

Network Working Group  
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**A One-way Active Measurement Protocol**  
<[draft-ietf-ippm-owdp-05.txt](#)>

## **1. Status of this Memo**

This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of [Section 10 of RFC2026](#).

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## **2. Motivation and Goals**

The IETF IP Performance Metrics (IPPM) working group has proposed draft standard metrics for one-way packet delay [[RFC2679](#)] and loss [[RFC 2680](#)] across Internet paths. Although there are now several measurement platforms that implement collection of these metrics [[SURVEYOR](#)], [[RIPE](#)], there is not currently a standard that would permit initiation of test streams or exchange of packets to collect

singleton metrics in an interoperable manner.

With the increasingly wide availability of affordable global positioning system (GPS) and CDMA based time sources, hosts increasingly have available to them very accurate time sources--either directly or through their proximity to NTP primary (stratum 1) time servers. By standardizing a technique for collecting IPPM one-way active measurements, we hope to create an environment where IPPM metrics may be collected across a far broader mesh of Internet paths than is currently possible. One particularly compelling vision is of widespread deployment of open OWAMP servers that would make measurement of one-way delay as commonplace as measurement of round-trip time using an ICMP-based tool like ping.

Additional design goals of OWAMP include being hard to detect and manipulate, security, logical separation of control and test functionality, and support for small test packets.

OWAMP test traffic is hard to detect, because it is simply a stream of UDP packets from and to negotiated port numbers with potentially nothing static in the packets (size is negotiated, too). Additionally, OWAMP supports an encrypted mode, that further obscures the traffic, at the same time making it impossible to alter timestamps undetectably.

Security features include optional authentication and/or encryption of control and test messages. These features may be useful to prevent unauthorized access to results or man-in-the-middle attackers who attempt to provide special treatment to OWAMP test streams or who attempt to modify sender-generated timestamps to falsify test results.

### **2.1. Relationship of Test and Control Protocols**

OWAMP actually consists of two inter-related protocols: OWAMP-Control and OWAMP-Test. OWAMP-Control is used to initiate, start and stop test sessions and fetch their results, while OWAMP-Test is used to exchange test packets between two measurement nodes.

Although OWAMP-Test may be used in conjunction with a control protocol other than OWAMP-Control, the authors have deliberately chosen to include both protocols in the same draft to encourage the implementation and deployment of OWAMP-Control as a common denominator control protocol for one-way active measurements. Having a complete and open one-way active measurement solution that is simple to implement and deploy is crucial to assuring a future in which inter-domain one-way active measurement could become as



commonplace as ping. We neither anticipate nor recommend that OWAMP-Control form the foundation of a general purpose extensible measurement and monitoring control protocol.

OWAMP-Control is designed to support the negotiation of one-way active measurement sessions and results retrieval in a straightforward manner. At session initiation, there is a negotiation of sender and receiver addresses and port numbers, session start time, session length, test packet size, the mean Poisson sampling interval for the test stream, and some attributes of the very general [RFC 2330](#) notion of 'packet type', including packet size and per-hop behavior (PHB) [[RFC2474](#)], which could be used to support the measurement of one-way active across diff-serv networks. Additionally, OWAMP-Control supports per-session encryption and authentication for both test and control traffic, measurement servers which may act as proxies for test stream endpoints, and the exchange of a seed value for the pseudo-random Poisson process that describes the test stream generated by the sender.

We believe that OWAMP-Control can effectively support one-way active measurement in a variety of environments, from publicly accessible measurement 'beacons' running on arbitrary hosts to network monitoring deployments within private corporate networks. If integration with SNMP or proprietary network management protocols is required, gateways may be created.


## **[2.2. Logical Model](#)**

Several roles are logically separated to allow for broad flexibility in use. Specifically, we define:

Session-Sender	the sending endpoint of an OWAMP-Test session;
Session-Receiver	the receiving endpoint of an OWAMP-Test session;
Server	an end system that manages one or more OWAMP-Test sessions, is capable of configuring per-session state in session endpoints, and is capable of returning the results of a test session;
Control-Client	an end system that initiates requests for OWAMP-Test sessions, triggers the start of a set of sessions, and may trigger their termination;
Fetch-Client	an end system that initiates requests to fetch the results of completed OWAMP-Test sessions;




One possible scenario of relationships between these roles is shown below.



(Unlabeled links in the figure are unspecified by this draft and may be proprietary protocols.)

Different logical roles can be played by the same host. For example, in the figure above, there could actually be only two hosts: one playing the roles of Control-Client, Fetch-Client, and Session-Sender, and the other playing the roles of Server and Session-Receiver. This is shown below.



Finally, because many Internet paths include segments that transport IP over ATM, delay and loss measurements can include the effects of ATM segmentation and reassembly (SAR). Consequently, OWAMP has been designed to allow for small test packets that would fit inside the payload of a single ATM cell (this is only achieved in unauthenticated and encrypted modes).



### **3. Protocol Overview**

As described above, OWAMP consists of two inter-related protocols: OWAMP-Control and OWAMP-Test. The former is layered over TCP and is used to initiate and control measurement sessions and to fetch their results. The latter protocol is layered over UDP and is used to send singleton measurement packets along the Internet path under test.

The initiator of the measurement session establishes a TCP connection to a well-known port on the target point and this connection remains open for the duration of the OWAMP-Test sessions. IANA will be requested to allocate a well-known port number for OWAMP-Control sessions. An OWAMP server SHOULD listen to this well-known port.

OWAMP-Control messages are transmitted only before OWAMP-Test sessions are actually started and after they complete (with the possible exception of an early Stop-Session message).

The OWAMP-Control and OWAMP-Test protocols support three modes of operation: unauthenticated, authenticated, and encrypted. The authenticated or encrypted modes require endpoints to possess a shared secret.

All multi-octet quantities defined in this document are represented as unsigned integers in network byte order unless specified otherwise.

### **4. OWAMP-Control**

Each type of OWAMP-Control message has a fixed length. The recipient will know the full length of a message after examining first 16 octets of it. No message is shorter than 16 octets.

If the full message is not received within 30 minutes after it is expected, connection SHOULD be dropped.

#### **4.1. Connection Setup**

Before either a Control-Client or a Fetch-Client can issue commands of a Server, it must establish a connection to the server.

First, a client opens a TCP connection to the server on a well-known port. The server responds with a server greeting:



Otherwise, the client **MUST** respond with the following message:



Session-key and Client-IV are generated randomly by the client.







While conducting active measurements, the only command available is Stop-Session.


These commands are described in detail below.

#### **4.3. Creating Test Sessions**

Individual one-way active measurement sessions are established using a simple request/response protocol. An OWAMP client MAY issue zero or more Request-Session messages to an OWAMP server, which MUST respond to each with an Accept-Session message. An Accept-Session message MAY refuse a request.

The format of Request-Session message is as follows:





This is immediately followed by one or more schedule slot







sent during this OWAMP-Test session (note that both server and client can abort the session early).

If Conf-Sender is not set, Sender Port is the UDP port OWAMP-Test packets will be sent from. If Conf-Receiver is not set, Receiver Port is the UDP port OWAMP-Test packets are requested to be sent to.

The Sender Address and Receiver Address fields contain respectively the sender and receiver addresses of the end points of the Internet path over which an OWAMP test session is requested.

SID is the session identifier. It can be used in later sessions as an argument for Fetch-Session command. It is meaningful only if Conf-Receiver is 0. This way, the SID is always generated by the receiving side. See the end of the section for information on how the SID is generated.

Padding length is the number of octets to be appended to normal OWAMP-Test packet (see more on padding in discussion of OWAMP-Test).

Start Time is the time when the session is to be started (but not before Start-Sessions command is issued). This timestamp is in the same format as OWAMP-Test timestamps.

Timeout is an interval of time (expressed as a timestamp). A packet belonging to the test session that is being set up by the current Request-Session command will be considered lost if it is not received during Timeout seconds after it is sent.

Type-P Descriptor covers only a subset of (very large) Type-P space. If the first two bits of Type-P Descriptor are 00, then subsequent 6 bits specify the requested Differentiated Services Codepoint (DSCP) value of sent OWAMP-Test packets as defined in [RFC 2474](#). If the first two bits of Type-P descriptor are 01, then subsequent 16 bits specify the requested Per Hop Behavior Identification Code (PHB ID) as defined in [RFC 2836](#).

Therefore, the value of all zeros specifies the default best-effort service.

If Conf-Sender is set, Type-P Descriptor is to be used to configure the sender to send packets according to its value. If Conf-Sender is not set, Type-P Descriptor is a declaration of how the sender will be configured.


If Conf-Sender is set and the server doesn't recognize Type-P Descriptor, cannot or does not wish to set the corresponding attributes on OWAMP-Test packets, it SHOULD reject the session



request. If Conf-Sender is not set, the server SHOULD accept the session regardless of the value of Type-P Descriptor.

Integrity Zero Padding MUST be all zeros in this and all subsequent messages that use zero padding. The recipient of a message where zero padding is not zero MUST reject the message as it is an indication of tampering with the content of the message by an intermediary (or brokenness). If the message is part of OWAMP-Control, the session MUST be terminated and results invalidated. If the message is part of OWAMP-Test, it MUST be silently ignored. This will ensure data integrity. In unauthenticated mode, Integrity Zero Padding is nothing more than a simple check. In authenticated and encrypted modes, however, it ensures, in conjunction with properties of CBC chaining mode, that everything received before was not tampered with. For this reason, it is important to check the Integrity Zero Padding Field as soon as possible, so that bad data doesn't get propagated.

To each Request-Session message, an OWAMP server MUST respond with an Accept-Session message:



In this message, zero in the Accept field means that the server is willing to conduct the session. A value of 1 indicates rejection of the request. All other values are reserved.

If the server rejects a Request-Session command, it SHOULD not close the TCP connection. The client MAY close it if it gets negative response to Request-Session.

The meaning of Port in the response depends on the values of Conf-Sender and Conf-Receiver in the query that solicited the response. If both were set, Port field is unused. If only Conf-Sender was set, Port is the port to expect OWAMP-Test packets from. If only Conf-



Receiver was set, Port is the port to send OWAMP-Test packets to.

If only Conf-Sender was set, SID field in the response is unused. Otherwise, SID is a unique server-generated session identifier. It can be used later as handle to fetch the results of a session.

SIDs SHOULD be constructed by concatenation of 4-octet IPv4 IP number belonging to the generating machine, 8-octet timestamp, and 4-octet random value. To reduce the probability of collisions, if the generating machine has any IPv4 addresses (with the exception of loopback), one of them SHOULD be used for SID generation, even if all communication is IPv6-based. If it has no IPv4 addresses at all, the last 4 octets of an IPv6 address can be used instead. Note that SID is always chosen by the receiver. If truly random values are not available, it is important that SID be made unpredictable as knowledge of SID might be used for access control.

#### **4.4. Send Schedules**

The sender and the receiver need to both know the same send schedule. This way, when packets are lost, the receiver knows when they were sent. It is desirable to compress common schedules and still to be able to use an arbitrary one for the test sessions. In many cases, the schedule will consist of repeated sequences of packets: this way, the sequence performs some test, and the test is repeated a number of times to gather statistics.


To implement this, we have a schedule with a given number of 'slots'. Each slots has a type and a parameter. Two types are supported: exponentially distributed pseudo-random quantity (denoted by a code of 0) and a fixed quantity (denoted by a code of 1). The parameter is expressed as a timestamp and specifies a time interval. For a type 0 slot (exponentially distributed pseudo-random quantity) this interval is the mean value (or  $1/\lambda$  if the distribution density function is expressed as  $\lambda \cdot \exp(-\lambda \cdot x)$  for positive values of  $x$ ). For a type 1 slot, the parameter is the delay itself. The sender starts with the beginning of the schedule, and 'executes' the instructions in the slots: for a slot of type 0, wait exponentially distributed time with mean of the specified parameter and then send a test packet (and proceed to the next slot); for a slot of type 1, wait the specified time and send a test packet (and proceed to the next slot). The schedule is circular: when there are no more slots, the sender returns to the first slot.

Slots of type 1 can be trivially reproduceably executed by both the sender and the receiver (so if a packet is lost, the receiver can still attach a send timestamp to it). To reproduceable execute slots



The server **MUST** respond with an Control-Ack message (which **SHOULD** be sent as quickly as possible). Control-Ack messages have the following format:





If Accept is 1, the Start-Sessions request was rejected; zero means that the command was accepted. All other values are reserved. The server MAY and the client SHOULD close the connection in the case of a negative response.

The server SHOULD start all OWAMP-Test streams immediately after it sends the response or immediately after their specified start times, whichever is later. (Note that a client can effect an immediate start by specifying in Request-Session a Start Time in the past.) If the client represents a Sender, the client SHOULD start its OWAMP-Test streams immediately after it sees the Control-Ack response from the Server.

#### [4.6.](#) Stop-Sessions

The Stop-Sessions message may be issued by either the Control-Client or the Server. The format of this command is as follows:



The party that receives this command MUST stop its OWAMP-Test streams and respond with a Stop-Sessions message. Any non-zero value in Accept field means something went wrong. A zero value means OWAMP-Test streams have been successfully stopped.



The OWAMP-Test session data consists of the following (concatenated):



- + A reproduction of the Request-Session command that was used to start the session; it is modified so that actual sender and receiver port numbers that were used by the OWAMP-Test session always appear in the reproduction.
- + The number of packet records that will follow represented as an unsigned 4-octet integer. This number might be less than the Number of Packets in the reproduction of the Request-Session command because of a session that ended prematurely; or it might be greater because of duplicates.
- + 12 octets of Integrity Zero Padding.
- + Zero or more (as specified) packet records.

Each packet record is 24 octets, and includes 4 octets of sequence number, 8 octets of send timestamp, 2 octets of send timestamp error estimate, 8 octets of receive timestamp, and 2 octets of receive timestamp error estimate (in this order). Packet records are sent out in the same order they are made when the results of the session are recorded. Therefore, the data is in arrival order.

Note that lost packets (if any losses were detected during the OWAMP-Test session) MUST appear in the sequence of packets. They can appear either at the point when the loss was detected or at any later point. Lost packet records are distinguished by the receive timestamp consisting of a string of zero bits and an error estimate with Multiplier=1, Scale=64, and S=0 (see OWAMP-Test description for definition of these quantities and explanation of timestamp format and error estimate format).

The last (possibly full, possibly incomplete) block (16 octets) of data is padded with zeros if necessary. (These zeros are simple padding and should be distinguished from the 16 octets of Integrity Zero Padding that follow the session data and conclude the response to Fetch-Session.)

## **5. OWAMP-Test**

This section describes OWAMP-Test protocol. It runs over UDP using sender and receiver IP and port numbers negotiated during Session-Prepare exchange.

As OWAMP-Control, OWAMP-Test has three modes: unauthenticated, authenticated, and encrypted. All OWAMP-Test sessions spawned by an OWAMP-Control session inherit its mode.



For authenticated and encrypted modes:



The first bit S is set if the party generating the timestamp has a clock that is synchronized to UTC using an external source (e.g., the



bit should be set if GPS hardware is used and it indicates that it has acquired current position and time or if NTP is used and it indicates that it has synchronized to an external source, which includes stratum 0 source, etc.); if there is no notion of external synchronization for the time source, the bit SHOULD NOT be set. The next bit has the same semantics as MBZ fields elsewhere: it MUST be set to zero by the sender and ignored by everyone else. The next six bits Scale form an unsigned integer; Multiplier is an unsigned integer as well. They are interpreted as follows: the error estimate is equal to  $\text{Multiplier} \times 2^{(-32)} \times 2^{\text{Scale}}$  (in seconds). [Notation clarification:  $2^{\text{Scale}}$  is two to the power of Scale.] Multiplier MUST NOT be set to zero. If Multiplier is zero, the packet SHOULD be considered corrupt and discarded.

Sequence numbers start with 0 and are incremented by 1 for each subsequent packet.

The minimum data segment length is therefore 14 octets in unauthenticated mode, and 32 octets in authenticated mode and encrypted modes.

The OWAMP-Test packet layout is the same in authenticated and encrypted modes. The encryption operations are, however, different. The difference is that in encrypted mode both the sequence number and the timestamp are encrypted to provide maximum data integrity protection while in authenticated mode the sequence number is encrypted and the timestamp is sent in cleartext. Sending the timestamp in cleartext in authenticated mode allows to reduce the time between a timestamp is obtained by a sender and the packet is shipped out. In encrypted mode, the sender has to fetch the timestamp, encrypt it, and send it; in authenticated mode, the middle step is removed improving accuracy (the sequence number can be encrypted before the timestamp is fetched).

In authenticated mode, the first block (16 octets) of each packet is encrypted using AES ECB mode. The key to use is the same key as is used for the corresponding OWAMP-Control session (where it is used in a different chaining mode). Electronic Cookbook (ECB) mode does not involve any actual chaining; this way, lost, duplicated, or reordered packets do not cause problems with decyphering any packet in an OWAMP-Test session.

In encrypted mode, the first two blocks (32 octets) are encrypted using AES CBC mode. The key to use is the same key as is used for the corresponding OWAMP-Control session. Each OWAMP-Test packet is encrypted as a separate stream, with just one chaining operation; chaining does not span multiple packets so that lost, duplicated, or reordered packets do not cause problems.



In unauthenticated mode, no encryption is applied.

Packet Padding in OWAMP-Test SHOULD be pseudo-random (it MUST be generated independently of any other pseudo-random numbers mentioned in this document). However, implementations MUST provide a configuration parameter, an option, or a different means of making Packet Padding consist of all zeros.

The time elapsed between packets is computed according to the slot schedule as mentioned in Request-Session command description. At that point we skipped over the issue of computing exponentially distributed pseudo-random numbers in a reproduceable fashion.

## **6. Computing Exponentially Distributed Pseudo-Random Numbers**

[This section will describe the method based on the ziggurat algorithm to generate exponentially distributed PRNs without any machine-dependent operations (no floating point is used).]

Pseudo-random stream of bits is obtained using AES with SID as the key, running in counter mode (first encrypted block is 0, second encrypted block is 1 in network octet order, etc.) Each block of 64 bits is used to obtain one pseudo-random number uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. If the bits are  $B_j$  ( $j=1..64$ , numbered left to right), the resulting value is

$$U = B_1 \cdot 2^{-1} + B_2 \cdot 2^{-2} + \dots B_{64} \cdot 2^{-64}$$

### **6.1. Receiver Behavior**

Receiver knows when the sender will send packets. The following parameter is defined: Timeout (from Request-Session). Packets that are delayed by more than Timeout are considered lost (or 'as good as lost'). Note that there is never an actual assurance of loss by the network: a 'lost' packet might still be delivered at any time. The original specification for IPv4 required that packets be delivered within TTL seconds or never (with TTL having a maximum value of 255). To the best of the authors' knowledge, this requirement was never actually implemented (and of course only a complete and universal implementation would ensure that packets don't travel for longer than TTL seconds). Further, IPv4 specification makes no claims about the time it takes the packet to traverse the last link of the path.

The choice of a reasonable value of Timeout is a problem faced by a user of OWAMP protocol, not by an implementor. A value such as two minutes is very safe. Note that certain applications (such as interactive 'one-way ping') might wish to obtain the data faster than



that.

As packets are received,

- + Timestamp the received packet.
- + In authenticated or encrypted mode, decrypt first block (16 octets) of packet body.
- + Store the packet sequence number, send times, and receive times for the results to be transferred.
- + Packets not received within the Timeout are considered lost. They are recorded with their seqno, presumed send time, and receive time consisting of a string of zero bits.

Packets that are actually received are recorded in the order of arrival. Lost packet records serve as indications of the send times of lost packets. They SHOULD be placed either at the point where the receiver learns about the loss or at any later point; in particular, one MAY place all the records that correspond to lost packets at the very end.

Packets that have send time in the future MUST be recorded normally, without changing their send timestamp, unless they have to be discarded. (Send timestamps in the future would normally indicate clocks that differ by more than the delay. Some data -- such as jitter -- can be extracted even without knowledge of time difference. For other kinds of data, the adjustment is best handled by the data consumer on the basis of the complete information in a measurement session as well as possibly external data.)

Packets with a sequence number that was already observed (duplicate packets) MUST be recorded normally. (Duplicate packets are sometimes introduced by IP networks. The protocol has to be able to measure duplication.)

If any of the following is true, packet MUST be discarded:

- + Send timestamp is more than Timeout in the past or in the future.
- + Send timestamp differs by more than Timeout from the time when the packet should have been sent according to its seqno.
- + In authenticated or encrypted mode, any of the bits of zero padding inside the first 16 octets of packet body is non-zero.



## **7. Security Considerations**

The goal of authenticated mode is to let one passphrase-protect service provided by a particular OWAMP-Control server. One can imagine a variety of circumstances where this could be useful. Authenticated mode is designed to prohibit theft of service.

Additional design objective of authenticated mode was to make it impossible for an attacker who cannot read traffic between OWAMP-Test sender and receiver to tamper with test results in a fashion that affects the measurements, but not other traffic.

The goal of encrypted mode is quite different: To make it hard for a party in the middle of the network to make results look 'better' than they should be. This is especially true if one of client and server doesn't coincide with neither sender nor receiver.

Encryption of OWAMP-Control using AES CBC mode with blocks of zeros after each message aims to achieve two goals: (i) to provide secrecy of exchange; (ii) to provide authentication of each message.

OWAMP-Test sessions directed at an unsuspecting party could be used for denial of service (DoS) attacks. In unauthenticated mode servers should limit receivers to hosts they control or to the OWAMP-Control client.

OWAMP-Test sessions could be used as covert channels of information. Environments that are worried about covert channels should take this into consideration.

Notice that AES in counter mode is used for pseudo-random number generation, so implementation of AES **MUST** be included even in a server that only supports unauthenticated mode.

## **8. IANA Considerations**

IANA is requested to allocate a well-known TCP port number for OWAMP-Control part of the OWAMP protocol.



## **9. Internationalization Considerations**

The protocol does not carry any information in a natural language.

## **10. Normative References**

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<http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/>
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[http://www.isoc.org/inet99/proceedings/4h/4h\\_2.htm](http://www.isoc.org/inet99/proceedings/4h/4h_2.htm)

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