Extended Message support for BGP
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Abstract

   The BGP specification mandates a maximum BGP message size of 4,096
   octets. As BGP is extended to support newer AFI/SAFIs and other
   features, there is a need to extend the maximum message size beyond
   4,096 octets. This document updates the BGP specification RFC4271 by
   extending the maximum message size from 4,096 octets to 65,535 octets
   for all except the OPEN and KEEPALIVE messages.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

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1. Introduction

   The BGP specification [RFC4271] mandates a maximum BGP message size
   of 4,096 octets. As BGP is extended to support newer AFI/SAFIs and
   newer capabilities (e.g., BGPsec [RFC8205] and BGP-LS [RFC7752]),
   there is a need to extend the maximum message size beyond 4,096
   octets. This draft provides an extension to BGP to extend its
   message size limit from 4,096 octets to 65,535 octets for all except
   the OPEN and KEEPALIVE messages.

2. BGP Extended Message

   A BGP message over 4,096 octets in length is a BGP Extended Message.

   BGP Extended Messages have a maximum message size of 65,535 octets.
   The smallest message that may be sent consists of a BGP KEEPALIVE
   which consists of 19 octets.

3. Extended Message Capability for BGP

The BGP Extended Message Capability is a new BGP Capability [RFC5492] defined with Capability code 6 and Capability length 0.

To advertise the BGP Extended Message Capability to a peer, a BGP speaker uses BGP Capabilities Advertisement [RFC5492]. By advertising the BGP Extended Message Capability to a peer, a BGP speaker conveys that it is able to receive and properly handle, see Section 4, BGP Extended Messages.

Peers that wish to use the BGP Extended Message capability MUST support Error Handling for BGP UPDATE Messages per [RFC7606].

4. Operation

The Extended Message Capability applies to all messages except for the OPEN and KEEPALIVE messages. The former exception is to reduce the complexity of providing backward compatibility.

A BGP speaker that is capable of receiving BGP Extended Messages SHOULD advertise the BGP Extended Message Capability to its peers using BGP Capabilities Advertisement [RFC5492]. A BGP speaker MAY send Extended Messages to a peer only if the Extended Message Capability was received from that peer.

An implementation that advertises the BGP Extended Message capability MUST be capable of receiving a message with a Length up to and including 65,535 octets.

Applications generating information which might be encapsulated within BGP messages MUST limit the size of their payload to take the maximum message size into account.

During the years of incremental deployment, speakers that are capable of Extended Messages should not simply pack as many NLRI in a message as they can, or otherwise unnecessarily generate UPDATES above the 4,096 octet pre- Extended Message limit, so as not to require downstream routers to decompose for peers that do not support Extended Messages. See Section 8.

If a BGP message with a Length greater than 4,096 octets is received by a BGP listener who has not advertised the Extended Message Capability, the listener will generate a NOTIFICATION with the Error Subcode set to Bad Message Length ([RFC4271] Sec 6.1).

A BGP UPDATE will (policy, best path, etc., allowing) typically propagate throughout the BGP speaking Internet; and hence to BGP

speakers which may not support Extended Messages. Therefore, an
announcement in an Extended Message where the size of the attribute
set plus the NLRI is larger than 4,096 octets may cause lack of
reachability.

A BGP speaker that has advertised the BGP Extended Message capability
to its peers, may receive an UPDATE from one of its peers that
produces an ongoing announcement that is larger than 4,096 octets.
When propagating that UPDATE onward to a neighbor which has not
advertised the BGP Extended Message capability, the speaker SHOULD
try to reduce the outgoing message size by removing attributes
eligible under the "attribute discard" approach of [RFC7606]. If the
message is still too big, then it must not be sent to the neighbor
([RFC4271], Section 9.2). Additionally, if the NLRI was previously
advertised to that peer, it must be withdrawn from service
([RFC4271], Section 9.1.3).

If an Autonomous System (AS) has multiple internal BGP speakers and
also has multiple external BGP neighbors, to present a consistent
external view care must be taken to ensure a consistent view within
the AS. In the context of BGP Extended Messages, a consistent view
can only be guaranteed if all the iBGP speakers advertise the BGP
Extended Message capability. If that is not the case, then the
operator should consider whether the BGP Extended Message capability
should be advertised to external peers or not.

During the incremental deployment of BGP Extended Messages and
[RFC7606] in an iBGP mesh, or with eBGP peers, the operator should
monitor any routes dropped and any discarded attributes.

5. Error Handling

A BGP speaker that has the ability to use Extended Messages but has
not advertised the BGP Extended Messages capability, presumably due
to configuration, MUST NOT accept an Extended Message. A speaker
MUST NOT implement a more liberal policy accepting BGP Extended
Messages.

A BGP speaker that does not advertise the BGP Extended Messages
capability might also genuinely not support Extended Messages. Such
a speaker will follow the error handling procedures of [RFC4271] if
it receives an Extended Message. Similarly, any speaker that treats
an improper Extended Message as a fatal error, MUST follow the error
handling procedures of [RFC4271].

It is RECOMMENDED that BGP protocol developers and implementers are
conservative in their application and use of Extended Messages.

Future protocol specifications MUST describe how to handle peers
which can only accommodate 4,096 octet messages.

6. Changes to [RFC4271](#)

[RFC4271] states "The value of the Length field MUST always be at
least 19 and no greater than 4,096." This document changes the
latter number to 65,535 for all except the OPEN and KEEPALIVE
messages.

[RFC4271] Sec 6.1, specifies raising an error if the length of a
message is over 4,096 octets. For all messages except the OPEN
message, if the receiver has advertised the BGP Extended Messages
Capability, this document raises that limit to 65,535.

7. IANA Considerations

The IANA has made an early allocation for this new BGP Extended
Message Capability referring to this document.

Registry: Capability Codes

Value	Description	Document
6	BGP Extended Message	[this draft]

8. Security Considerations

This extension to BGP does not change BGP's underlying security
issues; [RFC4272].

Due to increased memory requirements for buffering, there may be
increased exposure to resource exhaustion, intentional or
unintentional.

If a remote speaker is able to craft a large BGP Extended Message to
send on a path where one or more peers do not support BGP Extended
Messages, peers which support BGP Extended Messages may act to reduce
the outgoing message, see Section 4, and in doing so cause an attack
by discarding attributes its peer may be expecting. The attributes
eligible under the "attribute discard" must have no effect on route
selection or installation [RFC7606].

If a remote speaker is able to craft a large BGP Extended Message to
send on a path where one or more peers do not support BGP Extended
Messages, peers which support BGP Extended Messages may act to reduce
the outgoing message, see Section 4, and in doing so allow a

downgrade attack. This would only affect the attacker's message, where 'downgrade' has questionable meaning.

If a remote speaker is able to craft a large BGP Extended Message to send on a path where one or more peers do not support BGP Extended Messages, peers which support BGP Extended Messages may incur resource load (processing, message resizing, etc.) reformatting the large messages.

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