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An LDAP Schema for Configuration and Administration of IPSec based  
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)  
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Abstract

This document describes the structure of an LDAP directory schema that enables policy based configuration and administration of IPSec based Virtual private networks within and among Internet domains, intranets, and extranets. The schema extends the base IPSec Policy data model in [9] to include end hosts and security gateways. The schema closely follows and expands on the DEN specification [7].

## **1. Introduction**

IPSec [[1](#)], [[2](#)], [[4](#)] is a fairly large and complex protocol requiring participating hosts to negotiate a number of configuration parameters during protocol operation. These parameters typically have security related implications, so that defaults specified in the IPSec documents may not be acceptable to certain end hosts. In such cases, IPSec negotiations would fail and manual intervention would be required. Furthermore, the defaults may lead to redundancies in situations where the end hosts are also performing security operations at a higher layer (e.g. SSL).

The situation becomes more complex if security gateways have to be traversed for two end hosts to communicate. Depending on the end host application, a gateway may either deny or permit the connection or require an IPSec tunnel from either the end host or another gateway acting as a IPSec proxy for the end host. For successful communication, the gateways have to be properly configured to establish IPSec tunnels with certain end hosts and gateways.

In the light of the above discussion, it is plausible that manual configuration of each IPSec host will become less and less viable as more hosts become IPSec enabled. Directory based policy administration is becoming increasingly popular as a versatile and uniform means of managing network services. LDAP [[3](#)] is a widely deployed industry standard for accessing directory information. This document presents an LDAP schema for storing IPSec based policy information in a central directory. The schema describes

- the required IP layer security attributes of a connection; i.e. whether the connection should be blocked, permitted in the clear or secured by IPSec,
- end to end IPSec security association attributes in case the connection needs to be secured by IPSec,
- whether security gateways need to be traversed using IPSec; and if so, then the gateway address and the corresponding IPSec security association attributes,
- nested gateway traversal, etc.

We allow policies to be specified for groups of hosts by either specifying groups or ranges of addresses or wildcarded domains. Policies can also be specified by specific user ids as required by IPSec.

The rest of the document is as follows. [Section 2](#) provides general ideas of representing policy rules through a Policy object, the overview of the LDAP schema and the various object classes and their

inter-relationships. The schema described above closely follows the policy class hierarchy described in the DEN document [7]. Sections 3-7 details the various objects and their attributes. [Section 8](#) concludes with some VPN scenarios and examples.

### [1.1.](#) Specification of Requirements

The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", and "MAY" that appear in this document are to be interpreted as described in [Bradner97].

## [2.](#) Class Hierarchy

In this section, we describe the various classes related to Policy definition, their inheritance hierarchy and inter-relationships. They are best understood within the Common Information Model [8] of the Directory Management Task Force or the directory structure proposed by the Directory Enabled Networks (DEN) specification [7].

```
Top
|----Policy
|
|----PolicyCondition
|    |
|    |--IPPolicyCondition
|
|----UserIDCondition
|
|----PolicyValidityPeriod
|
|----PolicyAction
|    |----RSVPAction
|    |----DiffServAction
|    |----ISAKMPAction
|    |----IPSecSecurityAction
|
|----DiffServResourceGroup
|----RSVPResourceGroup
|----ISAKMPProposal
|----IPSecProposal
|----IPSecTransform
|----IPSecPrivateDiffieHellmanGroup
|
|----PolicyContainmentAuxClass
```

The schema described here closely follows the policy class hierarchy described in the current DEN document [7]. This document expands on Bhattacharya et. al. Expires April 9 1999 [Page iii]

the DEN specification but differs in a few significant details, where it was felt that the specification tended to be unclear or redundant.

A structural LDAP object class called Policy is defined as the container for policy rules. An object of this class ``pieces together'' several policy components relating to differentiated services, RSVP and IPSec based VPNs. Only the IPSec related parameters are described here; the RSVP and differentiated services related parameters are described in a related document [6].

A Policy rule is encoded as

```
if <PolicyCondition> then <PolicyAction>
```

A PolicyCondition class specifies attributes that determine when a policy rule applies. These include validity time related parameters and traffic descriptors such as ranges of IP packet header attributes, MAC addresses etc. The policy validity time is described by reference to a PolicyValidityPeriod object that specifies conditions restricting the validity period of a policy rule.

IPPolicyCondition is a subclass of PolicyCondition and describes the conditions based on IP packet header attributes. The reason for subclassing PolicyCondition is to allow extensibility to other networking protocols through sub-classes. Sometimes an IPSec policy needs to be specified by specifying host or user ids. This is allowed by a reference to a UserIDCondition class that describes a set of ids such as Host FQDN, User FQDN, X.500 name etc.

A PolicyAction class specifies a collection of attributes that detail permissions or additional behaviors that the policy enforcement entity MUST perform when the corresponding policy condition is satisfied. The PolicyAction class is subclassed into a number of protocol or service specific actions -- DiffServAction, RSVPAction, ISAKMPAction and IPSecSecurityAction. The QoS related classes: DiffServAction, RSVPAction, DiffServResourceGroup and RSVPResourceGroup are defined in a related document [6]. This document focuses on the IPSec related classes ISAKMPAction and IPSecSecurityAction.

The ISAKMPAction class specifies attributes required to perform an ISAKMP/Oakley Phase 1 exchange. These include exchange mode,

authentication types, Phase 1 proposals, Phase 1 connection management parameters etc. The proposals are described by references to ISAKMPProposal objects. If Private Diffie Hellman groups are to be used in the proposal then an ISAKMPProposal object must contain references to IPSecPrivateDiffieHellmanGroup objects describing private Diffie Hellman groups.

The IPSecSecurityAction class specifies the security action (e.g. permit/deny/secure) for a traffic stream. If the traffic is to be secured by IPSec, then this class specifies attributes required for ISAKMP Phase 2 (or Quick Mode) exchange. These include proxy ids, Phase 2 proposals, and Phase 2 connection management parameters. The Phase 2 proposals are described by references to IPSecProposal objects. An IPSec Proposal consists of logically AND-ed combinations of AH, ESP and IPCOMP protocols. The transform attributes for each protocol are described by references to corresponding IPSecTransform objects.

The modular object design is done to promote the sharing of objects such as IPSecTransforms, IPSecProposals and ISAKMPProposals.

Finally, given a device identity, it must be possible to find all the policies applicable for that device. The auxiliary class PolicyContainmentAuxClass as defined in the DEN specification [7] is for that purpose. It can be attached to a variety of classes that describe devices. The PolicyContainmentAuxClass itself contains an attribute PoliciesContainedRef describing a list of related policies. Therefore the policies for a given device can be obtained by retrieving all the objects specified by the PoliciesContainedRef attribute in an appropriate class such Device (or any other class to which the PolicyContainmentAuxClass class is attached).

### **3. The class Policy**

The Policy object class is the container class for the policy rules. It contains a number of entries, each entry encodes a policy rule that specifies the resources and services that are allowed (or denied) to a stream of packets. An overview of the class Policy is presented below, followed by the detailed syntax and semantics of various attributes.

NAME	Policy
TYPE	Structural
DERIVED FROM	Top
MUST	CommonName, PolicyScope, PolicyConditionRef, PolicyActionRef, PolicyVersion
MAY	PolicyRulePriority, PolicyKeyword,

PolicyType,  
PolicyName,  
PolicyEnabled

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The syntax and semantics of the attributes of the class Policy are as follows:

NAME        CommonName  
DESC        The common name for objects of this class. Used as relative distinguished name to identify object within a branch of directory tree.  
SYNTAX      IA5String  
EQUALITY    caseExactIA5Match  
SINGLE-VALUED

NAME        PolicyScope  
DESC        Lists the services that are controlled through this policy  
EQUALITY    caseExactIA5Match  
SYNTAX      IA5String  
MULTI-VALUED  
FORMAT:     The currently defined values for this attribute are:  
            DiffServ  
            RSVP  
            IPSec  
            ISAKMP  
SEMANTICS: This attribute is used by the appropriate directory clients to fetch only those policy rules that are relevant for their functionality. The value 'DiffServ' means the policy rule specifies DiffServ packet classification and traffic treatment. The value 'RSVP' means specifies an RSVP policy decision point. The value 'IPSec' means the policy refers to an IPSec action rule. The value 'ISAKMP' means the policy refers to an ISAKMP action rule. Note that this is a multi-valued attribute, and the same rule may regulate multiple services for a packet stream.

NAME        PolicyConditionRef  
DESC        Absolute Distinguished name of LDAP entry of the objectclass PolicyCondition, that identify the packets that the policy rule applies to.  
EQUALITY    distinguishedNameMatch  
SYNTAX      DN  
SINGLE-VALUED

The following reference attributes specify the treatment of packets that match the condition specified in the policy rule. The value of a reference attribute is the distinguished name of an LDAP entry which is an object corresponding to a prespecified class. For instance, if the value of the attribute PolicyActionRef is the

distinguished name of an entry in the class RSVPAction, then the policy rule specifies the policy relating to the handling of RSVP signalling messages.

NAME            PolicyActionRef  
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DESC Absolute Distinguished name(s) of LDAP entry, of the objectclass PolicyAction, that specifies permissions and restrictions that apply to the packets identified by the policy condition

EQUALITY distinguishedNameMatch

SYNTAX DN

MULTI-VALUED

SEMANTICS Multiple values are understood as logical AND; that is, all the actions must be performed

NAME PolicyVersion

DESC The version of the policy schema embodied by this policy.

SYNTAX IA5String

FORMAT The current draft specifies version ``1.0''

EQUALITY caseExactIA5Match

SINGLE-VALUED

NAME PolicyKeyword

DESC List of keywords that assist in locating this policy

SYNTAX IA5String

MULTI-VALUED

DEFAULT No Keywords

NAME PolicyType

DESC Describes the types of a policy

SYNTAX IA5String

MULTI-VALUED

FORMAT The following values are allowed:

ISAKMPPhase1

ISAKMPPhase2

IPSecDataLocal

IPSecDataRemote

RSVPSignalling

RSVP-DiffServ

DiffServ

SEMANTICS ISAKMPPhase1 denotes an ISAKMP Phase 1 policy

ISAKMPPhase2 denotes an ISAKMP Phase 2 or Quick Mode policy

IPSecDataLocal denotes a policy for securing locally originating data by IPSec. Local means either originating from the same host or from an host for which this host acts as a proxy

IPSecDataRemote denotes a policy for securing remotely originating data by IPSec. Remote is the opposite of Local as defined before.

RSVPSignalling denotes an RSVP signalling policy

RSVP-DiffServ denotes a policy for mapping an RSVP traffic into a DiffServ pipe

DiffServ denotes a DiffServ policy

DEFAULT Unnamed Type

NAME PolicyName  
DESC A user friendly name of this policy class  
SYNTAX IA5String  
SINGLE-VALUED  
DEFAULT No Name

The following attribute defines relationships among multiple related rules within the policy repository.

NAME PolicyRulePriority  
DESC Priority level for this rule. Used to resolve ambiguity in condition matching when the ranges specified in the Policy conditions overlap. Higher values of this attribute imply higher priority of the rule.  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
DEFAULT The default value is 0 (lowest priority)  
SINGLE-VALUED  
SEMANTICS: Whenever a packet matches two rules of different priority, the rule with the higher value of PolicyRulePriority is applied.

NAME PolicyEnabled  
DESC A flag describing whether the policy is currently enabled or disabled  
SYNTAX IA5String  
EQUALITY caseExactIA5Match  
SINGLE-VALUED  
FORMAT The currently defined values for this attribute are:  
Enabled  
Disabled  
DEFAULT Enabled

### **3.1. PolicyContainmentAuxClass**

Policy rules may need to be grouped together for a number of different purposes -- organizational, security, ease of administration, or ease of retrieval by a policy decision point. We reproduce the PolicyContainmentAuxClass from the DEN specification [7] that serves the useful purpose of grouping policies together. This auxillary class definition is as follows:

NAME PolicyContainmentAuxClass

TYPE	Auxillary	
DERIVED FROM	Top	
AUXILIARY CLASS	None	
POSSIBLE SUPERIORS	Organization, OrganizationalUnit, Group,	
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GroupOfDevices  
MUST PoliciesContainedRef  
MAY

The syntax and semantics of its sole attribute are as follows:

NAME PoliciesContainedRef  
DESC Absolute distinguished names of policies grouped together  
for some (context-dependent) purpose.  
SYNTAX DN  
EQUALITY distinguishedNameMatch  
MULTI-VALUED

#### **4. Policy Conditions**

In this section we define the abstract class PolicyCondition, its subclass IPPolicyCondition, and the class UserIDCondition. These classes list the conditions that must be statisfied by a stream of packets in order for the referring rule to apply to that packet stream.

The reason for subclassing PolicyCondition is to allow extensibility to other networking protocols through sub-classes such as ATMPolicyCondition (for instance).

NAME PolicyCondition  
TYPE Abstract  
DERIVED FROM Top  
AUXILIARY CLASS None  
MUST CommonName  
MAY PolicyConditionName  
PolicyValidityPeriodRef

The detailed syntax and semantics of the attributes is as below:

NAME CommonName  
DESC The common name of the policy condition object. Unique within a  
limited scope and used to identify the object within the  
directory tree.  
SYNTAX IA5String  
EQUALITY caseExactIA5Match  
SINGLE-VALUED

NAME PolicyConditionName  
DESC The user friendly name of this entry.The Name related attributes  
are only for ease of user administration.  
EQUALITY caseExactIA5Match  
SYNTAX IA5String  
SINGLE-VALUED  
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The next attribute is a reference to PolicyValidityPeriod object that identifies the entry that limits the temporal scope of the policy to specified periods of time.

NAME PolicyValidityPeriodRef  
DESC Absolute distinguished name(s) of an PolicyValidityPeriod object that specifies the times that the policy is active.  
EQUALITY distinguishedNameMatch  
MULTI-VALUED  
SYNTAX DN  
DEFAULT Policy applies at all times

#### **4.1. The class IPPolicyCondition**

The class PolicyCondition is now specialized to deal with IPv4 packet headers in the class IPPolicyCondition.

NAME IPPolicyCondition  
TYPE Structural  
DERIVED FROM PolicyCondition  
AUXILIARY CLASSES none  
MAY Interface,  
SourceIPAddressRange,  
DestinationIPAddressRange,  
SourcePortRange,  
DestinationPortRange,  
IPProtocolNumberRange,  
ReceivedTOSByteCheck  
HostUserIDRef

The first attribute limits the spatial scope of the policy rule by identifying specific router interfaces where the policy is to be applied.

NAME Interface  
DESC An attribute that limits the scope of the policy to packets on specified interface(s) and the direction(s) of traffic on these.  
EQUALITY caseExactIA5Match  
SYNTAX IA5String  
MULTI-VALUED  
FORMAT Three colon seperated strings. The left-most string is a numeral denoting the type of the specification, followed by the incoming and outgoing interface identifiers. Currently defined type/value formats are  
1:<IPv4Address>:<IPv4Address>  
2:<InterfaceID>:<InterfaceID>  
The IP addresses are in dotted decimal notation. The interface



IDs are integers unique to the host device.  
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The first address string specifies a restriction of the rule to traffic inbound on the interface, and the rightmost string specifies a corresponding restriction of the rule to traffic outbound from that interface. An unspecified interface(s) defaults to all interfaces on the device that this rule applies to.

EXAMPLE 1:9.3.1.52:9.2.1.54 (Applies to traffic inbound on 9.3.1.52  
and outbound on 9.3.1.54)

1:9.3.1.32: (Applies to traffic inbound on 9.3.1.52  
outgoing from any interface)

2::3 (Applies to traffic outbound on interface 3  
arriving on any interface)

DEFAULTS Defaults to traffic inbound on all interfaces, outbound on  
all interfaces.

NAME SourceIPAddressRange

DESC Source IP addresses to which the policy applies

EQUALITY caseExactIA5Match

SYNTAX IA5String

SINGLE-VALUED

FORMAT SourceIPAddressRange is of the following form: three colon (':')  
separated strings denoting a range of IP addresses. The  
following formats are currently defined

1:<IPv4Address>:<CIDRPrefixLength>

The IP v4 address is in dotted decimal format. The  
CIDRPrefixLength is the number of unmasked leading bits.  
A packet matches the condition if the unmasked  
bits on the packet are identical to the unmasked bits on the  
condition.

2:<IPv4Address>:<IPv4Address>

IP addresses in dotted decimal format. The second  
address must be no smaller than the first. The first  
denotes the start of the range, and the second denotes  
the end of the range. A packet matches the condition  
if its source address is no smaller than the first  
IP address in the condition, and no larger than the  
second.

3

Indicates policy applies to locally generated packets.

EXAMPLE 1:83.23.23.1:24

A packet with source address 83.23.23.5 matches.

A packet with source address 83.23.24.1 does not.  
2:83.23.23.0:83.28.28.0

A packet with source address 83.23.23.5 matches.

A packet with source address 83.29.24.1 does not.

DEFAULT Defaults to the entire address range, i.e., every packet

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matches the source address range condition.

NAME DestinationIPAddressRange

DESC Destination IP addresses to which policy applies

EQUALITY caseExactIA5Match

SYNTAX IA5String

SINGLE-VALUED

FORMAT Identical to that of SourceIPAddressRange above.

The value of ``3'' indicates a locally destined packet.

DEFAULT Defaults to the entire address range, i.e., every packet

matches the destination address range condition.

NAME SourcePortRange

DESC Source Ports to which policy applies

EQUALITY caseExactIA5Match

SYNTAX IA5String

SINGLE-VALUED

FORMAT String consisting of two colon separated positive integers, the second no smaller than the first, or one positive integer.

DEFAULT Defaults to the entire port range 0 to 65535, i.e., every packet matches the destination address range condition.

EXAMPLE 8000:8080 (ports 8000 to 8080),  
8000 (only port 8000)

NAME DestinationPortRange

DESC Destination Ports to which policy applies

EQUALITY caseExactIA5Match

SYNTAX IA5String

SINGLE-VALUED

FORMAT String consisting of two colon separated positive integers, the second no smaller than the first, or one positive integer.

DEFAULT Defaults to the entire port range 0 to 65535, i.e., every packet matches the source address range condition.

NAME IPProtocolNumberRange

DESC Protocol numbers to which policy applies

EQUALITY integerMatch

SYNTAX INTEGER

SINGLE-VALUED

FORMAT String consisting of two colon separated positive integers, the second no smaller than the first, or one positive integer.

DEFAULT Defaults to the entire protocol range 0 to 255, i.e., every packet matches the ip protocol range condition.

EXAMPLE 50:51 (protocol 50 to 51),

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50 (only protocol 50)

NAME ReceivedTOSByteCheck  
 DESC A condition attribute used to select traffic based on the contents of the TOS byte of the received packet's IP header  
 EQUALITY caseExactIA5Match  
 SYNTAX IA5String  
 SINGLE-VALUED  
 FORMAT String of the form xxxxxxxx:xxxxxxx, where each of the x's is either 0 or 1.  
 SEMANTICS Each of the substrings is treated as specifying an 8-bit field. The left substring is termed Mask and the right substring Match. The TOS byte of the received packet's IP header is ANDed with Mask and the result is compared against Match. The combination of Mask and Match allows definition of TOS byte based conditions where certain bits in the TOS byte may be ignored for the purpose of comparison.  
 EXAMPLE An incoming packet with TOS byte 11001010 matches the condition specified by a value of 00111100:00001000 for ReceivedTOSByte.  
 NAME UserIDConditionRef  
 DESC Absolute Distinguished name(s) of LDAP entry or entries, of an UserIDCondition object that identify the user or host whose packets that the policy rule applies to.  
 EQUALITY distinguishedNameMatch  
 SYNTAX DN  
 MULTI-VALUED

#### [4.2.](#) The Class UserIDCondition

In many scenarios, for instance an end host IPSec, policy needs to be specified for a user or a host ID instead of an IP address. A standard example is a corporate worker connecting from home via an ISP. The policy would be specified by Host FQDN, UserFQDN, X500 DN etc. To accomodate this source and destination ids are required.

NAME HostUserID  
 TYPE Structural  
 DERIVED FROM Top  
 AUXILIARY CLASS None  
 MUST CommonName  
 MAY SourceID,  
 DestinationID,

NAME SourceID  
 DESC Source Host Identifier

SYNTAX IA5String  
EQUALITY caseExact1A5Match  
MULTI-VALUED  
FORMAT Two strings , colon (':') seperated, the first describing the ID type and the second the ID value. The valid IdTypes and their corresponding values are defined in [Piper98]. These include:  
Host-FQDN:<ID>  
User-FQDN:<ID>  
X500-DN:<ID>  
X500-GN:<ID>  
Key-Id:<ID>  
DEFAULT Any ID is considered valid.

NAME DestinationID  
DESC Destination Host Identifier  
SYNTAX IA5String  
EQUALITY caseExact1A5Match  
MULTI-VALUED  
DEFAULT Any ID is considered valid.  
FORMAT Same as Source ID

## 5. The class PolicyValidityPeriod

Objects of this class describe conditions that restrict the validity period of the policy rule. The class definition is as follows:

NAME PolicyValidityPeriod  
TYPE Structural  
DERIVED FROM Top  
AUXILIARY CLASSES NONE  
MUST CommonName  
MAY PolicyValidityPeriodName,  
PolicyValidityTime,  
PolicyValidityMonthMask,  
PolicyValidityDayOfWeekMask,  
PolicyValidityTimeOfDayRange

The syntax and semantics of various attributes are as given below

NAME PolicyValidityPeriodName  
DESC The user friendly name of this entry.  
EQUALITY caseExactIA5Match  
SYNTAX IA5String  
SINGLE-VALUED

NAME	PolicyValidityTime	
DESC	When this policy is valid	
EQUALITY	caseExactIA5Match	
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SYNTAX IA5String  
MULTI-VALUED  
FORMAT String(s) of the form `yyyymmddhhmmss:yyyymmddhhmmss:<TZ>`  
SEMANTICS The first two substrings must be valid times,  
(year-month-date-hour-minute- second) the second larger  
than the first. The last substring is optional and  
describes the time zone.  
DEFAULT If the time zone is omitted then the time is local time at  
the policy decision point. If the attribute itself is absent  
then the policy is always valid.  
EXAMPLE 19980121060000:19991231133000:GMT  
(meaning Policy in effect from 6:00 AM on January 21, 1998  
to 1:30 PM on December 31, 1999, Greenwich Mean Time).

NAME PolicyValidityMonthMask  
DESC Months during which policy is valid  
EQUALITY caseExactIA5Match  
SYNTAX IA5String  
SINGLE-VALUED  
FORMAT String denoting a mask of 12 0s and 1s.  
SEMANTICS 1's corresponding to months in the January to December  
range when the policy is valid.  
EXAMPLE 000111111100 (Valid from April until October)  
DEFAULT 111111111111, i.e., valid always

NAME PolicyValidityDayOfWeekMask  
DESC days during which policy is valid  
EQUALITY caseExactIA5Match  
SYNTAX IA5String  
SINGLE-VALUED  
FORMAT String representing a mask of 7 0s and 1s.  
SEMANTICS 1's correspond to days in the Monday to Sunday range  
when the policy is valid.  
EXAMPLE 1111100 (Valid weekdays)  
DEFAULT 1111111, i.e., valid always

NAME PolicyValidityTimeOfDayRange  
DESC Time(s) of day during which policy is valid  
EQUALITY caseExactIA5Match  
SYNTAX IA5String  
MULTI-VALUED  
FORMAT String(s) of the form `hhmmss:hhmmss`  
SEMANTICS Substrings on either side of the colon must be valid  
time of day values. If the second string is not larger  
than the first, then a wrap around midnight is assumed.  
EXAMPLE 090000:170000 (Policy valid from 9 AM to 5 PM)



DEFAULT 000000:235959

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## **6. The class PolicyAction**

While implementing policy within a network device, the PolicyCondition helps identify a substream of packets that are to be granted access to network resources, in a manner that is specified by an instantiation of the class PolicyAction.

The class definition is as follows.

```
NAME PolicyAction
TYPE Abstract
DERIVED FROM Top
AUXILIARY CLASSES NONE
MUST CommonName
```

The PolicyAction is subclassed into a number of protocol or service specific actions, each of which is described next.

### **6.1. The class ISAKMPAction**

This class describes the ISAKMP/Oakley action attributes for the traffic flow as described by the linked IPPolicyCondition or AuxIDPolicyCondition object.

```
NAME ISAKMPAction
TYPE Structural
DERIVED FROM PolicyAction
AUXILIARY CLASSES NONE
DESC Describes ISAKMP/Oakley Phase 1 actions
MUST CommonName,
    ISAKMPExchangeMode,
    ISAKMPProposalRef
MAY
    ISAKMPActionName,
    LocalHostPublicKeyInfo,
    RemoteHostPublicKeyInfo,
    MinSecurityAssociationLifetimeSec,
    MinSecurityAssociationLifetimeKBytes,
    ISAKMPConnectionLifetimeSec,
    ISAKMPConnectionKBytes,
    SecurityAssociationRefreshThreshold,
    ISAKMPConnectionAutoStartFlag

NAME ISAKMPActionName
```

DESC The user friendly name of this entry.  
EQUALITY caseExactIA5Match  
SYNTAX IA5String  
SINGLE-VALUED

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The ISAKMPExchangeMode attribute denotes the ISAKMP/Oakley key exchange mode: main or aggressive.

NAME ISAKMPExchangeMode  
DESC ISAKMP-Oakley key Exchange mode  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED  
FORMAT The values can be found in [4]  
DEFAULT The value corresponding to Main mode

The ISAKMPProposalRef attribute describes a set of ordered ISAKMP proposals. Since LDAP does not support ordered lists, the ISAKMPProposalRef attribute is defined as a composite string in order to be able to capture the relative ordering of the proposals.

NAME ISAKMPProposalRef  
DESC Ordered list of absolute DNs of ISAKMPProposal objects  
EQUALITY caseExactIA5Match  
SYNTAX IA5String  
MULTI-VALUED  
FORMAT The format is `pref:ISAKMPProposalDN' where

- pref is an integer denoting the relative preference of the proposal. Lower number has higher preference.
- ISAKMPProposalDN denotes the distinguishing name (DN) of an ISAKMPProposal object

The following two attributes describe information about the repository of public keys for the source and the destination. The information consists of the type of the public key repository (e.g. Secure DNS, Certificate Authority, LDAP-Directory, Inline ISAKMP), the host name of the public key repository, and acceptable public key certificate encodings.

These are specified as part of policy so that an IPSec host can perform the proper public key operations during an actual ISAKMP/Oakley exchange.

NAME LocalHostPublicKeyInfo  
DESC Information about local hosts's public key. Required for public key based Authentication in ISAKMP  
EQUALITY caseIgnoreMatch  
SYNTAX IA5 String  
MULTI-VALUED

FORMAT: A string of the form `Type : IPName : X500Name: Encoding', where

- Type is any one of the following types of Public key CAs:

SecureDNS,

CA,

LDAP-Directory

Inline-ISAKMP

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- IPName is the fully qualified domain name of the allowed certificate authority. It is required for Types `SecuredNS', `CA' and `LDAP-Directory'
- X500Name is the X500 DN of the CA (for Types `CA' and `LDAP-Directory')
- Encoding is the acceptable certificate when source is using Inline ISAKMP to transfer public keys. The following values are allowed:
  - X.509
  - PKCS
  - DNS-SIG`KEY
  - SPKI

Multiple values of the attribute is treated as logical OR.

DEFAULT implementation dependent

NAME RemoteHostPublicKeyInfo  
DESC Information about remote hosts's public key. Required for public key based Authentication in ISAKMP  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
MULTI-VALUED  
FORMAT same as LocalHostPublicKeyInfo  
DEFAULT implementation dependent

The following two attributes specify minimum ISAKMP security association lifetimes. A received ISAKMP negotiation request with values smaller than this value are rejected.

NAME MinSecurityAssociationLifetimeKBytes  
DESC Minimum Security Association Lifetime in kiloBytes for use in ISAKMP negotiation  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED  
DEFAULT implementation dependent

NAME MinSecurityAssociationLifetimeSec  
DESC Minimum Security Association Lifetime in seconds for use in ISAKMP negotiation  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED  
DEFAULT implementation dependent

Often it may be desirable to have a long lived ``ISAKMP connection"

between two hosts, implying that the ISAKMP Security Associations must be automatically re-negotiated when the (negotiated) security association lifetime expires. The following two attributes specify these values.

NAME ISAKMPConnectionLifetimeKBytes  
DESC A large Lifetime in kiloBytes during which ISAKMP Security Associations are periodically renegotiated once they expire  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED  
DEFAULT The ISAKMP security associations are re-negotiated forever; that is the lifetime is infinity

NAME ISAKMPConnectionLifetimeSec  
DESC A large Lifetime in seconds during which ISAKMP Security Associations are periodically renegotiated once they expire  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED  
DEFAULT The ISAKMP security associations are renegotiated forever; that is the lifetime is infinity

The SecurityAssociationRefreshThreshold attribute denotes a fraction of negotiated ISAKMP security association Lifetime at which the ISAKMP security association must be refreshed. For example, if the SecurityAssociationRefreshThreshold is 0.9 and the negotiated ISAKMP security association lifetime is 100MBytes, then a new security association must be negotiated when 90 MBytes has been transferred.

NAME SecurityAssociationRefreshThreshold  
DESC Fraction of negotiated ISAKMP Security Association Lifetime at which an ISAKMP security association must be refreshed  
EQUALITY caseIgnoreMatch  
SYNTAX IA5String  
SINGLE-VALUED  
FORMAT a:b where a and b are integers  
SEMANTICS a:b means a/b  
DEFAULT implementation dependent

The ISAKMPConnectionAutoStart flag denotes whether the ISAKMP association must be negotiated at system initialization.

NAME ISAKMPConnectionAutoStartFlag  
DESC Flag denoting whether the ISAKMP security association must be automatically negotiated at system initialization  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED  
FORMAT 1 (YES), 0 (NO)



DEFAULT 0

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## **6.2. The class IPSecSecurityAction**

This class describes the IPSec Security action and related attributes for a traffic flow.

```
NAME  IPSecSecurityAction
TYPE  Structural
DERIVED FROM PolicyAction
AUXILIARY CLASSES NONE
DESC  Describes ipsec (Phase 2) security rules
MUST
    CommonName
    SecurityAction
MAY
    IPSecSecurityActionName,
    LocalIPSecTunnelEndPoint,
    RemoteIPSecTunnelEndPoint,
    LocalProxiedAddressRange,
    RemoteProxiedAddressRange,
    LocalProxiedPort,
    RemoteProxiedPort,
    ProxiedIPProtocol,
    ProxiedHostScope,
    IPSecProposalRef,
    ISAKMPActionRef,
    MinSecurityAssociationLifetimeSec,
    MinSecurityAssociationLifetimeKBytes,
    IPSecConnectionLifetimeSec,
    IPSecConnectionLifetimeKBytes,
    SecurityAssociationRefreshThreshold,
    IPSecAutoStartFlag
```

The IPSECSecurityActionName is the user friendly name of this object.

```
NAME  IPSECSecurityActionName
DESC  The user friendly name of this entry.
EQUALITY  caseExactIA5Match
SYNTAX  IA5String
SINGLE-VALUED
```

The SecurityAction attribute states the security action for the flow.

```
NAME  SecurityAction
DESC  Security action for the datagram
```

EQUALITY caseExactStringMatch

SYNTAX IA5String

SINGLE-VALUED

FORMAT The following values are allowed

Permit

Deny

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## PermitIfInboundIPSec

SEMANTICS Deny means that the packet must be dropped.

Permit means that the packet must be allowed and further processing depends on the presence of the IPSecProposalRef attribute. If such an attribute is present, then the packet must be secured by IPSec; else the packet is transmitted in the clear.

PermitIfInboundIPSec means that if the packet has already received inbound IPSec processing, then it must be processed according to 'Permit' rules; else it must be dropped. This is to disallow packets that attempt to bypass inbound IPSec processing.

The next two attributes specifies the two end points of the IPSec security association that must carry the traffic. These attributes are relevant if the SecurityAction attribute is 'Permit' or 'PermitIfInboundIPSec' and there is an IPSecProposalRef attribute implying that the traffic must be secured by IPSec.

For some applications, it may not be required to specify these two attributes and the defaults may suffice (see examples in [section 8](#))

NAME LocalIPSecTunnelEndPoint

DESC Address of the local IPSec host

EQUALITY caseIgnoreMatch

SYNTAX IA5 String

SINGLE-VALUED

FORMAT The following formats are supported

1:<IPv4address>

2:<Host FQDN>

DEFAULT Any one of the local interface addresses for the host for which the policy is applicable

NAME RemoteIPSecTunnelEndPoint

DESC A list of potential addresses of the remote IPSec host

EQUALITY caseIgnoreMatch

SYNTAX IA5 String

MULTI-VALUED

FORMAT Same as LocalIPSecTunnelEndPoint

DEFAULT If the packet is a locally destined IPSec Quick Mode packet then the RemoteIPSecTunnelEndPoint is the source address in the packet (that matches the policy conditions)

If the packet is a data packet that is to be forwarded after  
IPSec processing then the RemoteIPSecTunnelEndPoint is the  
destination address in the packet (that matches the policy  
conditions)

SEMANTICS If the SecurityAction is Permit and there is an IPSecProposalRef  
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attribute then, the flow described in the linked PolicyCondition object must be carried by an IPSec security association between the two hosts described by the LocalIPSecTunnelEndPoint and RemoteIPSecTunnelEndPoint attributes.

The LocalIPSecTunnelEndPoint attribute represents a particular interface for the local host. This is useful for multihomed hosts.

Multiple RemoteIPSecTunnelEndpoints are treated as logical OR.

The following six attributes together define the traffic in the Identity payload in the IPSec Quick Mode negotiation.

The LocalProxiedAddressRange, ProxiedIPProtocol and LocalProxiedPort attributes define the traffic for which the LocalIPSecTunnelEndPoint host acts as a proxy.

The RemoteProxiedAddressRange, ProxiedIPProtocol and RemoteProxiedPort attributes define the traffic for which the RemoteIPSecTunnelEndPoint host acts as a proxy.

The ProxiedHostScope attribute describes whether a separate IPSec Security Association is required for each pair of hosts in (LocalProxiedAddressRange, RemoteProxiedAddressRange) or only one is required for that entire range of hosts.

NAME LocalProxiedAddressRange  
DESC Local proxied address range for use in ISAKMP Quick Mode payload  
EQUALITY caseIgnoreMatch  
SYNTAX IA5 String  
SINGLE-VALUED  
FORMAT identical to SourceIPAddressRange in the IPPolicyCondition class.  
DEFAULT The entire address range

NAME RemoteProxiedAddressRange  
DESC Remote proxied address range for use ISAKMP Quick Mode Identity payload  
EQUALITY caseIgnoreMatch  
SYNTAX IA5 String  
SINGLE-VALUED  
FORMAT identical to SourceIPAddressRange in the IPPolicyCondition class.  
DEFAULT The entire address range

NAME ProxiedProtocol

DESC Proxied protocol for use in ISAKMP Quick Mode payload

EQUALITY caseIgnoreMatch

SYNTAX INTEGER

SINGLE-VALUED

DEFAULT The protocol value in the packet that matches the flow described  
in the linked PolicyCondition object

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NAME LocalProxiedPort

DESC local proxied port for use in ISAKMP Quick Mode Identity payload

EQUALITY integerMatch

SYNTAX INTEGER

SINGLE-VALUED

DEFAULT The local port number in the packet that matches the flow.

NAME RemoteProxiedPort

DESC remote proxied port for use in ISAKMP Quick Mode Identity payload

EQUALITY integerMatch

SYNTAX INTEGER

SINGLE-VALUED

DEFAULT The remote port number in the packet that matches the flow

NAME ProxiedHostScope

DESC Describes whether IPsec Security Association is one for each pair of hosts in (LocalProxiedAddressRange, RemoteProxiedAddressRange) or one for the entire range of hosts.

EQUALITY integerMatch

SYNTAX INTEGER

SINGLE-VALUED

FORMAT The following values are allowed

0x00

0x01 (i.e. Least Significant Bit(LSB) is set)

0x02 (i.e. LSB+1 is set)

0x03 (i.e. both LSB and LSB+1 are set)

SEMANTICS LSB corresponds to local address while LSB+1 corresponds to Remote address. The semantics for each bit is identical.

If LSB is reset then the entire set of addresses defined by the LocalProxiedAddressRange attribute must be carried over one IPsec security association.

If the LSB is set then a distinct IPsec security association must be used for each host in the range of the LocalProxiedAddressRange attribute.

Identical logic applies for the LSB+1 bit and the RemoteProxiedAddressRange attribute

DEFAULT The value 0x00; meaning that only one IPsec tunnel must be used for the entire set of LocalProxiedAddressRange and



RemoteAddressRange values.

The explicit rules for matching Proxied addresses are as follows:

1. If the packet is a locally destined IPSec Quick Mode packet (i.e. this host is acting as an IPSec Quick Mode responder), then the processing is as follows:

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The source address in the packet must be contained in the RemoteTunnelEndPoint values (if specified).

If the LSB in ProxiedHostScope is set, then the IDci presented must be a single address within the RemoteProxiedAddressRange and further, must be equal to the source address in the packet. Otherwise, the IDci must be entire RemoteProxiedAddressRange.

Similarly, if the LSB+1 bit is set then the IDcr presented must be a single address within the LocalProxiedAddressRange and further, must be equal to the destination address in the packet. Else, the IDcr presented must be the entire LocalProxiedAddressRange.

2. If the packet is one that is to be forwarded after IPSec processing, then the processing is to be done as follows.

The source address in the received packet must belong to LocalProxiedAddressRange and the destination address in the received packet must belong to the RemoteProxiedAddressRange.

If the LSB in ProxiedHostScope is set, then source address in the packet must be negotiated as IDci; otherwise the entire LocalProxiedAddressRange must be negotiated as IDci.

If the LSB+1 bit in ProxiedHostScope is set, then destination address in the packet must be negotiated as IDcr; otherwise the entire RemoteProxiedAddressRange must be negotiated as IDcr.

As an example of a situation where two IPSec hosts must not negotiate the entire range of addresses specified in the LocalProxiedAddressRange and RemoteProxiedAddressRange attributes, consider the remote access by users from a specific IPv4 subnet say 39.23.x.x. We might wish to say, for instance, that for any host attempting to do IPSec Quick Mode negotiation from the subnet 39.23.x.x, we require that the IDci presented comprise of the address of that host alone. We mandate this by specifying that the RemoteProxiedAddressRange is 39.23.x.x, but also that the ProxiedHostScope attribute value is 0x02 or 0x03. The meaning of these ProxiedHostScope values are described next and it implies that the source address in the received Quick Mode packet must be used to derive the IDci presented. This approach avoids having multiple IPSec actions, each containing single LocalProxiedAddressRange or

RemoteProxiedAddressRange values and provides flexibility in defining the traffic to be protected by an IPSec security association.

The IPSecProposalRef attribute contains a list of IPSec Proposals for the flow. Since LDAP does not support ordered lists, a composite string is required to define ordered IPSec proposals.

NAME IPSecProposalRef  
DESC Ordered list of absolute DNs of of IPSecProposal objects  
EQUALITY caseIgnoreMatch  
SYNTAX IA5String  
MULTI-VALUED  
FORMAT The format is `pref:IPSecProposalDN' where

- pref is an integer denoting the relative preference of this proposal
- IPSecProposalDN denotes the distinguishing name of an IPSecProposal object representing this proposal

Sometimes there can be multiple ISAKMPAction objects for the flow, e.g. if there are multiple ISAKMP security associations between the two IPSec hosts protecting this flow. In such scenarios, an ISAKMPActionRef attribute describes the particular ISAKMP security association that must carry this traffic.

NAME ISAKMPActionRef  
DESC Absolute distinguished name of the ISAKMPAction object that describes the ISAKMP action used to carry the IPSec traffic  
EQUALITY distinguishedNameMatch  
SYNTAX DN  
SINGLE-VALUED

The rest of the attributes are as defined in [Section 6.1](#) but apply to ISAKMP Quick Mode traffic.

## [7.](#) Other classes

### [7.1.](#) The class ISAKMPPProposal

This class describes the attributes of an ISAKMP (phase one) proposal.

NAME ISAKMPPProposal  
DESC Describes ISAKMP proposal attributes  
DERIVED FROM Top  
AUXILIARY CLASSES NONE  
MUST

- CommonName,
- ISAKMPAuthenticationMethod,
- ISAKMPHashAlgorithm,
- ISAKMPCipherAlgorithm,

MAY

- ISAKMPPProposalName,

ISAKMPPrfAlgorithm,  
ISAKMPCipherKeyLength,  
ISAKMPCipherKeyRounds,  
DefaultDiffieHellmanGroupId,

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PrivateDiffieHellmanGroupRef,  
SecurityAssociationLifetimeSec,  
SecurityAssociationLifetimeKBytes

The ISAKMPProposalName defines the user friendly name of this entry.

NAME ISAKMPProposalName  
DESC The user friendly name of this entry. The Name related attributes are  
only for ease of user administration  
EQUALITY caseExactIA5Match  
SYNTAX IA5String  
SINGLE-VALUED

The ISAKMPAuthenticationMethod attribute defines the ISAKMP/Oakley  
authentication method.

NAME ISAKMPAuthenticationMethod  
DESC Authentication method for key exchange in ISAKMP  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED  
FORMAT The acceptable values for are given in [4]  
DEFAULT Implementation dependent

NAME ISAKMPHashAlgorithm  
DESC Hash Algorithms for use in ISAKMP  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED  
FORMAT The acceptable values for are given in [4]  
DEFAULT Implementation dependent

NAME ISAKMPCipherAlgorithm  
DESC Cipher Algorithms for use in ISAKMP  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED  
FORMAT The acceptable values for are given in [4]  
DEFAULT Implementation dependent

NAME ISAKMPPRFAlgorithm  
DESC PseudoRandom function algorithm for use in ISAKMP  
EQUALITY integerMatch

SYNTAX INTEGER

SINGLE-VALUED

FORMAT The acceptable values for are given in [\[4\]](#)

DEFAULT The value corresponding to HMAC

The following two attributes are related to some special ISAKMP  
ciphers.

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NAME ISAKMPCipherKeyLength  
DESC Keylength for use when ISAKMP Cipher algorithms are CAST, RC5 or Blowfish  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED  
DEFAULT Not applicable

NAME ISAKMPCipherKeyRounds  
DESC Key rounds for use with some ISAKMP Cipher algorithms  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED  
DEFAULT Not applicable

ISAKMPCipherKeyRounds is not used at present, but may be needed for some new cipher algorithm.

DefaultDiffieHellmanGroupId attribute specifies the well known Diffie Hellman group Ids in case these are to be used. If on the other hand private groups are to be used, then the PrivateDiffieHellmanGroupRef provides a reference to the PrivateDiffieHellmanGroup object describing the group attributes.

NAME DefaultDiffieHellmanGroupId  
DESC Default Diffie Hellman group ids: 1,2,3,4 defined in [4]  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED  
DEFAULT Implementation dependent

NAME PrivateDiffieHellmanGroupRef  
DESC Absolute DN of an DiffieHellmanGroup object  
EQUALITY distinguishedNameMatch  
SYNTAX DN  
SINGLE-VALUED  
DEFAULT Not applicable

The following two attributes specify security association lifetimes.

NAME SecurityAssociationLifetimeKBytes  
DESC Security Association Lifetime time in KBytes  
EQUALITY integerMatch



SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED  
DEFAULT Implementation dependent

NAME SecurityAssociationLifetimeSec  
DESC Security Association Lifetime time in seconds  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
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SYNTAX INTEGER

SINGLE-VALUED

DEFAULT Implementation dependent

## **7.2. The class IPSecProposal**

This class describes an IPSec proposal for ISAKMP/Oakley Quick Mode negotiation. A proposal consists of combinations of AH, ESP and IPComp protocols.

The transform attributes of the AH protocol are specified by the AHProtocolTransformRef attribute that refers to an appropriate IPSecTransform object (described in [section 7.3](#)).

Similarly, the ESPProtocolTransformRef attribute specifies the transforms associated with the ESP protocol and the IPCompProtocolTransformRef attribute specifies the transforms associated with the IPComp protocol. The ESPProtocolTransformRef and IPCompProtocolTransformRef attribute refers to an appropriate IPSecTransform objects (described in [section 7.3](#)).

The attributes AHProtocolTransformRef, ESPProtocolTransformRef and IPCompProtocolTransformRef are all taken as logical ANDs when presented together. For example, when both an AHProtocolTransformRef and an ESPProtocolTransformRef are present, then both AH and ESP must be negotiated together.

The class definition is

```
NAME  IPSecProposal
DESC  Describes an IPSEC Proposal
DERIVED FROM  Top
MUST
    CommonName,
    PerfectForwardSecrecy
MAY
    IPSecProposalName,
    DefaultDiffieHellmanGroupId,
    PrivateDiffieHellmanGroupRef,
    AHProtocolTransformRef,
    ESPProtocolTransformRef,
    IPCompProtocolTransformRef
```

The attribute definitions are given below.

NAME ISAKMPPProposalName

DESC The user friendly name of this entry.

EQUALITY caseExactIA5Match

SYNTAX IA5String

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## SINGLE-VALUED

The PerfectForwardSecrecy attribute denotes whether a fresh Diffie Hellman Exchange is required in IPSec Quick Mode. If this attribute value is 1 (i.e. fresh Diffie Hellman exchange is required) then one of the Diffie Hellman attributes DefaultDiffieHellmanGroupId, PrivateDiffieHellmanGroupRef must be present in each of the referred IPSecTransform objects.

NAME PerfectForwardSecrecy  
DESC Perfect forward secrecy requirement in IPSec Quick Mode  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED  
FORMAT The following values are defined  
    1 (Required)  
    0 (not required)

NAME DefaultDiffieHellmanGroupId  
DESC Default Diffie Hellman group ids: 1,2,3,4 defined in [4]  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED

NAME PrivateDiffieHellmanGroupRef  
DESC Absolute DN of a private DiffieHellmanGroup object  
EQUALITY distinguishedNameMatch  
SYNTAX DN  
SINGLE-VALUED

Note that the following reference object lists are defined as strings in order to emulate ordered lists which is currently not supported in LDAP.

NAME AHProtocolTransformRef  
DESC Ordered list of absolute distinguished names of IPSecTransform objects corresponding to AH protocol  
EQUALITY caseIgnoreMatch  
SYNTAX IA5 String  
MULTI-VALUED  
FORMAT The format is `pref:IPSecTransformDN' where  
    - pref is an integer denoting the relative preference of the transform. Lower number is higher preference.  
    - IPSecTransformDN denotes the distinguishing name of an

IPSecTransform object corresponding to the AH protocol

NAME ESPProtocolTransformRef

DESC Ordered list of absolute distinguished names of IPSecTransform objects  
corresponding to ESP protocol

EQUALITY caseIgnoreMatch

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SYNTAX IA5 String

MULTI-VALUED

FORMAT The format is `pref:IPSecTransformDN' where

- pref is an integer denoting the relative preference of the transform. Lower number is higher preference.
- IPSecTransformDN denotes the distinguishing name of an IPSecTransform object corresponding to the ESP protocol

NAME IPCOMPProtocolTransformRef

DESC Ordered list of absolute distinguished names of IPSecTransform objects corresponding to IPCOMP protocol

EQUALITY distinguishedNameMatch

SYNTAX DN

MULTI-VALUED

FORMAT The format is `pref:IPSecTransformDN' where

- pref is an integer denoting the relative preference of the transform. Lower number is higher preference.
- IPSecTransformDN denotes the distinguishing name of an IPSecTransform object corresponding to the IPCOMP protocol

### **7.3. The class IPSecTransform**

This class describes the attributes of an IPSec Quick Mode transform.

NAME IPSecTransform

DESC Describes IPSec transform attributes

DERIVED FROM Top

MUST

CommonName

IPSecProtocolId

MAY

IPSecTransformName,

AHIntegrityAlgorithm,

ESPIntegrityAlgorithm,

ESPCipherAlgorithm,

ESPCipherKeyLength,

ESPCipherKeyRounds,

IPCOMPCompressAlgorithm,

IPCOMPVendorCompressAlgorithm,

EncapsulationMode,

SecurityAssociationLifetimeSec,

SecurityAssociationLifetimeKBytes

NAME ISAKMPTransformName

DESC The user friendly name of this entry. The Name related attributes are only for ease of user administration.

EQUALITY caseExactIA5Match

SYNTAX IA5String

SINGLE-VALUED

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The IPSecProtocolId attribute denotes the IPSec protocol (e.g. AH, ESP, IPCOMP) corresponding to this transform object. For example, if the transform object denotes an AH`MD5 transform then the IPSecProtocolId is IPSEC`AH.

NAME IPSecProtocolId  
DESC IPSec protocol corresponding to this transform  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED  
FORMAT The acceptable values are given in [4].

The AHIntegrityAlgorithm and ESPIntegrityAlgorithm attributes denote the integrity transform (e.g. MD5, SHA etc.) in AH and ESP protocols respectively.

NAME AHIntegrityAlgorithm  
DESC Integrity Algorithm for use in AH  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED  
FORMAT The acceptable values are given in [4].  
DEFAULT Not applicable

NAME ESPIntegrityAlgorithm  
DESC Integrity Algorithm for use in ESP  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED  
FORMAT The acceptable values are given in [4].  
DEFAULT Not applicable

The EncapsulationMode describes the Tunnel or transport encapsulation mode.

NAME EncapsulationMode  
DESC Encapsulation Mode: Tunnel or Transport  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED  
FORMAT The acceptable values for in [4].  
DEFAULT: the integer value corresponding to the Transport Mode



The ESPCipherAlgorithm attribute denotes the integrity transform  
(e.g. 3DES, IDEA etc.) in ESP.

NAME ESPCipherAlgorithm

DESC Cipher Algorithms for use in ESP

EQUALITY integerMatch

SYNTAX INTEGER

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SINGLE-VALUED

FORMAT The acceptable values are given in [4]

DEFAULT Not applicable

NAME ESPCipherKeyLength

DESC Keylength for use when ESP Cipher algorithms are CAST, RC5 or  
Blowfish

EQUALITY integerMatch

SYNTAX INTEGER

SINGLE-VALUED

DEFAULT Not applicable

NAME ESPCipherKeyRounds

DESC Key rounds for use with some ESP Cipher algorithms

EQUALITY integerMatch

SYNTAX INTEGER

SINGLE-VALUED

DEFAULT Not applicable

ESPCipherKeyRounds is not used at present, but may be needed for some  
new cipher algorithm.

NAME IPCOMPCompressAlgorithm

DESC Compression Algorithms for use in IPCOMP

EQUALITY integerMatch

SYNTAX INTEGER

SINGLE-VALUED

FORMAT The acceptable values are given in [4]

DEFAULT Implementation dependent

NAME IPCOMPVendorCompressAlgorithm

DESC Vendor specific Compression Algorithms for use in IPCOMP

EQUALITY integerMatch

SYNTAX INTEGER

SINGLE-VALUED

DEFAULT Not applicable

The VendorCompressAlgorithm attribute must be present when  
CompressAlgorithm represents OUI.

The following two attributes specify security association lifetimes.  
If a proposal consists of multiple protocols such as AH and ESP, then  
the lifetime values applies to each protocol as they are negotiated

together.

NAME SecurityAssociationLifetimeKBytes

DESC Security Association Lifetime in KBytes

EQUALITY integerMatch

SYNTAX INTEGER

SINGLE-VALUED

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DEFAULT Implementation dependent

NAME SecurityAssociationLifetimeSec  
DESC Security Association Lifetime in seconds  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED  
DEFAULT Implementation dependent

#### **[7.4.](#) The class PrivateDiffieHellmanGroup**

This class defines a private Diffie Hellman Group.

NAME PrivateDiffieHellmanGroup  
DESC Describes a private Diffie Hellman group attributes  
DERIVED FROM Top  
MUST  
    CommonName  
    DHGroupType  
MAY  
    PrivateDHGroupName,  
    DHPrime,  
    DHGenerator,  
    DHGenerator1,  
    DHGenerator2,  
    DHCurveA,  
    DHCurveB,  
    DHFieldSize,  
    DHOrder

The attribute definitions are as follows.

NAME DHGroupType  
DESC The diffie Hellman group type for a DHGroup object:  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED  
SEMANTICS The acceptable values are given in [[4](#)]

NAME DHFieldSize  
DESC GF size for elliptic curve groups  
EQUALITY integerMatch  
SYNTAX INTEGER  
SINGLE-VALUED

NAME DHGenerator  
DESC Group Generator  
EQUALITY caseIgnoreMatch  
SYNTAX IA5 String  
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```
NAME    DHCurveA
DESC    Group Curve A for elliptic curve groups
EQUALITY  caseIgnoreMatch
SYNTAX  IA5 String
SINGLE-VALUED
```

```
NAME      DHCurveB
DESC      Group Curve B for elliptic curve groups
EQUALITY  caseIgnoreMatch
SYNTAX    IA5 String
SINGLE-VALUED
```

```
NAME      DHOrder
DESC      Group Order for elliptic curve groups
EQUALITY  caseIgnoreMatch
SYNTAX    IA5 String
SINGLE-VALUED
```

## 8. VPN Schema Usage Examples

In this section we describe some usage scenarios for VPNs. The intent is not to be very complete in specifying all the attributes, rather to show how the important attributes are to be defined. The objects are all written in LDIF notation.

### 8.1. Scenario I: Intranet communication



The requirements are:

- All hosts on subnet S1 must use IPSec to communicate to hosts on subnet S2 and (HTTP) ports 8000-8080
- Only hosts on subnet S1 are allowed to initiate connections

- No intermediate gateways are required

### **8.1.1. ISAKMP rules for each host in S1 and S2**

Each host in S1 and S2 needs to have the following rule.

```
dn: cn=S1-S2-isakmp-rule, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: Policy
PolicyScope: ISAKMP
PolicyType: ISAKMP
PolicyConditionRef: cn=S1-S2-isakmp-traffic,o=XYZ, c=US,
PolicyActionRef: cn=S1-S2-isakmp-action, o=XYZ, c=US
```

```
dn: cn=S1-S2-isakmp-traffic, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: IPPolicyCondition
SourceAddressRange: S1
DestinationAddressRange: S2
IPProtocolRange: 17 (i.e. UDP)
SourcePortRange: 500 (i.e. ISAKMP port)
DestinationPortRange: 500 (i.e. ISAKMP port)
```

```
dn: cn=S1-S2-isakmp-action, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: ISAKMPAction
ISAKMPProposalRef: cn=S1-S2-isakmp-proposal,o=XYZ, c=US
```

```
dn: cn=S1-S2-isakmp-proposal, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: ISAKAMPProposal
ISAKMPHashAlgorithm: 2(i.e. SHA)
ISAKMPAuthenticationMethod: 4 (i.e. RSA encryption)
ISAKMPCipherAlgorithm: 5(i.e. 3DES)
SecurityAssociationLifetimeSec: 3600
```

Note that there must be no IPPolicyCondition object with S2 as the source address range and S1 as the destination address range, since hosts in S2 are not allowed to initiate ISAKMP negotiations.

### **8.1.2. IPSec Rules for each host in S1**

For the sake of illustration suppose that the following two IPSec proposals need to be negotiated.

- the first (preferred) proposal consists of only ESP protocol with 3DES as cipher and SHA as the integrity algorithm,



- the second proposal consists of both AH and ESP protocols; SHA is the integrity algorithm for AH while 3DES is the cipher for ESP. There is no integrity algorithm for ESP in this proposal.

Three IPSec rules are needed for hosts on subnet S1::

1. one rule for handling data packets from S2 to S1: this states that such packets must arrive at S1 within an IPSec security association. Because of this rule, it would not be possible to send non-IPSec packets from S2 to S1 on src port 8000-8080.

```
dn: cn=S2-S1-HTTP-rule, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: Policy
PolicyScope: IPSec
PolicyType: IPSecDataRemote
PolicyConditionRef: cn=S2-S1-HTTP-traffic, o=XYZ, c=US
PolicyActionRef: cn=inboundIPSecAction, o=XYZ, c=US
```

```
dn: cn=S2-S1-HTTP-traffic, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: IPPolicyCondition
SourceIPAddressRange: S2
DestinationIPAddressRange: S1
SourcePortRange: 8000:8080
IPProtocolRange: 4 (i.e. TCP)
```

```
dn: cn= inboundIPSecIPSecAction, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: IPSecSecurityAction
SecurityAction: PermitIfInboundIPSec
```

2. one rule for data packets from S1 to S2: this states that such packets must be secured by IPSec processing.

```
dn: cn= S1-S2-HTTP-rule, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: Policy
PolicyScope: IPSec
PolicyType: IPSecDataLocal
PolicyConditionRef: cn=S1-S2-HTTP-traffic, o=XYZ, c=US
PolicyActionRef: cn=S1-S2-HTTP-IPSec-action, o=XYZ, c=US
```

```
dn: cn=S1-S2-HTTP-traffic, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: IPPolicyCondition
SourceIPAddressRange: S1
DestinationIPAddressRange: S2
DestinationPortRange: 8000:8080
IPProtocolRange: 4 (i.e. TCP)
```

```
dn: cn= S1-S2-HTTP-IPSec-action, o=XYZ, c=US,
Objectclass: IPSecSecurityAction
SecurityAction: Permit
```

LocalProxiedAddressRange: S1  
RemoteProxiedAddressRange: S2  
LocalProxiedPort: 0  
RemoteProxiedPort: 8000 : 8080  
ProxiedProtocol: 4  
ProxiedHostScope: 0x11

IPSecProposalRef: 1: cn= ESPProposal, o=XYZ, c=US,

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IPSecProposalRef: 2: cn= AHESPProposal, o=XYZ, c=US

dn: cn=ESPProposal,o=XYZ, c=US

Objectclass: IPSecProposal

ESPProtocolTransformRef: 1: cn= AuthEncryptTransform,o=XYZ,

c=US

dn: cn=AHESPProposal, o=XYZ, c=US

Objectclass: IPSecProposal

AHProtocolTransformRef: 1: cn= AuthTransform, o=XYZ, c=US

ESPProtocolTransformRef: 1: cn= EncryptTransform, o=XYZ, c=US

dn: cn= AuthEncryptTransform,o=XYZ, c=US,

Objectclass: IPSecTransform

IPSecProtocolId: 3 (i.e. IPSEC`PROTO`ESP)

ESPCipherAlgorithm: 3 (i.e. 3DES)

ESPIntegrityAlgorithm: 2 (i.e. HMAC-SHA-1)

EncapsulationMode: 2 (i.e. transport)

SecurityAssociationLifetimeSec: 3600

dn: cn= AuthTransform,o=XYZ, c=US

Objectclass: IPSecTransform

IPSecProtocolId: 2 (i.e. IPSEC`PROTO`AH)

AHIntegrityAlgorithm: 2 (i.e. HMAC-SHA-1)

EncapsulationMode: 1 (i.e. tunnel)

SecurityAssociationLifetimeSec: 3600

dn: cn= EncryptTransform, o=XYZ, c=US

Objectclass: IPSecTransform

IPSecProtocolId: 3 (i.e. IPSEC`PROTO`ESP)

ESPCipherAlgorithm: 3 (i.e. 3DES)

EncapsulationMode: 2 (i.e. transport)

SecurityAssociationLifetimeSec: 3600

3. one for IPSec packets from S1 to S2 (that is, packets with protocol field AH or ESP). This would state whether S1 and S2 can communicate directly or a gateway has to be traversed.

dn: cn= S1-S2-AHESP-rule, o=XYZ, c=US

Objectclass: Policy

PolicyType: IPSecDataLocal

PolicyConditionRef: cn=S1-S2-AHESP-traffic, o=XYZ, c=US

PolicyActionRef: cn=clearIPSecSecurityAction, o=XYZ, c=US

dn: cn=S1-S2-AHESP-traffic, o=XYZ, c=US,  
Objectclass: IPPolicyCondition  
SourceIPAddressRange: S1  
DestinationIPAddressRange: S2  
IPProtocolRange: 50-51 (i.e. AH and ESP)

dn: cn=clearIPSecSecurityAction, o=XYZ, c=US

Objectclass: IPSecSecurityAction  
SecurityAction: Permit

### **[8.1.3.](#) IPSec Rules for each host in S2**

The situation for hosts in S2 is symmetric to those for S1, except that a policy is needed for hosts in S2 to respond to ISAKMP Quick Mode negotiations. Hosts in S1 do not need such a policy since they only initiate ISAKMP.

Such a policy is needed since the packet header in ISAKMP Quick Mode is different than in a data packet and we want to make it straightforward for hosts to match policies.

Hence for hosts in S2, the following IPSec rules are needed:

- Three rules as described in [section 8.1.2](#) with the difference that source and destination addresses, port numbers etc. must be reversed.
- An extra rule that enables hosts on S2 to respond to ISAKMP Phase 2 signalling.

```
dn: cn=S1-S2-isakmp-QuickMode-rule, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: Policy
PolicyScope: IPSec
PolicyType: IPSecPhase2
PolicyConditionRef: cn=S1-S2-isakmp-traffic,o=XYZ, c=US,
PolicyActionRef: cn=S2-HTTP-S1-ipsec-action, o=XYZ, c=US
```

```
dn: cn= S2-HTTP-S1-IPSec-action, o=XYZ, c=US,
Objectclass: IPSecSecurityAction
SecurityAction: Permit
LocalProxiedAddressRange: S2
RemoteProxiedAddressRange: S1
LocalProxiedPort: 8000 : 8080
RemoteProxiedPort: 0
ProxiedProtocol: 4
ProxiedHostScope: 0x11
IPSecProposalRef: 1: cn= ESPProposal, o=XYZ, c=US,
IPSecProposalRef: 2: cn= AHESPProposal, o=XYZ, c=US
```

The IPSecProposal objects are defined in [section 8.1.2](#).

## **8.2. Scenario II: Remote access to intranet via an ISP**

This case differs from the previous in that subnet S2 is behind a security gateway GW2. The traffic between subnets S1 and S2 on  
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```

-----
S1,TCP ---Internet--- | GW2---Intranet----->S2,TCP,HTTP ports
                        |
<-----end-to-end IPSec----->
<---outer IPSec --->|
    tunnel           -----

```

Identical to those in [section 8.1](#) since from S2's point of view, nothing has changed.

### ISAKMP Rules:

An additional rule is required for communication between hosts on S1 and GW2. Typically the traffic profile described in the PolicyCondition object for S1-S2 rule will be broad enough to include the S1 and GW2. If this is not the case then a new rule has to be added as in [section 8.1.1](#) by replacing the subnet S2 with the gateway GW2.

IPSec rules:

The difference between this case and the intranet case in [section 8.1.2](#) is that hosts on S1 now have to send S1-S2 traffic via the gateway GW2.

To accomplish this, simply replace the rule whose DN equals ``cn=S1-S2-AHESP-rule, o=XYZ, c=US'' in [section 8.1.2](#) by the following two rules: (Note that objects not defined here are defined earlier in this section)

1. One rule which states that IPSec packets between S1 and S2 must be sent within an IPSec tunnel between S1 and GW2.

```
dn: cn= S1-S2-AHESP-rule, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: Policy
PolicyScope: IPSec
```



PolicyType: IPSecDataLocal  
PolicyConditionRef: cn=S1-S2-AHESP-traffic, o=XYZ, c=US  
PolicyActionRef: cn=AH Tunnel Security Action, o=XYZ, c=US

```
dn: cn=AHTunnelSecurityAction, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: IPSecSecurityAction
SecurityAction: Permit
RemoteIPSecTunnelEndPoint: GW2
LocalProxiedAddressRange: S1
RemoteProxiedAddressRange: S2
ProxiedProtocol: 0
LocalProxiedPort:0
RemoteProxiedPort:0
ProxiedHostScope: 0x11
IPSecProposalRef: cn=AuthTunnelProposal, o=XYZ, c=US
```

```
dn: cn= AuthTunnelProposal,o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: IPSecProposal
IPSecTransformRef: 1: cn= AuthTransform, o=XYZ, c=US
```

2. one rule that states that hosts on S1 and GW2 need not traverse any intermediate gateways.

```
dn: cn=S1-GW2-AHESP-rule, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: Policy
PolicyScope: IPSec
PolicyType: IPSecDataLocal
TrafficProfileRef: cn=S1-GW2-AHESP-traffic, o=XYZ, c=US
PolicyActionRefe: cn=clearIPSecSecurityAction, o=XYZ,c=US
```

```
dn: cn=S1-GW2-AHESP-traffic, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: PolicyCondition
SourceAddressRange: S1
DestinationAddressRange: GW2
IPProtocolRange: 50:51
```

### **8.2.3. Rules for GW2**

Only the IPSec rules are described here. The ISAKMP rule between GW2 and hosts on S1 can be generated easily. Note that objects not defined here are defined earlier in this section.

1. A rule that states that packets from S1 to S2 on destination port 8000-8080 must be received inside of an IPSec security association, and then must be sent out in the clear.

```
dn: cn= S1-S2-GatewayRemoteAccessRule, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: Policy
```

PolicyScope: IPSec  
PolicyType: IPSecDataRemote  
TrafficProfileRef: cn=S1-S2-HTTP-traffic, o=XYZ, c=US  
PolicyActionRef: cn=S1-GW2-inbound-SecurityAction, o=XYZ,c=US

```
dn: cn=S1-GW2-inbound-SecurityAction, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: IPSecSecurityAction
SecurityAction: PermitIfInboundIPSec
```

2. A rule that states that packets from S2 to S1 on source port 8000 to 8080 must be secured by ipsec on the outbound path.

```
dn: cn= S2-S1-GatewayRemoteAccessRule, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: Policy
PolicyScope: IPSec
PolicyType: IPSecDataLocal
TrafficProfileRef: cn=S2-HTTP-S1-traffic, o=XYZ, c=US
PolicyActionRef: cn=GW2-S1-HTTP-SecurityAction, o=XYZ, c=US
```

```
dn: cn=GW2-S1-HTTP-SecurityAction, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: IPSecSecurityAction
SecurityAction: Permit
LocalIPSecTunnelEndpoint: GW2
LocalProxiedAddressRange: S2
RemoteProxiedAddressRange: S1
ProxiedProtocol: 0
LocalProxiedPort:0
RemoteProxiedPort:0
ProxiedHostScope: 0x11
ProxiedProtocol: 4(i.e. TCP)
IPSecProposalRef: cn=AHTunnelProposal, o=XYZ, c=US
```

3. A rule that states that GW2 and hosts on S1 can communicate directly.

```
dn: cn=GW2-S1-AHESP-rule, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: Policy
PolicyScope: IPSec
PolicyType: ISAKMPDataLocal
TrafficProfileRef: cn=GW2-S1-EHESP-traffic, o=XYZ, c=US
PolicyActionRef: cn=clearIPSecSecurityAction, o=XYZ, c=US
```

```
dn: cn=GW2-S1-AHESP-traffic, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: PolicyCondition
SourceAddressRange: GW2
DestinationAddressRange: S1
IPProtocolRange: 50-51 (i.e. AH and ESP)
```

4. A rule for GW2 to respond to ISAKMP Quick Mode packets from hosts in S1.

dn: cn=S1-GW2-isakmp-QuickMode-rule, o=XYZ, c=US  
Objectclass: Policy  
PolicyScope: IPSec  
PolicyType: ISAKMPPhase2

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
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PolicyConditionRef: cn=S1-GW2-isakmp-traffic,o=XYZ, c=US,  
 PolicyActionRef: cn=GW2-S1-HTTP-SecurityAction, o=XYZ, c=US

dn: cn=S1-GW2-isakmp-traffic, o=XYZ, c=US  
 Objectclass: IPPolicyCondition  
 SourceAddressRange: S1  
 DestinationAddressRange: GW2  
 IPProtocolRange: 17 (i.e. UDP)  
 SourcePortRange: 500 (i.e. ISAKMP port)  
 DestinationPortRange: 500 (i.e. ISAKMP port)

### **8.3. Scenario III: Corporate Branch office to Main office**

Suppose that hosts on subnets S1 and S2 are not IPSec enabled. therefore traffic initiated by any host on subnet S1 and destined to any host subnet S2 and port 80 is to be carried by the security gateways GW1 and GW2 within an IPSec security association in tunnel mode as show below.



Rules for GW1 are described here since those for GW2 are completely symmetric except the ISAKMP Quick Mode responder rule. Also, only IPSec rules are described since ISAKMP rules are straightforward. Note that objects not defined here are defined earlier in this section.

1. The first rule for the gateway GW1 concerns packets received from hosts on subnet S1 destined to hosts on subnet S2 and on port 8000-8080. These packets must be sent to GW2 within ONE IPSec tunnel. Note the use of the ProxiedHostScope attribute.

dn: cn= S1-S2-BrOffRule, o=XYZ, c=US  
 Objectclass: Policy  
 PolicyScope: IPSec  
 PolicyType: IPSecDataLocal  
 TrafficProfileRef: cn=S1-S2-HTTP-traffic, o=XYZ, c=US  
 PolicyActionRef: cn=S1-S2-BrOffSecAction, o=XYZ,c=US

dn: cn=S1-S2-BrOffSecAction, o=XYZ, c=US  
Objectclass: IPSecSecurityAction  
SecurityAction: Permit

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```
LocalIPSecTunnelEndPoint: GW1
RemoteIPSecTunnelEndPoint: GW2
LocalProxiedAddressRange: S1
RemoteProxiedAddressRange: S2
LocalProxiedPort: 0
RemoteProxiedPort: 8000 : 8080
ProxiedProtocol: 4
ProxiedHostScope: 0x00
IPSecProposalRef: cn=AH Tunnel Proposal, o=XYZ, c=US
```

2. The second rule states that GW1 and GW2 can communicate directly without any intermediate gateways.

```
dn: cn=GW1-GW2-AHESP-rule, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: Policy
PolicyScope: IPSec
PolicyType: IPSecDataLocal
TrafficProfileRef: cn=GW1-GW2-AHESP-traffic, o=XYZ, c=US
PolicyActionRef: cn=clearIPSecSecurityAction, o=XYZ, c=US
```

```
dn: cn=GW1-GW2-AHESP-traffic, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: PolicyCondition
SourceIPAddressRange: GW1
DestinationIPAddressRange: GW2
IPProtocolRange: 50-51 (i.e. AH and ESP)
```

3. The third rule states that packets from S2 to S1 must receive inbound IPSec processing and then forwarded in the clear.

```
dn: cn= S2-S1-BrOffRule, o=XYZ, c=US
Objectclass: Policy
PolicyScope: IPSec
PolicyType: PolicyDataRemote
PolicyConditionRef: cn=S2-S1-HTTP-traffic, o=XYZ, c=US
PolicyActionRef: cn=inboundIPSecAction, o=XYZ,c=US
```

## **9. Security Considerations**

This draft presents a policy model of the IPSec documents. All security considerations within those actual specification MUST be considered prior to implementing a policy architecture.

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