

BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis

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Specification of Requirements

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119](#) [[RFC2119](#)].

Abstract

BGP, along with a host of other infrastructure protocols designed before the Internet environment became perilous, was originally designed with little consideration for protection of the information it carries. There are no mechanisms internal to the BGP protocol to protect against attacks that modify, delete, forge, or replay data, any of which has the potential to disrupt overall network routing behavior.

This internet draft discusses some of the security issues with BGP routing data dissemination. This internet draft does not discuss security issues with forwarding of packets.

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1. Introduction

The inter-domain routing protocol BGP was created when the Internet environment had not yet reached the present contentious state. Consequently, the BGP protocol was not designed with protection against deliberate or accidental errors causing disruptions of routing behavior.

We here discuss the vulnerabilities of BGP, based on the BGP specification [[1](#)]. Readers are expected to be familiar with the BGP RFC and the behavior of BGP.

It is clear that the Internet is vulnerable to attack through its routing protocols and BGP is no exception. Faulty, misconfigured or deliberately malicious sources can disrupt overall Internet behavior by injecting bogus routing information into the BGP distributed routing database (by modifying, forging, or replaying BGP packets). The same methods can also be used to disrupt local and overall network behavior by breaking the distributed communication of information between BGP peers. The sources of bogus information can be either outsiders or true BGP peers.

Cryptographic authentication of the peer-peer communication is not an integral part of the BGP protocol. As a TCP/IP protocol, BGP is subject to all the TCP/IP attacks, like IP spoofing, session stealing, etc. Any outsider can inject believable BGP messages into the communication between BGP peers and thereby inject bogus routing information or break the peer to peer connection. Any break in the peer to peer communication has a ripple effect on routing that can be wide spread. Furthermore, outsider sources can also disrupt communications between BGP peers by breaking their TCP connection with spoofed packets. Outsider sources of bogus BGP information can reside anywhere in the world.

Consequently, the current BGP specification requires that a BGP implementation must support the authentication mechanism specified in [[5](#)]. However, the requirement for support of that authentication mechanism cannot ensure that the mechanism is configured for use. The mechanism of [[5](#)] is based on a pre-installed shared secret; it does not have the capability of IPSEC [[4](#)] to agree on a shared secret dynamically. Consequently, the use of [[5](#)] must be a deliberate decision, not an automatic feature or default.

The current BGP specification also allows for implementations that would accept connections from "un-configured peers" ([\[1\] Section 8](#)), however, the specification is not clear as to what an unconfigured peer might be

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or how the protections of [5] would apply in such a case. It is therefore not possible to include an analysis of the security issues of this feature. When a specification is released that describes this feature more fully, a security analysis should be part of that same specification.

BGP speakers themselves can inject bogus routing information, either by masquerading as any other legitimate BGP speaker, or by distributing unauthorized routing information as themselves. Historically, misconfigured and faulty routers have been responsible for widespread disruptions in the Internet. The legitimate BGP peers have the context and information to produce believable bogus routing information and therefore have the opportunity to cause great damage. The cryptographic protections of [5] and operational protections cannot exclude the bogus information arising from a legitimate peer. The risk of disruptions caused by legitimate BGP speakers is real and cannot be ignored.

Bogus routing information can have many different effects on routing behavior. If the bogus information removes routing information for a particular network, that network can become unreachable for the portion of the Internet that accepts the bogus information. If the bogus information changes the route to a network, then packets destined for that network may be forwarded by a sub-optimal path, or a path that does not follow the expected policy, or a path that will not forward the traffic. As a consequence, traffic to that network could be delayed by a longer than necessary path. The network could become unreachable from areas where the bogus information is accepted. Traffic might also be forwarded along a path that permits some adversary a view of the data. If the bogus information makes it appear that an autonomous system originates a network when it does not, then packets for that network may not be deliverable for the portion of the Internet that accepts the bogus information. A false announcement that an autonomous system originates a network may also fragment aggregated address blocks in other parts of the Internet and cause routing problems for other networks.

The damage that might result from these attacks are:

- starvation: data traffic destined for a node is forwarded to a part of the network that cannot deliver it,

- network congestion: more data traffic is forwarded through some portion of the network than would otherwise need to carry the traffic,

blackhole: large amounts of traffic are directed to be forwarded through one router that cannot handle the increased level of traffic and drops many/most/all packets,

delay: data traffic destined for a node is forwarded along a path that is in some way inferior to the path it would otherwise take,

looping: data traffic is forwarded along a path that loops, so that the data is never delivered,

eavesdrop: data traffic is forwarded through some router or network that would otherwise not see the traffic, affording an opportunity to see the data,

partition: some portion of the network believes that it is partitioned from the rest of the network when it is not,

cut: some portion of the network believes that it has no route to some network that is in fact connected,

churn: the forwarding in the network changes at a rapid pace, resulting in large variations in the data delivery patterns (and adversely affecting congestion control techniques),

instability: BGP become unstable so that convergence on a global forwarding state is not achieved, and

overload: the BGP messages themselves become a significant portion of the traffic the network carries.

resource exhaustion: the BGP messages themselves cause exhaustion of critical router resources, such as table space.

These consequences can fall exclusively on one end system prefix or may effect the operation of the network as a whole.

2. Attacks

The BGP protocol, in and of itself, is subject to the following attacks (list taken from the IAB Internet-Draft providing guideline for the security considerations section of Internet-Drafts [8]):

eavesdropping: The routing data carried in BGP is carried in cleartext, so eavesdropping is a possible attack against routing data confidentiality. (Routing data confidentiality is not a

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common requirement.)

replay: BGP does not provide for replay protection of its messages.

message insertion: BGP does not provide protection against insertion of messages. However, because BGP uses TCP, when the connection is fully established, message insertion by an outsider would require accurate sequence number prediction (not entirely out of the question, but more difficult with mature TCP implementations) or session stealing attacks.

message deletion: BGP does not provide protection against deletion of messages. Again, more difficult against a mature TCP implementation but not entirely out of the question

message modification: BGP does not provide protection against modification of messages. A modification that did not change the length of the TCP payload would in general not be detectable.

man-in-the-middle: BGP does not provide protection against man-in-the-middle attacks. As BGP does no peer entity authentication, a man-in-the-middle attack is childs-play.

denial of service: While bogus routing data can present a denial of service attack on the end systems that are trying to transmit data through the network and on the network infrastructure itself, certain bogus information can represent a denial of service on the BGP routing protocol. For example, advertising large numbers of more specific routes (longer prefixes) can cause BGP traffic and router table size to increase, even explode.

The mandatory-to-support mechanism of [5] will counter the message insertion, deletion, and modification, man-in-the-middle attacks and the denial of service attacks from outsiders. The use of [5] does not protect against eavesdropping attacks, but routing data confidentiality is not a goal of BGP. The mechanism of [5] does not protect against replay attacks, so the only protection against replay is provided by the TCP sequence number processing. The mechanism of [5] cannot protect against bogus routing information originating with an insider. A replay attack could be mounted against a BGP connection protected with [5] but only in very carefully timed circumstances.

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3. Vulnerabilities and Risks

The risks in BGP arise from three fundamental vulnerabilities:

BGP has no internal mechanism that provides strong protection of the integrity, freshness and peer entity authenticity of the messages in peer-peer BGP communications.

no mechanism has been specified within BGP to validate the authority of an AS to announce NLRI information.

no mechanism has been specified within BGP to ensure the authenticity of the path attributes announced by an AS.

The first fundamental vulnerability motivated the mandated support of [5] in the BGP specification. When that is employed, message integrity and peer entity authentication is provided. The mechanism of [5] assumes that the MD5 algorithm is secure and that the shared secret is protected and chosen to be difficult to guess.

3.1. Vulnerabilities in BGP messages

There are four different BGP message types - OPEN, KEEPALIVE, NOTIFICATION, and UPDATE. This section contains a discussion of the vulnerabilities arising from each message and the ability of outsiders or BGP peers to exploit the vulnerabilities. To summarize, outsiders can use bogus OPEN, KEEPALIVE, or NOTIFICATION messages to disrupt the BGP peer-peer connections and can use bogus UPDATE messages to disrupt routing. Outsiders can also disrupt BGP peer-peer connections by inserting bogus TCP packets. BGP peers themselves are permitted to break peer-peer connections at any time, and so they cannot be said to be issuing "bogus" OPEN, KEEPALIVE or NOTIFICATION messages. However, BGP peers can disrupt routing by issuing bogus UPDATE messages. In particular, bogus ATOMIC_AGGREGATE, NEXT_HOP and AS_PATH attributes and bogus NLRI in UPDATE messages can disrupt routing.

Each message introduces certain different vulnerabilities and risks.

3.1.1. Message Header

Event 21: Each BGP message starts with a standard header. In all cases, syntactic errors in the message header will cause the BGP speaker to close the connection, release all associated BGP resources, delete all routes learned through that connection and run its decision process to decide on new routes.

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3.1.2. OPEN

Event 19: Receipt of an OPEN message in state Connect, Active or Established will cause the BGP speaker to bring down the connection, release all associated BGP resources, delete all associated routes, run its decision process and cause the state to return to Idle. The deletion of routes can cause a cascading effect of routing changes propagating through other peers. Also, optionally, an implementation specific peer oscillation damping may be performed. The peer oscillation damping process can affect how soon the connection can be restarted. In state OpenSent, the arrival of an OPEN message will cause the BGP speaker to transition to the OpenConfirm state. The later arrival of the legitimate peer's OPEN message will lead the BGP speaker to declare a connection collision. The collision detection procedure may cause the legitimate connection to be dropped. Consequently, the ability to spoof this message can lead to a severe disruption of routing over a wide area.

Event 20: If an OPEN message arrives when the OpenDelay timer is running when the connection is in state OpenSent or Established, the BGP speaker will bring down the connection, release all associated BGP resources, delete all associated routes, run its decision process and cause the state to return to Idle. The deletion of routes can cause a cascading effect of routing changes propagating through other peers. Also, optionally, an implementation specific peer oscillation damping may be performed. The peer oscillation damping process can affect how soon the connection can be restarted. However, as the OpenDelay timer should never be running in the state OpenSent, this could only be caused by an error in the implementation (which is why the error code is "Finite State Machine Error"). It would be difficult, if not impossible, for an outsider to induce this error.

Event 22: Errors in the OPEN message (e.g., unacceptable Hold state, malformed Optional Parameter, unsupported version, etc.) will cause the BGP speaker to bring down the connection, release all associated BGP resources, delete all associated routes, run its decision process and cause the state to return to Idle. The deletion of routes can cause a cascading effect of routing changes propagating through other peers. Also, optionally, an implementation specific peer oscillation damping may be performed. The peer oscillation damping process can affect how soon the connection can be restarted. Consequently, the ability to spoof this message can lead to a severe disruption of routing over a wide area.

3.1.3. KEEPALIVE

Event 26: Receipt of a KEEPALIVE message when the peering connection is in the Connect, Active, and OpenSent states would cause the BGP speaker to transition to the Idle state and fail to establish a connection. The ability to spoof this message is a vulnerability. To exploit this vulnerability deliberately, the KEEPALIVE must be carefully timed in the sequence of messages exchanged between the peers; otherwise, it causes no damage.

3.1.4. NOTIFICATION

Event 25: Receipt of a NOTIFICATION message in any state will cause the BGP speaker to bring down the connection, release all associated BGP resources, delete all associated routes, run its decision process and cause the state to return to Idle. The deletion of routes can cause a cascading effect of routing changes propagating through other peers. Also, optionally, an implementation specific peer oscillation damping may be performed. The peer oscillation damping process can affect how soon the connection can be restarted. Consequently, the ability to spoof this message can lead to a severe disruption of routing over a wide area.

Event 24: A NOTIFICATION message carrying an error code of "Version Error" behaves the same as in Event 25, with the exception that the optional peer oscillation damping is not performed (in states Connect and Active, only when the OpenDelay timer is running). The damage caused is therefore one small bit less, in that restarting the connection is not affected.

3.1.5. UPDATE

Event 27: The Update message carries the routing information. The ability to spoof any part of this message can lead to a disruption of routing.

3.1.5.1. Unfeasible Routes Length, Total Path Attribute Length

There is a vulnerability arising from the ability to modify these fields. If a length is modified, the message is not likely to parse properly, resulting in an error, the transmission of a NOTIFICATION message and the close of the connection (see Event 28, below). As a true BGP speaker is always able to close a connection at any time, this vulnerability represents an additional risk only when the source is not the configured BGP peer, i.e., it presents no additional risk from BGP

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sources.

3.1.5.2. Withdrawn Routes

An outsider could cause the elimination of existing legitimate routes by forging or modifying this field. An outsider could also cause the elimination of reestablished routes by replaying this withdrawal information from earlier packets.

A BGP speaker could "falsely" withdraw feasible routes using this field. However, as the BGP speaker is authoritative for the routes it will announce, it is allowed to withdraw any previously announced routes that it wants. As the receiving BGP speaker will only withdraw routes associated with the sending BGP speaker, there is no opportunity for a BGP speaker to withdraw another BGP speaker's routes. Therefore, there is no additional risk from BGP peers via this field.

3.1.5.3. Path Attributes

The path attributes present many different vulnerabilities and risks.

Attribute Flags, Attribute Type Codes, Attribute Length

A BGP peer or an outsider could modify the attribute length or attribute type (flags and type codes) so they did not reflect the attribute values that followed. If the flags were modified, the flags and type code could become incompatible (i.e., a mandatory attribute marked as partial), or a optional attribute could be interpreted as a mandatory attribute or vice versa. If the type code were modified, the attribute value could be interpreted as if it were the data type and value of a different attribute.

The most likely result from modifying the attribute length, flags, or type code would be a parse error of the UPDATE message. A parse error would cause the transmission of a NOTIFICATION message and the close of the connection (see Event 28, below). As a true BGP speaker is always able to close a connection at any time, this vulnerability represents an additional risk only when the source is an outsider, i.e., it presents no additional risk from a BGP peer.

ORIGIN

This field indicates whether the information was learned from IGP or EGP information. This field is used in making routing decisions, so there is some small vulnerability in being able to affect the receiving BGP

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speaker's routing decision by modifying this field.

AS_PATH

A BGP peer or outsider could announce an AS_PATH that was not accurate for the associated NLRI.

As it is legitimate for a BGP peer not to verify that a received AS_PATH begins with the AS number of its peer, a malicious BGP peer could announce a path that begins with the AS of any BGP speaker with little impact on itself. This could affect the receiving BGP speaker's decision procedure and choice of installed route. The malicious peer could considerably shorten the AS_PATH, which will increase that route's chances of being chosen, possibly giving the malicious peer access to traffic it would otherwise not receive. The shortened AS_PATH also could result in routing loops, as it does not contain the information needed to prevent loops.

It is possible for a BGP speaker to be configured to accept routes with its own AS number in the AS path. Such operational considerations are defined to be "outside the scope" of the BGP specification, but the fact that AS_PATHs can have loops means that implementations cannot automatically reject routes with loops. Each BGP speaker verifies only that its own AS number does not appear in the AS_PATH.

Coupled with the ability to use any value for the NEXT_HOP, this gives a malicious BGP speaker considerable control over the path traffic will take.

Originating Routes

A special case of announcing a false AS_PATH occurs when the AS_PATH advertises a direct connection to a specific network address. An BGP peer or outsider could disrupt routing to the network(s) listed in the NLRI field by falsely advertising a direct connection to the network. The NLRI would become unreachable to the portion of the network that accepted this false route, unless the ultimate AS on the AS_PATH undertook to tunnel the packets it was forwarded for this NLRI on toward their true destination AS by a valid path. But even when the packets are tunneled to the correct destination AS, the route followed may not be optimal or may not follow the intended policy. Additionally, routing for other networks in the Internet could be affected if the false advertisement fragmented an aggregated address block, forcing the routers to handle (issue UPDATES, store, manage) the multiple fragments rather than the single aggregate. False originations for multiple

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addresses can result in routers and transit networks along the announced route to become flooded with mis-directed traffic.

NEXT_HOP

The NEXT_HOP attribute defines the IP address of the border router that should be used as the next hop when forwarding the NLRI listed in the UPDATE message. If the recipient is an external peer, then the recipient and the NEXT_HOP address must share a subnet. It is clear that an outsider modifying this field could disrupt the forwarding of traffic between the two AS's.

In the case that the recipient of the message is an external peer of an AS and the route was learned from another peer AS (this is one of two forms of "third party" NEXT_HOP), then the BGP speaker advertising the route has the opportunity to direct the recipient to forward traffic to a BGP speaker at the NEXT_HOP address. This affords the opportunity to direct traffic at a router that may not be able to continue forwarding the traffic. A malicious BGP speaker can also use this technique to force another AS to carry traffic it would otherwise not have to carry. In some cases, this could be to the malicious BGP speaker's benefit, as it could cause traffic to be carried long-haul by the victim AS to some other peering point it shared with the victim.

MULTI_EXIT_DISC

The MULTI_EXIT_DISC attribute is used in UPDATE messages transmitted between inter-AS BGP peers. While the MULTI_EXIT_DISC received from an inter-AS peer may be propagated within an AS, it may not be propagated to other AS's. Consequently, this field is only used in making routing decisions internal to one AS. Modifying this field, whether by an outsider or an BGP peer, could influence routing within an AS to be sub-optimal, but the effect should be limited in scope.

LOCAL_PREF

The LOCAL_PREF attribute must be included in all messages with internal peers and excluded from messages with external peers. Consequently, modification of the LOCAL_PREF could effect the routing process within the AS only. Note that there is no requirement in the BGP RFC that the LOCAL_PREF be consistent among the internal BGP speakers of an AS. As BGP peers are free to choose the LOCAL_PREF as they wish, modification of this field is a vulnerability with respect to outsiders only.

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ATOMIC_AGGREGATE

The ATOMIC_AGGREGATE field indicates that an AS somewhere along the way has aggregated several routes and advertised the aggregate NLRI without the AS_SET formed as usual from the AS's in the aggregated routes' AS_PATHs. BGP speakers receiving a route with ATOMIC_AGGREGATE are restricted from making the NLRI any more specific. Removing the ATOMIC_AGGREGATE attribute would remove the restriction, possibly causing traffic intended for the more specific NLRI to be routed incorrectly. Adding the ATOMIC_AGGREGATE attribute when no aggregation was done would have little effect, beyond restricting the un-aggregated NLRI from being made more specific. This vulnerability exists whether the source is a BGP peer or an outsider.

AGGREGATOR

This field may be included by a BGP speaker who has computed the routes represented in the UPDATE message from aggregation of other routes. The field contains the AS number and IP address of the last aggregator of the route. It is not used in making any routing decisions, so it does not represent a vulnerability.

3.1.5.4. NLRI

By modifying or forging this field, either an outsider or BGP peer source could cause disruption of routing to the announced network, overwhelm a router along the announced route, cause data loss when the announced route will not forward traffic to the announced network, route traffic by a sub-optimal route, etc.

Event 28: If the UPDATE message is mal-formed (Withdrawn Routes Length, Total Attribute Length, or Attribute Length that are improper, missing mandatory well-known attributes, Attribute Flags that conflict with the Attribute Type Codes, syntactic errors in the ORIGIN, NEXT_HOP or AS_PATH, etc.), then the BGP speaker will bring down the connection, release all associated BGP resources, delete all associated routes, run its decision process and cause the state to return to Idle. The deletion of routes can cause a cascading effect of routing changes propagating through other peers. Also, optionally, an implementation specific peer oscillation damping may be performed. The peer oscillation damping process can affect how soon the connection can be restarted. Consequently, the ability of an outsider to spoof this message could cause wide-spread disruption of routing. As a BGP speaker has the authority to close a connection whenever it wants, this message gives BGP speakers no opportunity to cause damage than they already had.

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3.2. Vulnerabilities through Other Protocols

3.2.1. TCP messages

BGP runs over TCP, listening on port 179. Therefore, BGP is subject to attack through attacks on TCP.

3.2.1.1. TCP SYN

SYN flooding: BGP is as subject to the effects on the TCP implementation of SYN flooding attacks as other protocols, and must rely on the implementation's protections against this attack.

Event 14: If an attacker were able to send a SYN to the BGP speaker, then the legitimate peer's SYN would appear to be a second connection. If the attacker were able to continue with a sequence of packets resulting in a BGP connection (guessing the BGP speaker's choice for sequence number on the SYN ACK, for example), then, the attacker's connection and the legitimate peer's connection would appear to be a connection collision. Depending on the outcome of the collision detection (i.e., the attacker chose a BGP identifier so as to win the race), the legitimate peer's true connection could be destroyed. The use of [5] will counter this attack.

3.2.1.2. TCP SYN ACK

Event 16: If an attacker were able to respond to a BGP speaker's SYN before the legitimate peer, then the legitimate peer's SYN-ACK would receive a empty ACK reply, causing the legitimate peer to issue a RST that would break the connection. The BGP speaker would bring down the connection, release all associated BGP resources, delete all associated routes and run its decision process. This attack requires that the attacker be able to predict the sequence number used in the SYN. The use of [5] will counter this attack.

This attack has no corollary from the legitimate BGP peer.

3.2.1.3. TCP ACK

Event 17: If an attacker were able to spoof an ACK at the appropriate time, then the BGP speaker would consider the connection complete, send an OPEN (Event 17) and transition to the OpenSent state. The arrival of the legitimate peer's ACK would not be delivered to the BGP process, as it would look like a duplicate packet. This message, then, presents no particular vulnerability to BGP.

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3.2.1.4. TCP RST/FIN/FIN-ACK

Event 18: If an attacker were able to spoof a RST, the BGP speaker would bring down the connection, release all associated BGP resources, delete all associated routes and run its decision process. If an attacker were able to spoof a FIN, then data could still be transmitted, but any attempt to receive would receive a notification that the connection is closing. In most cases, this results in the connection being placed in an Idle state, but if the connection is in the OpenSent state at the time, the connection returns to an Active state. Spoofing a RST in this situation requires an attacker to guess a sequence number that is in the proper half of the sending window, generally an easier task than guessing the exact sequence number so as to spoof a FIN. The use of [5] will counter this attack.

3.2.1.5. DoS and DDos

Because the packet directed to TCP port 179 are passed to the BGP process, that potentially resides on a slower processor in the router, flooding a router with TCP port 179 packets is an avenue for DoS attacks against the router. No BGP protocol mechanism can defeat such attacks; other mechanisms must be employed.

3.2.2. Other supporting protocols

3.2.2.1. Manual stop

Event 2: A manual stop event causes the BGP speaker to bring down the connection, release all associated BGP resources, delete all associated routes and run its decision process. If the mechanism by which a BGP speaker was informed of a manual stop were not carefully protected, the BGP connection could be destroyed by an attacker. Consequently, BGP security is secondarily dependent on the security of whatever protocols are used to operate the platform.

3.2.2.2. Timer events

Events 9-13: The Keepalive, Hold, and Open Delay timers are critical to BGP operation. For example, if the Hold timer value were changed, the remote peer might consider the connection unresponsive and bring the connection down, releasing resources, deleting associated routes, etc. Consequently, BGP security is secondarily dependent on the security of the protocols by which the platform is managed and configured.

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4. Security Considerations

This entire memo is about security, describing an analysis of the vulnerabilities that exist in the BGP protocol.

Use of the mandatory-to-support mechanisms of [\[5\]](#) counter the message insertion, deletion, and modification attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks from outsiders. If routing data confidentiality were desired (there being some controversy as to whether that is a desirable security service), the use of IPSEC ESP could provide that service.

4.1. Residual Risk

As cryptographic-based mechanisms, both [\[5\]](#) and IPSEC assume that the cryptographic algorithms are secure, that secrets used are protected from exposure and are chosen well so as not to be guessable, that the platforms are securely managed and operated to prevent break-ins, etc.

These mechanisms do not prevent attacks that arise from a router's legitimate BGP peers. There are several possible solutions to prevent a BGP speaker from inserting bogus information in its advertisements to its peers, i.e., from mounting an attack on a network's origination or AS-PATH.

- (1) Origination Protection: sign the originating AS.
- (2) Origination and Adjacency Protection: sign the originating AS and predecessor information ([\[2\]](#))
- (3) Origination and Route Protection: sign the originating AS, and nest signatures of AS_PATHs to the number of consecutive bad routers you want to prevent from causing damage. ([\[6\]](#))
- (4) Filtering: rely on a registry to verify the AS_PATH and NLRI originating AS ([\[3\]](#)).

Filtering is in use near some customer attachment points, but is not effective near the Internet center. The other mechanisms are still controversial and are not yet in common use.

4.2. Operational Protections

The primary usage of BGP is as a means to provide reachability information to Autonomous Systems (AS) and to distribute external reachability internally within an AS. BGP is the routing protocol used

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to distribute global routing information in the Internet. BGP is therefore used by all major Internet Service Providers (ISP) and many smaller providers and other organizations.

The role which BGP plays in the Internet puts BGP implementations in unique conditions and places unique security requirements on BGP. BGP is operated over interprovider interfaces in which traffic levels push the state of the art in specialized packet forwarding hardware and exceed the performance capabilities of hardware implementation of decryption by many orders of magnitude. The capability of an attacker using a single workstation with high speed interface to generate false traffic for denial of service (DoS) far exceeds the capability of software based decryption or appropriately priced cryptographic hardware to detect the false traffic. One means to protect the network elements from DoS attacks under such conditions is to use packet based filtering techniques based on relatively simple inspections of packets. As a result, for an ISP carrying large volumes of traffic, the ability to packet filter on the basis of port numbers is an important protection against DoS attacks, and a necessary adjunct to cryptographic strength in encapsulation.

Current practice in ISP operation is to use certain common filtering techniques to reduce the exposure to attacks from outside the ISP. To protect Internal BGP (IBGP) sessions, filters are applied at all borders to an ISP network which remove all traffic destined for addresses of network elements internal addresses (typically contained within a single prefix) and the BGP port number (179). Packets from within an ISP are not forwarded from an internal interface to the BGP speaker's address on which External BGP (EBGP) sessions are supported, or to a peer's EBGP address if the BGP port number is found. With appropriate consideration in router design, in the event of failure of a BGP peer to provide the equivalent filtering, the risk of compromise can be limited to the peering session on which filtering is not performed by the peer or the interface or line card on which the peering is supported. There is substantial motivation and little effort for ISPs to maintain such filters.

These operational practices can considerably raise the difficulty for an outsider to launch a DoS attack against an ISP. Prevented from injecting sufficient traffic from outside a network to effect a DoS attack, the attacker would have to undertake much more difficult tasks, such as compromise of the ISP network elements or undetected tapping into physical media.

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