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**DHCP Options for Homenet Naming Architecture**  
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Abstract

CPEs are usually constraint devices with reduced network and CPU capacities. As such, a CPE hosting on the Internet the authoritative naming service for its home network may become vulnerable to resource exhaustion attacks. One way to avoid exposing CPE is to outsource the authoritative service to a third party. This third party can be the ISP or any other independent third party.

Outsourcing the authoritative naming service to a third party requires setting up an architecture which may be unappropriated for most end users. To leverage this issue, this document proposes DHCP Options so any agnostic CPE can automatically proceed to the appropriated configuration and outsource the authoritative naming service for the home network. This document shows that in most cases, these DHCP Options make outsourcing to a third party (be it the ISP or any ISP independent service provider) transparent for the end user.

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## [1.](#) Requirements notation

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

## [2.](#) Terminology

- Customer Premises Equipment: (CPE) is the router providing connectivity to the home network. It is configured and managed by the end user. In this document, the CPE might also hosts services such as DHCPv6. This device might be provided by the ISP.
- Public Key: designates a public Key generated by the CPE. This key is used as an authentication credential for the CPE.
- Registered Homenet Domain: is the Domain Name associated to the home network.
- DNS Homenet Zone: is the DNS zone associated to the home network. This zone is set by the CPE and essentially contains the bindings between names and IP addresses of the nodes of the home network. In this document, the CPE does neither perform any DNSSEC management operations such as zone signing nor provide an authoritative service for the zone. Both are delegated to the Public Authoritative Server. The CPE synchronizes the DNS Homenet Zone with the Public Authoritative Server via a hidden master / slave architecture. The Public Authoritative Server might use specific servers for the synchronization of the DNS Homenet Zone: the Public Authoritative Name Server Set.



- DNS Homenet Zone Template: The template used as a basis to generate the DNS Homenet Zone.
- DNS Template Server: The DNS server that hosts the DNS Homenet Zone Template.
- DNS Homenet Reverse Zone: The reverse zone file associated to the DNS Homenet Zone.
- Public Authoritative Master(s): are the visible name server hosting the DNS Homenet Zone. End users' resolutions for the Homenet Domain are sent to this server, and this server is a master for the zone.
- Public Authoritative Name Server Set: is the server the CPE synchronizes the DNS Homenet Zone. It is configured as a slave and the CPE acts as master. The CPE sends information so the DNSSEC zone can be set and served.
- Reverse Public Authoritative Master(s): are the visible name server hosting the DNS Homenet Reverse Zone. End users' resolutions for the Homenet Domain are sent to this server, and this server is a master for the zone.
- Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set: is the server the CPE synchronizes the DNS Homenet Reverse Zone. It is configured as a slave and the CPE acts as master. The CPE sends information so the DNSSEC zone can be set and served.

### **3. Introduction**

CPEs are usually constraint devices with reduced network and CPU capacities. As such, a CPE hosting on the Internet the authoritative naming service for its home network may become vulnerable to resource exhaustion attacks. One way to avoid exposing CPE is to outsource the authoritative service to a third party. This third party can be the ISP or any other independent third party.

Outsourcing the authoritative naming service to a third party requires setting up an architecture which may be unappropriated for most end users. To leverage this issue, this document proposes DHCP Options so any agnostic CPE can automatically proceed to the appropriated configuration and outsource the authoritative naming service for the home network. This document shows that in most cases, these DHCP Options make outsourcing to a third party (be it the ISP or any ISP independent service provider) transparent for the end user.



When the CPE is plugged, the DHCP Options described in the document enable the CPE:

- 1. To build the DNS Homenet Zone: Building the DNS Homenet Zone requires filling the zone with appropriated bindings like name / IP addresses of the different devices in the home networks. Such information can be provided for example by the DHCP Server hosted on the CPE. On the other hand, it also requires configuration parameters like the name of the Registered Domain Name associated to the home network or the Public Authoritative Master(s) the DNS Homenet Zone is outsourced to. These configuration parameters are stored in the DNS Homenet Zone Template. This document describes the DHCP Zone Template Option. This option carries a DNS Homenet Zone Template FQDN. In order to retrieve the DNS Homenet Zone Template, the CPE sends a query of type AXFR [[RFC1034](#)] [[RFC5936](#)] for the DNS Homenet Zone Template FQDN.
- 2. To upload the DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone to the appropriated server: This server is designated as the Public Authoritative Name Server Set. It is in charge of publishing the DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone on the Public Authoritative Master(s). This document describes the DHCP Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option that provides the FQDN of the appropriated server. Note that, in the document we do not consider whether the DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone is signed or not and if signed who signs it. Such questions are out of the scope of the current document.
- 3. To upload the DNS Homenet Reverse Zone to the appropriated server: This server is designated as the Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set. It is in charge of publishing the DNS Homenet Reverse Zone on the Reverse Public Authoritative Master(s). This document describes the DHCP Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option that provides the FQDN of the appropriated server. Similarly to item 2., we do not consider in this document if the DNS Homenet Reverse Zone is signed or not, and if signed who signs it.
- 4. To provide authentication credential (a public key) to the DHCP Server: Information stored in the DNS Homenet Zone Template, the DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone and DNS Homenet Reverse Zone belongs to the CPE, and only the CPE should be able to update or upload these zones. To authenticate the CPE, this document defines the DHCP Public Key Option. This option is sent by the CPE to the DHCP Server and provides the Public Key the CPE uses to authenticate itself. The DHCP Server is then responsible to provide the Public Key to the various DNS servers.





As a result, the DHCP Options described in this document enable an agnostic CPE to outsource its naming infrastructure without any configuration from the end user. The main reason no configuration is required by the end user is that there are privilege links first between the CPE and the DHCP Server and then between the DHCP Server and the various DNS servers (DNS Homenet Zone Server, the Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set, Public Authoritative Name Server Set). This enables the CPE to send its authentication credentials (a Public Key) to the DHCP Server that in turn forward it to the various DNS servers. With the authentication credential on the DNS servers set, the CPE is able to update the various zones in a secure way.

If the DHCP Server cannot provide the public key to one of these servers (most likely the Public Authoritative Name Server Set) and the CPE needs to interact with the server, then, the end user is expected to provide it manually or using other mechanisms. Such mechanisms are outside the scope of this document. In that case, the authentication credentials need to be provided every time the key is modified. [Appendix A](#) provides more details on how different scenarios impact the end users.

#### **4. Protocol Overview**

This section illustrates how a CPE configures its naming infrastructure to outsource its authoritative naming service. All configurations and settings are performed using DHCP Options. In this section, for the sake of simplicity, we consider that the DHCP Server is able to communicate to the various DNS servers and provide them the public key associated to the CPE. Once each server got the credentials, the CPE can proceed to updates in a authenticated and secure way.

This scenario has been chosen as it is believed to be the most popular scenario. This document does not ignore that scenarios where the DHCP Server does not have privilege relations with the Public Authoritative Name Server Set must be considered. These cases are discussed latter in [Appendix A](#). Such scenario does not necessarily require configuration for the end user and can also be Zero Config.

The scenario is represented in Figure 1.

- 1: The CPE provides its Public Key to the DHCP Server using a DHCP Public Key Option (OPTION\_PUBLIC\_KEY) and sends a DHCP Option Request Option (ORO) for the DHCP Zone Template Option (OPTION\_DNS\_ZONE\_TEMPLATE), the DHCP Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option (OPTION\_NAME\_SERVER\_SET) and the DHCP Reverse



Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option  
(OPTION\_REVERSE\_NAME\_SERVER\_SET).

- 2: The DHCP Server makes the Public Key available to the DNS servers, so the CPE can secure its DNS transactions. Note that the Public Key alone is not sufficient to perform the authentication and the key should be, for example, associated with an identifier, or the concerned domain name. How the binding is performed is out of scope of the document. It can be a centralized database or various bindings may be sent to the different servers. Figure 1 represents the specific case were the DHCP Server forwards the set (Public Key, Zone Template FQDN) to the DNS Template Server, the set (Public Key, IPv6 subnet) to the Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set and the set (Public Key, Registered Homenet Domain) to the Public Authoritative Name Server Set.
- 3.: The DHCP Server responds to the CPE with the requested DHCP Options, i.e. the DHCP Public Key Option (OPTION\_PUBLIC\_KEY), DHCP Zone Template Option OPTION\_DNS\_ZONE\_TEMPLATE, DHCP Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option (OPTION\_NAME\_SERVER\_SET), DHCP Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option (OPTION\_REVERSE\_NAME\_SERVER\_SET).
- 4.: Upon receiving the DHCP Zone Template Option (OPTION\_DNS\_ZONE\_TEMPLATE), the CPE performs an AXFR DNS query for the Zone Template FQDN. The exchange is secured according to the security protocols defined in the Security field of the DHCP option. Once the CPE has retrieved the DNS Zone Template, the CPE can build the DNS Homenet Zone and the DNS Homenet Reverse Zone. Eventually the CPE signs these zones.
- 5.: Once the DNS(SEC) Homenet Reverse Zone has been set, the CPE uploads the zone to the Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set. The DHCP Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option (OPTION\_REVERSE\_NAME\_SERVER\_SET) provides the Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set FQDN as well as the upload method, and the security protocol to secure the upload.
- 6.: Once the DNS(SEC) Homenet Zone has been set, the CPE uploads the zone to the Public Authoritative Name Server Set. The DHCP Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option (OPTION\_NAME\_SERVER\_SET) provides the Public Authoritative Name Server Set FQDN as well as the upload method and the security protocol to secure the upload.






Figure 1: Protocol Overview

**5. Securing the exchanges**

Multiple protocols like IPsec [RFC4301] or TLS / DTLS [RFC5246] / [RFC6347] may be used to secure DNS transactions between the CPE and the DNS servers. This document restricts the scope of security protocols to those that have been designed specifically for DNS. This includes DNSSEC [RFC4033], [RFC4034], [RFC4035] that authenticates and provides integrity protection of DNS data, TSIG [RFC2845], [RFC2930] that use a shared secret to secure a transaction between two end points and SIG(0) [RFC2931] authenticates the DNS packet exchanged.

The key issue with TSIG is that a shared secret must be negotiated between the CPE and the server. On the other end, TSIG performs symmetric cryptography which is light in comparison with asymmetric cryptography used by SIG(0). As a result, over large zone transfer, TSIG may be preferred to SIG(0).

This document does not provides means to distribute shared secret for example using a specific DHCP Option. The only assumption made is that the CPE generates or is assigned a public key.

As a result, when the document specifies the transaction is secured with TSIG, it means that either the CPE and the DNS Server have been



manually configured with a shared secret, or the shared secret has been negotiated using TKEY [[RFC2930](#)], and the TKEY exchanged are secured with SIG(0).

Exchange with the DNS Template Server to retrieve the DNS Homenet Zone Template may be protected by SIG(0), TSIG or DNSSEC. When DNSSEC is used, it means the DNS Template Server only provides integrity protection, and does not necessarily prevents someone else to query the DNS Homenet Zone Template. In addition, DNSSEC is only a way to protect the communication of AXFR queries, in other words, DNSSEC cannot be used to secure updates. If DNSSEC is used to provide integrity protection for the AXFR response, the CPE should proceed to the DNSSEC signature checks. If signature check fails, it MUST reject the response. If the signature check succeeds, the CPE removes all DNSSEC related RRsets (DNSKEY, RRSIG, NSEC\* ...) before building the DNS Homenet Zone. In fact, these DNSSEC related fields as associated to the DNS Homenet Zone Template and not the DNS Homenet Zone.

Any update exchange should use SIG(0) or TSIG to authenticate the exchange.

## **6. DNS Zones Update Mechanisms**

### **6.1. Data subjected to update**

The CPE is likely to update various DNS contents:

- DNS Homenet Zone Template: may be updated by the CPE if the configuration of the zone may be changed. This can include additional Public Authoritative Master(s), a different Registered Homenet Domain as the one initially proposed, or a redirection to another domain.
- DNS Homenet Reverse Zone: may be updated every time a new device is connected or dis-connected.
- DNS Homenet Zone: may be updated every time a new device is connected, dis-connected.

### **6.2. Master / Slave Synchronization versus DNS Update**

As updates only concern DNS zones, this document only considers DNS update mechanisms such as DNS update [[RFC2136](#)] [[RFC3007](#)] or a master / slave synchronization.





The DNS Homenet Zone Template can only be updated with DNS update. The reason is that the DNS Homenet Zone Template contains static configuration data that is not expected to evolve over time.

The DNS Homenet Reverse Zone and the DNS Homenet Zone can be updated either with DNS update or using a master / slave synchronization. As these zones may be large, with frequent updates, we recommend to use the master / slave architecture as described in [\[I-D.mglt-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation\]](#). The master / slave mechanism is preferred as it better scales and avoids DoS attacks: First the master notifies the slave the zone must be updated, and leaves the slave to proceed to the update when possible. Then, the NOTIFY message sent by the master is a small packet that is less likely to load the slave. At last, the AXFR query performed by the slave is a small packet sent over TCP ([section 4.2 \[RFC5936\]](#)) which makes unlikely the slave to perform reflection attacks with a forged NOTIFY. On the other hand, DNS updates can use UDP, packets require more processing than a NOTIFY, and they do not provide the server the opportunity to post-pone the update.

### **[6.3.](#) Setting Master / Slave Synchronization**

The master / slave architecture is described in [\[I-D.mglt-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation\]](#). The CPE is configured as a master whereas the DNS Server is configured as a slave. The DNS Server represents the Public Authoritative Name Server Set or the Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set.

When the CPE is plugged its IP address may be unknown to the slave. The section details how the CPE or master communicate the necessary information to set up the slave.

In order to set the master / slave configuration, both master and slaves must agree on 1) the zone to be synchronized, 2) the IP address used by both master and slave. In this document we assume that synchronization is performed on both side on port 53.

[QUESTION Do we have to consider different port of port 53 is fine. I guess it is fine.]

### **[6.4.](#) Master / Slave Synchronization: CPE / Public Authoritative Name Server Set**

The CPE knows the zone to be synchronized by reading the Registered Homenet Domain in the DNS Homenet Zone Template provided by the DHCP Zone Template Option (OPTION\_DNS\_ZONE\_TEMPLATE). The IP address of the slave is provided by the DHCP Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option (OPTION\_NAME\_SERVER\_SET).



The Public Authoritative Name Server Set has been configured with the Registered Homenet Domain and the Public Key that identifies the CPE. The only thing missing is the IP address of the CPE. This IP address is provided by the CPE by sending a NOTIFY [[RFC1996](#)].

When the CPE has built its DNS Homenet Zone, it sends a NOTIFY message to the Public Authoritative Name Server Sets. Upon receiving the NOTIFY message, the slave reads the Registered Homenet Domain and checks the NOTIFY is sent by the authorized master. This can be done using the shared secret (TSIG) or the public key (SIG(0)). Once the NOTIFY has been authenticated, the Public Authoritative Name Server Sets might consider the source IP address of the NOTIFY query to configure the masters attributes.

#### **6.5. Master / Slave Synchronization: CPE / Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set**

The CPE knows the zone to be synchronized by looking at its assigned prefix. The IP address of the slave is provided by the DHCP Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option (OPTION\_REVERSE\_NAME\_SERVER\_SET).

Configuration of the slave is performed as illustrated in [Section 6.4](#).

### **7. DNS Zone Update Data**

#### **7.1. DNS Homenet Zone Template**

The DNS Homenet Zone Template contains at least the related fields of the Public Authoritative Master(s) as well as the Homenet Registered Domain, that is SOA, and NS fields. This template might be generated automatically by the owner of the DHCP Server. For example, an ISP might provide a default Homenet Registered Domain as well as default Public Authoritative Master(s). This default settings should provide the CPE the necessary pieces of information to set the homenet naming architecture.

If the DNS Homenet Zone Template is not subject to modifications or updates, the owner of the template might only use DNSSEC to enable integrity check.

The DNS Homenet Zone Template might be subject to modification by the CPE. The advantage of using the standard DNS zone format is that standard DNS update mechanism can be used to perform updates. These updates might be accepted or rejected by the owner of the DNS Homenet Zone Template. Policies that defines what is accepted or rejected is out of scope of this document. However, in this document we assume



the Registered Homenet Domain is used as an index by the Public Authoritative Name Server Set, and SIG(0), TSIG are used to authenticate the CPE. As a result, the Registered Homenet Domain should not be modified unless the Public Authoritative Name Server Set can handle with it.

7.2. DNS Homenet Zone

The DNS Homenet Zone might be generated from the DNS Homenet Zone Template. How the DNS Homenet Zone is generated is out of scope of this document. In some cases, the DNS Homenet Zone might be the exact copy of the DNS Homenet Zone Template. In other cases, it might be generated from the DNS Homenet Zone Template with additional RRsets. In some other cases, the DNS Homenet Zone might be generated without considering the DNS Homenet Zone Template, but only considering specific configuration rules.

In the current document the CPE only sets a single zone that is associated with one single Homenet Registered Domain. The domain might be assigned by the owner of the DNS Homenet Zone Template. This constrain does not prevent the CPE to use multiple domain names. How additional domains are considered is out of scope of this document. One way to handle these additional zones is to configure static redirections to the DNS Homenet Zone using CNAME [RFC2181], [RFC1034], DNAME [RFC6672] or CNAME+DNAME [I-D.sury-dnsext-cname-dname].

8. Payload Description

8.1. Security Field

The Security Field of the DHCP Option is represented in Figure 2. It indicates the security mechanism supported by the DNS Server. One of these mechanism MUST be chosen by the CPE in order to perform a transaction with the DNS server. See Section 5 for more details.




Figure 2: Security Field

- DNS (Bit 0): indicates, when set to 1, that DNS without any security extension is supported.



- DNSSEC (Bit 1): indicates, when set to 1, that DNSSEC provides integrity protection. This can only be used for read operations like retrieving the DNS Homenet Zone Template.
- SIG(0) (Bit 2): indicates, when set to 1, that transaction protected by SIG(0) are supported.
- TSIG (Bit 3): indicates, when set to 1, that transaction using TSIG is supported. Note that if a shared secret has not been previously negotiated between the two party, it should be negotiated using TKEY. The TKEY exchanges MUST be protected with SIG(0) even though SIG(0) is not supported.
- Remaining Bits (Bit 4-15): MUST be set to 0 by the DHCP Server and ignored by the DHCP Client.

A Security field with all bits set to zero indicates the operation is not permitted. The Security field may be set to zero when updates operations are not permitted for the DNS Homenet Template. In any other case this is an error.

## 8.2. Update Field

The Update Field of the DHCP Option is represented in Figure 3. It indicates the update mechanism supported by the DNS server. See [Section 6](#) for more details.




Figure 3: Update Field

- Master / Slave (Bit 0): indicates, when set to 1, that DNS Server supports data synchronization using a Master / Slave mechanism.
- DNS Update (Bit 1): indicates, when set to 1, that DNS Server supports data synchronization using DNS Updates.
- Remaining Bits (Bit 2-7): MUST be set to 0 by the DHCP Server and ignored by the DHCP Client.





### 8.3. DHCP Public Key Option

The DHCP Public Key Option (OPTION\_PUBLIC\_KEY) indicates the Public Key that is used to authenticate the CPE.




Figure 4: DHCP Public Key Option

- OPTION\_PUBLIC\_KEY (variable): the option code for the DHCP Public Key Option.
- option-len (16 bits): length in octets of the option-data field as described in [RFC3315].
- Public Key Data: contains the Public Key. The format is the DNSKEY RDATA format as defined in [RFC4034].

### 8.4. DHCP Zone Template Option

The DHCP Zone Template Option (OPTION\_DNS\_ZONE\_TEMPLATE) Option indicates the CPE how to retrieve the DNS Homenet Zone Template. It provides a FQDN the CPE SHOULD query with a DNS query of type AXFR. The option also specifies which security protocols are available on the authoritative server. DNS Homenet Zone Template update, if permitted MUST use the DNS Update mechanism.




Figure 5: DHCP Zone Template Option



- OPTION\_DNS\_ZONE\_TEMPLATE (variable): the option code for the DHCP Zone Template Option.
- option-len (16 bits): length in octets of the option-data field as described in [RFC3315].
- Security (axfr) (16 bits): defines which security protocols are supported by the DNS server. This field concerns the AXFR and consultation queries, not the update queries. See [Section 8.1](#) for more details.
- Security (16 bits): defines which security protocols are supported by the DNS server. This field concerns the update. See [Section 8.1](#) for more details.
- Zone Template FQDN FQDN (variable): the FQDN of the DNS server hosting the DNS Homenet Zone Template.

**8.5. DHCP Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option**

The DHCP Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option (OPTION\_NAME\_SERVER\_SET) provides information so the CPE can upload the DNS Homenet Zone to the Public Authoritative Name Server Set. Finally, the option provides the security mechanisms that are available to perform the upload. The upload is performed via a DNS master / slave architecture or DNS updates.




Figure 6: DHCP Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option

- OPTION\_NAME\_SERVER\_SET (16 bits): the option code for the DHCP Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option.
- option-len (16 bits): length in octets of the option-data field as described in [RFC3315].



- Security (16 bits): defines which security protocols are supported by the DNS server. See [Section 8.1](#) for more details.
- Update (8 bits): defines which update mechanisms are supported by the DNS server. See [Section 6](#) for more details.
- Public Authoritative Name Server Set FQDN (variable): the FQDN of the Public Authoritative Name Server Set.

### 8.6. DHCP Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option

The DHCP Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option (OPTION\_REVERSE\_NAME\_SERVER\_SET) provides information so the CPE can upload the DNS Homenet Zone to the Public Authoritative Name Server Set. The option provides the security mechanisms that are available to perform the upload. The upload is performed via a DNS master / slave architecture or DNS updates.



Figure 7: DHCP Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option

- OPTION\_REVERSE\_NAME\_SERVER\_SET (16 bits): the option code for the DHCP Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option.
- option-len (16 bits): length in octets of the option-data field as described in [\[RFC3315\]](#).
- Security (16 bits): defines which security protocols are supported by the DNS server. See [Section 8.1](#) for more details.
- Update (8 bits): defines which update mechanisms are supported by the DNS server. See [Section 6](#) for more details.
- Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set FQDN (variable): The FQDN of the Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set.



## **9. DHCP Behavior**

### **9.1. DHCPv6 Server Behavior**

The DHCP Server sends the DHCP Zone Template Option (OPTION\_DNS\_ZONE\_TEMPLATE), DHCP Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option (OPTION\_NAME\_SERVER\_SET), DHCP Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set Option (OPTION\_REVERSE\_NAME\_SERVER\_SET) upon request by the DHCP Client.

The DHCP Server MAY receive a DHCP Public Key Option (OPTION\_PUBLIC\_KEY) from the CPE. Upon receipt of this DHCP Option, the DHCP Server is expected to communicate this credential to the available DNS Servers like the DNS Template Server, the Public Authoritative Name Server Set and the Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set.

### **9.2. DHCPv6 Client Behavior**

The DHCP Client MAY send a DHCP Public Key Option (OPTION\_PUBLIC\_KEY) to the DHCP Server. This Public Key authenticates the CPE.

The DHCP Client sends a DHCP Option Request Option (ORO) with the necessary DHCP options.

A CPE SHOULD only send the an ORO request for DHCP Options it needs or for information that needs to be up-to-date.

Upon receiving a DHCP option described in this document, the CPE SHOULD retrieve or update DNS zones using the associated security and update protocols.

### **9.3. DHCPv6 Relay Behavior**

DHCP Relay behavior are not modified by this document.

## **10. IANA Considerations**

The DHCP options detailed in this document is:

- OPTION\_DNS\_ZONE\_TEMPLATE: TBD
- OPTION\_NAME\_SERVER\_SET: TBD
- OPTION\_REVERSE\_NAME\_SERVER\_SET: TBD
- OPTION\_PUBLIC\_KEY: TBD





## **11. Security Considerations**

### **11.1. DNSSEC is recommended to authenticate DNS hosted data**

It is recommended that the (Reverse) DNS Homenet Zone is signed with DNSSEC. The zone may be signed by the CPE or by a third party. We recommend the zone to be signed by the CPE, and that the signed zone is uploaded.

### **11.2. Channel between the CPE and ISP DHCP Server MUST be secured**

The document considers that the channel between the CPE and the ISP DHCP Server is trusted. More specifically, the CPE is authenticated and the exchanged messages are protected. The current document does not specify how to secure the channel. [[RFC3315](#)] proposes a DHCP authentication and message exchange protection, [[RFC4301](#)], [[RFC5996](#)] propose to secure the channel at the IP layer.

In fact, the channel MUST be secured because the CPE provides authentication credentials. Unsecured channel may result in CPE impersonation attacks.

### **11.3. CPEs are sensitive to DoS**

CPE have not been designed for handling heavy load. The CPE are exposed on the Internet, and their IP address is publicly published on the Internet via the DNS. This makes the Home Network sensitive to Deny of Service Attacks. The resulting outsourcing architecture is described in [[I-D.mglt-homenet-front-end-naming-delegation](#)]. This document shows how the outsourcing architecture can be automatically set.

## **12. Acknowledgment**

We would like to thank Tomasz Mrugalski, Marcin Siodelski and Bernie Volz for their comments on the design of the DHCP Options. We would also like to thank Mark Andrews, Andrew Sullivan and Lorenzo Colliti for their remarks on the architecture design. The designed solution has been largely been inspired by Mark Andrews's document [[I-D.andrews-dnsop-pd-reverse](#)] as well as discussions with Mark.

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### **Appendix A. Scenarios and impact on the End User**

This section details various scenarios and discuss their impact on the end user.

#### **A.1. Base Scenario**

The base scenario is the one described in [Section 4](#). It is typically the one of an ISP that manages the DHCP Server, and all DNS servers.

The end user subscribes to the ISP (foo), and at subscription time registers for example.foo as its Registered Homenet Domain example.foo. Since the ISP knows the Registered Homenet Domain and the Public Authoritative Master(s) the ISP is able to build the DNS Homenet Zone Template.

The ISP manages the DNS Template Server, so it is able to load the DNS Homenet Zone Template on the DNS Template Server.



When the CPE is plugged (at least the first time), it provides its Public Key to the DHCP Server. In this scenario, the DHCP Server and the DNS Servers are managed by the ISP so the DHCP Server can provide authentication credentials of the CPE to enable secure authenticated transaction between the CPE and these DNS servers. More specifically, credentials are provided to:

- Public Authoritative Name Server Set
- Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set
- DNS Template Server

The CPE can update the zone using DNS update or a master / slave configuration in a secure way.

The main advantage of this scenario is that the naming architecture is configured automatically and transparently for the end user.

The drawbacks are that the end user uses a Registered Homenet Domain managed by the ISP and that it relies on the ISP naming infrastructure.

## **[A.2.](#) Third Party Registered Homenet Domain**

This section considers the case when the end user wants its home network to use example.com as a Registered Homenet Domain instead of example.foo that has been assigned by the ISP. We also suppose that example.com is not managed by the ISP.

This can also be achieved without any configuration. When the end user buys the domain name example.com, it may request to redirect the name example.com to example.foo using static redirection with CNAME [[RFC2181](#)], [[RFC1034](#)], DNAME [[RFC6672](#)] or CNAME+DNAME [[I-D.sury-dnsext-cname-dname](#)].

This configuration is performed once when the domain name example.com is registered. The only information the end user needs to know is the domain name assigned by the ISP. Once this configuration is done no additional configuration is needed anymore. More specifically, the CPE may be changed, the zone can be updated as in [Appendix A.1](#) without any additional configuration from the end user.

The main advantage of this scenario is that the end user benefits from the Zero Configuration of the Base Scenario [Appendix A.1](#). Then, the end user is able to register for its home network an unlimited number of domain names provided by an unlimited number of different third party providers.





The drawback of this scenario may be that the end user still rely on the ISP naming infrastructure. Note that the only case this may be inconvenient is when the DNS Servers provided by the ISPs results in high latency.

### **A.3. Third Party DNS Infrastructure**

This scenario considers that the end user uses example.com as a Registered Homenet Domain, and does not want to rely on the authoritative servers provided by the ISP.

In this section we limit the outsourcing to the Public Authoritative Name Server Set and Public Authoritative Master(s) to a third party. All other DNS Servers DNS Template Server, Reverse Public Authoritative Master(s) and Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set remain managed by the ISP. The reason we consider that Reverse Public Authoritative Masters(s) and Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set remains managed by the ISP are that the prefix is managed by the ISP, so outsourcing these resources requires some redirection agreement with the ISP. More specifically the ISP will need to configure the redirection on one of its Reverse DNS Servers. That said, outsourcing these resources is similar as outsourcing Public Authoritative Name Server Set and Public Authoritative Master(s) to a third party. Similarly, the DNS Template Server can be easily outsourced as detailed in this section

Outsourcing Public Authoritative Name Server Set and Public Authoritative Master(s) requires:

- 1) Updating the DNS Homenet Zone Template: this can be easily done as detailed in [Section 6](#) as the DNS Template Server is still managed by the ISP. Such modification can be performed once by any CPE. Once this modification has been performed, the CPE can be changed, the Public Key of the CPE may be changed, this does not need to be done another time. One can imagine a GUI on the CPE asking the end user to fill the field with Registered Homenet Domain, optionally Public Authoritative Master(s), with a button "Configure DNS Homenet Zone Template".
- 2) Updating the DHCP Server Information. In fact the Reverse Public Authoritative Name Server Set returned by the ISP is modified. One can imagine a GUI interface that enables the end user to modify its profile parameters. Again, this configuration update is done once-for-ever.
- 3) Upload the authentication credential of the CPE, that is the Public Key of the CPE, to the third party. Unless we use specific mechanisms, like communication between the DHCP Server



and the third party, or a specific token that is plugged into the CPE, this operation is likely to be performed every time the CPE is changed, and every time the Public Key generated by the CPE is changed.

The main advantage of this scenario is that the DNS infrastructure is completely outsourced to the third party. Most likely the Public Key that authenticate the CPE need to be configured for every CPE. Configuration is expected to be CPE live-long.

## [Appendix B](#). Document Change Log

[RFC Editor: This section is to be removed before publication]

-03: Working Version Major modifications are:

- Redesigning options/scope: according to feed backs received from the IETF89 presentation in the dhc WG.
- Redesigning architecture: according to feed backs received from the IETF89 presentation in the homenet WG, discussion with Mark and Lorenzo.

-02: Working Version Major modifications are:

- Redesigning options/scope: As suggested by Bernie Volz

-01: Working Version Major modifications are:

- Remove the DNS Zone file construction: As suggested by Bernie Volz
- DHCPV6 Client behavior: Following options guide lines
- DHCPV6 Server behavior: Following options guide lines

-00: version published in the homenet WG. Major modifications are:

- Reformatting of DHCP Options: Following options guide lines
- DHCPV6 Client behavior: Following options guide lines
- DHCPV6 Server behavior: Following options guide lines

-00: First version published in dhc WG.



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