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IKEv2-derived Shared Secret Key for O/TWAMP
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Abstract

The One-way Active Measurement Protocol (OWAMP) and Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP) security mechanisms require that both the client and server endpoints possess a shared secret. This document describes the use of keys derived from an IKEv2 security association (SA) as the shared key in O/TWAMP. If the shared key can be derived from the IKEv2 SA, O/TWAMP can support certificate-based key exchange, which would allow for more operational flexibility and efficiency. The key derivation presented in this document can also facilitate automatic key management.

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[1.](#) Introduction

The One-way Active Measurement Protocol (OWAMP) [[RFC4656](#)] and the Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP) [[RFC5357](#)] can be used to measure network performance parameters such as latency, bandwidth, and packet loss by sending probe packets and monitoring their experience in the network. In order to guarantee the accuracy of network measurement results, security aspects must be considered. Otherwise, attacks may occur and the authenticity of the measurement results may be violated. For example, if no protection is provided, an adversary in the middle may modify packet timestamps, thus altering the measurement results.

The currently-standardized O/TWAMP security mechanism [[RFC4656](#)]

[[RFC5357](#)] requires that endpoints (i.e. both the client and the server) possess a shared secret. In today's network deployments, however, the use of pre-shared keys is far from optimal. For example, in wireless infrastructure networks, certain network elements, which can be seen as the two endpoints from an O/TWAMP

perspective, support certificate-based security. For instance, consider the case in which one wants to measure IP performance between a E-UTRAN Evolved Node B (eNB) and Security Gateway (SeGW). Both eNB and SeGW are 3GPP Long Term Evolution (LTE) nodes and support certificate mode and the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2).

The O/TWAMP security mechanism specified in [[RFC4656](#)] [[RFC5357](#)] only supports the pre-shared key mode hindering large scale deployment of O/TWAMP. Furthermore, deployment and management of "shared secrets" for massive equipment installation consumes a tremendous amount of effort and is prone to human error. At the same time, recent trends point to wider Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) deployment which, in turn, calls for mechanisms and methods that enable tunnel end-users, as well as operators, to measure one-way and two-way network performance in a standardized manner.

With IKEv2 widely deployed, employing shared keys derived from IKEv2 security association (SA) can be considered as a viable alternative through the method described in this document. If the shared key can be derived from the IKEv2 SA, O/TWAMP can support certificate-based key exchange and practically increase operational flexibility and efficiency. The use of IKEv2 also makes it easier to extend automatic key management.

In general, O/TWAMP measurement packets can be transmitted inside the IPsec tunnel, as it occurs with typical user traffic, or transmitted outside the IPsec tunnel. This may depend on the operator's policy and the performance evaluation goal, and is orthogonal to the mechanism described in this document. When IPsec is deployed, protecting O/TWAMP traffic in unauthenticated mode using IPsec is one option. Another option is to protect O/TWAMP traffic using the O/TWAMP layer security established using the Pre-Shared Key (PSK) derived from IKEv2 but bypassing the IPsec tunnel. Protecting unauthenticated O/TWAMP control and/or test traffic via Authentication Header (AH) [[RFC4302](#)] or Encapsulating Security

Payload (ESP) [[RFC4303](#)] cannot provide various security options, e.g. it cannot authenticate part of a O/TWAMP packet as mentioned in [[RFC4656](#)].

For measuring latency, a timestamp is carried in O/TWAMP test traffic. The sender has to fetch the timestamp, encrypt it, and send it. When the mechanism described in this document is used, partial authentication of O/TWAMP packets is possible and therefore the middle step can be skipped, potentially improving accuracy as the sequence number can be encrypted and authenticated before the timestamp is fetched. The receiver obtains the timestamp without the need for the corresponding decryption step. In such cases,

protecting O/TWAMP traffic using O/TWAMP layer security but bypassing the IPsec tunnel has its advantages.

This document specifies a method for enabling network measurements between a TWAMP client and a TWAMP server, as discussed in [Section 3](#). In short, the shared key used for securing TWAMP traffic is derived from IKEv2 [[RFC7296](#)]. From an operations and management perspective [[RFC5706](#)], the mechanism described in this document requires that both the TWAMP Control-Client and Server support IPsec. IKEv2-derived keys SHOULD be used instead of shared secrets when O/TWAMP is employed in a deployment using IKEv2.

After clarifying the terminology and scope in the subsequent sections, the remainder of this document is organized as follows. [Section 4](#) summarizes O/TWAMP protocol operation with respect to security. [Section 5](#) presents the method for binding TWAMP and IKEv2 for network measurements between the client and the server which both support IKEv2. Finally, [Section 6](#) discusses the security considerations arising from the proposed mechanisms.

[2](#). Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [[RFC2119](#)].

[3](#). Scope and Applicability

TWAMP implementations signal the use of this method by setting

IKEv2Derived (see [Section 7](#))

Although the control procedures described in this document are applicable to OWAMP per se, the lack of an established IANA registry for OWAMP Mode values akin to that listed in [Section 7](#) technically prevents us from extending OWAMP Mode values. Therefore, independent OWAMP implementations SHOULD be checked for full compatibility with respect to the use of this Mode value. Until an IANA registry for OWAMP Mode values is established, the use of this feature in OWAMP implementations MUST be arranged privately among consenting OWAMP users.

[4.](#) O/TWAMP Security

Security for O/TWAMP-Control and O/TWAMP-Test are briefly reviewed in the following subsections.

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[4.1.](#) O/TWAMP-Control Security

O/TWAMP uses a simple cryptographic protocol which relies on

- o Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Cipher Block Chaining (AES-CBC) for confidentiality
- o Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-Secure Hash Algorithm1 (SHA1) truncated to 128 bits for message authentication

Three modes of operation are supported in the OWAMP-Control protocol: unauthenticated, authenticated, and encrypted. In addition to these modes, the TWAMP-Control protocol also supports a mixed mode, i.e. the TWAMP-Control protocol operates in encrypted mode while TWAMP-Test protocol operates in unauthenticated mode. The authenticated, encrypted and mixed modes require that endpoints possess a shared secret, typically a passphrase. The secret key is derived from the passphrase using a password-based key derivation function PBKDF2 (PKCS#5) [[RFC2898](#)].

In the unauthenticated mode, the security parameters are left unused. In the authenticated, encrypted and mixed modes, the security

parameters are negotiated during the control connection establishment.

Figure 1 illustrates the initiation stage of the O/TWAMP-Control protocol between a Control-Client and a Server. In short, the Control-Client opens a TCP connection to the Server in order to be able to send O/TWAMP-Control commands. The Server responds with a Server Greeting, which contains the Modes, Challenge, Salt, Count, and MBZ fields (see [Section 3.1 of \[RFC4656\]](#)). If the Control-Client preferred mode is available, the client responds with a Set-Up-Response message, wherein the selected Mode, as well as the KeyID, Token and Client initialization vector (IV) are included. The Token is the concatenation of a 16-octet Challenge, a 16-octet AES Session-key used for encryption, and a 32-octet HMAC-SHA1 Session-key used for authentication. The Token is encrypted using AES-CBC.




Figure 1: Initiation of O/TWAMP-Control

Encryption uses a key derived from the shared secret associated with KeyID. In the authenticated, encrypted and mixed modes, all further communication is encrypted using the AES Session-key and authenticated with the HMAC Session-key. After receiving the Set-Up-Response the Server responds with a Server-Start message containing the Server-IV. The Control-Client encrypts everything it transmits through the just-established O/TWAMP-Control connection using stream encryption with Client-IV as the IV. Correspondingly, the Server encrypts its side of the connection using Server-IV as the IV. The IVs themselves are transmitted in cleartext. Encryption starts with the block immediately following that containing the IV.

The AES Session-key and HMAC Session-key are generated randomly by the Control-Client. The HMAC Session-key is communicated along with the AES Session-key during O/TWAMP-Control connection setup. The HMAC Session-key is derived independently of the AES Session-key.

[4.2.](#) O/TWAMP-Test Security

The O/TWAMP-Test protocol runs over UDP, using the Session-Sender and Session-Reflector IP and port numbers that were negotiated during the Request-Session exchange. O/TWAMP-Test has the same mode with O/TWAMP-Control and all O/TWAMP-Test sessions inherit the corresponding O/TWAMP-Control session mode except when operating in mixed mode.

The O/TWAMP-Test packet format is the same in authenticated and encrypted modes. The encryption and authentication operations are, however, different. Similarly with the respective O/TWAMP-Control session, each O/TWAMP-Test session has two keys: an AES Session-key and an HMAC Session-key. However, there is a difference in how the keys are obtained:

O/TWAMP-Control: the keys are generated by the Control-Client and communicated to the Server during the control connection establishment with the Set-Up-Response message (as part of the Token).

O/TWAMP-Test: the keys are derived from the O/TWAMP-Control keys and the session identifier (SID), which serve as inputs of the key derivation function (KDF). The O/TWAMP-Test AES Session-

key is generated using the O/TWAMP- Control AES Session-key, with the 16-octet session identifier (SID), for encrypting and decrypting the packets of the particular O/TWAMP-Test session. The O/TWAMP-Test HMAC Session-key is generated using the O/TWAMP-Control HMAC Session-key, with the 16-octet session identifier (SID), for authenticating the packets of the particular O/TWAMP-Test session.

[4.3.](#) O/TWAMP Security Root

As discussed above, the AES Session-key and HMAC Session-key used by the O/TWAMP-Test protocol are derived from the AES Session-key and HMAC Session-key which are used in the O/TWAMP-Control protocol. The AES Session-key and HMAC Session-key used in the O/TWAMP-Control protocol are generated randomly by the Control-Client, and encrypted with the shared secret associated with KeyID. Therefore, the security root is the shared secret key. Thus, for large deployments, key provision and management may become overly complicated. Comparatively, a certificate-based approach using IKEv2 can automatically manage the security root and solve this problem, as we explain in [Section 5](#).

[5.](#) O/TWAMP for IPsec Networks

This section presents a method of binding O/TWAMP and IKEv2 for network measurements between a client and a server which both support IPsec. In short, the shared key used for securing O/TWAMP traffic is derived using IKEv2 [[RFC7296](#)].

[5.1.](#) Shared Key Derivation

In the authenticated, encrypted and mixed modes, the shared secret key MUST be derived from the IKEv2 Security Association (SA). Note that we explicitly opt to derive the shared secret key from the IKEv2 SA, rather than the child SA, since the use case whereby an IKEv2 SA can be created without generating any child SA is possible [[RFC6023](#)].

When the shared secret key is derived from the IKEv2 SA, SK_d must be generated first. SK_d must be computed as per [[RFC7296](#)].

The shared secret key MUST be generated as follows:

Shared secret key = prf(SK_d, "IPPM")

Wherein the string "IPPM" is encoded in ASCII and "prf" is a pseudorandom function.

It is recommended that the shared secret key is derived in the IPsec layer so that IPsec keying material is not exposed to the O/TWAMP client. Note, however, that the interaction between the O/TWAMP and IPsec layers is host-internal and implementation-specific. Therefore, this is clearly outside the scope of this document, which focuses on the interaction between the O/TWAMP client and server. That said, one possible way could be the following: at the Control-Client side, the IPsec layer can perform a lookup in the Security Association Database (SAD) using the IP address of the Server and thus match the corresponding IKEv2 SA. At the Server side, the IPsec layer can look up the corresponding IKEv2 SA by using the Security Parameter Indexes (SPIs) sent by the Control-Client (see [Section 5.3](#)), and therefore extract the shared secret key.

In case that both client and server do support IKEv2 but there is no current IKEv2 SA, two alternative ways could be considered. First, the O/TWAMP Control-Client initiates the establishment of the IKEv2 SA, logs this operation, and selects the mode which supports IKEv2. Alternatively, the O/TWAMP Control-Client does not initiate the establishment of the IKEv2 SA, logs an error for operational management purposes, and proceeds with the modes defined in [\[RFC4656\]](#)[\[RFC5357\]](#)[\[RFC5618\]](#). Again, although both alternatives are feasible, they are in fact implementation-specific.

If rekeying for the IKEv2 SA or deletion of the IKEv2 SA occurs, the corresponding shared secret key generated from the SA MUST continue to be used until the O/TWAMP session terminates.

[5.2.](#) Server Greeting Message Update

To trigger a binding association between the key generated from IKEv2 and the O/TWAMP shared secret key, the Modes field in the Server Greeting Message (Figure 2) will need to allow for support of key derivation as discussed in [Section 5.1](#). Therefore, when this method is used, the Modes value extension MUST be supported. Support for deriving the shared key from the IKEv2 SA is indicated by setting IKEv2Derived (see [Section 7](#)).




Figure 2: Server Greeting format

The choice of this set of Modes values poses no backwards compatibility problems to existing O/TWAMP clients. Robust legacy Control-Client implementations would disregard the fact that the IKEv2Derived Modes bit in the Server Greeting is set. On the other hand, a Control-Client implementing this method can identify that the O/TWAMP Server contacted does not support this specification. If the Server supports other Modes, as one could assume, the Control-Client would then decide which Mode to use and indicate such accordingly as per [RFC4656][RFC5357]. A Control-Client implementing this method which decides not to employ IKEv2 derivation, can simply behave as a purely [RFC4656]/[RFC5357] compatible client.

5.3. Set-Up-Response Update

The Set-Up-Response Message Figure 3 is updated as follows. When a O/TWAMP Control-Client implementing this method receives a Server Greeting indicating support for Mode IKEv2Derived it SHOULD reply to the O/TWAMP Server with a Set-Up response that indicates so. For

example, a compatible O/TWAMP Control-Client choosing the authenticated mode with IKEv2 shared secret key derivation should set

Mode to 130, i.e. set the bits in positions 1 and 7 to one (see [Section 7](#)).




Figure 3: Set-Up-Response Message

The Security Parameter Index (SPI)(see [\[RFC4301\]](#) [\[RFC7296\]](#)) uniquely identifies the Security Association (SA). If the Control-Client supports the derivation of shared secret key from IKEv2 SA, it will choose the corresponding mode value and carry SPI_i and SPI_r in the Key ID field. SPI_i and SPI_r MUST be included in the Key ID field of the Set-Up-Response Message to indicate the IKEv2 SA from which the O/TWAMP shared secret key derived from. The length of SPI is 8 octets. Therefore, the first 8 octets of Key ID field MUST carry SPI_i and the second 8 octets MUST carry SPI_r. The remaining bits of the Key ID field MUST be set to zero.

A O/TWAMP Server implementation of this method, MUST obtain the SPI_i and SPI_r from the first 16 octets and ignore the remaining octets of the Key ID field. Then, the Control-Client and the Server can derive

the shared secret key based on the Mode value and SPI. If the O/TWAMP Server cannot find the IKEv2 SA corresponding to the SPI_i and SPI_r received, it MUST log the event for operational management purposes. In addition, the O/TWAMP Server SHOULD set the Accept field of the Server-Start message to the value 6 to indicate that the Server is not willing to conduct further transactions in this O/TWAMP-Control session since it can not find the corresponding IKEv2 SA.

[5.4.](#) O/TWAMP over an IPsec tunnel

IPsec Authentication Header (AH) [[RFC4302](#)] and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [[RFC4303](#)] provide confidentiality and data integrity to IP datagrams. An IPsec tunnel can be used to provide the protection needed for O/TWAMP Control and Test packets, even if the peers choose the unauthenticated mode of operation. In order to ensure authenticity and security, O/TWAMP packets between two IKEv2 systems SHOULD be configured to use the corresponding IPsec tunnel running over an external network even when using the O/TWAMP unauthenticated mode.

[6.](#) Security Considerations

As the shared secret key is derived from the IKEv2 SA, the key derivation algorithm strength and limitations are as per [[RFC7296](#)]. The strength of a key derived from a Diffie-Hellman exchange using any of the groups defined here depends on the inherent strength of the group, the size of the exponent used, and the entropy provided by the random number generator employed. The strength of all keys and implementation vulnerabilities, particularly Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are as defined in [[RFC7296](#)].

[7.](#) IANA Considerations

During the production of this document, the authors and reviewers noticed that the TWAMP-Modes registry, which should describe a bitfield of flags, instead is defined as a registry of integer values. In addition, the Semantics Definition column seems to have spurious information in it. The registry should be changed to correct these issues, as follows:

Bit	Description	Semantics Definition	Reference
0	Unauthenticated	Section 3.1	[RFC4656]
1	Authenticated	Section 3.1	[RFC4656]
2	Encrypted	Section 3.1	[RFC4656]
3	Unauth.TEST protocol, Encrypted CONTROL	Section 3.1	[RFC5618]
4	Individual Session Control		[RFC5938]
5	Reflect Octets Capability		[RFC6038]
6	Symmetrical Size Sender Test Packet Format		[RFC6038]

Figure 4: TWAMP Modes registry

In addition, this document adds a new entry to this registry:

Bit	Description	Semantics Definition	Reference
7	IKEv2Derived Mode Capability	Section 5	[RFCxxxx]

(where RFCxxxx refers to [draft-ietf-ippm-ipsec](#)).

Figure 5: IKEv2 Derived Mode Capability

8. Acknowledgments

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