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# Interoperability Report for Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES) draft-ietf-forces-interop-07

#### Abstract

This document captures results of the second Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES) interoperability test which took place on February 24-25, 2011 in the Internet Technology Lab (ITL) of Zhejiang Gongshang University, China. <u>RFC 6053</u> reported the results of the first ForCES interoperability test, and this document updates <u>RFC 6053</u> by providing further interoperability results.

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# **1**. Introduction

This document captures results of the second interoperability test of the Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES) which took place February 24-25, 2011 in the Internet Technology Lab (ITL) of Zhejiang Gongshang University, China. The test involved protocol elements described in several documents namely:

- ForCES Protocol [RFC5810]
- ForCES Forwarding Element Model [<u>RFC5812</u>]
- ForCES Transport Mapping Layer [RFC5811]

The test also involved protocol elements described in the thencurrent versions of two Internet-Drafts. Although these documents have subsequently been revised and advanced, it is important to understand which versions of the work were used during this test. The then-current Internet-Drafts are:

ForCES Logical Function Block (LFB) Library
 [<u>I-D.ietf-forces-lfb-lib-03</u>].
 ForCES Intra-NE High Availability [<u>I-D.ietf-forces-ceha-00</u>].

Three independent ForCES implementations participated in the test.

Scenarios of ForCES LFB Operation, TML with IPSec, CE High Availability, and Packet Forwarding are constructed. Series of testing items for every scenario are carried out and interoperability results are achieved. Popular packet analyzers Ethereal/ Wireshark[Ethereal] and Tcpdump[Tcpdump] are used to verify the wire results.

This document is an update to <u>RFC 6053</u>, which captured the results of the first ForCES interoperability test. The first test on ForCES was held in July 2008 at the University of Patras, Greece. That test focused on validating the basic semantics of the ForCES protocol and ForCES FE model.

### **<u>1.1</u>**. ForCES Protocol

The ForCES protocol works in a master-slave mode in which FEs are slaves and CEs are masters. The protocol includes commands for transport of Logical Function Block (LFB) configuration information, association setup, status, and event notifications, etc. The reader is encouraged to read the ForCES protocol specification [<u>RFC5810</u>] for further information.

#### <u>1.2</u>. ForCES FE Model

The ForCES FE model [RFC5812] presents a formal way to define FE Logical Function Blocks (LFBs) using XML. LFB configuration components, capabilities, and associated events are defined when the LFB is formally created. The LFBs within the FE are accordingly controlled in a standardized way by the ForCES protocol.

# **<u>1.3</u>**. Transport Mapping Layer

The ForCES Transport Mapping Layer (TML) transports the ForCES Protocol Layer (PL) messages. The TML is where the issues of how to achieve transport level reliability, congestion control, multicast, ordering, etc are handled. It is expected that more than one TML will be standardized. <u>RFC 5811</u> specifies an SCTP-Based Transport Mapping Layer (TML) for ForCES protocol, which is a mandated TML for ForCES. See <u>RFC 5811</u> for more details.

### **<u>1.4</u>**. Definitions

This document follows the terminology defined by ForCES related documents, including <u>RFC3654</u>, <u>RFC3746</u>, <u>RFC5810</u>, <u>RFC5811</u>, <u>RFC5812</u>, <u>RFC5813</u>, etc.

# 2. Overview

### **<u>2.1</u>**. Date, Location, and Participants

The second ForCES interoperability test meeting was held by IETF ForCES Working Group on February 24-25, 2011, and was chaired by Jamal Hadi Salim. Three independent ForCES implementations participated in the test:

- Zhejiang Gongshang University/Hangzhou BAUD Corporation of Information and Networks Technology (Hangzhou BAUD Networks), China. This implementation is referred to as "China" or in some cases "C" in the document for the sake of brevity.
- o NTT Corporation, Japan. This implementation is referred to as "Japan" or in some cases "J" in the document for the sake of brevity.
- o The University of Patras, Greece. This implementation is referred to as "Greece" or in some cases "G" in the document for the sake of brevity.

Two other organizations, Mojatatu Networks and Hangzhou BAUD Networks Corporation, which independently extended two different well known public domain protocol analyzers, Ethereal/Wireshark [<u>Ethereal</u>] and Tcpdump [<u>Tcpdump</u>], also participated in the interop test. During the

interoperability test, the two protocol analyzers were used to verify the validity of ForCES protocol messages and in some cases semantics.

Some issues related to interoperability among implementations were discovered. Most of the issues were solved on site during the test. The most contentious issue found was on the format of encapsulation for protocol TLV (Refer to Section 5.1).

Some errata related to ForCES document were found by the interoperability test. The errata has been reported to related IETF RFCs.

At times, interoperability testing was exercised between two instead of all three representative implementations due to a third one lacking a specific feature; however, in ensuing discussions, all implementers mentioned they will be implementing any missing features in the future.

# **<u>2.2</u>**. Testbed Configuration

#### 2.2.1. Participants Access

Japan and China physically attended on site at the Internet Technology Lab (ITL) of Zhejiang Gongshang University in China. The University of Patras implementation joined remotely from Greece. The chair, Jamal Hadi Salim, joined remotely from Canada by using the Teamviewer as the monitoring tool[Teamviewer]. The approach is as shown in Figure 1. In the figure, FE/CE refers to FE or CE that the implementer may act alternatively.

++	++		++
FE/CE			+ Monitoring
China	·-	/\/\/\/\/	(TeamViewer)
++		\Internet/	Canada
	LAN	/ \-	-   ++
++		////////////////////////////////////	++
FE/CE	·-		FE/CE
Japan			+  Greece
++	++		++

Figure 1: Access for Participants

As specified in  $\frac{\sf RFC\ 5811}{\sf Sec}$  , all CEs and FEs shall implement IPSec security in the TML.

On the internet boundary, gateways used must allow for IPSec, SCTP protocol and SCTP ports as defined in the ForCES SCTP-TML [<u>RFC5811</u>].

# **2.2.2.** Testbed Configuration

CEs and FEs from China and Japan implementations were physically located within the ITL Lab of Zhejiang Gongshang University and connected together using Ethernet switches. The configuration can be seen in Figure 2. In the figure, the SmartBits is a third-party supplied routing protocol testing machine, which acts as a router running OSPF and RIP and exchanges routing protocol messages with ForCES routers in the network. The Internet is connected via an ADSL channel.






Figure 2: Testbed Configuration Located in ITL Lab, China

Hardware and Software (CE and FE) of Greece those were located within the University of Patras, Greece, were connected together using LAN as shown in Figure 3. The Internet is connected via a VPN channel.

> \Internet/





All above testbed configurations can then satisfy requirements of all the interoperability test scenarios that are mentioned in this document.

# 3. Scenarios

#### <u>3.1</u>. Scenario 1 - LFB Operation

This scenario is to test the interoperability on LFB operations among the participants. The connection diagram for the participants is as shown in Figure 4.

++	++	++	++	++	++
CE	CE	CE	CE	CE	CE
China	Japan	China	Greece	Japan	Greece
++	++	++	++	++	++
		I		I	
++	++	++	++	++	++
FE	FE	FE	FE	FE	FE
Japan	China	Greece	China	Greece	Japan
++	++	++	++	++	++

### Figure 4: Scenario for LFB Operation

In order to make interoperability more credible, the three implementers are required to carry out the test in a way acting as CE or FE alternatively. As a result, every LFB operation is combined with 6 scenarios, as shown by Figure 4.

The test scenario is designed with the following purposes:

Firstly, the scenario is designed to verify all kinds of protocol messages with their complex data formats, which are defined in <u>RFC</u> 5810. Specially, we try to verify the data format of a PATH-DATA with nested PATH-DATAs, and the operation(SET, GET, DEL) of an array or an array with a nested array.

Secondly, the scenario is designed to verify the definition of ForCES LFB Library [<u>I-D.ietf-forces-lfb-lib-03</u>], which defines a base set of ForCES LFB classes for typical router functions. Successful test under this scenario also means the validity of the LFB definitions.

#### 3.2. Scenario 2 - TML with IPSec

This scenario is designed to implement a TML with IPSec, which is the requirement by RFC 5811. TML with IPSec was not implemented in the first ForCES interoperability test as reported by RFC 6053. For this reason, in the second interoperability test, we specifically designed the test scenario to verify the TML over IPSec channel.

In this scenario, tests on LFB operations for Scenario 1 were repeated with the difference that TML was secured via IPSec. This setup scenario allows us to verify whether all interactions between CE and FE can be made correctly under an IPSec TML environment.

The connection diagram for this scenario is shown as Figure 5. Because of system deficiency to deploy IPSec over TML in Greece, the text only took place between China and Japan.

++	++
CE	CE
China	Japan
++	++
TML over IPSec	TML over IPSec
TML over IPSec ++	TML over IPSec ++
1	
++	++

Figure 5: Scenario for LFB Operation with TML over IPSec

In this scenario, ForCES TML was run over IPSec channel. Implementers joined in this interoperability have used the same third-party software 'racoon' to have established the IPSec channel.

China and Japan have made a successful test with the scenario, and the following items have been realized:

- Internet Key Exchange (IKE) with certificates for endpoint authentication.
- o Transport Mode Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). HMAC-SHA1-96 for message integrity protection.

### 3.3. Scenario 3 - CE High Availability

CE High Availability (CEHA) was tested based on the ForCES CEHA document [<u>I-D.ietf-forces-ceha-00</u>]

The design of the setup and the scenario for the CEHA were simplified so as to focus mostly on the mechanics of the CEHA, which are:

- o Associating with more than one CE.
- o Switching to backup CE on master CE failure.

The connection diagram for the scenario is as shown in Figure 6.

master	standby	master	standby
++	++	+	+ ++
CE	CE	CE	CE
China	Greece	Japan	Greece
++	++	+	+ ++
+	+	+	+
++		+	. +
FE		FE	
Greece		Greece	9
++		+	· +
(a)			(b)

Figure 6: Scenario for CE High Availability

In this scenario one FE is connected and associated to a master CE and a backup CE. In the pre-association phase, the FE would be configured to have China's or Japan's CE as master CE and Greece's CE as standby CE. The CEFailoverPolicy component of the FE Protocol Object LFB that specifies whether the FE is in High Availability mode (value 2 or 3) would either be set in the pre-association phase by the FEM interface or in post-association phase by the master CE.

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If the CEFailoverPolicy value is set to 2 or 3, the FE (in the postassociation phase) will attempt to connect and associate with the standby CE.

When the master CE is deemed disconnected, either by a TearDown, Loss of Heartbeats or physically disconnected, the FE would assume that the standby CE is now the master CE. The FE will then send an Event Notification, Primary CE Down,to all associated CEs, only the standby CE in this case, with the value of the new master CEID. The standby CE will then respond by sending a configuration message to the CEID component of the FE Protocol Object with its own ID to confirm that the CE considers itself as the master as well.

The steps of the CEHA test scenario are as follows:

- In the pre-association phase, setup of FE with master CE and backup CE
- 2. FE connecting and associating with master CE.
- 3. When CEFailoverPolicy is set to 2 or 3, the FE will connect and associate with backup CE.
- 4. Once the master CE is considered disconnected then the FE chooses the first Associated backup CE.
- 5. It sends an Event Notification specifying that the master CE is down and who is now the master CE.
- The new master CE sends a SET Configuration message to the FE setting the CEID value to who is now the new master CE completing the switch.

### 3.4. Scenario 4 - Packet forwarding

This test scenario is to verify LFBs like RedirectIn, RedirectOut, IPv4NextHop, IPv4UcastLPM defined by the ForCES LFB library document [<u>I-D.ietf-forces-lfb-lib-03</u>], and more importantly, to verify the combination of the LFBs to implement IP packet forwarding.

The connection diagram for this scenario is as Figure 7.

```
+----+
| CE |
| Japan|
+----+
| ^
| 0SPF
```




Figure 7: Scenario for IP Packet forwarding

In case (a), a CE by Japan is connected to an FE by China to form a ForCES router. A Smartbits test machine with its routing protocol software are used to simulate an OSPF router and are connected with the ForCES router to try to exchange OSPF hello packets and LSA packets among them. Terminals are simulated by Smartbits to send and receive packets. As a result, the CE in the ForCES router need to be configured to run and support OSPF routing protocol.

In case (b), a CE by China is connected to an FE by Japan to form a ForCES router. Two routers running OSPF are simulated and connected to the ForCES router to test if the ForCES router can support OSPF protocol and support packet forwarding.

In case (c), two ForCES routers are constructed. One is with CE by Japan and FE by China and the other is opposite. OSPF and packet forwarding are tested in the environment.

Testing process for this scenario is as below:

- Boot terminals and routers, and set IP addresses of their interfaces.
- 2. Boot CE and FE.
- Establish association between CE and FE, and set IP addresses of FEs interfaces.
- 4. Start OSPF among CE and routers, and set FIB on FE.
- 5. Send packets between terminals.

### 4. Test Results

#### **4.1**. LFB Operation Test

The test result is as reported by Figure 8. For the convenience sake, as mentioned earlier, abbreviations of 'C' in the table means implementation from China,'J'Japan implementation, and 'G' Greece implementation.

++-	+ -		-+	+	+		++
Test#  	Ì		1	l		Component /Capability	i i
	·		•			LFBTopology	Success
i i	J	С	Ì		Ì		Success
	G	С					Success
	J	G					Success

I	G	J		l		Success
2       	C   J   C   G   J	   C   G   C   G   J	GET                   	FEObject           	LFBSelector	Success     Success     Success     Success     Success     Success
3       	C   J   C   G   J	J   C   G   C   G	GET               	EtherPHYCop           	PHYPortID	Success     Success     Success     Success     Success     Success
4       	C   J   C   G   J	J   C   G   C   G   J	GET                     	EtherPHYCop           	AdminStatus	Success     Success     Success     Success     Success     Success
5       	C   J   C   G   J	J   C   G   C   G	GET                     	EtherPHYCop           	OperStatus	Success     Success     Success     Success     Success     Success
6       	C   J   C   G   J	J   C   G   C   G   J	GET     GET           	EtherPHYCop           	AdminLinkSpeed	Success     Success     Success     Success     Success     Success
7       	C   J   C   G   J	J   C   G   C   G   J	GET     GET           	EtherPHYCop           	OperLinkSpeed	Success     Success     Success     Success     Success     Success
   8   	   C   J   C   G	J   C   G   C	GET     GET       	   EtherPHYCop     	AdminDuplexSpeed	   Success     Success     Success     Success

	J   G	G   J				Success     Success
   9       	C   J   C   G   J	   J   C   G   C   J	GET     GET           	EtherPHYCop	OperDuplexSpeed	Success     Success     Success     Success     Success     Success
10         	C   J   C   G   J	J   C   G   C   G   J	GET                     	EtherPHYCop	CarrierStatus	Success     Success     Success     Success     Success     Success
	C   J   C   G   J   G	J   C   G   C   G   J	GET     GET           	EtherMACIn	AdminStatus     	Success     Success     Success     Success     Success     Success
12       	C   J   C   G   J   G	J   C   G   C   G   J	GET               	EtherMACIn	LocalMacAddresses	Success     Success     Success     Success     Success     Success
13         	C   J   C   G   J   G	J   C   G   C   G   J	GET     GET           	EtherMACIn	L2Bridging PathEnable	Success     Success     Success     Success     Success     Success
14         	C   J   C   G   J   G	   J   C   G   C   G   J	GET     GET           	EtherMACIn	PromiscuousMode     	Success     Success     Success     Success     Success     Success
   15   	C   J   C	J   C   G	GET     GET   	EtherMACIn	TxFlowControl	Success     Success     Success     Success

	G   J   G	C   G   J				Success     Success     Success
16         	C   J   C   G   J   G	J   C   G   C   G	GET         	EtherMACIn	RxFlowControl	Success     Success     Success     Success     Success     Success
17     17         	C   J   C   G   J   G	   C   G   C   G   J	   GET       	EtherMACIn	MACInStats	Success     Success     Success     Success     Success     Success
	C   J   C   G   J	J   C   G   C   G   J	   GET         	EtherMACOut	AdminStatus	Success     Success     Success     Success     Success     Success
19               	C   J   C   G   J   G	J   C   G   C   G   J	GET         	EtherMACOut	MTU	Success     Success     Success     Success     Success     Success
20         	C   J   C   G   J   G	J   C   G   C   G   J	GET         	EtherMACOut	TxFlowControl	Success     Success     Success     Success     Success     Success
	C   J   C   G   J   G	J   C   G   C   G   J	   GET       	EtherMACOut	TxFlowControl	Success     Success     Success     Success     Success     Success
22   	   C   J	J   C	   GET   	EtherMACOut	MACOutStats	   Success     Success

1	C	G				Success
	G	C				Success
	J	G				Success
1	G	J				Success
			1		l I	
23	C	J	GET	ARP	PortV4AddrInfoTable	Success
1	J	С				Success
	C	G				Success
i	G	С				Success
1	J	G				Success
	G	J	1		l I	Success
i						
24	C	J	SET	ARP	PortV4AddrInfoTable	Success
i	JJ	С	i i		I I	Success
i	C	G				Success
	G	С				Success
	JJ	G	1		l I	Success
i	G	J				Success
i						
25	C	J	DEL	ARP	PortV4AddrInfoTable	Success
i	JJ	С				Success
i	C	G				Success
i	G	С				Success
i	JJ	G				Success
	G	J				Success
26	C	J	SET	EtherMACIn	LocalMACAddresses	Success
	J	С				Success
	C	G				Success
	G	С				Success
	J	G				Success
	G	J				Success
27	C	J	SET	EtherMACIn	MTU	Success
	J	С				Success
	C	G				Success
	G	С				Success
	J	G				Success
	G	J				Success
28	C	J	SET	IPv4NextHop	IPv4NextHopTable	Success
	J	C				Success
	C	G				Success
	G	C				Success
	J	G				Success
	G	J				Success
1						
29		J	SET	IPv4UcastLPM	IPv4PrefixTable	Success

	J     C     G     J     G	C G C G J	     			Success   Success   Success   Success   Success
30	C     J     C     G     G	J C G C J	DEL         	IPv4NextHop         	IPv4NextHopTable	Success Success Success Success Success Success
31	C     J     C     G     J	J C G C G J	DEL         	IPv4UcastLPM             	IPv4PrefixTable	Success Success Success Success Success Success
32	C     J     C     G     G	] C G C G J	SET         	EtherPHYCop       	AdminStatus	Success Success Success Success Success Success
33	C     J     C     G     G	] C G C G J J	   SET         	Ether     Classifier         	VlanInputTable	Success   Success   Success   Success   Success   Success
34	C     J     C     G     G	] C G C G J	DEL         	Ether   Classifier       	VlanInputTable	Success Success Success Success Success Success
35	C     J     C     G     G	J C G C J	SET       	Ether     Encapsulator     	VlanOutputTable	Success Success Success Success Success Success

	36   C		J	DE	L	Ether		VlanOutputTable	Success
	J		С		E	ncapsulato	r		Success
	C		G						Success
	G		С						Success
	J		G						Success
	G		J						Success
+ -	+	- + -		-+	+		+		++

Figure 8: LFB Operation Test Results

Note on test 1#:

On the wire format of encapsulation on array, only the case of FULLDATA-in-FULLDATA was tested.

In China's implementation, after test 2# CE have to get all LFBs' instance data actively according to the queried component of LFBSelectors.

Note on test 28# and 29#:

Only had new reachable network destination been set, can route entry be added into system.

Note on test 30# and 31#:

Corresponding nexthop entry must be deleted before prefix entry which is decided by FE's routing management.

#### 4.2. TML with IPSec Test

In this scenario, the ForCES TML is run over IPSec. Implementers joined this interoperability test use the same third-party tool software 'racoon' to establish IPSec channel. Some typical LFB operation tests as in Scenario 1 are repeated with the IPSec enabled TML.

A note on this test is, because of the system difficulty to implement IPSec over TML, Greece did not join in the test. Therefore, this scenario only took place between C and J.

The TML with IPSec test results are reported by Figure 9.

+++++	+-		-++
Test#  CE  FE(s) Oper	LFB	Component/	Result
	I	Capability	
+++++	+-		-++
1   C   J   GET	FEObject	LFBTopology	Success

Ι		J	Ι	С				Success
	2	C		J	GET	FE0bject	LFBSelectors	Success
		J		С				Success
	3	C		J	SET	Ether	VlanInputTable	Success
		J		С		Classifier		Success
	4	C		J	DEL	Ether	VlanInputTable	Success
		J		С		Classifier		Success
+ -		-+	-+-		-++	+	+	++

Figure 9: TML with IPSec Test Results

# 4.3. CE High Availability Test

In this scenario one FE connects and associates with a master CE and a backup CE. When the master CE is deemed disconnected the FE would attempt to find another associated CE to become the master CE.

The CEHA scenario as is described in Scenario 3 was completed successfully for both setups.

Due to a bug in one of the FEs, a interesting issue was caught: it was observed that the buggy FE took up to a second to failover. It was eventually found that the issue was due to the FE's prioritization of the different CEs. All messages from the backup CE were being ignored unless the master CE is disconnected.

While the bug was fixed and the CEHA scenario was completed successfully, the authors feel it was important to capture the implementation issue in this document. The recommended approach is the following:

- o The FE should receive and handle messages first from the master CE on all priority channels to maintain proper functionality and then receive and handle messages from the backup CEs.
- o Only when the FE is attempting to associate with the backup CEs, then the FE should receive and handle messages per priority channel from all CEs. When all backup CEs are associated with or deemed unreachable, then the FE should return to receiving and handling messages first from the master CE.

### <u>4.4</u>. Packet Forwarding Test

As described in the ForCES LFB library [<u>I-D.ietf-forces-lfb-lib-03</u>], packet forwarding is implemented by a set of LFB classes that compose

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a processing path for packets. In this test scenario, as shown in Figure 7, a ForCES router running OSPF protocol was constructed. In addition, a set of LFBs including RedirectIn, RedirectOut, IPv4UcastLPM, and IPv4NextHop LFBs are used. RedirectIn and RedirectOut LFBs redirect OSPF hello and LSA packets from and to CE. A Smartbits test machine is used to simulate an OSPF router and exchange the OSPF hello and LSA packets with CE in ForCES router.

Cases (a) and (b) in Figure 7 both need a RedirectIn LFB to send OSPF packets generated by CE to FE by use of ForCES packet redirect messages. The OSPF packets are further sent to an outside OSPF Router by the FE via forwarding LFBs including IPv4NextHop and IPv4UcastLPM LFBs. A RedirectOut LFB in the FE is used to send OSPF packets received from outside OSPF Router to CE by ForCES packet redirect messages.

By running OSPF, the CE in the ForCES router can generate new routes and load them to routing table in FE. The FE is then able to forward packets according to the routing table.

++		+	++		+
Test#	CE	FE(s)	Item	LFBs Related	Result
	J	C	IPv4NextHopTable SET	IPv4NextHop	Success
2	J	C	IPv4PrefixTable SET	IPv4UcastLPM	Success
	J	C   	Redirect OSPF packet from CE to SmartBits	RedirectIn   	Success   
	J	C   	Redirect OSPF packet from SmartBits to CE	RedirectOut   	Success   
	J	C   	Metadata in   redirect message	RedirectOut   RedirectIn	Success   
	J	C   	OSPF neighbor discovery   	RedirectOut   RedirectIn	Success   
	J	C   	OSPF DD exchange     	RedirectOut   RedirectIn   IPv4NextHop	Success     
   8   	J	C     C   	   OSPF LSA exchange   	 RedirectOut   RedirectIn   IPv4NextHop	 Success     

The test is reported with the results in Figure 10

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	9	J	   C 	Data Forwarding     Data Forwarding       	IPv4UcastLPM    RedirectOut   RedirectIn   IPv4NextHop   IPv4UcastLPM	 Success     
	10	C	   J	   IPv4NextHopTable SET	IPv4NextHop	Success
	11	С	   J	   IPv4PrefixTable SET	  IPv4UcastLPM	  Success
	12	C	   J 	  Redirect OSPF packet from    CE to other OSPF router	 RedirectIn   	 Success   
	13	C	   J 	  Redirect OSPF packet from   other OSPF router to CE	   RedirectOut 	 Success   
	14	С	   J 	Metadata in     redirect message	 RedirectOut   RedirectIn	 Success   
	15	С	   J 	  OSPF neighbor discovery   	 RedirectOut   RedirectIn	 Success   
	16	C	   J 	OSPF DD exchange         	 RedirectOut   RedirectIn   IPv4NextHop	 Failure   
       +	17	C     	   J     +	OSPF LSA exchange                 	 RedirectOut   RedirectIn   IPv4NextHop   IPv4UcastLPM	   Failure       

Figure 10: Packet Forwarding Test Results

Note on test 1# and 2#:

A multicast route pointed to localhost was manually set before redirect channel could work normally.

Note on test 3# to 9#:

During the tests, OSPF packets received from CE were found by Ethereal/Wireshark with checksum errors. China's FE corrected the checksum in FE so that the Smartbits would not drop the packets and the neighbor discovery can continue. Such correcting action does not affect the test scenarios and the results.

Comment on Test #16 and #17:

The two test items failed. Note that Test #7 and #8 are exactly the same as these tests, only with CE and FE implementers are exchanged, and Test #12 and #13 show the redirect channel works well. As a result, it can be inferred that the problem caused the test failure was almost certainly from the implementation of the related LFBs rather than from the ForCES protocol design problem, therefore the failure does not lead to the interoperability problem on ForCES.

#### 5. Discussions

#### **5.1**. On Data Encapsulation Format

In the first day of the test, it was found that the LFB interoperations about tables all failed. The reason is found to be the different ForCES protocol data encapsulation method among different implementations. The encapsulation issues are detailed as below:

Assuming that an LFB has two components, one is a struct with ID 1 and the other an array with ID 2, further with two components of u32 both inside, as below:

struct1: type struct, ID=1
 components are:
 a, type u32, ID=1
 b, type u32, ID=2
table1: type array, ID=2
 components for each row are (a struct of):
 x, type u32, ID=1
 y, type u32, ID=2

1. On response of PATH-DATA format

When a CE sends a config/query ForCES protocol message to an FE from a different implementer, the CE probably receives response from the FE with different PATH-DATA encapsulation format. For example, if a CE sends a query message with a path of 1 to a third party FE to manipulate struct 1 as defined above, the FE is probable to generate response with two different PATH-DATA encapsulation format: one is the value with FULL/SPARSE-DATA and the other is the value with many parallel PATH-DATA TLV and nested PATH-DATA TLV, as below:

format 1: OPER = GET-RESPONSE-TLV PATH-DATA-TLV:

```
IDs=1
FULLDATA-TLV containing valueof(a),valueof(b)
format 2:
OPER = GET-RESPONSE-TLV
PATH-DATA-TLV:
IDs=1
PATH-DATA-TLV:
IDs=1
FULLDATA-TLV containing valueof(a)
PATH-DATA-TLV:
IDs=2
FULLDATA-TLV containing valueof(b)
```

The interoperability test witnessed that a ForCES element (CE or FE) sender is free to choose whatever data structure that IETF ForCES documents define and best suits the element, while a ForCES element (CE or FE) should be able to accept and process information (requests and responses) that use any legitimate structure defined by IETF ForCES documents. While in the case a ForCES element is free to choose any legitimate data structure as a response, it is preferred the ForCES element responds in the same format that the request was made, as it is most probably the data structure is the request sender looks forward to receive.

2. On operation to array

An array operation may also have several different data encapsulation formats. For instance, if a CE sends a config message to table 1 with a path of (2.1), which refers to component with ID=2, which is an array, and the second ID is the row, so row 1, it may be encapsulated with three formats as below:

```
format 1:
    OPER = SET-TLV
        PATH-DATA-TLV:
        IDs=2.1
        FULLDATA-TLV containing valueof(x),valueof(y)
format 2:
    OPER = SET-TLV
    PATH-DATA-TLV:
        IDs=2.1
        PATH-DATA-TLV:
        IDs=1
        FULLDATA-TLV containing valueof(x)
    PATH-DATA-TLV
        IDs=2
        FULLDATA-TLV containing valueof(y)
```

Moreover, if CE is targeting the whole array, for example if the array is empty and CE wants to add the first row to the table, it could also adopt another format:

```
format 3:
    OPER = SET-TLV
    PATH-DATA-TLV:
        IDs=2
        FULLDATA-TLV containing rowindex=1,valueof(x),valueof(y)
```

The interoperability test experience shows that format 1 and format 3, which take full advantage of multiple data elements description in one TLV of FULLDATA-TLV, get more efficiency, although format 2 can also get the same operating goal.

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# 8. IANA Considerations

This memo includes no request to IANA.

### 9. Security Considerations

Developers of ForCES FEs and CEs must take the security considerations of the ForCES Framework [<u>RFC3746</u>] and the ForCES Protocol [<u>RFC5810</u>] into account. Also, as specified in the security considerations section of the SCTP-Based TML for the ForCES Protocol [<u>RFC5811</u>], the transport-level security has to be ensured by IPsec.

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