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I2NSF Capability YANG Data Model draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-01

Abstract

This document defines a YANG data model for capabilities that enable an I2NSF user to control various Network Security Functions (NSFs) in the framework for Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF).

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1. Introduction

As the industry becomes more sophisticated and network devices (e.g., Internet of Things, Self-driving vehicles, and VoIP/VoLTE smartphones), service providers have a lot of problems mentioned in [RFC8192]. To resolve these problems, [i2nsf-nsf-cap-im] specifies the information model of the capabilities of Network Security Functions (NSFs).

This document provides a data model using YANG [RFC6020][RFC7950] that defines the capabilities of NSFs to express capabilities of those security devices. This YANG data model is based on the information model for I2NSF NSF capabilities [i2nsf-nsf-cap-im]. The security devices can register their own capabilities into Network Operator Management (Mgmt) System (i.e., Security Controller) with this YANG data model through the registration interface [RFC8329]. After the capabilities of the NSFs are registered, this YANG data model can be used by the IN2SF user or Service Function Forwarder (SFF) [i2nsf-sfc] to acquire appropriate NSFs that can be controlled by the Network Operator Mgmt System.

The "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA) policy model is used as the basis for the design of I2NSF Policy Rules. The "ietf-i2nsf-capability" YANG module defined in this document provides the following features:

- o Configuration of identification for generic network security function policy
- o Configuration of event capabilities for generic network security function policy
- o Configuration of condition capabilities for generic network security function policy
- o Configuration of action capabilities for generic network security function policy
- o Configuration of strategy capabilities for generic network security function policy
- o Configuration of default action capabilities for generic network security function policy
- o RPC for acquiring appropriate network security function according to type of NSF and/or target devices.

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2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Terminology

This document uses the terminology described in [i2nsf-nsf-cap-im] [i2rs-rib-data-model] [supa-policy-info-model]. Especially, the following terms are from [supa-policy-info-model]:

- o Data Model: A data model is a representation of concepts of interest to an environment in a form that is dependent on data repository, data definition language, query language, implementation language, and protocol.
- o Information Model: An information model is a representation of concepts of interest to an environment in a form that is independent of data repository, data definition language, query language, implementation language, and protocol.

3.1. Tree Diagrams

A simplified graphical representation of the data model is used in this document. The meaning of the symbols in these diagrams [i2rs-rib-data-model] is as follows:

- o Brackets "[" and "]" enclose list keys.
- o Abbreviations before data node names: "rw" means configuration (read-write) and "ro" state data (read-only).
- o Symbols after data node names: "?" means an optional node and "*" denotes a "list" and "leaf-list".
- o Parentheses enclose choice and case nodes, and case nodes are also marked with a colon (":").
- o Ellipsis ("...") stands for contents of subtrees that are not shown.

4. Overview

This section explains overview how the YANG data model can be used by I2NSF User, Developer's Mgmt System, and SFF. Figure 1 shows capabilities of NSFs in I2NSF Framework. As shown in this figure,

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Developer's Mgmt System can register NSFs with capabilities that the device can support. To register NSFs in this way, the Developer's Mgmt System utilizes this standardized capabilities YANG data model through registration interface. Through this registration of capabilities, the a lot of problems [RFC8192] can be resolved. The following shows use cases.

Note [i2nsf-nsf-yang] is used to configure rules of NSFs in I2NSF Framework.




Figure 1: Capabilities of NSFs in I2NSF Framework

o If I2NSF User wants to apply rules about blocking malicious users, it is a tremendous burden to apply all of these rules to NSFs one by one. This problem can be resolved by standardizing the capabilities of NSFs. If I2NSF User wants to block malicious users with IPv6, I2NSF User sends the rules about blocking the users to Network Operator Mgmt System. When the Network Operator Mgmt System receives the rules, it sends that rules to appropriate

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NSFs (i.e., NSF-m in Developer Mgmt System A and NSF-1 in Developer Mgmt System B) which can support the capabilities (i.e., IPv6). Therefore, I2NSF User need not consider NSFs where to apply the rules.

- o If NSFs find the malicious packets, it is a tremendous burden for I2NSF User to apply the rule about blocking the malicious packets to NSFs one by one. This problem can be resolved by standardizing the capabilities of NSFs. If NSFs find the malicious packets with IPv4, they can ask the Network Operator Mgmt System to alter specific rules and/or configurations. When the Network Operator Mgmt System receives the rules for malicious packets, it inspects whether the rules are reasonable and sends the rules to appropriate NSFs (i.e., NSF-1 in Developer Mgmt System A and NSF-1 and NSF-n in Developer Mgmt System B) which can support the capabilities (i.e., IPv4). Therefore, the new rules can be applied to appropriate NSFs without control of I2NSF USer.
- o If NSFs of Service Function Chaining (SFC) [i2nsf-sfc] fail, it is a tremendous burden for I2NSF User to reconfigure the policy of SFC immediately. This problem can be resolved by periodically acquiring information of appropriate NSFs of SFC. If SFF needs information of Web Application Firewall for SFC, it can ask the Network Operator Mgmt System to acquire the location information of appropriate Web Application Firewall. When the Network Operator Mgmt System receives requested information from SFF, it sends location information of Web Application Firewall to the SFF. Therefore, the policy about the NSFs of SFC can be periodically updated without control of I2NSF USer.

5. The Structure and Objective of NSF Capabilities

5.1. Generic Network Security Function Identification

This shows a identification for generic network security functions. These objects are defined as location information and target device information.

5.2. Event Capabilities

This shows a event capabilities for generic network security functions policy. This is used to specify capabilities about any important occurrence in time of a change in the system being managed, and/or in the environment of the system being managed. When used in the context of I2NSF Policy Rules, it is used to determine whether the Condition clause of the I2NSF Policy Rule can be evaluated or not. These object of event capabilities is defined as user security event capabilities, device security event capabilities, system

security event capabilities, and time security event capabilities. These object of event capabilities can be extended according to specific vendor event features.

5.3. Condition Capabilities

This shows a condition capabilities for generic network security functions policy. This is used to specify capabilities about a set of attributes, features, and/or values that are to be compared with a set of known attributes, features, and/or values in order to determine whether or not the set of Actions in that (imperative) I2NSF Policy Rule can be executed or not. These object of condition capabilities is defined as packet security condition capabilities, packet payload security condition capabilities, target security condition capabilities, user security condition capabilities, context condition capabilities, and generic context condition capabilities. These object of condition capabilities can be extended according to specific vendor condition features.

5.4. Action Capabilities

This shows a action capabilities for generic network security functions policy. This is used to specify capabilities to control and monitor aspects of flow-based NSFs when the event and condition clauses are satisfied. NSFs provide security functions by executing various Actions. These object of action capabilities is defined as ingress action capabilities, egress action capabilities, and apply profile action capabilities. These object of action capabilities can be extended according to specific vendor action features.

5.5. Resolution Strategy Capabilities

This shows a resolution strategy capabilities for generic network security functions policy. This can be used to specify capabilities how to resolve conflicts that occur between the actions of the same or different policy rules that are matched and contained in this particular NSF. These objects are defined as first-matching-rule capability and last-matching-rule capability. These objects can be extended according to specific vendor resolution strategy features.

5.6. Default Action Capabilities

This shows a default action policy for generic network security functions. This can be used to specify capabilities about a predefined action when no other alternative action was matched by the currently executing I2NSF Policy Rule.

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5.7. RPC for Acquiring Appropriate Network Security Function

This shows a RPC for acquiring an appropriate network security function according to type of NSF and/or target devices. If the SFF [i2nsf-sfc]does not have the location information of network security functions that it should send in own cache table, this can be used to acquire the information. These objects are defined as input data (i.e., NSF type and target devices) and output data (i.e., location information of NSF).

6. Data Model Structure

This section shows an overview of a structure tree of capabilities for generic network security functions, as defined in the [i2nsf-nsf-cap-im].

6.1. Network Security Function Identification

The data model for network security function identification has the following structure:

```
module: ietf-i2nsf-capability
   +--rw nsf* [nsf-name]
      +--rw nsf-name
                                        string
      +--rw nsf-type?
                                        nsf-type
      +--rw nsf-address
       +--rw (nsf-address-type)?
           +--:(ipv4-address)
            | +--rw ipv4-address
                                    inet:ipv4-address
            +--:(ipv6-address)
                                     inet:ipv6-address
               +--rw ipv6-address
      +--rw target-device
      | +--rw pc?
                                   boolean
       | +--rw mobile-phone?
                                   boolean
       | +--rw voip-volte-phone?
                                   boolean
                                   boolean
      | +--rw tablet?
       | +--rw iot?
                                   boolean
         +--rw vehicle?
                                   boolean
      +--rw generic-nsf-capabilities
       +--rw net-sec-capabilities
            uses net-sec-caps
      +--rw complete-nsf-capabilities
         +--rw con-sec-control-capabilities
         | uses i2nsf-con-sec-control-caps
         +--rw attack-mitigation-capabilities
            uses i2nsf-attack-mitigation-control-caps
```

Figure 2: Data Model Structure for NSF-Identification

This draft also utilizes the concepts originated in Basile, Lioy, Pitscheider, and Zhao[2015] concerning conflict resolution, use of external data, and target device. The authors are grateful to Cataldo for pointing out this excellent work.

The nsf-type object can be used for configuration about type of a NSF. The types of NSF consists of Network Firewall, Web Application Firewall, Anti-Virus, IDS, IPS, and DDoS Mitigator. The nsf-address object can be used for configuration about location of a NSF. The target-device object can be used for configuration about target devices. We will add additional type of a NSF for more generic network security functions.

6.2. Capabilities of Generic Network Security Function

The data model for Generic NSF capabilities has the following structure:

```
+--rw generic-nsf-capabilities
+--rw net-sec-capabilities
uses i2nsf-net-sec-caps
```

Figure 3: Data Model Structure for Capabilities of Network Security
Function

6.2.1. Event Capabilities

The data model for event capabilities has the following structure:

```
+--rw i2nsf-net-sec-caps
       +--rw net-sec-capabilities
          +--rw time
           +--rw time-zone
          | | +--rw time-zone-offset? boolean
             +--rw time-inteval
               +--rw absolute-time-inteval
                | +--rw start-time? boolean
                | +--rw end-time?
                                     boolean
                +--rw periodic-time-inteval
                  +--rw day?
                               boolean
                  +--rw month? boolean
          +--rw event
          | +--rw usr-event
            | +--rw usr-sec-event-content?
                                             boolean
          | | +--rw usr-sec-event-format
             | | +--rw unknown? boolean
             | | +--rw guid? boolean
```

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```
boolean
      +--rw uuid?
      +--rw uri?
                        boolean
      +--rw fqdn?
                        boolean
      +--rw fqpn?
                        boolean
   +--rw usr-sec-event-type
      +--rw unknown?
                                      boolean
      +--rw user-created?
                                      boolean
      +--rw user-grp-created?
                                      boolean
      +--rw user-deleted?
                                      boolean
      +--rw user-grp-deleted?
                                      boolean
      +--rw user-logon?
                                      boolean
      +--rw user-logoff?
                                      boolean
      +--rw user-access-request?
                                      boolean
                                      boolean
      +--rw user-access-granted?
      +--rw user-access-violation?
                                      boolean
+--rw dev-event
   +--rw dev-sec-event-content
                                         boolean
   +--rw dev-sec-event-format
      +--rw unknown?
                        boolean
      +--rw guid?
                        boolean
                       boolean
      +--rw uuid?
      +--rw uri?
                       boolean
      +--rw fqdn?
                       boolean
      +--rw fqpn?
                        boolean
   +--rw dev-sec-event-type
      +--rw unknown?
                                         boolean
      +--rw comm-alarm?
                                          boolean
      +--rw quality-of-service-alarm?
                                         boolean
      +--rw process-err-alarm?
                                         boolean
      +--rw equipment-err-alarm?
                                         boolean
      +--rw environmental-err-alarm?
                                         boolean
   +--rw dev-sec-event-type-severity
      +--rw unknown?
                              boolean
      +--rw cleared?
                              boolean
      +--rw indeterminate?
                              boolean
      +--rw critical?
                              boolean
      +--rw major?
                              boolean
      +--rw minor?
                              boolean
      +--rw warning?
                              boolean
+--rw sys-event
   +--rw sys-sec-event-content?
                                   boolean
   +--rw sys-sec-event-format
      +--rw unknown?
                        boolean
                        boolean
      +--rw guid?
      +--rw uuid?
                        boolean
                       boolean
      +--rw uri?
      +--rw fqdn?
                        boolean
      +--rw fqpn?
                       boolean
```

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```
| | +--rw sys-sec-event-type
                                       boolean
        +--rw unknown?
                                       boolean
        +--rw audit-log-written-to?
        +--rw audit-log-cleared?
                                       boolean
        +--rw policy-created?
                                       boolean
        +--rw policy-edited?
                                       boolean
        +--rw policy-deleted?
                                       boolean
        +--rw policy-executed?
                                       boolean
   +--rw time-event
      +--rw time-sec-event-begin?
                                        boolean
      +--rw time-sec-event-end?
                                        boolean
                                       boolean
      +--rw time-sec-event-time-zone?
 +--rw condition
1 ...
+--rw action
| ...
 +--rw resolution-strategy
```

Figure 4: Data Model Structure for Event Capabilities of Network Security Function

These objects are defined as capabilities of user security event, device security event, system security event, and time security event. These objects can be extended according to specific vendor event features. We will add additional event objects for more generic network security functions.

6.2.2. Condition Capabilities

The data model for condition capabilities has the following structure:

```
+--rw i2nsf-net-sec-caps

+--rw net-sec-capabilities

+--rw time

| +--rw time-zone

| | +--rw time-zone-offset? boolean

| +--rw time-inteval

| +--rw absolute-time-inteval

| | +--rw start-time? boolean

| | +--rw end-time? boolean

| +--rw periodic-time-inteval

| +--rw day? boolean

| +--rw month? boolean
```

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```
+--rw event
 . . .
+--rw condition
  +--rw packet-security-condition
     +--rw packet-security-mac-condition
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-mac-dest?
                                               boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-mac-src?
                                               boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-mac-8021q?
                                               boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-mac-ether-type?
                                               boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-mac-tci?
                                               string
      +--rw packet-security-ipv4-condition
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-header-length?
                                                     boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-tos?
                                                     boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-total-length?
                                                     boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-id?
                                                     boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-fragment?
                                                     boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-fragment-offset?
                                                     boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-ttl?
                                                     boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-protocol?
                                                     boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-src?
                                                     boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-dest?
                                                     boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-ipopts?
                                                     boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-sameip?
                                                     boolean
         +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-geoip?
                                                     boolean
      +--rw packet-security-ipv6-condition
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv6-dscp?
                                                    boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv6-ecn?
                                                    boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv6-traffic-class?
                                                    boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv6-flow-label?
                                                    boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv6-payload-length?
                                                    boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv6-next-header?
                                                    boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv6-hop-limit?
                                                    boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv6-src?
                                                    boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-ipv6-dest?
                                                    boolean
      +--rw packet-security-tcp-condition
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-tcp-src-port?
                                                boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-tcp-dest-port?
                                                boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-tcp-seq-num?
                                                boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-tcp-ack-num?
                                                boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-tcp-window-size?
                                                boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-tcp-flags?
                                                boolean
      +--rw packet-security-udp-condition
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-udp-src-port?
                                              boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-udp-dest-port?
                                              boolean
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-udp-length?
                                              boolean
      +--rw packet-security-icmp-condition
        +--rw pkt-sec-cond-icmp-type?
                                             boolean.
         +--rw pkt-sec-cond-icmp-code?
                                             boolean
```

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```
+--rw pkt-sec-cond-icmp-seg-num?
                                          boolean
  +--rw packet-payload-condition
 | +--rw pkt-payload-content?
                                 boolean
  +--rw acl-number?
                                    boolean
  +--rw application-condition
  | +--rw application-object?
                                boolean
  | +--rw application-group?
                                boolean
  | +--rw application-label?
                                boolean
  | +--rw category
        +--rw application-category?
                                     boolean
  +--rw target-condition
  | +--rw device-sec-context-cond? boolean
  +--rw users-condition
    +--rw user
     | +--rw (user-name)?
          +--:(tenant)
          | +--rw tenant? boolean
           +--:(vn-id)
              +--rw vn-id?
                             boolean
     +--rw group
        +--rw (group-name)?
        | +--:(tenant)
        | | +--rw tenant?
                                    boolean
          +--:(vn-id)
              +--rw vn-id?
                                    boolean
        +--rw security-grup
                              boolean
  +--rw url-category-condition
  | +--rw pre-defined-category?
                                   boolean
  | +--rw user-defined-category?
                                   boolean
  +--rw context-condition
  | +--rw temp? string
  +--rw gen-context-condition
     +--rw geographic-location
        +--rw src-geographic-location?
                                         boolean
        +--rw dest-geographic-location?
                                         boolean
+--rw action
+--rw resolution-strategy
   . . .
```

Figure 5: Data Model Structure for Condition Capabilities of Network
Security Function

These objects are defined as capabilities of packet security condition, packet payload security condition, target security condition, user security condition, context condition, and generic context condition. These objects can be extended according to

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specific vendor condition features. We will add additional condition objects for more generic network security functions.

6.2.3. Action Capabilities

The data model for action capabilities has the following structure:

```
+--rw i2nsf-net-sec-caps
     +--rw net-sec-capabilities
        +--rw time
        | +--rw time-zone
           | +--rw time-zone-offset? boolean
          +--rw time-inteval
              +--rw absolute-time-inteval
             | +--rw start-time? boolean
             | +--rw end-time?
                                   boolean
             +--rw periodic-time-inteval
                +--rw day? boolean
                +--rw month? boolean
        +--rw event
        +--rw condition
        +--rw action
        | +--rw rule-log?
                                boolean
        | +--rw session-log?
                                  boolean
          +--rw ingress-action
          | +--rw ingress-action-type
               +--rw pass?
                              boolean
               +--rw drop?
                              boolean
               +--rw reject?
                                boolean
               +--rw alert? boolean
                +--rw mirror? boolean
          +--rw egress-action
             +--rw egress-action-type
                +--rw invoke-signaling?
                                             boolean
                +--rw tunnel-encapsulation?
                                             boolean
                +--rw forwarding?
                                             boolean
                +--rw redirection?
                                             boolean
        +--rw resolution-strategy
```

Figure 6: Data Model Structure for Action Capabilities of Network Security Function

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These objects are defined capabilities as ingress action, egress action, and apply profile action. These objects can be extended according to specific vendor action feature. We will add additional action objects for more generic network security functions.

<u>6.2.4</u>. Resolution Strategy Capabilities

The data model for resolution strategy capabilities has the following structure:

```
+--rw i2nsf-net-sec-caps
     +--rw net-sec-capabilities
        +--rw time
        | +--rw time-zone
          | +--rw time-zone-offset? boolean
          +--rw time-inteval
             +--rw absolute-time-inteval
             | +--rw start-time? boolean
                                    boolean
             | +--rw end-time?
             +--rw periodic-time-inteval
                 +--rw day? boolean
                +--rw month? boolean
        +--rw event
        1 ...
        +--rw condition
        1 ...
        +--rw action
        | ...
        +--rw resolution-strategy
           +--rw first-matching-rule?
                                       boolean
           +--rw last-matching-rule?
                                       boolean
```

Figure 7: Data Model Structure for Resolution Strategy Capabilities of Network Security Function

These objects are defined capabilities as first-matching-rule and last-matching-rule. These objects can be extended according to specific vendor resolution strategy features. We will add additional resolution strategy objects for more generic network security functions.

6.2.5. Content Security Capabilities

The data model for content security capabilities has the following structure:

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```
+--rw complete-nsf-capabilities
  +--rw con-sec-control-capabilities
  | +--rw anti-virus?
                                  boolean
                                  boolean
  | +--rw ips?
                                  boolean
  | +--rw ids?
  | +--rw url-filter?
                                  boolean
  | +--rw data-filter?
                                  boolean
  | +--rw mail-filter?
                                  boolean
  | +--rw sql-filter?
                                  boolean
  | +--rw file-blocking?
                                  boolean
  | +--rw file-isolate?
                                  boolean
  | +--rw pkt-capture?
                                  boolean
  | +--rw application-behavior?
                                  boolean
  | +--rw voip-volte?
                                  boolean
  +--rw attack-mitigation-capabilities
             . . .
```

Figure 8: Data Model Structure for Content Security Capabilities of Network Security Function

Content security is composed of a number of distinct security Capabilities; each such Capability protects against a specific type of threat in the application layer. Content security is a type of Generic Network Security Function (GNSF), which summarizes a welldefined set of security Capabilities.

<u>6.2.6</u>. Attack Mitigation Capabilities

The data model for attack mitigation capabilities has the following structure:

```
+--rw complete-nsf-capabilities
  +--rw attack-mitigation-capabilities
         +--rw (attack-mitigation-control-type)?
                +--:(ddos-attack)
                   +--rw (ddos-attack-type)?
                      +--: (network-layer-ddos-attack)
                        +--rw network-layer-ddos-attack-types
                            +--rw syn-flood-attack?
                                                              boolean
                            +--rw udp-flood-attack?
                                                              boolean
                            +--rw icmp-flood-attack?
                                                              boolean
                            +--rw ip-fragment-flood-attack?
                                                              boolean
                            +--rw ipv6-related-attack?
                                                              boolean
                      +--: (app-layer-ddos-attack)
                         +--rw app-layer-ddos-attack-types
                                                          boolean
                            +--rw http-flood-attack?
                            +--rw https-flood-attack?
                                                          boolean
                            +--rw dns-flood-attack?
                                                          boolean
                            +--rw dns-amp-flood-attack?
                                                          boolean
                            +--rw ssl-flood-attack?
                                                          boolean
                +--:(single-packet-attack)
                   +--rw (single-packet-attack-type)?
                          +--: (scan-and-sniff-attack)
                          | +--rw ip-sweep-attack?
                                                              boolean
                          +--rw port-scanning-attack?
                                                              boolean
                          +--: (malformed-packet-attack)
                          | +--rw ping-of-death-attack?
                                                              boolean
                             +--rw teardrop-attack?
                                                              boolean
                          +--:(special-packet-attack)
                                 +--rw oversized-icmp-attack?
                                                                  boolean
                                 +--rw tracert-attack?
                                                                  boolean
```

Figure 9: Data Model Structure for Attack Mitigation Capabilities of Network Security Function

Attack mitigation is composed of a number of GNSFs; each one protects against a specific type of network attack. Attack Mitigation security is a type of GNSF, which summarizes a well-defined set of security Capabilities.

<u>6.2.7</u>. RPC for Acquiring Appropriate Network Security Function

The data model for RPC for Acquiring Appropriate Network Security Function has the following structure:

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```
rpcs:
 +---x call-appropriate-nsf
    +---w input
     | +---w nsf-type
                              nsf-type
      +---w target-device
          +---w pc?
                                    boolean
                                    boolean
          +---w mobile-phone?
          +---w voip-volte-phone?
                                    boolean
          +---w tablet?
                                    boolean
          +---w iot?
                                    boolean
          +---w vehicle?
                                    boolean
    +--ro output
       +--ro nsf-address
          +--ro (nsf-address-type)?
             +--:(ipv4-address)
             | +--ro ipv4-address
                                      inet:ipv4-address
             +--:(ipv6-address)
                +--ro ipv6-address
                                      inet:ipv6-address
```

Figure 10: RPC for Acquiring Appropriate Network Security Function

This shows a RPC for acquiring an appropriate network security function according to type of NSF and/or target devices. If the SFF [i2nsf-sfc]does not have the location information of network security functions that it should send in own cache table, this can be used to acquire the information. These objects are defined as input data (i.e., NSF type and target devices) and output data (i.e., location information of NSF).

7. YANG Modules

7.1. I2NSF Capability YANG Data Module

This section introduces a YANG module for the information model of network security functions, as defined in the $[\underline{i2nsf-nsf-cap-im}]$.

module ietf-i2nsf-capability {
 namespace
 "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-capability";
 prefix
 i2nsf-capability;

import ietf-inet-types{
 prefix inet;
}

<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-i2nsf-capability@2018-07-02.yang"

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```
organization
  "IETF I2NSF (Interface to Network Security Functions)
   Working Group";
contact
  "WG Web: <http://tools.ietf.org/wg/i2nsf>
  WG List: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org>
   WG Chair: Adrian Farrel
   <mailto:Adrain@olddog.co.uk>
   WG Chair: Linda Dunbar
   <mailto:Linda.duhbar@huawei.com>
   Editor: Susan Hares
   <mailto:shares@ndzh.com>
   Editor: Jaehoon Paul Jeong
   <mailto:pauljeong@skku.edu>
   Editor: Jinyong Tim Kim
   <mailto:timkim@skku.edu>";
description
  "This module describes a capability model
 for I2NSF devices.";
revision "2018-07-02"{
 description "The fifth revision";
 reference
    "draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-00";
}
grouping i2nsf-nsf-location {
 description
    "This provides a location for capabilities.";
 container nsf-address {
    description
     "This is location information for capabilities.";
    choice nsf-address-type {
      description
        "nsf address type: ipv4 and ipv4";
      case ipv4-address {
        description
          "ipv4 case";
        leaf ipv4-address {
```

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```
type inet:ipv4-address;
          mandatory true;
          description
            "nsf address type is ipv4";
        }
      case ipv6-address {
        description
          "ipv6 case";
        leaf ipv6-address {
          type inet:ipv6-address;
          mandatory true;
          description
            "nsf address type is ipv6";
        }
      }
   }
 }
}
typedef nsf-type {
    type enumeration {
      enum network-firewall {
        description
          "If type of a NSF is Network Firewall.";
      enum web-app-firewall {
        description
          "If type of a NSF is Web Application
          Firewall.";
      }
      enum anti-virus {
        description
          "If type of a NSF is Anti-Virus";
      }
      enum ids {
        description
          "If type of a NSF is IDS.";
      }
      enum ips {
        description
          "If type of a NSF is IPS.";
      }
```

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```
enum ddos-mitigator {
        description
          "If type of a NSF is DDoS Mitigator.";
      }
   }
   description
      "This is used for type of NSF.";
}
grouping i2nsf-it-resources {
 description
   "This provides a link between capabilities
     and IT resources. This has a list of IT resources
     by name.";
 container target-device {
   description
      "it-resources";
   leaf pc {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If type of a device is PC.";
   }
   leaf mobile-phone {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If type of a device is mobile-phone.";
   }
   leaf voip-volte-phone {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If type of a device is voip-volte-phone.";
   }
   leaf tablet {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If type of a device is tablet.";
   }
   leaf iot {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If type of a device is Internet of Things.";
   }
```

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```
leaf vehicle {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If type of a device is vehicle.";
   }
 }
}
grouping capabilities-information {
 description
    "This includes information of capabilities.";
 leaf nsf-type {
   type nsf-type;
   description
      "This is type of NSF.";
 }
 uses i2nsf-nsf-location;
 uses i2nsf-it-resources;
}
grouping i2nsf-net-sec-caps {
 description
    "i2nsf-net-sec-caps";
 container net-sec-capabilities {
    description
      "net-sec-capabilities";
    container time {
        description
          "This is capabilities for time";
        container time-zone {
          description
            "This can be used to apply rules
            according to time zone";
          leaf time-zone-offset {
            type boolean;
            description
              "This is offset for UTC time zone";
          }
        }
        container time-inteval {
          description
            "This can be used to apply rules
```

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```
according to time inteval";
      container absolute-time-inteval {
        description
          "This can be used to apply rules according to
           absolute time inteval";
        leaf start-time {
          type boolean;
          description
            "This is start time for absolute time inteval";
        leaf end-time {
          type boolean;
          description
            "This is end time for absolute time inteval";
        }
      }
      container periodic-time-inteval {
        description
          "This can be used to apply rules according to
           periodic time inteval";
        leaf day {
          type boolean;
          description
            "This is day for periodic time inteval";
        }
        leaf month {
          type boolean;
          description
            "This is month for periodic time inteval";
        }
      }
    }
}
container event {
  description
    " This is abstract. An event is defined as any important
      occurrence in time of a change in the system being
      managed, and/or in the environment of the system being
      managed. When used in the context of policy rules for
      a flow-based NSF, it is used to determine whether the
      Condition clause of the Policy Rule can be evaluated
      or not. Examples of an I2NSF event include time and
      user actions (e.g., logon, logoff, and actions that
      violate any ACL.).";
    container usr-event {
      description "TBD";
```

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```
leaf usr-sec-event-content {
  type boolean;
  description
   "This is a mandatory string that contains the content
    of the UserSecurityEvent. The format of the content
    is specified in the usrSecEventFormat class
    attribute, and the type of event is defined in the
    usrSecEventType class attribute. An example of the
    usrSecEventContent attribute is a string hrAdmin,
    with the usrSecEventFormat set to 1 (GUID) and the
    usrSecEventType attribute set to 5 (new logon).";
}
container usr-sec-event-format {
  description
   "This is a mandatory uint 8 enumerated integer, which
    is used to specify the data type of the
    usrSecEventContent attribute. The content is
    specified in the usrSecEventContent class attribute,
    and the type of event is defined in the
    usrSecEventType class attribute. An example of the
    usrSecEventContent attribute is string hrAdmin,
    with the usrSecEventFormat attribute set to 1 (GUID)
    and the usrSecEventType attribute set to 5
    (new logon).";
  leaf unknown {
    type boolean;
    description
      "If SecEventFormat is unknown";
  leaf guid {
    type boolean;
    description
      "If SecEventFormat is GUID
      (Generic Unique IDentifier)";
  }
  leaf uuid {
    type boolean;
    description
      "If SecEventFormat is UUID
      (Universal Unique IDentifier)";
  }
  leaf uri {
    type boolean;
    description
      "If SecEventFormat is URI
      (Uniform Resource Identifier)";
  }
```

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```
leaf fqdn {
    type boolean;
    description
      "If SecEventFormat is FQDN
      (Fully Qualified Domain Name)";
  }
  leaf fqpn {
    type boolean;
    description
      "If SecEventFormat is FQPN
      (Fully Qualified Path Name)";
  }
}
container usr-sec-event-type {
  leaf unknown {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If usrSecEventType is unknown";
  }
  leaf user-created {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If usrSecEventType is new user
        created";
  }
  leaf user-grp-created {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If usrSecEventType is new user
        group created";
  }
  leaf user-deleted {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If usrSecEventType is user
        deleted";
  }
  leaf user-grp-deleted {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If usrSecEventType is user
        group deleted";
  leaf user-logon {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If usrSecEventType is user
```

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```
logon";
    }
    leaf user-logoff {
        type boolean;
        description
          "If usrSecEventType is user
          logoff";
    }
    leaf user-access-request {
        type boolean;
        description
          "If usrSecEventType is user
          access request";
    leaf user-access-granted {
        type boolean;
        description
          "If usrSecEventType is user
          granted";
    leaf user-access-violation {
        type boolean;
        description
          "If usrSecEventType is user
          violation";
    }
    description
     "This is a mandatory uint 8 enumerated integer, which
      is used to specify the type of event that involves
      this user. The content and format are specified in
      the usrSecEventContent and usrSecEventFormat class
      attributes, respectively. An example of the
      usrSecEventContent attribute is string hrAdmin,
      with the usrSecEventFormat attribute set to 1 (GUID)
      and the usrSecEventType attribute set to 5
     (new logon).";
 }
container dev-event {
 description "TBD";
 leaf dev-sec-event-content {
    type boolean;
   mandatory true;
    description
     "This is a mandatory string that contains the content
```

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```
of the DeviceSecurityEvent. The format of the
    content is specified in the devSecEventFormat class
    attribute, and the type of event is defined in the
    devSecEventType class attribute. An example of the
    devSecEventContent attribute is alarm, with the
    devSecEventFormat attribute set to 1 (GUID), the
    devSecEventType attribute set to 5 (new logon).";
}
container dev-sec-event-format {
  description
   "This is a mandatory uint 8 enumerated integer,
    which is used to specify the data type of the
    devSecEventContent attribute.";
  leaf unknown {
    type boolean;
    description
      "If SecEventFormat is unknown";
  }
  leaf guid {
    type boolean;
    description
      "If SecEventFormat is GUID
      (Generic Unique IDentifier)";
  }
  leaf uuid {
    type boolean;
    description
      "If SecEventFormat is UUID
      (Universal Unique IDentifier)";
  }
  leaf uri {
    type boolean;
    description
      "If SecEventFormat is URI
      (Uniform Resource Identifier)";
  }
  leaf fqdn {
    type boolean;
    description
      "If SecEventFormat is FQDN
      (Fully Qualified Domain Name)";
  }
  leaf fqpn {
    type boolean;
    description
      "If SecEventFormat is FQPN
```

```
(Fully Qualified Path Name)";
 }
}
container dev-sec-event-type {
  description
   "This is a mandatory uint 8 enumerated integer,
    which is used to specify the type of event
    that was generated by this device.";
  leaf unknown {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If devSecEventType is unknown";
  }
  leaf comm-alarm {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If devSecEventType is communications
        alarm";
  }
  leaf quality-of-service-alarm {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If devSecEventType is quality of service
        alarm";
  }
  leaf process-err-alarm {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If devSecEventType is processing error
        alarm";
  leaf equipment-err-alarm {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If devSecEventType is equipment error
        alarm";
  }
  leaf environmental-err-alarm {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If devSecEventType is environmental error
        alarm";
  }
}
```

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```
container dev-sec-event-type-severity {
    description
     "This is a mandatory uint 8 enumerated integer,
     which is used to specify the perceived
      severity of the event generated by this
      Device.";
    leaf unknown {
        type boolean;
        description
          "If devSecEventType is unknown";
    }
    leaf cleared {
        type boolean;
        description
          "If devSecEventTypeSeverity is cleared";
    leaf indeterminate {
        type boolean;
        description
          "If devSecEventTypeSeverity is
          indeterminate";
    }
    leaf critical {
        type boolean;
        description
          "If devSecEventTypeSeverity is critical";
    leaf major{
        type boolean;
        description
          "If devSecEventTypeSeverity is major";
    }
    leaf minor {
        type boolean;
        description
          "If devSecEventTypeSeverity is minor";
    }
    leaf warning {
        type boolean;
        description
          "If devSecEventTypeSeverity is warning";
   }
 }
}
container sys-event {
  description "TBD";
```

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```
leaf sys-sec-event-content {
  type boolean;
  description
   "This is a mandatory string that contains a content
    of the SystemSecurityEvent. The format of a content
    is specified in a sysSecEventFormat class attribute,
    and the type of event is defined in the
    sysSecEventType class attribute. An example of the
    sysSecEventContent attribute is string sysadmin3,
    with the sysSecEventFormat attribute set to 1(GUID),
    and the sysSecEventType attribute set to 2
    (audit log cleared).";
}
container sys-sec-event-format {
  description
   "This is a mandatory uint 8 enumerated integer, which
    is used to specify the data type of the
    sysSecEventContent attribute.";
  leaf unknown {
    type boolean;
    description
      "If SecEventFormat is unknown";
  leaf guid {
    type boolean;
    description
      "If SecEventFormat is GUID
      (Generic Unique IDentifier)";
  }
  leaf uuid {
    type boolean;
    description
      "If SecEventFormat is UUID
      (Universal Unique IDentifier)";
  }
  leaf uri {
    type boolean;
    description
      "If SecEventFormat is URI
      (Uniform Resource Identifier)";
  }
  leaf fqdn {
    type boolean;
    description
      "If SecEventFormat is FQDN
      (Fully Qualified Domain Name)";
```

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```
}
  leaf fqpn {
    type boolean;
    description
      "If SecEventFormat is FQPN
      (Fully Qualified Path Name)";
  }
}
container sys-sec-event-type {
  description
   "This is a mandatory uint 8 enumerated integer, which
    is used to specify the type of event that involves
    this device.";
  leaf unknown {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If sysSecEventType is unknown";
  }
  leaf audit-log-written-to {
      type boolean;
      description
      "If sysSecEventTypeSeverity
       is that audit log is written to";
  }
  leaf audit-log-cleared {
      type boolean;
      description
      "If sysSecEventTypeSeverity
       is that audit log is cleared";
  }
  leaf policy-created {
      type boolean;
      description
      "If sysSecEventTypeSeverity
       is that policy is created";
  }
  leaf policy-edited{
      type boolean;
      description
      "If sysSecEventTypeSeverity
       is that policy is edited";
  leaf policy-deleted{
      type boolean;
      description
      "If sysSecEventTypeSeverity
```

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is that policy is deleted";

```
}
        leaf policy-executed{
            type boolean;
            description
            "If sysSecEventTypeSeverity
             is that policy is executed";
        }
      }
    }
    container time-event {
      description "TBD";
      leaf time-sec-event-begin {
        type boolean;
        description
          "This is a mandatory DateTime attribute, and
          represents the beginning of a time period.
          It has a value that has a date and/or a time
          component (as in the Java or Python libraries).";
      }
      leaf time-sec-event-end {
        type boolean;
        description
          "This is a mandatory DateTime attribute, and
           represents the end of a time period. It has
           a value that has a date and/or a time component
           (as in the Java or Python libraries). If this is
           a single event occurrence, and not a time period
           when the event can occur, then the
           timeSecEventPeriodEnd attribute may be ignored.";
      }
      leaf time-sec-event-time-zone {
        type boolean;
        description
          "This is a mandatory string attribute, and defines a
           time zone that this event occurred in using the
           format specified in ISO8601.";
      }
    }
}
container condition {
  description
    " This is abstract. A condition is defined as a set
```

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```
of attributes, features, and/or values that are to be
compared with a set of known attributes, features,
and/or values in order to determine whether or not the
set of Actions in that (imperative) I2NSF Policy Rule
can be executed or not. Examples of I2NSF Conditions
include matching attributes of a packet or flow, and
comparing the internal state of an NSF to a desired state.";
container packet-security-condition {
  description "TBD";
 container packet-security-mac-condition {
    description
      "The purpose of this Class is to represent packet MAC
       packet header information that can be used as part of
       a test to determine if the set of Policy Actions in
       this ECA Policy Rule should be execute or not.";
    leaf pkt-sec-cond-mac-dest {
      type boolean;
      description
        "The MAC destination address (6 octets long).";
    }
    leaf pkt-sec-cond-mac-src {
      type boolean;
      description
        "The MAC source address (6 octets long).";
    }
    leaf pkt-sec-cond-mac-8021q {
      type boolean;
      description
        "This is an optional string attribute, and defines
         The 802.1Q tab value (2 octets long).";
    }
    leaf pkt-sec-cond-mac-ether-type {
      type boolean;
      description
        "The EtherType field (2 octets long). Values up to
         and including 1500 indicate the size of the payload
         in octets; values of 1536 and above define which
         protocol is encapsulated in the payload of the
         frame.";
    }
```

```
leaf pkt-sec-cond-mac-tci {
    type string;
    description
      "This is an optional string attribute, and defines
       the Tag Control Information. This consists of a 3
       bit user priority field, a drop eligible indicator
       (1 bit), and a VLAN identifier (12 bits).";
 }
}
container packet-security-ipv4-condition {
  description
    "The purpose of this Class is to represent packet IPv4
     packet header information that can be used as part of
     a test to determine if the set of Policy Actions in
     this ECA Policy Rule should be executed or not.";
  leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-header-length {
    type boolean;
    description
      "The IPv4 packet header consists of 14 fields,
       of which 13 are required.";
  }
  leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-tos {
    type boolean;
    description
      "The ToS field could specify a datagram's priority
       and request a route for low-delay, high-throughput,
       or highly-reliable service..";
  }
  leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-total-length {
    type boolean;
    description
      "This 16-bit field defines the entire packet size,
       including header and data, in bytes.";
  }
  leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-id {
    type boolean;
    description
      "This field is an identification field and is
       primarily used for uniquely identifying
       the group of fragments of a single IP datagram.";
  }
  leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-fragment {
```

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```
type boolean;
  description
    "IP fragmentation is an Internet Protocol (IP)
    process that breaks datagrams into smaller pieces
     (fragments), so that packets may be formed that
    can pass through a link with a smaller maximum
     transmission unit (MTU) than the original
    datagram size.";
}
leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-fragment-offset {
  type boolean;
 description
    "Fragment offset field along with Don't Fragment
    and More Fragment flags in the IP protocol
    header are used for fragmentation and reassembly
    of IP datagrams.";
}
leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-ttl {
  type boolean;
 description
    "The ttl keyword is used to check for a specific
    IP time-to-live value in the header of
    a packet.";
}
leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-protocol {
  type boolean;
 description
    "Internet Protocol version 4(IPv4) is the fourth
    version of the Internet Protocol (IP).";
}
leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-src {
  type boolean;
 description
    "Defines the IPv4 Source Address.";
}
leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-dest {
 type boolean;
 description
    "Defines the IPv4 Destination Address.";
}
leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-ipopts {
  type boolean;
```

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```
description
      "With the ipopts keyword you can check if
       a specific ip option is set. Ipopts has
       to be used at the beginning of a rule.";
  }
  leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-sameip {
    type boolean;
    description
      "Every packet has a source IP-address and
       a destination IP-address. It can be that
       the source IP is the same as
       the destination IP.";
  }
  leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-geoip {
    type boolean;
    description
      "The geoip keyword enables you to match on
       the source, destination or source and destination
       IP addresses of network traffic and to see to
       which country it belongs. To do this, Suricata
       uses GeoIP API with MaxMind database format.";
 }
}
container packet-security-ipv6-condition {
  description
     "The purpose of this Class is to represent packet
     IPv6 packet header information that can be used as
     part of a test to determine if the set of Policy
     Actions in this ECA Policy Rule should be executed
     or not.";
  leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv6-dscp {
    type boolean;
    description
      "Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP)
       of ipv6.";
  }
  leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv6-ecn {
    type boolean;
    description
      "ECN allows end-to-end notification of network
       congestion without dropping packets.";
  }
```

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```
leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv6-traffic-class {
  type boolean;
 description
    "The bits of this field hold two values. The 6
    most-significant bits are used for
    differentiated services, which is used to
    classify packets.";
}
leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv6-flow-label {
  type boolean;
 description
    "The flow label when set to a non-zero value
     serves as a hint to routers and switches
    with multiple outbound paths that these
    packets should stay on the same path so that
     they will not be reordered.";
}
leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv6-payload-length {
  type boolean;
 description
    "The size of the payload in octets,
    including any extension headers.";
}
leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv6-next-header {
  type boolean;
 description
    "Specifies the type of the next header.
    This field usually specifies the transport
    layer protocol used by a packet's payload.";
}
leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv6-hop-limit {
  type boolean;
 description
    "Replaces the time to live field of IPv4.";
}
leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv6-src {
 type boolean;
 description
    "The IPv6 address of the sending node.";
}
leaf pkt-sec-cond-ipv6-dest {
  type boolean;
```

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```
description
      "The IPv6 address of the destination node(s).";
 }
}
container packet-security-tcp-condition {
  description
    "The purpose of this Class is to represent packet
    TCP packet header information that can be used as
     part of a test to determine if the set of Policy
    Actions in this ECA Policy Rule should be executed
     or not.";
  leaf pkt-sec-cond-tcp-src-port {
    type boolean;
    description
      "This is a mandatory string attribute, and
      defines the Source Port number (16 bits).";
  }
  leaf pkt-sec-cond-tcp-dest-port {
    type boolean;
    description
      "This is a mandatory string attribute, and
      defines the Destination Port number (16 bits).";
  }
  leaf pkt-sec-cond-tcp-seq-num {
    type boolean;
    description
      "If the SYN flag is set (1), then this is the
       initial sequence number.";
  }
  leaf pkt-sec-cond-tcp-ack-num {
    type boolean;
    description
      "If the ACK flag is set then the value of this
      field is the next sequence number that the sender
       is expecting.";
  }
  leaf pkt-sec-cond-tcp-window-size {
    type boolean;
    description
      "The size of the receive window, which specifies
       the number of windows size units (by default, bytes)
       (beyond the segment identified by the sequence
```

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```
number in the acknowledgment field) that the sender
       of this segment is currently willing to recive.";
  }
  leaf pkt-sec-cond-tcp-flags {
    type boolean;
    description
      "This is a mandatory string attribute, and defines
       the nine Control bit flags (9 bits).";
  }
}
container packet-security-udp-condition {
  description
    "The purpose of this Class is to represent packet UDP
     packet header information that can be used as part
     of a test to determine if the set of Policy Actions
     in this ECA Policy Rule should be executed or not.";
  leaf pkt-sec-cond-udp-src-port {
    type boolean;
    description
      "This is a mandatory string attribute, and
      defines the UDP Source Port number (16 bits).";
  }
  leaf pkt-sec-cond-udp-dest-port {
    type boolean;
    description
      "This is a mandatory string attribute, and
      defines the UDP Destination Port number (16 bits).";
  }
  leaf pkt-sec-cond-udp-length {
    type boolean;
    description
      "This is a mandatory string attribute, and defines
       the length in bytes of the UDP header and data
       (16 bits).";
  }
}
container packet-security-icmp-condition {
  description
    "The internet control message protocol condition.";
  leaf pkt-sec-cond-icmp-type {
    type boolean;
```

```
description
        "ICMP type, see Control messages.";
    }
    leaf pkt-sec-cond-icmp-code {
      type boolean;
      description
        "ICMP subtype, see Control messages.";
    }
    leaf pkt-sec-cond-icmp-seg-num {
      type boolean;
      description
        "The icmp Sequence Number.";
    }
 }
}
container packet-payload-condition {
  description "TBD";
  leaf pkt-payload-content {
    type boolean;
    description
      "The content keyword is very important in
       signatures. Between the quotation marks you
       can write on what you would like the
       signature to match.";
 }
}
leaf acl-number {
 type boolean;
 description
   "This is acl-number.";
}
container application-condition {
  description
    "TBD";
 leaf application-object {
    type boolean;
    description
      "This is application object.";
  leaf application-group {
    type boolean;
    description
      "This is application group.";
```

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```
}
  leaf application-label {
    type boolean;
    description
      "This is application label.";
  container category {
    description
      "TBD";
    leaf application-category {
      type boolean;
      description
        "TBD";
   }
 }
}
container target-condition {
  description "TBD";
  leaf device-sec-context-cond {
    type boolean;
    description
      "The device attribute that can identify a device,
       including the device type (i.e., router, switch,
       pc, ios, or android) and the device's owner as
       well.";
  }
}
container users-condition {
  description "TBD";
 container user{
    description
      "The user (or user group) information with which
       network flow is associated: The user has many
       attributes such as name, id, password, type,
       authentication mode and so on. Name/id is often
       used in the security policy to identify the user.
       Besides, NSF is aware of the IP address of the
       user provided by a unified user management system
       via network. Based on name-address association,
       NSF is able to enforce the security functions
       over the given user (or user group)";
    choice user-name {
```

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```
description
      "The name of the user.
       This must be unique.";
    case tenant {
      description
        "Tenant information.";
      leaf tenant {
        type boolean;
        description
          "User's tenant information.";
      }
    }
    case vn-id {
      description
        "VN-ID information.";
      leaf vn-id {
        type boolean;
        description
          "User's VN-ID information.";
      }
    }
 }
}
container group {
  description
    "The user (or user group) information with which
     network flow is associated: The user has many
     attributes such as name, id, password, type,
     authentication mode and so on. Name/id is often
     used in the security policy to identify the user.
     Besides, NSF is aware of the IP address of the
     user provided by a unified user management system
     via network. Based on name-address association,
     NSF is able to enforce the security functions
     over the given user (or user group)";
  choice group-name {
    description
      "The name of the user.
       This must be unique.";
    case tenant {
      description
        "Tenant information.";
```

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```
leaf tenant {
          type boolean;
          description
            "User's tenant information.";
      }
      case vn-id {
        description
          "VN-ID information.";
        leaf vn-id {
          type boolean;
          description
            "User's VN-ID information.";
        }
      }
    }
    leaf security-grup {
      type boolean;
      mandatory true;
      description
        "security-grup.";
    }
 }
}
container url-category-condition {
  description
    "TBD";
 leaf pre-defined-category {
    type boolean;
    description
      "This is pre-defined-category.";
 leaf user-defined-category {
    type boolean;
    description
      "This user-defined-category.";
 }
}
container context-condition {
  description "TBD";
 leaf temp {
    type string;
    description
      "This is temp for context condition.";
```

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```
}
    }
    container gen-context-condition {
      description "TBD";
      container geographic-location {
        description
          "The location where network traffic is associated
           with. The region can be the geographic location
           such as country, province, and city,
           as well as the logical network location such as
           IP address, network section, and network domain.";
        leaf src-geographic-location {
          type boolean;
          description
            "This is mapped to ip address. We can acquire
             source region through ip address stored the
             database.";
        }
        leaf dest-geographic-location {
          type boolean;
          description
            "This is mapped to ip address. We can acquire
             destination region through ip address stored
             the database.";
        }
      }
    }
}
container action {
  description
    "An action is used to control and monitor aspects of
     flow-based NSFs when the event and condition clauses
     are satisfied. NSFs provide security functions by
     executing various Actions. Examples of I2NSF Actions
     include providing intrusion detection and/or protection,
     web and flow filtering, and deep packet inspection
     for packets and flows.";
    leaf rule-log {
      type boolean;
      description
        "rule-log";
    leaf session-log {
      type boolean;
      description
```

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```
"session-log";
}
container ingress-action {
  description "TBD";
  container ingress-action-type {
    description
      "Ingress action type: permit, deny, and mirror.";
    leaf pass {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If ingress action is pass";
    }
    leaf drop {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If ingress action is drop";
    leaf reject {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If ingress action is reject";
    }
    leaf alert {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If ingress action is alert";
    }
    leaf mirror {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If ingress action is mirror";
 }
container egress-action {
  description "TBD";
 container egress-action-type {
    description
      "Egress-action-type: invoke-signaling,
       tunnel-encapsulation, and forwarding.";
    leaf invoke-signaling {
      type boolean;
      description
        "If egress action is invoke signaling";
    }
```

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leaf tunnel-encapsulation {

```
type boolean;
              description
                "If egress action is tunnel encapsulation";
            leaf forwarding {
              type boolean;
              description
                "If egress action is forwarding";
            leaf redirection {
              type boolean;
              description
                "If egress action is redirection";
            }
          }
        }
    container resolution-strategy {
      description
        "The resolution strategies can be used to
        specify how to resolve conflicts that occur between
        the actions of the same or different policy rules that
        are matched and contained in this particular NSF";
      leaf first-matching-rule {
        type boolean;
        description
          "If the resolution strategy is first matching rule";
      }
      leaf last-matching-rule {
        type boolean;
        description
          "If the resolution strategy is last matching rule";
      }
   }
 }
}
grouping i2nsf-con-sec-control-caps {
 description
    "i2nsf-con-sec-control-caps";
 container con-sec-control-capabilities {
    description
      "content-security-control-capabilities";
```

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```
leaf anti-virus {
  type boolean;
  description
    "antivirus";
}
leaf ips {
  type boolean;
  description
    "ips";
}
leaf ids {
  type boolean;
  description
    "ids";
}
leaf url-filter {
  type boolean;
  description
    "url-filter";
}
leaf data-filter {
  type boolean;
  description
    "data-filter";
}
leaf mail-filter {
  type boolean;
  description
    "mail-filter";
}
leaf sql-filter {
  type boolean;
  description
    "sql-filter";
}
leaf file-blocking {
  type boolean;
  description
    "file-blocking";
}
leaf file-isolate {
  type boolean;
  description
    "file-isolate";
}
leaf pkt-capture {
```

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```
type boolean;
      description
        "pkt-capture";
   }
   leaf application-behavior {
      type boolean;
      description
        "application-behavior";
   }
   leaf voip-volte {
      type boolean;
      description
        "voip-volte";
   }
 }
}
grouping i2nsf-attack-mitigation-control-caps {
 description
    "i2nsf-attack-mitigation-control-caps";
 container attack-mitigation-capabilities {
   description
      "attack-mitigation-capabilities";
   choice attack-mitigation-control-type {
      description
        "attack-mitigation-control-type";
      case ddos-attack {
        description
          "ddos-attack";
        choice ddos-attack-type {
          description
            "ddos-attack-type";
          case network-layer-ddos-attack {
            description
              "network-layer-ddos-attack";
            container network-layer-ddos-attack-types {
              description
                "network-layer-ddos-attack-type";
              leaf syn-flood-attack {
                type boolean;
                description
                  "syn-flood-attack";
              leaf udp-flood-attack {
                type boolean;
```

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```
description
        "udp-flood-attack";
    leaf icmp-flood-attack {
      type boolean;
      description
        "icmp-flood-attack";
    leaf ip-fragment-flood-attack {
      type boolean;
      description
        "ip-fragment-flood-attack";
    leaf ipv6-related-attack {
      type boolean;
      description
        "ip-fragment-flood-attack";
    }
  }
}
case app-layer-ddos-attack {
  description
    "app-layer-ddos-attack";
  container app-layer-ddos-attack-types {
    description
      "app-layer-ddos-attack-types";
    leaf http-flood-attack {
      type boolean;
      description
        "http-flood-attack";
    leaf https-flood-attack {
      type boolean;
      description
        "https-flood-attack";
    leaf dns-flood-attack {
      type boolean;
      description
        "dns-flood-attack";
    leaf dns-amp-flood-attack {
      type boolean;
      description
        "dns-amp-flood-attack";
    leaf ssl-flood-attack {
      type boolean;
```

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```
description
            "ssl-flood-attack";
        }
     }
   }
 }
}
case single-packet-attack {
  description
    "single-packet-attack";
 choice single-packet-attack-type {
    description
      "single-packet-attack-type";
    case scan-and-sniff-attack {
      description
        "scan-and-sniff-attack";
      leaf ip-sweep-attack {
        type boolean;
        description
          "ip-sweep-attack";
      leaf port-scanning-attack {
        type boolean;
        description
          "port-scanning-attack";
      }
    }
    case malformed-packet-attack {
      description
        "malformed-packet-attack";
      leaf ping-of-death-attack {
        type boolean;
        description
          "ping-of-death-attack";
      leaf teardrop-attack {
        type boolean;
        description
          "teardrop-attack";
      }
    }
    case special-packet-attack {
      description
        "special-packet-attack";
      leaf oversized-icmp-attack {
        type boolean;
        description
```

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```
"oversized-icmp-attack";
            }
            leaf tracert-attack {
              type boolean;
              description
                "tracert-attack";
            }
         }
       }
     }
   }
 }
}
list nsf {
  key "nsf-name";
 description
   "nsf-name";
 leaf nsf-name {
   type string;
    mandatory true;
    description
      "nsf-name";
 }
 uses capabilities-information;
 container generic-nsf-capabilities {
    description
      "generic-nsf-capabilities";
   uses i2nsf-net-sec-caps;
 }
 container complete-nsf-capabilities {
   description
      "generic-nsf-capabilities";
   uses i2nsf-con-sec-control-caps;
   uses i2nsf-attack-mitigation-control-caps;
 }
}
rpc call-appropriate-nsf {
 description
    "We can acquire appropriate NSF that we want
```

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<CODE ENDS>

Figure 11: YANG Data Module of I2NSF Capability

8. IANA Considerations

No IANA considerations exist for this document at this time. URL will be added.

9. Security Considerations

This document introduces no additional security threats and SHOULD follow the security requirements as stated in $[\mbox{RFC8329}]$.

10. Acknowledgments

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11. Contributors

I2NSF is a group effort. I2NSF has had a number of contributing authors. The following are considered co-authors:

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<u>Appendix A</u>. Example: Extended VoIP-VoLTE Security Function Capabilities Module

This section gives a simple example of how VoIP-VoLTE Security Function Capabilities module could be extended.

```
module
ex-voip-volte-capa {
  namespace "http://example.com/voip-volte-capa";
  prefix "voip-volte-capa";
  import ietf-i2nsf-capability {
    prefix capa;
  }
  augment "/capa:nsf/capa:generic-nsf-capabilities/"
          + "capa:net-sec-control-capabilities/"
          + "capa:condition/capa:condition-type" {
    case voice-condition {
      leaf sip-header-method {
        type boolean;
        description
          "SIP header method.";
      }
      leaf sip-header-uri {
        type boolean;
        description
          "SIP header URI.";
      }
      leaf sip-header-from {
        type boolean;
        description
          "SIP header From.";
      }
      leaf sip-header-to {
        type boolean;
        description
          "SIP header To.";
      }
      leaf sip-header-expire-time {
        type boolean;
        description
          "SIP header expire time.";
```

```
leaf sip-header-user-agent {
    type boolean;
    description
        "SIP header user agent.";
}
}
```

Figure 12: Example: Extended VoIP-VoLTE Security Function Capabilities Module

Appendix B. Example: Configuration XML of Capability Module

This section gives a xml examples for a configuration of Capability module according to a requirement.

B.1. Example: Configuration XML of Generic Network Security Function Capabilities

This section gives a xml example for generic network security function capability configuration according to a requirement.

Requirement: Register packet filter according to requirements.

- 1. The location of the NSF is 221,159,112,150.
- 2. The NSF can obtain the best effect if the packet was generated by PC or IoT.
- 3. The NSF can apply policies according to time.
- 4. The NSF should be able to block the source packets or destination packets with IPv4 address.
- 5. The NSF should be able to pass, reject, or alert packets.
- 6. Here is XML example for the generic network security function capability configuration:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rpc message-id="1" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<edit-config>
<target>
 <running />
 </target>
 <config>
  <nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:" +</pre>
                      "ietf-i2nsf-capability">
   <nsf-name>Huawei-Firewall</nsf-name>
   <nsf-address>
     <ipv4-address>221.159.112.150</ipv4-address>
   </nsf-address>
   <target-device>
     <pc>true</pc>
   </target-device>
   <target-device>
    <iot>true</iot>
   </target-device>
   <generic-nsf-capabilities>
     <net-sec-control-capabilities>
      <nsc-capabilities-name>ipv4-packet-filter<nsc-capabilities-name>
      <time-zone>
       <start-time>true</start-time>
       <end-time>true</end-time>
      </time-zone>
      <condition>
        <packet-security-ipv4-condition>
         <pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-src>true</pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-src>
         <pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-dest>true</pkt-sec-cond-ipv4-dest>
        </packet-security-ipv4-condition>
      </condition>
      <action>
       <ingress-action-type>
        <pas>>true</pas>>
        <reject>true</reject>
        <alert>true</alert>
       </ingress-action-type>
      </action>
   </net-sec-control-capabilities>
   </generic-nsf-capabilities>
  </nsf>
</config>
</edit-config>
</rpc>
```

Figure 13: Example: Configuration XML for Generic Network Security

Function Capability

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B.2. Example: Configuration XML of Extended VoIP/VoLTE Security Function Capabilities Module

This section gives a xml example for extended VoIP-VoLTE security function capabilities (See Figure 12) configuration according to a requirement.

Requirement: Register VoIP/VoLTe security function according to requirements.

- 1. The location of the NSF is 221.159.112.151.
- 2. The NSF can obtain the best effect if the packet was generated by VoIP-VoLTE phone.
- 3. The NSF should be able to block the malicious sip packets with user agent.
- 4. The NSF should be able to pass, reject, or alert packets.

Here is XML example for the VoIP-VoLTE security function capabilities configuration:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rpc message-id="1" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:netconf:base:1.0">
<edit-config>
<target>
 <running />
 </target>
 <confiq>
 <nsf xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:" +</pre>
             "ietf-i2nsf-capability">
 <nsf-name>Cisco-VoIP-VoLTE</nsf-name>
 <nsf-address>
   <ipv4-address>221.159.112.151</ipv4-address>
 </nsf-address>
 <generic-nsf-capabilities>
   <net-sec-control-capabilities>
   <nsc-capabilities-name>sip-packet-filter<nsc-capabilities-name>
     <condition>
       <sip-header-user-agent>true</sip-header-user-agent>
     </condition>
     <action>
      <ingress-action-type>
        <pass>true</pass>
        <reject>true</reject>
        <alert>true</alert>
      </ingress-action-type>
     </action>
  </net-sec-control-capabilities>
 </generic-nsf-capabilities>
 </nsf>
 </config>
</edit-config>
</rpc>
```

Figure 14: Example: Configuration XML for Extended VoIP/VoLTE Security Function Capabilities

Appendix C. Changes from draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-01

The following changes are made from <u>draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-00</u>:

- 1. We have clarified and simplified capabilities.
- 2. We added additional condition capabilities for application and url.
- 3. We replaced unnecessary leaf-list component to leaf component.

- 4. We replaced the list component to the container component for net-sec-capabilities.
- 5. We modified the choice-case structure into a container structure to allow for the selection of multiple catalogues for condition and action clauses.
- 6. We added complete-nsf-capabilities such as content capabilities and attack mitigation capabilities.

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