

Geopriv  
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Carrying Location Objects in RADIUS  
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Abstract

This document describes RADIUS attributes for conveying access network ownership and location information based on a civic and geospatial location format.

The distribution of location information is a privacy sensitive task. Dealing with mechanisms to preserve the user's privacy is important and addressed in this document.

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## 1. Introduction

Wireless LAN (WLAN) access networks are being deployed in public places such as airports, hotels, shopping malls, and coffee shops by a diverse set of operators such as cellular network operators (GSM and CDMA), Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISPs), and fixed broadband operators.

When a user executes the network access authentication procedure to such a network, information about the location and ownership of this network needs to be conveyed to the user's home network to which the user has a contractual relationship. The main intent of this document is to enable location aware billing (e.g., determine the appropriate tariff and taxation in dependence of the location of the access network/user), location aware subscriber authentication and authorization for roaming environments and to enable other location aware services.

This document describes AAA attributes that are used by a AAA client or a local AAA server in an access network for conveying location-related information to the user's home AAA server. This document defines attributes for RADIUS [[1](#)].

Although the proposed attributes in this draft are intended for wireless LAN deployments, they can also be used in other types of wireless and wired networks whenever location information is required.

Location information needs to be protected against unauthorized

access and distribution to preserve the user's privacy with regard to location information. [12] defines requirements for a protocol-independent model for the access to geographic location information. The model includes a Location Generator (LG) that creates location information, a Location Server (LS) that authorizes access to location information, a Location Recipient (LR) that requests and receives information, and a Rule Maker (RM) that provides authorization policies to the LS which enforces access control policies on requests to location information.

## [2.](#) Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [2].

RADIUS specific terminology is borrowed from [1] and [3].

Terminology related to privacy issues, location information and authorization policy rules is taken from [12].

Based on today's protocols we assume that the location information is provided by the access network where the end host is attached. As part of the network attachment authentication to the home network is provided. The authenticated identity might refer to a user, a device or something else. Although there might often be a user associated with the authentication process (either directly or indirectly; indirectly when a binding between a device and a user exists) there is no assurance that a particular real-world entity (such as a person) triggered this process. Since location based authorization is executed based on the network access authentication of a particular "user" it might be reasonable to talk about user's privacy

within this document even though scenarios exist where this might not apply (and device or network privacy might be the correct term). Furthermore, the authors believe that there is a relationship between the NAS (or other nodes in the access network) and the location of the entity that triggered the network access authentication, such as the user. Knowing the location of a network (where the user or end host is attached to) might in many networks also reveal the location of the user or end host. In some networks it is even possible to provide accurate location of the user or end host. A similar assumption is also made with regard to the location information obtained via DHCP (see for example [4]). This information might be used by applications in other protocols (such as SIP [13] with extensions [14]) to indicate the location of a particular user even though the location "only" refers to the location of the network or equipment within the network. This assumption might not hold in all scenarios but seems to be reasonable and practicable.

Please note that the authors use the terms end host and user interchangeably with respect to the used identities as part of the network access authentication. The term 'user' is used whenever the privacy of the user could potentially be compromised.

### 3. Delivery Methods for Location Information

Location Objects, which consist of location information and privacy rules, are transported over the RADIUS protocol from the visited access network to the home AAA server. To embed a Location Object into RADIUS a number of attribute are used, such as Location-Information attribute, Basic-Policy-Rules attribute, Extended-Policy-Rules attribute, Operator-Name attribute. These attributes can be delivered to the RADIUS server during the authentication/authorization phase described in [Section 3.1](#), or in the mid-session using the dynamic authorization protocol framework described in [Section 3.2](#). This section describes messages flows for both delivery methods.

#### 3.1. Authentication/Authorization Phase Delivery






Figure 1: Location Delivery based on out-of-band Agreements

If no location information is provided by the RADIUS client although it is required by the RADIUS server to compute an authorization decision then the RADIUS server challenges the RADIUS client. This exchange is shown in Figure 2. The Access-Challenge thereby provides a hint to Network Access Server regarding the type of location information attributes that are desired. In the shown message flow these attributes are then provided in the subsequent Access-Request message. When receiving this Access-Request message the authorization procedure at the RADIUS server might be based on a number of criteria, including the newly defined Location-Information and Operator-Name attributes.




Figure 2: Location Delivery based on dynamic Request

If the AAA server needs to obtain location information also in accounting messages then it needs to include a Requested-Info attribute to the Access-Accept to express that is desired. The Network Access Server SHOULD then include location information to the RADIUS accounting messages.

### [3.2.](#) Mid-session Authorization

The mid-session delivery method uses the Change of Authorization (COA) message as defined in [5]. At anytime during the session the RADIUS server MAY send a COA message containing session identification attributes to the access network. The COA message MAY instruct the RADIUS client to generate an Authorize-Only Access-Request (Access-Request with Service-Type set to "Authorize-Only") in which case the RADIUS client MUST include location information in this Access-Request if it included location information in previous Access-Request messages.

Figure 3 shows the approach graphically.




Figure 3: Mid-session Authorization

Upon receiving the Authorize-Only message from the access network,

the RADIUS server MUST respond with either an Access-Accept or an Access-Reject message.

#### [4.](#) Scenarios

In the following subsections we describe two scenarios for use of location information. The location information may refer to the (visited) network or to the user. How the network obtains the user's location information is out of the scope of this document. There are two potential consumers of location information: the AAA server and location-based services. The privacy implications of these scenarios are described in [Section 13](#).

##### [4.1.](#) Scenario 1 - Use of Location Information in AAA

The home network operator requires location information for authorization and billing purposes. The operator may deny service if location information is not available, or it may offer limited service. The NAS delivers location information to the home AAA server.

The location of the AAA client and/or the end host is transferred from the NAS to the RADIUS server (based on a pre-established agreement or if the RADIUS server asks for it). The NAS and intermediaries (if any) are not allowed to use that information other than to forward it to the home network.

The RADIUS server authenticates and authorizes the user requesting access to the network. If the user's location policies are available to the RADIUS server, the RADIUS server MUST deliver those policies in an Access Accept to the RADIUS client. This information MAY be needed if intermediaries or other elements want to act as Location Servers (see [Section 4.2](#)). If the NAS or intermediaries do not receive policies from the RADIUS server (or the end host itself) then they MUST NOT make any use of the location information other than forwarding it to the user's home network.

Location Information may also be reported in accounting messages. Accounting messages are generated when the session starts, stops and periodically. Accounting messages may also be generated when the user roams during handoff. This information may be needed by the billing system to calculate the user's bill. For example, there may

be different rates applied based on the location and there may be different tax rates applied based on the location. Unless otherwise specified by authorization rules, location information in the accounting stream MUST NOT be transmitted to third parties.

The location information in the accounting stream MUST only be sent in the proxy chain to the home network (unless specified otherwise).

#### [4.2.](#) Scenario 2 - Use of Location Information for Other Services

Location Servers are entities that receive the user's location information and transmit it to other entities. In this second scenario, Location Servers comprise also the NAS and the RADIUS server. The RADIUS servers are in the home network, in the visited network, or in broker networks.

Unless explicitly authorized by the user's location policy, location information MUST NOT be transmitted to other parties outside the proxy chain between the NAS and the Home RADIUS server.

Upon authentication and authorization, the home RADIUS server MUST transmit the ruleset (if available) in an Access-Accept. The RADIUS client, intermediate proxies are allowed to share location information if they received ruleset indicates that it is allowed.

## [5.](#) Description of Attributes

Location information and ownership of the access network is conveyed in the following RADIUS attributes: Operator-Name and Location-Information. Furthermore, the Basic-Policy-Rules and the Extended-Policy-Rules attributes are attached to the Location-Information attribute turning location information into a Location Object as defined in [\[12\]](#).

### [5.1.](#) Operator-Name Attribute

This attribute contains the operator namespace and the operator name. The operator name is combined with the Namespace to uniquely identify the owner of an access network. The value of the Operator-Name is a non-NULL terminated string whose length MUST NOT exceed 253 bytes. The attribute value uniquely identifies the operator name within the scope of the operator namespace

This Namespace field within the Operator-Name attribute provides information about the operator namespace.

This document defines four values for this attribute: GSM, CDMA, REALM and ITU.

Additional namespaces require IANA registration and MUST be

associated with an organization responsible for assigning and managing the operator namespace.

#### GSM (0):

The GSM operator namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on GSMA TADIG codes. The TADIG Working Group within the GSM Association is the authority responsible for issuing unique Operator-Name values for operators of this type.

#### CDMA (1):

The CDMA operator namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on the Home Network Identifier (HNI). The HNI is the concatenation of the 3-digit Mobile Country Code (MCC) and 3-digit Mobile Network Code (MNC). The IMSI Oversight Council (IOC) is the authority responsible for issuing unique Operator-Name values for operators of this type.

#### REALM (2):

The REALM operator namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on any registered domain name. Such names are

required to be unique and the rights to use a given realm name are obtained coincident with acquiring the rights to use a particular Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN).

#### ITU (3):

The ITU operator namespace can be used to indicate operator names based on ITU Carrier codes. The Telecommunication Standardization Bureau (TSB) within the ITU-T is the authority responsible for the repository. Each national regulatory authority is responsible for issuing unique Operator-Name values for operators of this type.

## 5.2. Location-Information Attribute

This document describes two formats for conveying location information: civic and geospatial location information. [Section 5.2.1](#) defines the civic location information format. [Section 5.2.2](#) defines the geospatial location information format.

Additionally, the following fields provide more details about the transmitted location information.

**Entity:** With the help of the 'Entity' field it is possible to differentiate whether the described Location Object refers to the user's client device (as estimated by the network) or to the location of the AAA client.

**Method:** The 'Method' field describes the method for obtaining location information. GPS or manual configuration are possible methods for obtaining location information. The inclusion of this field should help the user's home network to deduce further information about the accuracy and to provide an easier translation into a Location Object for transmission to third party entities (e.g., using SIP). Note that the values for this field are taken from [\[15\]](#).

### [5.2.1.](#) Civic Location Information

Civic location is a popular way to describe the location of an entity. An unstructured location format limits automatic processing capabilities by the RADIUS server. For this document, we therefore reuse the civic location format defined in [\[4\]](#).

The civic location format includes a number of fields, including the country (expressed as a two-letter ISO 3166 code) and the administrative units A1 through A6 of [\[4\]](#). This designation offers street-level precision.

For completeness we include more detailed information from [\[4\]](#) with regard to the defined civic location elements:

Label	Description	Example
country	The country is identified by the two-letter ISO 3166 code.	US
A1	national subdivisions (state, region, province, prefecture)	New York

A2	county, parish, gun (JP), district (IN)	King's County
A3	city, township, shi (JP)	New York
A4	city division, borough, city district, ward, cho (JP)	Manhattan
A5	neighborhood, block, chome (JP)	Morningside Heights
A6	street, banchi and gou (JP)	Broadway
AC	Additional code, JIS address code (JP)	13203000003
PRD	Leading street direction	N, W
POD	Trailing street suffix	SW
STS	Street suffix	Avenue, Street
HNO	House number, numeric part only.	123
HNS	House number suffix	A, 1/2
LMK	Landmark or vanity address	Low Library
LOC	Additional location information	Room 543
FLR	Floor	5
NAM	Name (residence, business or office occupant)	Joe's Barbershop
PC	Postal code	10027-0401

Table 1

More description of these civic location elements can be found in Section 3.4 of [4]. These elements can be used to express further

information about the location, language specific settings via the 'language' item and encoding information via the 'script' item. [Section 12](#) shows usage examples of this attribute.

All attributes are optional and can appear in any order. The values are encoded using UTF-8 [\[6\]](#).

The usage of the type of place element (CAtype 29). The values in this element defined for usage are defined with the location type registry [\[7\]](#).

By using these location types it is possible to define more accurate location information. The type of place element (CAtype 29) may appear more than once. The content of this value will not be displayed to the user but rather used for authorization decisions. As such, internationalization support is not required. If multiple type of place elements are used then no specific semantic is associated regarding the order.

Example values for location types are 'aircraft', 'airport', 'cafe', 'classroom', 'convention-center', 'restaurant', 'office' etc.

#### [5.2.2](#). Geospatial Location Information

This document reuses geospatial location information from [\[8\]](#) which defines latitude, longitude, and altitude with resolution indicators for each. The value in the Altitude field either indicates meters or floors (via the Altitude Type field). As a coordinate reference system Section 2.1 of [\[8\]](#) defines (via extensible mechanism using IANA registration) three values in the 'Datum' field: WGS 84, NAD 83 (with the associated vertical datum for the North American Vertical Datum of 1988), NAD 83 (with the associated vertical datum for the Mean Lower Low Water (MLLW)). WGS 84 is used by the GPS system.

The NAS might return civic and geospatial location information. Per default civic location SHOULD be added.

## 6. Basic- and Extended-Policy-Rule Attributes

In some environments it is possible for the user to attach information about its privacy preferences available to the network. These preferences allow the visited network, intermediate RADIUS proxies and the home network to authorize the distribution of the user's location information. The home network will typically possess the user's authorization policies.

Without the user providing authorization information two approaches are possible:

- o The user hides its identity information from the access network and from intermediate networks using the appropriate network access authentication mechanism. [Section 13](#) discusses these issues in more details.
- o The access network attaches default authorization policies which indicates that intermediate networks and the home network should not distribute the location information to other entities. If the user is able to provide authorization policies to the NAS then these policies will be attached. Additionally, the home network might have authorization policies which control distribution of location information. These policies are sent from the RADIUS server to the RADIUS client. Users can dynamically change their policies using the authroization framework defined in [\[16\]](#) and [\[17\]](#).

With regard to authorization policies this document reuses work done in [\[15\]](#) and encodes it in an non-XML format. Two fields ('sighting time' and 'time-to-live') are additionally included in the Location-Information attribute to conform to the Geopriv Requirements [\[12\]](#), Section 2.7. Two RADIUS attributes are used for this purpose: Basic-Policy-Rule and Extended-Policy-Rule attribute. The Basic-Policy-Rule attribute contains a fixed set of privacy relevant fields whereas the Extended-Policy-Rule attribute contains a reference to a more extensive authorization rule set.

## 7. Requested-Info Attribute

The Requested-Info attribute allows the RADIUS server to indicate whether it needs civic and/or geospatial location information of the NAS or the end host (i.e., the entities that are indicated in the Entity field of the Location-Information attribute).

If the RADIUS server wants to dynamically decide on a per-request basis to ask for location information from the RADIUS client then the following cases need to be differentiated. If the AAA client and the AAA server have agreed out-of-band to mandate the transfer of location information for every network access authentication request then the issues listed below are not applicable.

- o The RADIUS server requires location information for computing the authorization decision. If the RADIUS client does not provide location information with the Access-Request message then the Requested-Info attribute is attached to the Access-Challenge to indicate what is required. Two cases can be differentiated:
  1. If the RADIUS client sends the requested information then the RADIUS server can process the location-based attributes.
  2. If the RADIUS server does not receive the requested information in response to the Access-Challenge (including the Requested-Info attribute) then the RADIUS server responds with an Access-Reject with an Error-Cause attribute (including the "Location-Info-Required" error value). Note that an Access-Reject message SHOULD only be sent if the RADIUS server MUST use location information for returning a positive access control decision.
- o If the RADIUS server would like location information in the Accounting-Request message but does not require it for computing an authorization decision then an Access-Accept MUST include a Required-Info attribute. This is typically the case when location information is used for inclusion to the user's bill only. The RADIUS client SHOULD attach location information to the Accounting-Request (unless authorization policies dictate something different), if it is available.

If the RADIUS server does not send a Requested-Info attribute then the RADIUS client MUST NOT attach location information to messages to the RADIUS server. The user's authorization policies MUST be consulted by the RADIUS server before requesting location information delivery from the RADIUS client.

Figure 4 shows a simple protocol exchange where the RADIUS server

indicates the desire to obtain location information, namely civic location information of the user, to grant access. Since the Requested-Info attribute is attached to the Access-Challenge the RADIUS server indicates that location information is required for computing an authorization decision.





Figure 4: RADIUS server requesting location information

## 8. Diameter RADIUS Interoperability

In deployments where RADIUS clients communicate with Diameter servers or Diameter clients communicate with RADIUS servers then a translation agent will be deployed and operate. The NASREQ specification [[18](#)] provides translation services. Furthermore, the RADIUS attributes specified in this document are also applicable for deployments where Diameter clients talk with Diameter servers. Diameter AVP Code numbers for corresponding RADIUS attributes are allocated as specified in Diameter Base protocol specification [Section 4.1](#) [[9](#)].







Type (8 bits):

To Be Assigned by IANA - Location-Information

Length (8 bits):

>= 3 Bytes

Code (8 bits):

Describes the location format that is carried in this attribute:

- (0) describes civic location information
- (1) describes geospatial location information

Entity (8 bits):

Describes which location this attribute refers to:

- (0) describes the location of the user's client device
- (1) describes the location of the AAA client

Sighting Time (64 bits):

NTP timestamp for the 'sighting time' field.

Time-to-Live (64 bits):

NTP timestamp for the 'time-to-live' field.

Method (8 bits):

Describes the way that the location information was derived or discovered. The following values are defined:

- (0) Global Positioning System (GPS)
- (1) GPS with assistance (A-GPS)
- (2) Manual configured information
- (3) Provided by DHCP
- (4) Triangulation: triangulated from time-of-arrival, signal strength or similar measurements
- (5) Cell: location of the cellular radio antenna
- (6) IEEE 802.11 WLAN access point

Location-Info (variable):

Contains either civic or geospatial location information attributes.


The following two fields need some explanation:

sighting time: This field indicates when the Location Information was accurate. The data type of this field is a string and the format is a 64 bit NTP timestamp [[19](#)].

time-to-live: This field gives a hint until when location information should be considered current. Note that the time-to-live field is different than retention-expires, which indicates the time the recipient is no longer permitted to possess the location

information and its encapsulating Location Object. The data type of this field is a string and the format is a 64 bit NTP timestamp [19].

For civic location information the Location-Info field in the above structure is defined as followed:



Countrycode (16 bits):

Two-letter ISO 3166 country code in capital ASCII letters.

Civic address elements (variable):

The text field contains location information element.


The format of the civic address elements is described in Section 3.3 of [4] with a TLV pair (whereby the Type and Length fields are one octet long). An example is given in Section 12.

For geospatial location information the Location-Info field is defined as follows:

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LaRes (6 bits):

Latitude resolution

Latitude (34 bits)

LoRes (6 bits):

Longitude resolution.

Longitude (34 bits)

Altitude (30 bits)

AltRes (6 bits):

Altitude resolution

AT (4 bits):

Altitude Type for altitude. The following codes are defined:

- (1) Meters
- (2) Floors

Datum (8 bits):

Coordinate reference system

The following codes for the this field are defined:

- (1) WGS 84
- (2) NAD 83 (with the associated vertical datum for the North American Vertical Datum of 1988)
- (3) NAD 83 (with the associated vertical datum for the Mean Lower Low Water (MLLW))

The length of the Location-Information Attribute MUST NOT exceed 253 octets. The length of the geospatial location information format is fixed with 16 bytes plus a four byte header.

The 'Datum' field contains an identifier for the coordinate system

used to interpret the values of Latitude, Longitude and Altitude. The field with value (2) and the value (3) both represent the NAD 83 coordinate reference system but they differ from each other with regard to their vertical datum representation as briefly noted in [Section 5.2.2](#) and described in more detail in [\[8\]](#).

### [9.3.](#) Basic Policy Rules Attribute

The Basic-Policy-Rules attribute MUST be sent in Access-Accept, Access-Challenge, Access-Request, Access-Reject and Accounting-Request messages if location information is transmitted with this exchange. If authorization policy rules are available to the RADIUS client then the Access-Request MUST carry the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute to to the RADIUS server.

A summary of the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute is shown below.

0										1										2										3									
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Type										Length										R										Flags									
Retention Expires																														...									
Retention Expires																																							
Note Well																														...									

Type :  
 To Be Assigned by IANA - Basic-Policy-Rules

Length:  
 > 3 Bytes

Flag (16 bits):

Only the first bit (R) is defined and corresponds to the retransmission-allowed field. All other bits are reserved.

Retention Expires (64 bits):

NTP timestamp for the 'retention-expires' field.

Note Well (variable):

This field contains a URI which points to human readable privacy instructions.

This document reuses fields of the 'usage-rules' element, described in [\[15\]](#). These fields have the following meaning:

retransmission-allowed: When the value of this element is '0', then the recipient of this Location Object is not permitted to share the enclosed location information, or the object as a whole, with other parties. The value of '1' allows to share the location information with other parties by considering the extended policy rules.

retention-expires: This field specifies an absolute date at which time the Recipient is no longer permitted to possess the location information. The data type of this field is a string and the format is a 64 bit NTP timestamp [\[19\]](#).

note-well: This field contains a URI which points to human readable privacy instructions. This field is useful when location information is distributed to third party entities, which can include humans in a location based service. RADIUS entities are not supposed to process this field.

Whenever a Location Object leaves the AAA system the URI in the note-well attribute MUST be expanded to the human readable text. For example, when the Location Object is transferred to a SIP based environment then the human readable text is placed in the text is put into the 'note-well' attribute inside the 'usage-rules' element inside the PIDF-LO document (see [\[15\]](#)).

#### [9.4.](#) Extended Policy Rules Attribute

The Extended-Policy-Rules attribute SHOULD be sent in Access-Accept,

Access-Challenge, Access-and Access-Reject messages if location information is transmitted with this exchange. If authorization policy rules are available to the RADIUS client then the Access-Request MUST carry the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute to to the RADIUS server.

Ruleset reference field of this attribute is of variable length. It contains a URI that indicates where a richer ruleset is available. The full ruleset SHOULD be fetched using Transport Layer Security (TLS). As a deviation from [15] this field only contains a reference and does not carry an attached rule set. This modification is motivated by the size limitations imposed by RADIUS.

A summary of the Extended-Policy-Rules attribute is shown below.

0										1										2										3									
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Type										Length										Ruleset reference										...									

Type :

To Be Assigned by IANA - Extended-Policy-Rules

Length:

> 3 Bytes


Ruleset reference:

The text field contains a URI which points to policy rules.

### 9.5. Challenge-Capable Attribute

The Challenge-Capable attribute allows a NAS (or client function of a proxy server) to indicate support for processing general purpose Access-Challenge messages from the RADIUS server, beyond those specified for support of the authentication methods of textual

challenge-response, CHAP or EAP. This mechanism allows the RADIUS server to request additional information from the RADIUS client prior to making an authentication and authorization decision. The Challenge-Capable attribute MUST appear in Access-Request Messages, if the NAS supports this feature, as a hint to the RADIUS Server.



Type (8 bits):  
To Be Assigned by IANA - Challenge-Capable Attribute

Length (8 bits):  
= 4 Bytes


Value (16 bits):  
The content of this field MUST be set to 0.

### 9.6. Requested-Info Attribute

The Requested-Info attribute MUST be sent by the RADIUS server if it wants the RADIUS client to return civic and/or geospatial information. This Requested-Info attribute MAY appear in the Access-

Accept or in the Access-Challenge messages.

A summary of the attribute is shown below.



Type:  
To Be Assigned by IANA - Requested-Info Attribute

Length:  
6 Bytes

Requested-Info (48 bits):

This text field contains a numerical value that encodes the requested information attributes.

Each value represents a bit position.

Currently the following capabilities are specified:

Name:

CIVIC\_LOCATION

Description:

The RADIUS server uses this attribute to request information from the RADIUS client to be returned. The numerical value representing CIVIC\_LOCATION requires the RADIUS client to attach civic location attributes.

Numerical Value:

A numerical value of this attribute is '0'.

Name:

GEO\_LOCATION

Description:

The RADIUS server uses this attribute to request information from the RADIUS client to be returned. The numerical value representing GEO\_LOCATION requires the RADIUS client to attach geospatial location attributes.

Numerical Value:

A numerical value of this attribute is '2'.

Name:

USERS\_LOCATION

Description:

The numerical value representing USERS\_LOCATION indicates that the AAA client must send a Location-Information attribute that contains location information with the Entity attribute expressing the value of zero (0). A value of zero indicates that the location information in the Location-Information attribute refers to the user's client device.

Numerical Value:

A numerical value of this attribute is '4'.

Name:

NAS\_LOCATION

Description:

The numerical value representing NAS\_LOCATION indicates that the AAA client must send a Location-Information attribute that contains location information with the Entity attribute expressing the value of one (1). A value of one indicates that the location information in the Location-Information attribute refers to the AAA client.

Numerical Value:

A numerical value of this attribute is '8'.

If neither the NAS\_LOCATION nor the USERS\_LOCATION bit is set then per-default the location of the user's client device MUST be returned. If neither the CIVIC\_LOCATION nor the GEO\_LOCATION bit is set then per-default geospatial location information MUST be returned. The value of NAS\_LOCATION and USERS\_LOCATION refers to the location requested via CIVIC\_LOCATION and/or via GEO\_LOCATION. As an example, if the bits for NAS\_LOCATION, USERS\_LOCATION and GEO\_LOCATION are set then location information of the AAA client and the users' client device are returned in a geospatial location format.

10. Table of Attributes

The following table provides a guide which attributes may be found in which RADIUS messages, and in what quantity.

Request	Accept	Reject	Challenge	Accounting #	Attribute
				Request	
0-1	0	0	0	0-1	TBD Operator-Name
0+	0	0	0	0+	TBD Location-Information
0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1	TBD Basic-Policy-Rules
0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1	0-1	TBD Extended-Policy-Rules
0	0-1	0	0-1	0-1	TBD Requested-Info
0-1	0	0	0	0	TBD Challenge-Capable

The Location-Information attribute may appear more than once. This is useful if the size of one Location-Information attribute exceeds the maximum size of an attribute. This might happen in case of civic location information that has a variable number of fields. The individual fields used for representing civic location information inside the Location-Information attribute (see [Section 5.2.1](#)) MUST NOT appear more than once. For example, it is not allowed to have a CAtype of 3 (indicating the name of the city) to appear more than once.

The next table shows the occurrence of the error-cause attribute.

Request	Accept	Reject	Challenge	Accounting #	Attribute
				Request	
0	0	0-1	0	0	TBD Location-Info-Required
0	0	0-1	0	0	101 Error-Cause

## [11.](#) Matching with Geopriv Requirements

This section compares the Geopriv requirements described in [\[12\]](#) and the approach of distributing Location Objects with RADIUS.

The main usage scenario aimed for Location Object transport in RADIUS assumes that the Location Server and the Location Recipient are co-located at a single entity with regard to location based network access authorization, taxation and billing. In [Section 11.1](#) and [Section 11.2](#) we discuss privacy implications when RADIUS is not used according to these usage scenario.

In [Section 11.3](#) Geopriv requirements are matched against these two scenarios.

### [11.1.](#) Distribution of Location Information at the User's Home Network

This section focuses on location information transport from the local AAA server (acting as the Location Generator) to the home AAA server (acting as the Location Server). To use a more generic scenario we assume that the visited AAA and the home AAA server belong to different administrative domains. The Location Recipient obtains location information about a particular Target via protocols specified outside the scope this document (e.g., SIP, HTTP or an API).

Please note that the main usage scenario defined in this document assumes that the Location Server and the Location Recipient are co-located into a single entity with regard to location based network access authorization, taxation and billing.

The subsequent figure shows the interacting entities graphically.



In order for this scenario to be applicable the following two assumptions must hold:

- o The visited network deploys a Location Server and wants to distribute Location Objects of a user
- o The visited network is able to learn the user's identity

The visited network provides location information to a Location Recipient (e.g., via SIP or HTTP). During the network access authentication procedure the visited network is able to retrieve the user's authorization policies from the home AAA server. This should ensure that the visited network acts according to the user's policies.

The subsequent figure shows the interacting entities graphically. The transport of the Location Object is not shown in this figure since this aspect is already covered in the previous paragraph.




Figure 17: Location Server at the Visited Network

### [11.3](#). Requirements matching

Section 7.1 of [[12](#)] details the requirements of a "Location Object".

There are:

Req. 1. (Location Object generalities):

- \* Regarding requirement 1.1, the Location Object has to be understood by the RADIUS server (and possibly a Diameter server in case of interworking between the two) as defined in this document. Due to the encoding of the Location Object it is possible to convert it to the format used in GMLv3 [[20](#)]. The same civic location information format is used in PIDF-LO [[15](#)] and this document.
- \* Regarding requirement 1.2, some fields of the Location Object defined in this document are optional. See [Section 5.2.1](#) as an example.
- \* Regarding requirement 1.3, the inclusion of type of place item (CAtype 29) gives a further classification of the location. This attribute can be seen as an extension.

- \* Regarding requirement 1.4, the Location Object is extensible in the same fashion as RADIUS is extensible.
- \* Regarding requirement 1.5, the Location Object is useful for both receiving and sending location information as described in this document.
- \* Regarding requirement 1.6, the Location Object contains both location information and privacy rules. Location information is described in [Section 5.2](#) and the corresponding privacy rules are detailed in [Section 9.3](#) and in [Section 9.4](#).
- \* Regarding requirement 1.7, the Location Object is usable in a variety of protocols. The format of the object is reused from other documents as detailed in the respective sections (see

[Section 5.2](#), [Section 9.3](#) and in [Section 9.4](#)).

- \* Regarding requirement 1.8, the encoding of the Location Object has an emphasis on a lightweight encoding format. As such it is useable on constrained devices.

Req. 2. (Location Object fields):

- \* Regarding requirement 2.1, the Target Identifier is carried within the network access authentication protocol (e.g., within the EAP-Identity Response when EAP is used and/or within the EAP method itself). As described in [Section 13](#) it has a number of advantages if this identifier is not carried in clear text. This is possible with certain EAP methods whereby the identity in the EAP-Identity Response only contains information relevant for routing the response to the user's home network. The user identity is protected by the authentication and key exchange protocol.
- \* Regarding requirement 2.2, the Location Recipient is in the main scenario the home AAA server. For a scenario where the Location Recipient is obtaining Location Information from the Location Server via HTTP or SIP the respective mechanisms defined in these protocols are used to identify the recipient. The Location Generator cannot, a priori, know the recipients if they are not defined in this protocol.
- \* Regarding requirement 2.3, the credentials of the Location Recipient are known to the RADIUS entities based on the security mechanisms defined in the RADIUS protocol itself. [Section 14](#) describes these security mechanisms offered by the RADIUS protocol. The same is true for requirement 2.4.

- \* Regarding requirement 2.5, [Section 5.2](#) describes the content of the Location Field. Motion and direction vectors as listed in requirement 2.6 are not provided as attributes. It is, however, possible to deduce the motion and direction of an entity via the Mid-session Delivery mechanism as shown in Figure 3.
- \* Regarding requirement 2.6, this document only describes one

Location Data Type for civic and for geospatial location information, respectively. No negotiation needs to take place.

- \* Regarding requirement 2.7, timing information is provided with 'sighting time' and 'time-to-live' field defined in [Section 9.3](#).
- \* Regarding requirement 2.8, a reference to an external (more detailed ruleset) is provided with the [Section 9.4](#) attribute.
- \* Regarding requirement 2.9, security headers and trailers are provided as part of the RADIUS protocol or even as part of IPsec.
- \* Regarding requirement 2.10, a version number in RADIUS is provided with the IANA registration of the attributes. New attributes are assigned a new IANA number.

Req. 3. (Location Data Types):

- \* Regarding requirement 3.1, this document defines two Location Data Types as described in [Section 5.2](#).
- \* With the support of civic and geospatial location information support requirement 3.2 is fulfilled.
- \* Regarding requirement 3.3, the geospatial location information as defined in this document only refers to absolute coordinates. However, the granularity of the location information can be reduced with the help of the AltRes, LoRes, LaRes fields described in the Location-Information attribute (see [Section 9.2](#)).
- \* Regarding requirement 3.4, further Location Data Types can be added via new coordinate reference systems (CRSs) (see Datum field in the Location-Information attribute of [Section 5.2](#)), extensions to existing fields or via additional attributes.

Section 7.2 of [[12](#)] details the requirements of a "Using Protocol".

These requirements are listed below:

Req. 4.: The using protocol has to obey the privacy and security instructions coded in the Location Object and in the corresponding Rules regarding the transmission and storage of the LO. This document requires, that RADIUS entities sending or receiving location MUST obey such instructions.

Req. 5.: The using protocol will typically facilitate that the keys associated with the credentials are transported to the respective parties, that is, key establishment is the responsibility of the using protocol. [Section 14](#) specifies how security mechanisms are used in RADIUS and how they can be reused to provide security protection for the Location Object. Additionally, the privacy considerations (see [Section 13](#)) are also relevant for this requirement.

Req. 6. (Single Message Transfer): In particular, for tracking of small target devices, the design should allow a single message/packet transmission of location as a complete transaction. The encoding of the Location Object is specifically tailored towards the inclusion into a single message that even respects the (Path) MTU size. The concept of a transaction is not immediately applicable to RADIUS.

Section 7.3 of [[12](#)] details the requirements of a "Rule based Location Data Transfer". These requirements are listed below:

Req. 7. (LS Rules): With the scenario shown in Figure 16 the decision of a Location Server to provide a Location Recipient access to location information is based on Rule Maker-defined Privacy Rules which are stored at the home network or are accessible for the home network. With regard to the scenario shown in Figure 17 the Rule Maker-defined Privacy Rules are sent from the home network to the visited network as part of the Policy-Information attribute (see [Section 9.3](#), [Section 9.4](#) and [Section 13](#) for more details).

Req. 8. (LG Rules): For mid-session delivery it is possible to enforce the user's privacy rules for the transfer of the Location Object. For the initial transmission of a Location Object the user would have to use network access authentication methods which provide user identity confidentiality which would render the

---

Location Object completely useless for the visited network. For the scenario shown in Figure 16 the visited network is already in possession of the users location information prior to the authentication and authorization of the user. A correlation between the location and the user identity might, however, still not be possible for the visited network (as explained in [Section 13](#)). The visited network MUST evaluate ruleset provided by the home AAA server as soon as possible.

Req. 9. (Viewer Rules): The Rule Maker might define (via mechanisms outside the scope of this document) which policy rules are disclosed to other entities.

Req. 10. (Full Rule language): Geopriv has defined a rule language capable of expressing a wide range of privacy rules which is applicable in the area of the distribution of Location Objects. A basic ruleset is provided with the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute [Section 9.3](#). A reference to the extended ruleset is carried in [Section 9.4](#). The format of these rules are described in [\[16\]](#) and [\[17\]](#).

Req. 11. (Limited Rule language): A limited (or basic) ruleset is provided by the Policy-Information attribute [Section 9.3](#) (and as introduced with PIDF-LO [\[15\]](#)).

Section 7.4 of [\[12\]](#) details the requirements of a "Location Object Privacy and Security". These requirements are listed below:

Req. 12 (Identity Protection): Support for unlinkable pseudonyms is provided by the usage of a corresponding authentication and key exchange protocol. Such protocols are available, for example, with the support of EAP as network access authentication methods. Some EAP methods support passive user identity confidentiality whereas others even support active user identity confidentiality. This issue is further discussed in [Section 14](#). The importance for user identity confidentiality and identity protection has already been recognized (see for example a document on 'EAP Method Requirements for Wireless LANs' [\[21\]](#)).

Req. 13. (Credential Requirements): As described in [Section 14](#) RADIUS signaling messages can be protected with IPsec. This

allows a number of authentication and key exchange protocols to be used as part of IKE, IKEv2 or KINK.

Req. 14. (Security Features): Geopriv defines a few security requirements for the protection of Location Objects such as mutual end-point authentication, data object integrity, data object confidentiality and replay protection. As described in [Section 14](#) these requirements are fulfilled with the usage of IPsec if the mutual authentication refers to the RADIUS entities (acting as various Geopriv entities) which directly communicate with each other.

Req. 15. (Minimal Crypto): A minimum of security mechanisms are mandated by the usage of RADIUS. Communication security for Location Objects between AAA infrastructure elements is provided by the RADIUS protocol (including IPsec and its dynamic key management framework) rather than on relying on object security via S/SIME (which is not available with RADIUS).

## 12. Example

This section provides an example for a civic location information format within the Location-Information attribute. The size of the geo-spatial location information object is fixed and well-described examples can be found in the Appendix of [8].

Due to the size limitations of the RADIUS attributes we give a more detailed example borrowed from Section 4 of [4].

Type	Length	Value
Type	8 bits	TBD
Length	8 bits	--total length--
Code	16 bits	1
Precision	8 bits	2
Countrycode	16 bits	DE
CAtype	8 bits	1
CALength	8 bits	7
CAValue	7 bytes	Bavaria
CAtype	8 bits	3
CALength	8 bits	6
CAValue	6 byte	Munich
CAtype	8 bits	6
CALength	8 bits	11
CAValue	11 bytes	Marienplatz
CAtype	8 bits	19
CALength	8 bits	1
CAValue	1 byte	8
CAtype	8 bits	24

CAlength	8 bits	5
CValue	5 bytes	80331

The Length element provides the length of the entire payload minus the length of the initial 'Type', the 'Length' and the 'Code' attribute. The 'Entity' field has a value of '2' which refers to the location of the user's client. The 'CountryCode' field is set to 'DE'. Note that the subsequent attributes are in Type-Length-Value format. Type '1' indicates the region of 'Bavaria', '3' refers to the city 'Munich', '6' to the street 'Marienplatz', the house number '8' is indicated by the type '19' and the zip code of '80331' is of type '24'.

The length of the elements need to consider the fact that all CValue elements are UTF-8 encoded.

The following example illustrates a civic address in Japan.

Type	Length	Value
Type	8 bits	TBD
Length	8 bits	--total length--
Code	16 bits	1
Precision	8 bits	2
Countrycode	16 bits	JP
CAtype	8 bits	1
CAlength	8 bits	5
CValue	7 bytes	Tokyo
CAtype	8 bits	3
CAlength	8 bits	13
CValue	6 byte	Musashino-shi
CAtype	8 bits	5
CAlength	8 bits	7
CValue	11 bytes	3-chome
CAtype	8 bits	30
CAlength	8 bits	8
CValue	1 byte	180-8585
CAtype	8 bits	32
CAlength	8 bits	11
CValue	5 bytes	13203000003

+-----+-----+-----+

Please note that the CAtype 32 ("additional code" item) provides an additional, country-specific code identifying the location, such as the Japan Industry Standard (JIS) address code.

### 13. Privacy Considerations

This section discusses privacy implications for the distribution of location information within RADIUS.

In many cases the location information of the network also reveals the current location of the user with a certain degree of precision depending on the mechanism used, the positioning system, update frequency, where the location was generated, size of the network and other mechanisms (such as movement traces or interpolation).

Two entities might act as Location Servers as shown in [Section 4](#), in Figure 16 and in Figure 17:

#### 13.1. Entity in the visited network

In this scenario it is difficult to obtain authorization policies from the end host (or user) immediately when the user attaches to the

network. In this case we have to assume that the visited network does not allow unrestricted distribution of location information to other than the intended recipients (e.g., to third party entities).

The visited network MUST behave according to the following guidelines:

- o Per default only the home network is allowed to receive location information. The visited network MUST NOT distribute location information to third parties without seeing the user's privacy rule set.
- o If the home network provides the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute either as part of the Access-Accept, the Access-Reject or the Access-Challenge message then the visited network MUST follow the guidance given with these rules.
- o If the home network provides the Extended-Policy-Rules attributes either as part of the Access-Accept, the Access-Reject or the Access-Challenge message then the visited network MUST fetch the full ruleset at the indicated URL and MUST follow the guidance given with these rules.
- o If the RADIUS client in the visited network learns the basic rule set or a reference to the extended rule set by means outside the RADIUS protocol (e.g., provided by the end host) then it MUST include the Basic-Policy-Rules and the Extended-Policy-Rules attribute in the Access-Request message towards the home AAA server. Furthermore, the visited network MUST evaluate these rules prior to the transmission of location information either to

the home network or a third party. The visited network MUST follow the guidance given with these rules.

- o If the RADIUS client in the visited network receives the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute with Access-Accept or the Access-Challenge message then the Basic-Policy-Rules MUST be attached in subsequent RADIUS messages which contain the Location-Information attribute (such as interim accounting messages).
- o If the RADIUS client in the visited network receives the Extended-Policy-Rules attribute with Access-Accept or the Access-Challenge

message then the Basic-Policy-Rules attribute MUST be attach in subsequent RADIUS messages which contain the Location-Information attribute (such as interim accounting messages).

### 13.2. Entity in the home network

The AAA server in the home network might be an ideal place for storing authorization policies. The user typically has a contractual relationship with his home network and hence the trust relationship between them is stronger. Once the infrastructure is deployed and useful applications are available there might be a strong desire to use location information for other purposes as well (such as location aware applications). Authorization policy rules described in [17] and in [16] are tailored for this environment. These policies might be useful for limiting further distribution of the user's location to other location based services. The home AAA server (or a similar entity) thereby acts as a location server for access to location services.

The home network MUST behave according to the following guidelines:

- o As a default policy the home network MUST NOT distribute the user's location information to third party entities.
- o If a user provides basic authorization policies then these rules MUST be returned to the visited network in the Access-Accept, the Access-Reject or the Access-Challenge message.
- o If a user provides basic authorization policies then these rules MUST be returned to the visited network in the Access-Accept, the Access-Reject or the Access-Challenge message.
- o If a user provides extended authorization policies then they MUST be accessible for the visited networking using a reference to these rule set. The Extended-Policy-Rules attribute MUST include the reference and they MUST be sent to the visited network in the Access-Accept, the Access-Reject or the Access-Challenge message.

- o The home network MUST follow the user provided rule set for both local storage and for further distribution. With regard to the usage of these rules the home network MUST ensure that the users preferences are taken care of within the given boundaries (such as

legal regulations or operational considerations). For example, a user might not want the home network to store information about its location information beyond a indicated time frame. However, a user might on the other hand want to ensure that disputes concerning the billed amount can be resolved. location information might help to resolve the dispute. The user might, for example, be able to show that he has never been at the indicated place.

- o If the policy rules provided by the user indicate that location information must not be distributed at all then the home network MUST provide the Basic-Policy-Rules to the RADIUS entity in the visited network via an Access-Accept, the Access-Reject and the Access-Challenge message. The RADIUS server in the user's home network would set the 'Retention-Expires' and the 'Retransmission-allowed' field to the user indicated value.

For the envisioned usage scenarios, the identity of the user and his device is tightly coupled to the transfer of location information. If the identity can be determined by the visited network or AAA brokers, then it is possible to correlate location information with a particular user. As such, it allows the visited network and brokers to learn movement patterns of users.

The identity of the user can "leak" to the visited network or AAA brokers in a number of ways:

- o The user's device may employ a fixed MAC address, or base its IP address on such an address. This enables the correlation of the particular device to its different locations. Techniques exist to avoid the use of an IP address that is based on MAC address [22]. Some link layers make it possible to avoid MAC addresses or change them dynamically.
- o Network access authentication procedures such as PPP CHAP [23] or EAP [24] may reveal the user's identity as a part of the authentication procedure. Techniques exist to avoid this problem in EAP, for instance by employing private Network Access Identifiers (NAIs) in the EAP Identity Response message [25] and by method-specific private identity exchange in the EAP method (e.g., [26], [27], [28]). Support for identity privacy within CHAP is not available.
- o AAA protocols may return information from the home network to the visited in a manner that makes it possible to either identify the

user or at least correlate his session with other sessions, such as the use of static data in a Class attribute [1] or in some accounting attribute usage scenarios [29].

- o Mobility mechanisms may reveal some permanent identifier (such as a home address) in cleartext in the packets relating to mobility signaling.
- o Application protocols may reveal other permanent identifiers.

Note that to prevent the correlation of identities with location information it is necessary to prevent leakage of identity information from all sources, not just one.

Unfortunately, most users are not educated about the importance of identity confidentiality and there is a lack of support for it in many protocols. This problem is made worse by the fact that the users may be unable to choose particular protocols, as the choice is often dictated by the type of network they wish to access, the kind of equipment they have, or the type of authentication method they are using.

A scenario where the user is attached to the home network is, from a privacy point of view, simpler than a scenario where a user roams into a visited network since the NAS and the home AAA are in the same administrative domain. No direct relationship between the visited and the home network operator may be available and some AAA brokers need to be consulted. With subscription-based network access as used today the user has a contractual relationship with the home network provider which could allow higher privacy considerations to be applied (including policy rules stored at the home network itself for the purpose of restricting further distribution).

In many cases it is necessary to secure the transport of location information along the RADIUS infrastructure. Mechanisms to achieve this functionality are discussed in [Section 14](#).

#### 14. Security Considerations

Requirements for the protection of a Location Object are defined in [12]: Mutual end-point authentication, data object integrity, data object confidentiality and replay protection. The distribution of location information can be restricted with the help of authorization policies. Basic authorization policies are attached to the location information itself, in the same fashion as described in [15]. It is possible that the user was already able to transfer some authorization policies to the access network to restrict the distribution of location information. This is, however, rather unlikely in case of roaming users. Hence, it will be primarily the NAS creating the Location Object which also sets the authorization policies. If no authorization information is provided by the user then the visited network MUST set the authorization policies to only allow the home AAA server to use the provided location information. Other entities, such as the visited network and possibly AAA brokers MUST NOT use the location information for a purpose other than described in this document. More extensible authorization policies can be stored at the user's home network. These policies are useful when location information is distributed to other entities in a location-based service. This scenario is, however, outside the scope of this document.

It is necessary to use authorization policies to limit the unauthorized distribution of location information. The security requirements which are created based on [12] are inline with threats which appear in the relationship with disclosure of location information as described in [30]. PIDF-LO [15] proposes S/MIME to protect the Location Object against modifications. S/SIME relies on public key cryptography which raises performance, deployment and size considerations. Encryption would require that the local AAA server or the NAS knows the recipient's public key (e.g., the public key of the home AAA server). Knowing the final recipient of the location information is in many cases difficult for RADIUS entities. Some sort of public key infrastructure would be required to obtain the public key and to verify the digital signature (at the home network). Providing per-object cryptographic protection is, both at the home and at the visited network, computationally expensive.

If no authentication, integrity and replay protection between the participating RADIUS entities is provided then an adversaries can spoof and modify transmitted attributes. Two security mechanisms are proposed for RADIUS:

- o [1] proposes the usage of a static key which might raise some concerns about the lack dynamic key management.

- o RADIUS over IPsec [31] allows to run standard key management mechanisms, such as KINK [32], IKE and IKEv2 [33], to establish IPsec security associations. Confidentiality protection MUST be used to prevent eavesdropper gaining access to location information. Confidentiality protection is not only a property required by this document, it is also required for the transport of keying material in the context of EAP authentication and authorization. Hence, this requirement is, in many environments, already fulfilled. Mutual authentication must be provided between the local AAA server and the home AAA server to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks from being successful. This is another requirement raised in the area of key transport with RADIUS and does not represent a deployment obstacle. The performance advantages superior compared to the usage of S/MIME and object security since the expensive authentication and key exchange protocol run needs to be provided only once (for a long time). Symmetric channel security with IPsec is highly efficient. Since IPsec protection is suggested as a mechanism to protect RADIUS already no additional considerations need to be addressed beyond those described in [31]. Where an untrusted AAA intermediary is present, the Location Object MUST NOT be provided to the intermediary.

In case that IPsec protection is not available for some reason and RADIUS specific security mechanisms have to be used then the following considerations apply. The Access-Request message is not integrity protected. This would allow an adversary to change the contents of the Location Object or to insert and modify attributes and fields or to delete attributes. To address these problems the Message-Authenticator (80) can be used to integrity protect the entire Access-Request packet. The Message-Authenticator (80) is also required when EAP is used and hence is supported by many modern RADIUS servers.

Access-Request packets including Location attribute(s) without a Message-Authenticator(80) attribute SHOULD be silently discarded by the RADIUS server. A RADIUS server supporting the Location attributes MUST calculate the correct value of the Message-Authenticator(80) and MUST silently discard the packet if it does not match the value sent.

Access-Accept, including Location attribute(s) without a Message-Authenticator(80) attribute SHOULD be silently discarded by the NAS. A NAS supporting the Location attribute MUST calculate the correct value of a received Message-Authenticator(80) and MUST silently discard the packet if it does not match the value sent.

RADIUS and Diameter make some assumptions about the trust between

traversed AAA entities in sense that object level security is not provided by neither RADIUS nor Diameter. Hence, some trust has to be placed on the AAA entities to behave according to the defined rules. Furthermore, the AAA protocols do not involve the user in their protocol interaction except for tunneling authentication information (such as EAP messages) through their infrastructure. RADIUS and Diameter have even become a de-facto protocol for key distribution. Hence, in the past there were some concerns about the trust placed into the infrastructure particularly from the security area when it comes to keying. The EAP keying infrastructure is described in [\[34\]](#).

## 15. IANA Considerations

The authors request that the Attribute Types, and Attribute Values defined in this document be registered by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) from the RADIUS name spaces as described in the "IANA Considerations" section of [RFC 3575](#) [[10](#)], in accordance with [BCP 26](#) [[11](#)]. Additionally, the Attribute Type should be registered in the Diameter name space.

This document defines the following attributes:

- Operator-Name
- Location-Information
- Basic-Policy-Rules
- Extended-Policy-Rules
- Challenge-Capable
- Requested-Info

Please refer to [Section 10](#) for the registered list of numbers.

This document also instructs IANA to assign a new value for the Error-Cause attribute [5], of "Location-Info-Required" TBA.

Additionally, IANA is requested to create the following new registries:

#### 15.1. New Registry: Operator Type

This document also defines an operator namespace registry (used in the Namespace field of the Operator-Name attribute). Initially, IANA is requested to register the following attributes: identifier and operator-namespace / associated registry owners for the operator namespace:

Identifier	Operator-Namespace / Registry Owner
0	GSM - GSM Association/TADIG WG
1	CDMA - IMSI Oversight Council
2	REALM - IANA or delegate
3	ITU - ITU-T/TSB

Following the policies outline in [11] new Operator-Namespaces will be assigned after Expert Review by the Geopriv working group or its designated successor. Updates can be provided based on expert approval only. No mechanism to mark entries as "deprecated" is envisioned. Based on expert approval it is possible to delete

entries from the registry.

#### 15.2. New Registry: Requested-Info attribute

This document creates a new IANA registry for the Requested-Info attribute. Currently four info elements are defined, as shown in [Section 7](#)

Following the policies outline in [10] new Operator-Namespaces will be assigned after Expert Review by the RADEXT working group or its designated successor. Updates can be provided based on expert approval only. A designated expert will be appointed by the O&M Area

Directors. No mechanism to mark entries as "deprecated" is envisioned. Based on expert approval it is possible to delete entries from the registry.

Each registration must include the name of the info element, a brief description and a numerical value representing a bit in the bit-string:

Name:

Identifier of the capability

Description:

Brief description indicating the meaning of the info element.

Numerical Value:

A numerical value that is placed into the Capability attribute.

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