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P. Dawes  
Vodafone Group  
C. Arunachalam  
Cisco Systems  
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**Requirements for Marking SIP Messages to be Logged**  
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Abstract

SIP networks use signaling monitoring tools to debug customer reported problems and for regression testing if network or client software is upgraded. As networks grow and become interconnected, including connection via transit networks, it becomes impractical to predict the path that SIP signaling will take between clients, and therefore impractical to monitor SIP signaling end-to-end.

This draft describes requirements for adding an indicator to the SIP protocol data unit (PDU, or a SIP message) that marks the PDU as a candidate for logging. Such marking will typically be applied as part of network testing controlled by the network operator and not used in regular client signaling. However, such marking can be carried end-to-end including the SIP terminals, even if a session originates and terminates in different networks.

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**1. Introduction**

Service providers, enterprises, and others who operate networks that use SIP (see [[RFC3261](#)]) need the ability to debug end user reported problems and also to run regression tests if SIP client software/



hardware is upgraded. Such debugging and tests might be confined to a single service provider or network, or may occur between the administrative domains of different network operators, including domains in different countries that are interconnected through networks belonging to one or more third parties.

A mechanism is needed to mark particular SIP sessions, i.e. those related to debugging or regression testing, as candidates for logging and this marking must be carried within the candidate SIP messages as they are routed across networks (and geographies) to enable logging at each SIP entity without having to know in advance the list of SIP entities through which the SIP signaling messages will traverse. Such marking must take into account that SIP messages might traverse different network operators, different countries, regions with different privacy requirements, and different trust domains. This draft describes the requirements for such a "log me" marker for SIP signaling.

## **2. Conventions Used in this Document**

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)], except that rather than describing interoperability requirements, they are used to describe requirements to be satisfied by the "log-me" marker solution.

## **3. Terminology**

### **3.1. Network Boundary**

A network boundary is the part of a signaling path where messages pass between entities that are under different administrative control. [[RFC5853](#)] Figure 2 shows a network boundary between GW-A1 in operator A's network and the Session Border Controller (SBC) in operator B's network. A network boundary is significant in this document because manipulation of signaling at the boundary could prevent end-to-end testing or troubleshooting.

Topology hiding and protocol repair (see [[RFC5853](#)]) are two common functions that manipulate signaling at the network boundary. These functions are performed by SIP device types (see [[RFC7092](#)]) such as Session Border Controller and Interconnection Border Control Function (IBCF).



### **[3.2.](#) Trust Domain**

In this document a trust domain is the set of entities that have been identified, by prior agreement, as participating elements in logging, typically for the purpose of debugging or regression testing. A trust domain contains all SIP entities under configuration control of the network operator that is performing regression testing plus all SIP entities that are under configuration control of peer network operators who have agreed to participate in that regression testing. The purpose of trust domain requirements is to prevent network operators inadvertently triggering logging in networks that are not part of any testing or troubleshooting.

### **[3.3.](#) Intermediary**

The term "intermediary" is defined in [\[RFC7989\] section 2](#) and refers to any entity along the call signaling path.

## **[4.](#) Motivating Scenario**

### **[4.1.](#) Introduction**

Signaling for SIP session setup can cross several networks, and these networks may not have common ownership and also may be in different countries. If a single operator wishes to perform regression testing or fault debugging end-to-end, the separate ownership of networks that carry the signaling and the explosion in the number of possible signaling paths through SIP entities from the originating to the terminating user make it impractical to pre-configure logging of an end-to-end SIP signaling of a session of interest.

### **[4.2.](#) Example Network Arrangement**

The figure below gives an example of a signaling path through multiple networks.







destination client terminal, detect that the "log me" marker is present and log SIP requests and responses that contain the marker if configured to do so.

- o Subsequent responses and requests in the same dialog are also marked with a "log me" marker. For some scenarios, such as call transfer, related dialogs may also be marked with "log me" marker.
- o Logging stops, either because the dialog has ended or because a 'stop event', typically expiry of a certain amount of time, occurred.
- o Logs are retrieved, for example by logging on to the SIP entity or entities that contain the logs.

## **5. Logme Marking Requirements**

### **5.1. Message Logs**

- o REQ1: If a SIP message is logged then the entire SIP message (SIP headers and message body) MUST be logged using standard logging format such as SIP CLF defined in [[RFC6873](#)].
- o REQ2: Header fields SHOULD be logged in the form in which they appear in the message, they SHOULD NOT be converted between long and compact forms described in [[RFC3261](#)] clause 7.3.3.

When and how signaling logs are retrieved is out of scope of this document. Logs might be retrieved by logging on to the SIP entity that contains the logs, by sending logs to a central server that is co-ordinating debugging, by storing them on removable media for later manual collection, or by some other method. All log retrieval mechanisms MUST adhere to authorization and privacy protection policies set forth by the network administrator.

### **5.2. "Log Me" Marking**

- o REQ3: It MUST be possible to mark a SIP request or response to be considered for logging by inserting a "log me" marker. This is known as "log me" marking.
- o REQ4: It MUST be possible for a "log me" marker to cross network boundaries.
- o REQ5: A "log me" marker MAY include an identifier that indicates the test case that caused it to be inserted, known as a test case identifier. The test case identifier does not have any impact on session setup, it is used to collate all logged SIP requests and



responses to the initial SIP request in a dialog or standalone transaction. The local UUID portion of Session-ID described in [RFC7206] and [RFC7989] could be used as a random test case identifier.

### **5.3. Processing the "Log Me" Marker**

- o REQ6: A "log me" marker is most effective if all networks on the signaling path agree to pass it end-to-end. However, source networks should behave responsibly and not leave it to a downstream network to detect and remove a marker that it is not expecting.
- o REQ7: The presence of a "log me" marker indicates that a request or response is part of debugging or regression testing.
- o REQ8: It MUST be possible to insert a "log me" marker in SIP responses that correspond to SIP requests with a "log me" marker in order to ensure that the complete SIP transaction is logged. This requirement applies to endpoints, SIP/PSTN gateways and B2BUAs.
- o REQ9: The "log me" marker mechanism SHOULD allow a SIP intermediary to request logging SIP requests and responses on behalf of the originating endpoint. The typical use case for this requirement is for compatibility with User Agents (UA) that have not implemented "log me" marking, i.e. when a UA has not marked a request or when responses received on a dialog of interest for logging do not contain an echoed "log me" marker. Another use case is when the session origination UA that inserted log me marker is no longer participating in the session (e.g., call transfer scenarios) and the intermediary adds "log me" marker in related sessions to enable end-to-end signaling analysis.
- o REQ10: The mechanism MUST allow stateless processing of SIP requests that contain a "log me" marker by SIP intermediaries. This requirement enables the SIP intermediaries to base the decision to log a SIP request or response solely on the presence of the "log me" marker.
- o REQ11: The scope of SIP message logging request includes all requests and responses within a given dialog. The scope can be extended to related dialogs that correspond to an end-to-end session for scenarios discussed in REQ9. The "log me" request MUST be indicated at the beginning of the dialog of interest and SHOULD continue to the dialog end without any stop and restart during the duration of the dialog.



- o REQ12: The presence of a "log me" marker might cause some SIP entities to log signaling. Therefore, this marker MUST be removed at the earliest opportunity if it has been incorrectly inserted (e.g. mid-dialog or outside the configured start and stop of "log me" marking).

The definition of types of events that cause logging to stop and configuring SIP entities to detect such "stop events" is outside the scope of this document.

## **6. Security Considerations**

In order to prevent any security implications of a "log me" marker, the marker itself MUST NOT contain any sensitive information, detecting its presence or absence MUST NOT reveal sensitive information, and maliciously adding a "log me" marker MUST NOT adversely affect a network. This section analyses how to meet these requirements.

### **6.1. Trust Domain**

Since a "log me" marker may cause a SIP entity to log the SIP header and body of a request or response, the "log me" marker MUST be removed at a trust domain boundary. If a prior agreement to log sessions exists with the next hop network then the "log me" marker SHOULD NOT be removed.

### **6.2. Security Threats**

#### **6.2.1. "Log Me" Marking**

The "log me" marker MUST NOT convey any sensitive information, although the "log me" marker will sometimes be inserted because a particular device is experiencing problems. The "log me" marker MUST NOT reveal any information related to any SIP user or device.

The insertion of "log me" marker at the endpoint MUST be approved by the end user or by the network administrator. Similarly, network administrator authorization is required for a SIP intermediary to insert a "log me" marker on behalf of an UA that does not support "log me" marking.

Activating a debug mode affects the operation of a terminal, therefore debugging configuration MUST be supplied by an authorized party to an authorized terminal through a secure communication channel.



### **6.2.2. Logged Information**

Logged signaling is privacy-sensitive data, therefore signaling logs MUST NOT be readable by an unauthorized third party.

## **7. IANA Considerations**

There are no IANA considerations associated with this document.

## **8. Acknowledgments**

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#### Authors' Addresses

Peter Dawes  
Vodafone Group  
The Connection  
Newbury, Berkshire RG14 2FN  
UK

Email: [peter.dawes@vodafone.com](mailto:peter.dawes@vodafone.com)

Chidambaram Arunachalam  
Cisco Systems  
7200-12 Kit Creek Road  
Research Triangle Park, NC, NC 27709  
US

Email: [carunach@cisco.com](mailto:carunach@cisco.com)

