](#) specification
- original-recipient-field - per [RFC 2298](#) specification
- final-recipient-field - per [RFC 2298](#) specification
- original-message-id-field - per [RFC 2298](#) specification
- disposition-field - the following "disposition-mode" values SHOULD be used for Internet EDI:
  - "automatic-action" - The disposition described by the disposition type was a result of an automatic action, rather than an explicit instruction by the user for this message.
  - "manual-action" - The disposition described by the disposition type was a result of an explicit instruction by the user rather than some sort of automatically performed action.
  - "MDN-sent-automatically" - The MDN was sent because the UA had previously been configured to do so.

"MDN-sent-manually" - The user explicitly gave permission for this particular MDN to be sent. "MDN-sent-manually" is meaningful with "manual-action", but not with "automatic-action".

- disposition-field - the following "disposition-type" values SHOULD be used for Internet EDI:

"processed" - The message has been processed in some manner (e.g., printed, faxed, forwarded, gatewayed)

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without being displayed to the user. The user may or may not see the message later.

"failed" - A failure occurred that prevented the proper generation of an MDN. More information about the cause of the failure may be contained in a Failure field. The "failed" disposition type is not to be used for the situation in which there is some problem in processing the message other than interpreting the request for an MDN. The "processed" or other disposition type with appropriate disposition modifiers is to be used in such situations.

- disposition-field - the following "disposition-modifier" values SHOULD be used for Internet EDI:

"error" - An error of some sort occurred that prevented successful processing of the message. Further information is contained in an Error field.

"warning" - The message was successfully processed but some sort of exceptional condition occurred. Further information is contained in a Warning field.

#### 5.3.1 Message Disposition Notification Extensions

The following "extension field" will be added in order to support signed receipts for [RFC 1767](#) MIME content type and multipart MIME content types that include the [RFC 1767](#) MIME content type. The extension field defined below follows the "disposition-field" in the MDN.

The "Received-content-MIC" extension field is set when the integrity of the received message is verified. The MIC is the base64 encoded quantity computed over the received message with a hash function. For details of "what" the "Received-content-MIC" should be calculated over, see [Section 5.2.1](#). The algorithm used to calculate the "Received-content-MIC" value MUST be the same as the "micalg" value used by the sender in the multipart/signed message. When no signature is received, or the mic-alg parameter is not supported then it is RECOMMENDED that the SHA1 algorithm be used to calculate the MIC on the received message or message contents.

This field is set only when the contents of the message are processed successfully. This field is used in conjunction with the recipient's signature on the MDN in order for the sender to verify "non-repudiation of receipt".

- extension field = "Received-content-MIC" ":" MIC

where:

<MIC> = <base64MicValue> "," <micalg>

<base64MicValue> = the result of one way hash function, base64 encoded.

< micalg> = the micalg value defined in [RFC1847](#), an IANA registered MIC algorithm ID token.

### [5.3.2](#) Disposition Mode, Type, and Modifier Use

Guidelines for use of the "disposition-mode", "disposition-type", and "disposition-modifier" fields within Internet EDI are discussed in this section. The "disposition-mode", "disposition-type", and "disposition-modifier" fields are described in detail in [RFC 2298](#). The "disposition-mode", "disposition-type" and "disposition-modifier" values SHOULD be used as follows:

#### [5.3.2.1](#) Successful Processing

When the request for a receipt or signed receipt, and the

received message contents are successfully processed by the receiving EDI UA, a receipt or MDN SHOULD be returned with the "disposition-type" set to 'processed'. When the MDN is sent automatically by the EDI UA, and there is no explicit way for a user to control the sending of the MDN, then the first part of the "disposition-mode" should be set to "automatic-action". When the MDN is being sent under user configurable control, then the first part of the "disposition-mode" should be set to "manual-action". Since a request for a signed receipt should always be honored, the user MUST not be allowed to configure the UA to not send a signed receipt when the sender requests one.

The second part of the "disposition-mode" is set to "MDN-sent-manually" if the user gave explicit permission for the MDN to be sent. Again, the user MUST not be allowed to explicitly refuse to send a signed receipt when the sender requests one. The second part of the "disposition-mode" is set to "MDN-sent-automatically" whenever the EDI UA sends the MDN automatically, regardless of whether the sending was under a user's, administrator's, or under software control.

Since EDI content is generally handled automatically by the EDI UA, a request for a receipt or signed receipt will generally return the following in the "disposition-field":

Disposition: automatic-action/MDN-sent-automatically; processed

Note this specification does not restrict the use of the "disposition-mode" to just automatic actions. Manual actions are valid as long as it is kept in mind that a request for a signed receipt MUST be honored.

#### [5.3.2.2](#) Unprocessed Content

The request for a signed receipt requires the use of two "disposition-notification-options", which specify the protocol format of the returned signed receipt, and the MIC algorithm used to calculate the mic over the message contents. The "disposition-field" values that should be used in the case where the message content is being rejected or ignored, for instance if the EDI UA determines that a signed receipt cannot be returned because it does not support the requested protocol format, so the EDI UA chooses not to process the message

contents itself, should be specified in the MDN "disposition-field" as follows:

```
Disposition: "disposition-mode";  
    failed/Failure: unsupported format
```

The syntax of the "failed" "disposition-type" is general, allowing the sending of any textual information along with the "failed" "disposition-type". For use in Internet EDI, the following "failed" values are defined:

```
"Failure: unsupported format"  
"Failure: unsupported MIC-algorithms"
```

#### [5.3.2.3](#) Content Processing Errors

When errors occur processing the received message content, the "disposition-field" should be set to the "processed" "disposition-type" value and the "error" "disposition-modifier" value. For use in Internet EDI, the following "error" "disposition-modifier" values are defined:

"Error: decryption-failed" - the receiver could not decrypt the message contents.

"Error: authentication-failed" - the receiver could not authenticate the sender.

"Error: integrity-check-failed" - the receiver could not verify content integrity.

"Error: unexpected-processing-error" - a catch-all for any additional processing errors.

An example of how the "disposition-field" would look when content processing errors are detected is as follows:

```
Disposition: "disposition-mode";  
    processed/Error: decryption-failed
```

#### [5.3.2.4](#) Content Processing Warnings

Situations arise in EDI where even if a trading partner cannot be authenticated correctly, the trading partners still agree to continue processing the EDI transactions. Transaction reconciliation is done between the trading partners at a later time. In the content processing warning situations as described above, the "disposition-field" SHOULD be set to the "processed" "disposition-type" value, and the "warning" "disposition-modifier" value. For use in Internet EDI, the following "warning" "disposition-modifier" values are defined:

"Warning: authentication-failed, processing continued"

An example of how the "disposition-field" would look when content processing warnings are detected is as follows:

Disposition: "disposition-mode"; processed/Warning:  
authentication-failed, processing continued

## [5.4](#) Message Disposition Notification Processing

### [5.4.1](#) Large File Processing

Large EDI Interchanges sent via SMTP can be automatically fragmented by some message transfer agents. A subtype of message, "partial", is defined in [RFC 2045](#) [1] to allow large objects to be delivered as separate pieces of mail and to be automatically reassembled by the receiving user agent. Using message, "partial", can help alleviate fragmentation of large messages by different message transfer agents, but does not completely eliminate the problem. It is still possible that a piece of a partial message, upon re-assembly, may prove to contain a partial message as well. This is allowed by the Internet standards, and it is the responsibility of the user agent to re-assemble the fragmented pieces.

It is RECOMMENDED that the size of the EDI Interchange sent via SMTP be configurable so that if fragmentation does occur, then

message, "partial" can be used to send the large EDI Interchange in smaller pieces. [RFC 2045](#) [1] defines the use of Content-Type: message/partial. Support of the message/partial content type for use in Internet EDI is OPTIONAL.



The receiving UA is required to re-assemble the original message before sending the message disposition notification to the original sender of the message. A message disposition notification is used to specify the disposition of the entire message that was sent, and should not be returned by a processing UA until the entire message is received, even if the received message requires re-assembling.

In general, EDI content compresses well, since there is Repetitive data in most EDI Interchanges. Instead of implementing the message/partial, compression of the EDI Interchange can be done after the signature is applied to the EDI Interchange, and before encryption. When no signature is applied, then compression is applied before the encryption. Compression is an alternative solution to implementing Content-Type: message/partial when sending large EDI Interchanges on the Internet.

Applying compression before encryption strengthens cryptographic security since repetitious strings are reduced. This sequence of signature, compression, then encryption, or compression then encryption, is consistent with the order in which PGP implementations handle compression.

Note: Compression is done automatically when using PGP encryption.

The MIME standards [\[1\]](#), do not define a way in which to convey that a message has been compressed. However, [RFC 2045 \[1\]](#) does allow the definition of additional MIME header fields to further describe the content of a message.

[RFC 2068 \[11\]](#), the HTTP/1.1 specification does define a Content-Encoding field that is primarily used to convey compression information:

Content-Encoding = "Content-Encoding" ":" content-coding

where content-coding can take on the values of "gzip" or "compress". The gzip compression standard is further described in [RFC 1952 \[12\]](#), and compress is the standard UNIX file compression program. Both gzip and compress are registered with IANA.

Trading partners can adopt the use of the Content-Encoding header if they need to compress their EDI data and convey the

compression type to their trading partners.

#### [5.4.2](#) Example

The following is an example of a signed receipt returned by a UA after successfully processing a MIME EDI content type. The Sending trading partner has requested a return signed receipt.

This example follows the S/MIME application/pkcs-7-signature format.

NOTE: This example is provided as an illustration only, and is not considered part of the protocol specification. If an example conflicts with the protocol definitions specified above or in the other referenced RFCs, the example is wrong.

```
To: <recipient email>
Subject:
From: <sender email>
Date: <date>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="separator";
    micalg=sha1; protocol="application/pkcs7-signature"

--separator
& Content-Type: multipart/report; report-type=disposition
& notification; boundary="xxxxx"
&
& --xxxxx
& Content-Type: text/plain
&
& The message sent to Recipient <Recipient@cyclonesoftware.com>
& has been received, the EDI Interchange was successfully
& decrypted and its integrity was verified. In addition, the
& sender of the message, Sender <Edi_Sender@cyclonesoftware.com>
& was authenticated as the originator of the message. There is
& no guarantee however that the EDI Interchange was
& syntactically correct, or was received by the EDI
& application.
&
& --xxxxx
& Content-Type: message/disposition-notification
&
& Reporting-UA: Interchange.cyclonesoftware.com (CI 2.2)
& Original-Recipient: rfc822; Edi_Recipient@cyclonesoftware.com
& Final-Recipient: rfc822; Edi_Recipient@cyclonesoftware.com
& Original-Message-ID: <17759920005.12345@cyclonesoftware.com >
```

& Disposition: automatic-action/MDN-sent-automatically; processed  
& Received-content-MIC: Q2hly2sgSW50XwdyaXRIQ, sha1  
&

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```
& --xxxxx
& Content-Type: message/rfc822
&
& To: <recipient email>
& Subject:
&
& [additional header fields go here]
&
& --xxxxx-

--separator
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name=smime.p7s;
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7s

MIIHygYJKoZIhvcNAQcDoIIHuzCCB7cCAQAxfIwge8CAQAwg
ZgwgYMxFjAUBgNVBAMTDVRlcnJ5IEhhcmRpbmcxEDA0BgNVBA
oTB0NZQ0xPTkUxDDAKBgNVBAsTA04vQTEQMA4GA1UEBxMHU=

--separator--
```

#### Notes:

-The lines preceded with "&" is what the signature is calculated over.

(For details on how to prepare the multipart/signed with protocol = "application/pkcs7-signature" see the "S/MIME Message Specification, PKCS Security Services for MIME".)

Note: As specified by [RFC 1892](#) [10], returning the original or portions of the original message in the third body part of the multipart/report is not required. This is an optional body part. It is RECOMMENDED that the received headers from the original message be placed in the third body part, as they can be helpful in tracking problems.

Also note that the textual first body part of the multipart/report can be used to include a more detailed explanation of the error conditions reported by the disposition headers. The first body part of the multipart/report when used in

this way, allows a person to better diagnose a problem in detail.

## [6.0](#) Public key certificate handling

### [6.1](#) Near term approach

In the near term, the exchange of public keys and certification of these keys must be handled as part of the process of establishing a trading partnership. The UA and/or EDI application

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interface must maintain a database of public keys used for encryption or signatures, in addition to the mapping between EDI trading partner ID and [RFC 822](#) [3] email address. The procedures for establishing a trading partnership and configuring the secure EDI messaging system might vary among trading partners and Software packages.

For systems which make use of X.509 certificates, it is RECOMMENDED that trading partners self-certify each other if an agreed upon certification authority is not used. It is highly RECOMMENDED that when trading partners are using S/MIME, that they also exchange public key certificates using the recommendations specified in the S/MIME Version 3 Message Specification. The message formats and S/MIME conformance requirements for certificate exchange are specified in this document.

This applicability statement does NOT require the use of a certification authority. The use of a certification authority is therefore OPTIONAL.

### [6.2](#) Long term approach

In the long term, additional Internet-EDI standards may be developed to simplify the process of establishing a trading partnership, including the third party authentication of trading partners, as well as attributes of the trading relationship.

## [7.0](#) Acknowledgments

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## [9.0](#) Authors' Addresses

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tharding@cyclonesoftware.com  
Cyclone Software  
14505 N. Hayden Road. Suite 300  
Scottsdale, AZ, 85260

Rik Drummond  
drummond@onramp.com  
The Drummond Group  
5008 Bentwood Ct.  
Ft. Worth, TX 76132 USA

Harding, Drummond

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