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Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Option for a Location Uniform Resource Identifier (URI)
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Abstract

This document creates a Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Option for the Location Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) of an endpoint. For example, an endpoint can be a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) User Agent (i.e., a phone). This Location-URI can be included in a UA's signaling messages to inform other nodes of that entity's geographic location, once the URI is dereferenced by a Location Recipient.

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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1. Introduction

This document creates a Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Option for delivery of a client's Location Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). For example, a client can be a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) User Agent (UA) [RFC3261] (i.e., a Phone). This Location-URI can be included in a UA's signaling messages [ID-SIP-LOC] to inform remote devices (i.e., other phones or servers or applications) of that UA's geographic location. This is an indirect means of passing a Location Target's location to another entity, called a dereference (of a URI). In other words, if an entity has the Location URI, it can access the location record at the server the URI points to, if the requestor has permission to access it there. Where the location record is will likely be an entity called a Location Information Server (LIS) [ID-LBYR-REQ], which stores the locations of many Location Targets, which has the ability to challenge each dereference request by whatever means it is capable of, thus providing additive security properties to location revelation.

A Location Recipient is a device that has received location from another entity. If this location is delivered by a URI, the URI has to be dereferenced by the Location Recipient to learn the remote device's geographic location. Dereferencing can be done in SIP by

use of the SUBSCRIBE/NOTIFY Methods [RFC3265] to either a sip:, sips: or pres: scheme URI. Each of these URI schemes are IANA registered in Section 5 of this document as valid for use by this

Option.

Endpoints will require their geographic location for a growing number of services. A popular use-case currently is for emergency services, in which SIP requires its location to be placed in a SIP INVITE request [ID-SIP-LOC] towards a public safety answering point (PSAP), i.e., an emergency response center. The reason for this is twofold:

- An emergency services SIP request must be routed/retargeted to the appropriate PSAP that is local to where the calling device is.

- The first responders require the UA's location in order to know where to be dispatched to render aid to the caller.

Including location in the SIP request is the most efficient means of accomplishing both requirements above.

There are other use-cases, such as calling the appropriate Pizza Hut without having to look up in a directory which store is closest. A UA knowing its location can call a main/national/international Pizza Hut number or address and let the UA's location tell Pizza Hut enough information to have them route/retarget the SIP request to the appropriate store within the Pizza Hut organization to deliver the pizza to the caller's location.

A problem exists within existing RFCs that provide location to the UA ([RFC3825] and [RFC4776]) that type of location has to be updated every time a UA moves. Not all UAs will move frequently, but some will. Refreshing location every time a UA moves does not scale in certain networks/environments, such as IP based cellular networks, enterprise networks or service provider networks with mobile endpoints. An 802.11 based access network is one example of this. Constantly updating location to endpoints might not scale in mobile (residential or enterprise or municipal) networks in which the UA is moving through more than one network attachment point, perhaps as a person walks or drives with their UA down a neighborhood street or apartment complex or a shopping center.

If the UA were provided a URI reference to retain and hand out when it wants or needs to convey its location (in a protocol other than DHCP), a Location-URI reference that would not change as the UA's location changes, scaling issues would be significantly reduced. This delivery of an indirect location has the added benefit of not using up valuable or limited bandwidth to the UA with the constant updates. It also relieves the UA from having to determine when it has moved far enough to consider asking for a refresh of its location. Many endpoints will not have this ability, so relying on it could prove fruitless. Once the UA has a Location-URI, a service

provider, however it Sights the Location Target, as described in RFC 3693 [RFC3693], would merely update the actual location in the LIS record, i.e., the URI the UA already points towards. This document

does not define how this update is done, as it will not be done with DHCP.

In enterprise networks, if a known location is assigned to each individual Ethernet port in the network, a device that attaches to the network a wall-jack (directly associated with a specific Ethernet Switch port) will be associated with a known location via a unique circuit-ID that's used by the RAIO Option defined in RFC 3046 [RFC3046]. This assumes wall-jacks have an updated wiremap database. RFC 3825 and RFC 4776 would return an LCI value of location. This document specifies how a Location-URI is returned by DHCP. Behind the DHCP server, in the backend of the network, via the (logical entity of a) LIS has a PIDF-LO in each location record a URI points to.

If an 802.11 Access Port (AP) is at a specific known location within this enterprise network, all wireless Ethernet devices attaching to the network through this AP would be given the same location in their respective location records because the DHCP server would know each device was attaching from a known location, in this case, the same location. This is assuming no 802.11 triangulation is occurring, this would give a more precise location to be placed in the location record (URI) of each device.

This Option can be useful in WiMAX connected endpoints or IP cellular endpoints. The Location-URI Option can be configured as a client if it is a router, such as a residential home gateway, with the ability to communicate to downstream endpoints as a server.

The means of challenge by any given LIS can vary, and a policy established by a rulemaker [RFC3693] for a Location Target as to what type of challenge(s) are used, how strong a challenge is used or how precise the location information is given to a requestor. All of this is outside the scope of this document (since this will not be accomplished using DHCP).

This document IANA registers the new DHC Option for a Location URI.

2. DHC Location-URI Elements

DHCP is a binary Protocol; URIs are alphanumeric (text) based. There is one byte per URI character.

The Location-URI Option format is as follows:



2.1. Elements of the Location Configuration Information

Code XXX: The code for this DHCP option.

Option Length: The length of this option variable.

Valid-For: The time, in seconds, this URI is to be considered Valid for dereferencing.

Location-URI: The Location-by-Reference URI for the client

The <Valid-For> field indicates how long, in seconds, the client is to consider this Location-URI valid before performing a refresh of this Option, with a refreshed <Valid-For> value. A refresh MAY be done merely at the normal DHCP refresh rate, or necessitated by this timer, perhaps with the client just requesting this Option be refreshed.

It is RECOMMENDED when the counter associated with this <valid-for> value has passed, the client perform a refresh of this Option. For example, if 600 was the initial value of the <valid-for> field, when 300 seconds have passed, the Option SHOULD be refreshed.

3. DHC Option Operation

The [RFC3046] RAIO MUST be utilized to provide the appropriate indication to the DHCP Server where this DISCOVER or REQUEST message came from, in order to supply the correct response. That said, this Option SHOULD NOT be in a DISCOVER message, because there is zero knowledge by the client of which Server will answer.

Caution SHOULD always be used involving the creation of large Options, meaning that this Option MAY need to be in its own INFORM,

OPTION or ACK message.

It is RECOMMENDED to avoid building URIs, with any parameters, larger than what a single DHCP response can be. However, if a message is larger than 255 bytes, concatenation is allowed, per RFC 3396 [RFC3396].

Per [RFC2131], subsequent Location-URI Options, which are non-concatenated, overwrite the previous value.

Location URIs MUST NOT reveal identity information of the user of the device, since DHCP is a cleartext delivery protocol. For example, Location URIs such as

sips:34LKJH534663J54@example.com

should be done, providing no identity information, rather than a Location-URI such as this

sips:aliceisinatlanta@example.com

This Option is for only communications between a DHCP client and a DHCP server. It may be solicited (requested) by the client, or it may be pushed by the server without a request for it. DHCP Options not understood are ignored. A DHCP server might or might not have the location of a client, therefore direct knowledge of a Location-URI within the server. If a server does not have a client's location, a communication path (or request) to a LIS would be necessary.

The LIS function, which is logical, is what creates the URI. The coordination between the logical entity of a DHCP server and the logical entity of a LIS as to which circuit-ID gets which Location-URI is not done via DHCP, therefore it is not defined here. Further, any location revelation rules and policies a user has regarding the treatment of their actual location, and who can access (what precision of) their location will be done with other than DHCP, and likely will be done before anything other than default authentication and authorization permissions are used when a Location Seeker, as defined in RFC 3693, requests a for a Target's location.

Any dereferencing of a client's Location-URI would not involve DHCP either, but more likely by an application layer protocol such as SIP, through a subscription to the Location-URI on the LIS. The LIS would also handle all authentication and authorization of location requests, which is also not performed with DHCP, therefore not defined here.

In the case of residential gateways being DHCP servers, they usually perform as DHCP clients in a hierarchical fashion up into a service provider's network DHCP server(s), or learn what information to

provide via DHCP to residential clients through a protocol such as PPP. In these cases, the Location-URI would likely indicate the

residence's civic address to all wired or wireless clients within that residence. This is not inconsistent with what's stated above.

3.1 Architectural Assumptions

The following assumptions have been made for use of this URI Option for a client to learn it's Location-URI (in no particular order):

- Any user control (what Geopriv calls a 'rulemaker') for the parameters and profile options a Location-Object will have is out of scope of this document, but assumed to take place via an external web interface between the user and the LIS (direct or indirect).

- Any user attempting to gain access to the information at this URI will be challenged by the LIS, not the DHCP server for credentials and permissions.

3.2 Harmful URIs and URLs

There are, in fact, some types of URIs that are not good to receive, due to security concerns. For example, any URLs that can have scripts, such as "data:" URLs, and some "HTTP:" URLs that go to web pages - that have scripts. Therefore,

- URIs received via this Option SHOULD NOT be sent to a general-browser to connect to a web page, because they could have harmful scripts.

- This Option SHOULD NOT contain "data:" URLs, because they could contain harmful scripts.

Instead of listing all the types of URIs and URLs that can be misused or potentially have harmful affects, Section 3.3 IANA registers acceptable Location-URI schemes (or types).

3.3 Valid Location-URI Schemes or Types

Therefore, this document specifies which URI types are acceptable as a Location-URI scheme (or type):

1. sip:
2. sips:
3. pres:

These Location-URI types are IANA registered in section 4.2 of this document.

4. IANA Considerations

4.1 IANA Considerations for DHCP Option Numbering

IANA is requested to assigned a DHCP option code of XXX for the Location-URI option, defined in Section 2.0 of this document.

Any additional Location-URI parameters to be defined for use via this DHC Option MUST be done through a Standards Track RFC.

4.2 IANA Considerations for Acceptable Location-URI Types

IANA is requested to create a new registry for acceptable Location URI types.

The following 3 URI types are registered by this document:

1. sip:
2. sips:
3. pres:

Any additional Location-URI types to be defined for use via this DHC Option MUST be done through a Standards Track RFC.

5. Security Considerations

Where critical decisions might be based on the value of this Location-URI option, DHCP authentication in [RFC3118] SHOULD be used to protect the integrity of the DHCP options.

A real concern with RFC 3118 it is that not widely deployed because it requires keys on both ends of a communication to work (i.e., in the client and in the server). Most implementations do not accommodate this.

DHCP is a broadcast initially (a client looking for a server), unicast response (answer from a server) type of protocol. It is not secure in a practical sense. In today's infrastructures, it will be primarily used over a wired, switched Ethernet network, requiring physical access to within a wire to gain access. Further, within an 802.11 wireless network, the 802.11 specs have layer 2 security mechanisms in place to help prevent a Location-URI from being learned by an unauthorized entity.

That said, having the Location-URI does not mean this unauthorized entity has the location of a client. The Location-URI still needs to be dereferenced to learn the location of the client. This dereferencing function, which is not done using DHCP, is done by

requesting the location record at a Location Information Server, or LIS, which is a defined entity built to challenge each request it

receives based on a joint policy of what is called a rulemaker. The rulemaker, as defined in RFC 3693, configures the authentication and authorization policies for the location revelation of a Target. This includes giving out more or less precise location information in an answer, therefore it can answer a bad-hat, but not allow it from learning exactly where a user is. The rulemaker, which is a combination of the default rules set up by the location provider and those decided on by the user of the Target device. Likely, the rules the user wants will not be allowed to go past some limits established by the location provider, i.e., the administrator of the LIS, for various capability or security reasons.

Penetrating a LIS is supposed to be hard, and hopefully vendors that implement a LIS accomplish this goal.

As to the concerns about the Location-URI itself, as stated in the document here (in Section 3.), it must not have any user identifying information in the URI string itself. The Location-URI also must be hard to guess that it belongs to a specific user. There is some debate as to whether this Location-URI need be a random alphanumeric string or just unique. If the latter, there is some debate as to the how we define unique. Is that through space as time, as RFC 3261 defines a SIP Call-ID needs to be (meaning: never a duplicate, ever, by any device, ever)? Or is it unique to within a specific domain for as long as it is actively assigned to a client (plus some interval).

When implementing a DHC server that will serve clients across an uncontrolled network, one should consider the potential security risks therein.

6. Acknowledgements

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