

Host Identity Protocol
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Host Identity Protocol Certificates
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Abstract

The CERT parameter is a container for digital certificates. It is used for carrying these certificates in Host Identity Protocol (HIP) control packets. This document specifies the certificate parameter and the error signaling in case of a failed verification. Additionally, this document specifies the representations of Host Identity Tags in X.509 version 3 (v3) and SPKI certificates.

The concrete use of certificates including how certificates are obtained, requested, and which actions are taken upon successful or failed verification are specific to the scenario in which the certificates are used. Hence, the definition of these scenario-specific aspects are left to the documents that use the CERT parameter.

This document updates [RFC 5201](#).

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1. Introduction

Digital certificates bind pieces of information to a public key by means of a digital signature, and thus, enable the holder of a private key to generate cryptographically verifiable statements. The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [[RFC5201](#)] defines a new cryptographic namespace based on asymmetric cryptography. The identity of each host is derived from a public key, allowing hosts to digitally sign data and issue certificates with their private key. This document specifies the CERT parameter, which is used to transmit digital certificates in HIP. It fills the placeholder specified in [Section 5.2 of \[RFC5201\]](#), and thus, updates [[RFC5201](#)].

1.1. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

2. CERT Parameter


```

|          Type          |          Length          |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| Cert group | Cert count | Cert ID | Cert type |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|                               Certificate                               |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
/                               |          Padding          |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

Type	768
Length	Length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding
Cert group	Group ID grouping multiple related CERT parameters
Cert count	Total count of certificates that are sent, possibly in several consecutive HIP control packets.
Cert ID	The sequence number for this certificate
Cert Type	Indicates the type of the certificate
Padding	Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple of 8 bytes.

The certificates MUST use the algorithms defined in [[RFC5201](#)] as the signature and hash algorithms.

The following certificate types are defined:

```

+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|          Cert format          | Type number |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
|          Reserved          |    0    |
|          X.509 v3          |    1    |
|          SPKI          |    2    |
| Hash and URL of X.509 v3 |    3    |
| Hash and URL of SPKI |    4    |
| LDAP URL of X.509 v3 |    5    |
| LDAP URL of SPKI |    6    |
| Distinguished Name of X.509 v3 |    7    |
| Distinguished Name of SPKI |    8    |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+

```

The next sections outline the use of Host Identity Tags (HITs) in X.509 v3 and in Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates. X.509 v3 certificates and the handling procedures are defined in [[RFC5280](#)]. The wire format for X.509 v3 is Distinguished Encoding Rules format as defined in [[X.690](#)]. The SPKI, the handling procedures, and the formats are defined in [[RFC2693](#)].

Hash and Uniform Resource Locator (URL) encodings (3 and 4) are used as defined in [\[RFC5996\] Section 3.6](#). Using hash and URL encodings results in smaller HIP control packets than by including the certificate(s), but requires the receiver to resolve the URL or check a local cache against the hash.

LDAP URL encodings (5 and 6) are used as defined in [\[RFC4516\]](#). Using LDAP URL encoding results in smaller HIP control packets but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or check a local cache against the URL.

Distinguished name (DN) encodings (7 and 8) are represented by the string representation of the certificate's subject DN as defined in [\[RFC4514\]](#). Using the DN encoding results in smaller HIP control packets, but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or check a local cache against the DN.

3. X.509 v3 Certificate Object and Host Identities

If needed, HITs can represent an issuer, a subject, or both in x.509 v3. HITs are represented as IPv6 addresses as defined in [\[RFC4843\]](#). When Host Identifier (HI) is used to sign the certificate the respective HIT MUST be placed in to the Issuer Alternative Name (IAN) extension using the GeneralName form `iPAddress` as defined in [\[RFC5280\]](#). When the certificate is issued for a HIP host, identified by a HIT and HI, the respective HIT MUST be placed in to the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) extension using the GeneralName form `iPAddress` and the full HI is presented as the subjects public key info as defined in [\[RFC5280\]](#).

The following examples illustrate how HITs are presented as issuer and subject in the X.509 v3 extension alternative names.

Format of X509v3 extensions:

X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:

IP Address:hit-of-issuer

X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:

IP Address:hit-of-subject

Example X509v3 extensions:

X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:

IP Address:2001:14:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056

X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:

IP Address:2001:1C:5a14:26de:a07C:385b:de35:60e3

[Appendix B](#) shows a full example X.509 v3 certificate with HIP content.

As another example, consider a managed Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) environment in which the peers have certificates that are anchored in (potentially different) managed trust chains. In this scenario, the certificates issued to HIP hosts are signed by intermediate Certification Authorities (CAs) up to a root CA. In this example, the managed PKI environment is neither HIP aware, nor can it be configured to compute HITs and include them in the certificates.

When HIP communications are established, the HIP hosts not only need to send their identity certificates (or pointers to their certificates), but also the chain of intermediate CAs (or pointers to the CAs) up to the root CA, or to a CA that is trusted by the remote peer. This chain of certificates **MUST** be sent in a Cert group as specified in [Section 2](#). The HIP peers validate each other's certificates and compute peer HITs based on the certificate public keys.

4. SPKI Cert Object and Host Identities

When using SPKI certificates to transmit information related to HIP hosts, HITs need to be enclosed within the certificates. HITs can represent an issuer, a subject, or both. In the following we define the representation of those identifiers for SPKI given as S-expressions. Note that the S-expressions are only the human-readable representation of SPKI certificates. Full HIs are presented in the public key sequences of SPKI certificates.

As an example the Host Identity Tag of a host is expressed as follows:

Format: (hash hit hit-of-host)

Example: (hash hit 2001:13:724d:f3c0:6ff0:33c2:15d8:5f50)

[Appendix A](#) shows a full example SPKI certificate with HIP content.

5. Revocation of Certificates

Revocation of X.509 v3 certificates is handled as defined in [Section 5 of \[RFC5280\]](#). Revocation of SPKI certificates is handled as defined in [Section 5 of \[RFC2693\]](#).

6. Error signaling

If the Initiator does not send the certificate that the Responder requires the Responder may take actions (e.g. reject the connection). The Responder MAY signal this to the Initiator by sending a HIP NOTIFY message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED.

If the verification of a certificate fails, a verifier MAY signal this to the provider of the certificate by sending a HIP NOTIFY message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type INVALID_CERTIFICATE.

NOTIFICATION PARAMETER - ERROR TYPES -----	Value -----
CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED	48

The Responder is unwilling to set up an association as the Initiator did not send the needed credentials.

INVALID_CERTIFICATE	50
---------------------	----

Sent in response to a failed verification of a certificate. Notification Data MAY contain n groups of 2 octets (n calculated from the NOTIFICATION parameter length), in order Cert group and Cert ID of the certificate parameter that caused the failure.

7. IANA Considerations

This document defines the CERT parameter for the Host Identity Protocol [[RFC5201](#)]. This parameter is defined in [Section 2](#) with type 768. The parameter type number is also defined in [[RFC5201](#)].

The CERT parameter has 8-bit unsigned integer field for different certificate types, for which IANA is to create and maintain a new sub-registry entitled "HIP certificate types" under the "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters". Initial values for the Certificate type registry are given in [Section 2](#). New values for the Certificate types from the unassigned space are assigned through IETF Review.

In [Section 6](#) this document defines two new types for "NOTIFY message types" sub-registry under "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters".

8. Security Considerations

Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks as IP-layer fragmentation allows, for example sending of fragments in wrong order and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet processing by the victim in order to use resources (e.g. CPU or memory). Hence, hosts SHOULD implement mechanisms to discard certificate groups with outstanding certificates if state space is scarce.

Checking of the URL and LDAP entries might allow DoS attacks, where the target host may be subjected to bogus work.

Security considerations for SPKI certificates are discussed in [[RFC2693](#)] and for X.509 v3 in [[RFC5280](#)]

9. Acknowledgements

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10. Normative References

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- [X.690] ITU-T, , "Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002, Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", July 2002.

[Appendix A](#). SPKI certificate example

This section shows a SPKI certificate with encoded HITs. The example has been indented for readability.

```
(sequence
  (public_key
    (rsa-pkcs1-sha1
      (e #010001#)
      (n |yDwzn0wX0w+zvQbpWoTnfWrUPLKW2NFrpXbsIch/QBSLb
        k1RKTZhLasFwvtSHAjqh220W8gRiQAGIqKplyrDEqSrJp
        OdIsHIQ8BQhJAYILWA1Sa6f5wAnWozDfgdXoKLNdT8ZNB
        mzluPiw4ozc78p6MHElH75Hm3yHaWxT+s83M=|
      )
    )
  )
)
(cert
  (issuer
    (hash hit 2001:15:2453:698a:9aa:253a:dcb5:981e)
  )
  (subject
    (hash hit 2001:12:ccd6:4715:72a3:2ab1:77e4:4acc)
  )
  (not-before "2011-01-12_13:43:09")
  (not-after "2011-01-22_13:43:09")
)
(signature
  (hash sha1 |h5fC8HUMATTtK0cjYqIgeN3HCIMA|)
  |u8NTRutINI/AeeZgN6bngjvjYPtVahvY7MhGfenTpT7MCgBy
  NoZglqH5Cy2vH6LrQFYwx0MjWoYwHKimEuBKCNd4TK6hrCyAI
  CIDJAZ70TyKXgONwDNWP0mcc3lFmsih8ezkoBseFWHQRGISIm
  MLdeaMciP4lVfxPY2AQKdMrBc=|
)
)
```


)

[Appendix B](#). X.509.v3 certificate example

This section shows a X.509 v3 certificate with encoded HITs.

Certificate:

Data:

```
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 0 (0x0)
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: CN=Example issuing host, DC=example, DC=com
Validity
  Not Before: Mar 11 09:01:39 2011 GMT
  Not After : Mar 21 09:01:39 2011 GMT
Subject: CN=Example subject host, DC=example, DC=com
Subject Public Key Info:
  Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
  RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
    Modulus (1024 bit):
      00:c0:db:38:50:8e:63:ed:96:ea:c6:c4:ec:a3:36:
      62:e2:28:e9:74:9c:f5:2f:cb:58:0e:52:54:60:b5:
      fa:98:87:0d:22:ab:d8:6a:61:74:a9:ee:0b:ae:cd:
      18:6f:05:ab:69:66:42:46:00:a2:c0:0c:3a:28:67:
      09:cc:52:27:da:79:3e:67:d7:d8:d0:7c:f1:a1:26:
      fa:38:8f:73:f5:b0:20:c6:f2:0b:7d:77:43:aa:c7:
      98:91:7e:1e:04:31:0d:ca:94:55:20:c4:4f:ba:b1:
      df:d4:61:9d:dd:b9:b5:47:94:6c:06:91:69:30:42:
      9c:0a:8b:e3:00:ce:49:ab:e3
    Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
  X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
    IP Address:2001:13:8D83:41C5:DC9F:38ED:E742:7281
  X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
    IP Address:2001:1C:6E02:D3E0:9B90:8417:673E:99DB
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
83:68:b4:38:63:a6:ae:57:68:e2:4d:73:5d:8f:11:e4:ba:30:
a0:19:ca:86:22:e9:6b:e9:36:96:af:95:bd:e8:02:b9:72:2f:
30:a2:62:ac:b2:fa:3d:25:c5:24:fd:8d:32:aa:01:4f:a5:8a:
f5:06:52:56:0a:86:55:39:2b:ee:7a:7b:46:14:d7:5d:15:82:
4d:74:06:ca:b7:8c:54:c1:6b:33:7f:77:82:d8:95:e1:05:ca:
e2:0d:22:1d:86:fc:1c:c4:a4:cf:c6:bc:ab:ec:b8:2a:1e:4b:
04:7e:49:9c:8f:9d:98:58:9c:63:c5:97:b5:41:94:f7:ef:93:
57:29
```


Appendix C. Change log

Contents of [draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-00](#):

- o [RFC6253](#) was submitted as [draft-RFC](#).

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