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Mitigating Negative Impact of Maintenance through BGP Session Culling draft-ietf-grow-bgp-session-culling-05

Abstract

This document outlines an approach to mitigate negative impact on networks resulting from maintenance activities. It includes guidance for both IP networks and Internet Exchange Points (IXPs). The approach is to ensure BGP-4 sessions affected by the maintenance are forcefully torn down before the actual maintenance activities commence.

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[1.](#) Introduction

BGP Session Culling is the practice of ensuring BGP sessions are forcefully torn down before maintenance activities on a lower layer network commence, which otherwise would affect the flow of data between the BGP speakers.

BGP Session Culling ensures that lower layer network maintenance activities cause the minimum possible amount of disruption, by causing BGP speakers to preemptively converge onto alternative paths while the lower layer network's forwarding plane remains fully operational.

The grace period required for a successful application of BGP Session Culling is the sum of the time needed to detect the loss of the BGP session, plus the time required for the BGP speaker to converge onto alternative paths. The first value is often governed by the BGP Hold Timer ([section 6.5 of \[RFC4271\]](#)), commonly between 90 and 180

seconds. The second value is implementation specific, but could be as much as 15 minutes when a router with a slow control-plane is receiving a full set of Internet routes.

Throughout this document the "Caretaker" is defined to be in control of the lower layer network, while "Operators" directly administrate the BGP speakers. Operators and Caretakers implementing BGP Session Culling are encouraged to avoid using a fixed grace period, but instead monitor forwarding plane activity while the culling is taking place and consider it complete once traffic levels have dropped to a minimum ([Section 3.3](#)).

2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

3. BGP Session Culling

From the viewpoint of the Operator, there are two types of BGP Session Culling:

Voluntary BGP Session Teardown: The Operator initiates the tear down of the potentially affected BGP session by issuing an Administrative Shutdown.

Involuntary BGP Session Teardown: The Caretaker of the lower layer network disrupts (higher layer) BGP control-plane traffic, causing the BGP Hold Timers of the affected BGP session to expire, subsequently triggering rerouting of end user traffic.

3.1. Voluntary BGP Session Teardown Recommendations

Before an Operator commences activities which can cause disruption to the flow of data through the lower layer network, an Operator can reduce loss of traffic by issuing an administrative shutdown to all BGP sessions running across the lower layer network and wait a few minutes for data-plane traffic to subside.

While architectures exist to facilitate quick network reconvergence (such as BGP PIC [[I-D.ietf-rtgwg-bgp-pic](#)]), an Operator cannot assume the remote side has such capabilities. As such, a grace period between the Administrative Shutdown and the impacting maintenance activities is warranted.

After the maintenance activities have concluded, the Operator is expected to restore the BGP sessions to their original Administrative state.

3.1.1. Maintenance Considerations

Initiators of the administrative shutdown MAY consider using Graceful Shutdown [[I-D.ietf-grow-bgp-gshut](#)] to facilitate smooth drainage of traffic prior to session tear down, and the Shutdown Communication [[RFC8203](#)] to inform the remote side on the nature and duration of the maintenance activities.

3.2. Involuntary BGP Session Teardown Recommendations

In the case where multilateral interconnection between BGP speakers is facilitated through a switched layer-2 fabric, such as commonly seen at Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), different operational considerations can apply.

Operational experience shows many Operators are unable to carry out the Voluntary BGP Session Teardown recommendations, because of the operational cost and risk of coordinating the two configuration changes required. This has an adverse affect on Internet performance.

In the absence of notifications from the lower layer (e.g. Ethernet link down) consistent with the planned maintenance activities in a switched layer-2 fabric, the Caretaker of the fabric could choose to cull BGP sessions on behalf of the Operators connected to the fabric.

Such culling of control-plane traffic will preempt the loss of end-user traffic, by causing the expiration of BGP Hold Timers ahead of the moment where the expiration would occur without intervention from the fabric's Caretaker.

In this scenario, BGP Session Culling is accomplished as described in the next sub-section, through the application of a combined layer-3 and layer-4 packet filter deployed in the Caretaker's switched fabric.

3.2.1. Packet Filter Considerations

The peering LAN prefixes used by the IXP form the control plane, and following considerations apply to the packet filter design:

- o The packet filter MUST only affect BGP traffic specific to the layer-2 fabric, i.e. forming part of the control plane of the

system described, rather than multihop BGP traffic which merely transits.

- o The packet filter MUST only affect BGP, i.e. TCP/179.
- o The packet filter SHOULD make provision for the bidirectional nature of BGP, i.e. that sessions may be established in either direction.
- o The packet filter MUST affect all Address Family Identifiers.

[Appendix A](#) contains examples of correct packet filters for various platforms.

3.2.2. Hardware Considerations

Not all hardware is capable of deploying Layer 3 / Layer 4 filters on Layer 2 ports, and even on platforms which claim support for such a feature, limitations may exist or hardware resource allocation failures may occur during filter deployment which may cause unexpected results. These problems may include:

- o Platform inability to apply layer 3/4 filters on ports which already have layer 2 filters applied.
- o Layer 3/4 filters supported for IPv4 but not for IPv6.
- o Layer 3/4 filters supported on physical ports, but not on 802.3ad Link Aggregate ports.
- o Failure of the Caretaker to apply filters to all 802.3ad Link Aggregate ports.
- o Limitations in ACL hardware mechanisms causing filters not to be applied.
- o Fragmentation of ACL lookup memory causing transient ACL application problems which are resolved after ACL removal / reapplication.
- o Temporary service loss during hardware programming
- o Reduction in hardware ACL capacity if the platform enables lossless ACL application.

It is advisable for the Caretaker to be aware of the limitations of their hardware, and to thoroughly test all complicated configurations

in advance to ensure that problems don't occur during production deployments.

3.3. Procedural Considerations

The Caretaker of the lower layer network can monitor data-plane traffic (e.g. interface counters) and carry out the maintenance without impact to traffic once session culling is complete.

It is recommended that the packet filters are only deployed for the duration of the maintenance and immediately removed after the maintenance. To prevent unnecessarily troubleshooting, it is RECOMMENDED that Caretakers notify the affected Operators before the maintenance takes place, and make it explicit that the Involuntary BGP Session Culling methodology will be applied.

4. Acknowledgments

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5. Security Considerations

There are no security considerations.

6. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.

7. References

7.1. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", [BCP 14](#), [RFC 2119](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>>.

[RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", [RFC 4271](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>>.

7.2. Informative References

- [I-D.ietf-grow-bgp-gshut]
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- [I-D.ietf-rtgwg-bgp-pic]
Bashandy, A., Filsfils, C., and P. Mohapatra, "BGP Prefix Independent Convergence", [draft-ietf-rtgwg-bgp-pic-05](#) (work in progress), May 2017.
- [RFC8203] Snijders, J., Heitz, J., and J. Scudder, "BGP Administrative Shutdown Communication", [RFC 8203](#), DOI 10.17487/RFC8203, July 2017, <<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8203>>.

7.3. URIs

- [1] <https://github.com/bgp/bgp-session-culling-config-examples>

Appendix A. Example packet filters

Example packet filters for "Involuntary BGP Session Teardown" at an IXP using peering LAN prefixes 192.0.2.0/24 and 2001:db8:2::/64 as its control plane.

A repository of configuration examples for a number of assorted platforms can be found at <https://github.com/bgp/bgp-session-culling-config-examples> [1].

A.1. Cisco IOS, IOS XR & Arista EOS Firewall Example Configuration

```
ipv6 access-list acl-ipv6-permit-all-except-bgp
  10 deny tcp 2001:db8:2::/64 eq bgp 2001:db8:2::/64
  20 deny tcp 2001:db8:2::/64 2001:db8:2::/64 eq bgp
  30 permit ipv6 any any
!
ip access-list acl-ipv4-permit-all-except-bgp
  10 deny tcp 192.0.2.0/24 eq bgp 192.0.2.0/24
  20 deny tcp 192.0.2.0/24 192.0.2.0/24 eq bgp
  30 permit ip any any
!
interface Ethernet33
  description IXP Participant Affected by Maintenance
  ip access-group acl-ipv4-permit-all-except-bgp in
  ipv6 access-group acl-ipv6-permit-all-except-bgp in
!
```


A.2. Nokia SR OS Filter Example Configuration

```
ip-filter 10 create
  filter-name "ACL IPv4 Permit All Except BGP"
  default-action forward
  entry 10 create
    match protocol tcp
      dst-ip 192.0.2.0/24
      src-ip 192.0.2.0/24
      port eq 179
    exit
  action
    drop
  exit
exit
exit

ipv6-filter 10 create
  filter-name "ACL IPv6 Permit All Except BGP"
  default-action forward
  entry 10 create
    match next-header tcp
      dst-ip 2001:db8:2::/64
      src-ip 2001:db8:2::/64
      port eq 179
    exit
  action
    drop
  exit
exit
exit

interface "port-1/1/1"
  description "IXP Participant Affected by Maintenance"
  ingress
    filter ip 10
    filter ipv6 10
  exit
exit
```

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