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I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface YANG Data Model draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-07

Abstract

This document describes an information model and a YANG data model for the Consumer-Facing Interface between an Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) User and Security Controller in an I2NSF system in a Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) environment. The information model defines various types of managed objects and the relationship among them needed to build the interface. The information model is organized based on the "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA) policy model defined by a capability information model for I2NSF [i2nsf-capability-im], and the data model is defined for enabling different users of a given I2NSF system to define, manage, and monitor security policies for specific flows within an administrative domain.

Status of This Memo

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1. Introduction

In a framework of Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF), each vendor can register their NSFs using a Developer's Management System (DMS). Assuming that vendors also provide the front-end web applications registered with an I2NSF User, the Consumer-Facing Interface is required because the web applications developed by each vendor need to have a standard interface specifying the data types used when the I2NSF User and Security Controller communicate using this interface. Therefore, this document specifies the required information, their data types, and encoding schemes so that highlevel security policies (or configuration information for security policies) can be transferred to the Security Controller through the Consumer-Facing Interface. These policies can easily be translated by the Security Controller into low-level security policies. The Security Controller delivers the translated policies to Network Security Functions (NSFs) according to their respective security capabilities for the required securiy enforcement.

The Consumer-Facing Interface would be built using a set of objects, with each object capturing a unique set of information from Security Administrator (i.e., I2NSF User [RFC8329]) needed to express a Security Policy. An object may have relationship with various other objects to express a complete set of requirements. An information model captures the managed objects and relationship among these objects. The information model proposed in this document is structured in accordance with the "Event-Condition-Action" (ECA) policy model.

An NSF Capability model is proposed in [<u>i2nsf-capability-im</u>] as the basic model for both the NSF-Facing interface and Consumer-Facing Interface security policy model of this document.

[RFC3444] explains differences between an information and data model. This document uses the guidelines in [RFC3444] to define both the information and data model for Consumer-Facing Interface. Figure 1 shows a high-level abstraction of Consumer-Facing Interface. A data model, which represents an implementation of the information model in a specific data representation language, is also defined in this document.




Figure 1: Diagram for High-level Abstraction of Consumer-Facing Interface

Data models are defined at a lower level of abstraction and provide many details. They provide details about the implementation of a protocol's specification, e.g., rules that explain how to map managed objects onto lower-level protocol constructs. Since conceptual models can be implemented in different ways, multiple data models can be derived from a single information model.

The efficient and flexible provisioning of network functions by a Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) system leads to a rapid advance in the network industry. As practical applications, Network Security Functions (NSFs), such as firewall, Intrusion Detection System (IDS)/Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), and attack mitigation, can also be provided as Virtual Network Functions (VNF) in the NFV system. By the efficient virtualization technology, these VNFs might be automatically provisioned and dynamically migrated based on real-time security requirements. This document presents a YANG data model to implement security functions based on NFV.

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2. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC3444] RFC8174 [RFC8174].

3. Terminology

This document uses the terminology described in [<u>i2nsf-terminology</u>] [client-facing-inf-req].

This document follows the guidelines of [RFC8407], uses the common YANG types defined in [RFC6991], and adopts the Network Management Datastore Architecture (NMDA). The meaning of the symbols in tree diagrams is defined in [RFC8340].

4. Information Model for Policy

A Policy object represents a mechanism to express a Security Policy by Security Administrator (i.e., I2NSF User) using Consumer-Facing Interface toward Security Controller; the policy would be enforced on an NSF. Figure 2 shows the YANG tree of the Policy object. The Policy object SHALL have the following information:

Name: This field identifies the name of this object.

Date: Date when this object was created or last modified.

Rule: This field contains a list of rules. These rules are defined for 1) communication between two Endpoint Groups, 2) for preventing communication with externally or internally identified threats, and 3) for implementing business requirement such as controlling access to internal or external resources for meeting regulatory compliance or business objectives. An organization may restrict certain communication between a set of user and applications for example. The threats may be from threat feeds obtained from external sources or dynamically identified by using specialty devices in the network. Rule conflict analysis should be triggered by the monitoring service to perform an exhaustive detection of anomalies among the configuration rules installed into the security functions.

Figure 2: Policy YANG Data Tree

A policy is a container of Rule. In order to express a Rule, a Rule must have complete information such as where and when a policy needs to be applied. This is done by defining a set of managed objects and relationship among them. A Policy Rule may be related segmentation, threat mitigation or telemetry data collection from an NSF in the network, which will be specified as the sub-model of the policy model in the subsequent sections. Figure 3 shows the YANG data tree of the Rule object. The rule object SHALL have the following information:

Name: This field identifies the name of this object.

Event: This field includes the information to determine whether the Rule Condition can be evaluated or not. See details in Section 4.1.

Condition: This field contains all the checking conditions to apply to the objective traffic. See details in Section 4.2.

Action: This field identifies the action taken when a rule is matched. There is always an implicit action to drop traffic if no rule is matched for a traffic type. See details in Section 4.3.

IPsec-Method: This field contains the information about IPsec
 method type. There are two types such as IPsec-IKE and
 IPsec-IKEless [i2nsf-ipsec].

Owner: This field contains the onwer of the rule. For example, the person who created it, and eligible for modifying it.

Figure 3: Rule YANG Data Tree

4.1. Event Sub-model

The Event Object contains information related to scheduling a Rule. The Rule could be activated based on a set time or security event. Figure 4 shows the YANG tree of the Event object. Event object SHALL have following information:

Security-event: This field identifies for which security event the policy is enforced. The examples of security events are: "DDOS", "spyware", "trojan", and "ransomware".

Enforce-type: This field identifies whether the event of triggering policy enforcement is "Admin" or "Time".

Admin: This represents the enforcement type based on admin's decision.

Time: This represents the security rule is enforced based on begin-time and end-time information.

Frequency: This represents how frequent the rule should be enforced. There are four options: "only-once", "daily", "weekly" and "monthly".

```
+--rw event
    +--rw security-event identityref
    +--rw (enforce-type)?
    | +--:(admin)
    | | +--rw admin? identityref
    | +--:(time)
    | +--rw time-information
    | +--rw begin-time? yang:date-and-time
    | +--rw end-time? yang:date-and-time
    +--rw frequency? enumeration
```

Figure 4: Event Sub-model YANG Data Tree

4.2. Condition Sub-model

This object represents Conditions that Security Administrator wants to apply the checking on the traffic in order to determine whether the set of actions in the Rule can be executed or not. The Condition Sub-model consists of three different types of containers each representing different cases, such as general firewall and DDoS-mitigation cases, and a case when the condition is based on the payload strings of packets. Each containers have source-target and destination-target to represent the source and destination for each case. Figure 5 shows the YANG tree of the Condition object. The Condition Sub-model SHALL have following information:

- Case (Firewall-condition): This field represents the general firewall case, where a security admin can set up firewall conditions using the information present in this field. The source and destination is represented as firewall-source and firewall-destination, each referring to the IP-address-based groups defined in the endpoint-group.
- Case (DDoS-condition): This field represents the condition for DDoS mitigation, where a security admin can set up DDoS mitigation conditions using the information present in this field. The source and destination is represented as ddossource and ddos-destination, each referring to the device-groups defined and registered in the endpoint-group.
- Case (Custom-condition): This field contains the payload string information. This information is useful when security rule condition is based on the string contents of incoming or outgoing packets. The source and destination is represented as custom-source and custom-destination, each referring to the payload-groups defined and registered in the endpoint-group.
- Case (Threat-feed-condition): This field contains the information obtained from threat-feeds (e.g., Palo-Alto, or RSA-netwitness). This information is useful when security rule condition is based on the existing threat reports gathered by other sources. The source and destination is represented as threat-feed-source and threat-feed-destination. For clarity, threat-feed-source/destination represent the source/destination of a target security threat, not the information source/destination of a threat-feed.

```
+--rw (condition)?
  +--:(firewall-condition)
   | +--rw firewall-source
   | | +--rw src-target -> /../../nacm:group/nacm:user-name
   | +--rw firewall-destination
        +--rw dest-target* -> /../../nacm:group/nacm:user-name
  +--:(ddos-condition)
   | +--rw ddos-source
   | | +--rw src-target* -> /../../device-group/name
   | +--rw ddos-destination
   | | +--rw dest-target* -> /../../device-group/name
   | +--rw rate-limit
        +--rw packet-per-second? uint16
  +--:(custom-condition)
   | +--rw custon-source
   | | +--rw src-target* -> /../../payload-content/name
   | +--rw custom-destination
        +--rw dest-target -> /../../payload-content/name
  +--:(threat-feed-condition)
     +--rw threat-feed-source
     +--rw src-target* -> /../../threat-feed-list/feed-name
     +--rw threat-feed-destination
        +--rw dest-target -> /../../threat-feed-list/feed-name
```

Figure 5: Condition Sub-model YANG Data Tree

4.3. Action Sub-model

This object represents actions that Security Admin wants to perform based on certain traffic class. Figure 6 shows the YANG tree of the Action object. The Action object SHALL have following information:

```
Primary-action: This field identifies the action when a rule is matched by an NSF. The action could be one of "PASS", "DROP", "ALERT", "RATE-LIMIT", and "MIRROR".
```

Secondary-action: This field identifies the action when a rule is matched by an NSF. The action could be one of "log", "syslog", "session-log".

```
+--rw action
+--rw primary-action identityref
+--rw secondary-action? identityref
```

Figure 6: Action Sub-model YANG Data Tree

5. Information Model for Policy Endpoint Groups

The Policy Endpoint Group is a very important part of building User-Construct based policies. A Security Administrator would create and use these objects to represent a logical entity in their business environment, where a Security Policy is to be applied. There are multiple managed objects that constitute a Policy's Endpoint Group as shown in Figure 7. Figure 8 shows the YANG tree of the Endpoint-Group object. This section lists these objects and relationship among them.




Figure 7: Endpoint Group Diagram

```
+--rw endpoint-group
+--rw user-group* [name]
...
+--rw device-group* [name]
...
+--rw location-group* [name]
```

Figure 8: Endpoint Group YANG Data Tree

5.1. User Group

This object represents a User-Group. Figure 9 shows the YANG tree of the User-Group object. The User-Group object SHALL have the following information:

Name: This field identifies the name of this object.

IP-address: This represents the IPv4 address of a user in the user group.

range-ipv4-address: This represents the IPv4 address of a user in the user gorup.

range-ipv6-address: This represents the IPv6 address of a user in the user gorup.

```
+--rw user-group* [name]
   +--rw name -> /../../nacm:group/nacm:user-name
   +--rw (match-type)?
     +--:(exact-match-ipv4)
      | +--rw ip-address*
                                   inet:ipv4-address
     +--:(exact-match-ipv6)
      | +--rw ip-address*
                                   inet:ipv4-address
     +--:(range-match-ipv4)
      | +--rw range-ipv4-address*
                         [start-ipv4-address end-ipv4-address]
           +--rw start-ipv4-address
                                      inet:ipv4-address
           +--rw end-ipv4-address inet:ipv4-address
     +--: (range-match-ipv6)
        +--rw range-ipv6-address*
                         [start-ipv6-vaddress end-ipv6-address]
           +--rw start-ipv6-address inet:ipv6-address
           +--rw end-ipv6-address
                                     inet:ipv6-address
```

Figure 9: User Group YANG Data Tree

<u>5.2</u>. Device Group

This object represents a Device-Group. Figure 10 shows the YANG tree of the Device-group object. The Device-Group object SHALL have the following information:

Name: This field identifies the name of this object.

IP-address: This represents the IPv4 address of a device in the device group.

range-ipv4-address: This represents the IPv4 address of a device in the device gorup.

range-ipv6-address: This represents the IPv6 address of a device in the device gorup.

Protocol: This represents the communication protocols used by the devices. The protocols are "SSH", "FTP", "SMTP", "HTTP", "HTTPS", and etc.

```
+--rw device-group* [name]
  +--rw name
                                    string
  +--rw (match-type)?
   +--:(exact-match-ipv4)
   | | +--rw ip-address*
                                    inet:ipv4-address
   | +--:(exact-match-ipv6)
   | | +--rw ip-address*
                                    inet:ipv4-address
   | +--:(range-match-ipv4)
   | | +--rw range-ipv4-address*
                       [start-ipv4-address end-ipv4-address]
           +--rw start-ipv4-address inet:ipv4-address
           +--rw end-ipv4-address inet:ipv4-address
   | +--:(range-match-ipv6)
        +--rw range-ipv6-address*
                       [start-ipv6-vaddress end-ipv6-address]
           +--rw start-ipv6-address inet:ipv6-address
           +--rw end-ipv6-address
                                      inet:ipv6-address
  +--rw protocol
                                      identityref
```

Figure 10: Device Group YANG Data Tree

5.3. Location Group

This object represents a location group based on either tag or other information. Figure 11 shows the YANG tree of the Location-Group object. The Location-Group object SHALL have the following information:

Figure 11: Location Group YANG Data Tree

6. Information Model for Threat Prevention

The threat prevention plays an important part in the overall security posture by reducing the attack surfaces. This information could come from various threat feeds (i.e., sources for obtaining the threat information). There are multiple managed objects that constitute this category. This section lists these objects and relationship among them. Figure 13 shows the YANG tree of a Threat-Prevention object.




Figure 12: Threat Prevention Diagram

```
+--rw threat-prevention
+--rw threat-feed-list* [name]
...
+--rw payload-content* [name]
...
```

Figure 13: Threat Prevention YANG Data Tree

6.1. Threat Feed

This object represents a threat feed which provides signatures of malicious activities. Figure 14 shows the YANG tree of a Threat-feed-list. The Threat-Feed object SHALL have the following information:

Feed-name: This field identifies the name of this object.

Feed-Server-ipv4: This represents the IPv4 server address of the feed provider, it may be external or local servers.

Feed-Server-ipv6: This represents the IPv6 server address of the feed provider, it may be external or local servers.

- Feed-description: This is the description of the threat feed.

 The descriptions should have clear indication of the security attack such as attack type (e.g., APT) and file types used (e.g., executable malware).
- Threat-file-types: This field identifies the information about the file types identified and reported by the threat-feed.
- signatures: This field contains the signatures of malicious programs or activities provided by the threat-feed. The examples of signature types are "YARA", "SURICATA", and "SNORT".

+--rw threat-prevention

```
+--rw threat-feed-list* [feed-name]
```

```
+--rw feed-name identityref
+--rw feed-server-ipv4? inet:ipv4-address
+--rw feed-server-ipv6? inet:ipv6-address
+--rw feed-description? string
+--rw threat-file-types* identityref
+--rw signatures* identityref
```

Figure 14: Threat Feed YANG Data Tree

6.2. Payload Content

This object represents a custom list created for the purpose of defining exception to threat feeds. Figure 15 shows the YANG tree of a Payload-content list. The Payload-Content object SHALL have the following information:

Name: This field identifies the name of this object. For example, the name "backdoor" indicates the payload content is related to backdoor attack.

payload-description: This represents the description of how the payload content is related to a security attack.

Content: This contains the payload contents, which are involed in a security attack, as strings.

```
+--rw payload-content* [name]
+--rw name string
+--rw payload-description string
+--rw content* string
```

Figure 15: Payload Content in YANG Data Tree

Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM)

Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM) provides a high-level overview of the access control with the following features [RFC8341]:

- o Independent control of action, data, and notification access is provided.
- o A simple and familiar set of datastore permissions is used.
- o Support for YANG security tagging allows default security modes to automatically exclude sensitive data.
- o Separate default access modes for read, write, and execute permissions are provided.
- o Access control rules are applied to configurable groups of users.

The data model for the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface provides NACM mechanisms and concepts to user-group and owners permissions. The NACM with the above features can be used to set up all the management access controls in the I2NSF high-level authorization view, and it may have a high impact on the optimization and performance.

8. YANG Data Model of Consumer-Facing Interface

The main objective of this data model is to provide both an information model and the corresponding YANG data model of I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface. This interface can be used to deliver control and management messages between an I2NSF User and Security Controller for the I2NSF User's high-level security policies.

The semantics of the data model must be aligned with the information model of the Consumer-Facing Interface. The transformation of the information model was performed so that this YANG data model can facilitate the efficient delivery of the control or management messages.

This data model is designed to support the I2NSF framework that can be extended according to the security needs. In other words, the model design is independent of the content and meaning of specific policies as well as the implementation approach. This document suggests a VoIP/VoLTE security service as a use case for policy rule generation.

This section describes a YANG data model for Consumer-Facing Interface, based on the information model of Consumer-Facing Interface to Security Controller.

```
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy@2019-11-04.yang"
module ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy {
yang-version 1.1;
  namespace
    "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy";
  prefix
    cfi-policy;
  import ietf-yang-types{
    prefix yang;
    reference
    "Section 3 of RFC 6991";
  }
  import ietf-inet-types{
    prefix inet;
    reference
    "Section 4 of RFC 6991";
  }
  import ietf-netconf-acm {
    prefix nacm;
  }
  organization
    "IETF I2NSF (Interface to Network Security Functions)
     Working Group";
  contact
    "WG Web: <<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/i2nsf">http://tools.ietf.org/wg/i2nsf</a>>
     WG List: <mailto:i2nsf@ietf.org>
     WG Chair: Linda Dunbar
     <mailto:Linda.duhbar@huawei.com>
     WG Chair: Yoav Nir
```

```
<mailto:ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
   Editor: Jaehoon Paul Jeong
   <mailto:pauljeong@skku.edu>
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description
 "This module is a YANG module for Consumer-Facing Interface.
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 (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>).
 This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX; see
 the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
revision "2019-11-04"{
  description "The latest revision";
  reference
    "draft-ietf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-07";
}
identity malware-file-type {
  description
    "Base identity for malware file types.";
identity executable-file {
  base malware-file-type;
  description
    "Identity for executable file types.";
}
identity doc-file {
  base malware-file-type;
  description
    "Identity for Microsoft document file types.";
}
identity html-app-file {
  base malware-file-type;
  description
    "Identity for html application file types.";
identity javascript-file {
```

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```
base malware-file-type;
  description
    "Identity for Javascript file types.";
identity pdf-file {
  base malware-file-type;
  description
    "Identity for pdf file types.";
identity dll-file {
  base malware-file-type;
  description
    "Identity for dll file types.";
identity msi-file {
  base malware-file-type;
  description
    "Identity for Microsoft installer file types.";
}
identity security-event-type {
  description
    "Base identity for security event types.";
identity ddos {
  base malware-file-type;
  description
    "Identity for DDoS event types.";
identity spyware {
  base malware-file-type;
  description
    "Identity for spyware event types.";
identity trojan {
  base malware-file-type;
  description
    "Identity for Trojan infection event types.";
identity ransomware {
  base malware-file-type;
  description
    "Identity for ransomware infection event types.";
}
identity i2nsf-ipsec {
  description
    "Base identity for IPsec method types.";
```

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```
}
identity ipsec-ike {
  base i2nsf-ipsec;
  description
    "Identity for ipsec-ike.";
}
identity ipsec-ikeless {
  base i2nsf-ipsec;
  description
    "Identity for ipsec-ikeless.";
}
identity continent {
 description
  "Base Identity for continent types.";
identity africa {
  base continent;
  description
  "Identity for africa.";
identity asia {
  base continent;
  description
  "Identity for asia.";
identity europe {
  base continent;
  description
  "Identity for europe.";
identity north-america {
  base continent;
  description
  "Identity for north-america.";
identity south-america {
  base continent;
  description
  "Identity for south-america.";
identity oceania {
  base continent;
  description
  "Identity for Oceania";
}
```

```
identity enforce-type {
 description
  "This identity represents the event of
 policy enforcement trigger type.";
identity admin {
 base enforce-type;
  description
  "The identity for policy enforcement by admin.";
identity time {
 base enforce-type;
 description
  "The identity for policy enforcement based on time.";
identity protocol-type {
 description
  "This identity represents the protocol types.";
identity ftp {
 base protocol-type;
  description
  "The identity for ftp protocol.";
identity ssh {
 base protocol-type;
  description
 "The identity for ssh protocol.";
identity telnet {
 base protocol-type;
 description
 "The identity for telnet.";
}
identity smtp {
 base protocol-type;
  description
  "The identity for smtp.";
identity sftp {
 base protocol-type;
  description
  "The identity for sftp.";
identity http {
  base protocol-type;
  description
```

```
"The identity for http.";
identity https {
  base protocol-type;
  description
  "The identity for https.";
identity pop3 {
  base protocol-type;
  description
  "The identity for pop3.";
identity nat {
  base protocol-type;
  description
  "The identity for nat.";
}
identity primary-action {
  description
  "This identity represents the primary actions, such as
 PASS, DROP, ALERT, RATE-LIMIT, and MIRROR.";
identity pass {
 base primary-action;
  description
  "The identity for pass.";
identity drop {
  base primary-action;
  description
  "The identity for drop.";
}
identity alert {
  base primary-action;
  description
  "The identity for alert.";
}
identity rate-limit {
  base primary-action;
  description
  "The identity for rate-limit.";
identity mirror {
  base primary-action;
  description
  "The identity for mirroring.";
}
```

```
identity secondary-action {
  description
  "This field identifies additional actions if a rule is
 matched. This could be one of 'LOG', 'SYSLOG',
  'SESSION-LOG', etc.";
}
identity log {
 base secondary-action;
 description
  "The identity for logging.";
}
identity syslog {
 base secondary-action;
 description
 "The identity for system logging.";
identity session-log {
 base secondary-action;
  description
  "The identity for session logging.";
}
identity owner {
 description
  "This is the base identity for the owner";
identity dept-head {
 base owner;
  description
  "This represents the identity of the head of department.";
identity manager {
 base owner;
  description
  "This represents the identity of the manager of the department.";
identity employee {
 base owner;
  description
  "This represents the identity of department employees.";
identity sec-head {
 base owner;
 description
  "This represents the identity of the head of security.";
identity sec-admin {
  base owner;
```

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```
description
  "This represents the identity of security admin.";
identity signature-type {
 description
  "This represents the base identity for signature types.";
identity signature-yara {
 base signature-type;
 description
  "This represents the YARA signatures.";
identity signature-snort {
 base signature-type;
  description
  "This represents the SNORT signatures.";
identity signature-suricata {
 base signature-type;
  description
  "This represents the SURICATA signatures.";
}
identity threat-feed-type {
 description
  "This represents the base identity for threat-feed.";
identity palo-alto {
 base threat-feed-type;
  description
  "This represents Palo-Alto threat-feed.";
identity rsa-netwitness {
 base threat-feed-type;
  description
 "This represents RSA-netwitness threat-feed.";
identity fireeye {
 base threat-feed-type;
 description
 "This represents FireEye threat-feed.";
identity alienvault {
 base threat-feed-type;
 description
  "This represents Alienvault threat-feed.";
}
```

```
/*
 * Groupings
grouping ipv4-list {
  description
  "Grouping for ipv4 based ip-addresses.";
  leaf-list ipv4 {
    type inet:ipv4-address;
    description
    "This is the entry for the ipv4 ip-addresses.";
}
grouping ipv6-list {
  description
  "Grouping for ipv6 based ip-addresses.";
  leaf-list ipv6 {
    type inet:ipv6-address;
    description
    "This is the entry for the ipv6 ip-addresses.";
  }
}
grouping ipv4 {
  description
  "Grouping for ipv4 based ip-address.";
  leaf ipv4 {
    type inet:ipv4-address;
    description
    "This is the entry for the ipv4 ip-address.";
  }
}
grouping ipv6 {
  description
  "Grouping for ipv6 based ip-address.";
  leaf ipv6 {
    type inet:ipv6-address;
    description
    "This is the entry for the ipv6 ip-address.";
  }
}
grouping ip-address-info {
  description
  "There are two types to configure a security policy
    for IPv4 address, such as exact match and range match.";
```

```
choice match-type {
  description
    "User can choose between 'exact match' and 'range match'.";
 case exact-match-ipv4 {
   uses ipv4;
   description
   "Exact ip-address match for ipv4 type addresses";
 case exact-match-ipv6 {
   uses ipv6;
   description
   "Exact ip-address match for ipv6 type addresses";
 case range-match-ipv4 {
   list range-ipv4-address {
      key "start-ipv4-address end-ipv4-address";
      leaf start-ipv4-address {
        type inet:ipv4-address;
        description
          "Start IPv4 address for a range match.";
      }
      leaf end-ipv4-address {
        type inet:ipv4-address;
        description
          "End IPv4 address for a range match.";
      }
      description
        "Range match for an IP-address.";
   }
  }
 case range-match-ipv6 {
   list range-ipv6-address {
      key "start-ipv6-address end-ipv6-address";
      leaf start-ipv6-address {
        type inet:ipv6-address;
        description
          "Start IPv6 address for a range match.";
      leaf end-ipv6-address {
        type inet:ipv6-address;
        description
          "End IPv6 address for a range match.";
      }
      description
        "Range match for an IP-address.";
 }
}
```

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```
}
grouping ipsec-based-method {
 description
  "This represents the ipsec-based method.";
  list ipsec-method {
   key "method";
    description
    "This represents the list of IPsec method types.";
    leaf method {
      type identityref {
        base i2nsf-ipsec;
     description
      "This represents IPsec IKE and IPsec IKEless cases.";
 }
}
grouping user-group {
 description
  "The grouping for user-group entities, and
    contains information such as name & ip-address.";
  leaf-list name {
    type leafref {
      path /nacm:nacm/nacm:groups/nacm:group/nacm:user-name;
    }
    description
    "This represents the name of a user.";
 uses ip-address-info;
}
grouping device-group {
 description
  "This group represents device group information
  such as ip-address protocol.";
  leaf name {
    type string;
    description
    "This represents the name of a device.";
  }
 uses ip-address-info;
  leaf-list protocol {
    type identityref {
      base protocol-type;
    }
```

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```
description
    "This represents the communication protocols of devices.";
 }
}
grouping location-group {
 description
  "This group represents location-group information
  such as geo-ip and continent.";
 leaf name {
    type string;
    description
    "This represents the name of a location.";
  leaf geo-ip-ipv4 {
    type inet:ipv4-address;
    description
    "This represents the IPv4 geo-ip of a location.";
  }
  leaf geo-ip-ipv6 {
    type inet:ipv6-address;
    description
    "This represents the IPv6 geo-ip of a location.";
 leaf continent {
    type identityref {
      base continent;
        }
    description
      "location-group-based on geo-ip of
      respective continent.";
 }
}
grouping threat-feed-info {
  description
  "This is the grouping for the threat-feed-list";
  leaf feed-name {
    type identityref {
      base threat-feed-type;
    description
    "This represents the name of the a threat-feed.";
  leaf feed-server-ipv4 {
    type inet:ipv4-address;
    description
```

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```
"The IPv4 ip-address for the threat-feed server.";
  leaf feed-server-ipv6 {
    type inet:ipv6-address;
    description
    "The IPv6 ip-address for the threat-feed server.";
  leaf feed-description {
    type string;
    description
    "This represents the descriptions of a threat-feed.
   The description should include information, such as
    the type, related threat, method, and file type.";
 }
}
grouping payload-string {
 description
    "The grouping for payload-string content.
    It contains information such as name and string content.";
  leaf payload-description {
    type string;
    description
    "This represents the description of a payload.";
 leaf-list content {
    type string;
    description
    "This represents the payload string content.";
 }
}
grouping owners-ref {
 description
    "This grouping is for owners reference using Network configuration Access
Control Model (NACM).";
  leaf-list owners {
    type leafref {
      path /nacm:nacm/nacm:groups/nacm:group/nacm:name;
    description
      "This leaf-list names the owner groups of the
      list instace it sits on. Only the owners and
      super users are authorized to modify the contents.";
 }
}
```

list i2nsf-cfi-policy {

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```
key "policy-name";
description
"This is the security policy list. Each policy in the list
contains a list of security rules, and is a policy instance
to have complete information such as where and when a
policy needs to be applied.";
leaf policy-name {
  type string;
 mandatory true;
 description
  "The name which identifies the policy.";
uses owners-ref;
container rule{
  description
  "This container is for rules.";
  nacm:default-deny-write;
  list rule {
    leaf rule-name {
      type string;
      mandatory true;
      description
      "This represents the name for the rule.";
    }
    key "rule-name";
    description
    "There can be a single or multiple number of rules.";
    uses owners-ref;
    container event {
      description
      "This represents the event (e.g., a security event,
      which a security rule is made for.)";
      leaf security-event {
        type identityref {
          base security-event-type;
        mandatory true;
        description
        "This contains the description of security events.";
      choice enforce-type {
        description
        "There are three different enforcement types; admin, and time.";
        case enforce-admin {
          leaf admin {
            type identityref {
```

```
base enforce-type;
      }
      description
      "This represents the enforcement type based on admin's
      decision.";
   }
  }
  case time {
    container time-information {
      description
      "The begin-time and end-time information
      when the security rule should be applied.";
      leaf enforce-time {
        type identityref {
          base enforce-type;
        }
        description
        "The enforcement type is time-enforced.";
      leaf begin-time {
        type yang:date-and-time;
        description
        "This is start time for time zone";
      leaf end-time {
        type yang:date-and-time;
        description
        "This is end time for time zone";
      }
    }
  }
}
leaf frequency {
  type enumeration {
    enum only-once {
      description
      "This represents the rule is enforced only once.";
    }
    enum daily {
      description
      "This represents the rule is enforced on a daily basis.";
    }
    enum weekly {
      description
      "This represents the rule is enforced on a weekly basis.";
    }
    enum monthly {
      description
```

```
"This represents the rule is enforced on a monthly basis.";
    }
  }
  default only-once;
  description
  "This represents how frequent the rule should be enforced.";
}
container condition {
  description
  "The conditions for general security policies.";
  choice condition {
    description
    "This choice condition is for general firewall.";
    case firewall-condition {
      description
      "The general firewall condition.";
      container firewall-source {
        description
        "This represents the source.";
        leaf src-target {
          type leafref {
            path /nacm:nacm/nacm:groups/nacm:group/nacm:user-name;
          }
          mandatory true;
          description
          "This describes the paths to
          the source reference.";
        }
      }
      container firewall-destination {
        description
        "This represents the destination.";
        leaf-list dest-target {
          type leafref {
            path /nacm:nacm/nacm:groups/nacm:group/nacm:user-name;
          }
        description
        "This describes the paths to the
        destination target reference.";
        }
      }
    }
    case ddos-condition {
      description
      "The condition for DDoS mitigation.";
      container ddos-source {
        description
```

```
"This represents the source.";
                leaf-list src-target {
                  type leafref {
                  path "/i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-group/device-group/name";
                  }
                description
                "This describes the path to the
                source target references.";
              }
              container ddos-destination {
                description
                "This represents the target.";
                leaf-list dest-target {
                  type leafref {
                  path "/i2nsf-cfi-policy/endpoint-group/device-group/name";
                  }
                  description
                  "This describes the path to the
                  destination target references.";
                }
              }
              container rate-limit {
                description "This describes the rate-limit.";
                leaf packet-per-second {
                  type uint16;
                  description
                  "The rate-limit limits the amount of incoming packets.";
                }
              }
            }
            case custom-condition {
              description
              "The condition based on packet contents.";
              container custon-source {
                description
                "This represents the source.";
                leaf-list src-target {
                  type leafref {
                    path "/i2nsf-cfi-policy/threat-prevention/payload-content/
name";
                  }
                description
                "Describes the payload string
                content condition source.";
                }
              container custom-destination {
```

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```
"This represents the destination.";
                leaf dest-target {
                  type leafref {
                    path "/i2nsf-cfi-policy/threat-prevention/payload-content/
name";
                  }
                mandatory true;
                description
                "Describes the payload string
                content condition destination.";
                }
              }
            case threat-feed-condition {
            description
            "The condition based on the threat-feed information.";
              container threat-feed-source {
                description
                "This represents the source.";
                leaf-list src-target {
                  type leafref {
                  path "/i2nsf-cfi-policy/threat-prevention/threat-feed-list/
feed-name";
                  }
                description "Describes the threat-feed
                condition source.";
                }
              container threat-feed-destination {
              description
              "This represents the destination.";
                leaf dest-target {
                  type leafref {
                  path "/i2nsf-cfi-policy/threat-prevention/threat-feed-list/
feed-name";
                  }
                mandatory true;
                description "Describes the threat-feed
                condition destination.";
                }
              }
            }
          }
        container action {
        description
          "This is the action container.";
        leaf primary-action {
```

```
type identityref {
base primary-action;
```

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```
mandatory true;
      description
      "This represent the primary actions (e.g., PASS, DROP,
      ALERT, and MIRROR) to be applied a condition.";
    }
    leaf secondary-action {
      type identityref {
        base secondary-action;
      description
      "This represents the secondary actions (e.g., log
      and syslog) to be applied if needed.";
      }
    }
    container ipsec-method {
    description
    "This container represents the IPsec IKE and IKEless cases.";
    leaf method {
      type identityref {
      base i2nsf-ipsec;
      }
      description
      "This references the IPsec method types,
       which includes IPsec IKE and IPsec IKEless cases.";
      }
    }
    leaf owner {
      type identityref {
      base owner;
      }
    mandatory true;
    description
    "This field defines the owner of this
    rule. Only the owner is authorized to
    modify the contents of the rule.";
    }
 }
}
container endpoint-group {
description
"A logical entity in their business
environment, where a security policy
is to be applied.";
uses user-group;
list device-group {
key "name";
uses device-group;
description
```

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```
"This represents the device group.";
}
 list location-group{
 key "name";
 uses location-group;
 description
 "This represents the location group.";
 }
}
container threat-prevention {
description
"this describes the list of threat-prevention.";
list threat-feed-list {
  key "feed-name";
 description
 "This represents the threat feed list.";
 uses threat-feed-info;
 leaf-list threat-file-types {
    type identityref {
    base malware-file-type;
   default executable-file;
    description
   "This contains a list of file types needed to
    be scanned for the virus.";
 leaf-list signatures {
    type identityref {
      base signature-type;
    default signature-suricata;
    description
    "This contains a list of signatures or hash
    of the threats.";
   }
 }
list payload-content {
 key "name";
 leaf name {
    type string;
    description
    "This represents the name of payload-content.
    It should give an idea of why specific payload
    content is marked as threat. For example, the name
    'backdoor' indicates the payload content is related
```

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```
to backdoor attack.";
}
description
"This represents the payload-string group.";
uses payload-string;
}
}
}
```

Figure 16: YANG for Consumer-Facing Interface

9. XML Configuration Examples of High-Level Security Policy Rules

This section shows XML configuration examples of high-level security policy rules that are delivered from the I2NSF User to the Security Controller over the Consumer-Facing Interface. The considered use cases are: Database registration, time-based firewall for web filtering, VoIP/VoLTE security service, and DDoS-attack mitigation.

9.1. Database Registration: Information of Positions and Devices (Endpoint Group)

If new endpoints are introduced to the network, it is necessary to first register their data to the database. For example, if new members are newly introduced in either of three different groups (i.e., user-group, device-group, and payload-group), each of them should be registered with information such as ip-addresses or protocols used by devices. Figure 17 shows an example XML representation of the registered information for the user-group and device-group.

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<endpoint-group xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy">
 <user-group>
   <name>employees</name>
   <range-ip-address>
     <start-ip-address>221.159.112.1/start-ip-address>
     <end-ip-address>221.159.112.90</end-ip-address>
   </range-ip-address>
 </user-group>
 <device-group>
   <name>webservers</name>
   <range-ip-address>
     <start-ip-address>221.159.112.91</start-ip-address>
     <end-ip-address>221.159.112.97</end-ip-address>
   </range-ip-address>
   otocol>http
   otocol>https
 </device-group>
</endpoint-group xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy">
```

Figure 17: Registering User-group and Device-group Information

9.2. Scenario 1: Block SNS Access during Business Hours

The first example scenario is to "block SNS access during office hours" using a time-based firewall policy. In this scenario, all users registered as "employees" in the user-group list are unable to access Social Networking Services (SNS) during the office hours. The XML instance is described below:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<policy xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy">
  <policy-name>security_policy_for_blocking_sns</policy-name>
  <rule>
   <rule-name>block_access_to_sns_during_office_hours</rule-name>
   <event>
      <time-information>
        <begin-time>09:00</begin-time>
        <end-time>18:00</end-time>
      </time-information>
    </event>
    <condition>
      <firewall-condition>
        <source-target>
          <src-target>employees</src-target>
        </source-target>
      </firewall-condition>
      <custom-condition>
        <destination-target>
          <dest-target>sns-websites</dest-target>
        </destination-target>
      </custom-condition>
   </condition>
    <action>
      <primary-action>drop</primary-action>
    </action>
    <ipsec-method>
      <method>ipsec-ike</method>
    </ipsec-method>
  </rule>
</policy xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy">
```

Figure 18: An XML Example for Time-based Firewall

Time-based-condition Firewall

- 1. The policy name is "security_policy_for_blocking_sns".
- The rule name is "block_access_to_sns_during_office_hours".
- 3. The Source-target is "employees".
- 4. The destination target is "sns-websites". "sns-websites" is the key which represents the list containing the information, such as URL, about sns-websites.
- 5. The action required is to "drop" any attempt to connect to websites related to Social networking.

6. The IPsec method type used for nsf traffic steering is set to "ipsec-ike".

9.3. Scenario 2: Block Malicious VoIP/VoLTE Packets Coming to a Company

The second example scenario is to "block malicious VoIP/VoLTE packets coming to a company" using a VoIP policy. In this scenario, the calls comming from from VOIP and/or VOLTE sources with VOLTE IDs that are classified as malicious are dropped. The IP addresses of the employees and malicious VOIP IDs should be blocked are stored in the database or datastore of the enterprise. Here and the rest of the cases assume that the security administrators or someone responsible for the existing and newly generated policies, are not aware of which and/or how many NSFs are needed to meet the security requirements. Figure 19 represents the XML document generated from YANG discussed in previous sections. Once a high-level seucurity policy is created by a security admin, it is delivered by the Consumer-Facing Interface, through RESTCONF server, to the security controller. The XML instance is described below:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<policy xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy">
  <policy-name>security_policy_for_blocking_malicious_voip_packets</policy-</pre>
name>
  <rule>
    <rule-name>Block_malicious_voip_and_volte_packets</rule-name>
    <condition>
      <custom-condition>
        <source-target>
          <src-target>malicious-id</src-target>
        </source-target>
      </custom-condition>
      <firewall-condition>
        <destination-target>
          <dest-target>employees</dest-target>
        </destination-target>
      </firewall-condition>
    </condition>
    <action>
      <primary-action>drop</primary-action>
    </action>
    <ipsec-method>
      <method>ipsec-ikeless</method>
    </ipsec-method>
  </rule>
</policy xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy">
```

Figure 19: An XML Example for VoIP Security Service

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Custom-condition Firewall

- The policy name is "security_policy_for_blocking_malicious_voip_packets".
- 2. The rule name is "Block_malicious_voip_and_volte_packets".
- 3. The Source-target is "malicious-id". This can be a single ID or a list of IDs, depending on how the ID are stored in the database. The "malicious-id" is the key so that the security admin can read every stored malicious VOIP IDs that are named as "malicious-id".
- 4. The destination target is "employees". "employees" is the key which represents the list containing information about employees, such as IP addresses.
- 5. The action required is "drop" when any incoming packets are from "malicious-id".
- 6. The IPsec method used for nsf traffic steering is set to "ipsec-ikeless".

9.4. Scenario 3: Mitigate HTTP and HTTPS Flood Attacks on a Company Web

The third example scenario is to "Mitigate HTTP and HTTPS flood attacks on a company web server" using a DDoS-attack mitigation policy. Here, the time information is not set because the service provided by the network should be maintained at all times. If the packets sent by any sources are more than the set threshold, then the admin can set the percentage of the packets to be dropped to safely maintain the service. In this scenario, the source is set as "any" to block any sources which send abnormal amount of packets. The destination is set as "web_server01". Once the rule is set and delivered and enforced to the nsfs by the security controller, the NSFs will monitor the incoming packet amounts and the destination to act according to the rule set. The XML instance is described below:

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<policy xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy">
  <policy-name>security_policy_for_ddos_attacks</policy-name>
  <rule>
    <rule-name>100_packets_per_second</rule-name>
    <condition>
      <ddos-condition>
        <destination-target>
          <dest-target>webservers</dest-target>
        </destination-target>
        <rate-limit>
          <packet-per-second>100</packet-per-second>
        </rate-limit>
      </ddos-condition>
    </condition>
    <action>
      <primary-action>drop</primary-action>
    </action>
    <ipsec-method>
      <method>ipsec-ikeless</method>
    </ipsec-method>
  </rule>
</policy xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy">
```

Figure 20: An XML Example for DDoS-attack Mitigation

DDoS-condition Firewall

- 1. The policy name is "security_policy_for_ddos_attacks".
- 2. The rule name is "100_packets_per_second".
- The destination target is "webservers". "webservers" is the key which represents the list containing information, such as IP addresses and ports, about web-servers.
- 4. The rate limit exists to limit the incoming amount of packets per second. In this case the rate limit is "100" packets per second. This amount depends on the packet receiving capacity of the server devices.
- 5. The Source-target is all sources which send abnormal amount of packets.
- 6. The action required is to "drop" packet reception is more than 100 packets per second.

7. The IPsec method used for nsf traffic steering is set to "ipsecike".

10. Security Considerations

The data model for the I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface is based on the I2NSF framework [RFC8329], so the same security considerations with the I2NSF framework should be included in this document. The data model needs a secure communication channel to protect the Consumer-Facing Interface between the I2NSF User and Security Controller.

11. IANA Considerations

This document requests IANA to register the following URI in the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]:

URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy Registrant Contact: The I2NSF.

XML: N/A; the requested URI is an XML namespace.

This document requests IANA to register the following YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC7950].

name: ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy

namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-i2nsf-cfi-policy

prefix: cfi-policy
reference: RFC 7950

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13. Contributors

This document is made by the group effort of I2NSF working group. Many people actively contributed to this document, such as Mahdi F. Dachmehchi and Daeyoung Hyun. The authors sincerely appreciate their contributions.

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<u>Appendix A.</u> Changes from <u>draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-06</u>

The following changes are made from <u>draft-ietf-i2nsf-consumer-facing-interface-dm-06</u>:

- o This version has reflected the comments from Jan Lindblad.
- o In <u>Section 1</u>, Figure 1 is modified such that "Multi-Tenancy" is deleted because "Multi-Tenancy" can be described by "Endpoint Groups" in a policy rule.
- o In <u>Section 4</u>, Figure 2 is modified such that the YANG data model of a policy having at least one rule has a hierarchical structure rather than a flat structure by deleing the "Multi-Tenancy" field.
- o The section named "Information Model for Multi-Tenancy" is deleted. The multi-tenancy can be specified by "Endpoint Groups" along with "Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM)" mechanisms.
- o In <u>Section 5.1</u>, "NACM" is applied in "user-group" and for its access control.
- o In <u>Section 5.2</u>, Figure 10 is modified because the "protocol" field was missed in the previous version.
- o <u>Section 7</u> is added as "Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM)" in order to provide the Consumer-Facing Interface with the existing access control mechanisms. Also, the reference of [RFC8341] is added for NACM.
- o The section named "Role-based Access Control (RBAC)" is deleted since this access control can be replaced by "NACM".
- o In <u>Section 8</u>, the YANG data module is modified according to the above changes.

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