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EAP Pre-authentication Problem Statement
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Abstract

EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) pre-authentication is defined as the use of EAP to pre-establish EAP keying material on a

target authenticator prior to arrival of the peer at the access network managed by that authenticator. This draft discusses EAP pre-authentication problems in detail.

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1. Introduction

When a mobile device during an active communication session moves from one access network to another access network and changes its point of attachment, it is subjected to disruption in the continuity of service because of the associated handover operation. The performance requirement of a real-time application will vary based on the type of application and its characteristics such as delay tolerance and loss tolerance limit. ITU-T G.114 [[ITU](#)] recommends 150 ms as the upper limit for VoIP applications and 400 ms as generally unacceptable delay. Similarly, a streaming application has a tolerable packet (SDU) error rates ranging from 0.1 to 0.00001 and the transfer delay of less than 300 ms. Thus, any optimized handoff mechanism will need to take these factors into consideration in order to be able to support a heterogeneous handover that is agnostic to link-layer technologies.

As a mobile device goes through a handover process, it is subjected to delay because of the rebinding of its association at several layers of the protocol stack. Delays incurred within each of these layers affect the ongoing multimedia application and data traffic within the client [[WCM](#)].

Handover often requires authentication and authorization for acquisition or modification of resources assigned to a mobile device and the authentication and authorization needs interaction with a central authority in a domain in most cases. In some cases the central authority may be placed far away from the mobile device. The delay introduced due to such an authentication and authorization procedure adds to the handover latency and consequently affects ongoing application sessions [[MQ7](#)]. We focus our discussion highlighting the factors that affect the performance due to network access authentication and authorization where EAP [[RFC3748](#)] is used for network access authentication.

This draft discusses EAP pre-authentication problems in detail where EAP pre-authentication is defined as the utilization of EAP to pre-establish EAP keying material on an EAP authenticator prior to arrival of the mobile device that acts as an EAP peer, at the access network served by that authenticator.

2. Terminology

Peer

See [[RFC3748](#)].

Authenticator

See [[RFC3748](#)].

EAP Server

See [[RFC3748](#)].

Serving Authenticator (SA)

An authenticator that is currently serving the peer.

Target Authenticator (TA)

An authenticator that has been chosen to be the new serving authenticator for a peer.

Candidate Authenticator (CA)

An authenticator that can potentially become the target authenticator for a peer. There can be multiple candidate authenticators for the peer.

Master Session Key (MSK)

See [[RFC3748](#)].

Access Point (AP)

A network point of attachment in IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN [[802.11](#)].

Basic Service Set (BSS)

The basic building block of an IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN [[802.11](#)]. The BSS consists of a group of any number of 802.11 stations.

Extended Service Set (ESS)

A set of infrastructure BSSs in IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN [[802.11](#)], where the access points communicate amongst themselves to forward traffic from one BSS to another to facilitate movement of stations between BSSs.

Access Domain

A set of access networks of a specific link layer technology among which a peer is allowed to change its network points of attachment without changing its serving authenticator. An IEEE 802.11r mobility domain [[802.11r](#)] is an access domain.

Inter-Access-Domain Handover

A handover across multiple access domains.

Inter-ESS Handover

An 802.11 handover across multiple ESSs.

Intra-AAA-Domain Handover (Intra-Domain Handover)

A handover within the same AAA domain.

Inter-AAA-Domain Handover (Inter-Domain Handover)

A handover across multiple AAA domains.

Intra-Technology Handover

A handover within the same link layer technology.

Inter-Technology Handover

A handover across different link layer technologies.

Inter-Authenticator Handover

A handover across multiple authenticators. An inter-authenticator handover includes an inter-access-domain handover, an inter-ESS handover, an inter-AAA-domain handover, an inter-technology handover, and any possible combination of them.

ERP (EAP Extensions for EAP Re-authentication Protocol)

Extensions to EAP and EAP keying hierarchy to support an EAP method-independent protocol for efficient re-authentication between the peer and an EAP re-authentication server defined in [[RFC5296](#)].

3. Problem Statement

The basic mechanism of handover is a three-step procedure involving i) discovery of candidate network points of attachment and their authenticators, ii) network selection procedure to determine the appropriate candidate network point of attachment and iii) handover or setting up L2 and L3 connectivity to the target network point of attachment. Currently, as part of the third step, network access authentication and authorization are performed directly with the target network. For example, in IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs [[802.11](#)], the network access authentication and authorization involves performing a new IEEE 802.1X message exchange with the authenticator in the target AP to initiate an EAP exchange to the authentication server [[WPA](#)]. Following a successful EAP authentication, a secure association procedure is performed between the peer and the target authenticator to derive a new set of link-layer ciphering keys from EAP keying material such as the MSK. The third step may require full EAP authentication in the absence of any particular optimization for handover key management. The handover latency introduced by full EAP authentication has proven to be larger than that is acceptable for real-time applications scenarios as described in [[MQ7](#)]. Hence, improvement in the handover latency performance due to EAP is a necessary objective for such scenarios.

There is relevant work undertaken by various standards organizations, but these efforts are scoped to a specific link layer technology. IEEE 802.11F [[802.11f](#)], a trial use document has defined context transfer and caching mechanism to transfer some IEEE 802.11 keying material between the neighboring APs. However, it has been administratively withdrawn since 2006. IEEE 802.11 [[802.11](#)] defines a pre-authentication mechanism for use in 802.11 wireless networks. This mechanism allows peers to pre-authenticate to one or more candidate authenticators over the wired medium, by way of the serving authenticator. IEEE 802.11r [[802.11r](#)] defines Fast BSS transition mechanisms involving a definition of a key management hierarchy and setup of session keys before the re-association to the target AP in the same 802.11r mobility domain. These mechanisms, as indicated before, are defined for IEEE 802.11 technologies and are only applicable for intra-access-domain handovers and fall short when it comes to inter-technology handovers. They also require L2 (e.g., Ethernet) connectivity for transfer of key management signaling to the target AP. A solution is needed to enable EAP pre-authentication for inter-access-domain or inter-ESS handovers in IEEE 802.11.

As various flavors of wireless technologies are increasingly available, there is a growing demand for seamless inter-technology mobility. This is particularly beneficial in the presence of high bandwidth, wireless technologies (e.g., IEEE 802.11) with only

hotspot-like coverage while the overlay licensed wireless/cellular coverage is expensive and relatively low bandwidth. Hence, the security optimization mechanisms for better handover performance must be looked at from the IP level so as to make it a common method over different access technologies.

Optimized solutions for secure inter-authenticator handovers can be largely seen as security context transfer: ERP [[RFC5296](#)] or EAP pre-authentication. Security context transfer involves transfer of reusable key context to the new point of attachment. However, the recent AAA key management requirements [[RFC4962](#)] do not recommend horizontal context transfer of reusable key context because of the domino effect in which the compromise of an authenticator will lead to the compromise of another authenticator. ERP uses existing EAP keying material for deriving a re-authentication key to be distributed to an ERP server in a visited domain in order to reduce the handover delay, which eliminates the need for running full EAP authentication with the EAP server in the home domain for intra-domain handovers. On the other hand, there are certain cases where ERP is not applicable or an additional optimization mechanism is needed to establish a key for the candidate authenticator:

- o One case is an inter-domain handover with or without any trust relationship between the home and visited AAA domains. If there is no trust relationship between the two AAA domains, ERP cannot be used in the visited AAA domain, and the EAP server in the home AAA domain is the only entity that can authenticate the peer. Even if there is a trust relationship between the two AAA domains and the visited AAA domain supports ERP, full EAP authentication with the EAP server in the home AAA domain is still needed when entering the visited AAA domain unless the security policy of the home AAA domain allows the same re-authentication root key to be shared with the visited AAA domain.
- o Another case is an intra-domain, inter-authenticator handover where the target authenticator or AAA domain do not support ERP, or ERP needs to be performed proactively before the peer arrives at the target authenticator.

EAP pre-authentication discussed in this document is mainly to deal with these cases while a general solution for the EAP pre-authentication problem can be used for other handover cases.

EAP pre-authentication has general applicability to various deployment scenarios in which proactive signaling can take effect. In other words, applicability of EAP pre-authentication is limited to the scenarios where candidate authenticators can be discovered and an accurate prediction of movement can be easily made. Also the

effectiveness of EAP pre-authentication may be less significant for particular inter-technology handover scenarios where simultaneous use of multiple technologies is not a major concern.

In EAP pre-authentication, AAA-based authentication and authorization for a candidate authenticator is performed while ongoing data communication is in progress via the serving network. The goal of EAP pre-authentication is to avoid AAA signaling for EAP when or soon after the peer moves. There are several AAA issues related to EAP pre-authentication. The pre-authentication AAA issues are described in [Section 6](#).

Figure 1 shows the functional elements that are related to EAP pre-authentication. These functional elements include a peer, a serving authenticator, a candidate authenticator and an AAA/EAP server or AAA/EAP servers. When the serving and candidate authenticators belong to different AAA domains, the candidate authenticator may use a different AAA server and user credentials than those were used by the serving authenticator to authenticate the peer.




Figure 1: EAP Pre-authentication Functional Elements

A peer is attached to the serving access network. Before the peer performs handover from the serving access network to a candidate access network, it performs EAP pre-authentication with a candidate authenticator via the serving access network. The peer may perform EAP pre-authentication with one or more candidate authenticators. It is assumed that each authenticator has an IP address. It is assumed that there is at least one candidate authenticator in each candidate access network while the serving access network may or may not have a serving authenticator. The serving and candidate access networks may use different link layer technologies.

Each authenticator is either a standalone authenticator or pass-through authenticator [[RFC3748](#)]. When an authenticator acts as a standalone authenticator, it also has the functionality of an EAP

server. When an authenticator acts as a pass-through authenticator, it communicates with the EAP server typically implemented on a AAA server using a AAA transport protocol such as RADIUS [[RFC2865](#)] and Diameter [[RFC3588](#)].

If the candidate authenticator uses an MSK [[RFC5247](#)] for generating lower-layer ciphering keys, EAP pre-authentication is used for proactively generating an MSK for the candidate authenticator.

4. Usage Scenarios

There are two scenarios for how EAP pre-authentication signaling can happen among a peer, serving authenticator, candidate authenticator and AAA server, depending on how the serving authenticator is involved in the EAP pre-authentication signaling. It is assumed that in both scenarios there is no direct L2 connectivity between a peer and a candidate authenticator. No security association between the serving authenticator and the candidate authenticator is required for either pre-authentication scenario (see [Section 7](#) for more detailed discussion).

4.1. Direct Pre-authentication

Direct pre-authentication signaling is shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Direct Pre-authentication

In this type of pre-authentication, the serving authenticator forwards the EAP pre-authentication traffic as it would any other data traffic or there may be no serving authenticator at all in the serving access network.

[I-D.ietf-pana-preauth] is identified as a protocol to realize direct pre-authentication.

4.2. Indirect Pre-authentication

In indirect pre-authentication, it is assumed that a trust relationship exists between the serving network (or serving AAA domain) and candidate network (or candidate AAA domain). Indirect pre-authentication signaling is shown in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Indirect Pre-authentication

With indirect pre-authentication, the serving authenticator is involved in EAP pre-authentication signaling. Indirect pre-authentication is needed if the peer cannot discover the candidate authenticator's IP address or if IP communication is not available due to security or network topology reasons.

Indirect pre-authentication signaling between a peer and a candidate authenticator consists of peer to serving authenticator signaling (Peer-SA signaling) and serving authenticator to candidate authenticator signaling (SA-CA signaling).

SA-CA signaling is performed over L3.

Peer-SA signaling is performed over L2 or L3.

The role of the serving authenticator in indirect pre-authentication is to forward EAP pre-authentication signaling between the peer and the candidate authenticator and not to act as an authenticator, while it acts as an authenticator for normal authentication signaling. This is illustrated in Figure 4.




Figure 4: Indirect Pre-authentication Layering Model

5. Architectural Considerations

There are two architectural issues relating to pre-authentication: authenticator discovery and context binding.

5.1. Authenticator Discovery

In general, pre-authentication requires an address of a candidate authenticator to be discovered either by a peer or by a serving authenticator prior to handover. An authenticator discovery protocol is typically defined as a separate protocol from a pre-authentication protocol. For both intra-domain and inter-domain handover, the IP address of a candidate authenticator must be reachable by the peer or the serving authenticator that is performing the pre-authentication. For example, IEEE 802.21 Information Service (IS) [[802.21](#)] provides a link layer independent mechanism for obtaining neighboring network information by defining a set of Information Elements (IEs), where one of the IEs is defined to contain an IP address of a point of attachment. IEEE 802.21 IS queries for such an IE may be used as a method for authenticator discovery.

If IEEE 802.21 IS or a similar mechanism is used, an authenticator discovery requires a database on the neighboring network information. Provisioning of a server with such a database is another issue.

5.2. Context Binding

When a candidate authenticator uses different EAP transport protocols for normal authentication and pre-authentication, a mechanism is needed to bind link layer independent context carried over pre-authentication signaling to the link layer specific context of the

link to be established between the peer and the candidate authenticator. The link layer independent context includes the identities of the peer and authenticator as well as the MSK. The link layer specific context includes link layer addresses of the peer and the candidate authenticator. Such context binding can happen before or after the peer changes its point of attachment.

There are at least two possible approaches to address the context binding issue. The first approach is based on communicating the link layer context as opaque data via pre-authentication signaling. The second approach is based on running EAP over the link layer of the candidate authenticator after the peer arrives at the authenticator using short-term credentials generated via pre-authentication. In this case, the short-term credentials are shared between the peer and the candidate authenticator, where the candidate authenticator is also the EAP server for the EAP method execution performed after the peer arrives at the target authenticator resides in the authenticator. In both approaches, context binding needs to be securely made between the peer and the candidate authenticator. Also, the peer is not fully authorized by the candidate authenticator until the peer completes the link layer specific secure association procedure with the authenticator using the link layer signaling.

6. AAA Issues

Most of the AAA documents today do not distinguish between a normal authentication and a pre-authentication and this creates a set of open issues:

Pre-authentication authorization: Many users may not be allowed to have more than one logon session at the time. This means that when such users actively engage in an active session (as a result of a previously valid authentication), they will not be able to perform pre-authentication. The AAA server currently has no way of distinguishing between a normal authentication request and a pre-authentication request.

Pre-authentication lifetime: Currently AAA protocols define attributes carrying lifetime information for a normal authentication session. Even when a user profile and the AAA server supports pre-authentication, the lifetime for a pre-authentication session is typically valid only for a short amount of time because the peer has not completed its authentication at the target link layer. It is currently not possible for a AAA server to indicate to the AAA client or a peer the lifetime of the pre-authenticated session unless AAA protocols are extended to carry pre-authentication session lifetime information. In other

words, it is not clear to the peer or the authenticator when the pre-authentication session will expire.

Pre-authentication retries: It is typically expected that shortly following the pre-authentication process, the peer moves to the new point of attachment and converts the pre-authentication state to a normal authentication state (the procedure for which is not the topic of this particular subsection). However, if the peer has not yet moved to the new location and realizes that the pre-authentication is expiring, it may perform another pre-authentication. Some limiting mechanism is needed to avoid unlimited number of pre-authentication tries.

Completion of network attachment: Once the peer has successfully attached to the new point of attachment, it needs to convert its authentication state from pre-authenticated to fully attached and authorized. There may need to be a mechanism within the AAA protocol to provide this indication to the AAA server if the AAA server needs to differentiate between pre-authentication and normal authentication. This is important from billing perspective where the billing policy does not charge for a pre-authenticated peer until the peer is fully attached to the target authenticator.

Session Resumption: In case the peer cycles between a network N1 with which it has a normal authentication state to another network N2 and then back to N1, it should be possible to simply convert the full authentication state to a pre-authenticated state. The problems around handling session lifetime and keying material caching need to be dealt with.

Multiple candidate authenticators: There may be situations where the peer may need to make a selection between a number of candidate authenticators. In such cases, it is desirable for the peer to perform pre-authentication with multiple candidate authenticators. In such cases the AAA server may need to be aware of the situation.

Inter-technology support: Current specifications on pre-authentication mostly deal with homogeneous 802.11 networks. The AAA attributes such as Calling-Station-ID [[I-D.aboba-radext-wlan](#)] may need to be expanded to cover other access technologies. Furthermore, inter-technology handovers may require a change of the peer identifier as part of the handover. Investigation on the best type of identifiers for peers that support multiple access technologies is required.

7. Security Considerations

This section specifically covers threats introduced to the EAP model by pre-authentication. Security issues on general EAP and handover are described in other documents such as [\[RFC3748\]](#), [\[RFC4962\]](#), [\[RFC5169\]](#) and [\[RFC5247\]](#).

Since pre-authentication described in this document needs to work across multiple authenticators, any solution needs to consider the following security threats.

First, a resource consumption denial of service attack is possible, where an attacker that is not on the same IP link as the legitimate peer or the candidate authenticator may send unprotected pre-authentication messages to the legitimate peer or the candidate authenticator. As a result, they may spend their computational and bandwidth resources on processing pre-authentication messages sent by the attacker. This attack is possible for both direct and indirect pre-authentication scenarios. To mitigate this attack, the candidate network or authenticator may apply non-cryptographic packet filtering so that pre-authentication messages received from only a specific set of serving networks or authenticators are processed. In addition, a simple solution for the peer side would be to let the peer always initiate EAP pre-authentication and not allow EAP pre-authentication initiation from an authenticator.

Second, consideration for the Channel Binding problem described in [\[RFC5247\]](#) is needed as lack of Channel Binding may enable an authenticator to impersonate another authenticator or communicate incorrect information via out-of-band mechanisms (such as via a AAA or lower layer protocol) [\[RFC3748\]](#). It should be noted that it is relatively easier to launch such an impersonation attack for pre-authentication than normal authentication because an attacker does not need to be physically on the same link as the legitimate peer to send a pre-authentication trigger to the peer.

8. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.

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