IPSEC Working Group
INTERNET-DRAFT
draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-oakley-03.txt
Expire in six months

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February 1997

The resolution of ISAKMP with Oakley
<draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-oakley-03.txt>

Status of this Memo

1. Abstract

[MSST96] (ISAKMP) provides a framework for authentication and key exchange but does not define them. ISAKMP is designed to be key exchange independant; that is, it is designed to support many different key exchanges.

[Orm96] (Oakley) describes a series of key exchanges-- called "modes"-- and details the services provided by each (e.g. perfect forward secrecy for keys, identity protection, and authentication).

This document describes a proposal for using the Oakley Key Exchange Protocol in conjunction with ISAKMP to obtain authenticated keying material for use with ISAKMP, and for other security associations such as AH and ESP for the IETF IPsec DOI.

2. Discussion

This draft combines ISAKMP and Oakley. The purpose is to negotiate, and provide authenticated keying material for, security associations in a protected manner.

Processes which implement this draft can be used for negotiating virtual private networks (VPNs) and also for providing a remote user from a remote site (whose IP address need not be known beforehand) access to a secure host or network.

Proxy negotiation is supported. Proxy mode is where the negotiating parties are not the endpoints for which security association negotiation is taking place. When used in proxy mode, the identities of the end parties remain hidden.

This proposal does not implement the entire Oakley protocol, but only a subset necessary to satisfy its goals. It does not claim conformance or compliance with the entire Oakley protocol. For greater understanding of the Oakley protocol and the mathematics behind it, please refer to [Orm96].

3. Terms and Definitions

3.1 Requirements Terminology

In this document, the words that are used to define the significance of each particular requirement are capitalised. These words are:

- MUST

  This word or the adjective "REQUIRED" means that the item is an absolute requirement of the specification.

- SHOULD

  This word or the adjective "RECOMMENDED" means that there might exist valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore this item, but the full implications should be understood and the case carefully weighed before taking a different course.

- MAY

This word or the adjective "OPTIONAL" means that this item is truly optional. One vendor might choose to include the item because a particular marketplace requires it or because it enhances the product, for example; another vendor may omit the same item.

3.2 Notation

The following notation is used throughout this draft.

HDR is an ISAKMP header whose exchange type is the mode. When writen as HDR* it indicates payload encryption.

SA is an SA negotiation payload with one or more proposals. An initiator MAY provide multiple proposals for negotiation; a responder MUST reply with only one.

SAp is the entire body of the SA payload (minus the SA header)-- i.e. all proposals and transforms offered by the Initiator.

g^xi and g^xr are the Diffie-Hellman public values of the initiator and responder respectively.

KE is the key exchange payload.

Nx is the nonce payload; x can be: i or r for the ISAKMP initiator and responder respectively.

IDx is the identity payload for "x". x can be: "ii" or "ir" for the ISAKMP initiator and responder respectively during phase one negotiation; or "ui" or "ur" for the user initiator and responder respectively during phase two. The ID payload format for the Internet DOI is defined in [Pip96].

SIG is the signature payload. The data to sign is exchange-specific.

CERT is the certificate payload.

HASH (and any derivitive such as HASH(2) or HASH_I) is the hash payload. The contents of the hash are specific to the

authentication method.

prf(key, msg) is the keyed pseudo-random function-- often a keyed hash function-- used to generate a deterministic output that appears pseudo-random. prf's are used both for key derivations and for authentication (i.e. as a keyed MAC). (See [KBC96]).

SKEYID is a string derived from secret material known only to the active players in the exchange.

SKEYID_e is the keying material used by the ISAKMP SA to protect it's messages.

SKEYID_a is the keying material used by the ISAKMP SA to authenticate it's messages.

SKEYID_d is the keying material used to derive keys for non-ISAKMP security associations.

<x>y indicates that "x" is encrypted with the key "y".

--> signifies "initiator to responder" communication (requests).

<-- signifies "responder to initiator" communication (replies).

| signifies concatenation of information-- e.g. X | Y is the concatentation of X with Y.

[x] indicates that x is optional.

Payload encryption (when noted by a '*' after the ISAKMP header) MUST begin immediately after the ISAKMP header. When communication is protected, all payloads following the ISAKMP header MUST be encrypted. Encryption keys are generated from SKEYID_e in a manner that is defined for each algorithm.

When used to describe the payloads contained in complete message exchanges, the ISAKMP generic header is implicitly included. When used as part of a prf computation, the ISAKMP generic header is not included. For example, the initiator may send the responder the following message:

HDR, KE, Ni

The ISAKMP header is included in the KE and Ni payloads. But if the initiator generates the following pseudo-random output:

HASH = prf(key, Ni | Nr)

the ISAKMP headers of the two nonce payloads are not included-- only the body of the payload-- the nonce itself-- is used.

3.3 Perfect Forward Secrecy

When used in the draft Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) refers to the notion that compromise of a single key will permit access to only data protected by a single key. For PFS to exist the key used to protect transmission of data MUST NOT be used to derive any additional keys, and if the key used to protect transmission of data was derived from some other keying material, that material MUST NOT be used to derive any more keys.

Perfect Forward Secrecy for both keys and identities is provided in this protocol. (Sections 5.8 and 7).

3.4 Security Association

A security association (SA) is a set of policy and key used to protect information. The ISAKMP SA is the shared policy and key used by the negotiating peers in this protocol to protect their communication.

4. Introduction

Oakley defines a method to establish an authenticated key exchange. This includes how payloads are constructed, the information they carry, the order in which they are processed and how they are used.

While Oakley defines "modes", ISAKMP defines "phases". The relationship between the two is very straightforward. ISAKMP's phase 1 is where the two ISAKMP peers establish a secure, authenticated channel with which to communicate. This is called the ISAKMP Security Association (SA). Oakley's "Main Mode" and "Aggressive Mode" each accomplish a phase 1 exchange. "Main Mode" and "Aggressive Mode" MUST ONLY be used in phase 1.

Phase 2 is where Security Associations are negotiated on behalf of services such as IPsec or any other service which needs key material and/or parameter negotiation. Oakley's "Quick Mode" accomplishes a phase 2 exchange. "Quick Mode" MUST ONLY be used in phase 2.

Oakley's "New Group Mode" is not really a phase 1 or phase 2. It follows phase 1, but serves to establish a new group which can be used in future negotiations. "New Group Mode" MUST ONLY be used in phase 2.

With the use of ISAKMP phases, an implementation can accomplish very fast keying when necessary. A single phase 1 negotiation may be used for more than one phase 2 negotiation. Additionally a single phase 2 negotiation can request multiple Security Associations. With these optimizations, an implementation can see less than one round trip per SA as well as less than one DH exponentiation per SA. "Main Mode" for phase 1 provides identity protection. When identity protection is not needed, "Aggressive Mode" can be used to reduce round trips even further. Developer hints for doing these optimizations are included below. It should also be noted that using public key encryption to authenticate an Aggressive Mode exchange will still provide identity protection.

The following attributes are used by Oakley and are negotiated as part of the ISAKMP Security Association. (These attributes pertain only to the ISAKMP Security Association and not to any Security Associations that ISAKMP may be negotiating on behalf of other

services.)

- encryption algorithm (e.g. DES, IDEA, Blowfish).

- hash algorithm (e.g. MD5, SHA)

- authentication method (e.g. DSS sig, RSA sig, RSA encryption, pre-shared key)

- information about a group over which to do Diffie-Hellman.

- prf (e.g. 3DES-CBC-MAC)

All of these attributes are mandatory and MUST be negotiated except for the "prf". The "prf" MAY be negotiated, but if it is not, the HMAC (see [KBC96]) version of the negotiated hash algorithm is used as a pseudo-random function. Other non-mandatory attributes are described in Appendix A. The selected hash algorithm MUST support both native and HMAC modes.

Oakley implementations MUST support the following attribute values:

- DES-CBC with a weak, and semi-weak, key check (weak and semi-weak keys are referenced in [Sch94] and listed in Appendix A). The key is derived according to Appendix B.

- MD5 and SHA.

- Authentication via pre-shared keys. The Digital Signature Standard SHOULD be supported; RSA SHOULD also be supported.

- MODP over the default Oakley group (see below). ECP groups MAY be supported.

The Oakley modes described here MUST be implemented whenever the IETF IPsec DOI [Pip96] is implemented. Other DOIs MAY use the Oakley modes described here.

5. Exchanges

There are two basic methods used to establish an authenticated key exchange: Oakley Main Mode and Oakley Aggressive Mode. Each generates authenticated keying material from an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange. Oakley in Main Mode MUST be implemented; Oakley Aggressive Mode SHOULD be implemented. In addition, Oakley Quick Mode MUST be implemented as a mechanism to generate fresh keying material and negotiate non-ISAKMP security services. In additon, Oakley New Group Mode SHOULD be implemented as a mechanism to define private groups for Diffie-Hellman exchanges. Implementations MUST NOT switch exchange types in the middle of an exchange.

Exchanges conform to standard ISAKMP [MSST96] payload syntax. attribute encoding, timeouts and retransmits of messages, and informational messages-- e.g a notify response is sent when, for example, a proposal is unacceptable, or a signature verification or decryption was unsuccessful, etc.

Oakley Main Mode is an instantiation of the ISAKMP Identity Protect Exchange: The first two messages negotiate policy; the next two exchange Diffie-Hellman public values and ancillary data (e.g. nonces) necessary for the exchange; and the last two messages authenticate the Diffie-Hellman Exchange. The authentication method negotiated as part of the initial ISAKMP exchange influences the composition of the payloads but not their purpose. The XCHG for Oakley Main Mode is ISAKMP Identity Protect.

Similarly, Oakley Aggressive Mode is an instantiation of the ISAKMP Aggressive Exchange. The first two messages negotiate policy, exchange Diffie-Hellman public values and ancillary data necessary for the exchange, and identities. In addition the second message authenticates the responder. The third message authenticates the initiator and provides a proof of participation in the exchange. The XCHG for Oakley Aggressive Mode is ISAKMP Aggressive. The final message is not sent under protection of the ISAKMP SA allowing each party to postpone exponentiation, if desired, until negotiation of this exchange is complete.

Quick Mode and New Group Mode have no analog in ISAKMP. The XCHG values for Quick Mode and New Group Mode are defined in Appendix A.

Three different authentication methods are allowed with either Main Mode or Aggressive Mode-- digital signature, public key encryption, or pre-shared key. The value SKEYID is computed seperately for each authentication method.

```
For signatures:             SKEYID = prf(Ni | Nr, g^xy)
For public key encryption:  SKEYID = hash(Ni | Nr)
For pre-shared keys:        SKEYID = prf(pre-shared-key, Ni | Nr)
```

The result of either Main Mode or Aggressive Mode is three groups of authenticated keying material:

```
SKEYID_d = prf(SKEYID, g^xy | CKY-I | CKY-R, 0)
SKEYID_a = prf(SKEYID, SKEYID_d | g^xy | CKY-I | CKY-R, 1)
SKEYID_e = prf(SKEYID, SKEYID_a | g^xy | CKY-I | CKY-R, 2)
```

and agreed upon policy to protect further communications. The values of 0, 1, and 2 above are represented by a single octet. The key used for encryption is derived from SKEYID_e in an algorithm-specific manner (see appendix B).

To authenticate either exchange the initiator of the protocol generates HASH_I and the responder generates HASH_R where:

```
HASH_I = prf(SKEYID, g^xi | g^xr | CKY-I | CKY-R | SAp | IDii)
HASH_R = prf(SKEYID, g^xr | g^xi | CKY-R | CKY-I | SAp | IDir)
```

For authentication with digital signatures, HASH_I and HASH_R are signed and verified; for authentication with either public key encryption or pre-shared keys, HASH_I and HASH_R directly authenticate the exchange.

As mentioned above, the negotiated authentication method influences the content and use of messages for Phase 1 Oakley Modes, but not their intent. When using public keys for authentication, the Phase 1 Oakley can be accomplished either by using signatures or by using public key encryption (if the algorithm supports it). Following are Main Mode Exchanges with different authentication options.

5.1 ISAKMP/Oakley Phase 1 Authenticated With Signatures

Using signatures, the ancillary information exchanged during the second roundtrip are nonces; the exchange is authenticated by signing a mutually obtainable hash. Oakley Main Mode with signature authentication is described as follows:

```
     Initiator                          Responder
     ----------                        -----------
     HDR, SA                    -->
                                <--     HDR, SA
     HDR, KE, Ni                -->
                                <--     HDR, KE, Nr
     HDR*, IDii, [ CERT, ] SIG_I -->
                                <--     HDR*, IDir, [ CERT, ] SIG_R
```

Oakley Aggressive mode with signatures in conjunction with ISAKMP is described as follows:

```
     Initiator                          Responder
     -----------                       -----------
     HDR, SA, KE, Ni, IDii      -->
                                <--     HDR, SA, KE, Nr, IDir,
                                             [ CERT, ] SIG_R
     HDR, [ CERT, ] SIG_I       -->
```

In both modes, the signed data, SIG_I or SIG_R, is the result of the negotiated digital signature algorithm applied to HASH_I or HASH_R respectively.

In general the signature will be over HASH_I and HASH_R as above using the negotiated prf, or the HMAC version of the negotiated hash function (if no prf is negotiated). However, this can be overridden for construction of the signature if the signature algorithm is tied to a particular hash algorithm (e.g. DSS is only defined with SHA's 160 bit output). In this case, the signature will be over HASH_I and

HASH_R as above, except using the HMAC version of the hash algorithm associated with the signature method. The negotiated prf and hash function would continue to be used for all other proscribed pseudo-random functions.

RSA signatures MUST be encoded in PKCS #1 format. DSS signatures MUST be encoded as r followed by s.

One or more certificate payloads MAY be optionally passed.

5.2 Oakley Phase 1 Authenticated With Public Key Encryption

Using public key encryption to authenticate the exchange, the ancillary information exchanged is encrypted nonces. Each party's ability to reconstruct a hash (proving that the other party decrypted the nonce) authenticates the exchange.

In order to perform the public key encryption, the initiator must already have the responder's public key. In the case where a party has multiple public keys, a hash of the certificate the initiator is using to encrypt the ancillary information is passed as part of the third message. In this way the responder can determine which corresponding private key to use to decrypt the encrypted payloads and identity protection is retained.

In addition to the nonce, the identities of the parties (IDii and IDir) are also encrypted with the other parties public key. If the authentication method is public key encryption, the nonce and identity payloads MUST be encrypted with the public key of the other party. Only the body of the payloads are encrypted, the payload headers are left in the clear.

When using encrytion for authentication with Oakley, Main Mode is defined as follows.

```
     Initiator                          Responder
     -----------                        -----------
     HDR, SA                  -->
                              <--       HDR, SA
```

```
     HDR, KE, [ HASH(1), ]
       <IDii>PubKey_r,
         <Ni>PubKey_r          -->
                                        HDR, KE, <IDir>PubKey_i,
                               <--            <Nr>PubKey_i
     HDR*, HASH_I              -->
                               <--    HDR*, HASH_R
```

Oakley Aggressive Mode authenticated with encryption is described as follows:

```
     Initiator                          Responder
    -----------                        -----------
     HDR, SA, [ HASH(1),] KE,
       <IDii>Pubkey_r,
        <Ni>Pubkey_r           -->
                                        HDR, SA, KE, <IDir>PubKey_i,
                               <--          <Nr>PubKey_r, HASH_R
     HDR, HASH_I               -->
```


Where HASH(1) is a hash (using the negotiated hash function) of the certificate which the initiator is using to encrypt the nonce and identity.

RSA encryption MUST be encoded in PKCS #1 format. The payload length is the length of the entire encrypted payload plus header. The PKCS #1 encoding allows for determination of the actual length of the cleartext payload upon decryption.

Using encryption for authentication provides for a plausably deniable exchange. There is no proof (as with a digital signature) that the conversation ever took place since each party can completely reconstruct both sides of the exchange. In addition, security is added to secret generation since an attacker would have to successfully break not only the Diffie-Hellman exchange but also both RSA encryptions. This exchange was motivated by [Kra96].

Note that, unlike other authentication methods, authentication with public key encryption allows for identity protection with Aggressive Mode.

5.3 Oakley Phase 1 Authenticated With a Pre-Shared Key

A key derived by some out-of-band mechanism may also be used to authenticate the exchange. The actual establishment of this key is out of the scope of this document.

When doing a pre-shared key authentication with Oakley, Main Mode is defined as follows



```
          HDR*, IDii, HASH_I  -->
                              <--    HDR*, IDir, HASH_R
```

Oakley Aggressive mode with a pre-shared key is described as follows:

```
          Initiator                          Responder
          -----------                        -----------
          HDR, SA, KE, Ni, IDii -->
                                <--    HDR, SA, KE, Nr, IDir, HASH_R
          HDR, HASH_I           -->
```

When using pre-shared key authentication with Main Mode the key can only be identified by the IP address of the peers since HASH_I must be computed before the initiator has processed IDir. Aggressive Mode allows for a wider range of identifiers of the pre-shared secret to be used. In addition, Aggressive Mode allows two parties to maintain multiple, different pre-shared keys and identify the correct one for a particular exchange.

5.4 Oakley Phase 2 - Quick Mode

Oakley Quick Mode is not a complete exchange itself, but is used as part of the ISAKMP SA negotiation process (phase 2) to derive keying material and negotiate shared policy for non-ISAKMP SAs. The information exchanged along with Oakley Quick Mode MUST be protected by the ISAKMP SA-- i.e. all payloads except the ISAKMP header are encrypted.

Quick Mode is essentially an exchange of nonces that provides replay protection. The nonces are used to generate fresh key material and prevent replay attacks from generating bogus security associations. An optional Key Exchange payload can be exchanged to allow for an additional Diffie-Hellman exchange and exponentiation per Quick Mode. While use of the key exchange payload with Quick Mode is optional it MUST be supported.

Base Quick Mode (without the KE payload) refreshens the keying material derived from the exponentiation in phase 1. This does not provide PFS. Using the optional KE payload, an additional exponentiation is performed and PFS is provided for the keying material. If a KE payload is sent, a Diffie-Hellman group (see section 5.6.1 and [Pip96]) MUST be sent as attributes of the SA being negotiated.

Quick Mode is defined as follows:

```
     Initiator                          Responder
     -----------                        -----------
     HDR*, HASH(1), SA, Ni
       [, KE ] [, IDui, IDur ] -->
                                <--     HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr
                                              [, KE ] [, IDui, IDur ]
     HDR*, HASH(3)              -->
```

Where:
HASH(1) and HASH(2) are the prf over the message id (M-ID) from the ISAKMP header concatenated with the entire message that follows the hash including payload headers, but excluding any padding added for encryption. HASH(3)-- for liveliness-- is the prf over the value zero represented as a single octet, followed by a concatenation of the message id and the two nonces-- the initiator's followed by the responder's. In other words, the hashes for the above exchange are:

```
HASH(1) = prf(SKEYID_a, M-ID | SA | Ni [ | KE ] [ | IDui | IDur ])
HASH(2) = prf(SKEYID_a, M-ID | SA | Nr [ | KE ] [ | IDui | IDur ])
HASH(3) = prf(SKEYID_a, 0 | M-ID | Ni | Nr)
```


If PFS is not needed, and KE payloads are not exchanged, the new

keying material is defined as KEYMAT = prf(SKEYID_d, SPI | Ni | Nr).

If PFS is desired and KE payloads were exchanged, the new keying material is defined as KEYMAT = prf(SKEYID_d, g(qm)^xy | SPI | Ni | Nr), where g(qm)^xy is the shared secret from the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange of this Quick Mode.

The SPI is the value from the SPI field in the SA payload.

A single SA negotiation results in two security assocations-- one inbound and one outbound. Different SPIs for each SA (one chosen by the initiator, the other by the responder) guarantee a different key for each direction. The SPI chosen by the destination of the SA is used to derive KEYMAT for that SA.

For situations where the amount of keying material desired is greater than that supplied by the prf, KEYMAT is expanded by feeding the results of the prf back into itself and concatenating results until the required keying material has been reached. In other words,

```
KEYMAT = K1 | K2 | K3 | ...
where
  K1 = prf(SKEYID_d, [ g(qm)^xy | ] SPI | Ni | Nr)
  K2 = prf(SKEYID_d, K1 | [ g(qm)^xy | ] SPI | Ni | Nr)
  K3 = prf(SKEYID_d, K2 | [ g(qm)^xy | ] SPI | Ni | Nr)
  etc.
```

This keying material (whether with PFS or without, and whether derived directly or through concatenation) MUST be used with the negotiated SA. It is up to the service to define how keys are derived from the keying material (see Appendix B).

In the case of an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange in Quick Mode, the exponential (g(qm)^xy) is irretreivably removed from the current state and SKEYID_e and SKEYID_a (derived from phase 1 negotiation) continue to protect and authenticate the ISAKMP SA and SKEYID_d continues to be used to derive keys.

If ISAKMP is acting as a proxy negotiator on behalf of another party the identities of the parties MUST be passed as IDui and IDur. Local policy will dictate whether the proposals are acceptible for the identities specified. If IDs are not exchanged, the negotiation is assumed to be done on behalf of each ISAKMP peer. If an ID range (see Appendix A of [Pip96]) is not acceptable (for example, the specified subnet is too large) a BAD_ID_RANGE notify message followed by an acceptible ID range, in an ID payload, MUST be sent.

Using Quick Mode, multiple SA's and keys can be negotiated with one exchange as follows:

```
     Initiator                          Responder
    -----------                        -----------
     HDR*, HASH(1), SA0, SA1, Ni,
       [, KE ] [, IDui, IDur ] -->
                                <--     HDR*, HASH(2), SA0, SA1, Nr,
                                           [, KE ] [, IDui, IDur ]
     HDR*, HASH(3)              -->
```

The keying material is derived identically as in the case of a single SA. In this case (negotiation of two SA payloads) the result would be four security associations-- two each way for both SAs.

5.5 Oakley New Group Mode

Oakley New Group Mode MUST NOT be used prior to establishment of an ISAKMP SA. The description of a new group MUST only follow phase 1 negotiation. (It is not a phase 2 exchange, though).

```
     Initiator                          Responder
    -----------                        -----------
     HDR*, HASH(1), SA          -->
                                <--     HDR*, HASH(2), SA
```

where HASH(1) is the prf output, using SKEYID_a as the key, and the entire SA proposal, body and header, as the data; HASH(2) is the prf output, using SKEYID_a as the key, and the reply as the data.

The proposal will be an Oakley proposal which specifies the characteristics of the group (see appendix A, "Oakley Attribute Assigned Numbers"). Group descriptions for private Oakley Groups MUST be greater than or equal to 2^15. If the group is not acceptable, the responder MUST reply with a Notify payload with the message type set to GROUP_NOT_ACCEPTABLE (13).

ISAKMP implementations MAY require private groups to expire with the SA under which they were established.

Groups may be directly negotiated in the SA proposal with Oakley Main Mode. To do this the Prime, Generator (using the Generator One attribute class from Appendix A), and Group Type are passed as SA attributes (see Appendix A in [MSST96]). Alternately, the nature of the group can be hidden using Oakley New Group Mode and only the group identifier is passed in the clear during phase 1 negotiation.

5.6 Oakley Groups

[Orm96] defines several groups. The value 0 indicates no group. The value 1 indicates the default group described below. The attribute class for "Group" is defined in Appendix A. Other values are also defined in [Orm96]. All values 2^15 and higher are used for private group identifiers.

5.6.1 Oakley Default Group

Oakley implementations MUST support a MODP group with the following prime and generator. This group is assigned id 1 (one).

The prime is: 2^768 - 2 ^704 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^638 pi] + 149686 }
Its hexadecimal value is

FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1
29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD
EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245
E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A63A3620 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF

The generator is: 2.

other groups can be defined using Oakley New Group Mode. This default group was generated by Richard Schroeppel at the University of Arizona. Properties of this prime are described by the following exerpt from [Orm96]:

> The prime for this group was selected to have certain properties. The high order 64 bits are forced to 1. This helps the classical remainder algorithm, because the trial quotient digit can always be taken as the high order word of the dividend, possibly +1. The low order 64 bits are forced to 1. This helps the Montgomery-style remainder algorithms, because the multiplier digit can always be taken to be the low order word of the dividend. The middle bits are taken from the binary expansion of pi. This guarantees that they are effectively random, while avoiding any suspicion that the primes have secretly been selected to be weak.

The prime is chosen to be a Sophie-Germain prime (i.e., (P-1)/2 is also prime), to have the maximum strength against the square-root attack. The starting trial numbers were repeatedly incremented by 2^64 until suitable primes were located.

Because this prime is congruent to 7 (mod 8), 2 is a quadratic residue. All powers of 2 will also be quadratic residues. This prevents an opponent from learning the low order bit of

the Diffie-Hellman exponent. Using 2 as a generator is efficient for some modular exponentiation algorithms. [Note that 2 is technically not a generator in the number theory sense, because it omits half of the possible residues mod P. From a cryptographic viewpoint, this is a virtue.]

A further discussion of the properties of this group, the motivation behind its creation, as well as the definition of several more groups can be found in [Orm96].

5.7 Payload Explosion for Complete ISAKMP-Oakley Exchange

This section illustrates how ISAKMP payloads are used with Oakley to:

- establish a secure and authenticated channel between ISAKMP processes (phase 1); and

- generate key material for, and negotiate, an IPsec SA (phase 2).

5.7.1 Phase 1 using Oakley Main Mode

The following diagram illustrates the payloads exchanged between the two parties in the first round trip exchange. The initiator MAY propose several proposals; the responder MUST reply with one.





The responder replies in kind but selects, and returns, one transform proposal (the ISAKMP SA attributes).

The second exchange consists of the following payloads:



The shared keys, SKEYID_e and SKEYID_a, are now used to protect and authenticate all further communication. Note that both SKEYID_e and

SKEYID_a are unauthenticated.



The key exchange is authenticated over a signed hash as described in section 5.1. Once the signature has been verified using the authentication algorithm negotiated as part of the ISAKMP SA, the shared keys, SKEYID_e and SKEYID_a can be marked as authenticated. (For brevity, certificate payloads were not exchanged).

5.7.2 Phase 2 using Oakley Quick Mode

The following payloads are exchanged in the first round of Oakley Quick Mode with ISAKMP SA negotiation. In this hypothetical exchange, the ISAKMP negotiators are proxies for other parties which have requested authentication.





where the contents of the hash are described in 5.4 above. The responder replies with a similar message which only contains one

transform-- the selected AH transform. Upon receipt, the initiator can provide the key engine with the negotiated security association and the keying material. As a check against replay attacks, the responder waits until receipt of the next message.



where the contents of the hash are described in 5.4 above.

5.8 Perfect Forward Secrecy Example

This protocol can provide PFS of both keys and identities. The identies of both the ISAKMP negotiating peer and, if applicable, the proxy for whom the peers are negotiating can be protected with PFS.

To provide Perfect Forward Secrecy of both keys and all identities, two parties would perform the following:

- o A Main Mode Exchange to protect the identities of the ISAKMP peers.
  This establishes an ISAKMP SA. o A Quick Mode Exchange to negotiate other security protocol protection.
  This establishes a SA on each end for this protocol. o Delete the ISAKMP SA and its associated state.

Since the key for use in the non-ISAKMP SA was derived from the single ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange PFS is preserved.

To provide Perfect Forward Secrecy of merely the keys of a non-ISAKMP security association, it in not necessary to do a phase 1 exchange if an ISAKMP SA exists between the two peers. A single Quick Mode in which the optional KE payload is passed, and an additional Diffie-Hellman exchange is performed, is all that is required. At this point the state derived from this Quick Mode must be deleted from the ISAKMP SA as described in section 5.4.

6. Implementation Hints

Using a single ISAKMP Phase 1 negotiation makes subsequent Phase 2 negotiations extremely quick. As long as the Phase 1 state remains cached, and PFS is not needed, Phase 2 can proceed without any exponentiation. How many Phase 2 negotiations can be performed for a single Phase 1 is a local policy issue. The decision will depend on the strength of the algorithms being used and level of trust in the peer system.

An implementation may wish to negotiate a range of SAs when performing Quick Mode. By doing this they can speed up the "re-keying". Quick Mode defines how KEYMAT is defined for a range of SAs. When one peer feels it is time to change SAs they simple use the next one within the stated range. A range of SAs can be established by negotiating multiple SAs (identical attributes, different SPIs) with one Quick Mode.

An optimization that is often useful is to establish Security Associations with peers before they are needed so that when they become needed they are already in place. This ensures there would be no delays due to key management before initial data transmission. This optimization is easily implemented by setting up more than one Security Association with a peer for each requested Security Association and caching those not immediately used.

Also, if an ISAKMP implementation is alerted that a SA will soon be needed (e.g. to replace an existing SA that will expire in the near future), then it can establish the new SA before that new SA is needed.

7. Security Considerations

This entire draft discusses a hybrid protocol, combining Oakley with ISAKMP, to negotiate, and derive keying material for, security associations in a secure and authenticated manner.

Confidentiality is assured by the use of a negotiated encryption algorithm. Authentication is assured by the use of a negotiated method: a digital signature algorithm; a public key algorithm which supports encryption; or, a pre-shared key. The confidentiality and authentication of this exchange is only as good as the attributes negotiated as part of the ISAKMP security association.

Repeated re-keying using Quick Mode can consume the entropy of the Diffie- Hellman shared secret. Implementors should take note of this fact and set a limit on Quick Mode Exchanges between exponentiations.

This draft does not proscribe such a limit.

Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) of both keying material and identities is possible with this protocol. By specifying a Diffie-Hellman group, and passing public values in KE payloads, ISAKMP peers can establish PFS of keys-- the identities would be protected by SKEYID_e from the ISAKMP SA and would therefore not be protected by PFS. If PFS of both keying material and identities is desired, an ISAKMP peer MUST establish only one non-ISAKMP security association (e.g. IPsec Security Association) per ISAKMP SA. PFS for keys and identities is accomplished by deleting the ISAKMP SA (and optionally issuing a DELETE message) upon establishment of the single non-ISAKMP SA. In this way a phase one negotiation is uniquely tied to a single phase two negotiation, and the ISAKMP SA established during phase one negotiation is never used again.

Implementations SHOULD not use Diffie-Hellman exponents of less than 200 bits to avoid adversely effecting the security of both parties.

It is assumed that the Diffie-Hellman exponents in this exchange are erased from memory after use. In particular, these exponents must not be derived from long-lived secrets like the seed to a pseudo-random generator.

8. Acknowledgements

This document is the result of close consultation with Hilarie Orman, Douglas Maughan, Mark Schertler, Mark Schneider, and Jeff Turner. It relies completely on protocols which were written by them. Without their interest and dedication, this would not have been written.

We would also like to thank Cheryl Madson, Harry Varnis, Elfed Weaver, and Hugo Krawcyzk for technical input.

9. References

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Appendix A

This is a list of DES Weak and Semi-Weak keys. The keys come from [Sch94]. All keys are listed in hexidecimal.

DES Weak Keys
0101 0101 0101 0101
1F1F 1F1F E0E0 E0E0
E0E0 E0E0 1F1F 1F1F
FEFE FEFE FEFE FEFE

DES Semi-Weak Keys
01FE 01FE 01FE 01FE
1FE0 1FE0 0EF1 0EF1
01E0 01E0 01F1 01F1
1FFE 1FFE 0EFE 0EFE
011F 011F 010E 010E
E0FE E0FE F1FE F1FE

FE01 FE01 FE01 FE01
E01F E01F F10E F10E
E001 E001 F101 F101
FE1F FE1F FE0E FE0E
1F01 1F01 0E01 0E01
FEE0 FEE0 FEF1 FEF1

Attribute Assigned Numbers

Attributes negotiated during phase one use the following definitions. Phase two attributes are defined in the applicable DOI specification (for example, IPsec attributes are defined in the IPsec DOI), with the exception of a group description when Quick Mode includes an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange. Attribute types can be either Basic (B) or Variable-length (V). Encoding of these attributes is defined in the base ISAKMP specification.

Attribute Classes

class	value	type
Encryption Algorithm	1	B
Hash Algorithm	2	B
Authentication Method	3	B
Group Description	4	B
Group Type	5	B
Group Prime	6	V
Group Generator One	7	V
Group Generator Two	8	V
Group Curve A	9	V
Group Curve B	10	V
Life Type	11	B
Life Duration	12	B/V
PRF	13	B
Key Length	14	B

Class Values

- Encryption Algorithm

DEC-CBC	1
IDEA-CBC	2
Blowfish-CBC	3
RC5-R12-B64-CBC	4
3DES-CBC	5
CAST-CBC	6

  values 7-65000 are reserved. Values 65001-65535 are for private use among mutually consenting parties.

- Hash Algorithm

MD5	1
SHA	2
Tiger	3

  values 4-65000 are reserved. Values 65001-65535 are for private use among mutually consenting parties.

- Authentication Method

pre-shared key	1
DSS signatures	2
RSA signatures	3
RSA encryption	4

  values 5-65000 are reserved. Values 65001-65535 are for private use

among mutually consenting parties.

- Group Description
  default group (section 5.6.1) 1

  values 2-32767 are reserved. Values 32768-65535 are for private use among mutually consenting parties.

- Group Type

MODP (modular exponentiation group)	1
ECP (elliptic curve group)	2

  values 3-65000 are reserved. Values 65001-65535 are for private use among mutually consenting parties.

- Life Type

seconds	1
kilobytes	2

  values 3-65000 are reserved. Values 65001-65535 are for private use among mutually consenting parties. For a given "Life Type" the value of the "Life Duration" attribute defines the actual length of the SA life-- either a number of seconds, or a number of kbytes protected.

- PRF

3DES-CBC-MAC	1

  values 2-65000 are reserved. Values 65001-65535 are for private use among mutually consenting parties

- Key Length

  When using an Encryption Algorithm that has a variable length key, this attribute specifies the key length in bits. (MUST use network byte order).

Additional Exchanges Defined-- XCHG values

Quick Mode	32
New Group Mode	33

Appendix B

This appendix describes encryption details to be used ONLY when encrypting ISAKMP messages. When a service (such as an IPSEC transform) utilizes ISAKMP to generate keying material, all encryption algorithm specific details (such as key and IV generation, padding, etc...) MUST be defined by that service. ISAKMP does not purport to ever produce keys that are suitable for any encryption algorithm. ISAKMP produces the requested amount of keying material from which the service MUST generate a suitable key. Details, such as weak key checks, are the responsibility of the service.

Encryption keys used to protect the ISAKMP SA are derived from SKEYID_e in an algorithm-specific manner. When SKEYID_e is not long enough to supply all the necessary keying material an algorithm requires, the key is derived from feeding the results of a pseudo-random function into itself, concatenating the results, and taking the highest necessary bits.

For example, if (ficticious) algorithm AKULA requires 320-bits of key (and has no weak key check) and the prf used to generate SKEYID_e only generates 120 bits of material, the key for AKULA, would be the first 320-bits of Ka, where:

```
    Ka = K1 | K2 | K3
and
    K1 = prf(SKEYID_e, 0)
    K2 = prf(SKEYID_e, K1)
    K3 = prf(SKEYID_e, K2)
```

where prf is the HMAC version of the negotiated hash function or the negotiated prf. Each result of the prf provides 120 bits of material for a total of 360 bits. AKULA would use the first 320 bits of that 360 bit string.

In phase 1, material for the initialization vector (IV material) for CBC mode encryption algorithms is derived from a hash of a concatenation of the initiator's public Diffie-Hellman value and the responder's public Diffie-Hellman value using the negotiated hash algorithm. This is used for the first message only. Each message should be padded up to the nearest block size using bytes containing 0x00. The message length in the header MUST include the length of the pad since this reflects the size of the cyphertext. Subsequent messages MUST use the last CBC encryption block from the previous message as their initialization vector.

In phase 2, material for the initialization vector for CBC mode encryption of the first message of a Quick Mode exchange is derived from a hash of a concatenation of the last phase 1 CBC output block and the phase 2 message id using the negotiated hash algorithm. The IV for subsequent messages within a Quick Mode exchange is the CBC output block from the previous message. Padding and IVs for subsequent messages are done as in phase 1.

Note that the final phase 1 CBC output block, the result of encryption/decryption of the last phase 1 message, must be retained in the ISAKMP SA state to allow for generation of unique IVs for each Quick Mode. Each phase 2 exchange generates IVs independantly to prevent IVs from getting out of sync when two different Quick Modes are started simultaneously.

The key for DES-CBC is derived from the first eight (8) non-weak and semi-weak (see Appendix A) bytes of SKEYID_e. The IV is the first 8 bytes of the IV material derived above.

The key for IDEA-CBC is derived from the first sixteen (16) bytes of SKEYID_e. The IV is the first eight (8) bytes of the IV material derived above.

The key for Blowfish-CBC is either the negotiated key size, or the first fifty-six (56) bytes of a key (if no key size is negotiated) derived in the aforementioned pseudo-random function feedback method. The IV is the first eight (8) bytes of the IV material derived above.

The key for RC5-R12-B64-CBC is the negotiated key length, or the first sixteen (16) bytes of a key (if no key size is negotiated) derived from the aforementioned pseudo-random function feedback method if necessary. The IV is the first eight (8) bytes of the IV material derived above. The number of rounds MUST be 12 and the block size MUST be 64.

The key for 3DES-CBC is the first twenty-four (24) bytes of a key derived in the aforementioned pseudo-random function feedback method. 3DES-CBC is an encrypt-decrypt-encrypt operation using the first, middle, and last eight (8) bytes of the entier 3DES-CBC key. The IV is the first eight (8) bytes of the IV material derived above.

The key for CAST-CBC is either the negotiated key size, or the first

sixteen (16) bytes of a key derived in the aforementioned pseudo-random function feedback method. The IV is the first eight (8) bytes of the IV material derived above.

Support for algorithms other than DES-CBC is purely optional. Some optional algorithms may be subject to intellectual property claims.

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Authors' Note:

The authors encourage independent implementation, and interoperability testing, of this hybrid exchange.