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Abstract

This document presents an object-oriented model of IPsec policy designed to:

- o facilitate agreement about the content and semantics of IPsec
 policy
- enable derivations of task-specific representations of IPsec policy such as storage schema, distribution representations, and policy specification languages used to configure IPsecenabled endpoints

The schema described in this document models the IKE phase one parameters as described in [IKE] and the IKE phase two parameters for the IPsec Domain of Interpretation as described in [COMP, ESP, AH, DOI]. It is based upon the core policy classes as defined in the Policy Core Information Model (PCIM) [PCIM].

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1. Introduction

Internet Protocol security (IPsec) policy may assume a variety of forms as it travels from storage to distribution point to decision point. At each step, it needs to be represented in a way that is convenient for the current task. For example, the policy could exist as, but is not limited to:

- a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) [LDAP] schema in a directory
- o an on-the-wire representation over a transport protocol like the Common Object Policy Service (COPS) [<u>COPS</u>, <u>COPSPR</u>]
- o a text-based policy specification language [<u>SPSL</u>] suitable for editing by an administrator
- o an Extensible Markup Language (XML) document

Each of these task-specific representations should be derived from a canonical representation that precisely specifies the content and semantics of the IPsec policy. The purpose of this document is to abstract IPsec policy into a task-independent representation that is not constrained by any particular task-dependent representation.

This document is organized as follows:

- <u>Section 2</u> provides a quick introduction to the Unified Modeling Language (UML) graphical notation conventions used in this document.
- <u>Section 3</u> provides the inheritance hierarchy which describes where the IPsec policy classes fit into the policy class hierarchy already defined by PCIM.
- o The remainder of the document describes the classes which make up the IPsec policy model.

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [<u>KEYWORDS</u>].

2. UML Conventions

For this document, a UML static class diagram was chosen as the canonical representation for the IPsec policy model. The reason behind this decision is that UML provides a graphical, task-independent way to model systems. A treatise on the graphical notation used in UML is beyond the scope of this paper. However, given the use of ASCII drawing for UML static class diagrams, a description of the notational conventions used in this document is in order:

 Boxes represent classes, with class names in brackets ([]) representing a virtual class.

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- A line that terminates with an arrow $(<, >, \land, v)$ denotes 0 inheritance. The arrow always points to the parent class. Inheritance can also be called generalization or specialization (depending upon the reference point). A base class is a generalization of a derived class, and a derived class is a specialization of a base class.
- Associations are used model a relationship between two classes. 0 Classes that share an association are connected using a line. There are two special kinds of associations - aggregations and compositions. Both model a whole-part relationship between two classes. Associations, and therefore aggregations and compositions, can also be modeled as classes.
- A line that begins with a "o" denotes aggregation. Aggregation 0 denotes containment in which the contained class and the containing class have independent lifetimes.
- A line that begins with an "x" denotes composition. Composition 0 denotes containment in which the contained class and the contianing class have coincident lifetimes.
- Next to a line representing an association appears a 0 multiplicity. Multiplicities indicate the number of objects in the relationship. The multiplicity may be: - a range in the form "lower bound..upper bound" indicating the minimum and maximum number of objects. - a number that indicates the exact number of objects. - an asterisk indicating any number of objects, including zero. Using an asterisk is shorthand for 0..n. - the letter n indicating from 1 to many. Using the letter n is shorthand for 1..n.

It should be noted that the UML static class diagram presented is a conceptual view of IPsec policy designed to aid in understanding. It does not necessarily get translated class for class into another representation. For example, an LDAP implementation may flatten out the representation to fewer classes (because of the inefficiency of following references).

3. IPsec Policy Model Inheritance Heirarchy

The following diagram represents the inheritance hierarchy and how the IPsec policy model classes fit into PCIM.

```
[unrooted]
+--Policy (PCIM)
+--PolicyGroup (PCIM)
+--IPsecPolicyGroup (new class)
```

```
| |
| +--PolicyRule (PCIM)
| | |
| | +--SARule (new abstract class)
| | |
```

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```
+--IKERule (new class)
+--IPsecRule (new class)
  +--PolicyCondition (PCIM)
+--SACondition (new class)
 +--PolicyAction (PCIM)
     +--SAAction (new abstract class)
        +--SAStaticAction (new abstract class)
         +--IPsecBypassAction (new class)
        +--IPsecDiscardAction (new class)
          +--IKERejectAction (new class)
        +--SAPreconfiguredAction (new class)
        +--SANegotiationAction (new abstract class)
           +--IPsecAction (new abstract class)
           1 1
           +--IPsecTransportAction (new class)
           +--IPsecTunnelAction (new class)
           +--IKEAction (new abstract class)
+--FilterList
+--FilterEntryBase
  +--IPFilterEntry (new abstract class)
     +--EndpointFilterEntry (new abstract class)
        +--IPv4AddressFilterEntry (new class)
     +--IPv4RangeFilterEntry (new class)
     +--IPv4SubnetFilterEntry (new class)
     +--IPv6AddressFilterEntry (new class)
```

| | +--IPv6RangeFilterEntry (new class)
| | | |
| | +--IPv6SubnetFilterEntry (new class)
| | | |
| | +--FQDNFilterEntry (new class)

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```
+--PortFilterEntry (new class)
 | +--ProtocolFilterEntry (new class)
+--IPSOFilterEntry (new class)
+--CredentialFilterEntry (new class)
+--SAProposal (new abstract class)
  +--IKEProposal (new class)
+--IPsecProposal (new class)
+--SATransform (new abstract class)
  +--AHTransform (new class)
  +--ESPTransform (new class)
  +--IPCOMPTransform (new class)
```

The following diagram represents the inheritance hierarchy and how the IPsec policy model association classes fit into PCIM.


[unrooted]
|
+--PolicyGroupInPolicyGroup (PCIM)
| |
| +--IPsecPolicyGroupInPolicyGroup (new class)
|
+--PolicyConditionInPolicyRule (PCIM)
| |
| +--SAConditionInRule (new class)
|
+--FallbackSAActionInRule (new class)
|
+--EntriesInFilterList (new class)
|
+--ContainedProposal (new class)
|
+--IPsecContainedTransform (new class)

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<u>4</u>. Policy Classes

The IPsec policy classes represent the set of policies that are contained on a system.



- (a) IPsecPolicyGroupInPolicyGroup
- (b) RuleForIKENegotiation
- (c) RuleForIPsecNegotiation
- (d) PolicyRuleValidityPeriod (defined in [PCIM])
- (e) SAConditionInRule
- (f) SAActionInRule
- (g) FallbackSAActionInRule

4.1. The Class IPsecPolicyGroup

The class IPsecPolicyGroup serves as a container of either other IPsecPolicyGroups or a set of IKERules and a set of IPsecRules. Rules contained within an IPsecPolicyGroup MUST have a unique Priority value. The class definition for IPsecPolicyGroup is as follows:

| NAME | IPsecPolicyGroup |
|-------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Either a set of IPsecPolicyGroups or a set of IKERules |
| | and a set of IPsecRules. |

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|--------|----------------------|----------|
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DERIVED FROM PolicyGroup (see [PCIM]) ABSTRACT FALSE PROPERTIES PolicyGroupName (from PolicyGroup) IKERuleOverridePoint IPsecRuleOverridePoint

NOTE: for derivations of the schema that are used for policy distribution to an IPsec device (for example, COPS-PR), the server may follow all of IPsecPolicyGroupInPolicyGroup associations and create one policy group which is simply a set of all of the IKE rules and a set of all of the IPsec rules. See the section on the IPsecPolicyGroupInPolicyGroup aggregation for information on merging multiple IPsecPolicyGroups.

<u>4.1.1</u>. The Property IKERuleOverridePoint

This property specifies the rule priority at which the policy author is willing to allow IKERule insertions by a local administrator. For example, the IT department may define the policy on a companywide basis, but allow groups or individuals to insert rules into the policy to override defaults. Rules are ordered in decreasing order of their priority (i.e., higher priorities come first). The override point specifies that if rules are inserted, they are to be inserted before all rules equal to or less than the override priority value.

For example, assume that there is a group G1 with IKE rules as follows:

G1 = { Rule A (priority 50), Rule B (priority 25), Rule C (priority 15) }

The IKE override value for G1 is 20. Now assume that a local administrator wants to insert a set of IKE rules {Rule D, Rule E} where Rule D has a higher priority than Rule E. The new rules will be added before rules in G1 with priority equal to or less than 20. So, when evaluating rules, the order of evaluation would be A, B, D, E, C. Note that the priority of the rules in override set are relative only to the set.

The property is defined as follows:

NAME IKERuleOverridePoint DESCRIPTION Specifies the rule priority at which the policy author is willing to allow IKERule insertions by a local administrator. SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer

<u>4.1.2</u>. The Property IPsecRuleOverridePoint

This property specifies the rule priority at which the policy author is willing to allow IPsecRule insertions by a local administrator.

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This property is the same as IKERuleOverridePoint except it is used for the IPsec rules in the IPsecPolicyGroup. The property is defined as follows:

NAME IPsecRuleOverridePoint DESCRIPTION Specifies the rule priority at which the policy author is willing to allow IPsecRule insertions by a local administrator. SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer

4.2. The Class SARule

The class SARule serves as a base class for IKERule and IPsecRule. Even though the class is concrete, it MUST not be instantiated. It defines a common connection point for associations to conditions and actions for both types of rules. Each SARule within a given IPsecPolicyGroup must contain a unique priority. Through its derivation from PolicyRule, an SARule (and therefore IKERule and IPsecRule) also has the PolicyRuleValidityPeriod association. The class definition for SARule is as follows:

NAME SARule DESCRIPTION A base class for IKERule and IPsecRule. DERIVED FROM PolicyRule (see [PCIM]) ABSTRACT FALSE PROPERTIES PolicyRuleName (from PolicyRule) Enabled (from PolicyRule) ConditionListType (from PolicyRule) Priority (from PolicyRule) PolicyRoles (from PolicyRule)

4.3. The Class IKERule

The class IKERule associates Conditions and Actions for IKE phase 1 negotiations. The class definition for IKERule is as follows:

NAME IKERule DESCRIPTION Associates Conditions and Actions for IKE phase 1 negotiations. DERIVED FROM SARule ABSTRACT FALSE PROPERTIES same as SARule

4.4. The Class IPsecRule

The class IPsecRule associates Conditions and Actions for IKE phase 2 negotiations for the IPsec DOI. The class definition for IPsecRule is as follows:

NAME IKERule DESCRIPTION Associates Conditions and Actions for IKE phase 2 negotiations for the IPsec DOI. DERIVED FROM SARule

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ABSTRACT FALSE PROPERTIES same as SARule

4.5. The Aggregation Class IPsecPolicyGroupInPolicyGroup

The class IPsecPolicyGroupInPolicyGroup allows multiple IPsec policies to be combined to into one effective policy. When merging policies, rule priorities are used in conjunction with the rule override point values to determine insertion points and for rule priority renumbering (if necessary to maintain uniqueness). The class definition for IPsecPolicyGroupInPolicyGroup is as follows:

| NAME | IPsecPolicyGroupInPolicyGroup |
|--------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Associates a nested IPsecPolicyGroup with the |
| | IPsecPolicyGroup that contains it. |
| DERIVED FROM | PolicyGroupInPolicyGroup (see [<u>PCIM</u>]) |
| ABSTRACT | FALSE |
| PROPERTIES | ContainingGroup[ref IPsecPolicyGroup[0n]] |
| | ContainedGroup[ref IPsecPolicyGroup[0n]] |
| | Precedence |

4.5.1. The Reference ContainingGroup

The property ContainingGroup is inherited from PolicyGroupInPolicyGroup and is overridden to contain object reference to an IPsecPolicyGroup that contains one or more IPsecPolicyGroups. The [0..n] cardinality indicates that there may be zero or more IPsecPolicyGroups that contain any given IPsecPolicyGroup.

<u>4.5.2</u>. The Reference ContainedGroup

The property ContainedGroup is inherited from PolicyGroupInPolicyGroup and is overridden to contain an object reference to an IPsecPolicyGroup contained by one or more IPsecPolicyGroups. The [0..n] cardinality indicates that an IPsecPolicyGroup may contain zero or more IPsecPolicyGroups.

4.5.3. The Property Precedence

The property Precedence specifies the merge ordering of the nested IPsecPolicyGroups. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | Precedence |
|-------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the merge ordering of the nested |
| | IPsecPolicyGroups. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer |
| VALUE | Any value between 1 and 2^16-1 inclusive. Lower values |
| | have higher precedence (i.e., 1 is the highest |
| | |

precedence). The merging order of two ContainedGroups with the same precedence is undefined.

<u>4.6</u>. The Composition Class RuleForIKENegotiation

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The class RuleForIKENegotiation associates an IKERule with the IPsecPolicyGroup that contains it. The class definition for RuleForIKENegotiation is as follows:

| NAME | RuleForIKENegotiation |
|-------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Associates an IKERule with the IPsecPolicyGroup that |
| | contains it. |
| ABSTRACT | FALSE |
| PROPERTIES | ContainingGroup [ref IPsecPolicyGroup [11]] |
| | ContainedRule [ref IKERule [<u>0n</u>]] |

<u>4.6.1</u>. The Reference ContainingGroup

The property ContainingGroup contains an object reference to an IPsecPolicyGroup that contains one or more IKERules. The [1..1] cardinality indicates that an IKERule may be contained in only one IPsecPolicyGroup (i.e., IKERules are not shared across IPsecPolicyGroups).

<u>4.6.2</u>. The Reference ContainedRule

The property ContainedRule contains an object reference to an IKERule contained by an IPsecPolicyGroup. The $[\underline{0..n}]$ cardinality indicates that an IPsecPolicyGroup may contain zero or more IKERules.

4.7. The Composition Class RuleForIPsecNegotiation

The class RuleForIPsecNegotiation associates an IPsecRule with the IPsecPolicyGroup that contains it. The class definition for RuleForIPsecNegotiation is as follows:

| NAME | RuleForIPsecNegotiation |
|-------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Associates an IPsecRule with the IPsecPolicyGroup that |
| | contains it. |
| ABSTRACT | FALSE |
| PROPERTIES | ContainingGroup [ref IPsecPolicyGroup [11]] |
| | ContainedRule [ref IPsecRule [<u>0n</u>]] |

<u>4.7.1</u>. The Reference ContainingGroup

The property ContainingGroup contains an object reference to an IPsecPolicyGroup that contains one or more IPsecRules. The [1..1] cardinality indicates that an IPsecRule may be contained in only one IPsecPolicyGroup (i.e., IPsecRules are not shared across IPsecPolicyGroups).

<u>4.7.2</u>. The Reference ContainedRule

The property ContainedRule contains an object reference to an IPsecRule contained by an IPsecPolicyGroup. The [0..n] cardinality

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indicates that an IPsecPolicyGroup may contain zero or more IPsecRules.

4.8. The Aggregation Class SAConditionInRule

The class SAConditionInRule associates an SARule with the SACondition instances that trigger it. See [PCIM] for the usage for the properties GroupNumber and ConditionNegated. The class definition for SAConditionInRule is as follows:

| NAME | SAConditionInRule |
|--------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Associates an SARule with the SACondition instances |
| | that trigger it. |
| DERIVED FROM | PolicyConditionInPolicyRule (see [<u>PCIM</u>]) |
| ABSTRACT | FALSE |
| PROPERTIES | ContainingRule [ref SARule [<u>0n]</u>] |
| | ContainedCondition [ref SACondition [<u>0n</u>]] |
| | GroupNumber (from PolicyConditionInPolicyRule) |
| | ConditionNegated (from PolicyConditionInPolicyRule) |
| | SequenceNumber |

4.8.1. The Reference ContainingRule

The property ContainingRule is inherited from PolicyConditionInPolicyRule and is overridden to contain an object reference to an SARule that contains one or more SAConditions. The [0..n] cardinality indicates that an SACondition may be contained in zero or more SARules.

4.8.2. The Reference ContainedCondition

The property ContainedCondition is inherited from PolicyConditionInPolicyRule and is overridden to contain an object reference to an SACondition that is contained by an SARule. The [0..n] cardinality indicates that an SARule may contain zero or more SAConditions.

4.8.3. The Property SequenceNumber

The property SequenceNumber specifies, for a given rule, the order in which the SACondition instances will be evaluated. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | SequenceNumber |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the evaluation order of the SAConditions. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer |
| VALUE | Lower valued SAConditions are evaluated first. The |
| | order of evaluation of ContainedConditions with the |
| | same SeguenceNumber value is undefined. |

<u>4.9</u>. The Aggregation Class SAActionInRule

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|----------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|----------------|
| | | | |
| The SAAction | InRule class associates | an SARule with | its primary |
| SAAction. T | ne class definition for | SAActionInRule | is as follows: |
| | | | |
| NAME | SAActionInRule | | |
| DESCRIPTION | Associates an SARule w | ith its primary | SAAction. |
| DERIVED FROM | PolicyActionInPolicyRu | le (see [<u>PCIM</u>]) | |
| ABSTRACT | FALSE | | |
| PROPERTIES | ContainingRule [ref SAM | Rule [<u>0n</u>]] | |
| | ContainedAction [ref S/ | AAction [11]] | |
| | | | |

<u>4.9.1</u>. The Reference ContainingRule

The property ContainingRule is inherited from PolicyActionInPolicyRule and is overridden to contain an object reference to an SARule that contains an SAAction. The [0..n] cardinality indicates that an SAAction may be contained in zero or more SARules.

<u>4.9.2</u>. The Reference ContainedAction

The property ContainedAction is inherited from PolicyActionInPolicyRule and is overridden to contain an object reference to an SAAction that is contained by an SARule. The [1..1] cardinality indicates that an SARule may contain only one SAAction.

4.10. The Aggregation Class FallbackSAActionInRule

The class FallbackSAActionInRule associates an SARule with its ordered set of fallback actions. Fallback actions allow an administrator to define what action is to be take if the SAAction referenced by SAActionInRule fails for any reason. The class definition for FallbackSAActionInRule is as follows:

| NAME | FallbackSAActionInRule |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Associates an SARule with the ordered set of fallback |
| | actions that should be attempted/applied in the case of |
| | failure of the primary SAAction. |
| ABSTRACT | FALSE |
| PROPERTIES | ContainingRule [ref SARule [<u>0n</u>]] |
| | ContaintedAction [ref SAAction [<u>0n</u>]] |
| | SequenceNumber |

<u>4.10.1</u>. The Reference ContainingRule

The property ContainingRule contains an object reference to an SARule that contains one or more fallback SAActions. The [0..n] cardinality indicates that an fallback SAAction may be contained in zero or more SARules.

<u>4.10.2</u>. The Reference ContainedAction

The property ContainedAction contains an object reference to a fallback SAAction that is contained by one or more SARules. The

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[0..n] cardinality indicates that an SARule may contain zero or more fallback SAActions.

<u>4.10.3</u>. The Property SequenceNumber

The property SequenceNumber specifies, for a given rule, the order in which the fallback SAActions should be attempted. Once a fallback SAAction is successfully applied, then subsequent fallback SAActions should be ignored. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | SequenceNumber |
|-------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the order of attempted application for the |
| | fallback SAAction. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer |
| VALUE | Lower valued fallback SAActions are attempted first. |
| | The order of attempt of ContainedActions with the same |
| | SequenceNumber value is undefined. |


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5. Condition and Filter Classes

The IPsec condition and filter classes are used to build the "if" part of the IKE and IPsec rules.

+----+* 0..1+-----+1 *+----+ | SACondition |o-----| FilterList |x-----| [FilterEntryBase] | +----+ (a) +----++ (b) +-----++ Λ [[IPFilterEntry] | | [IPSOFilterEntry] | | CredentialFilterEntry | Λ Λ +----+ | | +-----+ | +-| ClassificationLevelFilterEntry | | | +----+ | | +-----+ | +-| ProtectionAuthorityFilterEntry | +----+ -----+ ----+ +----+ | [EndpointFilterEntry] | |ProtocolFilterEntry | +----+ +----+ Λ +----+ | | UDPFilterEntry |--+ +----+ +----+ | +----+ +----+ | FQDNFilterEntry |----+ | TCPFilterEntry |--+ +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ | IPv4AddressFilterEntry |----+ IPv6AddressFilterEntry | +----+ +----+ +----+ +----+ | IPv4RangeFilterEntry |----+ IPv6RangeFilterEntry | +-----+ | +-----+



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- (a) FilterOfSACondition
- (b) EntriesInFilterList

<u>5.1</u>. The Class SACondition

The class SACondition defines the preconditions for IKE and IPsec negotiations. The class definition for SACondition is as follows:

NAME SACondition DESCRIPTION Defines the preconditions for IKE and IPsec negotiations. DERIVED FROM PolicyCondition (see [PCIM]) ABSTRACT FALSE PROPERTIES PolicyConditionName (from PolicyCondition) StartupCondition

<u>5.1.1</u>. The Property StartupCondition

This property specifies the triggering event that caused the rule evaluation. The property is defined as follows:

NAME StartupCondition DESCRIPTION Specifies the triggering event that cause the rule to be evaluated. unsigned 16-bit integer SYNTAX 1 (OnBoot) - the rule is triggered after system boot. VALUE The FilterList associated with the SACondition contains the information that will be used to build the selectors. 2 (OnManual) - the rule is triggered manually in response to user input. The FilterList associated with the SACondition contains the information that will be used to build the selectors. 3 (OnDataTraffic) - the rule is triggered when packets without associated security associations are sent or received (traffic directionality is indicated by the Direction field of the associated FilterList). 4 (OnIKEMessage) - the rule is triggered when an incoming request for IKE negotiation is received.

5.2. The Class FilterList

The class FilterList aggregates an ANDed set of filters that are used for determining when an SACondition evaluates to true and therefore its associated SAAction should be performed. The class definition for FilterList is as follows:

NAME FilterList DESCRIPTION Aggregates a set of filters for condition matching. ABSTRACT FALSE PROPERTIES Name Direction

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5.2.1. The Property Name

This property specifies a user-friendly name for the FilterList. The property is defined as follows:

NAME Name DESCRIPTION Specifies the user-friendly name for the FilterList. SYNTAX string

5.2.2. The Property Direction

This property specifies whether or the FilterList will be used on incoming, outgoing, or bi-directional traffic. Direction is only useful for filter types that inspect traffic parameters and when the StartupCondition property in the SACondition is set to OnDataTraffic (3). The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | Direction |
|-------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies what kind of traffic will be checked - |
| | incoming, outgoing, or bi-directional. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer |
| VALUE | 1 - Incoming |
| | 2 - Outgoing |
| | 3 - Bi-directional |

5.3. The Abstract Class FilterEntryBase

The abstract class FilterEntryBase serves as the base class for the specific filter class. The class definition for FilterEntryBase is as follows:

NAME FilterEntryBase DESCRIPTION Serves as the base class for specific filter classes. ABSTRACT TRUE PROPERTIES Name IsNegated

5.3.1. The Property Name

This property specifies a user-friendly name for the filter. The property is defined as follows:

NAME Name DESCRIPTION Specifies the user-friendly name for the filter. SYNTAX string

<u>5.3.2</u>. The Property IsNegated

This property specifies whether or not the result of the boolean

result of the filter evaluation should be negated. The property is defined as follows:

NAME IsNegated

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| | | | | | | |

| DESCRIPTION | Specifies whether or not to negate the result of the |
|-------------|--|
| | evaluation of the filter. |
| SYNTAX | boolean |
| VALUE | A value of true means that the boolean result of the |
| | filter evaluation of the filter will be negated. A |
| | value of false means that the boolean result of the |
| | evaluation of the filter will not be altered. |

5.4. The Abstract Class IPFilterEntry

The abstract class IPFilterEntry serves as a base class for filter entries which are used to match against the 5-tuple (i.e., source and destination address, protocol, and source and destination port) information in the IP packet. The class definition for IPFilterEntry is as follows:

NAME IPFilterEntry DESCRIPTION Serves as the base class for IP 5-tuple filters. DERIVED FROM FilterEntryBase ABSTRACT TRUE

<u>5.5</u>. The Abstract Class EndpointFilterEntry

The abstract class EndpointFilterEntry serves as a base class for filters which match against IP addresses (source or destination). The class definition for EndpointFilterEntry is as follows:

<u>5.5.1</u>. The Property ApplyToDestination

This property specifies whether or not the address to test against is the source or the destination IP address. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | ApplyToDestination |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies which IP address to test, source or |
| | destination. |
| SYNTAX | boolean |
| VALUE | A value of true means that the destination IP address |
| | should be tested against. A value of false means that |
| | the source IP address should be tested against. |

<u>5.6</u>. The Class IPv4AddressFilterEntry

The class IPv4AddressFilterEntry specifies a filter that will match against a single IPv4 address. The class definition for IPv4AddressFilterEntry is as follows:

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NAME IPv4AddressFilterEntry DESCRIPTION Defines the match filter for an IPv4 address. DERIVED FROM EndpointFilterEntry ABSTRACT FALSE PROPERTIES Address

<u>5.6.1</u>. The Property Address

This property specifies the IPv4 address that will be used in the equality test. The property is defined as follows:

NAMEAddressDESCRIPTIONSpecifies the IPv4 address to match against.SYNTAXunsigned 32-bit integer

5.7. The Class IPv4RangeFilterEntry

The class IPv4RangeFilterEntry specifies a filter for testing if an IPv4 address is between the start address and end address inclusively. The class definition for IPv4RangeFilterEntry is as follows:

| NAME | IPv4RangeFilterEntry |
|--------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Defines the match filter for an IPv4 address range. |
| DERIVED FROM | EndpointFilterEntry |
| ABSTRACT | FALSE |
| PROPERTIES | StartAddress |
| | EndAddress |

5.7.1. The Property StartAddress

This property specifies the first IPv4 address in the address range. The property is defined as follows:

NAME StartAddress DESCRIPTION Specifies the start of the IPv4 address range. SYNTAX unsigned 32-bit integer

5.7.2. The Property EndAddress

This property specifies the last IPv4 address in the address range. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | EndAddress |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the end of the IPv4 address. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 32-bit integer |
| VALUE | EndAddress must be greater than or equal to |
| | StartAddress. |

<u>5.8</u>. The Class IPv4SubnetFilterEntry

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The class IPv4SubnetFilterEntry specifies a filter for testing if an IPv4 address is in the specified subnet. The class definition for IPv4SubnetFilterEntry is as follows:

NAME IPv4SubnetFilterEntry DESCRIPTION Defines the match filter for an IPv4 subnet. DERIVED FROM EndpointFilterEntry ABSTRACT FALSE PROPERTIES Address Mask

5.8.1. The Property Address

This property specifies the IPv4 subnet. The property is defined as follows:

NAME Address DESCRIPTION Specifies the IPv4 subnet. SYNTAX unsigned 32-bit integer

5.8.2. The Property Mask

This property specifies the IPv4 mask. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | Mask |
|-------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the IPv4 mask. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 32-bit integer |
| VALUE | A special value of 0.0.0.0, coupled with an Address |
| | value of 0.0.0.0 can be used to specify all addresses. |

5.9. The Class IPv6AddressFilterEntry

The class IPv6AddressFilterEntry specifies a filter that will match against a single IPv6 address. The class definition for IPv6AddressFilterEntry is as follows:

NAME IPv6AddressFilterEntry DESCRIPTION Defines the match filter for an IPv4 address. DERIVED FROM EndpointFilterEntry ABSTRACT FALSE PROPERTIES Address

5.9.1. The Property Address

This property specifies the IPv6 address that will be used in the equality test. The property is defined as follows:

NAME Address

DESCRIPTION Specifies the IPv6 address to match against. SYNTAX byte[16]

5.10. The Class IPv6RangeFilterEntry

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The class IPv6RangeFilterEntry specifies a filter for testing if an IPv6 address is between the start address and end address inclusively. The class definition for IPv6RangeFilterEntry is as follows:

NAME IPv6RangeFilterEntry DESCRIPTION Defines the match filter for an IPv6 address range. DERIVED FROM EndpointFilterEntry ABSTRACT FALSE PROPERTIES StartAddress EndAddress

5.10.1. The Property StartAddress

This property specifies the first IPv6 address in the address range. The property is defined as follows:

NAME StartAddress DESCRIPTION Specifies the start of the IPv6 address range. SYNTAX byte[16]

5.10.2. The Property EndAddress

This property specifies the last IPv6 address in the address range. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | EndAddress |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the end of the IPv6 address. |
| SYNTAX | byte[16] |
| VALUE | EndAddress must be greater than or equal to |
| | StartAddress. |

5.11. The Class IPv6SubnetFilterEntry

The class IPv6SubnetFilterEntry specifies a filter for testing if an IPv6 address is in the specified subnet. The class definition for IPv4SubnetFilterEntry is as follows:

NAME IPv6SubnetFilterEntry DESCRIPTION Defines the match filter for an IPv6 subnet. DERIVED FROM EndpointFilterEntry ABSTRACT FALSE PROPERTIES Address Mask

5.11.1. The Property Address

This property specifies the IPv6 subnet. The property is defined as

follows:

NAME Address DESCRIPTION Specifies the IPv6 subnet.

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SYNTAX byte[16]

5.11.2. The Property Mask

This property specifies the IPv6 mask. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | Mask |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the IPv6 mask. |
| SYNTAX | byte[16] |
| VALUE | A special value of 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0; |
| | coupled with an Address value of |
| | 0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0 can be used to specify |
| | all addresses. |

5.12. The Class FQDNFilterEntry

The class FQDNFilterEntry specifies a filter for mathcing against a single or wild-carded DNS name. The class definition for FQDNFilterEntry is as follows:

NAME FQDNFilterEntry DESCRIPTION Defines the match filter for a DNS name. DERIVED FROM EndpointFilterEntry ABSTRACT FALSE PROPERTIES Name

5.12.1. The Property Name

This property specifies the DNS name to match against. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | Address |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the DNS name. |
| SYNTAX | string |
| VALUE | The DNS name can be fully qualified (for example, |
| | <pre>foo.intel.com) or partially qualified (*.intel.com).</pre> |

5.13. The Class ProtocolFilterEntry

The class ProtocolFilterEntry specifies a filter for testing against an IP protocol. The class definition for ProtocolFilterEntry is as follows:

NAME ProtocolFilterEntry DESCRIPTION Defines a match filter for IP protocol. DERIVED FROM IPFilterEntry ABSTRACT FALSE PROPERTIES Protocol

<u>5.13.1</u>. The Property Protocol

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|----------------|------------------------|-------------|-----------|
| | | | |

This property specifies the IP protocol to match against. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | Protocol | |
|-------------|---|-----|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the IP protocol. | |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 8-bit integer | |
| VALUE | A value of zero matches against any protocol. | Any |
| | other value is the IP protocol number. | |

5.14. The Class UDPFilterEntry

The class UDPFilterEntry specifies a filter for testing if a UDP port is between the start port and end port inclusively. It is assumed that the Protocol property from the ProtocolFilterEntry class will contain the value 17 (i.e., UDP). The class definition for UDPFilterEntry is as follows:

NAME UDPFilterEntry DESCRIPTION Defines the match filter for a UDP port range. DERIVED FROM ProtocolFilterEntry ABSTRACT FALSE PROPERTIES StartPort EndPort

<u>5.14.1</u>. The Property StartPort

This property specifies the first port in the UDP port range. The property is defined as follows:

NAME StartPort DESCRIPTION Specifies the start of the UDP port range. SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer

5.14.2. The Property EndPort

This property specifies the last port in the UDP port range. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | EndPort |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the end of the UDP port range. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer |
| VALUE | EndPort must be greater than or equal to StartPort. |

5.15. The Class TCPFilterEntry

The class TCPFilterEntry specifies a filter for testing if a TCP port is between the start port and end port inclusively. It is assumed that the Protocol property from the ProtocolFilterEntry class will contain the value 6 (i.e., TCP). The class definition

for TCPFilterEntry is as follows:

NAME TCPFilterEntry DESCRIPTION Defines the match filter for a TCP port range.

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DERIVED FROM ProtocolFilterEntry ABSTRACT FALSE PROPERTIES StartPort EndPort

<u>5.15.1</u>. The Property StartPort

This property specifies the first port in the TCP port range. The property is defined as follows:

NAME StartPort DESCRIPTION Specifies the start of the TCP port range. SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer

5.15.2. The Property EndPort

This property specifies the last port in the TCP port range. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | EndPort |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the end of the TCP port range. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer |
| VALUE | EndPort must be greater than or equal to StartPort. |

5.16. The Abstract Class IPSOFilterEntry

The abstract class IPSOFilterEntry serves as a base class for the IP Security Option (IPSO) filters. The class definition for IPSOFilterEntry is as follows:

NAME IPSOFilterEntry DESCRIPTION Serves as the base class for the IPSO filters. DERIVED FROM FilterEntryBase ABSTRACT TRUE

5.17. The Class ClassificationLevelFilterEntry

The class ClassificationLevelFilterEntry specifies a filter for matching against the classification level IPSO field type. The class definition for ClassificationLevelFilterEntry is as follows:

NAME ClassificationLevelFilterEntry DESCRIPTION Defines the filter for the IPSO classification level. DERIVED FROM IPSOFilterEntry ABSTRACT FALSE PROPERTIES Level

5.17.1. The Property Level

This property specifies the classification level to match against. The property is defined as follows:

NAME Level

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| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the classification level. |
|-------------|-------------------------------------|
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer |
| VALUE | 61 - Top Secret |
| | 90 - Secret |
| | 150 - Confidential |
| | 171 - Unclassified |
| | |

5.18. The Class ProtectionAuthorityFilterEntry

The class ProtectionAuthorityFilterEntry specifies a filter for matching against the protection authority IPSO field type. The class definition for ProtectionAuthorityFilterEntry is as follows:

NAME ProtectionAuthorityFilterEntry DESCRIPTION Defines the filter for the IPSO protection authority. DERIVED FROM IPSOFilterEntry ABSTRACT FALSE PROPERTIES Authority

<u>5.18.1</u>. The Property Authority

This property specifies the protection authority to match against. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | Authority |
|-------------|-------------------------------------|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the protection authority. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer |
| VALUE | 0 - GENSER |
| | 1 - SIOP-ESI |
| | 2 - SCI |
| | 3 - NSA |
| | 4 - DOE |
| | |

<u>5.19</u>. The Class CredentialFilterEntry

The class CredentialFilterEntry defines a filter for matching against credential information that was obtained during the IKE phase 1 negotiation. This information can be identity information (such as User FQDN) or information retrieved from credential information (for example, fields from a certificate). This information can be used as a form of access control. The class definition for CredentialFilterEntry is as follows:

5.20. The Aggregation Class FilterOfSACondition

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The class FilterOfSACondition associates an SACondition with the filter specifications (FilterList) that make up the condition. The class definition for FilterOfSACondition is as follows:

| NAME | FilterOfSACondition |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Associates a condition with the filter list that make |
| | up the individual condition elements. |
| ABSTRACT | FALSE |
| PROPERTIES | Antecedent [ref FilterList[01]] |
| | Dependent [ref SACondition [<u>0n]</u>] |

5.20.1. The Reference Antecedent

The property Antecedent contains an object reference to a FilterList that is contained in one or more SAConditions. The [0..1] cardinality indicates that an SACondition may have zero or one FilterList.

5.20.2. The Reference Dependent

The property Dependent contains an object reference to an SACondition that contains an FilterList. The [0..n] cardinality indicates that a FilterList may be contained in zero or more SAConditions.

5.21. The Composition Class EntriesInFilterList

The class EntriesInFilterList associates the individual FilterEntryBases with a FilterList. Together these individual FilterEntryBases can create complex conditions. The class definition for EntriesInFilterList is as follows:

| NAME | EntriesInFilterList |
|-------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Associates a FilterList with the set of individual |
| | filters. |
| ABSTRACT | FALSE |
| PROPERTIES | Antecedent [ref FilterEntryBase[0n]] |
| | Dependent [ref FilterList [11]] |
| | EntrySequence |

5.21.1. The Reference Antecedent

The property Antecedent contains an object reference to a FilterEntryBase that is contained in a FilterList. The [0...n]cardinality indicates that a FilterList may have zero or more FilterEntryBases.

5.21.2. The Reference Dependent

The property Dependent contains an object reference to a FilterList that contains zero or more FilterEntryBases. The [1..1] cardinality indicates that a FilterEntryBase may be contained in one and only

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one FilterLists (i.e., FilterEntryBases cannot be shared between FilterLists).

<u>5.21.3</u>. The Property EntrySequence

The property EntrySequence specifies, for a given FilterList, the order in which the filters should be checked. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | EntrySequence |
|-------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the order to check the filters in a |
| | FilterList. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer |
| VALUE | Lower valued filters are checked first. The order of |
| | checking of FilterEntryBases with the same |
| | EntrySequence value is undefined. |


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<u>6</u>. Action Classes

The action classes are used to model the different actions an IPsec device may take when the evaluation of the associated condition results in a match.



(a) ContainedProposal

6.1. The Class SAAction

The class SAAction serves as the base class for IKE and IPsec actions. Although the class is concrete, it MUST not be instantiated. The class definition for SAAction is as follows:

NAME SAAction DESCRIPTION The base class for IKE and IPsec actions. DERIVED FROM PolicyAction (see [PCIM]) ABSTRACT FALSE PROPERTIES PolicyActionName (from PolicyAction)

<u>6.2</u>. The Class SAStaticAction

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The class SAStaticAction serves as the base class for IKE and IPsec actions that do not require any negotation. Although the class is concrete, it MUST not be instantiated. The class definition for SAStaticAction is as follows:

NAME SAStaticAction
DESCRIPTION The base class for IKE and IPsec actions that do not
require any negotiation.
DERIVED FROM SAAction
ABSTRACT FALSE
PROPERTIES LifetimeSeconds

6.2.1. The Property LifetimeSeconds

The property LifetimeSeconds specifies how long the security association derived from this action should be used. The property is defined as follows:

| LifetimeSeconds |
|---|
| Specifies the amount of time (in seconds) that a |
| security association derived from this action should be |
| used. |
| unsigned 32-bit integer |
| A value of zero indicates that there is not a lifetime |
| associated with this action (i.e., infinite lifetime). |
| A nono-zero value is typically used in conjunction with |
| fallback actions performed when there is a negotiation |
| failure of some sort. |
| |

6.3. The Class IPsecBypassAction

The class IPsecBypassAction is used when packets are allowed to be processed without applying IPsec to them. This is the same as stating that packets are allowed to flow in the clear. The class definition for IPsecBypassAction is as follows:

NAME IPsecBypassAction DESCRIPTION Specifies that packets are to be allowed to pass in the clear. DERIVED FROM SAStaticAction ABSTRACT FALSE

6.4. The Class IPsecDiscardAction

The class IPsecDiscardAction is used when packets are to be discarded. This is the same as stating that packets are to be denied. The class definition for IPsecDiscardAction is as follows:

NAME IPsecDiscardAction

DESCRIPTION Specifies that packets are to be discarded. DERIVED FROM SAStaticAction ABSTRACT FALSE PROPERTIES DoLogging

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<u>6.4.1</u>. The Property DoLogging

The property DoLogging specifies whether or not an audit message should be logged when a packet is discarded. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | DoLogging |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies if an audit message should be logged when a |
| | packet is discarded. |
| SYNTAX | boolean |
| VALUE | A value of true indicates that logging should be done |
| | for this action. A value of false indicates logging |
| | should not be done for this action. |

<u>6.5</u>. The Class IKERejectAction

The class IKERejectAction is used to prevent attempting an IKE negotiation with the peer(s). The class definition for IKERejectAction is as follows:

| NAME | IKERejectAction |
|--------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies that an IKE negotiation should not even be |
| | attempted. |
| DERIVED FROM | SAStaticAction |
| ABSTRACT | FALSE |
| PROPERTIES | DoLogging |

<u>6.5.1</u>. The Property DoLogging

The property DoLogging specifies whether or not an audit message should be logged when a determination is made to prevent an IKE negotiation. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | DoLogging |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies if an audit message should be logged when IKE |
| | negotiation is prohibited. |
| SYNTAX | boolean |
| VALUE | A value of true indicates that logging should be done |
| | for this action. A value of false indicates logging |
| | should not be done for this action. |

6.6. The Class SAPreconfiguredAction

The class SAPreconfiguredAction is used to create a security association using preconfigured, hard-wired algorithms and keys. The class definition for SAPreconfiguredAction is as follows:

NAME SAPreconfiguredAction

| Specifies preconfigured algorithm and keying |
|---|
| information for creation of a security association. |
| SAStaticAction |
| FALSE |
| |

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PROPERTIES To Be Determined...

<u>6.7</u>. The Class SANegotiationAction

The class SANegotiationAction serves as the base class for IKE and IPsec actions which result in a IKE negotiation. Although the class is concrete, is MUST not be instantiated. The class definition for SANegotiationAction is as follows:

| SANegotiationAction |
|--|
| A base class for IKE and IPsec actions that specifies |
| the parameters that are common for IKE phase 1 and IKE |
| phase 2 IPsec DOI negotiations. |
| SAAction |
| FALSE |
| MinLifetimeSeconds |
| MinLifetimeKilobytes |
| RefreshThresholdSeconds |
| RefreshThresholdKilobytes |
| IdleDurationSeconds |
| |

6.7.1. The Property MinLifetimeSeconds

The property MinLifetimeSeconds specifies the minimum seconds lifetime that will be accepted from the peer. MinLifetimeSeconds is used to prevent certain denial of service attacks where the peer requests an arbitrarily low lifetime value, causing renegotiations with correspondingly expensive Diffie-Hellman operations. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | MinLifetimeSeconds |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the minimum acceptable seconds lifetime. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 32-bit integer |
| VALUE | A value of zero indicates that there is no minimum |
| | value. A non-zero value specifies the minimum seconds |
| | lifetime. |

6.7.2. The Property MinLifetimeKilobytes

The property MinLifetimeKilobytes specifies the minimum kilobyte lifetime that will be accepted from the peer. MinLifetimeKilobytes is used to prevent certain denial of service attacks where the peer requests an arbitrarily low lifetime value, causing renegotiations with correspondingly expensive Diffie-Hellman operations. The property is defined as follows:

NAME MinLifetimeKilobytes DESCRIPTION Specifies the minimum acceptable kilobyte lifetime. SYNTAX unsigned 32-bit integer

| VALUE | A value of zero indicates that there is no minimum |
|-------|--|
| | value. A non-zero value specifies the minimum kilobyte |
| | lifetime. |

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6.7.3. The Property RefreshThresholdSeconds

The property RefreshThresholdSeconds specifies what percentage of the seconds lifetime can expire before IKE should attempt to renegotiate the IPsec security association. A random value may be added to the calculated threshold (percentage x seconds lifetime) to reduce the chance of both peers attempting to renegotiate at the same time. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME DESCRIPTION | RefreshThresholdSeconds Specifies the percentage of seconds lifetime that has expired before the IPsec security association is |
|---------------------|--|
| | renegotiated. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 8-bit integer |
| VALUE | A value between 1 and 100 representing a percentage. A |
| | value of 100 indicates that the IPsec security |
| | association should not be renegotiated until the |

seconds lifetime has been reached.

6.7.4. The Property RefreshThresholdKilobytes

The property RefreshThresholdKilobytes specifies what percentage of the kilobyte lifetime can expire before IKE should attempt to renegotiate the IPsec security association. A random value may be added to the calculated threshold (percentage x kilobyte lifetime) to reduce the chance of both peers attempting to renegotiate at the same time. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | RefreshThresholdKilobytes |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the percentage of kilobyte lifetime that has expired before the IPsec security association is renegotiated. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 8-bit integer |
| | 6 |
| VALUE | A value between 1 and 100 representing a percentage. A |
| | value of 100 indicates that the IPsec security |
| | association should not be renegotiated until the kilobyte lifetime has been reached. |
| | |

6.7.5. The Property IdleDurationSeconds

The property IdleDurationSeconds specifies how many seconds a security association may remain idle (i.e., no traffic protected using the security association) before it is deleted. The property is defined as follows:

NAME IdleDurationSeconds DESCRIPTION Specifies how long, in seconds, a security association may remain unused before it is deleted.

| SYNTAX | unsigned 32-bit integer |
|--------|--|
| VALUE | A value of zero indicates that idle detection should |
| | not be used for the security association. Any non-zero |

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value indicates the number of seconds the security association may remain unused.

6.8. The Class IPsecAction

The class IPsecAction serves as the base class for IPsec transport and tunnel actions. It specifies the parameters used for an IKE phase 2 IPsec DOI negotiation. Although the class is concrete, is MUST not be instantiated. The class definition for IPsecAction is as follows:

NAME IPsecAction

 DESCRIPTION
 A base class for IPsec transport and tunnel actions

 that specifies the parameters for IKE phase 2 IPsec DOI

 negotiations.

 DERIVED FROM

 SANegotiationAction

 ABSTRACT

 FALSE

 PROPERTIES

 UseIKEGroup

 GroupId

 Granularity

6.8.1. The Property UsePFS

The property UsePFS specifies whether or not perfect forward secrecy should be used when refreshing keys. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | UsePFS |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the whether or not to use PFS. |
| SYNTAX | boolean |
| VALUE | A value of true indicates that PFS should be used. A |
| | value of false indicates that PFS should not be used. |

6.8.2. The Property UseIKEGroup

The property UseIKEGroup specifies whether or not phase 2 should use the same Diffie-Hellman as was used in phase 1. UseIKEGroup is ignored if UsePFS is false. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | UseIKEGroup |
|-------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies whether or not to use the same GroupId for |
| | phase 2 as was used in phase 1. If UsePFS is false, |
| | then UseIKEGroup is ignored. |
| SYNTAX | boolean |
| VALUE | A value of true indicates that the phase 2 GroupId |
| | should be the same as phase 1. A value of false |
| | indicates that the property GroupId will contain the |
| | Diffie-Hellman group to use for phase 2. |

<u>6.8.3</u>. The Property GroupId

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The property GroupId specifies the Diffie-Hellman group to use for phase 2. GroupId is ignored if (1) the property UsePFS is false, or (2) the property UsePFS is true and the property UseIKEGroup is true. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | GroupId |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the Diffie-Hellman group to use for phase 2 |
| | when the property UsePFS is true and the property |
| | UseIKEGroup is false. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer |
| VALUE | 1 - 768-bit MODP group |
| | 2 - 1024-bit MODP group |
| | 3 - EC2N group on GP[2^155] |
| | 4 - EC2N group on GP[2^185] |
| | 5 - 1536-bit MODP group |

<u>6.8.4</u>. The Property Granularity

The property Granularity specifies whether the proposed selector for the security association should be derived from the traffic that triggered the negotiation (Narrow) or from the FilterList of the Condition(s) that matched the rule (Wide). The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | Granularity |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the how the proposed selector for the |
| | security association will be created. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 8-bit integer |
| VALUE | 1 - The selector is created by using the FilterList |
| | information from the condition that matched the traffic |
| | parameters. This is called a Wide selector as it could |
| | for instance contain a IP subnet or range. |
| | 2 - The selector is created by using the traffic |
| | parameters (i.e., the 5-tuple of the traffic). This is |
| | called a Narrow selector. |

6.9. The Class IPsecTransportAction

The class IPsecTransportAction is a subclass of IPsecAction that is used to specify use of an IPsec transport mode security association. The class definition for IPsecTransportAction is as follows:

NAME IPsecTransportAction DESCRIPTION Specifies that an IPsec transport mode security association should be negotiated. DERIVED FROM IPsecAction ABSTRACT FALSE

<u>6.10</u>. The Class IPsecTunnelAction

The class IPsecTunnelAction is a subclass of IPsecAction that is used to specify use of an IPsec tunnel mode security association. The class definition for IPsecTunnelAction is as follows:

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| NAME | IPsecTunnelAction |
|--------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies that an IPsec tunnel mode security |
| | association should be negotiated. |
| DERIVED FROM | IPsecAction |
| ABSTRACT | FALSE |
| PROPERTIES | PeerGateway |
| | DFHandling |
| | |

<u>6.10.1</u>. The Property PeerGateway

The property PeerGateway specifies the IP address or DNS name of the peer gateway. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | PeerGateway |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies peer gateway's IP address or DNS name. |
| SYNTAX | string |
| VALUE | Either (1) IPv4 address in dotted quad format, (2) IPv6 |
| | address in format, or (3) a DNS name. |

6.10.2. The Property DFHandling

The property DFHandling specifies how the Don't Fragment (DF) bit should be managed by the tunnel. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | DFHandling |
|-------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the DF bit is managed by the tunnel. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 8-bit integer |
| VALUE | 1 - DF bit is copied. |
| | 2 - DF bit is set. |
| | 3 - DF bit is cleared. |

6.11. The Class IKEAction

The class IKEAction specifies the parameters that are to be used for IKE phase 1 negotiation. The class definition for IKEAction is as follows:

| NAME | IKEAction |
|--------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the IKE phase 1 negotiation parameters. |
| DERIVED FROM | SANegotiationAction |
| ABSTRACT | FALSE |
| PROPERTIES | RefreshThresholdDerivedKeys |
| | ExchangeMode |
| | UseIKEIdentityType |

6.11.1. The Property RefreshThresholdDerivedKeys

The property RefreshThresholdDerivedKeys specifies what percentage of the derived key limit (see the LifetimeDerivedKeys property of IKEProposal) can expire before IKE should attempt to renegotiate the IKE phase 1 security association. A random value may be added to

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the calculated threshold (percentage x derived key limit) to reduce the chance of both peers attempting to renegotiate at the same time. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | RefreshThresholdKilobytes |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the percentage of derived key limit that has expired before the IKE phase 1 security association is |
| | renegotiated. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 8-bit integer |
| VALUE | A value between 1 and 100 representing a percentage. A |
| | value of 100 indicates that the IKE phase 1 security |
| | association should not be renegotiated until the |
| | derived key limit has been reached. |

<u>6.11.2</u>. The Property ExchangeMode

The property ExchangeMode specifies which IKE mode should be used for IKE phase 1 key negotiations. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | ExchangeMode |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the IKE negotiation mode for phase 1. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer |
| VALUE | 1 - base mode |
| | 2 - main mode |
| | 4 - aggressive mode |

<u>6.11.3</u>. The Property UseIKEIdentityType

The property UseIKEIdentityType specifies what IKE identity type should be used when negotiating with the peer. This information is used in conjunction the IKE identities available on the system. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | UseIKEIdentityType |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the IKE identity to use during negotiation. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer |
| VALUE | 1 - IPv4 Address |
| | 2 - FQDN |
| | 3 - User FQDN |
| | 4 - IPv4 Subnet |
| | 5 - IPv6 Address |
| | 6 - IPv6 Subnet |
| | 7 - IPv4 Address Range |
| | 8 - IPv6 Address Range |
| | 9 - DER-Encoded ASN.1 X.500 Distinguished Name |
| | 10 - DER-Encoded ASN.1 X.500 GeneralName |
| | 11 - Key ID |
| | |

6.12. The Aggregation Class ContainedProposal

The class ContainedProposal associates an ordered list of SAProposals with the SANegotiationAction that contains it. If the

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referenced SANegotiationAction object is an IKEAction, then the referenced SAProposal object must be an IKEProposal. If the referenced SANegotiationAction object is an IPsecTransportAction or an IPsecTunnelAction, then the referenced SAProposal object must be an IPsecProposal. The class definition for ContainedProposal is as follows:

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| NAME | ContainedProposal |
|-------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Associates an ordered list of SAProposals with an |
| | SANegotiationAction. |
| ABSTRACT | FALSE |
| PROPERTIES | <pre>GroupComponent[ref SANegotiationAction[0n]]</pre> |
| | PartComponent[ref SAProposal[1n]] |
| | SequenceNumber |

6.12.1. The Reference GroupComponent

The property GroupComponent contains an object reference to an SANegotiationAction that contains one or more SAProposals. The [0..n] cardinality indicates that there may be zero or more SANegotiationActions that contain any given SAProposal.

6.12.2. The Reference PartComponent

The property PartComponent contains an object reference to an SAProposal contained by one or more SANegotiationActions. The [1..n] cardinality indicates that an SANegotiationAction MUST contain at least one SAProposal.

6.12.3. The Property SequenceNumber

The property SequenceNumber specifies the order of preference for the SAProposals. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | SequenceNumber |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the preference order for the SAProposals. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer |
| VALUE | Lower-valued proposals are preferred over proposals |
| | with higher values. If two proposals have the same |
| | SequenceNumber value, then the order of preference is |
| | undefined. |


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7. Proposal and Transform Classes

The proposal and transform classes model the proposal settings an IPsec device will use during IKE phase 1 and 2 negotiations.



(a) ContainedTransform

7.1. The Abstract Class SAProposal

The abstract class SAProposal serves as the base class for the IKE and IPsec proposal classes. It specifies the parameters that are common to the two proposal types. The class definition for SAProposal is as follows:

| NAME | SAProposal |
|-------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the common proposal parameters for IKE and |
| | IPsec security association negotiation. |
| ABSTRACT | TRUE |
| PROPERTIES | Name |
| | MaxLifetimeSeconds |
| | MaxLifetimeKilobytes |

<u>7.1.1</u>. The Property Name

The property Name specifies a user-friendly name for the SAProposal.

The property is defined as follows:

NAME Name DESCRIPTION Specifies a user-friendly name for this proposal.

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SYNTAX string

7.1.2. The Property MaxLifetimeSeconds

The property MaxLifetimeSeconds specifies the maximum amount of time, in seconds, to propose that a security association will remain valid after its creation. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | MaxLifetimeSeconds |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the maximum amount of time to propose a |
| | security association remain valid. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 32-bit integer |
| VALUE | A value of zero indicates that the default of 8 hours |
| | be used. A non-zero value indicates the maximum |
| | seconds lifetime. |

7.1.3. The Property MaxLifetimeKilobytes

The property MaxLifetimeKilobytes specifies the maximum kilobyte lifetime to propose that a security association will remain valid after its creation. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | MaxLifetimeKilobytes |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the maximum kilobyte lifetime to propose a |
| | security association remain valid. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 32-bit integer |
| VALUE | A value of zero indicates that there should be no |
| | maximum kilobyte lifetime. A non-zero value specifies |
| | the desired kilobyte lifetime. |

<u>7.2</u>. The Class IKEProposal

The class IKEProposal specifies the proposal parameters necessary to drive an IKE security association negotiation. The class definition for IKEProposal is as follows:

| NAME | IKEProposal |
|--------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the proposal parameters for IKE security |
| | association negotiation. |
| DERIVED FROM | SAProposal |
| ABSTRACT | FALSE |
| PROPERTIES | LifetimeDerivedKeys |
| | CipherAlgorithm |
| | HashAlgorithm |
| | PRFAlgorithm |
| | GroupId |
| | AuthenticationMethod |

7.2.1. The Property LifetimeDerivedKeys

The property LifetimeDerivedKeys specifies the number of times that a phase 1 key will be used to derive a phase 2 key before the phase 1 security association needs renegotiated. Even though this is not

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a parameter that is sent in an IKE proposal, it is included in the proposal as the number of keys derived may be a result of the strength of the algorithms in the IKE propsoal. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | LifetimeDerivedKeys |
|-------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the number of phase 2 keys that can be |
| | derived from the phase 1 key. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 32-bit integer |
| VALUE | A value of zero indicates that there is no limit to the |
| | number of phase 2 keys which may be derived from the phase 1 key; instead the seconds and/or kilobytes |
| | lifetime will dictate the phase 1 rekeying. A non-zero |
| | value specifies the number of phase 2 keys that can be derived from the phase 1 key. |

7.2.2. The Property CipherAlgorithm

The property CipherAlgorithm specifies the proposed phase 1 security association encryption algorithm. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | CipherAlgorithm | | | | |
|-------------|---|--|--|--|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the proposed encryption algorithm for the | | | | |
| | phase 1 security association. | | | | |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer | | | | |
| VALUE | 1 - DES-CBC | | | | |
| | 2 - IDEA-CBC | | | | |
| | 3 - Blowfish-CBC | | | | |
| | 4 - RC5-R16-B64-CBC | | | | |
| | 5 - 3DES-CBC | | | | |
| | 6 - CAST-CBC | | | | |
| | | | | | |

7.2.3. The Property HashAlgorithm

The property HashAlgorithm specifies the proposed phase 1 security assocation hash algorithm. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | HashAlgorithm |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the proposed hash algorithm for the phase 1 |
| | security association. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer |
| VALUE | 1 - MD5 |
| | 2 - SHA-1 |
| | 3 - Tiger |

7.2.4. The Property PRFAlgorithm

The property PRFAlgorithm specifies the proposed phase 1 security

association psuedo-random function. The property is defined as follows:

NAME PRFAlgorithm

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|----------------|---|------------|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the proposed psuedo-random function phase 1 security association. | on for the |

- SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer
- VALUE Currently none defined.

7.2.5. The Property GroupId

The property GroupId specifies the proposed phase 1 security assocation Diffie-Hellman group. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | GroupId |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the proposed Diffie-Hellman group for the |
| | phase 1 security association. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer |
| VALUE | 1 - 768-bit MODP group |
| | 2 - 1024-bit MODP group |
| | 3 - EC2N group on GP[2^155] |
| | 4 - EC2N group on GP[2^185] |
| | 5 - 1536-bit MODP group |

7.2.6. The Property AuthenticationMethod

The property AuthenticationMethod specifies the proposed phase 1 authentication method. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME DESCRIPTION | AuthenticationMethod Specifies the proposed authentication method for the |
|---------------------|--|
| | phase 1 security association. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer |
| VALUE | 0 - a special value which indicates that this |
| | particular proposal should be repeated once for each |
| | authentication method that corresponds to the |
| | credentials installed on the machine. For example, if |
| | the system has a pre-shared key and a certificate, a |
| | proposal list could be constructed which includes a |
| | proposal that specifies pre-shared key and proposals |
| | for any of the public-key authentication methods. |
| | 1 - Pre-shared key |
| | 2 - DSS signatures |
| | 3 - RSA signatures |
| | 4 - Encryption with RSA |
| | 5 - Revised encryption with RSA |
| | 6 - Kerberos (has this number been assigned???) |

<u>7.3</u>. The Class IPsecProposal

The class IPsecProposal adds no new properties, but inherits proposal propoerties from SAProposal as well as aggregating the

security association transforms necessary for building an IPsec proposal (see the aggregation class ContainedTransform). The class definition for IPsecProposal is as follows:

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NAME IPsecProposal DESCRIPTION Specifies the proposal parameters for IPsec security association negotiation. DERIVED FROM SAProposal ABSTRACT FALSE

7.4. The Abstract Class SATransform

The abstract class SATransform serves as the base class for the IPsec transforms that can be used to compose an IPsec proposal. The class definition for SATransform is as follows:

| NAME | SATransform |
|-------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Base class for the different IPsec transforms. |
| ABSTRACT | TRUE |
| PROPERTIES | Name |
| | VendorID |

7.4.1. The Property Name

The property Name specifies a user-friendly name for the SATransform. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | Name | | | | | |
|-------------|-------------|---------------|------|-----|------|------------|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies a | user-friendly | name | for | this | transform. |
| SYNTAX | string | | | | | |

7.4.1. The Property VendorID

The property VendorID specifies the vendor ID for vendor-defined transforms. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | VendorID |
|-------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the vendor ID for vendor-defined transforms. |
| SYNTAX | string |
| VALUE | An empty VendorID string indicates that the transform |
| | is one of the previously-defined ones. |

7.5. The Class AHTransform

The class AHTransform specifies the AH algorithm to propose during IPsec security association negotiation. The class definition for AHTransform is as follows:

NAMEAHTransformDESCRIPTIONSpecifies the AH algorithm to propose.ABSTRACTFALSEPROPERTIESAHTransformId

<u>7.5.1</u>. The Property AHTransformId

The property AHTransformId specifies the transform ID of the AH algorithm to propose. The property is defined as follows:

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AHTransformId NAME DESCRIPTION Specifies the transform ID of the AH algorithm. unsigned 16-bit integer SYNTAX VALUE 2 - MD5 3 - SHA-1 4 - DES

7.6. The Class ESPTransform

The class ESPTransform specifies the ESP algorithms to propose during IPsec security association negotiation. The class definition for ESPTransform is as follows:

| NAME | ESPTransform |
|-------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the ESP algorithms to propose. |
| ABSTRACT | FALSE |
| PROPERTIES | IntegrityTransformId |
| | CipherTransformId |
| | CipherKeyLength |
| | CipherKeyRounds |

7.6.1. The Property IntegrityTransformId

The property IntegrityTransformId specifies the transform ID of the ESP integrity algorithm to propose. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | IntegrityTransformId | | | |
|-------------|---|--|--|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the transform ID of the ESP integrity | | | |
| | algorithm. | | | |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer | | | |
| VALUE | 0 - None | | | |
| | 1 - HMAC-MD5 | | | |
| | 2 - HMAC-SHA | | | |
| | 3 - DES-MAC | | | |
| | 4 - KPDK | | | |

7.6.2. The Property CipherTransformId

The property CipherTransformId specifies the transform ID of the ESP encryption algorithm to propose. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | CipherTransformId |
|-------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the transform ID of the ESP encryption |
| | algorithm. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer |
| VALUE | 1 - DES IV64 |

- 2 DES
- 3 3DES
- 4 RC5
- 5 IDEA

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6 - CAST 7 - Blowfish 8 - 3IDEA 9 - DES IV32 10 - RC4 11 - NULL

7.6.3. The Property CipherKeyLength

The property CipherKeyLength specifies, in bits, the key length for the ESP encryption algorithm. For encryption algorithms which use fixed-length keys, this value is ignored. The property is defined as follows:

NAME CipherKeyLength DESCRIPTION Specifies the ESP encryption key length in bits. SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer

7.6.4. The Property CipherKeyRounds

The property CipherKeyRounds specifies the number of key rounds for the ESP encryption algorithm. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | CipherKeyRounds |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the number of key rounds for the ESP |
| | encryption algorithm. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer |
| VALUE | Currently, key rounds are not defined for any ESP |
| | encryption algorithms. |

7.7. The Class IPCOMPTransform

The class IPCOMPTransform specifies the IP compression (IPCOMP) algorithm to propose during IPsec security association negotiation. The class definition for IPCOMPTransform is as follows:

| NAME | IPCOMPTransform |
|-------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the IPCOMP algorithm to propose. |
| ABSTRACT | FALSE |
| PROPERTIES | Algorithm |
| | DictionarySize |
| | PrivateAlgorithm |

7.7.1. The Property Algorithm

The property Algorithm specifies the transform ID of the IPCOMP compression algorithm to propose. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | Algorithm |
|-------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the transform ID of the IPCOMP compression |
| | algorithm. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer |
| | |

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VALUE 1 - OUI (the property PrivateAlgorithm will contain the vendor-specific algorithm to use) 2 - DEFLATE 3 - LZS 4 - V42BIS (has this number been assigned ???)

7.7.2. The Property DictionarySize

The property DictionarySize specifies the log2 maximum size of the diction for the compression algorithm. For compression algorithms that have pre-defined dictionary sizes, this value is ignores. The property is defined as follows:

NAME DictionarySize DESCRIPTION Specifies the log2 maximum size of the dictionary. SYNTAX unsigned 16-bit integer

7.7.3. The Property PrivateAlgorithm

The property PrivateAlgorithm specifies a private vendor-specific compression algorithm. This value is only used when the property Algorithm is 1 (OUI). The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | PrivateAlgorithm |
|-------------|---|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies a private vendor-specific compression |
| | algorithm. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 32-bit integer |

7.8. The Aggregation Class ContainedTransform

The class ContainedTransform associates an IPsecProposal with the set of SATransforms that make up the proposal. If multiple tranforms of the same type are in a proposal, then they are to be logically ORed and the order of preference is dictated by the SequenceNumber property. Sets of transforms of different types are logically ANDed. For example, if the proposal list were

ESP = { (HMAC-MD5, DES), (HMAC-MD5, 3DES) }
AH = { MD5, SHA-1 }

then the one sending the proposal wants the other side to pick one from the ESP transform list AND one from the AH transform list. The class definition for ContainedProposal is as follows:

NAME ContainedTransform DESCRIPTION Associates an IPsecProposal with the set of SATransforms that make up the proposal. ABSTRACT FALSE

| PROPERTIES | GroupComponent[ref IPsecProposal[0n]] |
|------------|---------------------------------------|
| | PartComponent[ref SATransform[1n]] |
| | SequenceNumber |

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7.8.1. The Reference GroupComponent

The property GroupComponent contains an object reference to an IPsecProposal that contains one or more SATransforms. The [0..n] cardinality indicates that there may be zero or more IPsecProposals that contain any given SATransform.

7.8.2. The Reference PartComponent

The property PartComponent contains an object reference to an SATransform contained by one or more IPsecProposals. The [1..n] cardinality indicates that an IPsecPropsal MUST contain at least one SATransform.

7.8.3. The Property SequenceNumber

The property SequenceNumber specifies the order of preference for the SATransforms of the same type. The property is defined as follows:

| NAME | SequenceNumber |
|-------------|--|
| DESCRIPTION | Specifies the preference order for the SATransforms of |
| | the same type. |
| SYNTAX | unsigned 16-bit integer |
| VALUE | Lower-valued transforms are preferred over transforms |
| | of the same type with higher values. If two transforms |
| | of the same type have the same SequenceNumber value, |
| | then the order of preference is undefined. |

<u>8</u>. Security Considerations

This document describes a schema for IPsec policy. It does not detail security requirements for storage or delivery of said schema. Storage and delivery security requirements should be detailed in a comprehensive security policy architecture document.

9. Intellectual Property

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<u>10</u>. Acknowledgments

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