

ippm
Internet-Draft
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: December 18, 2022

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June 16, 2022

In-situ OAM IPv6 Options
draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-ipv6-options-08

Abstract

In-situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (IOAM) records operational and telemetry information in the packet while the packet traverses a path between two points in the network. This document outlines how IOAM data fields are encapsulated in IPv6.

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Internet-Draft

In-situ OAM IPv6 encapsulation

June 2022

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[1.](#) Introduction

In-situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (IOAM) records operational and telemetry information in the packet while the packet traverses a path between two points in the network. This document outlines how IOAM data fields are encapsulated in the IPv6 [[RFC8200](#)] and discusses deployment options for networks that use IPv6-encapsulated IOAM data fields. These options have distinct deployment considerations; for example, the IOAM domain can either be between hosts, or be between IOAM encapsulating and decapsulating network nodes that forward traffic, such as routers.

[2.](#) Contributors

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[3.](#) Conventions

[3.1.](#) Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [BCP 14](#) [[RFC2119](#)] [[RFC8174](#)] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

[3.2.](#) Abbreviations

Abbreviations used in this document:

E2E: Edge-to-Edge

IOAM: In-situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance

3. Proof of Transit Option: The in-situ OAM POT Option-Type defined in [[RFC9197](#)] is represented as an IPv6 option in the Hop-by-Hop extension header:

Option Type: TBD_1_1 8-bit identifier of the IPv6 Option Type for IOAM.

IOAM Type: IOAM POT Option-Type.

4. Edge to Edge Option: The in-situ OAM E2E option defined in [[RFC9197](#)] is represented as an IPv6 option in Destination extension header:

Option Type: TBD_1_0 8-bit identifier of the IPv6 Option Type for IOAM.

IOAM Type: IOAM E2E Option-Type.

5. Direct Export (DEX) Option: The in-situ OAM Direct Export Option-Type defined in [[I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-direct-export](#)] is represented as an IPv6 option in the Hop-by-Hop extension header:

Option Type: TBD_1_0 8-bit identifier of the IPv6 Option Type for IOAM.

IOAM Type: IOAM Direct Export (DEX) Option-Type.

All the in-situ OAM IPv6 options defined here have alignment requirements. Specifically, they all require 4n alignment. This ensures that fields specified in [[RFC9197](#)] are aligned at a multiple-of-4 offset from the start of the Hop-by-Hop and Destination Options header. In addition, to maintain IPv6 extension header 8-octet alignment and avoid the need to add or remove padding at every hop, the Trace-Type for Incremental Trace Option in IPv6 MUST be selected such that the IOAM node data length is a multiple of 8-octets.

IPv6 options can have a maximum length of 255 octets. Consequently, the total length of IOAM Option-Types including all data fields is also limited to 255 octets when encapsulated into IPv6.

[5.](#) IOAM Deployment In IPv6 Networks

[5.1.](#) Considerations for IOAM deployment in IPv6 networks

IOAM deployments in IPv6 networks should take the following considerations and requirements into account:

- C1 It is desirable that the addition of IOAM data fields neither changes the way routers forward packets nor the forwarding decisions the routers take. Packets with added OAM information should follow the same path within the domain that an identical packet without OAM information would follow, even in the presence of ECMP. Such behavior is particularly important for deployments where IOAM data fields are only added "on-demand", e.g., to provide further insights in case of undesired network behavior for certain flows. Implementations of IOAM SHOULD ensure that ECMP behavior for packets with and without IOAM data fields is the same.
- C2 Given that IOAM data fields increase the total size of a packet, the size of a packet including the IOAM data could exceed the PMTU. In particular, the incremental trace IOAM Hop-by-Hop (HbH) Option, which is intended to support hardware implementations of IOAM, changes Option Data Length en-route. Operators of an IOAM domain SHOULD ensure that the addition of OAM information does not lead to fragmentation of the packet, e.g., by configuring the MTU of transit routers and switches to a sufficiently high value. Careful control of the MTU in a network is one of the reasons why IOAM is considered a domain-specific feature (see also [\[RFC9197\]](#)). In addition, the PMTU tolerance range in the IOAM domain should be identified (e.g., through configuration) and IOAM encapsulation operations and/or IOAM data field insertion (in case of incremental tracing) should not be performed if it exceeds the packet size beyond PMTU.

- C3 Packets with IOAM data or associated ICMP errors, should not arrive at destinations that have no knowledge of IOAM. For example, if IOAM is used in transit devices, misleading ICMP errors due to addition and/or presence of OAM data in a packet could confuse the host that sent the packet if it did not insert the OAM information.

- C4 OAM data leaks can affect the forwarding behavior and state of

network elements outside an IOAM domain. IOAM domains SHOULD provide a mechanism to prevent data leaks or be able to ensure that if a leak occurs, network elements outside the domain are not affected (i.e., they continue to process other valid packets).

- C5 An Autonomous System (AS) that inserts and leaks the IOAM data needs to be easy to identify for the purpose of troubleshooting, due to the high complexity in identifying the source of the leak. Such a troubleshooting process might require coordination between multiple operators, complex configuration verification, packet capture analysis, etc.
- C6 Compliance with [\[RFC8200\]](#) requires OAM data to be encapsulated instead of header/option insertion directly into in-flight packets using the original IPv6 header.

[5.2.](#) IOAM domains bounded by hosts

For deployments where the IOAM domain is bounded by hosts, hosts will perform the operation of IOAM data field encapsulation and decapsulation. IOAM data is carried in IPv6 packets as Hop-by-Hop or Destination options as specified in this document.

[5.3.](#) IOAM domains bounded by network devices

For deployments where the IOAM domain is bounded by network devices, network devices such as routers form the edge of an IOAM domain. Network devices will perform the operation of IOAM data field encapsulation and decapsulation.

[5.4.](#) Deployment options

This section lists out possible deployment options that can be employed to meet the requirements listed in [Section 5.1](#).

[5.4.1.](#) IP-in-IPv6 encapsulation with ULA

The "IP-in-IPv6 encapsulation with ULA" [\[RFC4193\]](#) approach can be used to apply IOAM to either an IPv6 or an IPv4 network. In addition, it fulfills requirement C4 (avoid leaks) by using ULA for

the IOAM Overlay Network (ION). The original IP packet is preserved.

An IPv6 header including IOAM data fields in an extension header is added in front of it, to forward traffic within and across the IOAM domain. IPv6 addresses for the ION, i.e. the outer IPv6 addresses are assigned from the ULA space. Addressing and routing in the ION are to be configured so that the IP-in-IPv6 encapsulated packets follow the same path as the original, non-encapsulated packet would have taken. This would create an internal IPv6 forwarding topology using the IOAM domain's interior ULA address space which is parallel with the forwarding topology that exists with the non-IOAM address space (the topology and address space that would be followed by packets that do not have supplemental IOAM information). Establishment and maintenance of the parallel IOAM ULA forwarding topology could be automated, e.g., similar to how LDP [[RFC5036](#)] is used in MPLS to establish and maintain an LSP forwarding topology that is parallel to the network's IGP forwarding topology.

Transit across the ION could leverage the transit approach for traffic between BGP border routers, as described in [[RFC1772](#)], "A.2.3 Encapsulation". Assuming that the operational guidelines specified in [Section 4 of \[RFC4193\]](#) are properly followed, the probability of leaks in this approach will be almost close to zero. If the packets do leak through IOAM egress device misconfiguration or partial IOAM egress device failure, the packets' ULA destination address is invalid outside of the IOAM domain. There is no exterior destination to be reached, and the packets will be dropped when they encounter either a router external to the IOAM domain that has a packet filter that drops packets with ULA destinations, or a router that does not have a default route.

[5.4.2.](#) x-in-IPv6 Encapsulation that is used Independently

In some cases it is desirable to monitor a domain that uses an overlay network that is deployed independently of the need for IOAM, e.g., an overlay network that runs Geneve-in-IPv6, or VXLAN-in-IPv6. In this case IOAM can be encapsulated in as an extension header in the tunnel (outer) IPv6 header. Thus, the tunnel encapsulating node is also the IOAM encapsulating node, and the tunnel end point is also the IOAM decapsulating node.

[6.](#) Security Considerations

This document describes the encapsulation of IOAM data fields in IPv6. Security considerations of the specific IOAM data fields for each case (i.e., Trace, Proof of Transit, and E2E) are described and defined in [[RFC9197](#)].

As this document describes new options for IPv6, these are similar to the security considerations of [RFC8200] and the weakness documented in [RFC8250].

7. IANA Considerations

This draft requests the following IPv6 Option Type assignments from the Destination Options and Hop-by-Hop Options sub-registry of Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Parameters.

<http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv6-parameters/ipv6-parameters.xhtml#ipv6-parameters-2>

Hex Value	Binary Value			Description	Reference
	act	chg	rest		
TBD_1_0	00	0	TBD_1	IOAM	[This draft]
TBD_1_1	00	1	TBD_1	IOAM	[This draft]

8. Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Tom Herbert, Eric Vyncke, Nalini Elkins, Srihari Raghavan, Ranganathan T S, Karthik Babu Harichandra Babu, Akshaya Nadahalli, Stefano Previdi, Hemant Singh, Erik Nordmark, LJ Wobker, Mark Smith, Andrew Yourtchenko and Justin Iurman for the comments and advice. For the IPv6 encapsulation, this document leverages concepts described in [I-D.kitamura-ipv6-record-route]. The authors would like to acknowledge the work done by the author Hiroshi Kitamura and people involved in writing it.

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June 2022

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