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Z. Cao
H. Deng
China Mobile
Q. Wu
Huawei
G. Zorn
Network Zen
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EAP Re-authentication Protocol Extensions for Authenticated Anticipatory
Keying (ERP/AAK)
[draft-ietf-hokey-erp-aak-08](#)

Abstract

The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a generic framework supporting multiple types of authentication methods.

The EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) specifies extensions to EAP and the EAP keying hierarchy to support an EAP method-independent protocol for efficient re-authentication between the peer and an EAP re-authentication server through any authenticator.

Authenticated Anticipatory Keying (AAK) is a method by which cryptographic keying material may be established upon one or more candidate attachment points (CAPs) prior to handover. AAK uses the AAA infrastructure for key transport.

This document specifies the extensions necessary to enable AAK support in ERP.

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1. Introduction

The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [[RFC3748](#)] is a generic framework supporting multiple types of authentication methods. In systems where EAP is used for authentication, it is desirable to not repeat the entire EAP exchange with another authenticator. The EAP Re-authentication Protocol (ERP) [[RFC5296](#)] specifies extensions to EAP and the EAP keying hierarchy to support an EAP method-independent protocol for efficient re-authentication between the peer and an EAP re-authentication server through any authenticator. The re-authentication server may be in the home network or in the local network to which the peer is connecting.

Authenticated Anticipatory Keying (AAK) [[RFC5836](#)] is a method by which cryptographic keying materials may be established prior to handover upon one or more candidate attachment points (CAPs). AAK utilizes the AAA infrastructure for key transport.

This document specifies the extensions necessary to enable AAK support in ERP.

2. Terminology

2.1. Standards Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

2.2. Acronyms

The following acronyms are used in this document; see the references for more details.

AAA Authentication, Authorization and Accounting [[RFC3588](#)]

CAP Candidate Attachment Point [[RFC5836](#)]

EA Abbreviation for "ERP/AAK"; used in figures

MH Mobile Host

SAP Serving Attachment Point [[RFC5836](#)]

3. ERP/AAK Description

ERP/AAK is intended to allow the establishment of cryptographic keying materials on a single Candidate Attachment Points prior to the arrival of the MH at the Candidate Access Network (CAN) upon request by the peer.

In this document, ERP/AAK support for the peer is assumed. Also it is assumed that the peer has previously completed full EAP authentication and the peer or SAP knows the identities of neighboring attachment points. Note that the behavior of the peer that does not support the ERP-AAK scheme defined in this specification is out of the scope of this document. Figure 1 shows the general protocol exchange by which the keying material is established on the CAP.



Figure 1: ERP/AAK Exchange




Figure 2: Key Distribution for ERP/AAK

ERP/AAK re-uses the packet format defined by ERP, but specifies a new flag to differentiate EAP early-authentication from EAP re-authentication. The peer initiates ERP/AAK itself, or does so in response to an EAP-Initiate/Re-Auth-Start message from the SAP.

In the latter case, the SAP MAY send the identity of a candidate attachment point to the peer in the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start message (see a. in the figure 1). If the EAP-Initiate/ Re-auth-Start packet is not supported by the peer, it MUST be silently discarded.

If the peer initiate ERP/AAK, the peer MAY send an early-authentication request message (EAP-Initiate/ Re-auth with the 'E' flag set) containing the keyName-NAI, the CAP- Identifier, rIK and sequence number (see b. in the figure 1). The realm in the keyName-NAI field is used to locate the peer's ERP/AAK server. The CAP- Identifier is used to identify the CAP. The rIK is defined in [RFC5296](#) and used to protect the integrity of the message. The sequence number is used for replay protection.

The SAP SHOULD verify the integrity of the message at step b. If This verifications fail, the SAP MUST send an EAP- Finish/Re-auth message with the Result flag set to '1' (Failure).In success case, the SAP SHOULD encapsulate the early-authentication message into a AAA message and send it to the peer's ERP/AAK server in the realm indicated in the keyName-NAI field (see c. in the figure 1).

Upon receiving the message, the ERP/AAK server MUST first use the keyName indicated in the keyName-NAI to look up the rIK and MUST

check the integrity and freshness of the message. Then the ERP/AAK server MUST verify the identity of the peer by checking the username portion of the KeyName-NAI. If any of the checks fail, the server MUST send an early- authentication finish message (EAP-Finish/Re-auth with E-flag set) with the Result flag set to '1'. Next, the server MUST authorize the CAP specified in the CAP-Identifier TLV. In success case, the server MUST derive a pMSK from the pRK for each CAP carried in the the CAP-Identifier field using the sequence number associated with CAP-Identifier as an input to the key derivation. (see d. in the figure 1)

Then The ERP/AAK server MUST transport the pMSK to the authorized CAP via AAA [Section 7](#) as described in figure 2 (see e.1,e.2 in the figure 2). Note that key distribution in the figure 2 is one part of step d. in the figure 1.

Finally, in response to the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message, the ERP/AAK server SHOULD send the early-authentication finish message (EAP-Finish/ Re-auth with E-flag set) containing the identity of the authorized CAP to the peer via the SAP and associated lifetime of pMSK, OPTIONALLY, if the peer also requests the server for the rRK lifetime, the ERP/AAK server SHOULD send the rRK lifetime in the EAP-Finish/Re-auth message. (see f.,g. in the figure 1).

4. ERP/AAK Key Hierarchy

As an extension of ERP, ERP/AAK uses a key hierarchy similar to that of ERP. The ERP/AAK pre-established Root Key (pRK) is derived from either EMSK or DSRK as specified in the [section 4.1](#). In general, the pRK is derived from the EMSK in case of the peer moving in the home AAA realm and derived from the DSRK in case of the peer moving in a visited realm. The DSRK is delivered from the EAP server to the ERP/AAK server as specified in [[I-D.ietf-dime-local-keytran](#)]. If the peer has previously been authenticated by means of ERP or ERP/AAK, the DSRK SHOULD be directly re-used.




Figure 3: ERP/AAK Root Key Derivation

Similarly, the pre-established Master Session Key (pMSK) are derived from the pRK. The pMSK is established for the CAP when the peer early authenticates to the network. The hierarchy relationship is illustrated Figure 4,




Figure 4: ERP/AAK Key Hierarchy

below.

4.1. pRK, pMSK derivation

The rRK is derived as specified in [\[RFC5295\]](#).

$pRK = KDF(K, S)$, where

$K = EMSK$ or $K = DSRK$ and

$S = pRK \text{ Label} \mid "\backslash 0" \mid \text{length}$

The pRK Label is an IANA-assigned 8-bit ASCII string:

EAP Early-Authentication Root Key@ietf.org

assigned from the "USRK key labels" name space in accordance with [\[RFC5295\]](#). The KDF and algorithm agility for the KDF are as defined in [\[RFC5295\]](#).

The pMSK is derived as follows.

$pMSK = KDF(K, S)$, where

$K = pRK$ and

$S = pMSK \text{ label} \mid "\backslash 0" \mid SEQ \mid \text{length}$

The pMSK label is the 8-bit ASCII string:

Early-Authentication Master Session Key@ietf.org

The length field refers to the length of the pMSK in octets encoded as specified in [\[RFC5295\]](#). SEQ is sent by either the peer or the server in the ERP/AAK message using SEQ field or Sequence number TLV and encoded as an 8-bit number specified in the [section 5.2](#) and [section 5.3](#).

5. Packet and TLV Extension

This section describes the packet and TLV extensions for the ERP/AAK exchange.

5.1. EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start Packet and TLV Extension

Figure 5 shows the changed parameters contained in the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start packet defined in [RFC 5296](#) [[RFC5296](#)].




Figure 5

Flags

'E' - The E flag is used to indicate early-authentication. This field MUST be set to '1' if early authentication is in use and MUST be set to '0' otherwise.

The rest of the 7 bits (Reserved) MUST be set to 0 and ignored on reception.

TVs and TLVs

CAP-Identifier: Carried in a TLV payload. The format is identical to that of a DiameterIdentity [[RFC3588](#)]. It is used by the SAP to advertise the identity of the CAP to the peer. Exactly one CAP-Identifier TLV MAY be included in the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start packet if the SAP has performed CAP discovery.

If the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth-Start packet is not supported by the peer, it SHOULD be discarded silently.

5.2. EAP-Initiate/Re-auth Packet and TLV Extension

Figure 6 illustrates the changed parameters contained in the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth packet defined in [RFC 5296](#) [[RFC5296](#)].

[[RFC3315](#)]. There at least one instance of the CAP-Identifier TLV MUST be present in the ERP/AAK-Key TLV.

Sequence number: The Type is TBD (less than 128). The value field is a 16-bit field and used in the derivation of the pMSK for a CAP. If multiple CAP-Identifiers are carried, each CAP-Identifier in the packet MUST be associated with a unique sequence number and followed by that sequence number.

Cryptosuite

This field indicates the integrity algorithm used for ERP/AAK. Key lengths and output lengths are either indicated or obvious from the cryptosuite name, e.g., HMAC-SHA256-128 denotes HMAC computed using the SHA-256 function [[RFC4868](#)] and with the 256 bit key length and output truncated to 128 bits [[RFC2104](#)]. We specify some cryptosuites below:

0~1 RESERVED

2 HMAC-SHA256-128

3 HMAC-SHA256-256

HMAC-SHA256-128 is REQUIRED to implement and SHOULD be enabled in the default configuration.

Authentication Tag

This field contains the integrity checksum over the ERP/AAK packet, excluding the authentication tag field itself. The value field is calculated using the integrity algorithm indicated in the Cryptosuite field and rIK specified in [[RFC5296](#)] as the secret key. The length of the field is indicated by the Cryptosuite.

The peer uses authentication tag to determine the validity of the EAP-Finish/Re-auth message originates at a server.

If the message doesn't pass verification or authentication tag is not included in the message, the message SHOULD be discarded silently.

If the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth packet is not supported by the SAP, it SHOULD be discarded silently.

5.3. EAP-Finish/Re-auth packet and TLV extension

Figure 7 shows the changed parameters contained in the EAP-Finish/Re-auth packet defined in [[RFC5296](#)].



Figure 7

Flags

'x' - The x flag is reserved. It MUST be set to 0.

'E' - The E flag is used to indicate early-authentication.

The rest of the 4 bits (Resved) MUST be set to 0 and ignored on reception.

SEQ

As defined in [Section 5.3.2 of \[RFC5296\]](#), this field is 16-bit sequence number and used for replay protection.

TVs and TLVs

keyName-NAI: As defined in [RFC 5296 \[RFC5296\]](#), this is carried in a TLV payload. The Type is 1. The NAI is variable in length, not exceeding 253 octets. Exactly one keyName-NAI attribute SHALL be present in an EAP-Finish/Re-auth packet.

ERP/AAK-Key: Carried in a TLV payload for the key container. The type is TBD. Exactly one ERP/AAK-key SHALL only be present in an EAP-Finish/Re-auth packet.

ERP/AAK-Key ::=

```
{ sub-TLV: CAP-Identifier }
{ sub-TLV: pMSK-lifetime }
{ sub-TLV: pRK-lifetime }
{ sub-TLV: Cryptosuites }
```


CAP-Identifier

Carried in a sub-TLV payload. The Type is TBD (less than 128). This field is used to indicate the identifier of the candidate authenticator. The value field MUST be encoded as specified in [Section 8 of RFC 3315](#) [RFC3315]. There at least one instance of the CAP-Identifier TLV MUST be present in the ERP/ AAK-Key TLV.

pMSK-lifetime

Carried in a sub-TLV payload of EAP-Finish/Re-auth message. The Type is TBD. The value field is an unsigned 32-bit field and contains the lifetime of the pMSK in seconds. This value is calculated by the server after pRK-lifetime computation upon receiving EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message. The rIK SHOULD share the same lifetime as pMSK.If the 'L' flag is set, the pMSK-Lifetime attribute MUST be present.

pRK-lifetime

Carried in a sub-TLV payload of EAP-Finish/Re-auth message. The Type is TBD. The value field is an unsigned 32-bit field and contains the lifetime of the pRK in seconds. This value is calculated by the server before pMSK-lifetime computation upon receiving EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message. If the 'L' flag is set, the pRK-Lifetime attribute MUST be present.

List of Cryptosuites

Carried in a sub-TLV payload. The Type is 5 [RFC5296]. The value field contains a list of cryptosuites (at least one cryptosuite SHOULD be included), each 1 octet in length. The allowed cryptosuite values are as specified in [Section 5.2](#), above. The server SHOULD include this attribute if the cryptosuite used in the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message was not acceptable and the message is being rejected. The server MAY include this attribute in other cases. The server MAY use this attribute to signal to the peer about its cryptographic algorithm capabilities.

Cryptosuite

This field indicates the integrity algorithm and PRF used for ERP/ AAK. HMAC-SHA256-128 is mandatory to implement and should be enabled in the default configuration. Key lengths and output lengths are either indicated or obvious from the cryptosuite name.

Authentication Tag

This field contains the integrity checksum over the ERP/AAK packet, excluding the authentication tag field itself. The value field is calculated using the integrity algorithm indicated in the Cryptosuite field and rIK [RFC5296] as the integrity key. The length of the

field is indicated by the corresponding Cryptosuite.

The peer uses authentication tag to determine the validity of the EAP-Finish/Re-auth message originates at a server.

If the message doesn't pass verification or authentication tag is not included in the message, the message SHOULD be discarded silently.

If the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth packet is not supported by the SAP, it is discarded silently.

5.4. TV and TLV Attributes

With the exception of the rRK-Lifetime and rMSK-Lifetime TV payloads, the attributes specified in [Section 5.3.4 of \[RFC5296\]](#) also apply to this document. In this document, new attributes which may be present in the EAP-Initiate and EAP-Finish messages are defined as below:

- o Sequence number: This is a TV payload. The type is TBD.
- o ERP/AAK-Key: This is a TLV payload. The type is TBD.
- o pRK-Lifetime: This is a TV payload. The type is TBD.
- o pMSK-Lifetime: This is a TV payload. The type is TBD.
- o List of Cryptosuites: This is a TLV payload. The type is TBD.

6. Lower Layer Considerations

Similar to ERP, some lower layer specifications may need to be revised to support ERP/AAK; refer to of [Section 6 \[RFC5296\]](#) for additional guidance.

7. AAA Transport Considerations

AAA transport of ERP/AAK messages is the same as AAA transport of the ERP message [\[RFC5296\]](#). In addition, the document requires AAA transport of the ERP/AAK keying materials delivered by the ERP/AAK server to the CAP. Hence, a new AAA message for ERP/AAK application should be specified to transport the keying materials.

8. Security Considerations

This section provides an analysis of the protocol in accordance with the AAA key management requirements specified in [RFC 4962 \[RFC4962\]](#).

- o Cryptographic algorithm independence: ERP-AAK satisfies this requirement. The algorithm chosen by the peer for calculating the authentication tag is indicated in the EAP-Initiate/Re-auth message. If the chosen algorithm is unacceptable, the EAP server returns an EAP- Finish/Re-auth message with Failure indication.
- o Strong, fresh session keys: ERP-AAK results in the derivation of strong, fresh keys that are unique for the given CAP. An pMSK is always derived on-demand when the peer requires a key with a new CAP. The derivation ensures that the compromise of one pMSK does not result in the compromise of a different pMSK at any time.
- o Limit key scope: The scope of all the keys derived by ERP-AAK is well defined. The pRK is used to derive the pMSK for the CAP. Different sequence numbers for each CAP MUST be used to derive a unique pMSK.
- o Replay detection mechanism: For replay protection of ERP-AAK messages, a sequence number associated with the pMSK is used. The peer increments the sequence number by one after it sends an ERP/ AAK message. The server sets the expected sequence number to the received sequence number plus one after verifying the validity of the received message and responds to the message. If multiple CAP-identifier are carried, a unique sequence number for each pMSK SHOULD be associated for each CAP-Identifier.
- o Authenticate all parties: The EAP Re-auth Protocol provides mutual authentication of the peer and the server. The peer and SAP are authenticated via ERP. The CAP is authenticated and trusted by the SAP.
- o Peer and authenticator authorization: The peer and authenticator demonstrate possession of the same key material without disclosing it, as part of the lower layer secure authentication protocol.
- o Keying material confidentiality: The peer and the server derive the keys independently using parameters known to each entity.
- o Uniquely named keys: All keys produced within the ERP context can be referred to uniquely as specified in this document.
- o Prevent the domino effect: Different sequence numbers for each CAP MUST be used to derive the unique pMSK. So the compromise of one pMSK does not hurt any other CAP.
- o Bind key to its context: the pMSK are bound to the context in which the sequence numbers are transmitted.

- o Confidentiality of identity: this is the same as with the ERP protocol [[RFC5296](#)].
- o Authorization restriction: All the keys derived are limited in lifetime by that of the parent key or by server policy. Any domain-specific keys are further restricted to be used only in the domain for which the keys are derived. Any other restrictions of session keys may be imposed by the specific lower layer and are out of scope for this specification.

9. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to assign four TLV type values from the registry of EAP Initiate and Finish Attributes maintained at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/eap-numbers/eap-numbers.xml> with the following assigned number:

- o Sequence number: This is a TV payload. The type is 7.
- o ERP/AAK-Key: This is a TLV payload. The type is 8.
- o pRK Lifetime: This is a TLV payload. The type is 9.
- o pMSK Lifetime: This is a TLV payload. The type is 10.

This document reuses the cryptosuites we have already created for 'Re-authentication Cryptosuites' in [[RFC5296](#)].

Further, this document instructs IANA to add a new label in the User Specific Root Keys (USRK) Key Labels of the Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) Parameters registry, as follows:

EAP Early-Authentication Root Key@ietf.org

10. Acknowledgement

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Authors' Addresses

Zhen Cao
China Mobile
53A Xibianmennei Ave., Xuanwu District
Beijing, Beijing 100053
P.R. China

E-Mail: zehn.cao@gmail.com

Hui Deng
China Mobile
53A Xibianmennei Ave., Xuanwu District
Beijing, Beijing 100053
P.R. China

E-Mail: denghui02@gmail.com

Qin Wu
Huawei
Floor 12, HuiHong Mansion, No.91 BaiXia Rd.
Nanjing, Jiangsu 210001
P.R. China

Phone: +86 25 56623633
E-Mail: sunseawq@huawei.com

Glen Zorn
Network Zen
227/358 Thanon Sanphawut
Bang Na, Bangkok 10260
Thailand

Phone: +66 (0) 87-040-4617
EMail: glenzorn@gmail.com