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Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) Terminology  
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## Abstract

This document defines a set of terms that are used for the Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) effort.

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1. Introduction

This document defines the terminology for the Interface to Network Security Functions (I2NSF) effort. This section provides some background on I2NSF; a detailed problem statement can be found in [\[RFC8192\]](#). Motivation and comparison to previous work can be found in [\[I-D.ietf-i2nsf-gap-analysis\]](#).

Enterprises are now considering using network security functions (NSFs) hosted by service providers due to the growing challenges and complexity in maintaining an up-to-date secure infrastructure that complies with regulatory requirements, while controlling costs. The hosted security service is especially attractive to small- and medium-size enterprises who suffer from a lack of security experts to continuously monitor, acquire new skills and propose immediate mitigations to ever increasing sets of security attacks. Small- and medium-sized businesses (SMBs) are increasingly adopting cloud-based security services to replace on-premises security tools, while larger enterprises are deploying a mix of traditional (hosted) and cloud-based security services.

To meet the demand, more and more service providers are providing hosted security solutions to deliver cost-effective managed security services to enterprise customers. The hosted security services are primarily targeted at enterprises, but could also be provided to mass-market customers as well. NSFs are provided and consumed in increasingly diverse environments. Users of NSFs may consume

network security services hosted by one or more providers, which may be their own enterprise, service providers, or a combination of both.

It is out of scope in this document to define an exhaustive list of terms that are used in the security field; the reader is referred to other applicable documents, such as [[RFC4949](#)].

## [2.](#) Conventions Used in This Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)]. In this document, these words will appear with that interpretation only when in ALL CAPS. Lower case uses of these words are not to be interpreted as carrying [[RFC2119](#)] significance.

## [3.](#) Terminology

AAA: Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting. See individual definitions.

Abstraction: The definition of the salient characteristics and behavior of an object that distinguish it from all other types of objects. It manages complexity by exposing common properties between objects and processes while hiding detail that is not relevant.

Access Control: Protection of system resources against unauthorized access; a process by which use of system resources is regulated according to a security policy, and is permitted by only authorized entities (e.g., users, programs, processes, or other systems) according to that policy [[RFC4949](#)].

Access Control List (ACL): This is a mechanism that implements access control for a system resource by enumerating the system entities that are permitted to access the resource and stating,

either implicitly or explicitly, the access modes granted to each entity [[RFC4949](#)]. A YANG description is defined in [[I-D.ietf-netmod-acl-model](#)].

Accounting: The act of collecting information on resource usage for the purpose of trend analysis, auditing, billing, or cost allocation ([[RFC2975](#)] [[RFC3539](#)]).

Assertion: Defined by the ITU in [[X.1252](#)] as "a statement made by an entity without accompanying evidence of its validity". In the context of I2NSF, an assertion may include metadata about all or part of the assertion (e.g., context of the assertion, or about timestamp indicating the point in time the assertion was created). The validity of an assertion cannot be verified. (from [[I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology](#)]).

Attestation: The process of validating the integrity of a computing device. See also Direct Anonymous Attestation, Remote Attestation.

Authentication: Defined in [[RFC4949](#)] as "the process of verifying a claim that a system entity or system resource has a certain attribute value." (from [[I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology](#)]).

Authorization: Defined in [[RFC4949](#)] as "an approval that is granted to a system entity to access a system resource." (from [[I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology](#)]).

Business-to-Business (B2B). A type of transaction in which one business makes a commercial transaction with another business.

Business-to-Consumer (B2C). A type of transaction in which a business makes a commercial transaction with a Customer.

Bespoke: Something made to fit a particular person, customer, or company.

Bespoke security management: Security management systems that are made to fit a particular customer.

Boolean Clause: A logical statement that evaluates to either TRUE or FALSE. Also called Boolean Expression.

**Capability:** A set of features that are available from an I2NSF Component. These features may, but do not have to, be used. All Capabilities are announced using the I2NSF Registration Interface. Capabilities are a type of I2NSF Metadata.

**Component:** An encapsulation of software that communicates using Interfaces. A Component may be implemented by hardware and/or software, and be represented using a set of classes. In general, a Component encapsulates a set of data structures and a set of algorithms that implement the function(s) that it provides.

**Constraint:** A Constraint is a limitation or restriction. Constraints may be associated with any type of object (e.g., Events, Conditions, and Actions in Policy Rules).

**Constraint Programming:** A type of programming that uses constraints to define relations between variables in order to find a feasible (but not necessarily optimal) solution.

**Context:** The Context of an Entity is a collection of measured and/or inferred knowledge that describe the state and the environment in which an Entity exists or has existed. (from <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/i2nsf/current/msg00762.html>).

**Controller:** A Controller is a management Component that contains control plane functions to manage and facilitate information sharing. An I2NSF Controller may also execute security functions. This definition is based on that in [[I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology](#)].

**Control Plane:** In the context of I2NSF, the Control Plane is an architectural Component that provides common control functions to all I2NSF Components, including some or all of the following: authentication, authorization, accounting, auditing, and Capability discovery and negotiation. The Control Plane orchestrates the operation of the Data Plane according to guidance and/or input from the Management Plane. I2NSF Components with Interfaces to the Control Plane may have knowledge of the Capabilities of other I2NSF Components within a particular I2NSF

administrative domain. This definition is based on that in [[I-D.ietf-sacm-terminology](#)]. See also: Data Plane, Management Plane.

**Customer:** A business role of an entity that is involved in the definition and/or consumption of services, and the possible negotiation of a contract to use services from a Provider.

**Data Center (DC):** A facility used to house data processing and communication equipment.

**Data Confidentiality:** Defined in [[RFC4949](#)] as "the property that data is not disclosed to system entities unless they have been authorized to know the data."

**Data Integrity:** Defined in [[RFC4949](#)] as "the property that data has not been changed, destroyed, or lost in an unauthorized or accidental manner."

**Data Model:** A representation of concepts of interest to an environment in a form that is dependent on data repository, data definition language, query language, implementation language, and protocol (typically one or more of these ). Note the difference between a data **model** and a data **structure**. See also: Information Model.

**Data Plane:** In the context of I2NSF, the Data Plane is an architectural Component that provides operational functions to enable an I2NSF Component to provide and consume packets and flows. See also: Control Plane, Management Plane.

**Data Provenance:** A historical record of the sources, origins and evolution of data that is influenced by inputs, entities, functions and processes.

**Data Structure:** A low-level building block that is used in programming to implement an algorithm. It defines how data is organized. A data model typically contains multiple types of data structures; however, a data structure does not contain a data model. Note the difference between a data **model** and a data **structure**.

**Domain:** A collection of Entities that share a common purpose. In addition, each constituent Entity in a Domain is both uniquely addressable and uniquely identifiable within that Domain.

**Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA):** A cryptographic primitive that enables remote authentication of a trusted computer without compromising the privacy of that computer's user(s). See also attestation, remote attestation.

**Firewall (FW):** A function that restricts data communication traffic to and from one of the connected networks (the one said to be 'inside' the firewall), and thus protects that network's system resources against threats from the other network (the one that is said to be 'outside' the firewall) [[RFC4949](#)]. [[I-D.ietf-opsawg-firewalls](#)]

**Flow:** A set of information (e.g., packets) that are related in a fundamental manner (e.g., sent from the same source and sent to the same destination). A common example is a sequence of packets. It is the opposite of packet-based, which treats each packet discretely (e.g., each packet is assessed individually to determine the action(s) to be taken).

**Flow-based NSF:** A NSF that inspects network flows according to a set of policies intended for enforcing security properties. Flow-based security also means that packets are inspected in the order they are received, and without modification to the packet due to the inspection process.

**I2NSF Action:** An I2NSF Action is used to control and monitor aspects of flow-based NSFs. An I2NSF Action, when used in the context of an (imperative) I2NSF Policy Rule, may be executed only when the Event and the Condition clauses of its owning I2NSF Policy Rule evaluate to true. The execution of this I2NSF Action may be influenced by applicable metadata. Examples of I2NSF Actions include providing intrusion detection and/or protection, web and flow filtering, and deep packet inspection for packets and flows.  
See also: I2NSF Condition, I2NSF Event, I2NSF Policy Rule.

**I2NSF Agent:** A software Component that implements an NSF. It typically plays the roles of I2NSF Consumer and I2NSF Producer. For example, it can receive provisioning information and requests for operational and/or monitoring data from an I2NSF Component, and can provide these and other data to I2NSF Consumers. It can also receive I2NSF Policy Rules to change the configuration of one or more network devices, optionally transform each I2NSF Policy Rule into an alternate form (e.g., one that is directly consummable by the network device), and then execute the I2NSF Policy Rules.

**I2NSF Component:** A Component that provides one or more I2NSF Services. I2NSF Components are managed and communicate with other I2NSF Components using I2NSF Interfaces.

**I2NSF Condition:** An I2NSF Condition is defined as a set of attributes, features, and/or values that are to be compared with a set of known attributes, features, and/or values in order to determine whether or not the set of Actions in that (imperative) I2NSF Policy Rule can be executed or not. An I2NSF Condition, when used in the context of an (imperative) I2NSF Policy Rule, may be executed only when the Event clause of its owning I2NSF Policy Rule evaluates to true. Examples of an I2NSF Condition include matching attributes of a packet or flow, and comparing the internal state of an NSF to a desired state. See also: I2NSF Action, I2NSF Event, I2NSF Policy Rule.

**I2NSF Consumer:** A Consumer is a Role that is assigned to an I2NSF Component that contains functions to request information from, and/or use services provided by, other I2NSF Components. Examples include requesting Capabilities and I2NSF Policy Rules from another I2NSF Component. See also: I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface, I2NSF Producer, I2NSF Producer-Facing Interface, Role.

**I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface:** An Interface dedicated to requesting information from I2NSF Producers. This is typically defined per I2NSF administrative domain. For example, this Interface could be used to request a set of I2NSF Flow Security Policy Rules from an I2NSF Controller, or from one or more individual NSFs. See also: I2NSF Consumer, I2NSF Provider, I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface, Interface.

**I2NSF Directly Consummable Policy Rule:** An I2NSF Policy Rule is said to be directly consummable if a network device can execute it without translating its content or structure. See also I2NSF Indirectly Consummable Policy Rule, I2NSF Policy Rule.

**I2NSF Indirectly Consummable Policy Rule:** An I2NSF Policy Rule is said to be indirectly consummable if a network device can NOT



execute it without first translating its content or structure. See also I2NSF Directly Consummable Policy Rule, I2NSF Policy Rule.

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**I2NSF Event:** An I2NSF Event is defined as any important occurrence in time of a change in the system being managed, and/or in the environment of the system being managed. An I2NSF Event, when used in the context of an (imperative) I2NSF Policy Rule, is used to determine whether the Condition clause of that Policy Rule can be evaluated or not. Examples of an I2NSF Event include time and user actions (e.g. logon, logoff, and actions that violate an ACL). See also I2NSF Action, I2NSF Condition, I2NSF Policy Rule.

**I2NSF Management System:** I2NSF Consumers and Producers operate within the scope of a network management system, which serves as a collection and distribution point for I2NSF security provisioning, monitoring, and other operations.

**I2NSF NSF-Facing Interface:** An Interface dedicated to providing I2NSF Services. For example, this could provide Anti-Virus, (D)DoS, or IPS Services. This is also called the "NSF-Facing Interface". See also: Interface, I2NSF Consumer Interface.

**I2NSF Policy Rule:** An I2NSF Policy Rule is an imperative statement that is used as a means to monitor and control the changing and/or maintaining of the state of one or more managed objects. It consists of three clauses (Event, Condition, and Action). The Event and Condition clauses are Boolean clauses, while the Action clause consists of a set of one or more I2NSF Actions. In this context, "manage" means that one or more of the following six fundamental operations are supported: create, read, write, delete, start, and stop. Note that for this release of I2NSF, only imperative policy rules are in scope. An example of an I2NSF Policy Rule is, in pseudo-code:

```
IF <event-clause> is TRUE
  IF <condition-clause> is TRUE
    THEN execute <action-clause>
  END-IF
END-IF
```

**I2NSF Producer:** A Producer is a Role that is assigned to an I2NSF Component that contains functions to send information, and/or provide services, to another I2NSF Component (e.g., for describing, communicating, and/or executing policies, or for transmitting data and/or metadata). See also: I2NSF Consumer,

- I2NSF Registry:** A repository where I2NSF data and metadata information (e.g., alarms and Capabilities, respectively) are stored and maintained. I2NSF Components can connect to the I2NSF Registry using the I2NSF Registration Interface. Operations performed on an I2NSF Registry SHOULD be defined using an Access Control mechanism. Examples of information that SHOULD be registered include Capability metadata, as well as consistent definitions of data and I2NSF Components. See also: Access Control, I2NSF Component, I2NSF Consumer, I2NSF Provider, I2NSF Registration Interface.
- I2NSF Registration Interface:** An Interface dedicated to requesting information from, and writing information about, I2NSF Components and Capabilities. See also: I2NSF Component, I2NSF Consumer, I2NSF Provider, I2NSF Registry.
- I2NSF Service:** A set of functions, provided by an I2NSF Component, which provides data communication, processing, storage, presentation, manipulation, or other functions that can be consumed by I2NSF Components. Exemplary I2NSF Services include Anti-Virus, Authentication, Authorization, Firewall, and IPS Services. See also: I2NSF Component, Interface.
- Information Model:** A representation of concepts of interest to an environment in a form that is independent of data repository, data definition language, query language, implementation language, and protocol. See also: Data Model.
- Interface:** A set of operations one object knows it can invoke on, and expose to, another object. It is a subset of all operations that a given object implements. The same object may have multiple types of interfaces to serve different purposes. See also: I2NSF Component, I2NSF Consumer-Facing Interface, I2NSF Registration Interface, Interface Group, NSF-Facing Interface

**Interface Group:** A set of Interfaces that are related in purpose and which share the same communication mechanisms.  
See also: Interface.

**Intrusion Detection System (IDS):** A system that detects network intrusions via a variety of filters, monitors, and/or probes. An IDS may be stateful or stateless. See also: IPS.

**Intrusion Protection System (IPS):** A system that protects against network intrusions. An IPS may be stateful or stateless.  
See also: IDS.

**Management Domain:** A collection of Entities that share a common purpose, which has the following three behavioral features:

- 1) a set of administrators are assigned to govern the Entities that are contained in a Management Domain
- 2) a set of applications are defined that are responsible for executing one or more governance operations
- 3) a set of management mechanisms, such as Policy Rules, are defined to govern the behavior of the Entities contained in the Management Domain.

**Management Plane:** In the context of I2NSF, the Management Plane is an architectural Component that provides common functions to define the behavior of I2NSF Components. The primary use of the Management Plane is to formulate behavioral commands and forward them to the Control Plane. The Control Plane then translates them into a form that can be consumed by I2NSF components. The Management Plane may also instantiate and manage I2NSF Policy Rules. The Management Plane is also responsible for handling and acting on OAM data, which may influence the decision-making processes in the I2NSF Control Plane and other I2NSF Components. See also: Control Plane, Data Plane.

**Metadata:** Data that provides information about other data. Examples include IETF network management protocols (e.g. NETCONF, RESTCONF, IPFIX) or IETF routing interfaces (I2RS). The I2NSF

security interface may utilize Metadata to describe and/or prescribe characteristics and behavior of the YANG data models.

**Middlebox:** Any intermediary device performing functions other than the normal, standard functions of an IP router on the datagram path between a source host and destination host [[RFC3234](#)].

**Network Security Function (NSF):** Software that provides a set of security-related services. Examples include detecting unwanted activity and blocking or mitigating the effect of such unwanted activity in order to fulfil service requirements. The NSF can also help in supporting communication stream integrity and confidentiality.

**NSF-Facing Interface:** An Interface dedicated to specifying and monitoring I2NSF Policy Rules that are enforced by one or more NSFs. This is typically defined per I2NSF administrative domain. Note that all features of a given NSF do not have to be used. See also: Consumer-Facing Interface, Interface.

**Object Constraint Language (OCL):** A constraint programming language that is used to specify restrictions on functionality. (from <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/i2nsf/current/msg00762.html>)

**Profile:** A structured representation of information that uses a pre-defined set of capabilities of an object, typically in a specific context. Zero or more Capabilities may be changed at runtime. This may be used to simplify how this object interacts with other objects in its environment.

**Remote Attestation:** A function that enables changes to an Entity to be detected by authorized parties (e.g., applications or users). Direct Anonymous Attestation preserves the privacy of the user, whereas remote attestation may not. See also: Attestation, Direct Anonymous Attestation.

**Role:** An abstraction of a Component that models context-specific views and responsibilities of an object as separate Role objects. Role objects can optionally be attached to, and removed from, the object that the Role object describes at runtime. This provides three important benefits. First, it enables different behavior to be supported by the same Component for different contexts.

Second, it enables the behavior of a Component to be adjusted dynamically (i.e., at runtime, in response to changes in context) by using one or more Roles to define the behavior desired for each context. Third, it decouples the Roles of a Component from the Applications that use the Component.

Tenant: A group of users that share common access privileges to the same software. An I2NSF tenant may be physical or virtual, and may run on a variety of systems or servers.

### [3.](#) IANA Considerations

No IANA considerations exist for this document.

### [4.](#) Security Considerations

This is a terminology document with no security considerations.

### [5.](#) Contributors

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